USON v. DEL ROSARIOGR No.L-4963, January 29, 195392 PHIL 530

FACTS: Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 leaving as an only heir his estranged wife Maria Uson, the petitioner. The latter sued to recover the ownership and possession of five parcels of land occupied by defendant Maria del Rosario, decedent's common-law-spouse and her children. As a defense, defendant presented a deed of separation agreed upon and signed Faustino and Uson containing among others an statement giving a parcel of land to Uson as an alimony and the latter renouncing her rights to any inheritance from Faustino. The defendant also contends that while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of the decedent and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code they are given the status and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).

ISSUE: Are the contentions of the defendants correct?

HELD: No. It is evident that when the decedent died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code). As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested. The claim of the defendants that Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question in view of her expressed renunciation to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced. Nor does the contention that the provisions of the New Civil Code shall apply and be given retroactive effect. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin... As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.

De Borja vs. Vda. de Borja 46 SCRA 577 FACTS This case is compilation of three cases including: CASE A: G.R. No. L-28040 – appeal by Tasiana Vda. de de Borja from approval of compromise agreement by CFI Rizal CASE B: G.R. No L-28568 – appeal Jose de Borja from the disapproval of compromise agreement by CFI Nueva Ecija CASE C: G.R. No. L-28611 – appeal by Jose de Borja from the decision of CFI Rizal that the main object of the compromise agreement is a separate and exclusive property of Francisco de Borja and not a conjugal asset Family Tree

Francisco de Borja filed a petition for the probate of the will of her wife Josefa Tangco upon her death (CFI Rizal). He was appointed executor and administrator while Jose de Borja (their son) was appointed co-administrator. When Francisco died, Jose became sole administrator Francisco had taken a 2nd wife Tasiana before he died and she instituted testate proceedings with the CFI of Nueva Ecija upon his death and was appointed special administatrix. The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been plagued with several court suits and counter-suits. Thus, Jose and Tasiana entered into a compromise agreement to put an end to all of the pending litigations. However, Tasiana argues that compromise agreement was not valid, because the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco, and at the time the agreement was made, the will was still being probated with the CFI of Nueva Ecija. ISSUE W/N the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of Francisco has not yet been probated.

RULING COMPROMISE AGREEMENT VALID Doctrine in Guevara vs. Guevara: “presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is against the law and public policy.” – NOT APPLICABLE o There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. o The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. Francisco de Borja #1 Josefa Tangco Jose de Borja Cayetano de Borja Matilde de Borja Crisanto de Borja #2 Tasiana Vda. de de Borja o There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777)# 3 there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. o Tasiana was Francisco’s compulsory heir and her successional interest existed independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist even if such will were not probated at all. Case A: affirmed Case B: reversed Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) should be declared property of the conjugal partnership of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco o Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. o Reasons: Witness’s testimony considered hearsay and inadmissible Francisco’s testimony does not refer precisely to the Hacienda in question o The legal presumption in favor of the conjugal character of the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) now in dispute has not been rebutted but actually confirmed by proof. CASE C: reversed

ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA(their father) who represents the minors,petitioners, vs.LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA,AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of theCourt of First Instance of Abra,respondents.G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976

FACTS:On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla andS alvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra. The herein defendants then filed a written motion to dismiss the complaint, but before the hearing of the said motion, the plaintiff’s counsel moved to amend the complaint which was granted.The defendants again filed another motion to dismiss the complaint. The said motion to dismiss was then heard. On August 19, 1975, plaintiff’s counsel received a copy of the orderdismissing the complaint and on the 23rd of the same month; he moved to set aside the said order. The court denied the MR filed by the plaintiff’s counsel which the counsel later on filed a written manifestation allowing the minor petitioners to be allowed to substitutetheir deceased mother. From the order, the plaintiff’s counsel filed a second MR of the order dismissing the complaint but the same was denied. Hence, this present petition for review.

ISSUE: WON THE ACTION SURVIVES EVEN AFTER THE DEATH OF A PARTY DURING THEPENDENCY OF THE CASE.

HELD:Yes. While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. Under Section 16, Rule 3of the Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending case dies, it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death, and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representatives." Moreover, Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. In addition, Under Section17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appearand be substituted for the deceased, within such time as may be granted." The question asto whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. The claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and principally property and property rights and therefore is one that survives even after her death. It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her. Thus, the action in the instant case survives

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO BORROMEO-HERRERA, petitioner, vs. FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, respondents.G.R. No. L-41171 July 23, 1987GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu City, died on March 13, 1952, in Paranaque,Rizal at the age of 88 years, without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu.On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the probateof a one page document as the last will and testament left by the said deceased, devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and designating Junquera as executor thereof. After due trial, the probate court held that the document presented as the will of the deceased was aforgery.The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings. After determining the intestate heirs of the decedent, the court ordered that the assets of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo shall be divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed in equal and equitable shares among the 9 declared intestate heirs. On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier claimed as heir under the forgedwill, filed a motion before the trial court praying that he be declared as one of the heirs of the deceasedVito Borromeo, alleging that he is an illegitimate son of the deceased and that in the declaration of heirsmade by the trial court, he was omitted, in disregard of the law making him a forced heir entitled to receive a legitime like all other forced heirs. As an acknowledged illegitimate child, he stated that he was entitled to a legitime equal in every case to four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child. Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was already barred by the order of the court dated April12, 1969 declaring the persons named therein as the legal heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, the court dismissed the motion on June 25, 1973.Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration. In the memorandum he submitted to supporthis motion for reconsideration, Fortunato changed the basis for his claim to a portion of the estate. Heasserted and incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary Rights dated July 31, 1967, supposedly signed by PilarN. Borromeo, Maria B. Putong, Jose Borromeo, Canuto V. Borromeo, Jr., Salud Borromeo, PatrocinioBorromeo-Herrera, Marcial Borromeo, Asuncion Borromeo, Federico V. Borromeo, Consuelo B. Morales,Remedios Alfonso and Amelinda B. Talam In the waiver, five of the nine heirs relinquished to Fortunat otheir shares in the disputed estate. The motion was opposed on the ground that the trial court, acting as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim; that respondent FortunatoBorromeo is estopped from asserting the waiver agreement; that the waiver agreement is void as it wasexecuted before the declaration of heirs; that the same is void having been executed before thedistribution of the estate and before the acceptance of the inheritance; and that it is void ab initio and inexistent for lack of subject matter. On December 24, 1974, after due hearing, the trial court concluding that the five declared heirs who signed the waiver agreement assigning their hereditary rights to Fortunato Borromeo had lost the same rights, declared the latter as entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo.It is argued by the petitioner that the document entitled " waiver of Hereditary Rights" executed on July31, 1967, aside from having been cancelled and revoked on June 29, 1968, by Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo, is without force and effect because there can be noeffective waiver of hereditary rights before there has been a valid acceptance of the inheritance the heirs intend to transfer. Pursuant to Article 1043 of the Civil Code, to make acceptance or repudiation of inheritance valid, the person must be certain of the death of the one from whom he is to inherit and of his right to the inheritance. Since the petitioner and her

co-heirs were not certain of their right to the inheritance until they were declared heirs, their rights were, therefore, uncertain. This view, according to the petitioner, is also supported by Article 1057 of the same Code which directs heirs, devicees, and legatees to signify their acceptance or repudiation within thirty days after the court has issued an orderfor the distribution of the estate.Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand, contends that under Article 1043 of the Civil Codethere is no need for a person to be first declared as heir before he can accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is required is that he must first be certain of the death of the person from whom he is to inherit and that he must be certain of his right to the inheritance. He points out that at the time of the signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to the waiver document were certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead as well as of their rights to the inheritance as shown in thewaiver document itself.

ISSUE: Whether or not an acceptance or renunciation of inheritance, in order to be valid, must be preceded bya court declaration that the person making the acceptance or renunciation is indeed an heir.

RULING:No.The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that "the properties included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law continue the personality of the former. Nor do such properties have the character of future property, because the heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment of the death of the deceased, by principle established in article 657 and applied by article 661 of the Civil Code, according to which the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of death. More or less, time may elapse from the moment of the death of the deceased until the heirs enter into possession of the hereditary property, but the acceptance in any event retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance with article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although conditioned upon the adjudication of the corresponding hereditary portion." The heirs, therefore, could waive their hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order to partition the estate was issued only in 1969.In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot be considered to be effective. For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2) the knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish such right. The intention to waive a right or advantage must be shown clearly and convincingly, and when the only proof of intention rests in what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an intent to, voluntarily relinquish the particular right or advantage that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible. The circumstances of this case show that the signatories to the waiver document did not have the clear and convincing intention to relinquish their rights, Thus: (1) On October 27, 1967. Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo filed a pleading entitled "Compliance" wherein they submitted a proposal for the amicable settlement of the case. In that Compliance, they proposed to concede to all the eight (8)intestate heirs of Vito Borromeo all properties, personal and real, including all cash and sums of money in the hands of the Special Administrator, as of October 31, 1967, not contested or claimed by them inany action then pending in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. In turn, the heirs would waive and concede to them all the 14 contested lots. In this document, the respondent recognizes and concedes that the petitioner, like the other signatories to the waiver document, is an heir of the deceased Vito Borromeo, entitled to share in the estate. This shows that the "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" was never meant to be what the respondent now purports it to be. Had the

intent been otherwise, there would not be any reason for Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo to mention the heirs in the offer to settle the case amicably, and offer to concede to them parts of the estate of the deceased; (2) On April 21 and30, 1969, the majority of the declared heirs executed an Agreement on how the estate they inherited shall be distributed. This Agreement of Partition was approved by the trial court on August 15, 1969; (3)On June 29, 1968, the petitioner, among others, signed a document entitled Deed of Assignment" purporting to transfer and assign in favor of the respondent and Tomas and Amelia Borromeo all her(Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights, interests, and participation as an intestate heir in the estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo. The stated consideration for said assignment was P100,000.00; (4) On thesame date, June 29, 1968, the respondent Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo (assignees in theaforementioned deed of assignment) in turn executed a "Deed of Reconveyance" in favor of the heirs-assignors named in the same deed of assignment. The stated consideration was P50,000.00; (5) A Cancellation of Deed of Assignment and Deed of Reconveyance was signed by Tomas Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo on October 15, 1968, while Fortunato Borromeo signed this document on March 24,1969.

RIOFERIOvs.COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004]Facts:Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will leaving several personal and real properties. Privaterespondents discovered that petitioner Teodora Rioferio (the paramour) and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim , r e a l e s t a t e m o r t g a g e s a n d transfers involving the properties of the estate of the decedent. To recover their rights, Alfonso “Clyde” P.O r fi n a d a I I I fi l e d a Petition for Letters of Administration praying that letters of administration encompassing the estate of Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. be issued to him.Issue:Whether the heirs (respondents) may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment of an administrator is the issue in this case?Ruling:Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code “that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.” The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law. Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. The heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the mean time do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated.

Cayetano v. Leonides, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]OshDoctrine: The U.S. law on succession in the state of Pennsylvania applies to the intrinsic and extrinsic validity of the last will and testament of a U.S. national and resident of Pennsylvania under whose laws a person may give his entire estate to a complete stranger. Intrinsic validity of the will can be passed upon during probate of will. The attested will is still valid even if the compulsory heir was deprived of his legitime because the decedent, at the time of his death, was a citizen of US, and was governed by Pennsylvania law which does not have a system of legitime and forced heirs. Adoracion can therefore dispose of her whole estate and deprive Hermogenes of any share in her estate.FACTS:1.Adoracion C. Campos died, leavingher father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and hersisters, privaterespondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs.2. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74,Section I of the Rules of Court wherebyhe adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of thedeceased Adoracion Campos.3. Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977,Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will ofthe deceased, Adoracion Campos, which wasallegedly executed in the United States and for herappointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix. xxx alleged that thetestatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death xxx; that thetestatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime,the testatrix made her last will and testament on July 10, 1975,according to thelaws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor;

that after the testatrix death,her last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, andregistered with the Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin,the administrator who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment asexecutor in favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of an administratrix to administer andeventually distribute the properties of the estate located in the Philippines.4. On January 11, 1978, anopposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging amongother things, that he has every reason to believe that the will in question is a forgery; that theintrinsicprovisions of the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions areinvoked,the same could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him.ISSUE: Whether or not the preterition is proper. Yes, the governing law is law of Pennsylvania

HELD:The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will.

As a general rule, the probate court's authority islimited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the dueexecution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites orsolemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been dulyauthenticated.

However, wherepractical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, evenbefore it is probated, the court should meet the issue. (Maninang vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the reprobate ofAdoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.□ This contention is without merit.□ Although on its face,the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner

and thus, the respondent judgeshould have denied its reprobate outright,the private respondents have sufficiently established thatAdoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia,Pennsylvania, U.S.A.□ Therefore the law which governs Adoracion Campo'swill is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is thenational law of the decedent.□ Although the parties admit that thePennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estatemay be given away by the testatrix to a complete strangerthe petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and establishedpublic policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.□ It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code,the national law of the decedent must apply. □ This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled: It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system oflegitimes,Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. XxxAs regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief,□ the records bear the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing on separate dates until June 19,1980 was the petitioner'spetition for relief and not his motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979.□ There is no reason why the petitioner should have been led to believe otherwise.The court even admonished the petitioner's failing to adduce evidence when his petition for relief was repeatedly set for hearing.There was no denial of due process. The fact that he requested "for the future setting of the case for hearing . . ." did not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate would be heard and given preference in lieu of the

petition for relief. Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a motion and not in a mere notice of hearing.The issue of jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit. the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Camposwas correctly filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania , United States of America and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner.

Moreover,petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petitionfor relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against hisopponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction

PARISH PRIEST OF VICTORIA V. RIGOR (CIVIL)

The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments. When his intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any iterpretation must be in accord with the plain and literal meaning of his words, except when it may certainly appear that his contention was different from that literally expressed.

The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of wills. It is the greatest rule in giving effect to a will.

From the testamentary provisions, it may be deduced that the testator intended to devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative who would become a priest, who was forbidden to sell the ricelands, who would lose the devise if he discontinued his studies for the priesthood, or having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated, and who would be obligated to say masses for the repose of the souls of the testator and his parents.

On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands only in two situations: (a) during the interval of time that no nearest male relative of the testator was studying for priesthood; and (b) in case the testator's nephew became a priest and he was excommunicated.

Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria as envisaged in the will was likewise inoperative.

The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by the testator in his favor assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute devisee. The contention is untenable. A reading of the testamentary provisions does not support the view that the parish priest was a trustee or a substitute devisee in the event that the testator was not survived by a nephew who became a priest.

The CA correctly rules that this case is covered by Article 956 of the Civil Code which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in this the right of accretion exists."

This case is also covered by Article 960(2) which provides "legal succession takes place when the will does not dispose of all the belongings to the testator." There being mo substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands, the same should be distributed among the legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.

The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or that there may be mixed succession. If a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the property recovered by the said legacy.

was never an open admission of any illicit relationship. Thus, there was no need to go beyond the face of the will.

ENRIQUEZ VS ABADIAIn re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA, SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL. v. MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL.G.R. No. L-7188, 9 August 1954MONTEMAYOR, J.:

FACTS:On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia executed a document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament. Resident of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees, filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition.During the hearing, it was established that Father Sancho wrote out the will in longhand in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood, and that he signed on the left hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and that he signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page. All this was done in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will. The said three witnesses signed their names on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The trial court found and declared the will to be a holographic will. Although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law, still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect in form, said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to probate the will as the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors appealed from that decision, and because only questions of law are involved in the appeal, the case was certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not a will which purportedly is a holographic will executed before the New Civil Code may be considered for probate as such during the effectivity of the same.

RULING: No.At the time Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted. The law at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses, requirements which were not complied with. The failure of the testator and his witnesses to sign on the left hand margin of every page vitiates the testament. What is the law to apply to the probate of the will of Father Abadia? May we apply the provisions of the new Civil Code which not allows holographic wills? But article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or statement of the weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his

estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and controlling factor and that all adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry out said intention, and that when statutes passed after the execution of the will and after the death of the testator lessen the formalities required by law for the execution of wills, said subsequent statutes should be applied so as to validate wills defectively executed according to the law in force at the time of execution. However, we should not forget that from the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under the due process clause of the constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the Legislature can not validate void wills.In view of the foregoing, the will concerned is denied probate.

Fleumer vs. Hix 54 Phil 610

Facts:The petitioner is a special administrator of the estate of Edward Hix. He alleged that the latters will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia on November 3, 1925 by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of that state govern. To this end, the petitioner submitted a copy of Section 3868 of Acts 1882, c.84 as found in West Virginia Code, annotated by Hogg, Charles E., vol.2 1914, p. 1690 anda s certified to by the Director of National Library. The Judge of the First Instance however denied the probate of the will on the grounds that Sec 300 and301 of the Code of Civil Procedure were not complied with. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Is it necessary to prove in this jurisdiction the existence of such law in West Virginia as a prerequisite to the allowance and recording of said will.

Held: Yes. The laws of the foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of thePhilippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various states of theAmerican Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no showing that the book from which an extract was taken was printed or published under the authority of the state of West Virginia, as provided in Sec 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the seal of the State of West Virginia as provided in Sec 301. No evidence was introduced showing that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time alleged will was executed. The court therefore did not err in denying the probate of the will. The existence of such law in West Virginia must be proved.

Dela Cerna v. Potot

12 SCRA 576

FACTS: Spouses Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will ad

testament where they willed that their 2 parcels of land be given to Manuela Rebaca, their niece

and that while each of them are living, he/she will continue to enjoy the fruits of the lands

mentioned.

Bernabe died. Gervasia submitted the will for probated. By order of Oct. 31, 1939, the Court

admitted for probate the said will but only for the part of Bernabe.

When Gervasia died, another petition for probate was instituted by Manuela, but because she

and her attorney failed to appear in court, the petition was dismissed. When the same was

heard, the CFI declared the will void for being executed contrary to the prohibition on joint wills.

On appeal, the order was reversed.

ISSUE: W/N the will may be probated.

HELD: Admittedly the probate of the will in 1939 was erroneous, however, because it was

probated by a court of competent jurisdiction it has conclusive effect and a final judgment

rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world. However, this is

only with respect to the estate of the husband but cannot affect the estate of the wife;

considering that a joint will is a separate will of each testator.

The joint will being prohibited by law, its validity, in so far as the estate of the wife is concerned,

must be reexamine and adjudicated de novo.

The undivided interest of the wife should pass upon her death to her intestate heirs and not to

the testamentary heir. Thus as to the disposition of the wife, the will cannot be given effect.

A decree of probate decree is conclusive on the due execution and the formal validity of the will

subject to such probate.

Estate of Amos Bellis,

Succession – Nationality of the Decedent – Legitimes

Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife whom he divorced he had five legitimate children (Edward Bellis et al), by his second wife, who survived him, he had three legitimate children. He, however, also had three illegitimate children in the Philippines (Maria Cristina Bellis et al). Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to be applied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of the illegitimate children.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that the said children, maria Kristina et al, are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes.