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TRANSCRIPT
Success Paths Forward
for Newcomer States
in Developing Sustainable
Nuclear Energy
Man-Sung Yim
Korea Advanced Institute of
Science and Technology
Presented to INPRO Dialogue Forum on
Global Nuclear Energy Sustainability
September 7, 2012
2
Nuclear Power It features: – The promise of abundant supplies of energy
To overcome the handicaps of lack of energy resources
To reduce dependence on foreign energy import
To help diversify energy supplies
– Mastery of highly modern and sophisticated technology A sense of increased national prestige
– Inspiration for rapid industrial, economic, scientific and technological development.
Transformation into technological and affluent societies
– Opportunity for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from electricity generation
It comes with: – The concern over reactor safety and nuclear waste
– The demand for long-term national commitment
– Dual use possibility
– The demand for establishing the supporting culture
3
Initial Interests under Atoms for Peace
(1954-1962) (37 countries) vs. Current
Status Brazil
India
Argentina
Pakistan
Chile – No Nuclear Power
Philippines – No Nuclear Power
Yugoslavia
Turkey – No Nuclear Power
Egypt – No Nuclear Power
Thailand – No Nuclear Power
Peru – No Nuclear Power
Romania
Korea (ROK)
Greece – No Nuclear Power
Indonesia – No Nuclear Power
Colombia – No Nuclear Power
Mexico
Israel – No Nuclear Power
Uruguay – No Nuclear Power
Ecuador – No Nuclear Power
Taiwan
Costa Rica – No Nuclear Power
Venezuela – No Nuclear Power
Lebanon – No Nuclear Power
Afghanistan – No Nuclear Power
Portugal – No Nuclear Power
Iceland – No Nuclear Power
Spain
Japan
Guatemala – No Nuclear Power
Austria – No Nuclear Power
Italy
Denmark – No Nuclear Power
Federal Republic of Germany
Netherlands
New Zealand – No Nuclear Power
Sweden
(Rank: Cumulative IAEA assistance in 1981)
4
Interests (Under IAEA Support, 1954-1973) (57 countries)
vs.
Current Nuclear Status (as of Feb 1, 2010)
Brazil
India
Argentina
Pakistan
Chile – No Nuclear Power
Philippines – No Nuclear Power
Yugoslavia
Turkey – No Nuclear Power
Egypt – No Nuclear Power
Thailand – No Nuclear Power
Peru – No Nuclear Power
Romania
Korea (ROK)
Greece – No Nuclear Power
Indonesia – No Nuclear Power
Colombia – No Nuclear Power
Mexico
Israel – No Nuclear Power
Uruguay – No Nuclear Power
Ecuador – No Nuclear Power
Taiwan
Costa Rica – No Nuclear Power
Venezuela – No Nuclear Power
Lebanon – No Nuclear Power
Afghanistan – No Nuclear Power
Portugal – No Nuclear Power
Iceland – No Nuclear Power
Spain
Japan
Guatemala – No Nuclear Power
Austria – No Nuclear Power
Italy
Denmark – No Nuclear Power
Federal Republic of Germany
Netherlands
New Zealand – No Nuclear Power
Sweden
Hungary
Ghana– No Nuclear Power
Morocco– No Nuclear Power
Cuba– No Nuclear Power
Sri Lanka– No Nuclear Power
Iraq– No Nuclear Power
Poland– No Nuclear Power
Bulgaria
Nigeria– No Nuclear Power
Sudan– No Nuclear Power
Madagascar– No Nuclear Power
Burma– No Nuclear Power
Malaysia– No Nuclear Power
Bangladesh– No Nuclear Power
Zaire– No Nuclear Power
Iran– No Nuclear Power
Bolivia– No Nuclear Power
Zambia– No Nuclear Power
Tunisia– No Nuclear Power
Kenya– No Nuclear Power
5
Capacity of Nuclear Power Countries (as of Feb. 1, 2010)
USA – 101,119 MWe (104 units, 197.5)
France – 63,236 MWe (58 units, 76.2%)
Japan – 47,102 MWe (54 units, 24.9%)
Russia – 21,821 MWe (31 units, 16.9%)
Germany – 20,339 MWe (17 units, 28.3%)
Korea (ROK) – 17,716 MWe (20 units, 35.6%)
Ukraine – 13,168 MWe (15 units, 47.4%)
Canada – 12,652 MWe (18 units, 14.8%)
UK – 11,035 MWe (19 units, 13.5%)
Sweden – 9,399 MWe (10 units, 42.0%)
China – 8,587 MWe (11 units, 2.2%)
Spain – 7,448 MWe (8 units, 18.3%)
Belgium – 5,712 MWe (7 units, 53.8%)
Taiwan – 4,885 (6 units)
India – 3,981 (18 units, 2.0%)
Czech Republic – 3,686 MWe (6 units, 32.5%)
Switzerland – 2,985 MWe (5 units, 39.2%)
Finland – 2,696 MWe (4 units, 29.7%)
Bulgaria – 1,906 MWe (2 units, 32.9%)
Brazil – 1,901 MWe (2 units, 3.1%)
Hungary – 1,880 MWe (4 units, 37.2%)
South Africa – 1,842 MWe (2 units, 5.3%)
Slovakia – 1,760 MWe (4 units, 56.4%)
Mexico – 1,310 MWe (2 units, 4.0%)
Romania – 1,310 MWe (2 units, 17.5%)
Argentina – 935 MWe (2 units, 6.2%)
Slovenia – 696 MWe (1 unit, 41.7%)
Netherlands – 485 MWe (1 unit, 3.8%)
Pakistan – 400 MWe (2 units, 1.9%)
Armenia – 376 MWe (1 unit, 39.4%)
Are there objective quantitative
understanding of the national
attributes that associate with
successful development of civilian
nuclear power program (e.g., the
reliance on nuclear energy)?
Historical Analysis:
Earlier Quantitative Modeling
Nelson and Sprecher Study (Atoms for Peace, 3, 2, 93, 2010)
Based on 86 nuclear candidate states
Using data on 5 independent variables
Results – Nuclear reliance promoters
International commercialization
Level of democracy
Unable to provide nuclear materials and technology domestically
– Nuclear reliance inhibitors Indigenous coal reserve
Presence of fuel cycle production plants
8
Historical Analysis:
New Quantitative Modeling
By using 66 predictor variables
– Technology Capability
– Economic Capability
– Domestic Politics/Security Situation
Group I: The Initial “Atoms for Peace”
Countries – 37 countries
Group II: The Expanded “Atoms for Peace”
Countries – 57 countries
Factors that might have contributed positively to
the success of civilian nuclear power development Group I – The Initial “Atoms for
Peace” Countries
Group II – The Expanded “Atoms
for Peace” Countries
Non-nuclear
technological
factors
GDP (0.728)
Industrial capacity (0.622)
GDP per capita (0.410)
Major power status (0.383)
Rival’s nuclear weapon program
(0.285)
NPT ratification (0.208)
Level of democracy (0.190)
IAEA safeguards (0.177)
GDP (0.713)
Industrial capacity (0.614)
GDP per capita (0.369)
Major power status (0.381)
Rival’s nuclear weapon program
(0.296)
Level of democracy (0.198)
NPT ratification (0.169)
IAEA safeguards (0.159)
Nuclear techno-
logical factors
Fuel fabrication (0.878)
Zr tubing/alloy (0.872/0.319)
U conversion (0.683)
Research reactors (0.581)
U ore (0.308)
Spent fuel storage pool (0.249)
Latent nuclear weapons production
capability (0.185)
U enrichment (0.156)
Fuel fabrication (0.876)
Zr tubing/alloy (0.870/0.322)
U conversion (0.683)
Research reactors (0.583)
U ore (0.313)
Spent fuel storage pool (0.254)
Latent nuclear weapons production
capability (0.190)
U enrichment (0.162)
(The estimated Pearson correlation coefficients are in the parenthesis)
Factors that might have contributed negatively to
the success of civilian nuclear power development
Group I – The Initial “Atoms for Peace”
Countries
Group II – The Expanded “Atoms for
Peace” Countries
Nonnuclear
techno-
logical
factors
Diplomatic isolation (-0.136)
IAEA assistance (-0.0666)
Presence of nuclear defender (-0.0643)
Presence of nuclear weapons program
(-0.0431)
Decision for nuclear weapons (-0.0428)
Frequency of military disputes (-0.034)
5-yr changes in economic openness
(-0.0313)
De facto status of nuclear weapon
possession
(-0.0153)
5-yr changes in the level of democracy
(-0.003)
Diplomatic isolation (-0.109)
IAEA assistance (-0.0636)
Presence of nuclear weapons program
(-0.0293)
Frequency of military disputes (-0.027)
Decision for nuclear weapons (-0.0247)
5-yr changes in economic openness
(-0.0236)
Presence of nuclear defender (-0.020)
De facto status of nuclear weapon
possession (-0.006)
(The estimated Pearson correlation coefficients are in the parenthesis)
Observations The economic capability of a country, represented by GDP, GDP per capita, and industrial capacity, was a dominant factor in the success of civilian nuclear power development.
– High capital cost requirements is closely related to the long lead-time involved with nuclear power program establishment and project realization.
– Financing initial capital expenditures may present a major challenge to a developing nation.
– There are also the very heavy preparatory and infrastructure costs involved in creating a nuclear power program.
– A cadre of skilled manpower must be created and sustained.
– Institutions to own and operate nuclear power plants and to regulate their safe operation must be established and sustained.
Major power status of a country was found to be important in the success of civilian nuclear power development.
– This may simply reflect that all of the countries with major power status were successful in the development of civilian nuclear power infrastructure.
Rival’s nuclear weapons program appears to provide motivation for civilian nuclear power program.
– The motivation for a country to develop civilian nuclear power may be dual purpose.
NPT ratification and IAEA safeguards were important factors in the success of civilian nuclear power development.
– This indicates the importance of state level commitment to nuclear nonproliferation.
– Interference with IAEA safeguards may hamper civilian nuclear power development.
Observations Mature level of democracy was found to be important for the success of civilian nuclear power program.
– Civilian nuclear development demands establishing and running administrative and regulatory institutions with strict safety requirements and strict standards for design, manufacturing, construction, operation and maintenance of nuclear reactors.
Nuclear technological capability (especially fuel manufacturing capability), research reactor operating experiences, and the capacity for spent fuel storage, was found to be important.
– The fact that a country was capable of developing these facilities indicates high levels of financial, technological, and political commitment to civilian nuclear power development, which are important for the success of the nuclear program.
A country with diplomatic isolation was found to experience difficulty in civilian nuclear power development.
– Starting a new nuclear power program in a country requires a high level of industrial and technical dependence on foreign design, manufacturing, and consulting.
“Presence of IAEA assistance” was found to have a potentially negative effect on civilian nuclear power development.
– This may be due to the negative track records many of the countries had on the IAEA assistance list.
“Presence of nuclear defender” was found to be a potentially negative factor for civilian nuclear power development.
– A state with no need for nuclear weapons is not strongly motivated to develop a civilian nuclear power program.
Observations
“Presence of nuclear weapons” was found to be potentially a negative factor.
– A non-nuclear weapon state with nuclear weapons is likely to be under major sanction that prevents the country from acquiring the necessary assistance for civilian nuclear power development.
Frequency of military disputes was found to have a negative impact on civilian nuclear power program.
– A state with frequent dispute involvement with neighboring state(s) finds it difficult to make long-term financial and political commitment to a high capital cost intensive civilian nuclear power project.
The 5-year change in economic openness and the 5-year change in the level of democracy were both found to be potentially a negative factor for civilian nuclear power development.
– A country with fast changes in international trade may lack maturity to sustain long-term commitment to civilian nuclear development.
– Rapid changes in democratic development of a country may initially bring in instability, making the long-term commitment to civilian nuclear power development difficult.
The de-facto status of nuclear weapon possession was found to be potentially a negative factor in civilian nuclear power development.
– Difficulty in obtaining outside support aid for the domestic civilian nuclear development.
14
Refinement of the List
Hypothesis
– Lessons from the developed countries may
not be applicable to the developing world.
– The past nuclear power development in the
Eastern European countries may not be
readily applicable to the developing world.
15
Selected Countries
Group III: 13 countries
– Countries who initiated major civilian nuclear power
project as a developing nation
– Argentina, Brazil, India, Iran, Iraq, Mexico, Pakistan,
Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, Yugoslavia
Group IV: 8 countries
– Countries currently owns civilian nuclear power
program, starting as a developing country
– Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, Pakistan, South
Korea, South Africa, Taiwan
Factors that might have contributed positively to
the success of civilian nuclear power development Group III - Initiated major civilian nuclear
power project
Group IV – Currently owns civilian nuclear
reactors
Non-nuclear
techno-logical
factors
Industrial capacity (0.420)
Economic openness (0.397)
GDP per capita (0.386)
Rival’s nuclear weapon (NW) program
(0.383)
GDP (0.322)
NPT ratification (0.229)
5-yr change in the level of democracy
(0.220)
Domestic unrest (0.220)
Conventional threat (0.197)
Level of democracy (0.177)
IAEA safeguards (0.166)
Number of enduring rivalry (0.158)
NPT ratification (0.466)
Economic openness (0.440)
Rival’s nuclear weapon program (0.421)
GDP per capita (0.402)
Industrial capacity (0.372)
GDP (0.264)
5-yr change in the level of democracy
(0.251)
IAEA safeguards (0.247)
Level of democracy (0.188)
Number of enduring rivalry (0.186)
Domestic unrest (0.165)
Conventional threat (0.146)
Nuclear techno-
logical factors
Fuel fabrication (0.539)
Research reactors (0.431)
Spent fuel dry storage (0.287)
U conversion (0.258)
D2O production (0.234)
Zr tubing/alloy (0.230/0.232)
Latent NW production capability (0.171)
U enrichment (0.159)
Fuel fabrication (0.519)
Research reactors (0.400)
Spent fuel dry storage (0.288)
U conversion (0.226)
D2O production (0.216)
Latent NW production capability (0.203)
Zr tubing/alloy (0.195/0.210)
U enrichment (0.142)
(The estimated Pearson correlation coefficients are in the parenthesis)
Factors that might have contributed negatively to
the success of civilian nuclear power development III - Initiated major civilian
nuclear power project
IV – Currently owns civilian
nuclear reactors
Non-nuclear
techno-
logical
factors
5-yr changes in economic
openness
(-0.134)
Military pact with nuclear armed
state (-0.130)
IAEA assistance (-0.100)
Presence of nuclear weapons
program
(-0.0431)
Frequency of military disputes (-
0.046)
Diplomatic isolation (-0.025)
5-yr changes in economic
openness
(-0.243)
Presence of nuclear weapons
program
(-0.217)
IAEA assistance (-0.123)
Diplomatic isolation (-0.095)
Military pact with nuclear armed
state
(-0.095)
Frequency of military disputes (-
0.028)
Decision for nuclear weapons (-
0.0247)
(The estimated Pearson correlation coefficients are in the parenthesis)
Observations
(Category III and IV Countries) The observations made about the history of the Atoms for Peace program are relevant to both developed and developing countries
Two additional factors that were found to be significant with the developing nations: – Economic openness
Increasing economic interdependence of a developing nation with the outside world raises the stake of the country in maintaining trade and investment ties. The country may abstain from pursuing highly sensitive activities which might generate uncertainty, negative repercussions, and heightened international tensions.
– Domestic unrest.
All of the countries in Group IV experienced a stage of domestic unrest while pursuing civilian nuclear power development - Top level political commitment could outweigh the destabilizing effect of domestic unrest.
Impact of nuclear proliferation decisions on
civilian nuclear power development?
“Does the interest or development in nuclear weapons have relationship with civilian nuclear power development, or vice versa?” – All types of civilian nuclear assistance raise the risks
of nuclear proliferation and that peaceful nuclear cooperation and proliferation are casually connected because of the dual-use nature of nuclear technology and know-how [Fuhrmann, 2009].
– Having research nuclear reactors and related experiences could contribute to the decision to “explore” or “pursue” nuclear weapons. Increased electricity generation capacity from nuclear power reactors” may work against nuclear weapons proliferation [Li, Yim, McNelis, 2010].
Impact of nuclear proliferation decisions on
civilian nuclear power development? Nuclear Proliferation Decisions – 1) the “explore” decision as political authorization to explore such
as by linking research to defense agencies,
– 2) the “pursue” decision as political decision by cabinet-level officials, moving toward weaponization and development of single-use dedicated technology, and
– 3) the “acquire” decision to obtainat least one functional nuclear weapon
How these decisions by nations affected their civilian nuclear power development
The analysis was performed for three groups of the countries: – 1) A total of 178 nations in the world which are represented in the
current database;
– 2) The Group III countries
– 3) The Group IV countries
The relationship between nuclear proliferation
decisions and nuclear electricity generating
capacity
General
Category
– 173
countries
in the
world
Group III Countries -
Initiated major
civilian nuclear
power project as
developing country
Group IV Countries -
Currently operating
civilian nuclear
power plants after
initiating the
development as
developing country
Explore +0.041
(0.007)
+0.088 (0.111) +0.097 (0.205)
Pursue - 0.007
(0.650)
- 0.023 (0.624) - 0.039 (0.539)
Acquire - 0.005
(0.754)
- 0.011 (0.791) - 0.022 (0.689)
Correlation coefficients (Parenthesis: p-value for the null hypothesis that the correlation equals zero)
Observation Nuclear weapons proliferation and civilian nuclear power program may be related. – The initial motivation to develop civilian nuclear power may be
dual purpose. A country may be motivated to develop a civilian nuclear power program when the country has initial interest in nuclear weapons or the country’s rival state owns a nuclear weapons program.
A state with no need for nuclear weapons is not strongly motivated to develop a civilian nuclear power program.
– For a civilian nuclear power program to be ultimately successful, nuclear nonproliferation plays a very important role.
A country with major efforts to develop nuclear weapons is likely to fail in their pursuit of civilian nuclear power development.
Presence of nuclear weapons in a country was found to have a negative impact on a civilian nuclear power program.
State level commitment to nuclear nonproliferation is very important for the success of civilian nuclear power development.
Important factors for sustainable
nuclear energy development
Mature level of democracy
Strong economic capability (GDP, GDP
per capita, and industrial capacity)
Nuclear technological capability
Economic openness
Commitment to nuclear nonproliferation