supreme court of the united statessorrell syllabus limitations are inconsistent with the first...

1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as isbeing done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has beenprepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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RANDALL ET AL. v. SORRELL ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 04–1528. Argued February 28, 2006—Decided June 26, 2006*

Vermont’s Act 64 stringently limits both the amounts that candidatesfor state office may spend on their campaigns and the amounts thatindividuals, organizations, and political parties may contribute tothose campaigns. Soon after Act 64 became law, the petitioners—individuals who have run for state office, citizens who vote in state elections and contribute to campaigns, and political parties and committees participating in state politics—brought this suit againstthe respondents, state officials charged with enforcing the Act. The District Court held that Act 64’s expenditure limits violate the First Amendment, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, and that the Act’s lim-its on political parties’ contributions to candidates were unconstitu-tional, but found the other contribution limits constitutional. The Second Circuit held that all of the Act’s contribution limits are consti-tutional, ruled that the expenditure limits may be constitutional be-cause they are supported by compelling interests in preventing cor-ruption or its appearance and in limiting the time state officials must spend raising campaign funds, and remanded for the District Court to determine whether the expenditure limits were narrowly tailored to those interests.

Held: The judgment is reversed, and the cases are remanded. 382 F. 3d 91, reversed and remanded.

JUSTICE BREYER, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE ALITO, concluded in Parts I, II–B–3, III, and IV that both of Act 64’s sets of

—————— *Together with No. 04–1530, Vermont Republican State Committee

et al. v. Sorrell et al., and No. 04–1697, Sorrell et al. v. Randall et al., also on certiorari to the same court.

2 RANDALL v. SORRELL

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limitations are inconsistent with the First Amendment. Pp. 6–8, 10– 29.

1. The expenditure limits violate the First Amendment’s free speech guarantees under Buckley. Pp. 6–8, 10–11.

(a) In Buckley, the Court held, inter alia, that the Government’s asserted interest in preventing “corruption and the appearance of corruption,” 424 U. S., at 25, provided sufficient justification for the contribution limitations imposed on campaigns for federal office bythe Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, id., at 23–38, but that FECA’s expenditure limitations violated the First Amendment, id., at 39–59. The Court explained that the difference between the twokinds of limitations is that expenditure limits “impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expressionand association than” do contribution limits. Id., at 23. Contribution limits, though a “marginal restriction,” nevertheless leave the con-tributor “fre[e] to discuss candidates and issues.” Id., at 20–21. Ex-penditure limits, by contrast, impose “[a] restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication,” id., at 19, and thereby necessarily “reduc[e] the quantity of expression byrestricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their explora-tion, and the size of the audience reached,” ibid. For over 30 years, inconsidering the constitutionality of a host of campaign finance stat-utes, this Court has adhered to Buckley’s constraints, including those on expenditure limits. See, e.g., McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 134. Pp. 6–8.

(b) The respondents argue unpersuasively that Buckley should be distinguished from the present cases on a ground they say Buckley did not consider: that expenditure limits help to protect candidates from spending too much time raising money rather than devotingthat time to campaigning among ordinary voters. There is no signifi-cant basis for that distinction. Act 64’s expenditure limits are not substantially different from those at issue in Buckley. Nor is Ver-mont’s primary justification for imposing its expenditure limits sig-nificantly different from Congress’ rationale for the Buckley limits: preventing corruption and its appearance. The respondents say un-persuasively that, had the Buckley Court considered the time protec-tion rationale for expenditure limits, the Court would have upheld those limits in the FECA. The Buckley Court, however, was aware of the connection between expenditure limits and a reduction in fund-raising time. And, in any event, the connection seems perfectly obvi-ous. Under these circumstances, the respondents’ argument amounts to no more than an invitation so to limit Buckley’s holding as effec-tively to overrule it. That invitation is declined. Pp. 10–11.

2. Act 64’s contribution limits violate the First Amendment because

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those limits, in their specific details, burden protected interests in amanner disproportionate to the public purposes they were enacted to advance. Pp. 11–29.

(a) In upholding the $1,000 contribution limit before it, the Buck-ley Court recognized, inter alia, that such limits, unlike expenditure limits, “involv[e] little direct restraint on” the contributor’s speech, 424 U. S., at 21, and are permissible as long as the government dem-onstrates that they are “closely drawn” to match a “sufficiently im-portant interest,” id., at 25. It found that the interest there ad-vanced, “prevent[ing] corruption” and its “appearance,” was “sufficiently important” to justify the contribution limits, id., at 25– 26, and that those limits were “closely drawn.” Although recognizing that, in determining whether a particular contribution limit was“closely drawn,” the amount, or level, of that limit could make a dif-ference, see id., at 21, the Court added that such “distinctions in de-gree become significant only when they . . . amount to differences in kind,” id., at 30. Pointing out that it had “no scalpel to probe,whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000,” ibid., the Court found “no indication” that FECA’s contribution limi-tations would have “any dramatic adverse effect on the funding of campaigns,” id., at 21. Since Buckley, the Court has consistently up-held contribution limits in other statutes, but has recognized thatsuch limits might sometimes work more harm to protected FirstAmendment interests than their anticorruption objectives could jus-tify, see, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 395–397. Pp. 12–13.

(b) Although the Court has “no scalpel to probe,” 424 U. S., at 30,with exactitude whether particular contribution limits are too lowand normally defers to the legislature in that regard, it must never-theless recognize the existence of some lower bound, as Buckley ac-knowledges. While the interests served by contribution limits, pre-venting corruption and its appearance, “directly implicate the integrity of our electoral process,” McConnell, supra, at 136, that does not simply mean the lower the limit, the better. Contribution limits that are too low also can harm the electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting effective campaigns against incumbent of-ficeholders, thereby reducing democratic accountability. Where there is strong indication in a particular case, i.e., danger signs, that such risks exist (both present in kind and likely serious in degree), courts,including appellate courts, must review the record independently and carefully with an eye toward assessing the statute’s “tailoring,” i.e., toward assessing the restrictions’ proportionality. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 499. Dangersigns that Act 64’s contribution limits may fall outside tolerable First


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Amendment limits are present here. They are substantially lower than both the limits the Court has previously upheld and the compa-rable limits in force in other States. Consequently, the record must be examined to determine whether Act 64’s contribution limits are “closely drawn” to match the State’s interests. Pp. 13–19.

(c) The record demonstrates that, from a constitutional perspec-tive, Act 64’s contribution limits are too restrictive. Five sets of fac-tors, taken together, lead to the conclusion that those limits are notnarrowly tailored. First, the record suggests, though it does not con-clusively prove, that Act 64’s contribution limits will significantly re-strict the amount of funding available for challengers to run competi-tive campaigns. Second, Act 64’s insistence that a political party andall of its affiliates together abide by exactly the same low $200 to $400 contribution limits that apply to individual contributors threat-ens harm to a particularly important political right, the right to asso-ciate in a political party. See, e.g., California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U. S. 567, 574. Although the Court upheld federal limitson political parties’ contributions to candidates in Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, the limits there at issue were far less problematic, for they were significantly higher than Act 64’s limits, see, e.g., id., at 438–439, and n. 3, and they were much higher than the federal limits on contribu-tions from individuals to candidates, see id., at 453. Third, Act 64’s treatment of volunteer services aggravates the problem. Althoughthe Act excludes uncompensated volunteer services from its “contri-bution” definition, it does not exclude the expenses volunteers incur, e.g., travel expenses, in the course of campaign activities. The com-bination of very low contribution limits and the absence of an excep-tion excluding volunteer expenses may well impede a campaign’sability effectively to use volunteers, thereby making it more difficult for individuals to associate in this way. Cf. Buckley, supra, at 22. Fourth, unlike the contribution limits upheld in Shrink, Act 64’s lim-its are not adjusted for inflation, but decline in real value each year.A failure to index limits means that limits already suspiciously lowwill almost inevitably become too low over time. Fifth, nowhere in the record is there any special justification for Act 64’s low and re-strictive contribution limits. Rather, the basic justifications the Statehas advanced in support of such limits are those present in Buckley.Indeed, other things being equal, one might reasonably believe that acontribution of, say, $250 (or $450) to a candidate’s campaign wasless likely to prove a corruptive force than the far larger contribu-tions at issue in the other campaign finance cases the Court has con-sidered. Pp. 19–28.

(d) It is not possible to sever some of the Act’s contribution limit

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provisions from others that might remain fully operative. Doing sowould require the Court to write words into the statute (inflation in-dexing), to leave gaping loopholes (no limits on party contributions),or to foresee which of many different possible ways the Vermont Leg-islature might respond to the constitutional objections to Act 64. In these circumstances, the legislature likely would not have intended the Court to set aside the statute’s contribution limits. The legisla-ture is free to rewrite those provisions to address the constitutionaldifficulties here identified. Pp. 28–29.

JUSTICE BREYER, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE in Parts II–B–1 and II–B–2, rejected the respondents’ argument that Buckley should, in effect, be overruled because subsequent experience has shown that contribution limits alone cannot effectively deter corruption or its ap-pearance. Stare decisis, the basic legal principle commanding judicial respect for a court’s earlier decisions and their rules of law, preventsthe overruling of Buckley. Adherence to precedent is the norm; de-parture from it is exceptional, requiring “special justification,” Ari-zona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, 212, especially where, as here, theprinciple at issue has become settled through iteration and reitera-tion over a long period. There is no special justification here. Subse-quent case law has not made Buckley a legal anomaly or otherwise undermined its basic legal principles. Cf. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 443. Nor is there any demonstration that circum-stances have changed so radically as to undermine Buckley’s critical factual assumptions. The respondents have not shown, for example, any dramatic increase in corruption or its appearance in Vermont;nor have they shown that expenditure limits are the only way to at-tack that problem. Cf. McConnell, supra. Finally, overruling Buckleynow would dramatically undermine the considerable reliance thatCongress and state legislatures have placed upon it in drafting cam-paign finance laws. And this Court has followed Buckley, upholdingand applying its reasoning in later cases. Pp. 8–10.

JUSTICE ALITO agreed that Act 64’s expenditure and contributionlimits violate the First Amendment, but concluded that respondents’ backup argument asking this Court to revisit Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, need not be reached because they have failed to address consid-erations of stare decisis. Pp. 1–2.

JUSTICE KENNEDY agreed that Vermont’s limitations on campaignexpenditures and contributions violate the First Amendment, butconcluded that, given his skepticism regarding this Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence, see, e.g., McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 286–287, 313, it is appropriate for him to con-cur only in the judgment. Pp. 1–3.

JUSTICE THOMAS, joined by JUSTICE SCALIA, agreed that Vermont’s


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Act 64 is unconstitutional, but disagreed with the plurality’s ration-ale for striking down that statute. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, pro-vides insufficient protection to political speech, the core of the First Amendment, is therefore illegitimate and not protected by stare de-cisis, and should be overruled and replaced with a standard faithful to the Amendment. This Court erred in Buckley when it distin-guished between contribution and expenditure limits, finding the former to be a less severe infringement on First Amendment rights.See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 410–418. Both the contribution and expenditure restrictions of Act 64 should be subjected to strict scrutiny, which they would fail. See, e.g., Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 640–641. Pp. 1–10.

BREYER, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered anopinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., joined, and in which ALITO, J., joined as to all but Parts II–B–1 and II–B–2. ALITO, J., filed an opinion con-curring in part and concurring in the judgment. KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion con-curring in the judgment, in which SCALIA, J., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. SOUTER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined, and in which STEVENS, J., joined as to Parts II and III.

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1 Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006)

Opinion of BREYER, J.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in thepreliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested tonotify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in orderthat corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.


Nos. 04–1528, 04–1530 and 04–1697

NEIL RANDALL, ET AL., PETITIONERS 04–1528 v.

WILLIAM H. SORRELL ET AL.

VERMONT REPUBLICAN STATE COMMITTEE, ET AL., PETITIONERS

04–1530 v. WILLIAM H. SORRELL ET AL.

WILLIAM H. SORRELL, ET AL., PETITIONERS 04–1697 v.

NEIL RANDALL ET AL. ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[June 26, 2006]

JUSTICE BREYER announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, and in which JUSTICE ALITO joins except as to PartsII–B–1 and II–B–2.

We here consider the constitutionality of a Vermontcampaign finance statute that limits both (1) the amounts that candidates for state office may spend on their cam-paigns (expenditure limitations) and (2) the amounts thatindividuals, organizations, and political parties may con-tribute to those campaigns (contribution limitations). Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, §2801 et seq. (2002). We hold that both



sets of limitations are inconsistent with the First Amend-ment. Well-established precedent makes clear that the expenditure limits violate the First Amendment. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 54–58 (1976) (per curiam). The contribution limits are unconstitutional because in their specific details (involving low maximum levels and other restrictions) they fail to satisfy the First Amendment’srequirement of careful tailoring. Id., at 25–30. That is to say, they impose burdens upon First Amendment intereststhat (when viewed in light of the statute’s legitimate objectives) are disproportionately severe.

I

A

Prior to 1997, Vermont’s campaign finance law imposed no limit upon the amount a candidate for state office could spend. It did, however, impose limits upon the amountsthat individuals, corporations, and political committeescould contribute to the campaign of such a candidate. Individuals and corporations could contribute no morethan $1,000 to any candidate for state office. §2805(a)(1996). Political committees, excluding political parties, could contribute no more than $3,000. §2805(b). The statute imposed no limit on the amount that political parties could contribute to candidates.

In 1997, Vermont enacted a more stringent campaignfinance law, Pub. Act No. 64, codified at Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, §2801 et seq. (2002) (hereinafter Act or Act 64), the statute at issue here. Act 64, which took effect immedi-ately after the 1998 elections, imposes mandatory expen-diture limits on the total amount a candidate for state office can spend during a “two-year general election cycle,” i.e., the primary plus the general election, in approxi-mately the following amounts: governor, $300,000; lieu-tenant governor, $100,000; other statewide offices, $45,000; state senator, $4,000 (plus an additional $2,500

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for each additional seat in the district); state representa-tive (two-member district), $3,000; and state representa-tive (single member district), $2,000. §2805a(a). These limits are adjusted for inflation in odd-numbered yearsbased on the Consumer Price Index. §2805a(e). Incum-bents seeking reelection to statewide office may spend no more than 85% of the above amounts, and incumbents seeking reelection to the State Senate or House may spend no more than 90% of the above amounts. §2805a(c). The Act defines “[e]xpenditure” broadly to mean the

“payment, disbursement, distribution, advance, de-posit, loan or gift of money or anything of value, paid or promised to be paid, for the purpose of influencing an election, advocating a position on a public question, or supporting or opposing one or more candidates.”§2801(3).

With certain minor exceptions, expenditures over $50made on a candidate’s behalf by others count against thecandidate’s expenditure limit if those expenditures are“intentionally facilitated by, solicited by or approved by” the candidate’s campaign. §§2809(b), (c). These provi-sions apply so as to count against a campaign’s expendi-ture limit any spending by political parties or committeesthat is coordinated with the campaign and benefits thecandidate. And any party expenditure that “primarilybenefits six or fewer candidates who are associated with the political party” is “presumed” to be coordinated withthe campaign and therefore to count against the cam-paign’s expenditure limit. §§2809(b), (d).

Act 64 also imposes strict contribution limits. The amount any single individual can contribute to the cam-paign of a candidate for state office during a “two-yeargeneral election cycle” is limited as follows: governor,lieutenant governor, and other statewide offices, $400; state senator, $300; and state representative, $200.



§2805(a). Unlike its expenditure limits, Act 64’s contribu-tion limits are not indexed for inflation.

A political committee is subject to these same limits. Ibid. So is a political party, ibid., defined broadly to in-clude “any subsidiary, branch or local unit” of a party, aswell as any “national or regional affiliates” of a party (taken separately or together). §2801(5). Thus, for exam-ple, the statute treats the local, state, and national affili-ates of the Democratic Party as if they were a single entityand limits their total contribution to a single candidate’s campaign for governor (during the primary and the gen-eral election together) to $400.

The Act also imposes a limit of $2,000 upon the amount any individual can give to a political party during a 2-year general election cycle. §2805(a).

The Act defines “contribution” broadly in approximately the same way it defines “expenditure.” §2801(2). Any expenditure made on a candidate’s behalf counts as a contribution to the candidate if it is “intentionally facili-tated by, solicited by or approved by” the candidate.§§2809(a), (c). And a party expenditure that “primarilybenefits six or fewer candidates who are associated with the” party is “presumed” to count against the party’scontribution limits. §§2809(a), (d).

There are a few exceptions. A candidate’s own contribu-tions to the campaign and those of the candidate’s family fall outside the contribution limits. §2805(f). Volunteer services do not count as contributions. §2801(2). Nor does the cost of a meet-the-candidate function, provided that the total cost for the function amounts to $100 or less. §2809(d).

In addition to these expenditure and contribution limits, the Act sets forth disclosure and reporting requirementsand creates a voluntary public financing system for gu-bernatorial elections. §§2803, 2811, 2821–2823, 2831,2832, 2851–2856. None of these is at issue here. The Act

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also limits the amount of contributions a candidate, politi-cal committee, or political party can receive from out-of-state sources. §2805(c). The lower courts held these out-of-state contribution limits unconstitutional, and the parties do not challenge that holding.

B The petitioners are individuals who have run for state

office in Vermont, citizens who vote in Vermont elections and contribute to Vermont campaigns, and political par-ties and committees that participate in Vermont politics. Soon after Act 64 became law, they brought this lawsuit in Federal District Court against the respondents, state officials charged with enforcement of the Act. Several other private groups and individual citizens intervened in the District Court proceedings in support of the Act andare joined here as respondents as well.

The District Court agreed with the petitioners that theAct’s expenditure limits violate the First Amendment. See Buckley, 424 U. S. 1. The court also held unconstitutional the Act’s limits on the contributions of political parties to candidates. At the same time, the court found the Act’s other contribution limits constitutional. Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 470 (Vt. 2000).

Both sides appealed. A divided panel of the Court ofAppeals for the Second Circuit held that all of the Act’s contribution limits are constitutional. It also held that the Act’s expenditure limits may be constitutional. Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F. 3d 91 (2004). It found those limits sup-ported by two compelling interests, namely, an interest inpreventing corruption or the appearance of corruption and an interest in limiting the amount of time state officialsmust spend raising campaign funds. The Circuit then remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to determine whether the Act’s expenditure limits werenarrowly tailored to those interests.



The petitioners and respondents all sought certiorari.They asked us to consider the constitutionality of Act 64’s expenditure limits, its contribution limits, and a related definitional provision. We agreed to do so. 545 U. S. ___ (2005).

II We turn first to the Act’s expenditure limits. Do

those limits violate the First Amendment’s free speech guarantees?

A In Buckley v. Valeo, supra, the Court considered the

constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of1971 (FECA), 86 Stat. 3, as amended, 2 U. S. C. §431 et seq., a statute that, much like the Act before us, imposed both expenditure and contribution limitations on cam-paigns for public office. The Court, while upholdingFECA’s contribution limitations as constitutional, held that the statute’s expenditure limitations violated the First Amendment.

Buckley stated that both kinds of limitations “implicatefundamental First Amendment interests.” 424 U. S., at 23. It noted that the Government had sought to justify thestatute’s infringement on those interests in terms of the need to prevent “corruption and the appearance of corrup-tion.” Id., at 25; see also id., at 55. In the Court’s view, this rationale provided sufficient justification for thestatute’s contribution limitations, but it did not providesufficient justification for the expenditure limitations.

The Court explained that the basic reason for this dif-ference between the two kinds of limitations is that ex-penditure limitations “impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association than” do contribution limitations. Id., at 23. Contribution limitations, though a “marginal restric-

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tion upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free com-munication,” nevertheless leave the contributor “fre[e] todiscuss candidates and issues.” Id., at 20–21. Expendi-ture limitations, by contrast, impose “[a] restriction on theamount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign.” Id., at 19. Theythereby necessarily “reduc[e] the quantity of expression byrestricting the number of issues discussed, the depth oftheir exploration, and the size of the audience reached.” Ibid. Indeed, the freedom “to engage in unlimited politicalexpression subject to a ceiling on expenditures is likebeing free to drive an automobile as far and as often asone desires on a single tank of gasoline.” Id., at 19, n. 18.

The Court concluded that “[n]o governmental interestthat has been suggested is sufficient to justify the restric-tion on the quantity of political expression imposed by” the statute’s expenditure limitations. Id., at 55. It decided that the Government’s primary justification for expendi-ture limitations, preventing corruption and its appear-ance, was adequately addressed by the Act’s contributionlimitations and disclosure requirements. Ibid. The Court also considered other governmental interests advanced in support of expenditure limitations. It rejected each. Id., at 56–57. Consequently, it held that the expenditure limitations were “constitutionally invalid.” Id., at 58.

Over the last 30 years, in considering the constitutional-ity of a host of different campaign finance statutes, thisCourt has repeatedly adhered to Buckley’s constraints, including those on expenditure limits. See McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 134 (2003); Fed-eral Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 441 (2001) (Colorado II); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 386 (2000) (Shrink); Colorado Republican Federal Cam-paign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 610 (1996) (Colorado I) (plurality opinion); Federal Elec-



tion Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 259–260 (1986); Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 491 (1985) (NCPAC); California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 453 U. S. 182, 194–195 (1981) (plurality opinion).

B 1

The respondents recognize that, in respect to expendi-ture limits, Buckley appears to be a controlling—and unfavorable—precedent. They seek to overcome that precedent in two ways. First, they ask us in effect to overrule Buckley. Post-Buckley experience, they believe,has shown that contribution limits (and disclosure re-quirements) alone cannot effectively deter corruption or its appearance; hence experience has undermined an assump-tion underlying that case. Indeed, the respondents havedevoted several pages of their briefs to attacking Buckley’s holding on expenditure limits. See Brief for Respondent-Cross-Petitioner Vermont Public Interest Research Groupet al. 36–39 (arguing that “sound reasons exist to revisit the applicable standard of review” for expenditure limits); Brief for Respondent-Cross-Petitioner William Sorrellet al. 28–31 (arguing that “the Court should revisit Buck-ley and consider alternative constitutional approaches tospending limits”).

Second, in the alternative, they ask us to limit the scopeof Buckley significantly by distinguishing Buckley from the present case. They advance as a ground for distinction ajustification for expenditure limitations that, they say, Buckley did not consider, namely that such limits help toprotect candidates from spending too much time raising money rather than devoting that time to campaigning among ordinary voters. We find neither argument persuasive.

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2 The Court has often recognized the “fundamental impor-

tance” of stare decisis, the basic legal principle that com-mands judicial respect for a court’s earlier decisions and the rules of law they embody. See Harris v. United States, 536 U. S. 545, 556–557 (2002) (plurality opinion) (citing numerous cases). The Court has pointed out that stare decisis “ ‘promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and con-sistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance onjudicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and per-ceived integrity of the judicial process.’ ” United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 856 (1996) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827 (1991)). Stare decisis thereby avoids the instability and unfairness that accompany disruption of settled legalexpectations. For this reason, the rule of law demands that adhering to our prior case law be the norm. Depar-ture from precedent is exceptional, and requires “special justification.” Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, 212 (1984). This is especially true where, as here, the princi-ple has become settled through iteration and reiterationover a long period of time.

We can find here no such special justification that would require us to overrule Buckley. Subsequent case law has not made Buckley a legal anomaly or otherwise under-mined its basic legal principles. Cf. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 443 (2000). We cannot find in the respondents’ claims any demonstration that circumstanceshave changed so radically as to undermine Buckley’s critical factual assumptions. The respondents have notshown, for example, any dramatic increase in corruptionor its appearance in Vermont; nor have they shown that expenditure limits are the only way to attack that prob-lem. Cf. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U. S. 93. At the same time, Buckley has promoted considerable reliance. Con-gress and state legislatures have used Buckley when



drafting campaign finance laws. And, as we have said, this Court has followed Buckley, upholding and applyingits reasoning in later cases. Overruling Buckley now would dramatically undermine this reliance on our settled precedent.

For all these reasons, we find this a case that fits the stare decisis norm. And we do not perceive the strongjustification that would be necessary to warrant overrul-ing so well established a precedent. We consequentlydecline the respondents’ invitation to reconsider Buckley.

3 The respondents also ask us to distinguish these cases

from Buckley. But we can find no significant basis for that distinction. Act 64’s expenditure limits are not substan-tially different from those at issue in Buckley. In both instances the limits consist of a dollar cap imposed upon acandidate’s expenditures. Nor is Vermont’s primary justi-fication for imposing its expenditure limits significantly different from Congress’ rationale for the Buckley limits: preventing corruption and its appearance.

The sole basis on which the respondents seek to distin-guish Buckley concerns a further supporting justification. They argue that expenditure limits are necessary in order to reduce the amount of time candidates must spendraising money. Brief for Respondent/Cross-PetitionerVermont Public Interest Research Group et al. 16–20; Brief for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner William H. Sorrell et al. 22–25. Increased campaign costs, together with thefear of a better-funded opponent, mean that, without expenditure limits, a candidate must spend too much time raising money instead of meeting the voters and engagingin public debate. Buckley, the respondents add, did notfully consider this justification. Had it done so, they say,the Court would have upheld, not struck down, FECA’sexpenditure limits.

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In our view, it is highly unlikely that fuller considera-tion of this time protection rationale would have changed Buckley’s result. The Buckley Court was aware of the connection between expenditure limits and a reduction in fundraising time. In a section of the opinion dealing withFECA’s public financing provisions, it wrote that Congresswas trying to “free candidates from the rigors of fundrais-ing.” 424 U. S., at 91; see also id., at 96 (“[L]imits oncontributions necessarily increase the burden of fundrais-ing,” and “public financing” was designed in part to relieve Presidential candidates “from the rigors of soliciting pri-vate contributions”); id., at 258–259 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same). The Court of Ap-peals’ opinion and the briefs filed in this Court pointed out that a natural consequence of higher campaign expendi-tures was that “candidates were compelled to allow to fundraising increasing and extreme amounts of money and energy.” Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F. 2d 821, 838 (CADC 1975); see also Brief for United States et al. as Amici Curiae in Buckley v. Valeo, O. T. 1975, Nos. 75–436 and 75–437, p. 36 (“Fund raising consumes candidate timethat otherwise would be devoted to campaigning”). And, in any event, the connection between high campaign ex-penditures and increased fundraising demands seems perfectly obvious.

Under these circumstances, the respondents’ argumentamounts to no more than an invitation so to limit Buck-ley’s holding as effectively to overrule it. For the reasons set forth above, we decline that invitation as well. And, given Buckley’s continued authority, we must con-clude that Act 64’s expenditure limits violate the FirstAmendment.

III We turn now to a more complex question, namely the

constitutionality of Act 64’s contribution limits. The par-



ties, while accepting Buckley’s approach, dispute whether, despite Buckley’s general approval of statutes that limitcampaign contributions, Act 64’s contribution limits are so severe that in the circumstances its particular limitsviolate the First Amendment.

A As with the Act’s expenditure limits, we begin with

Buckley. In that case, the Court upheld the $1,000 contri-bution limit before it. Buckley recognized that contribu-tion limits, like expenditure limits, “implicate fundamen-tal First Amendment interests,” namely, the freedoms of “political expression” and “political association.” 424 U. S., at 15, 23. But, unlike expenditure limits (which “necessar-ily reduc[e] the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached,” id., at 19), contribu-tion limits “involv[e] little direct restraint on” the con-tributor’s speech, id., at 21. They do restrict “one aspect ofthe contributor’s freedom of political association,” namely, the contributor’s ability to support a favored candidate, but they nonetheless “permi[t] the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution,” and they do “not inany way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discusscandidates and issues.” Id., at 21, 24.

Consequently, the Court wrote, contribution limitationsare permissible as long as the Government demonstrates that the limits are “closely drawn” to match a “sufficientlyimportant interest.” Id., at 25. It found that the interest advanced in the case, “prevent[ing] corruption” and its“appearance,” was “sufficiently important” to justify thestatute’s contribution limits. Id., at 25–26.

The Court also found that the contribution limits before it were “closely drawn.” It recognized that, in determining whether a particular contribution limit was “closelydrawn,” the amount, or level, of that limit could make a

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difference. Indeed, it wrote that “contribution restrictions could have a severe impact on political dialogue if thelimitations prevented candidates and political committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advo-cacy.” Id., at 21. But the Court added that such “distinc-tions in degree become significant only when they can be said to amount to differences in kind.” Id., at 30. Pointingout that it had “no scalpel to probe, whether, say, a $2,000ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000,” ibid., the Court found “no indication” that the $1,000 contribution limita-tions imposed by the Act would have “any dramatic ad-verse effect on the funding of campaigns,” id., at 21. It therefore found the limitations constitutional.

Since Buckley, the Court has consistently upheld contri-bution limits in other statutes. Shrink, 528 U. S. 377 ($1075 limit on contributions to candidates for Missouristate auditor); California Medical Assn., 453 U. S. 182 ($5,000 limit on contributions to multicandidate political committees). The Court has recognized, however, thatcontribution limits might sometimes work more harm to protected First Amendment interests than their anticor-ruption objectives could justify. See Shrink, supra, at 395–397; Buckley, supra, at 21. And individual Members of the Court have expressed concern lest too low a limitmagnify the “reputation-related or media-related advan-tages of incumbency and thereby insulat[e] legislators from effective electoral challenge.” Shrink, supra, at 403– 404 (BREYER, J., joined by GINSBURG, J., concurring). In the cases before us, the petitioners challenge Act 64’scontribution limits on that basis.

B Following Buckley, we must determine whether Act 64’s

contribution limits prevent candidates from “amassing theresources necessary for effective [campaign] advocacy,” 424 U. S., at 21; whether they magnify the advantages of



incumbency to the point where they put challengers to a significant disadvantage; in a word, whether they are too low and too strict to survive First Amendment scrutiny. In answering these questions, we recognize, as Buckleystated, that we have “no scalpel to probe” each possible contribution level. Id., at 30. We cannot determine with any degree of exactitude the precise restriction necessaryto carry out the statute’s legitimate objectives. In practice,the legislature is better equipped to make such empirical judgments, as legislators have “particular expertise” inmatters related to the costs and nature of running for office. McConnell, 540 U. S., at 137. Thus ordinarily we have deferred to the legislature’s determination of such matters. Nonetheless, as Buckley acknowledged, we must recog-nize the existence of some lower bound. At some point theconstitutional risks to the democratic electoral processbecome too great. After all, the interests underlying con-tribution limits, preventing corruption and the appearanceof corruption, “directly implicate the integrity of our elec-toral process.” McConnell, supra, at 136 (internal quota-tion marks omitted). Yet that rationale does not simplymean “the lower the limit, the better.” That is because contribution limits that are too low can also harm the electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting effective campaigns against incumbent officeholders, thereby reducing democratic accountability. Were we to ignore that fact, a statute that seeks to regulate campaigncontributions could itself prove an obstacle to the very electoral fairness it seeks to promote. Thus, we see no alternative to the exercise of independent judicial judg-ment as a statute reaches those outer limits. And, where there is strong indication in a particular case, i.e., dangersigns, that such risks exist (both present in kind and likely serious in degree), courts, including appellate courts, mustreview the record independently and carefully with an eye

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toward assessing the statute’s “tailoring,” that is, towardassessing the proportionality of the restrictions. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 499 (1984) (“[A]n appellate court has an obligation to ‘make an independent examination of the whole record’ inorder to make sure that ‘the judgment does not constitutea forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression’ ” (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 284–286 (1964))).

We find those danger signs present here. As comparedwith the contribution limits upheld by the Court in thepast, and with those in force in other States, Act 64’slimits are sufficiently low as to generate suspicion thatthey are not closely drawn. The Act sets its limits perelection cycle, which includes both a primary and a gen-eral election. Thus, in a gubernatorial race with bothprimary and final election contests, the Act’s contribution limit amounts to $200 per election per candidate (with significantly lower limits for contributions to candidatesfor State Senate and House of Representatives, see supra, at 3). These limits apply both to contributions from indi-viduals and to contributions from political parties, whether made in cash or in expenditures coordinated (or presumed to be coordinated) with the candidate. See supra, at 3–4.

These limits are well below the limits this Court upheld in Buckley. Indeed, in terms of real dollars (i.e., adjustingfor inflation), the Act’s $200 per election limit on individ-ual contributions to a campaign for governor is slightly more than one-twentieth of the limit on contributions to campaigns for federal office before the Court in Buckley. Adjusted to reflect its value in 1976 (the year Buckley was decided), Vermont’s contribution limit on campaigns forstatewide office (including governor) amounts to $113.91 per 2-year election cycle, or roughly $57 per election, as compared to the $1,000 per election limit on individual



contributions at issue in Buckley. (The adjusted value ofAct 64’s limit on contributions from political parties to candidates for statewide office, again $200 per candidateper election, is just over one one-hundredth of the compa-rable limit before the Court in Buckley, $5,000 per elec-tion.) Yet Vermont’s gubernatorial district—the entireState—is no smaller than the House districts to which Buckley’s limits applied. In 1976, the average congres-sional district contained a population of about 465,000. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstractof the United States 459 (1976) (Statistical Abstract) (describing results of 1970 census). Indeed, Vermont’s population is 621,000—about one-third larger. Statistical Abstract 21 (2006) (describing Vermont’s population in2004).

Moreover, considered as a whole, Vermont’s contribution limits are the lowest in the Nation. Act 64 limits contribu-tions to candidates for statewide office (including gover-nor) to $200 per candidate per election. We have found no State that imposes a lower per election limit. Indeed, we have found only seven States that impose limits on contri-butions to candidates for statewide office at or below $500 per election, more than twice Act 64’s limit. Cf. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §16–905 (West Cum. Supp. 2005) ($760 per election cycle, or $380 per election, adjusted for inflation); Colo. Const., Art. XXVIII, §3 ($500 per election, adjusted for inflation); Fla. Stat. §106.08(1)(a) (2003) ($500 perelection); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21A, §1015(1) (1993) ($500 for governor, $250 for other statewide office, per election); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 55, §7A (West Supp. 2006)($500 per year, or $250 per election); Mont. Code Ann.§13–37–216(1)(a) (2005) ($500 for governor, $250 for other statewide office, per election); S. D. Codified Laws §12–25–1.1 (2004) ($1,000 per year, or $500 per election). We are aware of no State that imposes a limit on contributions from political parties to candidates for statewide office

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lower than Act 64’s $200 per candidate per election limit. Cf. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21A, §1015(1) (1993) (next lowest: $500 for contribution from party to candidate for governor, $250 for contribution from party to candidate for other statewide office, both per election). Similarly, wehave found only three States that have limits on contribu-tions to candidates for state legislature below Act 64’s $150 and $100 per election limits. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §16–905 (West Cum. Supp. 2005) ($296 per election cycle,or $148 per election); Mont. Code Ann. §13–37–216(1)(a) (2005) ($130 per election); S. D. Codified Laws §12–25–1.1 (2004) ($250 per year, or $125 per election). And we are aware of no State that has a lower limit on contributions from political parties to state legislative candidates. Cf. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21A, §1015(1) (1993) (next lowest: $250 per election).

Finally, Vermont’s limit is well below the lowest limit this Court has previously upheld, the limit of $1,075 perelection (adjusted for inflation every two years, see Mo. Rev. Stat. §130.032.2 (1998 Cum. Supp.)) for candidates for Missouri state auditor. Shrink, 528 U. S. 377. The comparable Vermont limit of roughly $200 per election, not adjusted for inflation, is less than one-sixth of Mis-souri’s current inflation-adjusted limit ($1,275).

We recognize that Vermont’s population is much smaller than Missouri’s. Indeed, Vermont is about one-ninth of the size of Missouri. Statistical Abstract 21 (2006). Thus, per citizen, Vermont’s limit is slightly more generous. As of 2006, the ratio of the contribution limit to the size of the constituency in Vermont is .00064, while Missouri’s ratiois .00044, 31% lower. Cf. App. 55 (doing same calculation in 2000).

But this does not necessarily mean that Vermont’slimits are less objectionable than the limit upheld in Shrink. A campaign for state auditor is likely to be lesscostly than a campaign for governor; campaign costs do



not automatically increase or decrease in precise propor-tion to the size of an electoral district. See App. 66 (1998winning candidate for Vermont state auditor spent about $60,000; winning candidate for governor spent about $340,000); Opensecrets.org, The Big Picture, 2004 Cycle:Hot Races, available at http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/hotraces.asp?cycle=2004 (as visited June 22, 2006, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file) (U. S. Senate campaigns identified as competitive spend less per voter than U. S. House campaigns identified as competi-tive). Moreover, Vermont’s limits, unlike Missouri’s lim-its, apply in the same amounts to contributions made bypolitical parties. Mo. Rev. Stat. §130.032.4 (2000) (enact-ing limits on contributions from political parties to candi-dates 10 times higher than limits on contributions fromindividuals). And, as we have said, Missouri’s (current) $1,275 per election limit, unlike Vermont’s $200 per elec-tion limit, is indexed for inflation. See supra, at 17; see also Mo. Rev. Stat. §130.032.2 (2000).

The factors we have mentioned offset any neutralizing force of population differences. At the very least, they make it difficult to treat Shrink’s (then) $1,075 limit asproviding affirmative support for the lawfulness of Ver-mont’s far lower levels. Cf. 528 U. S., at 404 (BREYER, J., concurring) (The Shrink “limit . . . is low enough to raise. . . a [significant constitutional] question”). And even were that not so, Vermont’s failure to index for inflation means that Vermont’s levels would soon be far lower than Missouri’s regardless of the method of comparison.

In sum, Act 64’s contribution limits are substantially lower than both the limits we have previously upheld and comparable limits in other States. These are danger signsthat Act 64’s contribution limits may fall outside tolerable First Amendment limits. We consequently must examine the record independently and carefully to determinewhether Act 64’s contribution limits are “closely drawn” to

http:Opensecrets.orghttp://www.opensecrets.org/

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match the State’s interests. C

Our examination of the record convinces us that, from a constitutional perspective, Act 64’s contribution limits are too restrictive. We reach this conclusion based not merely on the low dollar amounts of the limits themselves, but also on the statute’s effect on political parties and onvolunteer activity in Vermont elections. Taken together, Act 64’s substantial restrictions on the ability of candi-dates to raise the funds necessary to run a competitiveelection, on the ability of political parties to help their candidates get elected, and on the ability of individual citizens to volunteer their time to campaigns show thatthe Act is not closely drawn to meet its objectives. In particular, five factors together lead us to this decision.

First, the record suggests, though it does not conclu-sively prove, that Act 64’s contribution limits will signifi-cantly restrict the amount of funding available for chal-lengers to run competitive campaigns. For one thing, thepetitioners’ expert, Clark Bensen, conducted a race-by-race analysis of the 1998 legislative elections (the last totake place before Act 64 took effect) and concluded that Act 64’s contribution limits would have reduced the funds available in 1998 to Republican challengers in competitive races in amounts ranging from 18% to 53% of their total campaign income. See 3 Tr. 52–57 (estimating loss of 47% of funds for candidate Tully, 50% for Harvey, 53% for Welch, 19% for Bahre, 29% for Delaney, 36% for LaRoc-que, 18% for Smith, and 31% for Brown).

For another thing, the petitioners’ expert witnesses produced evidence and analysis showing that Vermont political parties (particularly the Republican Party) “tar-get” their contributions to candidates in competitive races, that those contributions represent a significant amount oftotal candidate funding in such races, and that the contri-



bution limits will cut the parties’ contributions to competi-tive races dramatically. See 1 id., at 189–190; 3 id., at 50– 51; 8 id., at 139; 10 id., at 150; see also, e.g., Gierzynski & Breaux, The Role of Parties in Legislative Campaign Financing, 15 Am. Rev. Politics 171 (1994); Thompson, Cassie, & Jewell, A Sacred Cow or Just a Lot of Bull? Party and PAC Money in State Legislative Elections, 47Pol. Sci. Q. 223 (1994). Their statistics showed that the party contributions accounted for a significant percentage of the total campaign income in those races. And their studies showed that Act 64’s contribution limits would cut the party contributions by between 85% (for the legisla-ture on average) and 99% (for governor).

More specifically, Bensen pointed out that in 1998, theRepublican Party made contributions to 19 Senate cam-paigns in amounts that averaged $2,001, which on averagerepresented 16% of the recipient campaign’s total income. 3 Tr. 84. Act 64 would reduce these contributions to $300 per campaign, an average reduction of about 85%. Ibid. The party contributed to 50 House campaigns in amountsaveraging $787, which on average represented 28% of therecipient campaign’s total income. Id., at 85. Act 64 would reduce these contributions to $200 per campaign, an average reduction of 74.5%. Ibid. And the party con-tributed $40,600 to its gubernatorial candidate, an amount that accounted for about 16% of the candidate’s funding. Id., at 86. The Act would have reduced that contribution by 99%, to $400.

Bensen added that 57% of all 1998 Senate campaignsand 30% of all House campaigns exceeded Act 64’s expen-diture limits, which were enacted along with the statute’s contribution limits. 7 Trial Exhs. in No. 00–9159(L) etc. (CA2), Exh. 8, p. 2351. Moreover, 27% of all Senate cam-paigns and 10% of all House campaigns spent more thandouble those limits. Ibid.

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The respondents did not contest these figures. Rather, they presented evidence that focused, not upon strongly contested campaigns, but upon the funding amounts avail-able for the average campaign. The respondents’ expert, Anthony Gierzynski, concluded, for example, that Act 64would have a “minimal effect on . . . candidates’ ability toraise funds.” App. 46. But he rested this conclusion upon his finding that “only a small proportion of” all contribu-tions to all campaigns for state office “made during thelast three elections would have been affected by the newlimits.” Id., at 47; see also id., at 51 (discussing “averageamount of revenues lost to the limits” in legislative races(emphasis added)); id., at 52–53 (discussing total numberof campaigns receiving contributions over Act 64’s limit).The lower courts similarly relied almost exclusively onaverages in assessing Act 64’s effect. See 118 F. Supp. 2d, at 470 (“Approximately 88% to 96% of the campaign con-tributions to recent House races were under $200” (empha-sis added)); id., at 478 (“Expert testimony revealed thatover the last three election cycles the percentage of all candidates’ contributions received over the contribution limits was less than 10%” (emphasis added)).

The respondents’ evidence leaves the petitioners’ evi-dence unrebutted in certain key respects. That is because the critical question concerns not simply the average effect of contribution limits on fundraising but, more impor-tantly, the ability of a candidate running against an in-cumbent officeholder to mount an effective challenge. And information about average races, rather than competitiveraces, is only distantly related to that question, becausecompetitive races are likely to be far more expensive than the average race. See, e.g., N. Ornstein, T. Mann, & M. Malbin, Vital Statistics on Congress 2001–2002, pp. 89–98(2002) (data showing that spending in competitive elec-tions, i.e., where incumbent wins with less than 60% of vote or where incumbent loses, is far greater than in most



elections, where incumbent wins with more than 60% of the vote). We concede that the record does contain some anecdotal evidence supporting the respondents’ position,namely, testimony about a post-Act-64 competitive may-oral campaign in Burlington, which suggests that a chal-lenger can “amas[s] the resources necessary for effective advocacy,” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 21. But the facts of that particular election are not described in sufficient detail tooffer a convincing refutation of the implication arisingfrom the petitioners’ experts’ studies.

Rather, the petitioners’ studies, taken together with low average Vermont campaign expenditures and the typicallyhigher costs that a challenger must bear to overcome the name-recognition advantage enjoyed by an incumbent,raise a reasonable inference that the contribution limits are so low that they may pose a significant obstacle to candidates in competitive elections. Cf. Ornstein, supra, at 87–96 (In 2000 U. S. House and Senate elections, suc-cessful challengers spent far more than the average candi-date). Information about average races does not rebut that inference. Consequently, the inference amounts toone factor (among others) that here counts against theconstitutional validity of the contribution limits.

Second, Act 64’s insistence that political parties abide by exactly the same low contribution limits that apply toother contributors threatens harm to a particularly impor-tant political right, the right to associate in a political party. See, e.g., California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U. S. 567, 574 (2000) (describing constitutional impor-tance of associating in political parties to elect candi-dates); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U. S. 351, 357 (1997) (same); Colorado I, 518 U. S., at 616 (same); Norman v. Reed, 502 U. S. 279, 288 (1992) (same). Cf. Buckley, supra, at 20–22 (contribution limits constitute “only a marginal restriction” on First Amendment rights

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because contributor remains free to associate politically, e.g., in a political party, and “assist personally” in the party’s “efforts on behalf of candidates”).

The Act applies its $200 to $400 limits—precisely the same limits it applies to an individual—to virtually all affiliates of a political party taken together as if they werea single contributor. Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, §2805(a) (2002). That means, for example, that the Vermont De-mocratic Party, taken together with all its local affiliates,can make one contribution of at most $400 to the Democ-ratic gubernatorial candidate, one contribution of at most $300 to a Democratic candidate for State Senate, and one contribution of at most $200 to a Democratic candidate for the State House of Representatives. The Act includes within these limits not only direct monetary contributions but also expenditures in kind: stamps, stationery, coffee,doughnuts, gasoline, campaign buttons, and so forth. See §2801(2). Indeed, it includes all party expenditures “in-tended to promote the election of a specific candidate or group of candidates” as long as the candidate’s campaign “facilitate[s],” “solicit[s],” or “approve[s]” them. §§2809(a),(c). And a party expenditure that “primarily benefits six or fewer candidates who are associated with the” party is “presumed” to count against the party’s contribution limits. §2809(d).

In addition to the negative effect on “amassing funds”that we have described, see supra, at 18–21, the Act would severely limit the ability of a party to assist its candidates’ campaigns by engaging in coordinated spending on adver-tising, candidate events, voter lists, mass mailings, even yard signs. And, to an unusual degree, it would discour-age those who wish to contribute small amounts of money to a party, amounts that easily comply with individualcontribution limits. Suppose that many individuals do not know Vermont legislative candidates personally, but wish



to contribute, say, $20 or $40, to the State RepublicanParty, with the intent that the party use the money to help elect whichever candidates the party believes would best advance its ideals and interests—the basic object of a political party. Or, to take a more extreme example,imagine that 6,000 Vermont citizens each want to give $1to the State Democratic Party because, though unfamiliar with the details of the individual races, they would like tomake a small financial contribution to the goal of electing a Democratic state legislature. And further imagine thatthe party believes control of the legislature will depend onthe outcome of three (and only three) House races. The Act forbids the party from giving $2,000 (of the $6,000) toeach of its candidates in those pivotal races. Indeed, it permits the party to give no more than $200 to each can-didate, thereby thwarting the aims of the 6,000 donorsfrom making a meaningful contribution to state politics by giving a small amount of money to the party they support. Thus, the Act would severely inhibit collective political activity by preventing a political party from using contri-butions by small donors to provide meaningful assistance to any individual candidate. See supra, at 19.

We recognize that we have previously upheld limits on contributions from political parties to candidates, in par-ticular the federal limits on coordinated party spending. Colorado II, 533 U. S. 431. And we also recognize that any such limit will negatively affect to some extent the fund-allocating party function just described. But the contribu-tion limits at issue in Colorado II were far less problem-atic, for they were significantly higher than Act 64’s lim-its. See id., at 438–439, and n. 3, 442, n. 7 (at least $67,560 in coordinated spending and $5,000 in direct cashcontributions for U. S. Senate candidates, at least $33,780 in coordinated spending and $5,000 in direct cash contri-butions for U. S. House candidates). And they were muchhigher than the federal limits on contributions from indi-

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viduals to candidates, thereby reflecting an effort by Con-gress to balance (1) the need to allow individuals to par-ticipate in the political process by contributing to political parties that help elect candidates with (2) the need toprevent the use of political parties “to circumvent contri-bution limits that apply to individuals.” Id., at 453. Act 64, by placing identical limits upon contributions to candi-dates, whether made by an individual or by a politicalparty, gives to the former consideration no weight at all.

We consequently agree with the District Court that theAct’s contribution limits “would reduce the voice of politi-cal parties” in Vermont to a “whisper.” 118 F. Supp. 2d, at 487. And we count the special party-related harms that Act 64 threatens as a further factor weighing against the constitutional validity of the contribution limits.

Third, the Act’s treatment of volunteer services aggra-vates the problem. Like its federal statutory counterpart, the Act excludes from its definition of “contribution” all “services provided without compensation by individuals volunteering their time on behalf of a candidate.” Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, §2801(2) (2002). Cf. 2 U. S. C. §431(8)(B)(i) (2000 ed. and Supp. III) (similar exemption in federal campaign finance statute). But the Act does not exclude the expenses those volunteers incur, such as travel ex-penses, in the course of campaign activities. The Act’s broad definitions would seem to count those expensesagainst the volunteer’s contribution limit, at least where the spending was facilitated or approved by campaignofficials. Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, §2801(3) (2002)(“[E]xpenditure” includes “anything of value, paid . . . for the purpose of influencing an election”); §§2809(a), (c) (Any “expenditure . . . intentionally facilitated by, solicited by orapproved by the candidate” counts as a “contribution”).And, unlike the Federal Government’s treatment of com-parable requirements, the State has not (insofar as we are



aware) created an exception excluding such expenses. Cf. 2 U. S. C. §§431(8)(B)(iv), (ix) (2000 ed. and Supp. III)(excluding from the definition of “contribution” volunteer travel expenses up to $1,000 and payment by political party for campaign materials used in connection with volunteer activities).

The absence of some such exception may matter in thepresent context, where contribution limits are very low.That combination, low limits and no exceptions, meansthat a gubernatorial campaign volunteer who makes fouror five round trips driving across the State performingvolunteer activities coordinated with the campaign canfind that he or she is near, or has surpassed, the contribu-tion limit. So too will a volunteer who offers a campaignthe use of her house along with coffee and doughnuts for afew dozen neighbors to meet the candidate, say, two orthree times during a campaign. Cf. Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, §2809(d) (2002) (excluding expenditures for such activities only up to $100). Such supporters will have to keep care-ful track of all miles driven, postage supplied (500 stamps equals $200), pencils and pads used, and so forth. And any carelessness in this respect can prove costly, perhapsgenerating a headline, “Campaign laws violated,” that works serious harm to the candidate.

These sorts of problems are unlikely to affect the consti-tutionality of a limit that is reasonably high. Cf. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 36–37 (Coordinated expenditure by a volun-teer “provides material financial assistance to a candi-date,” and therefore “may properly be viewed as a contri-bution”). But Act 64’s contribution limits are so low, and its definition of “contribution” so broad, that the Act may well impede a campaign’s ability effectively to use volun-teers, thereby making it more difficult for individuals toassociate in this way. Cf. id., at 22 (Federal contributionlimits “leave the contributor free to become a member of

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any political association and to assist personally in the association’s efforts on behalf of candidates”). Again, thevery low limits at issue help to transform differences in degree into difference in kind. And the likelihood of un-justified interference in the present context is sufficiently great that we must consider the lack of tailoring in the Act’s definition of “contribution” as an added factor count-ing against the constitutional validity of the contribution limits before us.

Fourth, unlike the contribution limits we upheld in Shrink, see supra, at 16, Act 64’s contribution limits are not adjusted for inflation. Its limits decline in real value each year. Indeed, in real dollars the Act’s limits have already declined by about 20% ($200 in 2006 dollars has areal value of $160.66 in 1997 dollars). A failure to index limits means that limits which are already suspiciouslylow, see supra, at 14–17, will almost inevitably become too low over time. It means that future legislation will benecessary to stop that almost inevitable decline, and it thereby imposes the burden of preventing the decline uponincumbent legislators who may not diligently police the need for changes in limit levels to assure the adequatefinancing of electoral challenges.

Fifth, we have found nowhere in the record any specialjustification that might warrant a contribution limit solow or so restrictive as to bring about the serious associa-tional and expressive problems that we have described.Rather, the basic justifications the State has advanced insupport of such limits are those present in Buckley. The record contains no indication that, for example, corruption (or its appearance) in Vermont is significantly more seri-ous a matter than elsewhere. Indeed, other things beingequal, one might reasonably believe that a contribution ofsay, $250 (or $450) to a candidate’s campaign was less likely to prove a corruptive force than the far larger con-



tributions at issue in the other campaign finance cases wehave considered. See supra, at 15–17.

These five sets of considerations, taken together, lead usto conclude that Act 64’s contribution limits are not nar-rowly tailored. Rather, the Act burdens First Amendment interests by threatening to inhibit effective advocacy bythose who seek election, particularly challengers; its con-tribution limits mute the voice of political parties; theyhamper participation in campaigns through volunteeractivities; and they are not indexed for inflation. Vermont does not point to a legitimate statutory objective thatmight justify these special burdens. We understand that many, though not all, campaign finance regulations im-pose certain of these burdens to some degree. We also understand the legitimate need for constitutional leeway in respect to legislative line-drawing. But our discussion indicates why we conclude that Act 64 in this respect nonetheless goes too far. It disproportionately burdensnumerous First Amendment interests, and consequently, in our view, violates the First Amendment.

We add that we do not believe it possible to sever some of the Act’s contribution limit provisions from others that might remain fully operative. See Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm’n of Okla., 286 U. S. 210, 234 (1932) (“invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully opera-tive as a law”); see also Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U. S. 172, 191 (1999) (severability “essentially an inquiry into legislative intent”); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 1, §215 (2003) (severability principles apply toVermont statutes). To sever provisions to avoid constitu-tional objection here would require us to write words into the statute (inflation indexing), or to leave gaping loop-holes (no limits on party contributions), or to foresee which of many different possible ways the legislature mightrespond to the constitutional objections we have found.

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Given these difficulties, we believe the Vermont Legisla-ture would have intended us to set aside the statute’s contribution limits, leaving the legislature free to rewrite those provisions in light of the constitutional difficulties we have identified.

IV We conclude that Act 64’s expenditure limits violate the

First Amendment as interpreted in Buckley v. Valeo. We also conclude that the specific details of Act 64’s contribu-tion limits require us to hold that those limits violate the First Amendment, for they burden First Amendmentinterests in a manner that is disproportionate to the pub-lic purposes they were enacted to advance. Given our holding, we need not, and do not, examine the constitu-tionality of the statute’s presumption that certain party expenditures are coordinated with a candidate. Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, §2809(d) (2002). Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings.

It is so ordered.

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Opinion of ALITO, J.


Nos. 04–1528, 04–1530 and 04–1697








[June 26, 2006]

JUSTICE ALITO, concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment.

I concur in the judgment and join in JUSTICE BREYER’s opinion except for Parts II–B–1 and II–B–2. Contrary tothe suggestion of those sections, respondents’ primary defense of Vermont’s expenditure limits is that those limits are consistent with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). See Brief for William H. Sorrell et al. in Nos. 04–1528 and 04–1530, pp. 15–28 (hereinafter Sorrell Brief); Brief for Vermont Public Interest Research Groupet al. in Nos. 04–1528 and 04–1530, pp. 5–36 (hereinafterVPIRG Brief). Only as a backup argument, an afterthoughtalmost, do respondents make a naked plea for us to “revisit Buckley.” Sorrell Brief 28; VPIRG Brief 36. This is fairly


Opinion of ALITO, J.

incongruous, given that respondents’ defense of Vermont’s contribution limits rests squarely on Buckley and later decisions that built on Buckley, and yet respondents fail toexplain why it would be appropriate to reexamine only onepart of the holding in Buckley. More to the point, respon-dents fail to discuss the doctrine of stare decisis or the Court’s cases elaborating on the circumstances in which it isappropriate to reconsider a prior constitutional decision. Indeed, only once in 99 pages of briefing from respondents do the words “stare decisis” appear, and that reference is in connection with contribution limits. See Sorrell Brief 31. Such an incomplete presentation is reason enough to refuserespondents’ invitation to reexamine Buckley. See United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 856 (1996).

Whether or not a case can be made for reexamining Buckley in whole or in part, what matters is that respon-dents do not do so here, and so I think it unnecessary toreach the issue.

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1 Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006)

KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment


Nos. 04–1528, 04–1530 and 04–1697








[June 26, 2006]

JUSTICE KENNEDY, concurring in the judgment. The Court decides the constitutionality of the limita-

tions Vermont places on campaign expenditures and con-tributions. I agree that both limitations violate the First Amendment.

As the plurality notes, our cases hold that expenditurelimitations “place substantial and direct restrictions onthe ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected political expression, restrictions that the First Amendment cannot tolerate.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 58–59 (1976) (per curiam); see also Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 618 (1996) (principal opinion); Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political



Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 497 (1985).The parties neither ask the Court to overrule Buckley in

full nor challenge the level of scrutiny that decision ap-plies to campaign contributions. The exacting scrutiny the plurality applies to expenditure limitations, however, is appropriate. For the reasons explained in the plurality opinion, respondents’ attempts to distinguish the presentlimitations from those we have invalidated are unavailing. The Court has upheld contribution limits that do “not come even close to passing any serious scrutiny.” Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 410 (2000) (KENNEDY, J., dissenting). Those concerns aside, Vermont’s contributions, as the plurality’s detailed analy-sis indicates, are even more stifling than the ones that survived Shrink’s unduly lenient review.

The universe of campaign finance regulation is one thisCourt has in part created and in part permitted by its course of decisions. That new order may cause more prob-lems than it solves. On a routine, operational level thepresent system requires us to explain why $200 is too restrictive a limit while $1,500 is not. Our own experiencegives us little basis to make these judgments, and cer-tainly no traditional or well-established body of law existsto offer guidance. On a broader, systemic level political parties have been denied basic First Amendment rights.See, e.g., McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 286–287, 313 (2003) (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judg-ment in part and dissenting in part). Entering to fill thevoid have been new entities such as political action com-mittees, which are as much the creatures of law as of traditional forces of speech and association. Those entities can manipulate the system and attract their own elite power brokers, who operate in ways obscure to the ordi-nary citizen.

Viewed within the legal universe we have ratified andhelped create, the result the plurality reaches is correct;

3 Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006)


given my own skepticism regarding that system and its operation, however, it seems to me appropriate to concur only in the judgment.

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1 Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006)

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment


Nos. 04–1528, 04–1530 and 04–1697








[June 26, 2006]

JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins,concurring in the judgment.

Although I agree with the plurality that Vt. Stat. Ann.,Tit. 17, §2801 et seq. (2002) (Act 64), is unconstitutional, I disagree with its rationale for striking down that statute.Invoking stare decisis, the plurality rejects the invitation to overrule Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per cu-riam).1 It then applies Buckley to invalidate the expendi-——————

1 Although the plurality’s stare decisis analysis is limited to Buckley’s treatment of expenditure limitations, its reasoning cannot be so con-fined, and would apply equally to Buckley’s standard for evaluating contribution limits. See ante, at 10 (noting, inter alia, that Buckley has engendered “considerable reliance” that would be “dramatically under-mine[d]” by overruling it now).



ture limitations and, less persuasively, the contribution limitations. I continue to believe that Buckley providesinsufficient protection to political speech, the core of theFirst Amendment. The illegitimacy of Buckley is further underscored by the continuing inability of the Court (and the plurality here) to apply Buckley in a coherent and principled fashion. As a result, stare decisis should poseno bar to overruling Buckley and replacing it with a stan-dard faithful to the First Amendment. Accordingly, I concur only in the judgment.

I I adhere to my view that this Court erred in Buckley

when it distinguished between contribution and expendi-ture limits, finding the former to be a less severe in-fringement on First Amendment rights. See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 410–418 (2000) (dissenting opinion) (Shrink); Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 465–466 (2001) (Colorado II) (dis-senting opinion); Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 635– 644 (1996) (Colorado I) (opinion concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). “[U]nlike the Buckley Court, I believe that contribution limits infringe as directly and asseriously upon freedom of political expression and associa-tion as do expenditure limits.” Id., at 640. The Buckley Court distinguished contributions from expendituresbased on the presence of an intermediary between a con-tributor and the speech eventually produced. But that reliance is misguided, given that “[e]ven in the case of adirect expenditure, there is usually some go-between that facilitates the dissemination of the spender’s message.” Colorado I, supra, at 638–639; Shrink, supra, at 413–418 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Likewise, Buckley’s suggestionthat contribution caps only marginally restrict speech,

3 Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006)


because “[a] contribution serves as a general expression ofsupport for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support,” 424 U. S., at 21, even if descriptively accurate, does not sup-port restrictions on contributions. After all, statements of general support are as deserving of constitutional protec-tion as those that communicate specific reasons for that support. Colorado I, supra, at 639–640 (opinion of Tho-mas, J.); Shrink, supra, at 414–415, and n. 3 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Accordingly, I would overrule Buckley and subject both the contribution and expenditure restrictionsof Act 64 to strict scrutiny, which they would fail. See Colorado I, supra, at 640–641 (opinion of Thomas, J.) (“I am convinced that under traditional strict scrutiny, broadprophylactic caps on both spending and giving in thepolitical process . . . are unconstitutional”). See also Colo-rado II, supra, at 465–466 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

II The plurality opinion, far from making the case for

Buckley as a rule of law, itself demonstrates that Buckley’s limited scrutiny of contribution limits is “insusceptible of principled application,” and accordingly is not entitled to stare decisis effect. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U. S. 559, 599 (1996) (SCALIA, J., dissenting).Indeed, “ ‘when governing decisions are unworkable or arebadly reasoned, this Court has never felt constrained tofollow precedent.’ ” Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U. S. 267, 306 (2004) (plurality opinion) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827 (1991); internal quotation marks omitted). Today’s newly minted, multifactor test, particularly when read in combination with the Court’s decision in Shrink, supra, places this Court in the position of addressing the propriety of regulations of political speech based upon little more than its impression of the appropriate limits.

The plurality sets forth what appears to be a two-step



process for evaluating the validity of contribution limits:First, determine whether there are “danger signs” in a particular case that the limits are too low; and, second,use “independent judicial judgment” to “review the recordindependently and carefully with an eye towards assessingthe statute’s ‘tailoring,’ that is, towards assessing the proportionality of the restrictions.” Ante, at 14. Neither step of this test can be reduced to a workable inquiry to beperformed by States attempting to comply with this Court’s jurisprudence.

As to the first step, it is entirely unclear how to deter-mine whether limits are so low as to constitute “dangersigns” that require a court to “examine the record inde-pendently and carefully.” Ante, at 18. The pluralitypoints to several aspects of the Act that support its conclu-sion that such signs are present here: (1) the limits are setper election cycle, rather than divided between primary and general elections; (2) the limits apply to contributions from political parties; (3) the limits are the lowest in theNation; and (4) the limits are below those we have previ-ously upheld. Ante, at 15–19.

The first two elements of the Act are indeed constitu-tionally problematic, but they have no bearing on whetherthe contribution limits are too low. The first substantiallyadvantages candidates in a general election who did not face a serious primary challenge. In practice, this restric-tion will generally suppress more speech by challengers than by incumbents, without serving the interests theCourt has recognized as compelling, i.e., the prevention of corruption or the appearance thereof. Cf. B. Smith, Un-free Speech: The Folly of Campaign Finance Reform 50–51 (2001) (hereinafter Smith) (describing the ability of in-cumbents to amass money early, discouraging serious challengers from entering a race). The second element has no relation to these compelling interests either, given that “ ‘[t]he very aim of a political party is to influence its can-

5 Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006)


didate’s stance on issues and, if the candidate takes office or is reelected, his votes.’ ” Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 476 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Colorado I, 518 U. S., at 646 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting inpart)). That these provisions are unconstitutional, how-ever, does not make the contribution limits on individuals unconstitutionally low.

We are left, then, with two reasons to scrutinize Act 64’s limitations: They are lower than those of other States, and lower than those we have upheld in previous cases, i.e., Buckley and Shrink. But the relative limits of other States cannot be the key factor, for such considerationsare nothing more than a moving target. After all, if the Vermont Legislature simply persuaded several otherStates to lower their contribution limits to parallel Act 64,then the Act, which would still “significantly restrict the amount of funding available for challengers to run com-petitive campaigns,” ante, at 19, would survive this aspect of the majority’s proposed test.

Nor is the

supreme court of the united statessorrell syllabus limitations are inconsistent with the first...

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