submission: supplementary response to the disability ... · including new minimum requirements in...

Submission: supplementary response to the Disability Employment Framework Discussion Paper December 2015

CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 3

1.1 ABOUT JOBS AUSTRALIA ........................................................................................................ 3

1.2 ABOUT THIS SUBMISSION ...................................................................................................... 3

2. THE DEPARTMENT’S PROPOSAL ...................................................................................................... 4

2.1 THE BASIS FOR CHANGE ........................................................................................................ 4

2.2 WHAT WE AGREE WITH ......................................................................................................... 5

2.3 PROBLEMS WITH THE PROPOSED MODEL ............................................................................ 5

FIGURE 1: ARRANGEMENTS IN DSS PROPOSAL ............................................................................... 7

FIGURE 2: ACTORS IN EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS AND THEIR INTERESTS ...................................... 8

3. AN ALTERNATIVE ............................................................................................................................ 11

3.1 MODIFY EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS TO GIVE PARTICIPANTS CHOICE ................................ 11

FIGURE 3: ARRANGEMENTS IN OUR ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL ..................................................... 14

4. ATTACHMENT: ONLINE SURVEY RESPONSES ................................................................................. 18

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 ABOUT JOBS AUSTRALIA

Jobs Australia is the national peak body for non-profit organisations that assist unemployed people to prepare for and find employment. The network helps members to make the most effective use of their resources to promote the need for services and support that will help unemployed people to participate fully in society.

We provide an independent voice for members who range from large charitable organisations to small local community-based agencies. Jobs Australia is the largest network of employment and related service providers in Australia and is funded and owned by its members.

Typically, Jobs Australia members do some or all of the following:

Deliver services under Commonwealth and/or State Government funded programs, such as jobactive (including Work for the Dole), Disability Employment Services, Community Development Program (formerly the Remote Jobs and Communities Program), Skills for Education and Employment, and similar State Government programs.

Deliver accredited or non-accredited training for unemployed people as Registered Training Organisations, Group Training Organisations, apprenticeship centres, social enterprises and other non-profit training and education institutions.

Deliver similar employment and training services to unemployed people without any government funding.

Jobs Australia supports its members by offering support such as industrial relations and human resources advice, tailored insurance products, advice on tenders and funding applications, and policy research and advocacy services.

1.2 ABOUT THIS SUBMISSION

This submission is part of Jobs Australia’s response to the National Disability Employment Framework Discussion Paper (Department of Social Services, 2015). It is supplementary to our responses to the Department’s online survey, which was the Department’s preferred method for providing feedback. For ease of reference, the survey questions and our responses are included as an attachment to this paper – see Attachment 1.

Our answers to the survey questions and our comments in this submission are informed by our broad and extensive experience of employment services systems, the available research and evidence and the views of our members.

Just as the Department’s Discussion Paper builds on the earlier Issues Paper, this submission builds on some of the themes we discussed in our Issues Paper response. References to Jobs Australia’s Issues Paper response are included in this submission where relevant. The complete document can be accessed from the Department’s consultation website or from the Submissions section on Jobs Australia’s website.

https://engage.dss.gov.au/def_consultation-submissions/1437006187/

https://www.ja.com.au/policy-advocacy/publications/jobs-australia-responds-disability-employment-framework-issues-paper

https://www.ja.com.au/policy-advocacy/publications/jobs-australia-responds-disability-employment-framework-issues-paper

2. THE DEPARTMENT’S PROPOSAL

2.1 THE BASIS FOR CHANGE

As we stated in our response to the Issues Paper (at p. 4):

“Jobs Australia supports models that empower individuals because they are more likely to tap into job seekers’ intrinsic motivations. Intrinsic motivation is important because employment outcomes depend so much on the efforts of the job seeker. Extrinsic motivators, such as financial incentives or penalties, while important for the enforcement of mutual obligation requirements, elicit the wrong type of compliance: grudging, technical compliance with the rules, rather than genuine motivation to find a job.”

This is a very different basis from the one which is outlined in the Discussion Paper. Jobs Australia sees individual choice and control and a more open market for employment services as enhancements to the existing programs that should, if pursued in the right way, better meet the needs of people with a disability and drive better overall system performance. Our views are based on our understanding of public service design, concepts such as co-production and recent work in the field of behavioural economics.

A system that provides choice and control is also more likely to align with a contemporary understanding of the human rights of people with a disability.

The Department has a different view on the basis for change. The Discussion Paper outlines many of the perceived flaws in existing disability employment programs. Outcome data is presented in such a way as to suggest that outcomes are low – for example, the Paper notes that “only 32 per cent of participants will receive a 26 week job outcome in DES, and performance has plateaued over the past three years” (at p. 8).

In fact, that outcome rate compares very well internationally, especially given that Australian invests significantly less in labour market programs than other comparable countries. Moreover, the Department’s presentation of the data ignores the influence of other social and economic factors that affect outcome rates in employment services. For example, the rising unemployment rate (and particularly, the steadily rising long-term unemployment rate) in Australia in the last few years would tend to suggest that “plateaued” performance is a positive achievement.

Other factors that affect outcome rates in employment services include: attitudes in society and particularly attitudes of employers; labour market regulation; other services and supports; other public infrastructure, such as transport networks; demographics; arrangements in the welfare system; and arrangements with other employment supports.

Rather than unpack the issues relating to the performance in disability employment services, the Discussion Paper simplistically repeats common complaints about the system, such as (at p. 10) that there is “[a] focus on supporting participants who are deemed likely to find a job at the expense of other participants who are perceived as a poor return on investment”. These criticisms are based on anecdotes, not evidence, and the Department has too readily accepted such criticisms.

Moreover, many of the issues identified could be rectified more readily by adjusting the existing model with minor changes to the incentives in the payment model and/or the Star Ratings, or by including new minimum requirements in the contract and guidelines, rather than by undertaking major reform.

By adopting a flawed basis for change, the Department has mistakenly proceeded down a path that discards too many features of the existing arrangements too readily: as the saying goes, it throws the proverbial baby out with the bathwater. Outcome-based payments are rejected in favour of simple

fee-for-service arrangements and performance measurement through the Star Ratings is rejected in favour of user ratings. As a result, the model proposed will not achieve the benefits claimed and, in our considered assessment, is likely to result in poorer performance and poorer outcomes for people with a disability.

2.2 WHAT WE AGREE WITH

As indicated by our responses to the survey, there are many features of the Department’s proposal that we agree with. These include:

We support the principles that underpin the Department’s proposals. This includes the principle of individual funding based on needs and aspirations.

Removal of fixed ‘market share’ allocations of people with a disability. Allocated caseloads are contrary to the principle that every individual should engage with a provider that they themselves have chosen.

Staged implementation. Clearly, a staged roll-out gives greater opportunity to discover issues and make minor adjustments to the model. The roll-out may be enhanced by a trial phase for the complete ‘suite’ of reforms in a handful of areas. We also have some concern that the roll-out may be rushed, with a great deal or work required in the preliminary phase and very little time to do it. Funding for the first stage will need to be allocated in next year’s Budget.

Use of technology and incorporation of user feedback. While the proposal for the ‘Virtual Marketplace’ needs some further detail, it is clear that the Department intends for user feedback ratings to be a key feature and for user ratings to be available to inform individuals’ choices.

The Department’s proposal for ADEs is reasonable. No doubt those for or against ADEs in principle will have firm views. Jobs Australia’s view is that open employment is the ideal, but the reality is that there are thousands of people currently in ADEs who would not readily move into open employment if ADEs were shut down or phased out over a short timeframe. The Department has proposed a path forward that neither promotes ADEs nor destroys them; rather, it would provide equivalent support for open employment as is available for sheltered employment, and leave it up to individuals (and, where relevant, their guardians and/or advocates) to choose. This is the most appropriate response that recognises both where we have come from and where we need to head.

2.3 PROBLEMS WITH THE PROPOSED MODEL

Jobs Australia has a number of concerns about the proposed model, which we believe are fatal to the success of the overall proposal.

In overall terms, the proposed changes are framed around large numbers of individual service transactions, each of which will have to recorded, evidenced, justified and paid for. This transactional approach to service delivery strongly mitigates against the formation of relationships between frontline workers and the recipients of the services they provide or arrange. It makes the journey to be navigated by the citizens less coherent and integrated and more difficult for them to understand and manage.

The relational approach revolves around the provision of individualised case management, support and guidance and is an essential centrepiece of delivery of services and assistance and sustainable

employment outcomes for people with disability who are very disadvantaged. Effective case management also, importantly, ensures that recipients of services have necessary agency in terms of decisions about what is done, when it is done and how it is done – by engaging, enthusing, empowering and encouraging them.

The proposed transactional approach might be appropriate and cost-effective for people who are not very disadvantaged and who are able to navigate and self-manage in the service delivery system. From experience in the mainstream public employment service in Australia, we have learned that this mode of service delivery does not deliver good results for very disadvantaged unemployed people. It also generates whole mountains of red-tape and an undesirable focus on processes rather than the outcomes the people themselves, the taxpayers and the government expect.

The arrangements proposed in the Discussion Paper do not include appropriate mechanisms to:

Adequately balance mutual obligation with individual choice and control;

Provide incentives to drive system performance; or

Measure provider performance.

To help inform the discussion that follows, we have mapped the arrangement of services as described in the Discussion Paper.

FIGURE 1: ARRANGEMENTS IN DSS PROPOSAL

Key:

Outsourced provision (fee-for-service)

Government provision

Outsourced + outcome payments / incentives

Mix of government and outsourced service providers

2.3.1 INADEQUATE CONSIDERATION OF COMPETING INTERESTS

This arrangement draws heavily on the arrangements for the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS). Disability employment services, however, have some important differences from the NDIS.

Referral agency

•JSCI

•ESAt

•JCA

•Funded by Government

Human Services

•Plan based on service catalogue

•Set budget based on service catalogue

•Monitor / enforce Mutual Obligation

•Funded by Government

Career Planner

•Only provided if included in the Career Plan

•Funded by user (fee-for-service)Case Management

•As per plan

•Eg: training, psychology

•Funded by user (fee-for-service)Services

•Review CV, job matching

•Funded by user (fee-for-service + outcome)Job Placement services

•Ongoing support

•Job in jeopardy support

•Funded by userPost Placement Support services

In the NDIS, the interest of Government is to efficiently and effectively meet the support needs of the person with a disability. The interest of Government therefore aligns almost perfectly with the interests of the individual – they too want their needs met in the most efficient and effective way.

In employment programs, however, there are more actors involved in ‘co-producing’ the employment outcome, and their interests do not perfectly align.

The following diagram illustrates.

FIGURE 2: ACTORS IN EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS AND THEIR INTERESTS

These interests do not naturally align, and programs must be designed to provide the right mix of services, rewards and penalties to bring these actors together and produce the desired outcomes. At times, the interests can even conflict: for instance, when Government enforces mutual obligation, the individual will generally experience a financial penalty in the form of a reduction in their benefit payments. This is a core difficulty for a system founded on ‘choice and control’, because mutual obligation and the system of benefit sanctions imposes financial penalties when individuals make choices that the Government has determined are the ‘wrong’ choices. This extends to participation in support services – which, even if the individual finds unhelpful or even counter-productive, they may nonetheless be required to attend.

Individual

• Improve financial position

• Improve employability

•Find a job that fits with skills / interests

•Establish a career / meet career goals

Government

•Reduce welfare expenditure and increase labour force participation by moving people off benefits and into work

•Enforce 'mutual obligation' to maintain community support for welfare

Employers

•Meet labour / skills needs with productive workers

•Fill vacancies quickly

•Lower wages costs

JOB

The arrangements proposed would also introduce new risks. At present, individuals are ‘locked in’ to a DES provider and cannot simply change provider at a whim. A change of provider is only allowed if there has been a breakdown of the relationship, and it is subject to an approval process. In these arrangements, the provider can report non-attendance or other mutual obligation compliance issues without the fear that the job seeker will simply change provider.

In the proposed arrangements, services will be disaggregated and atomised, and each service will need to report attendance to the Career Planner, who will be responsible for managing mutual obligation requirements. When services are fragmented, keeping track of attendance will be significantly more difficult and it is likely to involve onerous administrative requirements and an alarming increase in red tape, with each service provider reporting attendance either directly into an IT system or with a paper system that would be entered into an IT system later. For example, a plan might include, on a particular day, 1 hour of Case Management, 1 hour of psychology or counselling services, and one 1 hour of Occupational Therapy. Each provider will have to report attendance to the Career Planner, probably via an IT facility such as a website or smartphone app.

In a fragmented system, the chances of non-attendance not being reported are high and there are risks of mistakes and even fraud. It is a sad fact that every time significant amounts of government funds are made available to outsourced providers, a small number of unscrupulous operators try to take advantage. In the current system, DES providers are subject to rigorous program assurance monitoring and audits to mitigate the risk of incorrect claims for payments. In the Department’s proposal, however, the functions that are currently performed by a DES provider are split up into separate services, which means that significantly more resources will be required to police the larger number of providers that each deliver a smaller part of the system. It will not be enough to rely on individuals and their ‘purchasing power’ – there are ample examples of systems where accountability to the user has not protected against unscrupulous operators. Indeed, State and Federal Governments are currently ‘cracking down’ on vocational education providers for precisely that reason.

2.3.2 CAREER PLANNERS – AGENTS OF GOVERNMENT?

As can be seen in Figure 1 above, the monitoring (which is closely associated with enforcement) of a person’s compliance with mutual obligation requirements is the responsibility of the Career Planner.

We note that, under this proposal:

There is no ‘market’ for Career Planners. Individuals do not appear to have choice of Career Planner. Planners are Government-paid (though probably outsourced) and as such, will primarily be responsive to the needs of Government, not the needs of the individual. Even if requirements and KPIs initially include measures of the satisfaction of individuals, it is inevitable in this arrangement that the needs of Government would, over time, supplant the needs of the individual. The needs of Government include the need to keep costs down and enforce mutual obligation. In practice, this could mean that if the individual does not like their plan, they may be compelled to sign it under threat of benefit sanctions.

There are no incentives to drive quality or performance with respect to Career Plans. There are no consequences for a Career Planner who repeatedly negotiates poor quality Career Plans that do not adequately prepare an individual for the world of work. Indeed, Career Planners may be subject to pressures such as budgetary constraints that drive standardised, poorly tailored Plans.

https://ministers.education.gov.au/birmingham/government-targets-vet-fee-help-scammers

Furthermore, under the Department’s proposal, each service that is currently provided by a DES provider would be available to be purchased separately, with prices set according to a schedule of fees. The individual person with a disability would control the funds, and would pay each service provider on a fee-for-service basis. The proposal mentions, almost as an afterthought, that outcome payments could be included “for some services, such as job placement” (p. xiii).

It is difficult, however, to attribute an outcome entirely to the job placement service. In reality, all of the services that a job seeker receives contribute to an employment outcome in combination. The job placement services are likely to be preceded by a range of other services that improve the employability of the person, such as training to improve skills and/or confidence. The precise mix of services is clearly going to depend on the specific needs and wants of the person with a disability – making the Career Plan critical to the achievement of an outcome.

The Career Plan is also likely to be iterative, developed over time and adjusted as factors change or, as in many real-life cases, as the individual becomes more comfortable with their case manager and discloses further barriers. The model proposed does not appear to allow for this iterative development of a Career Plan.

2.3.3 CASE MANAGEMENT – JUST ANOTHER SERVICE?

It is notable that in the Discussion Paper case management is merely another service to be purchased on a fee-for-service basis. There is very good evidence from Australia (see, for example, DEWR 2006, DEWR 2008) and around the world (see, for example, DWP 2013) that high quality, intensive, genuine case management (as opposed to the mere policing of mutual obligation) is a highly effective (and possibly the most effective) tool for assisting disadvantaged people into work. Under the proposed arrangements, there is again very little to drive performance or quality in case management services. In fact, in fee-for-service arrangements with no outcome payments and no performance measurement, the case manager has a financial incentive for the individual to remain engaged in services and not move into work.

2.3.4 JOB PLACEMENT SERVICES – THE OUTCOME GENERATOR?

The Discussion Paper suggests that job placement services may have a component of funding that is contingent on achievement of outcomes. It is not clear whether the outcome payment would be a payment from Government or a standard arrangement for payment by the individual (i.e.: where the individual must pay part of the fee up-front and part of the fee on achievement of an outcome, however defined). Either way, the job placement service provider will be highly dependent on other service providers to achieve the outcome payments.

In particular, the job placement service’s success will depend on the Career Planner negotiating a quality, effective plan with the individual and a quality case manager (assuming that the individual includes in their plan the purchase of case management services) building a positive, encouraging relationship with the individual and supporting them to stay motivated. Should the Career Planner, case manager, or other service providers fail to deliver the high quality services that the individual needs, the job placement service will have great difficulty in matching that individual to an employer.

http://web.archive.org/web/20110428101614/http:/www.workplace.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/2BD8779C-6650-4E5C-A101-97A35B952306/0/NetImpact.pdf

http://web.archive.org/web/20120321043218/http:/www.workplace.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/8BDCD5EB-256B-4C49-9BCF-DBABD672BA66/0/Sustainabilityofoutcomesreport.pdf

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/265931/svltu-dec-13-adhoc.pdf

2.3.5 MEASURING SUCCESS

The Discussion Paper includes some criticisms of the Star Ratings (see, for example, p. 11). The criticisms suggest that there is a need for adjustments to the Star Ratings and/or the outcomes in the payment model, but they do not make the case for the complete abandonment of performance measurement.

For example, there the Discussion paper says that Star Ratings “reward providers that use approaches which lead to unintended consequences” (p. 11). Those “unintended consequences” are the same issues that arise from the outcome-based payment model, such as perceived “poor job matching”, “job splitting” and “placing participants in jobs at the minimum hours assessed” (p. 10). These criticisms are debatable in themselves, but even if they are accepted they would tend to support the case for refining the outcome definitions, not abandoning performance measurement altogether.

Similarly, the Discussion Paper asserts that the Star Ratings system “reduces the choice of providers over time as business is reallocated from providers with a low star rating to those with higher star ratings” (p. 11). The measurement of performance does not necessarily demand that poor performers be removed – those are two separate issues. The Government could equally choose to measure performance and choose to allow poor performers to continue in the system – relying instead on individuals to shift their preferences towards high performers. Again, the arguments put forward do not support the conclusion that the performance framework must be removed altogether.

Jobs Australia believes that there will always be a need for objective measurement of performance against hard indicators. User ratings will of course be a useful measure of client satisfaction and will be help inform individuals’ choices, but they cannot replace hard performance measures. The Star Ratings, which were originally developed to inform job seeker choice in the Job Network, should be retained with adjustments to address the Department’s concerns, and used to inform individuals’ choices as a complement to user ratings.

It is worth noting that the Star Ratings are a sophisticated system for performance measurement. They measure providers’ performance in relation to key performance indicators, which broadly align with the outcome payments framework but also include some differences. For instance, the Star Ratings measure and reward the achievement of 52 week outcomes, which are not included in the payment model. Each provider’s performance is then compared, with a regression model to control for variations in labour markets and other factors. Star Ratings have been used in mainstream employment programmes for more than a decade and continue to be used in jobactive.

A difficulty with the fragmented system is that it becomes much harder to measure performance, in part because it is much harder to attribute the attainment of an outcome to any particular service in the Career Plan and in part because it is difficult to compare providers that offer different suites of services. If, for example, one organisation provides case management for one hour per week and another organisation provides training for 8 hours per week, and another organisation provides Job Placement services for 2 hours per week, then who is responsible for the outcome, and to what extent? How should the ‘credit’ for the outcome be shared?

3. AN ALTERNATIVE

3.1 MODIFY EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS TO GIVE PARTICIPANTS CHOICE

The Department’s proposal dispenses with too much of ‘what works’ in the current system. The Department appears to have started with the NDIS and sought to imagine a NDIS system for employment supports, without adequately thinking through the very issues that we cautioned in our Issues Paper response needed to be finely balanced.

A simpler and better solution would start with the existing DES system, rather than start with the NDIS, and introduce choice and control while also integrating some processes with the NDIS.

The proposal we outline here is merely a suggestion which we believe better balances the needs of Government, employers and individuals. There are, of course, many other possible solutions and we are not wedded to any particular model.

It is also worth noting that our proposal draws on elements of our Blueprint for Reform of Job Services Australia, which was published in 2013 ahead of the development of the jobactive model and included proposals to give job seekers more say over the services they received in the mainstream employment services system.

3.1.1 OUTLINE

Starting with the existing DES system but introducing more choice, control and agency and aligning the system with the NDIS might involve:

Retaining the JSCI / ESAt / JCA processes for determining eligibility for employment services, including Disability Employment Services.

Using the NDIA planners to perform an initial ‘budget-setting’ function and, perhaps, development of an initial ‘draft’ Career Plan.

Retaining the ability of providers to pool the funds allocated to their clients and to make minor adjustments to the amounts spent on individuals as they iteratively come to know and learn more about their clients and their needs and what they need to do to get them into sustainable employment.

Maintaining the core functions of (i) finalising a Career Plan and then developing it iteratively over time, (ii) Case Management (and mutual obligation); and (iii) Job Placement as the core services of a DES provider. These services could be funded by Government (not by the individual) with an outcome-based payment model and with performance measured by Star Ratings.

Giving individuals the chance to ‘shop around’ before locking themselves in to a particular DES provider. For example, an individual could have a period, such as one month, in which to take the draft plan and funding determined by the NDIA planner to different DES providers to sit down and flesh out the draft plan in a greater level of detail. The individual would be free to discuss their Career Plan with as many providers as they like. If a choice was not locked in by the end of the period, then (rather than allocate the person to a provider) the compliance framework could be used to prompt the individual to make a decision. This would likely take the form of a suspension of benefits, with reinstatement and full back pay once the individual locks-in their choice of provider. This would ensure individuals make a genuine choice about their provider and not simply accept a default allocation from Human Services.

Giving individuals the opportunity to change DES provider, with ‘choice points’ at regular intervals, such as at every 3, or 6 months of service. This would mean the participant could leave at the end of the period if they are dissatisfied with the service, but the DES provider would also

https://www.ja.com.au/policy-advocacy/publications/reforming-employment-assistance-blueprint-future

be able to utilise the compliance framework in the meantime without fear that the individual would simply disengage. The provider would have discretion as to whether they use the compliance framework or engage the individual in a more proactive way.

Either putting funding in the hands of the individual for the purchase of all other services, such as training, counselling, wage subsidies and post-placement support, with the individual having completely free choice over who they purchase those services from; or having the DES provider purchase those services on the individual’s behalf, taking account of the choices expressed in their Career Plan.

This proposal would still have the funding and individual budget set by an independent NDIA Planner. The NDIA Planners are not experts in employment programmes, but would not need to be, as they would not be responsible for finalising the Career Plan. Note also that this proposal retains features of the Department’s proposal that Jobs Australia supports, including the opening up of the provider market – though we believe there is a case for closer management of the market through the transition.

The following diagram illustrates the roles in this proposal.

FIGURE 3: ARRANGEMENTS IN OUR ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL

Key:

Outsourced provision (fee-for-service)

Government provision

Outsourced + outcome payments / incentives

Mix of government and outsourced service providers

Referral agency

•JSCI / ESAt / JCA

•Funded by GovernmentHuman Services

•Set budget and draft plan based on needs (and supports typically purchased by a person with similar needs)

•Funded by GovernmentNDIA Planner

•Finalise plan and review / update over time

•Case Management + MO

•Funded by Gov (service fees + outcomes)

•Performance measured (through Star Ratings and user ratings)

Case Management (DES)

•As required / as per plan - eg: training, psychology / counselling, wage subsidies

•Funded by user (fee-for-service)Other services

•Job Placement

•Funded by Government (service fee + outcomes)

•Performance measured (through Star Ratings and user ratings)Job Placement services (DES)

•Ongoing support

•Job in jeopardy support

•Funded by userPost Placement Support services

3.1.2 HOW CHOICE AND CONTROL WOULD DRIVE PERFORMANCE

The proposal outlined above would foster competition between DES providers in a very different way to the competition in the current system or in the Department’s proposed model.

In the current system, providers essentially compete for limited monopolies allocated by Government once every few years, with ongoing competition driven by the Star Ratings. In the Department’s proposal, competition would apply to services available to be purchased but would not be used to drive performance in the things that really make the difference: the Career Plan and Case Management.

In our alternative proposal, DES providers would do the Career Plan, Case Management (including managing mutual obligation) and Job Placement, and thus have control over the key services that contribute to employment outcomes. These providers would compete for individuals to choose them – with the basis for that choice being the quality of the Career Plan and other services, past performance as measured by the Star Ratings, and user satisfaction, as measured by user ratings.

Individuals would be able to evaluate each provider in the market and the services they will offer with the freedom (and the time) to select the provider that will offer them the best Career Plan. Because providers will be accountable to the individual, there could be greater flexibility around the minimum requirements of a Career Plan than exists in the current system.

Once the individual has selected a DES provider, both the provider and the individual would be bound by the Career Plan. The DES provider would be unable to refuse service to a person who has chosen them, and likewise the individual would be unable to leave the service for a period of time. At the conclusion of a set period, such as 3 or 6 months, the individual would have the option of changing DES provider or continuing in the service. This would ensure that providers are continually striving to meet the needs of the individual to retain them in the service.

The DES provider would have a strong incentive, however, to support the individual into sustainable employment, with an outcome-based payment model (where Government pays providers a larger reward for the hardest to help) and Star Ratings to measure and drive performance.

This means the DES provider would have to continuously weigh up the competing incentives. They will have an incentive to move the individual into work, but if they try to push the individual too hard (or if they are too heavy-handed with the compliance framework) then the individual might leave at the first available opportunity. They will also have an incentive to keep employers happy by sending them the best prepared individuals. In this way the DES provider plays a key role in balancing the competing interests in the system.

Moreover, this alternative proposal would retain well-established features of employment programs that, though not perfect, have proven to be effective in driving employment outcomes.

3.1.3 MANAGING THE MARKET THROUGH THE TRANSITION

Under the alternative arrangements proposed, Government may need to continue to manage the market through the transition from the existing DES system to the new system. Jobs Australia will leave it to the Department to work out a detailed transition plan, but we envisage that the transition could include the following in addition to the Department’s existing transition plans:

Introducing provider choice elements. Modify existing arrangements so that individuals entering the system must actively choose a provider.

Increasing caseload share tolerance. Currently, providers can exceed their caseload share by a maximum of 30%. This constrains choice and competition. The limit could be removed early, or, as an interim step, increased significantly.

Remove ESA boundaries in one State, or even in a handful of regions, before proceeding with other areas. This would allow some monitoring of provider behaviour ahead of the national rollout. In the transition to a more open market, some providers may implement aggressive growth strategies that (to the extent allowed by competition laws) undermine existing good performers in the market and force them to exit. The public interest will be better served by maintaining a managed approach while other reforms are introduced and treading carefully when opening the market up.

A trial of the complete package of reforms in one State, or in a handful of regions, to test for improvements in performance and satisfaction with the new system. While there is good evidence to suggest that there will be benefits from the introduction of choice and control, these precise arrangements are untested. There must be some testing to ensure that performance is improved or at least maintained in the new arrangements. It is possible that the new arrangements will improve individuals’ satisfaction with their services without increasing job outcomes. That would still be a successful improvement to the system. If, however, satisfaction improves but performance in terms of job outcomes declines, then the model will need further adjustment before any wide scale rollout.

3.1.4 COMPARISON SNAPSHOT

The following table provides a snapshot of the differences between the current DES system, the Department’s proposal, and the alternative proposal suggested in this paper.

TABLE 1:

Existing arrangements Department’s proposal Alternative proposal

Choice

Notional choice of provider, but in practice most individuals are referred to a DES provider.

No choice of Career Planner; free choice for all other services including Case Management and Job Placement

DES provider does Career Plan, Case Management and Job Placement as a package. Choice of DES provider at the beginning of service and then at set points (e.g.: 3 or 6 months). Free choice for all other services.

Competition

DES providers compete for contracts from Government every 3-5 years, and compete to keep their contracts in between. Contracts are for a fixed area and with a guaranteed share of referrals from DHS.

Service providers compete to sell services to the individual participants. Career Planners are either public servants or outsourced monopoly providers, not subject to competition. No fixed areas or guaranteed share of referrals.

DES providers compete for selection by individual DES participants; service providers compete to sell services to individuals. No fixed areas or fixed caseloads.

Performance measurement

Outcome payments and Star Ratings. No user ratings.

Outcome Payments only for some specific services, such as Job Placement services. User satisfaction ratings in the Virtual Marketplace. No performance measurement.

Outcome payments and Star Ratings for DES provider + user ratings for all services (DES providers and other service providers) in the Virtual Marketplace.

Regulation

Providers are contracted to Government and regulation primarily in the contract (Deed + Guidelines). ‘Regulator’ is DSS.

Providers accredited / licensed; regulation through standards. Regulator could be DSS or an independent body.

Accredited / licensed; regulation through standards. Regulator could be DSS or NDIA or another independent body.

Policy Policy set by DSS. Policy set by DSS. Policy set by DSS.

4. ATTACHMENT: ONLINE SURVEY RESPONSES

DISABILITY EMPLOYMENT FRAMEWORK – ROUND TWO – SURVEY:

PEAK BODIES FOR SERVICE PROVIDERS

INDIVIDUALISED FUNDING AND MARKET-BASED SERVICE PROVISION

The Discussion Paper explores important elements of a disability employment services approach focused on individual funding in a market-based environment.

These include:

An effective gateway into services.

An individualised and agreed career planning process.

Funding linked to the activities and services necessary for achieving long-term sustainable outcomes, outlined in a career action plan.

Consumer choice of service providers to deliver these services.

A more open and less restricted market for employment services, while maintaining service coverage.

An effective quality assurance framework.

Some important features of the existing system could also be maintained including:

A continuation of outcome payments for some services, such as job placement.

Mutual obligations and responsibilities, outlined as part of the career action plan.

Service provider engagement and ensuring adequate service coverage.

AN EFFECTIVE GATEWAY INTO THE SERVICE

An effective gateway into employment services is required to make sure those who are eligible and would benefit from employment assistance enter the system.

Please rate the importance of the following elements of a future gateway into disability employment services:

Not at all important

Slightly important

Moderately important

Very important Extremely important

Continuing to use the JSCI, ESAt and JCAs to stream participants into either jobactive or disability employment services

•

Broadening eligibility to allow access to employment services for •

young people with disability transitioning from school to work

Broadening eligibility to allow access to employment services for people with disability not currently looking for work

•

Broadening eligibility to allow access to employment services for people with disability already working who acquire disability

•

Broadening eligibility to allow access to employment services for people with disability already working to support long-term career goals

•

Different referral pathways into the system including the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) and health system as well as through DHS

•

A single gateway and assessment process across disability support systems particularly employment services and the NDIS

•

Remaining in the system for the whole of a participant’s working life •

DO YOU AGREE WITH THE POTENTIAL BROADENING OF THE ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA?

• Yes

No

DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS ON ELIGIBILITY?

Continuing to use the JSCI, ESAt and JCAs to stream participants

Under the new Framework it will still be necessary to have a process for determining eligibility for mainstream or disability employment services, as well as a person’s type of income support and any Mutual Obligation requirements. The National Disability Employment Framework Consultation Report refers to widespread criticism of the adequacy of the client assessment process, which often refers people to inappropriate services and identifies ‘benchmark hours’ that are confusing and do not accurately reflect a participant’s work capacity. Other criticisms of the assessment process included waiting times, assessments not undertaken face-to-face and assessments completed by assessors with qualifications not related to the participant’s disability.

We support the view that assessments need to be more holistic and strengths based, rather than focusing on perceived deficits to determine eligibility for services. Disability employment services should

be available to all who have disability as their main barrier to employment. Expanding eligibility for disability employment services to those currently assessed as having a weekly employment benchmark of 0-7 hours will help to achieve this.

Further improvements could be made to existing eligibility assessment tools to improve the quality of assessments and minimise the impact of inappropriate referrals. This includes more face-to-face assessments, availability of more specialised and qualified assessors relevant to a person’s disability, reduced waiting time and increased flexibility in the system for a person to transfer between jobactive and disability employment services if their initial assessment is inappropriate or their circumstances change.

Broadening Eligibility for Young People with Disability Transitioning from School to Work

Broadening eligibility to services could better identify and support young people with disability to make successful transitions from education to employment. This includes increasing access to intensive specialist support in school, VET and higher education for young people with disabilities to achieve higher levels of attainment and establish a career pathway. Increased access to specialist services that take account of a person’s disability support needs, including individualised career counselling support from a young age, work experience and mentoring, is needed. Access to job placements with intensive post-placement support while still in full-time education could also be expanded.

We need to get the balance right between on one hand, supporting young people with disabilities in education to set and achieve long-term education and employment goals, and on the other, supporting them to get work experience and employment opportunities in the short term. This means preventing service providers from harming young people’s long term career prospects by encouraging them to leave school too early for work. This will be determined on a case-by-case basis, so flexibility in the system will be needed, as well as opportunities for young people with disabilities and their carers to exercise informed choices.

Broadening Eligibility for People with Disability not Currently Looking for Work

The objective of bringing more people with disabilities into the labour force and employment services is supported. Jobs Australia welcomes the wide focus of the Framework, including the 374,273 who identify as being able to work but are not in the labour force.

Increasing the labour force creates opportunities for economic growth, but it needs to be matched by an increase in employment opportunities. The Discussion Paper acknowledges the need to increase at the same time the participation rate of people with disability and their employment rate, in order to avoid simply increasing the ranks of unemployed. This is why the role of employers is so important to the success of the new Framework.

Many in this cohort are likely to be on DSP or not on income support, without participant requirements and have chosen not to look for work. To increase participation in the labour force it will be necessary to address possible barriers such as:

health issues;

lack of availability of personal support, accessible transport, technology in the workplace and workplace design;

a perception that DES can’t help them get a job.

being discouraged from looking. They may have given up on the idea of ever getting a job, worn down by previous experiences of employment, discriminatory attitudes and behaviours, a perceived lack of work opportunities or unsuccessful attempts to find work;

low self-expectations;

fear of losing access to the DSP and living instead on the lower Newstart payment.

being ineligible for employment services and not receiving employment assistance.

One way is to open up eligibility to people with 0-7 hours’ work capacity, and to those who are not on income support and are outside the system. Removing restrictions on eligibility for employment services due to assessments of low work capacity would support a strengths-based approach, allowing focus on career goals and aspirations, while taking into account work capacity and local labour market conditions.

Service models which empower individuals are more likely to tap into their intrinsic motivation to find employment. A shift to a more individualised approach in disability employment may increase the appeal of participating in services, and it may also lift the rate of employment for those who do participate.

Broadening Eligibility for People with Disability Already Working who Acquire Disability

People with disability need to ready access to timely services to support early intervention, maintain connection with employment and early return to work.

Current Job in Jeopardy arrangements lack flexibility and discourage participation. A common view is that employers are reluctant to use JiJ because of perceptions that it may involve discrimination against people with disabilities. The low take up rate of Job in Jeopardy services suggests more needs to be done to support awareness and confidence to use this type of service, including through a national awareness campaign and the expanded NDRC role.

Broadening Eligibility for People with Disability Already Working to Support Long-term Career Goals

People with disability in employment, including people with episodic conditions, may need access to specialised ongoing support to help them stay employed. Many people with disabilities have casual and short term jobs and would prefer work with longer hours, better long-term prospects and opportunities for career progression. Opening up eligibility to services across the life-course could assist people with disability to rapidly reconnect with ongoing support to maintain employment or assistance if they fall out of insecure employment. If they are in stable employment, they could be supported to develop their career to achieve a more satisfying or rewarding job. This could involve access to career counselling or mentoring, skills development opportunities and job search support.

A single gateway and assessment process across disability support systems particularly employment services and the NDIS

Having a single gateway and assessment process is desirable for people in the NDIS, but specialised assessments of a participant’s individual employment servicing needs are more likely to lead to higher quality assessments and improved recommendations and referrals to employment services. Experiences to date in the NDIS trial sites indicate that only 2-3% of participant plans have a “discernible employment related activity”. Instead NDIS participants would be better served through a referral to a specialised assessment of their employment goals and aspirations and corresponding employment servicing needs. This assessment would be informed by knowledge of available disability supports in the workplace and realistic labour market opportunities. This could be supported through information sharing with the NDIS to avoid unnecessary duplication.

Remaining in the system for the whole of a participant’s working life

Remaining in the system for life should not be an overriding goal of the new disability employment framework. Support should be available to get or keep a particular job throughout a participant’s career, but participants should also be encouraged to achieve independence from this support.

AN INDIVIDUALISED AND AGREED CAREER PLANNING PROCESS

A process would need to be established to assess individual need and allocate funding. This could be done through a career planning process which focuses on career goals and aspirations, while taking into account capacity to work, local labour market conditions and responsibility. This process could be facilitated by a career planner and at the end the participant would have a career action plan.

Consider the following characteristics and indicate how important you think each is for a career planning service to have:


Slightly important


Very important

Extremely important

Expertise in career planning • Knowledge of the local labour market • An understanding of disability/ies • Independence from service providers •

ARE THERE OTHER CHARACTERISTICS THAT YOU THINK ARE IMPORTANT FOR A CAREER PLANNING SERVICE TO HAVE?

Jobs Australia has concerns that the Discussion Paper’s proposal to separate the process of service planning from service delivery will result in unrealistic plans and in goals not being achieved. During the case management process, service providers iteratively learn more about participants’ aspirations and needs, and iteratively negotiate corresponding changes to service plans. Shifting responsibility for service planning from a provider that is in regular contact with a participant to a third party organisation will make the process of planning more complex and less flexible, and risks compromising the quality of services delivered.

If service plans are not closely aligned with capacity, service offerings and work opportunities, they are likely to set a person up for failure or underachievement. The planning function must be informed by knowledge of available disability supports in the workplace and the current and future labour market needs of local industries and employers. It needs to support participation in training and skills development to acquire the skills employers need, consistent with individual career goals.

The ongoing, iterative planning function must be retained by service providers. This could be separated from the process of initially assessing and determining the overall funding package at the gateway into disability employment services, or when individual circumstances change significantly. A third party agency could be responsible for calculating the value of the funding package.

FUNDING LINKED TO THE ACTIVITIES AND SERVICES NECESSARY FOR ACHIEVING LONG-TERM SUSTAINABLE OUTCOMES OUTLINED IN A CAREER ACTION PLAN

A career action plan, developed as part of a career planning process, could allocate appropriate services from a service catalogue with agreed levels of funding for each service. The Discussion Paper outlines the following services that might be part of that catalogue:

Advocacy.

Auslan interpreting services.

Job seeker support.

Ongoing support.

Training and study (Job readiness, vocational, professional qualifications).

Workplace adjustment.

ARE THERE ANY OTHER SERVICES YOU THINK THE CATALOGUE SHOULD COVER?

Wage subsidies

Individualised career counselling

Work experience placements

Mentoring

GENERAL QUESTIONS ON OVERALL APPROACH

Indicate whether you agree with the following statements. A move to an individualised funding, market-based model would:

Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree

Better meet individual need. • Improve employment outcomes for individuals. • Increase competition between service providers. • Improve the quality of services provided. • Provide greater access to services. • Require service providers to change their business models. •

Provide opportunities for service providers. •

Threaten the viability of services providers. •

IF YOU BELIEVE THE VIABILITY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS WOULD BE THREATENED, PLEASE EXPLAIN WHY:

The shift towards individualised funding means that participants, not the Department, will choose which services are purchased and which providers get funded. This will remove some of the funding certainty that we see under current arrangements, where providers are paid to deliver services and outcomes. In order to survive, providers will need to continuously adapt to the wishes of the market, delivering services that participants, not the Department, choose to buy.

Other risks for service providers are the abolition of guaranteed market share and the entry of new players over time. While this offers opportunities for growth and expansion, it also necessarily carries with it the risk of providers losing business or a reduction in choice.

In regions with small numbers of participants, service providers may find it more difficult to stay afloat. In many regions, there is a risk that there will be no providers at all.

THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS WOULD ASSIST THE ORGANISATIONS WE REPRESENT TO TRANSITION TO A MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENT:


A staged implementation over multiple years • Access to a sector development fund • Fixed pricing for services • Limiting the market to existing service providers •

IS THERE ANY OTHER ASSISTANCE THAT WOULD HELP WITH THE TRANSITION?

A risk associated with fixed pricing is that if set too low, fixed prices are likely to compromise the availability and delivery of services and undermine competition. Higher financial risks for providers, which would be a consequence of unfettered job seeker choice, should somehow be reflected in the financial architecture of the system.

VIRTUAL MARKETPLACE

A virtual marketplace could be established to help people navigate the market. The virtual marketplace website could be a place where service providers can create profiles to promote their business to people with disability and employers, and access information and support to assist in service provision for people with disability. The virtual marketplace could also have participant

profiles for individuals to manage their plan and approach service providers to provide assistance included in their career action plan.

HOW IMPORTANT ARE THE FOLLOWING FEATURES FOR A VIRTUAL MARKETPLACE TO HAVE?


Slightly important


Very important Extremely important

Service providers being able to process claims for services, linked to an individual’s plan

•

Service providers being able to promote their business and services to people with disability and employers

•

Information for service providers and employers on disability types and best practice approaches to assisting people with disability

•

Employers and people with disability being able to rate service providers they have used

•

Information for employers and people with disability on what to look for when choosing service providers

•

People with disability and service providers being able to search for jobs and contact employers directly

•

Tablet/mobile app functionality •

GENERAL QUESTIONS ON THE OVERALL PROPOSALS DETAILED IN THE DISCUSSION PAPER

The following are some questions asked in the Discussion Paper about the approaches the Paper outlines. If you have not read the Discussion Paper, or do not have anything more to add, you are welcome to leave these blank.

DO YOU AGREE THAT THE PROPOSALS, AS A WHOLE, OUTLINED IN THE DISCUSSION PAPER, REFLECT THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES:


Individual funding based on needs and aspirations • Market-based service provision • Long-term career planning and capacity building • Understanding of employer needs • Increased open employment options • Whole-of-Government coordination and use of technology •

The person is supported through the life-course •

DO YOU AGREE THAT THE PROPOSALS ADDRESS THE CRITICISMS OF THE CURRENT DISABILITY EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM?


•

WHAT ARE THE STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND RISKS OF THE PROPOSALS?

Strengths

Individualised funding creates opportunities to put unemployed people with disability at the centre, empower and allow them to live with greater dignity. It offers opportunities for creative, innovative solutions that better reflect their choices and meet their needs.

Based on the NDIS principles of choice and control, participation in employment services is likely to be more satisfying and tap into intrinsic motivation, and has potential to achieve higher levels of participation and employment

The transportability of funding for participants offers new opportunities for people in ADEs to work in open employment.

Weaknesses

The abolition of government payments to providers for employment outcomes is a weakness, and will remove a major driver towards employment outcomes in the system.

The possibility for fragmentation and atomisation of service delivery will make it very difficult to measure performance and exercise informed choices about services, and involve considerable transaction and red tape costs.

The Framework emphasises labour supply considerations. Changing employer attitudes will be critical to creating more employment opportunities for people with disabilities. The Framework goes some of the way to address this, through improvements in employer access to supports and services, a national awareness campaign and national employer accreditation scheme. The proposal could be strengthened with a clearer plan to change attitudes and implement effective incentives to employing people with disability.

Risks

Most unemployed people with disability lack opportunity, not ability. There is a risk that the proposed new Framework will not increase access to employment opportunities, and that its performance will not be better than the current DES, or may be even worse. The new proposals may boost participation, but without more jobs, it may just increase the number of unemployed people with disability.

As with the NDIS, the whole of the proposed new Framework needs to be trialled or piloted in some locations and progressively refined prior to implementation. The Discussion Paper proposes piloting aspects of the system, but the risks of the new approach can be managed by piloting the entire model in certain locations prior to the national rollout.

Adequacy of funding. There are risks that individuals will not receive enough funding to purchase the services they need, or that the prices of services will be set too low to be delivered in a competitive market. If more people enter the system, it is not clear that additional funding will be available to support them.

Increased competition is likely to initially increase the number of service providers, but as the market matures over time it is likely we will see a reduced number of service providers and less competition. There is also risk that in geographic areas with smaller populations, access to services will be constrained by market failure. There may still be a role for Government to intervene to fill gaps, with incentives to deliver services in some regional areas.

Reduced certainty of funding for providers may make it difficult to attract and retain qualified and quality staff. The full rollout of the NDIS is also likely to place strains on the creation and retention of a skilled workforce in disability employment services.

Applying more competition and choice to the delivery of disability employment services carries risks for service quality, such as recently seen in cases of consumer exploitation in the VET sector. The reform of disability employment services must learn from mistakes that have been made elsewhere in shifting to individualised funding and a more open market, to get the level of regulation right. The processes for registering and ongoing regulation of providers need to strike a balance between maintaining service quality and stifling providers with administration.

The quality of choice depends on the quality of the information it is based on. The framework risks fragmenting service delivery, overwhelming consumers with options and making it difficult to exercise informed choices about the best way for them to achieve sustained employment in their chosen career. People may lack information, expertise, access to communication channels or cognitive capacity to understand the choices available to them. There is a risk that client ratings published in the virtual marketplace may not necessarily be a reliable source of information about services and providers. Consumers, and employers, will need quantitative and qualitative measures of performance, but it is difficult to see how this could be achieved in a marketplace of fragmented services. Whatever happens,

it is likely that some job seekers will need significant resources to help them exercise informed choices under the framework. Fragmenting and atomising services is likely to make the journey to employment more onerous and complex than it needs to be.

Related to the fragmentation of services, the framework proposes to abolish mandatory employment outcome payments to providers and the star ratings framework. There is a huge risk that there will be a loss of incentives and accountability for employment outcomes in the system. The career planner function as outlined in the Discussion Paper is not responsible for achieving sustained employment. Instead responsibility is transferred to the consumer, who may lack the capacity or skills to manage this responsibility effectively. The net result will inevitably be a reduction in employment outcome rates.

WHAT ARE THE OPERATIONAL AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES THAT WOULD NEED TO BE CONSIDERED IF THESE PROPOSALS WERE ADOPTED?

Safeguards will need to be built in to the system to ensure that the hardest to assist still get a high quality service and outcomes.

The Virtual Marketplace proposal for a single platform, that would perform all functions for all stakeholders at all times, is too ambitious. It will not replace the need for other interactions to occur between people. The use of current and emerging electronic platforms and social media also have potential to be of significant benefit, depending on how they are designed and used by people with disability, employers and service providers.

ARE THERE OTHER MODELS, PROPOSALS OR IDEAS THAT NEED TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN LOOKING AT OPTIONS FOR A NEW NATIONAL DISABILITY EMPLOYMENT FRAMEWORK?

Instead of the proposed separation of planning from service delivery, planning should be incorporated into the competitive delivery of services, focussed on the achievement of employment outcomes.

After their initial assessment and funding envelope is determined, participants could then shop around to find a provider who is most likely to help them achieve their employment goals within their allocated budget.

Instead of fragmented services, the basic services of case management, ongoing service planning and job placement should be offered by registered providers as a package, which participants would commit to for a period of time. Providers would continue to manage Mutual Obligation requirements as a tool for engaging participants in services as required.

Incentives and accountability for employment outcomes should be maintained through employment outcome payments by government to providers. The Department should continue to calculate and publish provider star ratings simply as an aid to consumer choice, which could sit alongside participant-determined ratings.

Other proposals include:

All levels of Government, particularly the Commonwealth, should lead by example and commit to achieving targets for employing people with disabilities in the public sector.

Policy should be separated from service delivery, with the creation of an independent regulator tasked with the role of registering and monitoring providers.

The reforms should include building capacity for the Department to build the evidence base and evaluate the effectiveness of different types of support provided.

Establish a centre for excellence in employing people with disability, which shares information about successful interventions and the conditions needed to implement them.

Have a sector development fund to build capacity, including skills development, and support innovation

Liaise with the NDIA and learn as much as possible about the experiences of the NDIS to date, as well as other recent experiences of opening up human services to markets and more competition.

A expanded business consultancy service that helps employers to identify employment opportunities for people with disabilities that would boost their productivity and profitability.

DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER COMMENTS?

By atomising and disaggregating services, there are serious risks and a strong likelihood that the proposed Framework will deliver outcomes which are worse than the current DES system.

Jobs Australia will be making a further submission to the Disability Employment Taskforce in early December, that outlines our concerns with the proposed new Framework and recommendations on how best to implement an individualised, market-based approach to disability employment services.

submission: supplementary response to the disability ... · including new minimum requirements in...

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