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THE LOTTERY AS A

DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION

GIL DELANNOI

OLIVER DOWLEN

PETER STONE

University of Dublin

Trinity College

S t u d i e s I n

P u

b l i c P o l i c y 2 8

In partnershIp wIth

scIences po parIs



THE LOTTERY AS A DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION

3

The LoTTery as a DemocraTic insTiTuTion

Gl DlSciences P Paris98 Rue De L’Université75007 Paris, France

[email protected]

olv DwlSchl Plitics and Internatinal RelatinsQueen Mar, Universit LndnMile End RadLndn E1 4NS, United Kingdm

[email protected]

Pt stPlitical Science Department3 Cllege GreenTrinit CllegeDublin 2, Ireland

[email protected]




4

contents

Th Lttry as a Dmcratic Istituti ...................................................................................... 3

Itrducti.................................................................................................................................... 5

Backgrud ..................................................................................................................................... 7

Summary f Fidigs .................................................................................................................... 9

Attds ...................................................................................................................................... 10

Part 1: What Ca Lttris Ctribut t Plitics?...................................................................12

Part 2: Hw Ca Lttris Bst B Icrpratd it Mdr Dmcratic Istitutis?..... 22

Part 3: What Qustis Rgardig Lttris Rmai fr Futur Rsarch?.......................... 31

Bibligraphy .................................................................................................................................41

Ackwldgmts .....................................................................................................................46

Appdix 1: Prgramm fr

“Th Lttry as a Dmcratic Istituti: A Wrkshp”.........................................................47

Appdix 2: Summary f Prcdigs fr“Th Lttry as a Dmcratic Istituti: A Wrkshp”.........................................................48

Appdix 3: Spakr Bigraphis..............................................................................................61

ConTenTS




5

inTroDucTion

on octber 11-12, 2012, “The Ltter as a Demcratic Ther” was held at Trinit CllegeDublin. This wrkshp brught tgether an interdisciplinar research team rm acrssEurpe t cnsider the rle ltteries in a vibrant and well-unctining mdern demcraticplit. In particular, the wrkshp cnsidered hw the careul use randm selectin inplitics might cntribute t the revitalizatin demcrac in the 21st centur. The eventwas jintl rganised b Gil Delanni (Sciences P), oliver Dwlen (QMUL) and PeterStne (Trinit Cllege Dublin) in cllabratin with The Plic Institute (http://www.tcd.ie/plic-institute/events/Ltter_wrkshp_oct12.php).

The large and grwing prblems acing mdern demcracies have led man t recnsiderthe idea selecting sme plitical cials b lt. The randml-selected jur remainswidel regarded as a mdel bringing rdinar peple tgether t make vital publicdecisins. As a result, there are nw man prpsals t use the ltter as a demcraticinstitutin mre expansivel. This is increasingl seen as a wa t restre lie t

dsunctinal demcracies in the wake recent crises, rm the “War n Terrr” t the banking crisis.

But while the idea selecting plitical cials b lt is receiving mre and mreattentin, it still st rikes man peple as unrealistic and utpian. This is in part a refectin the act that the ideal demcrac has been clsel assciated with electins rthe past tw centuries. An attempt t mve awa rm vting b the citizenr—eitherr representatives r r plicies via reerenda—is viewed as anti-demcratic. Thisassciatin verlks the clse assciatin between demcrac and randm selectin that

prevailed up until the 18th centur.1

Indeed, Aristtle amusl prpsed that electinswere inherentl aristcratic, while selectin b lt was the demcratic wa lling publicces. Nevertheless, it is understandable that peple wuld be skittish abut large-scalechanges t their plitical institutins, particularl when the have little direct experiencewith ltteries in plitics.

The wrkshp sught t address these cncerns. It did s in tw was. First, it brughttgether bth prpnents randm selectin and plitical scientists bradl cncernedwith demcratic institutins. Secnd, it invited bth these grups t examine what is

1 Manin (1997) careull examines the histr demcrac, its earl assciatin with randmselectin, and its later assciatin with representatin and electins.

INTRoDUCTIoN




6

currentl knwn abut ltteries and what questins still remain t be investigated. Trient these discussins, the wrkshp asked the llwing three questins:

1) What can ltteries cntribute t plitics?2) Hw can ltteries best be incrprated int mdern demcratic institutins?3) What questins regarding ltteries remain r uture research?

The rganizers the wrkshp circulated a drat dcument t the participants whichprpsed answers t these three questins. This drat dcument was then revised in light the discussin at the wrkshp, as well as subsequent eedback. This reprt is the result.2

2 The authrs wuld like t stress the reprt’s status as a discussin dcument, designed t stimulatethe explratin the ideas expressed in the seminar series which generated it. It des nt representan cmmn r dened psitin taken b the authrs as a grup

INTRoDUCTIoN




7

backGrounD

There is a grwing interest amng bth academics and rdinar citizens in randm selectinas a means allcating scial gds and assigning public respnsibilities. Ecnmists,legal schlars, plitical scientists, philsphers, and scilgists have investigated theman histrical uses t which ltteries have been put. The have als examined thearguments r and against the use ltteries, as well as the specic circumstances underwhich ltter use ma be advisable.3

This grwing interest in ltteries has generated an internatinal wrking grup rschlars and nn-schlars with an interest in randm selectin. This grup calls itsel theKleroterians, ater the device empled b the Athenians t select their juries. Funded becnmist Cnall Ble, this grup brings tgether prpnents ltter use rm Australia,France, German, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdm, the UnitedStates, and ther cuntries in a trul internatinal and interdisciplinar netwrk. Thegrup currentl maintains a blg, entitled Equalit b Lt (http://equalitblt.wrdpress.

cm/), as well as a Facebk page and a Ggle Grup. It has als brught members tgetherin a variet settings. The rst tw these rganized activities were a sessin at the2008 Manchester Wrkshps in Plitical Ther and a cnerence entitled “Selectin bLtter: Ther and Practice,” held at Sciences P, Paris, n Nvember 27, 2008.

In 2011, Gil Delanni, oliver Dwlen, and Peter Stne began rganizing a series wrkshps as part an nging Research Prgram n Srtitin. (The term “srtitin”reers t the practice selectin b lt.) The gal these wrkshps was t advance thestud randm selectin in plitics, understand its advantages and disadvantages, and

explre the cntributin it can make t plitics tda. It sught t bring plitical ther t bear n the prblem institutinal design, a task attempted all-t-rarel in the academicwrld tda (c. Waldrn 2013). The rst these wrkshps was held at Sciences P,Paris, n octber 6-7, 2011, under the title “Srtitin and Direct Demcrac.” The secndsessin, entitled “Srtitin and the State,” tk place n Nvember 18-19, 2011, als atSciences P. The third sessin was devted t Bernard Manin’s classic wrk The Principles

o Representative Government (1997). It was held at Sciences P n Ma 24-25, 2012.

3 Imprtant bks in this literature include Elster (1989), Carsn and Martin (1999), Duxbur (1999),Gdwin (2005), Burnheim (2006), Dwlen (2008), and Stne (2011). Man the central papers n thetpic ltteries have been cllected in Stne, ed. (2011).

BACKGRoUND




8

The octber 11-12, 2012 Dublin wrkshp was the urth in this nging series. Stne,as the lcal rganizer the event, tk respnsibilit r the wrkshp’s theme. He wasparticularl anxius t expand the circle peple invlved in the dialgue surrundingrandm selectin in plitics. This had been ne the rganizers’ gals thrughut theseries wrkshps; at each event, a pint was made t invite bth established Klerteriansas well as resh aces t take part. Stne wished t take this prcess a step urther. He didthis b inviting plitical scientists bradl cncerned with participatr and deliberativedemcrac but withut specic interest in ltteries. He invited these newcmers t cmetgether with Klerterians and ther established ltter advcates in a dialgue n therle ltteries in the demcrac prcess.

T this end, Delanni, Dwlen, and Stne prduced a drat dcument r discussin bthe wrkshp participants. (The drat reprt can be und at http://www.tcd.ie/plic-institute/assets/pd/Ltter_Reprt_oct12.pd.) The dcument addressed three questinsregarding the ltter as a demcratic institutin. First , what can randm selectincntribute t plitics? Second , hw can randm selectin best be incrprated int

mdern demcratic institutins? Third , what research questins n ltteries still need t be addressed? The dcument was presented at the wrkshp, and the presentatins, alngwith the discussins that llwed, were recrded b Dwlen. The cnversatin generated

b this drat dcument at the wrkshp rmed the basis r the revisin and expansin the dcument int the present reprt.

In additin, Stne presented drats this reprt at the Séminaire de Recherche, Départementde Science Plitique et Relatins Internatinals, Universit Geneva, March 11, 2013; andat the Plitical Science Department Writing Wrkshp, Trinit Cllege Dublin, April 2,

2013. Cmments and suggestins received at these tw events were als incrprated intthe nal versin this reprt.

Delanni, Dwlen, and Stne plan t cntinue rganizing additinal sessins theResearch Prgram n Srtitin. A sessin is scheduled t be held at QMUL n octber10-11, 2013. Hpeull, this reprt will cntribute t the nging dialgue generated bthe Research Prgram, and spark urther interest in the ptential cntributin ltteriescan make t demcrac.

BACKGRoUND




9

summary of finDinGs

Prpnents randm selectin in plitics have identied at least eight ptentialcntributins that the practice can make t the plitical prcess. These are: descriptiverepresentatin, preventin crruptin and/r dminatin, mitigatin elite-levelcnfict, cntrl plitical utliers, distributive justice, participatin, rtatin, andpschlgical benets. We argue that randm selectin makes its strngest cntributinwhen it selects citizens t unctin as impartial guardians the plitical sstem. Thismeans selecting citizens at randm, nt t make plic r enact laws, but t prtect theintegrit the plitical prcess—b making and enrcing legislative ethics standards,r example. Randm selectin’s strngest cntributin is t the preventin crruptinand/r dminatin; the act that it enables descriptive representatin, while undeniabltrue, is less imprtant t plitics.

SUMMARy oF FINDINGS




10

sPeakers $ resPonDenTs

yann Allard-TremblaUniversity o St Andrews and

the University o Stirling

Hubertus BuchsteinGreiswald University

Ètienne Chuard

Gil DelanniSciences Po

oliver DwlenQueen Mary, University o London

Stephen ElstubUniversity o the West o Scotland

David FarrellUniversity College Dublin

Peter StneTrinity College Dublin

Jane SuiterDublin City University

Antine VergneMissions Publiques

ParTiciPanTs

Daniel BarnInstitut ür Soziologie

ola BckUniversität Hamburg

Cnall Ble

Insek ChaeSenshu University/Trinity College Dublin

J.P Clanc

Barbara Gdwin

University o East Anglia

Peter Sheldn GreenUniversity o East Anglia

Jel F. HanisekTrinity College Dublin

Kim Kaivant

Lancaster University

Thmas Lamberti

Keith McDnnell

ATTENDEES




11

ParTiciPanTs (conT)

Guillaume MesuretRoyal College o Surgeons, Ireland

Sukana Mniai

Hug NewmanUniversity College Dublin

Dnal Ó Brlcáin

Mind Peden John Carroll University

Emilie Petit

Royal College o Surgeons, Ireland

Keith SutherlandImprint Academic

ATTENDEES




12

ParT 1: WhaT can LoTTeries conTribuTe To PoLiTics?

Ltteries have been used t make an incredibl wide variet decisins. The have, rexample, been used t decide wh gets admitted t a desirable schl, wh gets drated,and which persn stranded in a liebat gets eaten r thrwn verbard. The have

been used t admit peple t jur dut, militar service, perrmances the MrmnTabernacle Chir, and Michael Jacksn’s uneral. The have been used t determine therder candidate names n ballts, as well as the rder authr names n publishedarticles. (Fr an extensive list real r hpthetical ltter uses, with dcumentatin, seeStne 2011, sectin 1.2). one the mst cmmn and cnsistent uses t which ltterieshave been put is the assignment public respnsibilities. Randm selectin has beenincrprated int a wide variet schemes t ll public ces, and an even wider variet schemes have been prpsed in recent ears. In this reprt, we will deal mainl withthe use ltteries r this specic purpse. We will reer t this use ltteries in thisreprt as sortition.4 We cus upn the prblem identiing and deending the prperuse srtitin in the cntemprar wrld.

Srtitin has been widel used in the past b small cit-states, ntabl in ancient Greeceand Renaissance-era Ital. But it has been eectivel eclipsed b electral demcrac inthe mdern wrld, despite the cntinued survival the jur in the Angl-American wrld.Nevertheless, the man deciencies cntemprar demcrac have led t a grwingrevival interest in srtitin ver the past ew decades. Vergne (2010) catalgues thisrevival, demnstrating a clear increase in academic studies devted t randm selectinin plitics since the 1950s. Mrever, each ear seems t generate new theretical andempirical ndings n the tpic srtitin. The blg Equalit b Lt ers a review at the

end each ear the latest wrk n the tpic; its latest review can be und at http://equalitblt.wrdpress.cm/2012/12/29/2012-review-srtitin-related-events/.

The idea srtitin has a certain intuitive appeal. one plitician, when cnrnted withthe idea selecting Cngress b lt, r example, quipped, “The idea a ltter is at rst

4 The term “srtitin” has histricall had a wider meaning than this. The Shrter oxrd EnglishDictinar denes “srtitin” as “The casting r drawing lts; selectin, chice, r determinatin

b lt.” There is disagreement amng current prpnents ltter use as t hw the term ught t beused tda. Stne (the main authr parts I and III) avurs a rened denitin the term as denting

the selectin citizens r public ce. Dwlen (the main authr part II), n the ther hand,avurs maintaining the traditinal use the term as reerring t the mechanism r act drawing lts itsel. In mst cases this has little eect n the meaning the text as the reprt’s cus is n theselectin citizens r ce, but the reader shuld be aware this distinctin.

PART 1




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thught absurd, and at secnd thught bvius” (Callenbach and Phillips 2008, p. 75).5 Butthis intuitive appeal has nt et led t a single unied understanding as t when and whsrtitin makes sense. Rather, it has led t a diversit arguments that d nt necessarilt tgether well. A careul scrutin this diversit will demnstrate the extent t whichprpnents srtitin agree, as well as identi pints disagreement that have ett be reslved. Bth these results will advance the stud srtitin; mrever, theidenticatin pints disagreement will prvide a clear cus r uture research.

This reprt will scrutinize the existing state pla in the stud srtitin. It will begin b catalguing the majr benets that srtitin, in the ees its admirers, can bring t plitics. It will nt, at this stage, examine the plausibilit thse benets, rthe cnditins under which thse benets can be realized. It will simpl prvide a list the reasns srtitin prpnents have put rth in deence the practice. It will theninquire whether there is an unit underling these reasns, whether there is anthingabut ltter use that explains wh srtitin shuld prve capable prviding all theseadvantages. It will ask, in ther wrds, whether there is, r culd be, such a thing as a

general ther ltter use. The perrmance these tasks will enable us t answer thequestin, what can ltteries cntribute t plitics.

Answering this questin is the gal this sectin ur reprt. The secnd sectin willthen appl the answer generated in this sectin t the prblem identiing the bestwas t bring srtitin t bear in cntemprar plitics. In ther wrds, it will address thequestin, hw can ltteries best be incrprated int mdern demcratic institutins. Thenal sectin will ask what questins regarding srtitin still remain r uture research.It will accmplish this b recnsidering the list benets generated b srtitin. It will

tentativel evaluate this list. This requires asking tw urther questins: 1) hw strng acnnectin can be established between srtitin and each benet, and 2) is each benetreall a benet. The third sectin can er n rm answers t these tw questins; rather,it will er sme suggestins that will hpeull prvide a gd starting pint r uture,mre detailed inquiries int these tpics.

We begin, then, b cnsidering the varius virtues attributed t srtitin. Prpnents srtitin evke at least eight distinct cntributins that ltter use can make t theplitical prcess. Sme these cntributins receive mre attentin than thers in the

5 When we presented the drat reprt at a seminar at the Universit Geneva, ne audience membercmmented that srtitin was “ne the sexiest ideas in plitical ther” tda. We cncur.

PART 1




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literature, with thers receiving attentin spradicall r hardl at all. Man thesecntributins result in the imprvement the qualit plitical decisin-making; sme,hwever, cnstitute “side benets” t the plitical prcess nt directl related t decisin-making prper. Nt everne agrees that srtitin can generate all these cntributins.Mrever, nt everne agrees that all these cntributins cnstitute genuine benets.Put anther wa, srtitin ma r ma nt generate all these eects, and these eectsma r ma nt all be gd. We list these cntributins here in rughl descending rder the amunt attentin the receive in the literature surrunding srtitin:

a) Descriptive representation. Srtitin ensures that an prpert appearing in the generalppulatin will als appear in rughl the same prprtins n a randml-selecteddecisin-making bd. This prpert srtitin is ver rbust s lng as tw cnditinshld.First , the decisin-making bd must have a signicant number members (ideall,several hundred). obviusl, descriptive representatin is a meaningless standard tappl t an ce ccupied b nl a single individual; ne president cannt, in anmeaningul sense, be said t represent descriptivel the entire cuntr. But this is nt a

serius bjectin t srtitin; there are n examples in the histrical recrd ltteries being used t select single cehlders, and virtuall n live prpsals tda t attemptthis.6 Still, srtitin has been empled t select small decisin-making bdies that areminimall capable ensuring descriptive representatin; it was used, r example,t select varius 10-member administrative bards in classical Athens, and it is usedt select 12-member juries in the Angl-American wrld tda. Such uses srtitincannt rbustl be justied in terms descriptive representatin. Second , randmselectin must prceed rm a pl cnsisting the entire ppulatin it is suppsed trepresent descriptivel. Adding additinal selectin criteria—b requiring citizens t

vlunteer r dut, r example, r even b allwing citizens t pt ut the selectinprcess—will alter the ppulatin t be represented. Erts t ensure that cehlderspssess mtivatin, experience, abilit, r an ther criteria nt pssessed b the entireppulatin threaten t wrk against the ideal descriptive representatin.

b) Prevention o corruption and/or domination: The demcratic prcess can be severelundermined when cehlders use their ces t benet themselves. Srtitinhampers this prcess b ensuring that thse anxius t btain ce r venal purpses

6 Ltteries have, hwever, been incrprated int vting schemes t select single cehlders—the Dge Venice, r example. The have als been empled t ll largel ceremnial ces. Indemcratic Athens, a single member the Athenian bule (cuncil) was randml selected ever dat serve as “president” Athens.

PART 1




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cannt btain it mre reliabl than anne else. (obviusl, srtitin can d nthingi the majrit the ppulatin desires ce r such venal purpses, althugh therinstitutins can be adpted alngside srtitin t address the prblem.) Mre seriusl,the prcess can be undermined when utside interests subrn cehlders s as tmake the latter advance the rmer’s agenda at the expense the general interest.This can happen either because the special interests infuence the selectin prcess(ensuring that nl thse avuring the special interest cause btain ce), r becausethe infuence thse selected accrding t ther criteria (thrugh bribes and/r threats).Srtitin bviusl prevents special interests rm infuencing the selectin prcess;it can als prevent bribes and threats prvided that the randm selectin prcess issuitabl insulated.7 B preventing bjectinable reasns rm infuencing the selectinprcess, randm selectin—a prcess which excludes reasns rm decisin-making,can irnicall enable mre reasned behaviur n the part public cials, behaviuruntainted b special interests. (yann-Allard Trembla stressed this last pint duringthe wrkshp.)8 This ma als have the mre general eect limiting the eects ecnmic pwer upn plitical pwer, a pint made b Ètienne Chuard during the

wrkshp. Dminatin, accrding t Michael Walzer, ccurs when inequalit in nesphere lie inapprpriatel leads t inequalit in anther sphere (Walzer 1983).Srtitin ma help limit ecnmic dminatin this srt.

c) Mitigation o elite-level conict: Plitical cmpetitin, like ecnmic cmpetitin, isdesirable nl when it serves the interest the brader public. Market cmpetitin

between rms can d this b prducing lwer prices, higher qualit, etc. But marketcmpetitin unders i rms either rm cartels t restrain cmpetitin, r engage indestructive rms cmpetitin (e.g., blwing up rival actries). Similarl, plitical

cmpetitin between elites can benet the public when educated, inrmed, andmtivated pliticians cmpete r public supprt b ering sciall desirable plicies.But this cmpetitin unders when elites either cmpete t little (b establishing

7 This requires, r example, that the selected cials assume ce immediatel, and that either theare sequestered r access t them is suitabl cntrlled r mnitred. I the public enjs ull publicaccess t randml-selected cials, as the d with man public cials, then additinal rms prtectin against crruptin will curse be required.

8 Thse wh remain sceptical this pint shuld take care nt t run aul the allac cmpsitin. Reasn ma ail t btain in ne stage the plitical prcess withut preventing theentire prcess rm being reasned. Indeed, the rmer might even be a prerequisite r the latter.

PART 1




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“plitical cartels”) r t much (at the limit, b engaging in civil war).9 The rmer eectcan be curtailed thrugh srtitin b preventing elites rm cntrlling the selectinprcess. This is the “prtectin against dminatin” eect described previusl. Thelatter eect is similarl curtailed thrugh srtitin; because n actin the elite canstack randml-selected bdies with its supprters, n elites need ear such a actintaking cntrl the entire plitical sstem. (one culd als dub this the mitigatin partisanship.) This mtivatin was surel present in the selectin prcess used inRenaissance-era Venice t select its head state, the dge. The selectin prcess wasincredibl cmplex, invlving multiple levels electin and srtitin. Whatever theprcess’s deects, it survived r ve hundred ears (Finla 1980).

d) Control o political outliers: Small grups with utlier preerences ma be highlmtivated t subrn the plitical prcess. The ma thus gain a measure pliticalinfuence ttall disprprtinate t their size. Srtitin can mitigate this b ensuringthat such utlier grups cannt btain vastl versized representatin; at the limit,when perect descriptive representatin is attained, n such grup can btain plitical

ce in numbers larger than its presence in the general ppulatin. Deviatins rmprprtinalit will curse weaken this eect; i srtitin is used t select nl amngvlunteers, r example, an utlier grup might becme radicall verrepresented.10 And srtitin can nl mitigate the eects utlier preerences; i a majrit r a largeminrit has despicable preerences, srtitin can d little t mitigate this act. (Butthen again, n demcratic prcess can d much better.)

e) Distributive justice. The citizens classical Athens regarded public ce as a gd,ne t which all citizens had equal claims (Mulgan 1984). Mst mdern citizens are

9 Shapir sees this as the essential insight Jseph Schumpeter (2010). “The underling lgic,”Shapir writes, “ his [Schumpeter’s] argument is disarmingl simple. It reduces t a duble claim:(1) that structured cmpetitin r pwer is preerable bth t Hbbesian anarch and t the pwermnpl that Hbbes saw as the lgical respnse t it, and (2) that the chices amng anarch,mnpl, and cmpetitin are the nl meaningul pssibilities” (Shapir 2003, p. 55).

10 This ma, curse, be regarded as a strength. Jhn Burnheim, in his bk Is Democracy Possible? (2006), deends srtitin rm a pl vlunteers as a wa ensuring that thse wh care the mstabut issues are the nes wh make decisins regarding thse issues. This might have the eects increasing stabilit and ensuring that decisin-makers are knwledgeable. But the mere act thatvlunteers want smething dierent rm what the public as a whle wants pses a challenge t

demcratic ther, even i vlunteers have n venal mtivatins (c. Walzer 1970). And the benecialeects are ar rm certain. I vlunteers are sharpl divided n an issue, then empwering themculd decrease stabilit. And thse wh care the mst abut an issue ma be mtivated t becmeknwledgeable abut the subject, but the als ma nt (e.g., creatinists).

PART 1




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nt s cvetus cehlding; witness the lengths t which peple will g t avidjur dut. But i public ce were, nt a valued scial benet, but a genuine scial

burden, then ne might make the argument that the avidance public ce is a gdt which all citizens have equal claims.11 Either wa, a ltter is a air wa t distribute

benets (burdens) amng thse wh have equal claims t them (aviding them) (Stne2007; Stne 2011, part II). But neither these psitins is widel held tda; mstcitizens mdern demcrac tend t think plitical equalit as an equal right tselect plitical cials, as well as an equal right t pursue ce, but nt an equal rightt ce itsel (Manin 1997). This understanding ts well with the idea a sciet-widedivisin labur, which allws sme t specialize in plitics while leaving thers reet pursue ther gals (Cnstant 1988). Mst mdern prpnents srtitin share thisview. While the recgnize the limits making plitics a vcatin (nt t mentin itsdangers—thse mst mtivated t btain plitical expertise are ten thse with themst t gain b crrupting the plitical prcess), and tut the advantages a certainamunt plitical amateurism, ew deend the idea plitical ce as a gd in itsel.12

) Participation. While ew prpnents srtitin explicitl argue that plitical ceshuld be regarded as a gd, man share the widespread cncern with decliningplitical participatin and citizen apath. The believe it is imprtant bth rplitical sstems t prvide genuine pprtunities r participatin and t ensurethat such participatin takes place. (This is smetimes described as the prblem making the sstem “inclusive.”) Rarel, hwever, d the explain wh pliticalsstems shuld d this, althugh man participatr demcrats endrse Jhn StuartMill’s case r the educative eects participatin (Bachrach 1967; Pateman 1970).Again, the cunterargument is that plitics is a pressin, like an ther, and best

let t the experts. There is therere n reasn t ret i man reuse t get invlvedwith plitics, an mre than i man tk n interest in particle phsics r chemicalengineering r patent law. The plitical prcess ma wrk better i plitics is nt let tthe pressinals, but this act is prperl captured b the ther advantages t srtitin

11 on the avidance a burden as a benet, see Sher (1980).

12 Equalit and impartialit are smetimes expressed as separate values advanced b a ltter.But it is dicult t see hw bth values culd be specied in a manner that leaves them distinct.Impartialit, n mst accunts, invlves keeping irrelevant actrs ut the decisin-making prcess.(This is what is nrmall meant b the saing, “Justice is blind.”) But i equalit is a demcratic

value, in the sense that all citizens are equall entitled t hld ce, then all distinctins betweencitizens are irrelevant r purpses lling thse ces. Cnversel, i there exist legitimate reasnsr distinguishing between citizens in assigning public respnsibilities, then citizens shuld receiveunequal but impartial access t thse respnsibilities.

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listed abve. Mre imprtant r the purpses the argument here is that participatinis, in a ver real sense, zer-sum. Given a xed number ces, nl a certain number citizens can btain the participatr benets ce-hlding, n matter what theselectin methd used. Srtitin ma be said t enable participatin b allwingdierent , as ppsed t more, peple t participate—specicall, peple traditinallexcluded rm the plitical prcess due t pvert, race, etc. Als, srtitin ma beused in cnjunctin with an expansin in the number ces, enabling a greater ttalquantit participatin.

g) Rotation. Prpnents srtitin als requentl tut the act that the practice ensuresrtatin plitical ce (e.g., Gdwin 2005, ch. 6). Rtatin is smetimes cnfatedwith participatin, but this is a mistake. Rtatin simpl means that there is turnverin ce, that the peple in pwer tda are nt same as the peple in pwer tmrrw.It refects the Aristtelian ideal ruling and being ruled in turn. It is unclear hwdistinct is the cntributin t plitics made b rtatin. I rtatin is desirable, rexample, because it lets mre peple participate in plitics; r because the it allws the

benet/burdens plitical ce t be shared widel amngst the citizenr; r becauseit prevents dminatin plitics b elite grups; then rtatin can likel be reducedt ne r mre the ther advantages catalgued here.

h) Psychological benefts. It is transparent that cehlders selected b lt are ntselected n the basis an persnal qualit, psitive r negative, the might pssess.Therere, it is dicult r thse wh win ce t eel an special entitlement tce,13 r r thse wh lse ce t eel an special deerence t thse wh win. Itis an pen questin hw strng this eect reall is, althugh its existence seems ver

likel.14

This eect des, hwever, seem parasitic n the thers described here. otherpschlgical eects are pssible, a pint made b Hubertus Buchstein during thewrkshp. Participatin via srtitin ma, r example, prmte a sense reciprcit,as well as persnal autnm and cndence. But care must be taken here; while sme these eects ma be tied specicall t srtitin, thers will likel llw rm anprcedure that brings traditinall marginalized citizens int the plitical prcess.

13 But nt impssible, i the ltter is interpreted as expressing the will sme higher pwer, suchas Gd r ate. T see the ltter this wa, hwever, is t see it as nt being a real ltter at all. SeeStne (2010a).14 Klerterian Jan-Willem Burgers has stressed the imprtance this srt itin-related benet in pastwrk. See in particular Burgers (2011). He has, hwever, since distanced himsel rm this psitin.

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We regard this list prpsed benets generated b srtitin as airl cmprehensive.There ma be a case t be made r reclassiing these benets, perhaps lumping tw them tgether r splitting ne them int tw sub-benets. There ma be a case reliminating ne r mre these benets as purel derivative rm the thers. But thislist exhausts the current reasns r avuring srtitin in the cntemprar debatessurrunding the tpic.15

Schlars cncerned with srtitin thus recgnize a number cntributins that thepractice can make t the assignment public r plitical respnsibilities. The disagree,hwever, whether these cntributins can all be explained b a general ther ltteruse.16 There are tw psitins n this subject, which can be described as the “mnist”and “pluralist” psitins (Burgers 2013, ch. 3). Bth mnists and pluralists agree thatdecisin-making b ltter will, depending upn the nature the decisin in questin,er numerus advantages and disadvantages. But mnists argue that ltteries pssessa single prpert that accunts r all these advantages and disadvantages, and thatthis prpert accunts r all these advantages and disadvantages in rughl the same

wa. The accrdingl attempt t er what amunts t a general ther ltter use.Pluralists, in cntrast, den that an such general ther is pssible, r that there is ansingle prpert that can accunt r all the things (gd r bad) that ltteries can d.

Bth oliver Dwlen, in The Political Potential o Sortition (2008), and Peter Stne, inThe Luck o the Draw: The Role o Lotteries in Decision Making (2011), deend the mnistpsitin (see als Dwlen 2009 and Stne 2009, 2010a). Their accunts are similar. Bthpint t the act that ltteries, due t their unpredictable nature, make decisins in amanner uncnnected t ratinalit r reasns. Dwlen speaks the “aratinalit”

ltteries as the undamental cntributin the make, whereas Stne argues that ltteriesprvide the sanitizing eect a prcess unaected b reasns. Dwlen and Stne d havesme disagreements (Dwlen 2012; Stne 2010b, rthcming). Bth, r example, agreethat ltteries have “weak” uses (in which the primar prpert ltteries—the lack cnnectin t ratinalit/reasns—cntributes nthing, even thugh it des nt detractrm decisin-making) and “strng” uses (in which the primar prpert makes a psitive

15 Hubertus Buchstein argued at the wrkshp r including legitimac and stabilit n this list. yannAllard-Trembla als invked the idea legitimac as a separate cntributin srtitin might make.We are nt cnvinced that these cnstitute additins t the list. Whatever cntributin srtitin makest legitimac r stabilit prbabl takes place thrugh the ther cntributins described abve.16 The discussin here applies mre generall, t decisin-making b ltter in general, nt just tsrtitin. We will, hwever, maintain ur cus n srtitin here.

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cntributin). The use ltteries as a cheap, quick, and cnvenient decisin-making tl,r example, is a weak use. But while bth Dwlen and Stne acknwledge that ltteriescan be used t ensure descriptive representatin (t be discussed urther shrtl), Dwlendescribes this use as weak, whereas Stne regards it as strng (see als Stne 2010b).

The distinctin between strng and weak uses ltteries is crucial t the mnist psitin.Fr neither Dwlen nr Stne denies that ltteries can be used in was that make n use their essential prpert. A knie, r example, culd simpl be used as a paperweight, but i it is s used, it is nt being used as a knie. Similarl, ne culd make a decisin b rllinga die simpl because it’s quick and cheap. But ding s des nt use the ltter as a lottery ;it makes n use the prpert that distinguishes ltteries rm ther decisin-makingmethds.17 There are als, quite bviusl, arguments ne culd make r r against ltteruse that d nt reer t the prpert that ltteries share. A wealth eccentric might tr

bribing a lcal gvernment t select a zning cmmissin b lt; this might give the lcalgvernment a reasn t empl ltteries unrelated t the essential prpert ltteries, butit des nt deeat the claim that such an essential prpert exists.

Prpnents the mnist psitin have surveed numerus prpsed cntributins thatltteries might make, in rder t shw that the can sael be described in terms a singlecntributin made under dierent circumstances. Peter Stne, r example, has criticallscrutinized tw majr wrks n ltteries—Jn Elster’s Solomonic Judgments (1989) andBarbara Gdwin’s Justice by Lottery (2005)—and argued that all the advantages anddisadvantages discussed in these wrks can be expressed in terms the sanitizing eect a prcess unaected b reasns (Stne 2009, 2010a). other schlars, hwever, remainsceptical the idea a general ther. And s the cntinue t er lists distinct

cntributins that ltteries can make t decisin-making. A gd example such a listappears in Gil Delanni’s “Refectins n Tw Tplgies r Randm Selectin” (2010), alist rganized arund the three central principles equalit, impartialit, and serenit. Inhis cntributin t the wrkshp, Hubertus Buchstein als strngl endrsed the pluralistpsitin and questined the plausibilit a general ther ltter use.

The cntrast between mnist and pluralist accunts ltter use is, we believe, seriustheretical imprtance, and wrth urther theretical investigatin. Fr the purpses

17 Stne (2011, pp. 33-34) cmpares ltteries t electins in rder t make this pint. He als argues(ibid., pp. 42-44) that the ancient practice divinatin via ltter (as in the I Ching ) des nt prperlcnstitute decisin-making via ltter (see als Stne 2010a, p. 159).

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this reprt, hwever, we will set this particular debate aside, and cus ur attentinupn the list advantages srtitin catalgued in this sectin. We will prceed bth tthe applicatin this list advantages t the prblem demcratic institutinal designin the cntemprar wrld, and t the theretical prblem justiing and deending thevarius elements n this list. These tasks will be the cus the secnd and third sectins this reprt, respectivel.

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ParT 2: hoW can LoTTeries besT be incorPoraTeD inTo moDernDemocraTic insTiTuTions?

It is dicult t address this questin withut rst cnsidering why it is that we mightvalue srtitin in the cntext mdern demcrac. The questin How then llwslgicall as the means achieving the desired slutin.

one apprach is t see the current interest in srtitin as a respnse t perceiveddeciencies r prblems with the current paradigm liberal demcrac. There is a sensethat the magnitude the perceived need r srtive measures is in direct prprtin tthe dissatisactin with liberal elective plitics. A severe critic wuld like t see majritvting replaced b srtive measures, at least r sme vital decisin-making bdies (SeeCallenbach and Phillips 2008; Mueller et al. 1972; Sutherland 2004). A less severe criticwuld preer t see srtitin as a means cmplementing and enhancing existing electivemeasures. A mild “imprver”, n the ther hand might envisage srtitin as useul nln the margins the bd plitic exiled t the judiciar (as it currentl is) r cnned t

lcal municipalities.

The main line critical thught—pregured b writers such as Michels (1915) andSchumpeter (2010) and taken up mre widel ater the pst WWII triumph liberaldemcrac—is that the liberal demcratic rm encurages gvernment, nt b thepeple, but b cmpeting elites. Despite electral rights and the right ree pliticalexpressin, a gap pens up between a pressinal plitical caste and the peple at large.Citizen participatin is limited t peridic vting and cheapened in that activit b theuse mdern image-based advertising. Vting sstems themselves are seen as unair t

entrenched minrities; the plitical prcess itsel is seen as dminated b sel-interestedpartisan grups, extra-plitical industrial lbb grups and career interests. The currentinterest in srtitin can be seen rst and remst as a respnse t this situatin, and theprimar qualit that srtitin can bring t this cntext is seen as the deliver muchneeded citizen participatin t an arena dminated b these rces. In this respect theinterest in srtitin is part the same plitical impulse that brught us participatrdemcrac and deliberative demcrac.18

A clser understanding the qualities the srtive prcess (the cus this reprt’s

rst sectin) and the histr its use leads us t a smewhat dierent viewpint. The

18 Pateman (1970) and Barber (1984) are imprtant examples this.

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prcess randm selectin is ne that cannt be interered with. It is strateg-pr andcrruptin-pr (at the level selectin, at least—the subsequent crruptin cialsvia lbbing, briber, etc. is a dierent matter). It denies the pwer appintment tplitical actrs and thus it can cntribute t the breakup cncentratins pwerwithin the bd plitic. This anti-actinal, anti-partisan rle is maniest in its use inthe late medieval cit republics nrth Ital and (arguabl) underpins its sstematic andwidespread use in Ancient Athens (Dwlen 2008). Frm this pint view srtitin hasthe capacit t generate citizen participatin, but the randm mechanism has the capacitt bring ther attributes with it.19 The prpsitin t use srtitin merel and simpl tacilitate citizen participatin wuld cnstitute, in act, a weak use srtitin since,stated thus, there is n real need t use an aratinal decisin-making prcedure.20

Understanding this enables us t apprach the Why? questin rm anther directin.I we want t see imprvements in the qualit the plitical prcess, airer plitics,mre pen plitics, plitics insulated against actinal intrigue, partisan manipulatinand authritarian dminatin, then the careull managed use srtitin can help t

realise this visin. Randml-selected plitical bdies can unctin, in eect, as impartial guardians o the political system, prvided the are prperl cnstituted and assigned theright tasks. It is dicult t think a selectin methd mre suitable r this unctin thansrtitin.21 What is mre, because an appintment b srtitin is unmediated b an thirdpart r interest grup, widespread use srtitin can create a new direct relatinship

between citizen and state. This can be ne in which, b careul cnstitutinal planning,the citizenr can be instrumental in prtecting the integrit the plitical sstem itsel. We start, therere, rm the premise that citizen participatin ma be a desirable gd,

but that citizen participatin in deence an pen, air, inclusive, rule gverned plit isa desirable gd mre cmmensurate with the qualities the ltter prcess. The questin How? can nw be addressed with greater clarit.

19 See Stne’s “sanitizing eect” (Stne 2011) and Delanni’s highlighting the qualit serenit(Delanni 2011).

20 See Dwlen (2008, pp 11-30) r the rmulatin the dist inctin between weak and strng use.

21 Traditinall, curts are viewed as agents r this rm impartial guardianship (c. Shapir 2003,p. 64). But the limits the “aplitical” nature curts are als well-knwn. This raises an imprtantissue r prpnents srtitin—the virtues and disadvantages appinted judges versus randml-selected juries. There is a vast literature n this tpic that is wrth detailed explratin.

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The rst questin that demands attentin is whether srtitin shuld be used instead , r in combination with electin. There ma well be better arguments in supprt acmbinatin. I we are seeking a airer sstem gvernment, with a greater emphasis nthe rule-gverned cntrl plitical pwer, then it is clear that here are man aspects the prcess cnsent b electin that serve t prmte these ends (Manin 1997).Mrever vting, despite all its deects in the aggregatin vtes, is a sstem that invlvesthe cnscius decisin-making capacit the citizen bd. This wuld be denied b attall srtive sstem. It shuld als be recgnised that srtitin and liberal demcrac

belng t the same traditin pen participatr gvernment; t this extent the are ntin cmpetitin with each ther (Dwlen 2010). Furthermre in histrical practice thewere invariabl used with each ther, each taking a distinct rle in the entire prcess selecting cers, r each used t select a dierent tpe cer. The aratinal is usedin cmbinatin with the ratinal. A mve t an entirel srtive scheme might cnstitutea step in the dark and wuld therere nl be justied b the existence an verridingreasn t adpt an aratinal mechanism in preerence t a ratinall based sstem in all

its aspects. Such a reasn might be the cmplete bankruptc r crruptin electral

plitics. Even then an exclusivel srtive scheme culd be resrted t as a temprarmeasure rather than as a permanent institutin. one the mst straightrward was that srtitin and electin culd wrk well tgetherwuld invlve a bicameral sstem where electin was used r ne legislative chamberand srtitin r the ther.22 In such cases it might make sense that each chamber shuldhave a cnstitutinall distinct rle s that it wuld be ver clear where legislativesvereignt la (Barnett and Cart 2008). An alternative t this wuld be a single chamberwith members selected b srtitin sitting alngside elected members (Penidis 2010).

This culd, indeed, temper sme the excessive partisanship the elected members, but

22 Prpsals this nature have been made r the U.S. b Mueller et al. (1972), McCrmick (2006);o’Lear (2006); Callenbach and Phillips (2008); and Zakaras (2010); r the UK b Barnett and Cart(2008) and Sutherland (2004, 2008); r France b Sintmer (2007); and r the EU b Buchstein andHein (2009).

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the presence citizen members amngst pressinal pliticians culd als wrk t thedetriment the citizens unless each were given specic rles and duties.23

A prpsal r such a bicameral sstem wuld make the mst sense i the tw legislativechambers had distinct unctins, with the randml-selected chamber taking n a “nn-plitical” rle maintaining the integrit the plitical prcess as a whle. A gdexample such a prpsal wuld be Barnett and Cart’s (2008) prpsal t rerm theUK’s Huse Lrds. Barnett and Cart wuld have a randml-selected bd “Peersin Parliament” (PPs) empwered t reject legislatin sent t it b an elected Huse Cmmns n three specic grunds. The PPs wuld be entitled t 1) “reject legislatin thatundermines the principles cnstitutinal demcrac;” 2) “return nn-scal legislatinthat it believes will nt achieve the bjectives the gvernment claims and t insist that thegvernment rermulates either its aims r its legislatin;” and 3) “insist that legislatin bedrated in a wa that citizens can understand” (ibid., p. 37; see als Stne, rthcming).A legislative huse with such pwers might well strengthen the ties between citizen andgvernment withut undul interering with the legislative prcess.

A urther ptin culd be t use randml-selected citizens, nt in direct (r even indirect)cmpetitin with elected members, but in a supprt rle. Here again the rle randml-selected bdies as guardians the plitical prcess cmes t the re. A develpment Séglène Ral’s scheme r citizens’ juries t hld elected cers t accunt wuldt in this categr. (Ral included this prpsal in her maniest r the 2007 Frenchpresidential campaign.) Instead being cast in an adversarial rle, hwever, a grup citizens culd be selected bth t versee and t assist the elected member. This culd bedne b the citizens acting as the interace between the member and the cnstituenc,

handling appintments, public appearances, press releases, receipt petitins etc. In thiswa citizens wuld begin t have a greater insight int the wrk their representatives,and the sitting member wuld have clser links with the cnstituenc withut alwaswrking r part advantage. In this rle the citizens wuld be members the state rather

23 In 2010, a grup called Repair Calirnia called r a reerendum that wuld create a cnventint verhaul the state cnstitutin. The cnventin wuld have been cmprised pressinalpliticians, representatives Native American tribes, and randml-selected citizens. The ert tplace the prpsal n the ballt ailed due t lack unds, but sme critics claimed that the cmplexand unwield cnventin prpsal made it dicult t justi t vters. In December 2012, Ireland

cnvened an Irish Cnstitutinal Cnventin t make nn-binding recmmendatins n pssiblecnstitutinal rerms. This cnventin als eatures bth elected representatives and randml-selected citizens, and has met with criticisms similar t thse directed at Repair Calirnia’s prpsal.on the Irish case, see https://www.cnstitutin.ie/.

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than gvernment: the wuld help t ensure the prbit and smth-running thesstem rather than make decisins in a representative capacit. one the main arguments r this tpe arrangement is that the rle the citizens asimpartial guardians the plitical sstem is entirel cmmensurate with their methd selectin. The rle the MP’s versight cmmittee is similar t that the tribune in theRman Republic. The act as citizen witnesses t inner wrkings the plitical sstem.once this principle is grasped it is pssible t envisage numerus similar applicatins.Randml-selected citizens culd be incrprated int the management bards natinalised industries r ther state wned cncerns; secret services culd be mnitredr acts against the interests the citizenr; the rules gverning legislative ethics culd

be created and enrced b either standing r ccasinal alltted chambers; electins inemerging demcracies culd be mnitred b randml-selected citizens; the decisinwhether it wuld be in the public interest t disclse certain cndential matters stateculd be made b citizens juries.24 A randml-selected cnstitutinal cnventin mightals reasnabl be included in this categr, and indeed srtitin is ten mentined

as a device apprpriate r this purpse. (Ètienne Chuard stressed this pint duringthe wrkshp.) Where this categr use diers rm the use randml-selected citizens in legislativer executive bdies is that citizens in the rmer wuld be expected t represent the generalinterest in their prtectin pen participatr gvernment. In a randml-selectedchamber based n the principle descriptive representatin, citizens wuld be expected,in sme sense, t act accrding t their sel-interest r the interest the gruping(s) which the were a part. This pint is, curse, a cntentius ne. It has bth theretical

and empirical cmpnents. Thereticall, it raises the questin which mdel plitics best accunts r the (hpthesized) imprtance descriptive representatin—a liberalne, a republican ne, r sme ther pssibilit (Habermas 1994). Empiricall, it raisesthe questin hw dierent mdels demcrac predict dierent rms plitical

24 We acknwledge Dr Keith Nilsen r this idea alng with the prpsal t use randml-selectedmnitrs r the secret services. See preace t Dwlen (2008).

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behaviur, and which predictins are best brne ut b the acts. Bth tpes questin,we believe, are wrth careul uture investigatin.25

There is anther sense in which the rle citizens as impart ial guardians the pliticalsstem is cmmensurate with randm selectin. one the mst devastating criticismsmade electral demcrac is that it generates a massive prblem rational ignorance.Citizens have a negligible chance infuencing which candidates get elected, and anequall negligible chance infuence thse candidates nce elected. Citizens thus haven incentive t becme well-inrmed regarding plitical aairs (Dwns 1957). I srtitinwere used t ll certain plitical ces, the prbabilit that a citizen wuld win cewuld be ver small, and the pssibilit infuencing the selectin prcess (hweversmall it ma be under electin) wuld becme zer. But citizens selected r ce wuldhave ever incentive t becme well-inrmed abut plitical tpics relevant t the cein questin. This suggests that srtitin shuld be reserved r public ces which d ntrequire a lietime plitical experience, where the relevant training can be handled bhighl-mtivated amateurs in a shrt time. The rles assciated with the guardianship

the plitical prcess t this bill quite well.26

Even when guardianship requires expertise, this expertise need nt cme directl rmthe relevant decisin-makers. Suppse, r example, a randml-selected cmmittee acedthe task drawing r redrawing the bundaries electral districts. This task seemseas t classi as ne impartial guardianship the integrit the plitical sstem.But it als seems t call r a certain plitical expertise. There is n reasn in principle,hwever, wh such a cmmittee culd nt simpl cmmissin several such plans and thenselect the mst attractive ne. The successul unctin such a cmmittee will, curse,

depend upn the prper selectin ther institutinal eatures besides srtitin.

25 It is wrth adding, as Stephen Elstub pinted ut during the wrkshp, that interests requirelegitimate expressin in an well-unctining plitical prcess. I randml-selected bdies arent the apprpriate place r this expressin, sme ther rum must be devised. This prvides etanther reasn t envisin a variet plitical institutins—sme cnstituted via srtitin, sment—cmplementing each ther.

26 In additin, a sstem with man such guardian rles wuld prvide man pprtunities rcitizens t participate. While the prbabilit that a citizen will be selected r an ne rle at a giventime will remain lw, the prbabilit that a citizen will be selected r sme such rle at sme pint in

her lie culd becme substantial. That ma prvide citizens with sme incentive t acquire pliticalknwledge. But because the nature the ces in questin, and because the citizen has n telling which ce she will take up, she cannt sstematicall pursue plitical knwledge r venalpurpses.

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A urther dicult questin cncerns the nature and extent necessar training. The ldaristcratic argument against srtitin was that thse selected in this manner wuld lackthe specialist skills needed r gvernment.27 This is nt, hwever, a cherent argumentagainst the srtive principle itsel r it is the dut the ratinal designer an schemet match the general capacities thse in the pl with the requirements the pst rwhich the might be selected. Anther variable in this scheme is the pssible simplicatin the tasks ce t suit the wide range abilities that wuld be und in citizen-widepl. The Athenians, in act, adpted this slutin and arranged that magistrates shuldwrk in bards ten s the culd assist each ther (Headlam 1933). The prvisin training is als a means b which thse in the pl, r thse selected, can be made readr the demands the ce in questin. Here again there is a cntrast with the assumptins underling the use srtitin rdescriptive representatin. With descriptive representatin it is necessar that thseselected take ce withut training s that the bring the diversit their educatinal

backgrunds int the decisin-making the chamber. Special training r the tasks

ce culd be seen as interering with that principle. Callenbach and Philips (2008), intheir deence a randml-selected U.S. Huse Representatives, make precisel thispint. Indeed, the g s ar as t deend the act that members this Huse will be lazand inattentive in direct prprtin t the number laz and inattentive members thegeneral public! The questin the cntent the training culd be prblematic, but i citizens wereselected t prtect what the culd recgnise as their plitical institutins, then thiswuld prvide an incentive r them t d the jb t the best their abilities. The cntent

training in such a cntext wuld present n prblems since it wuld refect the impartialnature the ce rather than having an specic partisan idelgical missin.28

Participatin in srtive ces wuld therere be a tw wa prcess: the citizens wuld bring their diversit, experience and new energies t the bd plitic, while the ceitsel wuld educate the citizen in respect t means and methds their plitical sstem.

27 See Scrates’ criticism srtit in alng these lines (Dwlen 2008, pp. 57-58).

28 C. Fishkin (2009), wh strngl deends the idea that randml-selected public cials can beprvided with training and supprt in an impartial manner. Critics Fishkin are less sanguine nthis pint.

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In additin the ver existence citizen ces wuld sharpen and place new demands nthe prvisin r citizenship training within the general educatin sstem.

Anther imprtant questin cncerning the incrpratin srtive methds withinmdern demcracies is whether srtitin shuld be vluntar r cmpulsr. In therwrds, shuld thse selected b ltter be required t serve in the ce r which thewere selected, r shuld the pls r ce cnsist nl thse wh put themselvesrward r the pst in questin. I srtitin was t be used r the purpse descriptiverepresentatin this wuld require cmpulsr selectin, but r ther unctins srtitinthe questin is mre pen. An argument against the vluntar principle is that the ceswuld end up being staed b thse wh were alread cmmitted r active, and thesepeple might be merel bringing their wn pre-determined interests and ambitins intthe bd plitic. In these circumstances there wuld be n lwering the threshld participatin s that “rdinar” citizens culd hld ce and the ptential r diversitgenerated b the ltter principle wuld be lst. on the ther hand there culd be realprblems i srtive ces were entirel staed b reluctant cnscripts.29

one the diculties with this questin is that it is nrmall rmulated in the cntext tda’s nn-participatr sciet where an cmprmise t an individual’s ree timeand persnal libert is regarded as a burden. We wuld envisage that an sciet thatimplemented a cmprehensive prgramme srtitin r public ces wuld alsaddress the questin hw citizens culd be suitabl mtivated and rewarded. We dnt see srtive schemes perating successull in a vacuum r in a hstile envirnment,

but in circumstance where a general eths the duties and respnsibilities citizenshiphas a high prle.30 Srtive ces culd perate easil in a sstem where, r instance,

cmpulsr scial cnscriptin was the nrm and in which a sstem tax breaks andspecial pament prvisins culd act as incentives r thse taking and hlding ce.31 Insuch circumstances it culd be pssible t cmbine cmpulsr ces shrter duratinwith ces that required greater lng-term cmmitment that perated n a vluntar rquasi vluntar basis. The guiding principle shuld be that the pint entr t the bdplitic shuld be cmpulsr (whether it be an ce r a special curse) and that jining

29 A discussin alng these lines tk place n the nal da the Nvember 2011 Paris seminar.

30 A nte shuld be made here the imprtance rtatin in cmbinatin with srtitin. Clearldierent terms tenure r ce culd be used t make a range ces rm “entr level” t“advanced cmmitment.”31 It is an pen questin hw serius a challenge such par ticipatr demands wuld pse t the idea a liberal sciet. Space prhibits us rm ding mre than mentining the issue here.

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the pls r subsequent ces culd be vluntar. In this wa the diversit and the lwthreshld can be maintained. T rganise this ecientl, hwever, sme srt ranking the pls r dierent ces and the careul stipulatin the requirements r an plsthat were nt simpl citizen-wide wuld be necessar.

We will cnclude this sectin b separating tw distinct prblematics gverning thequestin appling srtive based schemes in mdern demcracies. The rst invlvessrtitin as a mechanism r slving specic, discrete plitical prblems. In this arena thecentral principle is that srtitin shuld be used when a psitive use can be made thene r mre the essential qualities the ltter prcedure in respect t the task in hand.This judgement wuld als invlve assessing whether the psitive advantages usingan aratinal, nnhuman mechanism utweigh the pssible disadvantages, and whetherthese disadvantages can be addressed b ther aspects the prcedure as a whle. As inall design thinking, a clear assessment bjectives is an abslute prerequisite, and thearatinal ltter prcess then becmes an ptin in a prcess clear, deliberate, ratinalcalculatin. Presented in this wa, srtitin culd cmmand mre cnsideratin as a

serius plitical prblem-slving mechanism. The secnd prblematic relates t the larger picture the t rajectr liberal demcracand its perceived limitatins. The questins raised under this heading are mre prund,ar reaching and undamental in their nature. Rather than asking hw we can selectmembers r this r that cmmittee r chse mnitrs r this r that gvernmentalperatin, prblems in this arena invlve cmplex questins such as whether there isan inevitable trend twards ligarch in part electral plitics (Michels 1915; but seeAlrd 1985), whether mre elements direct demcrac shuld be intrduced and t

what eect, and whether the interace between civil and plitical sciet perates airl.These, and mre, questins rm the backgrund t the inquir int the value the wideradvcac srtitin as a new re-regenerative element in mdern wrld demcrac. We started t answer the questin How? with the questin Why? We then raised theissue participatin. It is eas t see participatin as a gd in its wn right and t seesrtitin as a tl b which this can be put int eect. our respnse wuld be t invertthe argument and suggest that in the greater task prtecting the integrit the pen,air plitical prcess, citizen participatin is an incredibl pwerul tl, particularl

because a citizen-wide pl is almst impssible t crrupt r t bring under the will an pwerul individual r part. This is a largel instrumental view demcrac, butne that is cnsistent with the acknwledgment imprtant demcratic rights. once

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this central principle has been grasped, the questin How? can be answered in numerusinventive was.

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ParT 3: WhaT QuesTions reGarDinG LoTTeries remain forfuTure research?

The rst sectin this reprt ered a list eight ptential cntributins that srtitinmight ptentiall make t plitics. The secnd made a case r the use randml-selected

bdies citizens as guardians the integrit and impartialit the plitical prcess.In this nal sectin, we will use this case in rder t re-examine and re-evaluate ur list cntributins. This re-examinatin and re-evaluatin will be tentative. It will prvide,nt a cnclusive argument, but a tentative ne designed t mtivate uture research intthe ther and practice srtitin. Such research wuld useull advance, nt simpl urunderstanding srtitin, but ur understanding demcratic ther as a whle. As nted in the rst sectin this reprt, ne can ask tw vitall imprtant questinsabut each the eight cntributins assciated with srtitin. First, des srtitin indeedprvide the cntributin in questin? Secnd, is the cntributin in questin reall value, and wh? Cnvincing answers are needed t bth questins r each cntributin

bere ne culd reasnabl endrse srtitin as a means t that cntributin. It shuld be clear b nw that the largest cntributin we believe srtitin can make tmdern demcratic plitics is the preventin crruptin and dminatin. We wuldcnceive srtitin as a means t select cials charged with preserving the integrit the plitical prcess. We believe that srtitin, prperl institutinalized, can makesuch a cntributin (althugh urther empirical stud here is denitel warranted), andthat such a cntributin wuld g a signicant wa twards addressing the widespreaddissatisactin with demcratic institutins tda. We als believe that sme the ther

cntributins, ntabl the mitigatin elite-level cnfict and the cntrl pliticalutliers, are clsel related t this ne. (The pschlgical benets srtitin might wellt int this categr, but this is mre a speculative pssibilit at this time, and urtherresearch here ught t be cnducted.) other cntributins, particularl participatin,rtatin, and distributive justice, are less imprtant, unless cnstrued in such a wa as ttie them t the preventin crruptin and dminatin.

Take, r example, the questin rtatin. There is n dubt that randm selectin cangenerate regular turnver amng cehlders. This is true even i, r sme reasn,

cehlders were permitted t enter the randm draw repeatedl. In an large-scaleplit, the prbabilit that an single persn will be selected twice r the same cein her lietime (let alne twice in a rw) is vanishingl small. But srtitin is simpl nt

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necessar t accmplish this purpse. Electins, when cmbined with term limits, canaccmplish this aim just as easil, as can an ther selectin methds with shrt terms ce and a bar upn reappintment. The use srtitin as a methd r attaining rtatinis thus a weak use the ltter at best. The mst cntrversial ptential cntributin srtitin t demcratic plitics is, we

believe, descriptive representatin. The cntrvers des nt reside in the cnnectin between srtitin and descriptive representat in. There is n dening that srt itin can,under the apprpriate cnditins, advance this value. (These cnditins include, rexample, the requirement that participatin in the randm selectin prcess be mandatr.)Indeed, srtitin arguabl accmplishes this task better than an ther prcedure.32 Rather,the cntrvers lies at the level the value descriptive representatin. Wh, in therwrds, des descriptive representatin matter r demcratic plitics? Wh shuld it be agd thing r demcrac that a decisin-making bd “mirrrs” the general ppulatin? The answer t this questin is, we believe, ke t establishing a deensible accunt

srtitin’s cntributin t demcrac. Srtitin prpnents requentl disparageelectral demcrac’s demcratic credentials. And while sme recgnize that pliticalsstems empling ltteries need nt be demcratic,33 mst share Aristtle’s view thatelectin is an inherentl aristcratic selectin prcess, while srtitin is in inherentldemcratic.34 Ètienne Chuard, in his cntributin t the wrkshp, went s ar as tdismiss representative demcrac as an “xmrn.” And the cnnectin the perceive

between srtitin and demcrac—a cnnectin the d nt perceive between electinand demcrac—runs thrugh descriptive representatin. Descriptive representatinmakes it pssible r plitical bdies t mirrr the general public, and this is enugh t

make them secnd-best t direct demcrac, whse demcratic credentials are curseimpeccable. But wh shuld this mirrring relatin be s critical t demcrac? Tpicall, the answer ered t this questin is that a bd that “lks like” the ppulatinas a whle will make decisins that have sme psitive relatin with the ppulatin as a

32 As nted in the rst sectin, Dwlen believes the cnnectin between srtitin and descriptiverepresentatin t be weak; Stne cntends that it is strng.

33 Hubertus Buchstein stressed this pint during the wrkshp.34 We are mre smpathetic t Bernard Manin’s (1997) cntentin that electins have an aristcraticand a demcratic side t them.

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whle. But what precisel is this psitive relatinship? Hw might ne individual r gruprelate t anther in a psitive wa? The pssibilities include the llwing: 35

a) I am like u. b) I share ur interests.c) I represent ur interests.d) I make gd decisins.e) I d what u want me t d, r I d what u wuld have dne.) I d what u wuld want me t d, r what u wuld have dne, in sme hpthetical

set circumstances (e.g., i u were better inrmed—this is smetimes described asthe achievement “enlightened public pinin”).

g) yu selected me t make these decisins.h) I have been authrized t act n ur behal.i) I have been authrized b u t act n ur behal.

Tpicall, the case r descriptive representatin presuppses sme sstematic

relatinship amng these elements. The case, r example, might be that a) implies b),which in turn implies c), which is dened t be equivalent t d). I I am like u, then Ishare ur interests, therere I represent ur interests. And i I represent ur interests,m decisins will be gd. one might als add t this the idea that d) implies ), r viceversa. A gd decisin might simpl be dened as the decisin u wuld have madeunder the right hpthetical circumstances. The challenge wuld then be t make surethat I, as ur representative, make this “gd” decisin r u. Finall, Keith Sutherlandhas in recent wrk suggested that a) might impl i), r at least h), even thugh it is mretpical r g) and i) (as well as g) and c)) t be cnnected via electins. Tpicall, we think

electins as authrizing representatin—u select me, and that is wh I am authrizedt represent u, but Sutherland argues (llwing Fishkin) that I might be authrized trepresent u simpl b virtue being like u. Man these cnnectins, hwever, are ar rm bvius. Fr example, it will be verdicult t cnnect ) and a) except thrugh c). I I make the same decisin as u wuldmake in sme hpthetical scenari, it is presumabl because that decisin prperladvances ur interests, and under that hpthetical scenari u wuld gure this ut.This pint is imprtant, because i the interests an agent and the gals an agent cme

35 Fr a similar cnsideratin descriptive representatin, see the exchange in Griths andWllheim (1960).

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apart, ne must decide which is mst imprtant t the plitical prcess. (The tw willcme apart an time an agent decides t sacrice its interests in rder t advance smether gal—e.g., when a wealth plit decides t send mne t help AIDS rphans inArica.) Mrever, it is ver dicult t evaluate the claim that I would d smethingunder sme hpthetical set circumstances unless the circumstances are specied verclearl—and even then, it will be much harder t evaluate the claim r a cllective bd.The situatin is clearer, thugh still thereticall cmplex in the cllective case, i thegal is simpl t cnnect likeness t the advancement interests. It is, hwever, the cnnectin i), r even h), t a) that pses the mst prblems. Whshuld the mere act that I am like u cnve an kind authrizatin t act upn ur

behal? Admittedl, the cnnectin g) t i) is tenuus at best, despite the erts thescial cntract ther traditin. M abilit t select m representatives prvides at best aver weak rm authrizatin. Fr accrding t the scial cntract traditin, I am takent have authrized a gvernment t make varius decisins aecting me even i:

- I did nt vte in an electin determining the cmpsitin the gvernment;- I vted r a variet candidates r the gvernment, and the all lst;- I vted r a variet candidates r the gvernment, but nne them became part

the new gvernment;- I vted r a variet candidates r the gvernment because the prmised t take

certain actins, and while thse candidates did becme part the gvernment theailed t take an thse actins; r even

- I vted against the enactment the cnstitutin creating the prcedures r authrizingthe gvernment, and have nt vted in an wa since then.

Man these cnclusins seem cunterintuitive, even absurd, as the attribute mauthrizatin t actins r inactins that wuld never be understd that wa in annn-plitical sphere. But descriptive representatin makes matters even wrse. With vting, there is at leasta chance that I will vte r a candidate wh bth wins and is willing and able t ullhis campaign prmises. There is at least sme sense in which I can be said t authrizesuch a candidate t act r me. But even this sense des nt exist when srtitin is used

t generate descriptive representatin, r srtitin ensures there will be no relatinship between the candidates that I want and the candidates that are selected.

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There are tw ptential was ut this, neither ver prmising. on the ne hand, neculd pint t the cnstitutinal prcedure that authrizes srtitin. I I vte r theprcedure, then ne culd claim that I have indirectl authrized the candidates selected

b it. But this des nt help the case r srtitin. The prblem authrizatin b thsewh vte against the prcedures, r reuse t vte at all, remains the same as bere.Mrever, whatever authrizatin that cnstitutinal enactment prvides des nt avursrtitin in an wa. I a cnstitutinal raticatin prcess can be said t prvide cllectiveauthrizatin r srtitin, then that same prcess wuld surel prvide cllectiveauthrizatin r vting, r hereditar mnarch, r an ther selectin prcedure thatmight survive the raticatin prcess.36 But n the ther hand, ne culd tr t art iculatea psitive case r wh descriptive representatin prduces sme srt authrizatin. Aswith vting, this tpe authrizatin wuld never happen utside a plitical cntext;ther peple are nt authrized t sublet m apartment, r bu m grceries, withut mcnsent simpl because the resemble me, hwever clsel. The prblem descriptive representatin runs deep. It is ne the mst cmmnl

evked reasns in avur srtitin (understandabl, given hw ecientl srtitinachieving this gal). yet there remain deep questins regarding just wh descriptiverepresentatin is suppsed t be imprtant—what values it represents and advances—andhw thse values t with ther values. Mst imprtantl, as the discussin here indicates,descriptive representatin raises the questin just what demcrac is all abut, whetherthere even exists a single demcratic value r clsel-cnnected set demcratic values.Mst cmmnl, the attempt t dene demcratic values cuses upn authrizatin insme rm r anther. Demcrac is dened in terms sel-gvernment, which is takent mean gvernment b the cnsent the gverned. Electins were suppsed t enable

such gvernment, and sme prpnents srtitin prpse srtitin as a respnse t theailure electins t accmplish this gal. But the argument s ar has shwn wh bthsrtitin and electins all s ar shrt accmplishing this gal as t raise the questinwhether the gal is achievable at all. And i the gal gvernment b the cnsent the

36 Gdwin (2005) envisages a srtitin-based cnstitutin enjing this rm cllectiveauthrizatin. Stne (2011, sectin 3.3) critiques Gdwin’s argument.

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gverned is nt achievable, then the questin becmes what srt str abut demcracis bth easible and desirable, and hw des srtitin t int that str.37

Fr this reasn, we are sceptical the case r descriptive representatin. We d nt havea knck-dwn argument against it. Rather, we believe that descriptive representatin isne the weaker theretical undatins upn which erect the case r srtitin in themdern wrld. But this is nt a reasn t neglect the case r the ltter as a means tdescriptive representatin. Rather, it prvides a reasn r rethinking the undatins demcratic ther, in such a wa as t illuminate the cnnectin srtitin has t theseundatins. That cnnectin ma r ma nt invlve descriptive representatin, but weare ar mre cndent that it will invlve advancing ther demcratic values, such as thepreventin dminatin. Bere prceeding, we hasten t add that we in n wa reject the gal ensuring thatvices rm all segments sciet are able t nd their wa int the plitical prcess.But the cnnectin between this gal and descriptive representatin is less clear than is

cmmnl assumed. This gal is imprtant r several reasns, mst ntabl the epistemic benets prvided b cgnitive diversit. But these benets require that a variet vicesin the general ppulatin be heard, nt that vices rm the general ppulatin be heardin prprtin t their presence in the general ppulatin, as descriptive representatindemands. Indeed, the demands cgnitive diversit might require the verrepresentatin certain small and marginal scial grups with a vital stake in the decisins at hand.(The pinin gas and lesbians n ga marriage wuld be an example this.) Therepresentatin opinions r discourses might matter a lt t demcrac (Drzek 1994),

but this des nt straightrwardl generate a case r descriptive representatin (Stne

(2012a). one can, in shrt, reject the gal descriptive representation and still embracethe gal diversity in the decisin-making prcess. The latter gal can be sustained anddeended in was that the rmer cannt.

37 C. Plamenatz (1968, p. 3; see als pp. 23-24): i bth direct and representative demcrac

are nl t a limited extent gvernments b cnsent, it will necessaril llw either that cnsentis nt the sle basis the dut the gverned t be their rulers r else that there exists in everstate, hwever demcratic, a large number persns under n bligatin t be its laws. The latter

cnclusin is suspect rm the start, r n state culd perrm its unct ins i it cntained a largenumber citizens exempt rm bedience t its laws. There remains, therere, nl the rmercnclusin, that cnsent cannt be the sle basis the dut in questin, thught it ma well be ne them.

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Sustained refectin upn the cntributins that srtitin can make t demcratic plitics(refectin at which we can nl gesture here thrugh ur brie explratin descriptiverepresentatin et al.) is imprtant r tw reasns. First, the decisin t use srtitin isalwas accmpanied b a mriad ther institutinal design decisins. Getting the rst these decisins right is criticall imprtant i the ther decisins are t be made crrectlas well. Secnd, srtitin is alwas ne several ptins n the table r selecting pliticalcials; i srtitin is t be selected ver its rivals, the advantages and disadvantages iters must be made crstal clear. B wa a cnclusin t this reprt, we will elabrateupn and deend bth these claims. First, cnsider the questin what institutinal eatures shuld be used in cnjunctinwith srtitin. The simple recgnitin that randm selectin has prperties that ma prvedesirable in demcratic plitics des nt straightrwardl generate a case r srtitin.Fr demcratic institutins are cmplex things. Randm selectin can t int them innumerus was, and in cnjunctin with numerus dierent design eatures. Mrever,the selectin ne design eature cannt be made independentl the selectin ther

design eatures. In his bk Equalities, Duglas Rae argued that the cncept equalithas numerus dimensins that an meaningul egalitarian ther justice must speci.I a ther gets even ne these dimensins wrng, it culd cmpletel negate the value the ther even i chices are made crrectl alng all the ther dimensins (Rae1981). Demcratic institutinal design, we believe, wrks in a similar wa. A demcraticinstitutin has numerus eatures that must be selected prperl, and imprper selectin an ne them culd cnceivabl sabtage the prper selectin the rest. The mst imprtant institutinal questin is, curse, just what is suppsed t be selected

b lt. Virtuall all prpnents srt itin answer, “plit ical cials.” Nne, t the best ur knwledge, wuld select plicies at randm. But sme are attracted t the idea lottery voting (therwise knwn as the “randm dictatr” rule). Accrding t this rule,peple make decisins b vting, but the vtes are nt cunted; instead, a single vte isselected at randm, and that vte determines the utcme. This rule has sme surprisinglattractive prperties. In particular, it is strateg-pr; it prvides vters with n incentivet vte r an candidate ther than the ne the mst preer (Gibbard 1977). Fr thisreasn, it has a number partisans (e.g., Amar 1984), but it has received litt le attentin bprpnents srtitin.

Assume, then, that randm selectin is t be used t select plitical cials. Then thesecnd mst critical questin t answer regarding srtitin is just what srts tasks are

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best perrmed b randml-selected cials. The pssible answers are numerus. Theplicmaking prcess has man stages t it, including agenda rmatin, debate, recrd-keeping, implementatin, and review. Randml-selected bdies culd be empled t trcases, make r implement administrative decisins, enact laws, r nminate and/r electcandidates r ther ces. This last usage has attracted little recent attentin amngprpnents srtitin, but it is histricall imprtant; Renaissance Venice used srtitinr this purpse, in a plitical sstem that survived r hal a millennium and was theenv republicans thrughut the western wrld (Finla 1980). It certainl merits urtherattentin; it might t well int the categr “guardians the plitical sstem” that we

believe might prperl be assciated with srtitin. once the decisin has been made t select randml a bd cials t perrm atask, numerus ther institutinal eatures must still be chsen. Shuld candidates bevlunteers? Shuld the be allowed t vlunteer? Shuld the be nminated b thers rincluding in the randm selectin, but given the pprtunit t decline? Shuld everyone

be included in the randm draw, whether the like it r nt? And nce the bd has been

selected, hw shuld it make its decisins? Shuld it be required t deliberate? Shuld it be allowed t participate? With what surces inrmatin shuld it be prvided? Shuldit be empwered t select its wn surces? Shuld thers have the right t speak t it, rprvide evidence? I s, under what cnditins? Will thse selected be required t attend?I s, hw shuld attendance be enrced? Shuld ther perrmance requirements beenrced upn them? What mechanisms, i an, might be required t hld them accuntabler their actins? Shuld the bd vte, r pursue cnsensus (as with the Angl-Americanjur)? Shuld it vte secretl r penl? Shuld its vte be recrded? Shuld it simplmake decisins, r shuld it be cmpelled t present reasns r its decisin? And nall,

shuld its decisins be binding r merel advisr? This last questin currentl attractsa great deal attentin; it lies at the heart the debate between deenders and critics James Fishkin’s deliberative pinin plls (Fishkin 2009). Cnsider ne these questins in urther detail—the questin accuntabilit (an issueraised b Ètienne Chuard during the wrkshp). Representative demcrac has lng been

based upn what Judith Shklar called the “liberalism ear” (Shklar 1998), with electinsprviding the accuntabilit that ensures even less-than-saintl pliticians will behavethemselves. Electins ma nt prvide this accuntabilit as reliabl as the unders

representative demcrac believed (Shapir 2003, p. 60), but the act remains that srtitinhas n cnceptual cnnectin with a similar accuntabilit mechanism. This des ntimpl that srtitin inherentl leads t accuntabilit, but it des impl that care must

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be taken in generating the apprpriate mechanisms r accmplishing this task. Schlarscncerned with demcrac have begun t devte attentin t the varius mechanismsavailable t ensure accuntabilit (Przewrski, Stkes, and Manin 1999). Srtitin shuld

be cnsidered as part this research prgramme, which cnsiders the general prblem mtivating public actrs t serve the public interest. The questin accuntabilit brings us t the secnd ur tw cncluding questins.

Just as ne must cnsider what institutinal eatures shuld be used in cnjunctinwith srtitin, s must ne cnsider hw srtitin cmpares t ther methds rassigning public respnsibilities. Srtitin is, curse, nl ne several alternativemethds selecting plitical cials. Electins are anther. Appintment is anther.Indeed, these three methds are the primar alternatives cnsidered apprpriate tdar selecting plitical cials (Stne 2012b). And curse, each these alternativesinvlves cuntless variatins—electins, r example, can be cnducted using an ne a vast arra pssible vting rules. Is ne these alternatives demnstrabl superirt the thers in all cases? Unlikel. I nt, which alternative is apprpriate under which

circumstances? When can vters make gd decisins in selecting cials, in the sense ding markedl better than pure chance? When des randmizatin make a psitivecntributin t the selectin prcess? Is it pssible t speci appintment prceduresthat avid the pitalls electin and utperrm srtitin? Mdern demcratic ther hastaken the superirit electins r granted. Prpnents srtitin shuld nt repeatthis mistake b presuming the superirit srtitin. Demcratic ther must trul becmparative, examining impartiall and dispassinatel the respective cntributins andlimitatins all alternative methds cmpatible with its basic values.

An cmparative investigatin alternative selectin mechanisms must remember thatplitical psitins are nt lled in a vacuum. Hw well randml-selected ce X unctinswill depend criticall upn bth the existence ce y and the selectin mechanismempled b y. one tpical cmplaint made against randml-selected legislatures, rexample, is that the wuld greatl increase legislative amateurism. Whatever the thervirtues such amateurism ma be, the wuld (accrding t this argument) result in amassive transer pwer t the bureaucrac, which can be assumed t have much mrestable lng-term interests its wn. Electins, b cntrast, create pprtunities r careerpliticians with the expertise t discipline and cntrl bureaucrats. This argument,

curse, makes several critical assumptins. It assumes, r example, that electedcials can be eectivel disciplined b vters, and that thse cials will thrugh thisdisciplinar prcess share mre interests with vters than with bureaucrats. But whatever

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its validit, this argument raises the critical questin hw randml-selected bdieswill interact with elected and appinted cials. This questin must be addressed i demcratic institutinal design is t be studied in a trul cmparative manner. Investigatin bth these questins regarding srtitin will require thereticalwrk, histrical research, as well as cntinued use small-scale experiments invlvingsrtitin (Fishkin 2009).38 Research int srtitin shuld remain interdisciplinar, and

be integrated mre ull int the stud demcratic plitics. Fr while this reprt caner sme tentative lessns abut the prper rle srtitin in mdern demcrac, thereremains much wrk t be dne.

38 During the wrkshp, hwever, Peter Stne cautined against drawing ambitius cnclusins abutsrtitin slel rm the small-scale experiments. Institutins ma unctin ne wa n the peripher sciet and quite anther wa when the becme mainstream. See Elster (1993) n this pint.

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ACKNoWLEDGEMENTS




47

acknoWLeDGemenTs

The cnvenrs “The Ltter as a Demcratic Institutin: A Wrkshp” are deeplgrateul t all the participants—bth thse n the prgramme and thse taking partin the discussins—r making the wrkshp such a success. The made man valuablecmments and suggestins—t man, in act, r all t be ull addressed in the space ur brie reprt. We have endeavured t acknwledge these cntributins and respndt them where pssible. o curse, we are ull respnsible r the ideas expressed in thisreprt.

The cnvenrs wuld als like t thank Denise Carlin Huebner r prviding stang atthe wrkshp; Helen Murra (Plic Institute) r her invaluable rganizatinal skills; TmPegram (Directr the Plic Institute) r cnsistentl supprting bth the wrkshp andthis reprt; and Peter Simns (Head Trinit’s Schl Scial Sciences and Philsph)r pening the wrkshp. The summar the wrkshp cntained in Appendix 2 wasprepared b oliver Dwlen and Berenice Benjellun rm a Dictaphne recrding the

cnerence prceedings. Jan-Willem Burgers reviewed the reprt and prvided helpulcmments and suggestins.

Funding r the wrkshp was prvided b the Arts and Scial Sciences BeneactinsFund, b the Plic Institute, and b Sciences P.

Subsequent t the wrkshp, Peter Stne presented drat versins this reprt at theSéminaire de Recherche, Département de Science Plitique et Relatins Internatinals,Universit Geneva, March 11, 2013; and at the Plitical Science Department Writing

Wrkshp, Trinit Cllege Dublin, April 2, 2013. He is grateul t participants at bthevents r their man helpul cmments and suggestins, and t Annabelle Lever and WillPhelan in particular r making these events pssible.

APPENDIX 1




48

aPPenDix 1: ProGramme for “The LoTTery as aDemocraTic insTiTuTion: a WorkshoP”

APPENDIX 1

9.00 – 9.15am Welcome by Peter Simons

Head of School of Social Sciences and Philosophy9.15 – 10.00am “From Gambling to Sort ition:

A Proposal for a Typology of Random Selection” - Antoine Vergne

10.30 – 10.50am Speaker - Peter Stone10.50 – 11.10am First Respondent - Hubertus Buchstein

11.10 – 11.30am Second Respondent - Yann Allard-Tremblay11.30 – 12.45pm Discussion12.45 – 1.45pm Lunch (sandwiches provided)

1.45 – 2.05pm Speaker - Oliver Dowlen2.05 – 2.25pm First Respondent - Stephen Elstub2.25 – 2.45pm Second Respondent - Étienne Chouard2.45 – 4.00pm Discussion

8.45 – 9.00am Registration

10.00 – 10.30am Tea/ Coffee

Thursday 11 October, 2012

Session 1: 10.30 – 12.45pmWhat can random selection contribute to politics?

Session 2: 1.45 – 4.00pmHow can random selection best be incorporated into modern democratic institutions?

9.15– 9.35am Speaker - Gil Delannoi

9.35 – 9.55am First Respondent - David Farrell

9.55 – 10.15am Second Respondent - Jane Suiter

10.15 – 10.45am Tea/Coffee

10.45 – 12.00pm Discussion

Friday 12 October, 2012

Session 3: 9.15 – 12.00pm

What research questions on sortition still need to be addressed?




49

aPPenDix 2: summary of ProceeDinGs for “The LoTTery as aDemocraTic insTiTuTion: a WorkshoP”

nt: This summar was prepared b oliver Dwlen and Berenice Benjellun rm aDictaphne recrding the cnerence prceedings.

The wrkshp pened with a welcme b Peter Simns, Head the Schl Scial Sciencesand Philsph at Trinit Cllege Dublin, and with a presentatin b Antine Vergneentitled “Frm Gambling t Srtitin: A Prpsal r a Tplg Randm Selectin.”

In sectin 1 the wrkshp, Peter Stne presented the rst sectin the drat reprt,addressing himsel t the questin, “What can randm selectin cntribute t plitics.”In rder t address this pint, he inquired hw best t understand what randm selectindes and hw can it be put t use.

In respect t the rst questin, there seems in the recent discussins t be a divisin

that has emerged. on ne side the divide is the “mnist” view that the ltter hasne primar prpert and that when an applicatin is cnsidered the apprpriateness the ltter is judged b whether this prpert is required in an given situatin. Thisinterpretatin has been ascribed t the wrk oliver Dwlen in The Political Potential o

Sortition (2008) and t Peter Stne’s The Luck o the Draw (2011). The pluralist view, n thether hand, is a view that accepts that a ltter b a multitude prperties, and thererea multitude pssible applicatins.

There is a sense, hwever, that neither Stne nr Dwlen are ruling ut diversit, but

rather that the are seeking t draw clearer lines divisin between claims in rder tacilitate a mre cussed discussin. Sme claims r the ltter are ver similar, and it isthe jb analsis t clari this. The view the authr this sectin the reprt (PeterStne), r instance, is the centralit the qualit unpredictabilit.

In respect the secnd pint inquir—hw ltter can best be put t gd use—thereprt puts rward the llwing eight pssibilities:

1) T aid descriptive representatin b creating a gvernmental r decisin-making bd

that cnstitutes the ppulatin in miniature. Whether r nt descriptive representatin isa valuable idea is anther imprtant but cmplex questin, but a psitin that cmmandedgreater cnsensus was that where a diversit vices was necessar, srtitin culd deliver.

APPENDIX 2




50

2) T prevent crruptin r dminatin the plitical prcess b pwerul grupings.3) T mitigate pliticall destructive cmpetitin amngst elites b creating sharedprcedural nrms.4) T cntrl plitical utliers (s as t allw pssible inclusin, but t prevent dminatin

b extremist grupings).5) T allcate the benets and burdens sciet airl (distributive justice).6) T increase participatin in the plitical prcess.7) T generate rtatin in plitical participatin. A ltter culd cntribute t this, butmuch depends n the central institutinal design.8) T prvide varius pschlgical benets. Ltteries bviate the triumphalism thewinners and assuage the shame the lsers. B the same tken, i entitlement n the basis persnal merit and its ppsite (the exclusin and shame the less-than-cmpetent)were seen as whll desirable, the use ltter wuld be prblematic.

Hubertus Buchstein prvided the rst respnse t Stne’s presentatin. He questined thecreatin t strng a link between srtitin and demcrac. Ltteries were nt inevitabl

cnnected t demcrac and culd actuall ull anti-demcratic rles. There was alsa questin wh a general ther srtitin was needed; a perspective which invlvedcmparisns with ther rms plitical decisin-making might be better. There wasals a prblem with the mnist/pluralist classicatin. Better, he argued, t prceed n amre principled basis b lking at cncepts such as prcedural autnm and seeing hwa ltter, as a prcedure immune t intererence, cnrms r prmtes this.

on the subject the number pssible benets, Buchstein argued that what was neededwas a strateg r understanding what shuld be included and which excluded. Ltteries

can be used t stabilise pre-demcratic plitical settlements thrugh general pliticalcnslidatin. This we can als see as part transrmative scenaris, as ppsed t beingrelated t sme distinct rm plit. In respect t uture research we shuld lk mre atempirical evidence. This culd cme rm areas utside plitics, such as secndar schlapplicatins r rm cmputer simulatins.

The secnd respnse t Stne’s presentatin came rm yann Allard-Trembla. Heidentied the imprtance a prcedure in which the absence reasn allws us tlk at reasns and nt at interests, t avid dminatin and cntrl, and t cunteract

the interest naked pwer. It is this that gives srtitin its demcratic legitimac; it isacceptable because it is nt part the plitics interest and bias. A ltter is aratinal, butnt unaected b the peratin reasn in its applicatin and its backgrund cnditins.

APPENDIX 2




51

There is ‘intentinalit’ in the applicatin a ltter; it is nt abslute unreasn, but canhave a ratinalit which cnnects it t demcratic legitimac.

on the subject descriptive representatin, Allard-Trembla argued, we shuld lk atthe primar alternative, vting, and enquire abut its legitimac. Electins have mandeects, but the certainl cnnect the gvernment t the peple. Since ltteries reducethe capacit plitical pwer, srtitin culd be viewed as air, while descriptiverepresentatin wuld imprve the epistemic eatures demcrac thrugh the generatin diversit (and it wuld d s in a air wa). We wuld als have t realise that there culd

be prblems accuntabilit and inexperience in a plit ical set-up that had descriptiverepresentatin as its ratinale and eatured ltter selectin with strict rtatin. Schemes

based n descriptive representatin culd be cmbined with ratinal means, such as thevluntar expressin views t make up r imperectins in the descriptive representatinparadigm. Allard-Trembla nted here Jsiah ober’s examinatin hw randm selectinin Athens acilitated the redistributin practical and scial knwledge. Descriptiverepresentatin might be imprtant r sme institutins, but the case r using srtitin as

an anti-dminatin measure is strnger.

Allard-Trembla argued that there were several pints missing rm the dra t reprt:

1) Participatin has the eect bsting deliberatin, cntributing t the creatin apeple—a netwrk interrelated interests where inrmatin can be pled and scial

barriers brken dwn.2) The use ltteries t make decisins shuld nt be dismissed. Frms ltter vtingculd be valuable in a number cntexts. We need t be clear wh we nd it mre

acceptable t chse cials b lt than t make decisins b the same methd.3) It was nt alwas clear hw eective srtitin actuall is at preventing crruptin. Hwdes it cmpare with majrit vting, r instance?

Descriptive representatin, Allard-Trembla cncluded, is nt the main reasn r thedevelpment ltteries, but it can cntribute t the primar capacit srtitin tprmte shared scial knwledge and rbust, legitimate, demcratic plicies.

The wrkshp then entered int wide-ranging discussin cused upn sectin 1 the

drat reprt. A number tpics received extensive attentin in this discussin. Theseincluded the relatinship srtitin t demcrac; the mnist/pluralist aspect thepresentatin and its relatin t descriptive representatin; the need r empirical evidence;

APPENDIX 2




52

the cmparisn between deliberative rms and direct demcrac; decisin-making b ltin general; and the capacit r ltteries t disrupt the activities interest grups.

Sme agreed it was wrng t assciate srtitin slel with demcrac, but the pintwas made that the apprpriateness srtitin as a demcratic institutin depended nwhat denitin r ther demcrac was alluded t. The answer wuld be dierent rdierent cnceptins demcrac. The idea gvernment perating in the interests the peple r that demcrac included the need r plitical expressin culd be seen ascmmensurate with srtitin. But demcrac as gvernment b the wise n behal theunwise wuld nt be.

There was als discussin the relatinship between the Athenian polis and the mdernplitical cntext. The principle the circulatin between the ruler and ruled culd beseen as a central justicatin r srtitin, althugh Aristtle did nt expressl make thatcnnectin. The ntin that this tpe circulatin wuld be pssible in a large mdernplit was challenged. There was hwever, n clearl expressed ancient ratinale r the

use srtitin. Recnstructin was needed t achieve this.

The idea a ttall pluralistic, relativist ppsitin t the use srtitin was attackedn the basis that this created semantic chas. Citizens wuld need clear reasns whsrtitin culd be valuable. Advcates a mre pluralistic apprach were wrried abutthe centralit the aratinal and aratinalit in theries justiing the use srtitin.one wa expressing this was t distinguish psitive uses srtitin rm negativer preventative uses. Descriptive representatin was a psitive use; the inhibitin crruptin r the limiting pwer was a negative use. Putting unpredictabilit at the

centre ltter ther shuld be challenged b the value the ltter in descriptiverepresentatin; in this case its use becmes predictable, based n ratio and perating at thegrup rather than the individual level. Against this view, it was suggested that this rm predictabilit merel served the plitics interest; mrever, it culd be argued thatthe preventive actin srtitin was itsel part the prmtin psitive, principled,inclusive plitics.

It was als suggested that there was a tacit calitin rming between advcates deliberative demcrac and thse descriptive representatin. Srtitin was being

incrprated t blster a pure ther deliberative demcrac.

There was general agreement n the need r mre empirical research, especiall n

APPENDIX 2




53

peple’s attitude t existing r recent ltter schemes. What d British MPs think, rinstance, the use ltteries t select private members bills r debate? D we haveevidence attitudes t the United States’ Vietnam-era drat ltter? D we knw i therewere citizens juries with mandatr rather than advisr pwers? We shuld lk t sme the nn-plitical uses srtitin, such as ltteries r higher educatin places, t serveas strng examples. This culd help us t evaluate the emtinal reactins t srtitin. Itwas als nted that the prspect srtitin r ce culd stimulate psitive attitudest participatin.

Direct demcrac, ten based the Swiss example, eatured strngl in the discussin. Itwas cited as a better alternative t the use deliberative grups and was a direct expressin citizens’ views cmpared t the indirectness implied in descriptive representatin. Itwas als nted that man the eight pints culd be addressed b nn-randm means.There was sme discussin n the questin decisin-making b lt; whether it waspssible t dene a crrupt decisin; whether we shuld llw Cndrcet and see themajrit as necessaril mrall right; and whether we were “epistcrats” and placed all

ur plitical eggs in the basket “rightness.”

While nt a majr theme in the discussin, the imprtance srtitin in breaking the link between gvernment and ecnmic class was stressed, as was its value r breaking up theplitical habits debate b placing members a deliberating grup in new relatinshipswith each ther.

Ater a break r lunch, oliver Dwlen pened Sessin 2 the wrkshp b inquiring hwrandm selectin might best be incrprated int demcrac. The idea the drat reprt,

Dwlen said, was t establish where the current arguments have led us, and als t utlinethe srt ltter ther that has underpinned the discussins up t nw. The secndsectin the reprt ered an attempt t integrate this with ideas institutinal design.

The best starting pint r bth ltter ther develpment and the prspective applicatin ltteries t plitics is with the qualities the ltter prcess itsel. once these qualitiesare grasped, we can then adpt a design apprach t match the qualities the ltterwith the task that we wish the ltter t undertake. This helps us t assess whether theltter is the right tl r the jb. one wa lking at this is t think the ltter as

a mechanism that deliberatel excludes the human. I we wish t use a ltter we d s because we wish t use ne r mre the nn-human attributes the prcedure.

APPENDIX 2




54

on the questin hw randm selectin methds might best be incrprated intdemcrac, it might be better t cnsider the cmplementar questin, “Wh?” Withrespect r participatin, the desire r participatin cmes histricall rm the perceiveddeciencies liberal demcrac. I we nw cnsider the use srtitin t engenderparticipatin as a desired gd we have t ask what mre is added t this gd b the use this particular mechanism.

The rst pint abut incrpratin is the idea that srtitin shuld be used in cmbinatinwith existing demcratic institutins rather than in ppsitin t them, r t theirexclusin. The secnd chamber scenari, where each chamber has a dierent unctin,might be ideal. Citizen mnitring , and assistance r, elected cers wuld t thiscmplementar pattern, as wuld “citizen witness” schemes. This rle mnitring andprtecting the plitical sstem ts with the use srtitin as an impartial mechanismand has an existing pedigree perating in this capacit.

other imprtant pints discussed b Dwlen included the questin whether ltteries

shuld be vluntar r cmpulsr; what srt training shuld be given t ce-hlders;and what srt remuneratin culd be given t citizen ce-hlders.

one the main diculties in assessing hw these schemes might perate is the tendenct view ptential srtive measures thrugh the prism the current psitin the nn-participatr citizen in a largel discnnected, sel-interested sciet. Alng with themeasures themselves, the cntext r applicatin wuld need t be develped. Finall, itmight be useul t separate analsis the particular prblem-slving acilit srtitinrm explanatin hw mre sstematic use the mechanism might change r challenge

ur ideas demcrac.

Stephen Elstub ered the rst respnse t Dwlen. He began b acknwledging that thiswas a new area investigatin r him, althugh he had had experience deliberativedemcrac and mini-publics. on the questin descriptive representatin, verreliancen descriptive representatin culd be prblematic, but it culd be relevant r certain srts sstem and culd be a principle that culd extend the range ideas in an deliberatin.Peple culd als have great trust in “peple like us.” on the preventin crruptin, hestressed, it is imprtant t remember that manipulatin culd still ccur with srtitin.

on the subject impartialit, he argued that the expressin partialit and the vices stake-hlders are necessar parts the plitical prcess. The cmplementar rle

APPENDIX 2




55

srtitin within mixed institutins seems t er the mst likel wa rward. Institutinsculd be designed t deliver the demcratic values that were wanted.

Elstub cncluded with a ew refectins n the prblem institutinal design. Furtherresearch regarding institutins culd best be achieved in a ull cmparative ramewrk,using bth empirical evidence and nminative analsis. Rtatin has t be seen as anindependent mechanism in its wn right. We have t ask wh participatin might becnsidered a desirable gd, recgnising that the ideal gvernment shuld refect all theinterests in sciet. Vluntar schemes are preerable t cmpulsr, and this principleshuld gvern institutinal design. Finall, we wuld need t lk careull at questins incentive and accuntabilit.

The secnd respnse t Dwlen came rm Ètienne Chuard. His respnse dealt mainlwith the ptential srtitin r rectiing scial injustice. The main cause scialinjustice is the pwerlessness rdinar gd peple. The interests the pr aresstematicall excluded rm mst mdern cnstitutinal arrangements, althugh the

institutin cnstitutin itsel has the capacit t weaken cncentratins pwer.Similarl, representatin, while currentl misused, has the capacit t prevent thedminatin b the strngest. Within this ramewrk there are a variet ptential usesr srtitin: a secnd chamber t er a cunterweight t an elected legislative bd; thecntrl judges; the cntrl the executive; the cntrl the media; the cntrl thelegislature s as t limit the infuence lbbists. All these wuld t under the generalaim imprving representative gvernment.

It is dicult t see hw an arrangement this srt culd cme abut thrugh elected

gvernments. It is imprtant t cnvince rdinar peple the value this srt arrangement, and als t see the benets having amateur rather than pressinalrepresentatives.

We can get a urther perspective n these matters b cmparing the 200 ears Atheniangvernment b the pr with ur 200 ears gvernment b the rich. We shuld ntthink srtitin as the nl wa achieving scial justice, but it is certainl ne wa imprving representatin and breaking the identicatin gvernment with the richestscial class.

Discussin sectin 2 the drat reprt then ensued. In this discussin the llwingthemes were pursued: 1) the disentangling srtitin rm the cncept deliberative

APPENDIX 2




56

demcrac and its dierent elements; 2) the tpe transrmative prcess that wuld be needed t intrduce and evaluate srtive measures; 3) the nature demcrac inits ancient and mdern guises and its relatin t srtitin in bth; 4) hw srtitin anddeliberative demcrac relate t direct demcrac.

Sme cntributrs elt that descriptive representatin culd useull be de-cupled rmdeliberative demcrac. others were keen t pint ut dierences in the interpretatin deliberatin—a Habermasian emphasis n speech versus an emphasis n “weighing”derived rm Fishkin, r example. There was sme cnusin as t the exact meaning “srtitin.” The term seemed t sme cntributrs t signi a uture sstem as a whle,rather than simpl the ltter mechanism. This impressin was crrected, and it was alspinted ut that in Athenian practice the main deliberative bd, the Assembl, was ntselected b srtitin.

This raised the questin whether a deliberative assembl needed t be selected bltter, and a subsequent suggestin that deliberative demcrac and srtitin shuld

be viewed as independent and separate. Similarl it was elt that it wuld be useul tseparate participatin rm deliberatin, since the rmer encmpassed a wider range pssible activities.

on the questin descriptive representatin it was stressed that this cncept culd nt be realised individuall but nl cllectivel. Descriptive representatin ered thepssibilit cgnitive enlargement and prmted cgnitive diversit. Thse selected neednt act slel in their wn interest r the sstem t perate successull. It was als pintedut that descriptive representatin wuld sn reduce t active representatin as dentists

(r example) asked their parliamentar members t take an active rle n their behal.

The questin evaluating srtitin with respect t pssible uture use generateddiscussin abut the relatinship between ther and practice. There was a clear needt examine places where srtive schemes were perating successull and there werestrategic questins abut the transrmative path t greater use the mechanism. Certaindecentralised ederal structures such as the United States and German culd erpprtunities r experiment bend the lcal level.

It was pinted ut, hwever, that it wuld nt be a simple matter t iner the success a natinwide scheme rm a successul lcal ne. There were hwever, sme aspects mdern demcratic rule, such as the dangers actinalism, that paralleled ancient

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experience and this culd be used as empirical evidence i care was taken t cmpare thehistrical cntext with mdern cnditins. The need t present srtitin as part a whlepackage measures was stressed; assessing srtitin utside the particular schemes inwhich it was t perate culd als be prblematic.

In respnse t the questin where there were an randml selected schemes currentlperating successull, the example the jur was cited. This was imprtant because its peratinal psitin within the cnstitutins where it was used, because its ptentiallaw-making capacit (in cmmn-law sstems), and because its rle as the guardian plitical reedm. Man mdern citizens’ jur schemes were “crisis led.” The respnserates members the public t such srtive and deliberative schemes were nt alwasavurable, and man thse mst likel t be aected b the prpsals in hand were themst uninterested.

There was much discussin abut the term “demcrac” and hw ancient practicesdiered rm mdern representative gvernment. It was nted that there was nthing

intrinsicall demcratic abut srtitin, but it did have the ptential t break the links between scial and ecnmic pwer and plitical pwer.

It was thught b sme that the name “demcrac” was misleading since in the ancientdemcrac the pr culd, t sme extent, cntrl the rich, whereas the ppsite wastrue with mdern representative demcrac. The idea was even expressed that the term“representative demcrac” was a cntradictin. It had t be recgnised that the inventrs mdern representative demcrac, particularl the Americans in the late 18th centur,did nt use the term, but saw themselves as unding a republican sstem. As a mdern

“desirable gd,” the term was als shruded in rhetric. In earlier perids it was apejrative term, denting the pr gathering in a threatening manner. It was als pintedut that in Athens srtitin and ther methds develped in a pre r prt-demcraticphase which helped t prmte a rle-gverned, stable, participating plis. It was elt thatrepresentatin itsel was nt fawed, but needed t be cntrlled. I the existing checksand balances were inadequate t cntrl the experts, then tribune-tpe sstems might bea valuable additin. In this respect the dierence between parliamentar and republicancnstitutinal arrangements needed t be recgnised. The idea that liberal demcrac wasnt sucientl accuntable was challenged, but it was als pinted ut that the Athenian

sstem incrprated a wide range ppular anti-crruptin and accuntabilit measuresar bend thse the mdern liberal paradigm.

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There was a brie discussin direct demcrac at the clse this sessin. This discussincused n whether direct demcratic measures wuld be preerable t sampled min-publics.

Sessin 3 the wrkshp pened the next mrning. Gil Delanni ered sme refectinsn part 3 the drat reprt and n the reprt in general. He nted that the current wrkshpwas part a series launched tw ears ag which included sessins n demcrac anddirect demcrac and n the advent representative gvernment as the use srtitin wasn the decline. Next ear there were tw sessins planned, ne n srtitin in transitint demcrac, and anther (t take place in Switzerland) n a theme t be annunced. Ansuggestins subject matter r the uture, Delanni added, wuld be welcme.

Delanni himsel nce advcated srtitin r the selectin an imprtant universitchairpersn. This prpsal was rejected, but a prpsal t elect withut candidates wasaccepted. This str demnstrates hw srtitin, r at least the threat srtitin, culdwrk in msterius was.

What we need t lk at nw, Delanni cncluded, is what institutinal measures need taccmpan srtitin; hw dierent measures selectin cmpare t each ther; and what bundles demcratic values can be prmted b the use srtitin. There is alwas hpethat unding will be und r experiments that we culd then examine and bserve rthat lcal gvernment cers smewhere might be persuaded t cllabrate.

David Farrell and Jane Suiter respnded t Delanni’s remarks. Farrell reprted n wrkthat he and anther clleague had undertaken in the previus ear. In terms the widercntext, this wrk is linked t theretical wrk cncerned with the current health

representative demcrac. This wrk led t arguments abut hw t dene “demcrac,” but it was judged easiest t g with Dahl’s ntin polyarchy . Central t this ntin wasthe idea that citizens needed nl t be active at electin time. Even this minimal ntin demcrac is aected tda b declining turnut, dwindling supprt r parties, and ageneral sense that representative demcrac is ailing. Nnetheless, there is a widespreadsense that there still exists space in representative demcratic structures r mrecitizen invlvement between electins. Farrell was particularl interested in temprarinstitutins a deliberative tpe set up with a part icular purpse in mind, especiall the“We the Citizens” prject in Ireland.

Suiter asserted that the ke questin cncerning large-scale deliberative prjects is that participation. This meant talking abut the recruiting methds empled r such

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prjects, as well as the dierences in perceptin between thse wh were willing t takepart and thse wh, r whatever reasn, were indierent t plitical questins. Thereis a discernible dierence, Suiter argued, between dissatised demcrats—thse whhad alread had sme plitical experience, but had becme disenchanted with the statusqu—and thse wh had never taken an interest in the plitical prcess. This latter grupamunted t sme 20% the ppulatin.

The “We the Citizens” prject, with which bth Farrell and Suiter were invlved, invlvedsrtitin, but while the citizens were initiall chsen randml the tk part nl i thethen agreed t d s. Recruitment was b randm digital dialling. In sme senses it was amck citizens’ assembl. Its bject was t explre pssible rerms t the current sstem,

based n the premise that a prmise rerm had been made b the last gvernment.

The grup chsen r “We the Citizens” culd be described as airl representative, but it included sme surprising elements, such as peple in their 40’s wh had nevervted. Discussins in the prject llwed a small grup rmat in an inrmal “caé”-

tpe envirnment. o the 1200 psitive telephne respndents, 100 actuall tk part.Inrmatin packs were sent ut t all and regular phne calls were needed t maintaininvlvement. Much the academic interest la in when and hw peple changed theirminds during the deliberative prcess, hw shits understanding tk place and theextent t which participants’ views remained xed.

The prject arused interest rm pressinal pliticians and members the gvernment,and shrtl aterwards the gvernment annunced its wn cnventin. 66 randml-selected members the public, plus 33 MPs, wuld meet t discuss the reductin the

vting age rm 18 t 17, a prpsal t reduce the term the president rm 7 t 5 ears,and ther tpics.

Mst the discussin that llwed in this sessin cused upn the “We the Citizens”prject. There were als mre general questins r inquiries abut the value the prcessas a whle and its relatinship t ther srtive r demcratic prcedures

In the rst categr there were questins abut the aggregating vices in the discussinand whether it culd be determined when peple changed their minds. Additinal

knwledge appeared as the instigatr greatest change, and because sme nn-attendeeshad been sent inrmatin packs it was thereticall pssible t determine the eect attending the deliberative sessins.

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Peple with let-wing views seemed mre pen t change than thse with right-wingviews. In answer t a questin abut whether recruitment was rm the entire ppulatin(which wuld give the prcess legitimac), it was explained that the randm diallingsstem delivered a 99.5% cverage.

other questins cncerned the lng-term eects these tpes rums and whetherpeple retained their newund interest in plitics. There was nt much evidence eitherwa n this, but pliticians paid attentin t the results deliberatin rums and thismight help rame uture agendas. Anther direct questin cncerned wh was representingwh in a rum this tpe. In ther wrds, culd we be justied in assuming that thsewh attended were smehw representing thse wh didn’t? The respnse t this was thatthe eect these rums shuld nt be verestimated; there was a sense that these rumswere simpl ne wa tring t represent a ragmented and disrganized sciet and tgive sme srt vice t thse wh did nt have ne.

The relatinship between deliberative rums and reerenda was als discussed. Was it

right, r instance, that the nal decisin shuld be made n an issue b thse wh hadnt taken part in the rum? one respnse t this was t questin the assumptin thatthere was n deliberatin amngst the public during a reerendum.

The dierence, it was explained, between deliberative rums and reerenda was that thermer sught a mre cntrlled, mre inrmed, and mre balanced discussin. Whateverthe nminative value each, it was useul t draw a distinctin between these articialagras and their natural cunterparts. Man articulated the view that peple might preerreerendums t deliberative rums, but thers thught sme mini-publics culd becme

leaders public pinin. While deliberative rums had direct access t inrmatin,ull public inrmatin prvisin was essential r reerenda. It was pinted ut thatSwitzerland was a ver divided sciet et smehw it managed t develp and maintainsuch a sstem. This was, in sme respects, a respnse t an earlier questin abut hwsrtitin culd develp in a divided sciet like Nrthern Ireland (which was denied theright trial b jur), and hw deliberative demcrac rums culd wrk when therewere s man pre-decided views.

There was sme discussin abut experts. In larger deliberative demcrac rums,

citizens themselves tk greater respnsibilit r the chice experts. It was als ntedthat in sme cnstitutins, such as the United States, judges were assigned t their cases

b srtitin. This suggested ther similar schemes invlving experts culd be develped.

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Questins were raised abut the legitimac srt ive rms and whether this representatin b prx, b “peple like me,” culd be seen as legitimate as the cnsent the peple inreerendums. I “peple like me” pssessed the legitimac t represent in the legislature,wuld thers submit t their rle i the rmed part the executive? This was acmplicated issue, and part a wider discurse n scial cntract ther. It was, hwever,pinted ut that expressins cnsent perated as plitical capital r plitical decisin-makers, and gave them the pprtunit and encuragement t pursue certain issues.An example was deliberative rms in China which never reall challenged authrit.

There was a small amunt discussin as t whether srtitin culd help prvide checksand balances in a plit. The subject exclusins was explred, as well as and the needr transparenc in randm-selectin prcedures (especiall in an age cmputers). TheG1000 rum in Belgium was brief discussed and the sstematic use electrnic mediain that event was nted. Cmputer simulatin might suppl a dierent srt empiricalevidence r srtive schemes.

The relatinship between srtitin and pwer was suggested as a tpic r urtherresearch. There was a similar interest expressed in cmparative studies between srtiveand elective schemes, as well as the use randm selectin r scial husing and/rimmigratin sstems. The view was expressed that it might be useul t see srtitin aspart a plitical narrative, especiall amngst thse natins wh were new t demcracand were lking r new ptins. It was als pinted ut that deliberative demcrac hada strng prle in the academic cmmunit, whereas interest in ther srts srtitinwas relativel lw and shuld be encuraged.

The wrkshp clsed with the cnclusin this sessin.

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aPPenDix 3: sPeaker bioGraPhies

y alld-Tl recentl cmpleted his Ph.D. in the jint prgramme in Philsph the Universit St Andrews and the Universit Stirling. His thesis addresses therelatinship between a prcedural epistemic ther demcrac and cnstitutinalism.His main research interests are n theries demcrac, varius ntins jurisprudencesuch as authrit and legitimac, and epistemlg. He has recentl published a paperin Res Publica n the epistemic edge majrit vting ver ltter vting. He als has apaper rthcming in the Oxord Journal o Legal Studies n the tpic judicial reviewwithin a prcedural and epistemic ther demcrac.

ht bt is Pressr and Chair Plitical Ther and the Histr PliticalIdeas at Greiswald Universit, German. He studied Plitical Science, Histr, Philsphand German Literature at the Freie Universität Berlin and cmpleted his dissertatin n theHistr Plitical Science in German there in 1990. He later tk psitins at the FreieUniversität Berlin and was Aliated Facult member at the New Schl r Research in

New yrk between 1995 and 2003. Since September 2009 he is serving as President theGerman Plitical Science Assciatin (DVPW). He was a Fellw at the Wissenschatskllegzu Berlin in the 2012-2013 academic ear. His main research tpics are prcedures plitical will rmatin and electral rules, mdern theries demcrac, the histr plitical ideas, and right-wing extremism in German. Recent publicatins include his

bks Demokratie und Lotterie (2009), Demokratietheorie in der Kontroverse (2010), andDemokratiepolitk (2011), as well as the articles (with Michael Hein) “Randmizing Eurpe.The Ltter as a Decisin-Making Prcedure r Plic Creatin in the EU” (Critical Policy

Studies) and (with Dirk Jörke) “The Argumentative Turn tward Deliberative Demcrac:

Habermas’s Cntributin and the Fucauldian Critique.” (In The Argumentative TurnRevisited: Public Policy as Communicative Practice, ed. b Frank Fischer and HerbertGttweis). He has a website at http://www.hubertus-huchstein.de.

Èt cd teaches Ecnmics in Marseille. Since the French reerendum n theCnstitutin r Eurpe, he has been investigating the cause the causes scial injustices,with particular cncerns r the cnstitutinal prcess and the creatin mne. He has

becme a strng advcate r the centralit selectin b lt in an demcrac wrth the name. He has a website at http://etienne.chuard.ree.r/Eurpe.

Gl Dl is a Fellw the Centre de Recherches Plitiques and Pressr pliticalther at Sciences P, Paris. He has served as a visiting pressr at varius universities. He

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ered lectures in 2013 n “The Histr and Ther Demcrac” and “A Cmparisn Plitical Frms.” His interests include plitical philsph, plitical ther and histr ideas. His mst recent publicatin n srtitin is “on Several Kinds Demcrac,” whichappeared in Direct Democracy and Sortition, a vlume in the series Cahier du Cevip.(www.cevip.cm/chier/p_publicatin/978/publicatin_pd_cahier.56.23.pd)

olv Dwl is an independent schlar specialising in the randm selectin citizensr public ce. Ater wrking as a teacher and practitiner in the arts, he tk a parttime M.Phil. in Plitics in 1999 at the Universit Hertrdshire and then a ull-timeD.Phil. at New Cllege, oxrd, graduating in 2007. The subject r his M.Phil. was “Marx’sCncept Alienatin.” Fr his dctrate, he investigated the plitical value selectingcitizens r public ce b ltter. His dctral thesis was jint winner the Sir ErnestBarker prize r best thesis in plitical ther r 2006-7. It has since been published asThe Political Potential o Sortition (Imprint Academic, 2008). In recent ears he has beenjint rganiser the CEVIPoF seminar series n the plitical use srtitin unded bSciences P, Paris. In octber 2012 he tk up an ISRF Earl Career Fellwship at Queen

Mar, Universit Lndn t stud the benets using randml-selected citizens intransitins t demcrac.

stp elt is a Senir Lecturer in Plitics at the Universit the West Sctland.Stephen’s research interests are n the cusp between demcrac in ther and practice,particularl in relatin t deliberative demcrac and its institutinalisatin in practice.He has bth cnceptual and empirical research interests in multi-level gvernance,with particular emphasis n the rle civil sciet within these prcesses, and he haspublished bradl n these tpics. His current and previus research has cused n civil

sciet rganisatins and their cntributin t deliberative and demcratic prcesses inrelatin t an arra institutins, including quangs, the Eurpean Unin, the vluntarand cmmunit sectr, partisan rums and minipublics. He is currentl researching elitedeliberatin in the UK Leaders’ Debates in the 2010 general electin campaign. He is theauthr Towards a Deliberative and Associational Democracy (Edinburgh UniversitPress, 2008) and the editr Democracy in Theory and Practice (Rutledge, 2012). Since2009 he has cnvened the UK Plitical Studies Assciatin Participatr and DeliberativeDemcrac Specialist Grup (www.uws.ac.uk/PDD). In 2008 he accepted an invitatin tjin the Ral Sciet Arts and has been a Fellw since.

Dvd fll is Head Plitics and Internatinal Relatins at Universit Cllege Dublin.He was appinted t the Chair Plitics there in 2009. Prir t that he was Pressr and

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Head Schl Scial Sciences at the Universit Manchester. A specialist in thestud electral sstems, plitical parties and parliamentar representatin, PressrFarrell’s mst recent bks include Electoral Systems (a six-vlume reader, c-edited withMatthew Shugart, Sage 2012), Political Parties and Democratic Linkage (c-authred withRussell Daltn and Ian McAllister, oxrd Universit Press, 2011), and Electoral Systems:

A Comparative Introduction (secnd editin, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). He is the c-editr Party Politics and the oxrd Universit Press bk series n “CmparativePlitics.” Pressr Farrell’s mst recent prject was as research directr the We theCitizens initiative that ran thrughut 2011 and was unded b Atlantic Philanthrpies.

Pt st is Ussher Assistant Pressr Plitical Science (Plitical Ther) at TrinitCllege Dublin. He received his Ph.D. rm the Universit Rchester in 2000. Beremving t Trinit, he taught Plitical Science at Stanrd Universit and held a FacultFellwship at Tulane Universit’s Center r Ethics and Public Aairs. He wrks incntemprar plitical ther, with particular interest in theries justice, demcraticther, ratinal chice ther, and the philsph scial science. He is the authr The

Luck o the Draw: The Role o Lotteries in Decision Making (oxrd Universit Press, 2011)and the editr Lotteries in Public Lie: A Reader (Imprint Academic, 2011). He has alspublished articles in such jurnals as the Journal o Political Philosophy , the Journal o

Theoretical Politics, Political Theory, Rationality and Society, Social Science Inormation,and Social Theory and Practice. He is an ccasinal cntributr t the blg Equalit b Lt(http://equalitblt.wrdpress.cm/).

J st is a lecturer in the Schl Cmmunicatins at Dublin Cit Universit. Shehas a particular research interest in new cmmunicatin methds and in deliberative and

participative demcrac and was an academic member the We the Citizens initiativein 2011.

at Vg studied Plitical Science in France and German. He earned his Ph.D. rma binatinal dctral training prgram run b the Freie Universität Berlin and the Institutd’Études Plitiques in Paris. His wrk cuses upn the ther and practice AleatrianDemcrac. He is currentl a cnsultant at the French rm Missins Publiques, whichsupprts public authrities in the design, implementatin and acilitatin prcesses public participatin and deliberatin.

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