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Fearon. 1995. Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization 49 (3): 379-414.

1 In Brief1.1 The Real Puzzle

2 Main Argument2.1 X1: Bluffing2.2 X2: Commitment Problems2.3 X3: Issue indivisibility

In Brief

"On close inspection none of the rationalist arguments advanced in the literature holds up as an explanation becausenone addresses or adequately resolves the central puzzle, namely, that war is costly and risky, so rational states shouldhave incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all would prefer to the gamble of war" (380). Why don't leadersreach "ex ante (prewar) bargains that would avoid the costs and risks of fighting?" It's not enough to show why armedconflict might happen, even between rational leaders--you must also show why a peaceful bargain won't happen first.This quotation from Gartze summaries Fearon's argument well:

"Fearon seeks to identify the causes of war that are consistent with the rationality assumption(s). Hebegins with two stylized observations. First, states often have incentives to compete. Second, certainmodes of competition (such as war) are more costly than other methods (negotiation, bargaining). Forstates that compete through war, the loss in lives and property reduces the benefit or increases theburden of eventual settlements. Therefore, states are better off obtaining a given settlement without acostly contest. Rationalist explanations for war are then accounts of why states are unable to bargainand obtain settlements ex ante for which they settle ex post...."Fearon's article deftly exposes the deductive flaws in realist and most contemporary rationalistexplanations for international conflict. Fearon points out that, although both power and preferences arelikely to influence the nature of settlements reached between competing parties, and in their absencecan account for peace, such factors tell us little about why states choose to fight. Any variable likely toinfluence the conduct and consequences of war (such as power or resolve) that is knowable prior to thecontest can simply be factored into a settlement that averts the need to fight. Indeed, even uncertaintyabout these variables does not necessitate war. States in competition must have incentives to bluff or

deceive their opponents. Otherwise, states could resolve their uncertainty by simply sharinginformation."

The Real Puzzle

The puzzle that rationalists ought to be paying attention to is this: "In a rationalist framework...leaders have incentivesto share...private information, which could have the effect of revealing peaceful settlements that lie within thebargaining range. So, to explain how war could occur...we need to explain what would prevent them from sharing suchprivate information." (395)

Main Argument

Fearon identifies five arguments in the literature about war:

1. anarchy;2. expected benefits exceed expected costs;3. rational preventive war;4. rational miscalculation due to lack of information;5. and rational miscalculation or disagreement about relative power.

According to Fearon, the first three don't explain why a bargain can't be reached. The latter two get at this, but don'texplain why diplomacy or other communication couldn't be used to improve on the communication problems.

So what does resolve the puzzle? Fearon identifies three variables (with associated hypotheses) that explain theoccurrence of war.

X1: Bluffing

Incentives to misrepresent information. To get the best outcome through bargaining, leaders have an incentive toexaggerate their resolve/capabilities (i.e. bluff) and to hide their weakness. (i.e. each leader tries to persuade the otherto give in.) (see also Jervis 1988).

X2: Commitment Problems

Three commitment problems caused by anarchy. (a) The first-strike advantage increases the incentive to defect soonerin prisoner's dilemma bargaining. (b) If one state is declining relative to another, the rising power cannot crediblycommit to benign hegemony once it is dominant over the declining power. Thus, the declining power has an incentive towage pre-emptive war against a rising power (as long as the costs of war are less than the expected costs of furtherdecline). (This sounds like hegemonic stability theory). (c) Most state conflicts occur over resources, which are the rootof military capability. When bargaining over these resources (in an effort to avoid war), neither state can crediblycommit to use resources gained through bargaining for only peaceful purposes; it might use them to increase itsmilitary power. Thus, the zero-sum nature of resources lowers the probability of successfully bargaining over them.

X3: Issue indivisibility

Many of the things that states bargain/fight over are not easily divisible. Fearon dismisses this problem, as states caneasily make side payments or something.

Related ReadingThe following summaries link (or linked) to this one:

Gartzke: War is in the error termJervis: War and misperceptionLake and Rothchild: Containing fearWagner: Bargaining and war

Keywords: Authors/Fearon, James - Political Science - International Relations - War - Rational Choice -Information - Credible Commitment - Anarchy - Bargaining - Hegemony