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SPECIAL SECTION:

NORTH KOREA

Guest Editor: Jae-Jung Suh



Introduction

Making Sense of North Korea:Institutionalizing Juche at the

Nexus of Self and Other

Jae-Jung Suh

In American discourse, both popular and scholarly, North Korea remainseither an unknown hermit or a palpable evil. While it is a country everyoneloves to hate, its reality remains elusive to most, and many speculate aboutits contemporary conditions and future viability. As a country, North Koreahas existed for over half a century, yet its history remains in oblivion. Themost recognizable features of contemporary North Korea — its nuclear prob-

lem, famine, and son gun chöngch'i (military-first policy) — seem somehowahistoric, entities that the North's leadership has produced seemingly out of the blue, and perhaps out of evil intentions. In general, the world views NorthKorea — with a population of over twenty million spread over land the sizeof New York state — as little more than a monolithic unit that speaks withone voice and walks in regimental unison. For its part, the United States,which fought the first "hot" war (armed, open conflict) of the Cold War periodagainst North Korea, considers the country to be a threat, constantly wielding

weapons to undermine U.S. security and that of U.S. allies. Mostly, however, North Korea remains invisible. On the occasions that it emerges from theshadows, it does so as a laggard, an outlier, a violator, or a threat. In short, itis the other.1

The state of discourse about North Korea parallels, at least partially, thatof politics. The process through which the United States and North Korea

produce knowledge about each other has been tainted by the enmity in whichthey have been mired for over fifty years. This enmity has cut off direct andmeaningful channels of communication and exchange, and has created, in

Jae-Jung Suh is associate professor and director of Korea Studies Program at SAIS JohnsHopkins University.

The Journal of Korean Studies 12, no. 1 (Fall 2007): 3-143



4 Jae-Jung Suh

each case, the structural absence of the object of inquiry. The dearth of first-hand experience and direct knowledge between North Korea and the United

States forces scholars to rely on secondary sources that are susceptible toexisting presumptions, whereupon they often unwittingly reproduce them.2The scarcity of "raw data" has been supplemented, or in some cases replaced,with theories developed in the context of studying other communist countries(particularly the Soviet Union), underdeveloped communist countries (suchas China), or lately collapsed communist countries (such as Romania). Suchknowledge is produced with empirical deficiencies, and the presumed gen-eralizability of these theories elides the problems that underlie them. Thisvicious circle of flawed knowledge production is exacerbated by the powerful

antagonism between North Korea and the United States, which skews andconstrains the possible range of discursive space open to deliberations. To theextent that presumptions in the existing theories, which stand in for absentempirics, are affected by enmity — whether of a global Cold War kind or amore local Korean variety— the resulting knowledge contributes to repro-ducing enmity and misunderstanding. The cycle of confrontation is thereforecomplete: the enmity affects knowledge production, and the knowledge, soaffected, reinforces the enmity.

Out of this vicious circle, North Korea's identity emerges as everything theUnited States is not: totalitarian, economically bankrupt, morally repulsive,and backward. For those who contemplate offering assistance or who advo-cate engagement, such an identity provides a starting point: North Korea isneedy, deserving of benevolence; an objective, ripe for transformation; or a target, crying out for civilizing mission. For those who dig deeper, NorthKorea represents a deviation even from the standard deviations, which com-

pels them to add a prefix or modifier to the standard othering discourses, andto underline that the North is the outlier of outliers. Hence, North Korea is

often described in terms of neo-totalitarianism or Confucian socialism.3 The"securitization" framework that bifurcates the world into security and dan-ger — and that squarely places the country in the latter zone — buttresses thisdiscourse. North Korea's political deficiencies and economic difficulties, andeven its very existence, are understood within the framework that links themto danger as the root cause.4 Various narratives about North Korea draw and build on the common perception that the country's mode of being is antitheti-cal to what the United States is and what it aspires to become.5

This special issue of the Journal of Korean Studies seeks to move beyondsuch a binary framework of knowledge about North Korea. Specifically, thearticles in this issue each highlight juche as the central institution of NorthKorean life, from which all of its organizing principles and patterned prac-tices derive. Collectively, these articles — which analyze, respectively, the



Making Sense of NorthKorea5

country's founding, politics, and agriculture — propose and demonstrate thatanalyzingy'wcÄe (chuch 'e) offers a productive way to think about North Korea.

Indeed, juche can provide considerable insight into this otherwise shadowynation: juche as an institution that has developed in response to internal andexternal challenges, that has shaped North Korean actors' definition of inter-est, and that has both facilitated and hampered their choice of strategies. Theauthors in this issue examine concrete and specific social realities of NorthKorea in a way that complicates the conventional, and sometimes oriental-istic, narratives that overlook or erase variegated historical realities and that

privilege a particular conceptualization of national identity over multiplealternatives. Taken together, the articles in this special section challenge the

monotonous securitization framework within which North Korea is routinelydiscussed, and develop instead a historical institutionalist framework thatmakes sense of the North's variegated realities and self-understandings interms of the historical evolution of lis juche institutions.

This special issue also addresses the emerging and possibly widening gap between South Korean and American perceptions of North Korea. To theAmericans, the North is one of a few remaining tyrannical communist des-

potic states. It is, they believe without doubt, a totalitarian, unstable, and

aggressive country, and the threat it poses might impel the U.S. governmentto use military force or other means in order to quell it. Americans disagreeover how to handle the threat, but most agree that North Korea is an "outpostof tyranny" and "kleptocracy" on the "axis of evil." Americans love to hate

North Korea.

The South Koreans, not surprisingly, take a different view. For them, NorthKorea is part of their nation, with which they consider themselves bound to live,regardless of what they think of its practices and policies. It is a country againstwhich South Koreans are increasingly unwilling to go to war. Furthermore, it

is a country they are becoming more and more familiar with, and perhaps evenview with fondness. Recent studies, for example, show that a majority of SouthKoreans consider the people in the North as tongp'o (fellow countrymen).6 It isnot that South Koreans hold up North Korea as an idealized space that preservesthe primordial Korean nation; they have their own complaints and criticismsof the country and even feel disdain for it. Yet their relationship with the Northincreasingly looks like a family affair, with all the accompanying contradictoryemotions. The shared understanding that powerful outsiders have victimizedthe Korean nation since at least the nineteenth century only intensifies thesefeelings. In short, the North remains the other to the United States, whereas toSouth Korea, it is increasingly becoming part of the self.7

Mindful of this perception gap, this special edition of the Journal ojKoreanStudies brings together scholars from South Korea and the United States who



6 Jae-Jung Suh

share a concern about its cause and effect. They bring to their discussion of North Korea not only their expertise on the country but also their sensitiv-

ity to the different styles of scholarship that have developed in South Koreaand the United States. The differences between the two countries are wide

and deep, from political orientations to theoretical presumptions to schol-arly perspectives, and have the potential to grow wider and deeper in thecoming years unless they are consciously and carefully addressed. While theexchanges of scholarship between South Korea and the United States willnot erase the gap entirely, this volume makes a modest contribution to thedialogue. We hope the dialogue not only will improve scholarly and popular understanding of North Korea, but also will enhance the two allies' percep-tions of each other.

JUCHE AS NORTH KOREA'S CENTRAL INSTITUTION

The following articles examine the history of domestic politics, which hasgenerated the institution oî juche as the central feature of North Korea'sdomestic order. Both Gwang-Oon Kim and Young Chul Chung argue that

juche has taken its current shape not through omniscientdesign,

as the North's official rhetoric suggests, nor as a sinister power motive, as manyoutsiders claim, but instead as the result of domestic actors' purposefulactions, contingent factors, and unanticipated consequences. Chong-Ae Yufurther suggests that while juche, once established, has been the central fea-ture that shapes North Koreans' lives, it has also produced divergent out-comes in response to dramatic changes in contingent factors. Nevertheless,Young Chul Chung also points out that as juche itself has evolved over thecourse of five decades, it has reacted to the pressure of changing realities on

the ground, often constrained by its own inertia and influenced by domesticactors' divergent desires.In the United States, it is commonly suggested that the Soviet Union

transplanted its own political institutions into North Korea at the end of the Second World War, whereas in the official histories of North Korea,

the country fiercely defends its institutions as its own original creations.The truth lies somewhere between: North Korea's political framework wasneither imposed solely by outsiders nor created entirely by domestic actors.The Soviet military, which reached Pyongyang in early August 1945 beforeAmerican forces could land in Seoul, acted as the occupation force withoverbearing power. The fact that it wielded enormous influence in shapingthe basic contours of North Korea's political and economic landscape is dra-matically illustrated by a contrast with the developments in the South, where




its occupation authority, the U.S. Military Government, overwhelminglyopposed and eventually uprooted political forces with similar aspirations.8

Many in the United States see North Korea's political institutions as the toolsof power designed, established, and maintained with the overriding purpose of keeping Kim Il Sung (Kim Ilsöng) — and later Kim Jong Il (Kim Chöngil) — in power. The North's official rhetoric again tells a different story, one of theleaders' benevolence and the masses' loyalty. In his article, Gwang-Oon Kimoffers a historical account that North Korea's institutions have emerged anddeveloped as a result of functionally constrained interactions between pur-

poseful actors and the consequences — both foreseen and unanticipated — of their previous actions. Institutions fundamentally shape the interests that

actors pursue while at the same time limiting the range of strategies availableto them. The interests that these actors pursue and the strategies they chooseconsequently reproduce and revise the institutions.

Institutional analysis allows us to examine the relationship between politi-cal actors as objects and as agents of history. The institutions at the center of historical institutional analyses can shape and constrain political strategies inimportant ways, but they are themselves also the outcome (conscious or unin-tended) of deliberate political strategies, of political conflict, and of choice.

Institutionalism provides the theoretical bridge between "men [who] maketheir own history," and the "circumstances . . . given and transmitted fromthe past" under which they are able to do so.9

Young Chul Chung situates the suryöng (supreme leader) system in the his-torical context of the North's political economy, arguing that it has developedout of the interplay between the North's developmental strategies and their outcomes. The central location of suryöng and the organic unity betweenhim and the masses have emerged from the North Korean leadership's effortsto address the tensions among the goals that it has pursued, many of which

work at cross-purposes. For example, Pyongyang has had to strike a balance between socialist Utopian goals and pragmatic developmental necessities,and between collectivist intentions and individualistic desires. These cross-

cutting pressures have decisively affected the development of suryöng andthe politics it engendered. The political system has in turn generated its ownmomentum, which — by facilitating idealistic choices that privilege humanagency and excluding other pragmatic choices that emphasize immediatematerial necessities — delimits the future trajectory and pace of the North's

political and economic development. Pyongyang's political programs havecreated the conditions of the political institution of suryöng as much as theinstitution has shaped them.

Institutionalists face a difficult challenge in attempting to explain NorthKorea's economic performance for thepast fifty years, because its performance



8 Jae-Jung Suh

has varied a great deal under essentially the same economic institutions. The North's economic organization has mainly centered on the collective owner-

ship of the means of production, although it has adopted different managementapproaches to particular economic challenges. Its economic institution, onceestablished, has generated a momentum of stasis, as institutionalists wouldexpect, and yet it has produced an extremely uneven economic performanceover the five decades. It was spectacularly successful in mobilizing humanresources to rebuild its economy from the ashes of the war in the 1950s, andcontinued with an impressively high rate of economic development in the1960s and 1970s, building a highly modernized economy by the end of thelatter decade. It started to stagnate in the 1980s, and dropped precipitously

in the 1990s, across all economic performance indicators, generating massstarvation in the middle of the decade.

North Korea's inconsistent economic performance has led to a bifurcationof scholarship. Those scholars critical of North Korea's institutions attributethe overall economic difficulties and famine of the 1990s to various charac-

teristics of its institutions.10 Scholars sympathetic to the North tend to focuson the very same institutional features, arguing that they gave rise to the ear-lier decades' economic successes.11 Despite their political differences, both

groups of scholars sharea

common analytical strategy of using thesame

institutions to explain one part of the North's historical trajectory, but turn-ing a blind eye to the other, less convenient part. The resulting scholarship is

partial. Neither school of thought attempts to develop a coherent framework that encompasses both the dramatic success of the earlier period andthe cata-strophic failure of the later period.

In her article, Chong-Ae Yu begins where the existing partial scholarshipends. Her institutionalist explanation of the success and failure of NorthKorea's agriculture begins with an understanding of how a shift in the con-

text can bring about divergent performance from the same institutions. Whileinstitutions are by definition resistant to change, their impact on outcomescan alter over time, sometimes dramatically, in response to a change in the

broader socioeconomic context.12 Yu shows how the North's agricultural sys-tem, built to rely on a massive infusion of industrial inputs, has producedopposite outcomes, depending on the level of those very inputs.

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE OF JUCHE

Since the 1940s, American understanding of North Korea has gone througha number of changes: from Soviet puppet to totalitarian, and subsequentlyneototalitarian society, and finally to Confucian autocracy. More recently,




American scholars have begun to pay attention to the ways in which the state-society relationship and interactions between North Koreans and outsiders

have shaped the North's institutions.13 The three articles featured in thisspecial section build on the recent scholarship to make the case that NorthKorea's juche has emerged from interactions between Kim Il Sung's groupand his challengers and between the North Koreans and outsiders, particularlySoviets and Chinese. As the North's pivotal institution, juche has evolved inresponse to shifting conditions and as a result of anticipated and unanticipated outcomes of the North's own choices. Juche provides the foundationfor both the North's political and economic organizations and its social order.As such, it facilitates certain choices and impedes others, as North Koreans

continuously respond to indigenous developments and exogenous shocks.The institutionalist approach described in the ensuing pages helps us to make better sense of continuity in the country and its potential for change.

In speculating about the North's future, it is useful to start with a key his-torical institutionalist observation that political actors, behaving less as all-knowing rational maximizers than as rule-following "satisfiers," generate theself-sustaining qualities of institutions, as DiMaggio and Powell explain:

The constant and repetitive quality of much organized life is explicable notsimply by reference to individual, maximizing actors but rather by a view thatlocates the persistence of practices in both their taken-for-granted quality andtheir reproduction in structures that are to some extent self-sustaining.14

Most of us, most of the time, follow societally defined rules, even when doingso may not be directly in our self-interest. It seems reasonable to expect that,in this respect, people in North Korea are no different.

But institutional stasis does not completely preclude the possibility of

change. Despite institutional inertia and stasis, institutions do change. Threemechanisms of change that derive from institutional attributes are notable inthis regard. First, institutions empower certain actors to act and disempower others; the accumulation of these actions and inactions can prompt institu-tional changes. The rise of the cabinet's importance in the North's govern-ment structure in recent years, for example, may reflect the fact that jucheinstitutions have nurtured the offspring of the first-generation revolutionar-ies to become elite technocrats, who occupy key decision-making positions.The intentional nurturing, inspired by the idealistic juche institutions to con-tinue the juche revolution, have produced the unintended consequence thatthe second generation, surrounding the suryöng, often prefers to follow amore pragmatic course than an idealistic one. Second, institutions also influ-ence an actor's definition of his own interests, by establishing his institutional



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Jae-Jung Suh

responsibilities and relationship to other actors. Institutional factors affect both the degree of pressure an actor can bring to bear on policy, and the

likely direction ofthat pressure. Although scholars generally posit some sortof external change or exogenous shocks to explain change in institutions, thekey is not simply change in the environment but how actors interpret thatenvironment, including their understanding of the degree and significanceof change. To the extent that existing institutions color their interpretations,these existing institutions will affect the direction and pace of change. KimJong U's sön'gun chôngch ? (military-first policy) represents the continuationof juche, but with significant revisions that reflect the power of the institutionover the direction and pace of change.

The third and final mechanism of change is the dense matrix of institutionsthat characterizes modern society and embodies values that are not neces-sarily compatible. This matrix influences individuals' definition of interestand their repertoire of available behavior, in complex and sometimes con-flicting ways.15 The diversity of, and potential tension among, preferencesand behavior that these institutions evoke contribute to the system's dyna-mism, as Friedland and Alford point out: "These institutions are potentiallycontradictory and hence make multiple logics available to individuals and

organizations. Individuals and organizations transform the institutional rela-tions of society by exploiting these contradictions."16 Chung's rich accountof suryöng illustrates how institutional mechanisms of change have operatedin the past. Recent efforts to introduce, or officially sanction, market mecha-nisms indicate that these dynamics are alive and well in contemporary NorthKorea: many individuals have responded to the failure of juche economicinstitutions to provide for basic needs by taking advantage of the exchangemechanism that the juche system had long allowed.

For the past five decades, juche has constituted the central institution that

underpins North Korea's political cohesion, under a concentric power sys-tem with suryöng at the center. This system continues to underscore humanagency and idealistic goals in economic decision-making, and privileges thenational sovereignty over diplomatic necessities in the North's foreign rela-tions. The institutional continuity stands out as the most striking feature.However, as the articles in this special edition note, beneath the ostensiblestasis, North Korea's institutions underwent a number of significant changes

before taking on today's shape. The changes of the past indicate that the jucheinstitutions will continue to evolve in the future, even if the nature and paceof their change are constrained by institutional inertia. Understanding the

North's past in terms of its juche institutions helps to make sense of NorthKorea's present continuity and future change.



Making Sense of NorthKorea1 1

NOTES

1.See K. W. Ku, "Pukhan yön'gu üi "kukche chöngch'i": Orient'allijüm pip'an"(International Politics of North Korean Studies: Criticizing Orientalism), HyondaePukhan yöngu 5, no. 1 (2002): 237-80.2.The few exceptions, which prove the rule by their existence, have been based

mainly on North Korean documents that the American military gathered during theKorean War. See B. Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War. Studies of the EastAsian Institute, Columbia University (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,1981); H. S. Paik, "North Korean State Formation, 1945-1950," PhD diss. (Univer-sity of Pennsylvania, 1993).3.See G. McCormack, "Kim's Country: Hard Times in North Korea," New Left

Review, no. 198 (March-April 1993): 21-148; and K. D. Oh and R. C. Hassig, NorthKorea through the Looking Glass (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press,2000).

4.See H. Smith, "Bad, Mad, Sad or Rational Actor? Why the 'Securitization'Paradigm Makes for Poor Policy Analysis of North Korea," International Affairs 76,no. 1 (January 2000): 111-32.5.See Nick Eberstadt, The North Korean Economy: Between Crisis and Catas-

trophe (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2007); Raphael F. Perl andDick K. Nanto, "North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities" (Washington, D.C.: Con-

gressional Research Service, 2007); Staffof U.S. Rep. Ed Royce, "Gangster Regime:How North Korea Counterfeits United States Currency," March 12, 2007; and DavidHawk, The Hidden Gulag: Exposing North Korea's Prison Camps (Washington,D.C.: U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2003).6.See P'yönghwa t'ongil chamun wiwönhoe (Advisory Council on Peaceful

Reunification). Kungmin ùìsik chosa charyo (National Opinion Poll, 2004).7.See G. W Shin and K. C. Burke, "North Korea and Contending South Korean

Identities: Analysis of the South Korean Media; Policy Implications for the UnitedStates," KEl Academic Paper Series (Washington, D.C.: Korea Economic Institute,

2007).8.See Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, particularly chapters 9, 10, and

11.

9.Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York: Inter-national Publishers, 1963), 15.

10.See N. Eberstadt, The End of North Korea (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press for the American Enterprise Institute, 1999); and S. Haggard and M. Noland, Faminein North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform (New York: Columbia University Press,2007).

11.See E. Brun and J. Hersh, Socialist Korea: A Case Study in the Strategy of Economic Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976); and L. Rinser,RuijeRinjô HiPukhan ìyagi (Luise Rinser's North Korea Story) (Seoul: Hyöngsöngsa,1988).



12

Jae-Jung Suh

12.See K. A. Thelen and S. Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in ComparativePolitics," in Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analy-sis, ed. S. Steinmo, K. A. Thelen, and F. Longstreth (Cambridge/New York: Cam- bridge University Press, 1992), 1-32.

13.See C. K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950 (Ithaca, N.Y.:Cornell University Press, 2003).

14.P. DiMaggio and W Powell, "Introduction," in The New Institutionalism inOrganizational Analysis, ed. P. DiMaggio and W Powell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 9.

15.See K. A. Thelen and S. Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in ComparativePolitics," in Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analy-sis, ed. S. Steinmo, K. A. Thelen, and F. Longstreth (Cambridge/New York: Cam-

bridge University Press, 1992), 1-32.16.R. Friedland and R. Alford, "Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices, and

Institutional Contradictions," in The New Institutionalism in OrganizationalAnalysis,ed. W Powell and P. DiMaggio (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 232.

REFERENCES

Armstrong, C. K. The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell

University Press, 2003.Brun, E., and J. Hersh. Socialist Korea: A Case Study in the Strategy of Economic

Development. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976.Cumings, B. The Origins of the Korean War. Studies of the East Asian Institute,

Columbia University. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981.DiMaggio, P., and W. Powell. "Introduction." Pp. 1-40 in The New Institutionalism

in Organizational Analysis, ed. P. Powell and W DiMaggio. Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1991.

Eberstadt, N. The End of North Korea. Washington, D.C.: AEI Press for the Ameri-

can Enterprise Institute. 1999.--------- . The North Korean Economy: Between Crisis and Catastrophe. New Bruns-wick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2007.

Friedland, R., and R. Alford. "Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices, andInstitutional Contradictions." Pp. 232-63 in The New Institutionalism in Organi-zational Analysis, ed. P. Powell and W DiMaggio. Chicago: University of ChicagoPress, 1991.

Haggard, S., and M. Noland. Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

Hawk, David.The

Hidden Gulag: Exposing North Korea's Prison Camps. Washing-ton, D.C.: U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2003.Ku, K. W. "Pukhan yön'gu úi "kukche chóngch'i": Orient'allijüm pip'an" (Inter-

national Politics of North Korean Studies: Criticizing Orientalism). HyondaePukhanyün'gu 5, no. 1 (2002): 237-80.



Making Sense of NorthKorea1 3

Marx, Karl. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. New York: InternationalPublishers, 1963.

McCormack, G. "Kim's Country: Hard Times in North Korea." New Left Review, no.198 (March-April 1993): 21-148.

Oh, K. D., and R. C. Hassig. North Korea through the Looking Glass. Washington,D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000.

Paik, H. S. "North Korean State Formation, 1945-1950." PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1993.

Perl, Raphael F, and Dick K. Nanto. "North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities."Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2007.

P 'yônghwa t'ongil chamun wiwönhoe (Advisory Council on Peaceful Reunification).Kungmin itisik chosa charyo (National Opinion Poll), 2004.

Rinser, L. Ruije Rinjö üi Pukhan iyagi (Luise Rinser's North Korea Story). Seoul:Hyöngsöngsa, 1988.

Royce, Staff of U.S. Rep. Ed. "Gangster Regime: How North Korea CounterfeitsUnited States Currency." March 12, 2007.

Shin, G. W, and K. C. Burke. "North Korea and Contending South Korean Identities:Analysis of the South Korean Media; Policy Implications for the United States."KEIAcademic Paper Series. Washington, D.C.: Korea Economic Institute, 2007.

Smith, H. "Bad, Mad, Sad or Rational Actor? Why the 'Securitization' ParadigmMakes for Poor Policy Analysis of North Korea." International Affairs 76, no. 1

(January 2000): 111-32.Thelen, K. A., and S. Steinmo. "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Poli-tics." Pp. 1-32 in Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in ComparativeAnalysis, ed. S. Steinmo, K. A. Thelen, and F. Longstreth. Cambridge/New York:Cambridge University Press, 1992.

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