http://www.jstor.org/stable/3399304

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=bap.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Islamic Law and Society.

http://www.jstor.org

SUNNI MUSLIM SCHOLARS ON THE STATUS OF LOGIC, 1500-1800*

KHALED EL-ROUAYHEB

(University of Cambridge)

Abstract In the present article, I discuss Goldziher's contention (echoed in more recent literature) that from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Sunni Muslim scholars ('ulama') became increasingly hostile to rational sciences such as logic. On the basis of discussions andfatawa by Sunni scholars in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, I show that this idea is radically mistaken. Mainstream scholars in the Maghrib, Egypt and Turkey considered logic to be not only permissible but actually commendable or even a religious duty incumbent on the Muslim community as a whole (i.e. a fard kifayah). Though there were dissenting voices in the period, such as the Qadizadelis, this seems to have been the mainstream opinion of Sunni scholars until the rise of the Salafiyyah movement in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

IN A CLASSIC ARTICLE FIRST PUBLISHED IN I916, the great orientalist Ignaz Goldziher surveyed the attitude of orthodox Islam to what he called the "ancient sciences," i.e. the sciences that had been handed down to the Muslims from Greek antiquity.1 Goldziher devoted almost half of the article to discussing attitudes to logic amongst Muslim scholars. He noted that opposition to logic gained strength in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when condemnations of the dis- cipline were advanced by influential scholars such as the Shafi'i jurist Ibn al-Salah (d. 643/1245) and the Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328). "From this period on," Goldziher asserted, "the study of logic was more or less decisively considered to be part of the

* I would like to thank the Executive Editors of ILS and the anonymous readers for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this essay.

1 Goldziher's article was originally published as "Stellung der alten islamischen Orthodoxie zu den antikken Wissenschaften," Abhandlung der Koniglichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 8 (1915): 3-46. In what follows, all references and quotations will be to and from the English translation "The Attitude of Orthodox Islam Toward the Ancient Sciences," in M.L. Swartz (transl. and ed.), Studies on Islam (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 185-215.

? Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2004 Also available online - www.brill.nl

Islamic Law and Society 11, 2

KHALED EL-ROUAYHEB

category of haram (forbidden)."2 Goldziher's article is almost a hundred years old, but the view just cited is still current in the scholarly literature. In an influential series of articles from the 1960s, George Makdisi argued that "the main current" in "Muslim theological thought" was represented by traditionalist opponents of rational theology (and logic) such as Ibn Taymiyya and his fourteenth century followers.3 In his influential A History of Islamic Philosophy (1st ed., 1970; 2nd ed. 1983), Majid Fakhry likewise stated that Ibn Taymiyya and his disciples "insured the victory of Neo-Hanbalism over scholastic theology and philosophy."4 More recently, Jonathan Berkey has suggested that between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries, "rational sciences" such as logic tended to become marginalized from what he calls the "Sunni intellectual maintream," largely due to the increased hostility of Sunni 'ulamd'.5

According to Goldziher, the intensification of Muslim scholars' hostility to logic in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries coincided with the onset of "decline in literature and art."6 The idea that Arabic- Islamic civilization entered a period of "decline" or "stagnation" after the thirteenth century is well known, and still influential in academic circles, both Western and Arab. The suggestion that hostility to logic "made decisive progress" from around this date may seem to fit well with this overall interpretation of the course of Arabic-Islamic intellectual history. Yet, Goldziher himself, towards the end of his article, noted that opposition to logic gradually disappeared in subsequent centuries, and that "up until the modern period, logic was treated in the theological curriculum as an ancillary discipline."7 In support of his statement, he mentioned that the eighteenth century Egyptian scholar Ahmad al-Sija'i (d. 1197/1783) composed a poem on the syllogistic figures.8 Yet, he did not discuss how this purported

2 Goldziher, "The Attitude of Orthodox Islam," 207. 3 G. Makdisi, "Ash'ari and the Ash'arites in Islamic religious history," Studia

Islamica 17 (1962): 37-80 and 18 (1963): 19-39. See also idem, "Law and Traditionalism in the Institutions of Learning of Medieval Islam," in G. E. von Griinebaum (ed.), Theology and Law in Islam (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1971).

4 M. Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy (2nd ed., New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 323.

5 Jonathan Berkey, The Formation of Islam: Religion and Society in the Near East, 600-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 229-30.

6 Goldziher, "The Attitude of Orthodox Islam," 204. 7 Ibid., 208. 8 Goldziher writes "al-Shuja'i" but this is a misprint or misreading. The scholar

214 SUNNI MUSLIM SCHOLARS

change in attitude came about. The reader of his article is left won- dering just how and why logic went from being considered religiously forbidden in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to being a fixed feature of the education of a Muslim scholar in the eighteenth.

In the present article, I examine some of the discussions concerning the status of logic by Sunni scholars in the period between 1500 and 1800. The picture that emerges is that hostility to logic was indeed a minority view in scholarly circles throughout this period. However, many of the scholars regularly invoked earlier authorities in support of their position. It is therefore questionable whether hostility to logic was ever a predominant view amongst Sunni scholars, at least between the endorsement of the discipline by Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 505/ 1111) and the rise of the Salafiyya in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

I

The last Muslim scholar cited by Goldziher as an opponent of logic was the Egyptian Jalal al-Din al-Suyut.i (d. 911/1505), who on several occasions condemned logic as both useless and inimical to the Muslim faith. One such condemnation, entitled al-Qawl al-mushriqfi tahrim al-ishtighdl bi'l-mantiq, is included in the collection of his religious responsa (fatawa).9 Suyut.i also produced an abridged version of an extended attack on logic by Ibn Taymiyyah.10 However, Suyuti-'s hostility to logic was not representative of his age. Already in his own lifetime, his condemnation of logic was contested by the Maghribi scholar Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Karim al-Maghili (d. 909/1503-4).11

in question is mentioned in 'Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, 'Aja'ib al-dthdrfi al-tardjim wa'l-akhbdr (Cairo: al-Matba'a al-'amira, 1297/1879), vol. 2, 75-7. His poem on syllogisms is extant in the Berlin Staatsbibliothek (MS: Landberg 962). The vocalization of his home town is given in Muhammad Murtada al-Zabidi, Taj al- carus fi sharh jawahir al-Qdmuis, ed. Farrufj et al. (Kuwait: Kuwait Government Press, 1965-2001), vol. 21, 182.

9 Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti, al-Hdwi li' l-fatdwd (Beirut: Dar al-kutub al-'ilmiyya, n.d. [reprint of Cairo edition of 1352/1933-34), vol.1, 255-7.

10 Suyuti's abridgment has been studied and translated by Wael Hallaq in his Ibn Taymiyya against the Greek Logicians (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).

1 On Maghili, see Ahmad Baba al-Tinbukti, Nayl al-ibtihdj bi-tatriz al-Dibdj, printed on the margins of Ibn Farhun, al-Dibaj al-mudhahhabfi ma'rifat a'yan al- madhhab (Cairo: Matba'at al-sa'ada, 1329/1911), 330-2. The poetic exchange between Maghili and Suyuti on logic is cited on p. 332.

215

KHALED EL-ROUAYHEB

Another Maghribi contemporary of Suyuti, the influential theologian Muhammad b. Yusuf al-Sanusi (d. 895/1490), was himself a prominent logician, and left behind a series of works on the topic.12 Suyuti's Egyptian contemporary, the highly esteemed judge Zakariyya al-Ansari (d. 926/1520), also defended the permissibility of logic, and wrote a popular commentary on the introductory logical handbook Isdghufi by Athir al-Din al-Abhari (d. 663/1264).13 Scholars like Sanusi and Ansari were by no means marginal-the former's theological works were extremely popular for centuries throughout Muslim Africa, and the latter wrote highly esteemed works on Shafi'i fiqh. There is no reason to suppose that Suyuti's attitude to logic was typical of Sunni scholars in the fifteenth century, and that as time went on scholars became more tolerant of the discipline. Suyuti seems rather to have been a late-but by no means the last-exponent of an undercurrent of hostility towards logic that had crystallised from an early period, but which does not seem to have become the predominant attitude among Sunni scholars, at least not before the twentieth century.

Two prominent jurists of the Shafi'i school of law, both of whom had studied with the aforementioned Zakariyya al-Ansari, illustrate the attitude of mainstream Sunni scholars to logic in the sixteenth century. In afatwa, the Egyptian jurist Shihab al-Din Ahmad al-Ramli (d. 957/1550) responded thus to the question whether studying logic is prohibited:

There are three positions on studying it: Ibn al-Salah and [Yahya] al- Nawawi [d. 676/1277] have said that it is prohibited, and Ghazali has said that he who does not know it cannot be trusted as a scholar, and the chosen position is, as some have said, that it is permitted to the person who can be trusted to be of sound mind and who adheres to the Holy Book and the Prophet's sunnah. Its aim is to ensure man against errors of reasoning, and it is related to meanings as grammar is related to words, and it is an instrument that enables one to acquire the other sciences, and does not itself require any other instrument.14

12 On Sanusi, see Tinbukti, Nayl al-ibtihdj, 325-9 and Carl Brockelmann, Geschichte der Arabischen Literatur [henceforth GAL], (Leiden: Brill, 1937-49), vol. 2, 250-2 (and Suppl.).

13 On Ansari, see Brockelmann, GAL, vol. 2, 99-100 (and Suppl.). Ansari briefly defends the permissibility of logic in his Sharh Isaghuji [printed on the margins of Yusuf al-Hafni, Hdshiya 'ala Sharh Isaghuji (Cairo: al-Matba'a al-'amira al- sharafiyya, 1302/1885)], 10.

14 Ahmad al-Ramli, Fatawa [printed on the margins of Ibn Hajar al-Haytami, al-Fatawa al-kubra al-fiqhiyya (Cairo: al-Matba'a al-muyammaniyya, 1308/ 1891)], vol. 4, 337. Ramli's responsa were collected by his son Shams al-Din

216 SUNNI MUSLIM SCHOLARS

The Egyptian-born but Meccan-based jurist Ibn Hajar al-Haytami (d. 973/1566) expounded at great length in one of hisfatdwa on what he saw as the correct position on logic. He started by noting that some scholars had prohibited logic, but went on to invoke the position of Ghazali in al-Mustasfd (on the principles of jurisprudence), where it is stated: "it is the preliminary to all the sciences and he who does not master it cannot be trusted in his scholarship." Ibn Hajar also adduced the discussion of logic in Ghazali's al-Munqidh min al-dalal, where it is stated:

Nothing in logic is relevant to religion by way of denial and affirmation. Logic is the study of the methods of demonstration and forming syllogisms, of the conditions for the premises of proofs, of the manner of combining the premises, of the conditions of sound definition, and the manner of ordering it ... What connection has this with the essentials of religion, that it should be denied or rejected?15

Ibn Hajar commented thus on Ghazali's pronouncements: Consider these words without partisanship and you will find that he- may God bless him-has clarified the way and established the proof to the effect that there is nothing in it [i.e. logic] which is reprehensible or leads to what is reprehensible, and that it is of use in the religious sciences such as the science of the principles of religion (usul al-din) and of jurisprudence (fiqh). The jurists have established the general principle that what is of use for the religious sciences should be respected and may not be derided, and it should be studied and taught as a fard kifdya [i.e. studying and teaching it is a collective duty incumbent on the Muslim community as a whole, rather than afard 'ayn which is an individual duty incumbent on each and every Muslim].16

Ibn Hajar went on to state that earlier jurists like Ibn al-Salah who prohibited logic were thinking of the logic of the philosophers (mantiq al-falasifah):

As for the logic that is known now amongst prominent Sunni scholars: it contains nothing that is reprehensible and nothing of the doctrines of the philosophizers, but is an intricate science, requiring mental exertion and consideration, which can be relied on for guarding against errors in reasoning as much as possible. God forbid that Ibn al-Salah or even someone of lesser stature should think ill of this!17

Muhammad al-Ramli (d. 1004/1596), and the work is sometimes attributed to the latter.

151 follow the translation of W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazali (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953), 35-36.

16 Ibn Hajar al-Haytami, Fatawa, vol. 1, 50. 17 Ibid., vol. 1, 50.

217

KHALED EL-ROUAYHEB

The logical handbooks studied in Sunni scholarly circles in the sixteenth century belonged to the Aristotelian logical tradition, as modified by Avicenna and later logicians working within the Aris- totelian-Avicennian paradigm.'8 The "logic known amongst Sunni scholars" was, in other words, Aristotelian-Avicennian logic. It is thus doubtful whether there is much content to the distinction between the logic of the philosophers and the logic of the Islamic scholars. The notion of "the logic of the philosophers" seems simply to have been used to explain away-as opposed to contradicting-the hostile views of earlier, venerable jurists. As will be seen below, this strategy would be deployed repeatedly in later centuries.

Ibn Hajar did not, however, extend his charitable reinterpretation to all scholars who were hostile to logic. He seems to have been more willing to criticize those who were closer to his own age, including- one presumes- Suyuti:

A group of later scholars have attacked it because they were ignorant of it-as the saying goes: "he who is ignorant of something is against it." It is sufficient for it to be deemed useful in religion that it is not possible to reply to the doubts raised by the philosophers or other [heretical] sects except by adherence to its principles. It ought to be motive enough for he who is ignorant of it that he will not be able to say a single word to the philosopher or anyone else who masters it. Rather, the philosopher or his like will deploy specious arguments and the person who is ignorant of it-even if he were one of the prominent scholars-will remain silent, not knowing how to reply. Al-Qarafi [Shihab al-Din Ahmad (d. 684/1285)]-one of the leading Maliki scholars-was indeed right to make it [i.e. the mastery of logic] one of the preconditions for exercising independent legal reasoning (ijtihad) ... He said in his discussion of the preconditions of exercising ijtihad: "it is a precondition that the conditions of definition and inference are known ... and the one who practices ijtihad needs to know these in each case. If that concerning which he practices ijtihad is a single essence (haqiqa basitah), then it cannot be ascertained except by means of a definition. And if he is to judge concerning a juridical matter, then every judgment presupposes two conceptions [of the subject and of the predi- cate] which ought to be ascertained, and thus he needs definition in both cases, and the conditions of definition are expounded in the science of logic ... As for the conditions of inference, he would need them because

18 This is true of the standard handbooks of the time, such as the Isaghuji of Abhari and the Shamsiyya of al-Katibi al-Qazwini; see the description of the works in Tony Street, "Arabic Logic," in J. Woods and D. Gabbay (eds.), Handbook of the History and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 1 (forthcoming). I am grateful to Dr. Street for making a copy of this article available to me prior to publication.

218 SUNNI MUSLIM SCHOLARS

he who practices ijtihad necessarily needs a proof, whether conclusive or probable, for his judgments, and every proof has conditions which are expounded in the science of logic, and if they are missing, the proof will be rendered fallacious while he thinks it is sound ... and thus logic is a precondition for ijtihad."19

Ibn Hajar rounded up his responsum by quoting the opinion of the prominent Shafi'i jurist Taj al-Din b. al-Subki (d. 771/1370), the crux of which is that logic is like a sword, which may be used in fighting for Islam and in a highway robbery.

The fact that both Ramli and Ibn Hajar were asked about the status of logic shows that there were still those who were suspicious of the discipline. However, the fact that both jurists answered that logic was permissible, indeed praiseworthy and necessary, also shows that this suspicion was not the dominant attitude amongst Sunni scholars of the sixteenth century. It should be emphasized that Suyuti, though he was widely respected in his own day for his knowledge of hadith and tafslr and grammar, was not considered to be on the same level as Ansari, Ramli and Ibn Hajar in the field of fiqh.20 The latters' juridical works were still considered authoritative within the Shafi'i school of law as late as the 1960s when Joseph Schacht wrote his Introduction to Islamic Law.21

Furthermore, the fact that a scholar like Ibn Hajar could invoke several earlier jurists in support of his position shows that he was not advancing a new position on the matter. Focusing, as Goldziher did, on a few isolated scholars like Ibn al-Salah, Ibn Taymiyya and Suyuti, may give the impression that their views were typical of the period between 1200 and 1500. The attitudes expressed by Ansari, Ramli and Ibn Hajar could on this account be taken to indicate a shift in attitudes in the early sixteenth century, towards a more positive evaluation of logic. However, once prominent jurists like Qarafi from the thirteenth century and Subki from the fourteenth are taken into consideration, the picture becomes much less clear-cut. Indeed, Wael

19 Ibn Hajar al-Haytami, Fatdwa, vol. 1, 50-1. 20 Suyuti himself thought that he was better versed in tafsir and hadith and

grammar than any of his contemporaries, but not in fiqh; see Suyuti, Sawn al- mantiq wa'l-kaldm 'an fannay al-mantiq wa'l-kalam, ed. 'All Sami al-Nashshar (Cairo, 1947), lam.

21 J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 262. Brockelmann also wrote that the commentaries of Ramli and Ibn Hajar on al-Minhdj of al-Nawawi were the two standard works of Shafi'ifiqh in his time (GAL, vol. 2, 321).

219

KHALED EL-ROUAYHEB

Hallaq has shown that during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries- the very centuries in which hostility to logic is supposed to have made "decisive progress"- Sunni writers on the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) consciously started incorporating the concepts and forms of argument of Aristotelian logic into their works.22

It is worth emphasising that there was no consensus on the status of logic, and that negative assessments continued to be made after the sixteenth century. For instance, an Egyptian contemporary of Ramli and Ibn Hajar, the Hanafi jurist Ibn Nujaym (d. 971/1563), laconically noted that philosophy was a religiously prohibited science, and that logic was part of philosophy. However, for the purpose of ascertaining what seems to have been the "main current" or "mainstream"- to use the words of Makdisi and Berkey - opinion among Sunni scholars, it is important to note that later Hanafi commentators of Ibn Nujaym's work dissented from this assessment. The Egyptian jurist Ahmad al- Hamawi (d. 1098/1687) cited two earlier commentators on this issue. One stated:

I have not seen in the books of jurists of our school the statement that logic is prohibited, and if the author has seen it he ought to have cited it. In the writings of Shafi'i jurists, particularly the later among them, there occur statements to this effect. It may be that he reasoned that it leads to the wasting of one's life, or that he who occupies himself with it usually inclines to philosophy, in which case his prohibition is one of closing off the means that can lead to evil (sadd al-dhar'i'). Other- wise, there is nothing in logic that contradicts religious law.

The other commentator stated:

It may be that what is intended, i.e. by the author, is the logic of the philosophers. As for the logic of Muslim scholars, there is no reason for the statement that it is prohibited, since it does not include what contradicts the principles of Islam. Prominent Muslim scholars have written on it [i.e. logic], such as Qutb al-Din al-Razi [(d. 766/1364-5)] from among the early scholars, and among the later scholars the Imam Ibn 'Arafa [(d. 803/1401)] and Shaykh al-Islam Zakariyya al-Ansari. And the Imam Ghazali has called it the standard of the sciences, and has said that he who has no knowledge of it cannot be trusted in his scholarship.23

Prominent Egyptian jurists and theologians of the seventeenth century

22 W. Hallaq, "Logic, Formal Arguments and Formalization of Arguments in Sunni Jurisprudence," Arabica 37(1990): 315-58.

23 Ahmad al-Hamawi, Ghamz 'uyuin al-basa'ir bi-sharh al-Ashbah wa' l-naza'ir (Cairo: al-Matba'a al-'amira, 1290/1873), vol. 2, 258.

220 SUNNI MUSLIM SCHOLARS

seem to have shared the evaluation of the commentators of Ibn Nujaym. For instance, the Hanafi theologian Ahmad al-Ghunaymi (d. 1044/ 1634) wrote glosses on Ansari's commentary on the Isaghuji.24 Another set of glosses on the same work was written by the prominent Shafi'i jurist Ahmad al-Qalyibi (d. 1069/1658).25 The Maliki jurist 'All al- Ujhuri (d. 1066/1656), who left behind a series of esteemed works on Maliki fiqh, also wrote a commentary on the logical handbook Tahdhib al-mantiq of Sa'd al-Din al-Taftazani (d. 792/1390).26 Ujhuri is also known to have taught the advanced logical handbook al- Shamsiyyafi al-qawd'id al-mantiqiyya by Najm al-Din al-Katibi al- Qazwini (d. 675/1277) to, among others, 'All al-Shabramallisi (d. 1087/1676) who would become perhaps the leading Shafi'i jurist of his day.27

In other parts of the Ottoman empire too, scholars studied, taught and wrote about logic, without worrying too much about the views of Suyuti and Ibn Nujaym. For instance, the Ottoman scholar and judge Ahmad Tashkoprtizade (d. 968/1560), in his encyclopaedia of the sciences Miftdh al-sa'ada, extolled the science of logic, calling it the "most noble" (ajall) of the auxiliary sciences and the "chief' (ra'ls) of the rational sciences:

In sum, logic is a science of evident certainties, like the sun that cannot but be clear everywhere. No one doubts its excellence except he who cannot perceive truths, and is incapable of understanding subtleties. And appropriate are the words of he who has said:

Logic is ill thought of by people without intelligence, and there is no harm in their view.

24 See the entry on Ghunaymi in Muhammad Amin al-Muhibbi, Khuldsat al- atharfi a'ydn al-qarn al-hadd 'ashar (Cairo: al-Matba'a al-wahbiyya, 1284/1867- 8), vol. 1, 312-15. See also Brockelmann, GAL, vol. 2, 329 (and Suppl.).

25 See the entry on Qalyubi in Muhibbi, Khuldsat al-athar, vol. 1, 175 and Brockelmann, GAL, vol. 2, 364-5 (and Suppl.). Qalyibi also wrote esteemed glosses on Mahalli's commentary on Nawawi's authoritative compendium of Shafi'i law al-Minhaj, which were printed in Cairo (Dar ihya' al-kutub al-'arabiyya) in 1949.

26 See the entry on Ujhuri in Muhibbi, Khuldsat al-athar, vol. 3, 157-60 and Brockelmann, GAL, vol. 2, 317-8 (and Suppl.). I give the vocalization indicated by Muhibbi (and by Zabidi, Tdj al-'aris, vol. 10, 498). The modern Egyptian vocalisation of the scholar's home town is Ajhur.

27 See the entry on Shabramallisi in Muhibbi, Khuldsat al-athar, vol. 3, 174-7 and in Brockelmann, GAL, vol. 2, 322 (and Suppl.). Again, the vocalization of Muhibbi differs from modern Egyptian vocalization of the scholar's home town, which is Shubramillis. Shabramallisi wrote influential glosses on Ramli's standard commentary on Nawawi's al-Minhdj that have been printed several times in Cairo (for example by Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi in 1938 and in 1967-9).

221

KHALED EL-ROUAYHEB

It does not harm the rising morning sun that the blind cannot see its light.28

To be sure, the so-called Qadizadeli movement, which spread in the Turkish-speaking parts of the Ottoman empire in the seventeenth century, kept alive the hostility to logic. Katib Celebi (d. 1067/1657), author of the well-known bibliography Kashf al-zunuin, attended one of the sermons of the founder of the movement, Qadizade Muhammad Efendi (d. 1045/1635-6), and related that the preacher was wont to make statements like "Who sheds a tear if a logician dies?."29 However, he clearly regarded the followers of Qadizade as marginal fanatics: "It is unnecessary to point out that the followers of Qadizade at the present time are notorious for their extremism and have earned general reproach."30 He himself was proficient in logic, having studied hand- books such as the Isaghuji of Abhari, the Tahdhib al-mantiq of Taftazani, and the Shamsiyya of Katibi, along with the standard commentaries on these works.31 It has been suggested that Katib Celebi was not typical of his age, and that there had been a backlash against the rational sciences after the reign of Sulayman the Magnificent (r. 1520-1566).32 At least in the case of logic, such a backlash seems never to have happened. Several prominent Ottoman scholars of the seventeenth century were also accomplished logicians. For instance, Qara Khalil b. Hasan (d. 1123/1711), who reached the high ranking position of Chief Judge (Qadi 'Askar) of Anatolia, and Muhammad Sadiq al-Shirwani (d. 1120/1708), who assumed the even higher position of Grand Mufti (Shaykh al-Islam) of the Empire, both wrote works on logic.33 Muhammad Saqaqlizade (d. 1145/1732-3) seems

28 Ahmad Tashk6priizade, Miftah al-sa'ada wa misbah al-siydda (Hyderabad: Matba'at da'irat al-ma'arif al-nizamiyya, 1327/1911), vol. 1, 235-6.

29 follow the translation of G.L. Lewis, Katib Chelebi: The Balance of Truth (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1957), 136.

30 Lewis, Ibid, 137. On the Qadizadeli movement, see M. Zilfi, The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age: 1600-1800 (Bibliotheca Islamica: Minneapolis, 1988), ch. 4. Zilfi also states (on p. 190) that the Qadizadelis "were a minority among the religious intelligentsia."

31 Lewis, Katib Chelebi, 141. 32 H. Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600 (London:

Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1973), 179-85; M. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), vol. 3, 123.

33 On Qara Khalil, see Isma'il Pasha al-Baghdadi, Hadiyyat al-'arifinfi asma' al-mu'allifin wa athar al-musannifin (Istanbul: Wikalat al-ma'arif al-jalila, 1951- 5), vol. 1, 354-5. His super-commentary on Fanari's commentary on Isaghuji was printed in Istanbul (al-Matba'a al-sultaniyya, 1265/1848). On Shirwani, see

222 SUNNI MUSLIM SCHOLARS

to have been representative of mainstream Ottoman scholars in holding the study of logic to be either commendable or a collective religious duty. This was partly, Sa9aqlizade wrote, because the study of proofs (adillah) was a prerequisite for the study of the principles of juris- prudence.34 Logic was also helpful in sharpening wits (tashhidh al- khdtir), which was itself a religious duty:

The mind is an instrument of religion, as he [i.e. Ghazali] has stated, and the stupid person corrupts religion. It is therefore commendable or a fard kifaya to study some subtle works on the religious or in- strumental sciences in such a way as to sharpen wits.35

Another seventeenth century scholar who rejected the position of the scholars who were hostile to logic was the Moroccan al-Hasan al- Yuisi (d. 1102/1691). Yusi was himself a prominent logician, who left behind extensive glosses on the logical handbook al-Mukhtasar fi al-mantiq by the aforementioned fifteenth century scholar Mu- hammad b. Yusuf al-Sanusi. Yusi also wrote an influential super- commentary on the major theological work of Sanusi, 'Aqldat ahl al-tawhid (also known as al-Kubra al-Sanuslyyah), in which he devoted considerable space to refuting the position of those who considered logic and rational theology (kaldm) to be reprehensible or prohibited. Yusi's discussion starts by considering two possible reasons for considering logic and theology to be reprehensible: (i) they are innovations (bida'), and (ii) they cite and discuss heretical views and arguments. Yusi rejects both reasons. To the position that one ought simply to ignore heretical views and stick to the views of the earliest generations of Islam, he replied:

How is it possible to know the truth and confine one's attention to it and differentiate it from false views unless the false views are known? As for the earliest generations (al-salaf), the specious views were simply not around at their time, and hence they did not discuss them, and we are certain that if they had been confronted with them they would have

Mehmet Stireyya, Sicill-i Osmani (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1891-1897) vol. 3, 188. Shirwani wrote Sharh Takmil al-mantiq, a manuscript of which is extant in the British Library (MS: Or.12405). For a list of Ottoman Chief Judges and Grand Muftis in these centuries, see Zilfi, The Politics of Piety, 246ff.

34 Saaqlizade, Tartib al-'ulum, ed. Muhammad b. Isma'il al-Sayyid Ahmad (Beirut: Dar al-basa'ir al-islamiyya, 1988), 104. Professor Stefan Reichmuth has kindly sent me a copy of his as yet unpublished paper on Sacaqlizade's work. Professor Reichmuth also suggests that Sa,aqlizade's attitude towards logic was typical of the Ottoman scholars of his age.

35 Ibid., 114-5.

223

KHALED EL-ROUAYHEB

disproved them ... Furthermore, most of these matters are in the Qur'an and they were Arabs who understood its meanings ... It [i.e. the Qur'an] is full of arguments and replies to the unbelievers, and God-may He be exalted-mentioned their doctrines, such as the rejection of the resurrection, the Trinity and other examples of unbelief, and disproved them. In this there is the most powerful argument for rational theology (kaldm).36

To the position that theology and logic were innovations, Yusi replied by showing that all sciences were established after the earliest generations of Islam. Even such thoroughly respectable sciences as Qur'an commentary (tafslr), the sciences of hadith, jurisprudence (fiqh), and Arabic grammar ('ilm al-nahw) are thus all "innovations." If a science is reprehensible or prohibited because it was developed after the earliest generations of Islam, then all sciences should be considered reprehensible. It could perhaps be argued that though the sciences of tafslr and had[th andfiqh--with their technical terms and systematic presentations-were developed at a later stage, the earliest generations nevertheless interpreted the Qur'an, related hadith, and articulated legal principles. However, as Yusi pointed out, the earliest generations also argued and inferred and gave reasons. There would still be no reason for enjoining the sciences of tafslr and hadith andfiqh while proscribing logic. The need for the latter discipline arises when the other sciences develop and disagreements emerge concerning the legitimacy of inferences made by scholars:

So as the need arose for that which will lead to knowledge, and distinguish between correct and incorrect reasoning, they wrote down the science of logic and translated it into Arabic so that this noble Arab community may benefit from it, since it is the ruler of minds and the chief amongst all the sciences. And it was originally part of the wisdom that was extracted by the Greeks.37

The general position of Yusi, expressed in his work on the sciences, al-Qanun fl ahkam al-'ilm, was that all sciences are permitted in themselves:

We do not heed those who prohibit some of these sciences, for science in itself is food for the mind and the joy of the spirit and the attribute of virtue ... Even magic, which all jurists agree may not be used, if one were to learn it ... just to know it, and be able to distinguish

36 Hasan al-Yusi, Hawashl al-kubra (MS: Berlin Staatsbibliothek: Or. Quart. 1440), fols. 31a-31b.

37 Ibid., fol. 32b.

224 SUNNI MUSLIM SCHOLARS

between it and miracles ... studying it would be permissible, or even a duty, as has been stated already. And the science of belles-lettres, which is licit by common consent, if one were to study it with the view to becoming a poet who lampoons those whom it is not permitted to lampoon, or praise those whom it is not permitted to praise, studying it would not be permitted to him. "Acts are judged according to their intentions."38

In his glosses on Sanusi's theological work, Yusi went on to consider the views of Suyuti. The latter, in his responsum against logic, had stated that the discipline had no worldly or religious use, since it dealt with inferences involving universals (kulliyyat), and universals do not exist outside the mind and do not refer to existing particulars (la tadullu 'ala juz'l aslan). To this Yusi replied:

As for his claim that universals do not exist outside the mind etc., I wonder how such a claim can be made in such a context by a rational being, not to mention a scholar. I had thought that he [i.e. Suyuti] was of a higher scholarly rank, and that he was one of those who, though not a specialist, had an idea of the discipline, but such a statement shows that he has not an inkling of the rational sciences.39

The statement implies, wrote Yusi, that there is no general scientific principle (qanun) whatsoever, whether juridical or theological or grammatical. The term qanun in this context refers to a proposition that has as its subject a general term (such as "man") rather than a singular term (such as "Zayd").40 Such propositions were clearly conceived by Yusi to be essential to anything claiming to be a science. To say, as Suyuti did, that logic was of no worldly or religious use because it involved such universals, meant that all sciences were of no use. Furthermore, Suyuti's statement suggested that he believed that all of his own knowledge was only of externally existing parti- culars. But this view, which Yusi compared to that of the ancient Sophists, was patently absurd. Propositions consisting of a subject and predicate did not assert a relationship (nisbah) between two externally existing particulars. Rather, they assert that concepts

38 Hasan al-Yusi, al-Qanun fi ahkdm al-'ilm wa ahkdm al-'alim wa ahkdm al- muta'allim, ed. Humayd Hammani (Rabat: Matba'at shala, 1998), 177. Yusi is quoting a well-known hadlth.

39 YUsi, Hawashi al-kubra, fols. 33a-33b. Also quoted in Muhammad Murtada al-Zabidi, Ithaf al-sada al-muttaqin bi-sharh lhya' 'ulum al-dln (Cairo: al-Matba'a al-muyammaniyya, 1311/1893-4), vol. 1, 178.

40 See al-Sayyid al-Sharif al-Jurjani, Kitdb al-ta'rifdt (Beirut: Maktabat Lubnan, 1969 [reprint of Flugel ed. of 1895]), 177.

225

KHALED EL-ROUAYHEB

(ma'ani) applied or did not apply to externally existing particulars.41 Yusi ended his discussion by saying that he had intended to compose

an independent treatise on this matter when he first came across Suyuti's responsum, but then concluded that it would be a waste of time. He would indeed have ignored Suyuti's idiosyncratic view altogether were it not for the fact that the dull-witted (al-buladd') sometimes thought that it was correct. Yusi was explicitly reacting against Suyuti's laconic responsum, and seems to have been unaware of the much longer and more formidable attack on logic by Ibn Taymiyyah.

Yusi's logical and theological works were widely studied in the Maghrib in subsequent centuries, as is shown by the large number of extant manuscripts of his works in the national libraries of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. A number of his students settled in Egypt and taught his works to several local students who went on to become some of the most prominent Egyptian scholars of the eighteenth century, such as Ahmad al-Mallawi (d. 1181/1767) and Ahmad al- Damanhuri (d. 1192/1778).42 Both scholars composed widely studied commentaries on a didactic poem on logic by 'Abd al-Rahman al- Akhdari (d. 953/1546), in the introduction to which they discussed the permissibility of the discipline. Mallawi mentioned the three standard positions on the issue: (i) the view, attributed to Ibn al- Salah and Nawawi, that it is prohibited; (ii) the view, attributed to Ghazali, that it ought to be taught, and that scholars who are ignorant of it cannot be trusted to avoid errors of reasoning; and (iii) the predominant and correct view that it is permitted to those who are of sound mind and adhere to the Qur'an and the Prophet's sunnah. This is essentially the same tripartite division and ultimate assessment given in the above-cited responsum of the sixteenth century jurist Ahmad al-Ramli. However, Mallawi gave the discussion an important twist by stating that the controversy concerns only the logic that was "mixed with philosophy." In other words, it was what Ibn Hajar had called "the philosophers' logic"-and not the logic that was studied and taught in Islamic scholarly circles -that had been prohibited by some, and permitted or commended by others.

41 Yusi, Hawdshi al-kubra, fol. 33b; Zabidi, Ithdf al-sada al-muttaqin, vol. 1, 178. For the use of the term ma'adn to denote concepts or ideas (suwar dhihniyya), see Zabidi, Tdj al-'arus, vol. 39, 123.

42 I discuss this development in my "Was There a Revival of Logical Studies in Eighteenth Century Egypt?" (forthcoming in Die Welt des Islams).

226 SUNNI MUSLIM SCHOLARS

As for the logic that is not mixed with philosophy, as in this book and the Mukhtasar of al-Sanusi and [the Mukhtasar] of Ibn 'Arafa and the treatise of Athir al-Din al-Abhari called Isaghuji and the works of al- Katibi [i.e. al-Shamsiyyah] and al-Khunaji [Afdal al-Din (d. 646/1249), i.e. al-Jumal] and Sa'd al-Din [al-Taftazani, i.e. Tahdhib al-mantiq], there is no disagreement concerning the permissibility of engaging in it, and it is rejected only by he who has no inkling of the rational sciences. Indeed, it is afard kifdya because the ability to reply to heretical views in rational theology (kalam), which is afard kifdya, depends on mastering this science, and that which is necessary for a religious duty is itself a duty.43

The same assessment, though couched in a slightly more cautious tone, was given by Damanhuri, who in the last years of his life was Rector of the Azhar College in Cairo:

Know that this disagreement concerns the logic that is mixed with the statements of the philosophers, as in the Tawali' al-anwar of al-Baydawi [d. ca. 681/1282]. As for that which is not so mixed, as in the Mukhtasar of al-Sanusi and the Shamsiyya and the present work, there is no disagreement concerning the permissibility of engaging in it. Indeed, studying and teaching it is plausibly held to be a fard kifaya since on this depends the knowledge of how to reply to heretical doubts, which is known to be a fard kifdyah.44

The same assessment was given by one of the most prominent Egyptian Maliki jurists of the eighteenth century, 'All al-'Adawi al-Sa'idi (d. 1189/1775):

Know that this disagreement concerns the logic that is mixed with the statements of the philosophers, not that which is not mixed, such as the Sullam and the Mukhtasar of Sanusi and Isaghuji and the Shamsiyya, about whose permissibility there is no disagreement, and it is not rejected except by he who has no inkling of the rational sciences. It is a fard kifaya because the ability to address doubts in rational theology (kalam), which is a fard kifaya, depends on the mastery of this science.45

An eighteenth century scholar residing in Egypt was unhappy with what he considered the undue popularity of logic in the scholarly

43 Ahmad al-Mallawi, Sharh al-Sullam [printed on the margins of Sabban, .Hashiya 'ald Sharh al-Sullam (Cairo: al-Matba'a al-azhariyya, 1319/1901), 36-7.

44 Ahmad al-Damanhfiri, Idah al-mubham min ma'ani al-Sullam, ed. 'Umar Faruq al-Tabba' (Beirut: Maktabat al-ma'arif, 1996), 32-3.

45 'All al-'Adawi, Hdshiya 'ala Sharh al-Sullam (MS: British Library: Or. 3125), fol. 43a. On 'Adawi, see Jabarti, 'Aja'ib al-athar, vol. 1,414-16 and Brockelmann, GAL, vol. 2, 319. His esteemed glosses on the commentary of Kharashi on the standard manual of Maliki law Mukhtasar Khalll have been reprinted several times (for example in Cairo: al-Matba'a al-kubra al-amiriyya, 1317/1899-1900).

227

KHALED EL-ROUAYHEB

circles of his time. Muhammad Murtada al-Zabidi (d. 1205/1791), in his commentary on the Ihya' 'ululm al-din of Ghazali, cited the various opinions concerning logic that had been voiced by Muslim scholars in the past. In this connection, he mentioned the view of Suyuti, and Yusi's riposte thereto. Though he seems to have stopped short of the view that logic was prohibited, he argued that it was basically a reprehensible science. Knowledge of elementary logic might perhaps be helpful for mastering other sciences, but Maghribi scholars such as Yusi were cultivating it far beyond this level. Furthermore, Maghribi scholars had-according to Zabidi-recently infected Egyp- tian scholars with this enthusiasm for logic, leading them to neglect the sciences of hadith.46 As a matter of fact, Zabidi argued, logic tends to encourage reprehensible character traits such as pride, dis- putatiousness, and the tendency to belittle others for no religious reason:

You do not find in their [i.e. the logicians'] books any mention of God and his Prophet, except in the preamble, nor do you find their classes filled with anything but reprehensible disputations and illicit quarrels and refutations and condemnations and contestations and scorn.47

Suyuti was indeed right in claiming that it was of no religious use:

For the faith that comes from the profession of the unity of God (al- tawhid) is not based on logical demonstration, contrary to what they [i.e. the theologians and logicians] claim, but on knowledge bringing the one who possesses it to the truth of the matter. Its sign is the opening of the heart to the stations of faith, and acceptance of the decree of God, and turning to the recollection (dhikr) of Him, and loving Him while turning away from the world of vanity ... He who is preoccupied with it [i.e. logic] is preoccupied with his outward aspect and visible conditions, to the detriment of the inward condition (batin halihi), and the reason for him being in this sorry state is his love of prominence and his desire for acclaim from people... and so he wastes his days for their days, and his life for their desires, just so he can be called a scholar.48

Zabidi was a mystic initiated into the Naqshbandi order, and his mystical inclinations clearly color his discussion. Yet, not all mystics shared his hostility to logic. For instance, the Damascene mystic (and fellow Naqshbandi) 'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi (d. 1143/1731) seems to have been more sympathetic to it. He composed a short poem

46 Zabidi, Ithafal-sdda al-muttaqln, vol. 1, 179-80. 47 Ibid., vol. 1, 180. 48 Ibid., vol. 1, 181.

228 SUNNI MUSLIM SCHOLARS

outlining its basics, along with a commentary in prose. The second line of the poem states:

Now then: Logic is a thing that should be sought by the one who wants to master any science.49

Other eighteenth century Egyptian scholars who also belonged to mystical orders, such as the Maliki jurist and Khalwati mystic Ahmad al-Dardir (d. 1201/1786) apparently had no compunctions in engaging in the discipline. Dardir wrote a commentary on the poem on syllogistic figures by Ahmad al-Sija'i that was noted by Goldziher.5?

Zabidi belonged to the Hanafi school of law, but again there seems to have been no correlation between belonging to a certain school of law and hostility towards logic. Nabulusi was also a Hanafi, as were the sixteenth and seventeenth century Turkish scholars whose position on logic has been described above. Several Hanafi contemporaries of Zabidi were actually considered specialists in logic. For instance, the Egyptian scholar Hasan al-Jabarti (d. 1188/1774)-the father of the more famous historian 'Abd al-Rahman-was both a prominent Hanafi jurist and a specialist in the philosophical sciences. He studied advanced logical handbooks such as the Shamsiyya of al-Katibi, as well as handbooks on physics and metaphysics, particularly Hiddyat al-hikma by al-Abhari and various commentaries and glosses thereon.51

II

Zabidi's discussion does not seem to have had much effect on the attitude of mainstream Egyptian scholars. Several prominent scholars of the following generations continued to study, teach and write about logic. For instance, Hasan al-'Attar (d. 1250/1834-5), Hasan al-

49 The line is quoted in 'Abd al-Hamid Hasan, Fihris makhtuttdt ddr al-kutub al-zahiriyyah: al-falsafa wa'l-mantiq wa dddb al-bahth (Damascus: Matbu'at majma' al-lugha al-'arabiyya, 1970), 173.

50 The commentary is extant in the Berlin Staatsbibliothek (MS: Landberg 962). On Dardir, see Jabarti, 'Aja'ib al-dthar, vol. 2, 147-8 and Brockelmann, GAL, vol. 2, 353. Dardir wrote an esteemed commentary on Mukhtasar Khalil, printed in 1912-3 with the glosses of Dasuqi (Cairo: Matba'at al-sa'adah). He also wrote an independent manual on Maliki law entitled Aqrab al-masalik ild madhhab al-Imdm Mdlik which have been reprinted several times with Dardir's own commentary (for example in Cairo: Matba'at al-madani, 1962-5).

51 See the long entry on Hasan al-Jabarti in Jabarti, 'Ajd'ib al-dthar, vol. 1, 390ff.

229

KHALED EL-ROUAYHEB

Quwaysini (d. 1255/1839) and Ibrahim al-Baijuri (d. 1276/1860)- all three Rectors of the Azhar-wrote works on logic.52 However, the nineteenth century witnessed the strengthening of intellectual currents that were to challenge the predominant attitude of the pre- ceding centuries. The so-called Salafiyya movement, inspired in part by the Yemeni scholars Muhammad b. Isma'il al-Amir (d. 1182/1768) and Muhammad al-Shawkani (d. 1250/1834), and in part by the Wahhabi movement of central Arabia, gradually gained strength amongst Sunni scholars during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. One of the hallmarks of the movement was a rehabilitation of Ibn Taymiyya and his fideist rejection of kalam and logic for the sup- posedly pristine faith of the earliest generations of Islam (al-salaf)53 One of the most influential nineteenth century Salafis, the Indian- born Muhammad Siddiq b. Hasan Khan al-Qannawji (d. 1308/1889), upheld Ibn Taymiyyah's views on logic:

I say: look at the book criticizing the logicians by Ibn Taymiyya- may God have mercy on him-and know that his replies [to the logicians] are many, and that they are all true ... He who is of sound and undistorted nature, heart and mind does not need the science of logic, rather he will have the corresponding know-how without acquaintance with the discipline.54

52 See Fihris al-kutub al-mahfuza bi'l-kutubkhane al-khediviyya al-misriyya (Cairo, 1305/1888), vol. 6,53 (on Bajuri), 63 (on Quwasini), 91 (on 'Attar). Bajuri's glosses on Sanusi's Sharh al-mukhtasarfi al-mantiq have been printed (Cairo: al- Matba'a al-khayriyya, 1292/1875). 'Attar's glosses on Khabisi's Sharh Tahdhib al-mantiq have also been printed (Cairo: al-Matba'a al-azhariyya, 1327/1909).

53 On Salafi ideology, see the older but still useful overview of H. Laoust, "Le Reformisme Orthodoxe des Salafiyya," Revue des Etudes Islamique 6 (1932): 175-224. Laoust points out that the Salafiyya considered themselves to be reverting to the position of the early Ahl al-hadlth in viewing all kaldm, Ash'ari as well as Mu'tazili, as reprehensible innovation (see esp. 190). L. Gardet has also noted the "alienation from kaldm" amongst the Salafis; see EF, s.v. 'Ilm al-Kalam. The argument that a mastery of logic was necessary for dealing with doubts raised in kalam would have carried little weight with them.

54 Siddiq b. Hasan al-Qannawji, Abjad al-'ulum (Beirut: Dar al-kutub al- 'ilmiyya, n.d), vol. 2, 523. On Qannawji, see EF, s.v. Nawwab Sayyid Siddik Hasan Khan (Z. Khan). The fact that he was a second-generation student of Shawkani, and his subsequent influence on Arab Salafis, is apparent from Nu'man b. Mahmud al-Alusi, Jald' al-'aynayn ft muhakamat al-Ahmadayn (Beirut: Dar al-kutub al-'ilmiyya [reprint]), 48-50, and 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Bitar, Hilyat al-bashar ft tarikh al-qarn al-thalith 'ashar, ed. Muhammad Bahjat al-Bitar (Damascus: Matbu'at majma' al-lugha al-'arabiyya, 1961-3), vol. 2, 738-46. The influence of Qannawji on later Arab Salafis is also noted in D. Commins, Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 24-5.

230 SUNNI MUSLIM SCHOLARS

Qannawji's view of kalam was not much more positive: The eminent scholar Muhammad b. al-Wazir [d. 840/1436] has written a work entitled The superiority of the way of the Qur'an to the way of the Greeks and a work entitled The Decisive Proof in which he has replied to the theologians. He has shown that all the issues dealt with by them can be established from the Qur'an and the sunna, and that there is no need for the principles of theology. These two works are priceless.55

Qannawji's attitude to logic and kalam seems to have been widely, if not invariably, shared by the Salafis.56 It was a far cry from the philosophically sophisticated approach of prominent Sunni theologians and logicians of the period between the twelfth and the nineteenth century, such as Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 606/1209), Sa'd al-Din al- Taftazani (d. 792/1390), al-Sayyid al-Sharif al-Jurjani (d. 816/1413), Muhammad b. Yusuf al-Sanusi (d. 895/1490), Jalal al-Din al-Dawani (d. 907/1501), 'Abd al-Hakim al-Siyalkuti (d. 1067/1657), and al- Hasan al-Yusi (d. 1102/1691).57

By the middle of the twentieth century, the Salafi and Wahhabi movements were so influential that they could hardly be called an "undercurrent." The "decisive progress" in the opposition to the study of logic seems to have come about, not in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, as Goldziher suggested, but during the second half of the

55 Qannawji, Abjad al-'ulum, vol. 2, 441. The Yemeni scholar Muhammad b. al-Wazir was one of the major influences on the thought of Ibn al-Amir and Shawkani, see B. Haykal, Revival and Reform in Islam: The Legacy of Muhammad al-Shawkdni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 10-12, and the entry on him in Muhammad al-Shawkani, al-Badr al-tali' bi-mahasin man ba'd al-qarn al-sabi' (Cairo: Matba'at dar al-sa'ada, 1348/1929-30), vol. 2, 81-93.

56 It should be noted that Salafi attitudes towards logic have not yet been investigated thoroughly. Given Qannawji's personal influence, and the Salafis' well-attested enthusiasm for Ibn Taymiyya and hostility to kaldm, one would expect the cited assessment of logic to be typical of the movement. However, there may have been differences on this issue between various figures often described as "Salafi". Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905), who is sometimes-though rather questionably-- considered a Salafi, shared the positive attitude of previous Rectors of the Azhar towards logic, and wrote annotations to 'Umar b. Sahlan al-Sawi, al- Basd'iral-nasiriyyaft al-mantiq (printed in Cairo: al-Matba'a al-kubra al-amiriyya, 1898).

57 Ibn Khaldun, writing in the late fourteenth century, noted (and regretted) the tendency of theologians after Ghazali to mix theological speculation with logic and philosophy, to such an extent that "one discipline is no longer distinguishable from the other," see F. Rosenthal (tr.), The Muqaddima (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), vol. 3, 53.

231

232 KHALED EL-ROUAYHEB

nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth. Hostility amongst Sunni scholars to rational theology and logic gained strength, not in the centuries of so-called "decline," but in the period widely referred to as "the awakening" (al-nahdah).