Studies in Intelligence (1984)

To Paris for plans

THE OSS AND THE MAGINOT AND SIEGFRIED LINES

Leonard C. Courier

On 8 September 1944 it began to look to man y of us at General Patton'sThird Army Headquarters, bivouacked in a field near Chalons sur Marne inFrance. as if the war was rapidly coming to an end. Paris had been liberatedon 25 August and Brussels on 3 September. The forward elements of the USThird Army had reached the Moselle River. Ever ywhere the German armieswere retreating in disarra y toward the German frontier.

In May 1944 1 had been transferred from Army G-2 in En g land to theOffice of Strategic Services (OSS) and assigned to the Third Army OSS FieldDetachment. In anticipation of the Normandy landings both the US First andThird Armies had received an OSS detachment, consisting of about twentymen each, to support Army G-2 as well as OSS agents parachuted into Franceprior to the invasion. Since the Normandy breakout on 1 August, we had beenmuch on the move. In early September the work load of the OSS Detachmenthad slowed considerably as France was almost completely liberated and mostof our agents had been safely recuperated.

Late in the afternoon of 8 September, I was informed by the commanderof our detachment, Colonel Vanderblue, that he had a mission for me. I was toleave for Paris with a Third Army G-2 staff officer to try to locate a set of theoriginal plans of the Maginot Line. Colonel Vanderblue ex plained thatGeneral Patton expected to reach the Maginot Line fortifications in the nextfew days, and that there was a possibility that the Germans might decide todefend some of the Maginot forts and bunkers before falling back on theSiegfried Line, which ran along the German border. To the dismay of ThirdArmy G-2 there were no available plans or information on the Maginot Line,

lir. 0.- 02 I-••

OM C.) C.4 I..' and Third Army maps did not even indicate the location of the Maginot Line. . ..zC2

1.0 C.% w fortifications.1.0in Co ZIC 126

.6C General Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force

3.— =I (SHAEF) had no information either. A French liaison officer at SHAEF had,..., 0.. ...J06 x C.) said that the French High Command in 1939 had given the British a set of theL.) 1.0 cnc2 to >•C — plans, but inquiries in London had drawn a blank. Colonel Vanderblue added: — La 60

that French liaison had suggested that the old cartography office of the French...I 0

CM 4.1 0 41 Army in Paris, known as the Service Geographique de l'Armee (SGA), mightxW 1— =

— = i--

be able to help. We were to start our inquiries there. The colonel concluded by.u.. — L." r.,stressing that, as the Third Army G-2 officer did not speak French, 1 would

U) • cn pc 4=cn "gr LA.1 ...0 Cog have to deal with the French authorities..4 me (-1

—I I— a= — urt- = = I-■ Early the following morning we took off for Paris, our jeep driver,....1.1.1 LaJ co ,e .4C

0 C.J C.., 2r 47' skillfully dodging the two-and-one-half-ton GMC trucks of the endless convoysof the "Red Ball Express" bringing up supplies from the Normandy beach-heads to the front line. We were elated at the prospect of enjoying, even if for

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All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of theauthor. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying USgovernment endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

OSS

only a few hours, the pleasures of Paris , and spending at least one night in acomfortable bed, a luxur y that had been denied to us since landing at UtahBeachhead in June.

An Irascible Old Man

Upon arriving in Paris we were billeted in the Hotel des Deux Mondes onAvenue de l'Opera, and with the aid of a phone book discovered that the SCAwas located on the rue de Grenelle in the 6th Arrondissement. When wearrived there, that late afternoon of 9 September, every house on the streetappeared shut. The SGA was housed in a magnificent Seventeenth Centurybuilding with a large inner courtyard. The large double doors were closed andthe building seemed unoccupied. We rang the door bell, but nothing stirred. Ibanged on the door with the butt of my M-1 carbine for about five minutes.Finally we heard the sound of feet shuffling across the inner court yard, and asmall window was opened by an irascible old man, who informed us that theoffice was closed. He told us to stop hammerin g on the door and to come backon Monday. I explained to him that we were Americans and had come fromUS Army Headquarters in the field to see the commandin g officer of the SGAon a matter of urgent national importance. He peered through the windowand realized that we were in muddy combat uniforms and meant business. Hetold us to wait, shut the small window, and disappeared.

A few minutes later we heard the shuffling feet again, and this time theold concierge opened the door and beckoned us to follow him. He led us acrossthe courtyard, up two flights of stairs, and ushered us into a dark office wherea small superannuated officer, in a faded horizon-blue French uniform ofWorld War I vintage, was seated behind a large desk. He got up, and I noticedgeneral stars on his sleeve. We introduced ourselves and saluted. He stared atus coldly and said stiffly: "I am General Hurault. Nobod y has notified me ofyour presence in Paris. What can I do for you?" I explained that we haddriven from Third Arm y Headquarters in Chalons sur Marne with orders fromGeneral Patton to ask for his assistance in a matter of importance to both ourcountries. He thawed when the name of General Patton was mentioned. Hehad heard of the general, he said, and of his successes in North Africa andSicily, and was aware that his army had liberated Paris. The atmosphererelaxed and we were invited to sit down and to state our business.

I repeated to General Hurault what Colonel Vanderblue had told me, andexpressed hope that he would be able to help us. He listened attentivel y andwhen I had finished said: "There are only three copies of the plans of theMaginot Line, France's most closel y guarded military secret until 1940. Onecopy was given to the English in 1939, and the other two were buried in a safeplace, and the Boches never got their hands on them." He had a look of satis-faction as he said this. A small triumph over the hated Germans. The fact thatthe Germans had physically occupied the Maginot Line and stripped it of itsarmament for the Atlantic Wall, and therefore had little need for the plans,did not diminish his feeling of gratification.

I asked him if he had the two remaining copies and whether we couldborrow one of them. "Absolutely not" the General replied. "They are the

34

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property of France. I know where they are and I can let you see them, but Icannot let you take them, as they are in my trust. - We had reached animpasse. As convincingl y as possible 1 repeated the urgent need that GeneralPatton had for this vital information, which could save the lives of manyAllied soldiers and bring about the quicker defeat of our common enemy.After reflecting for a few moments, General Hurault stated: Do you haveAmerican Army maps of the Maginot Line area?" I confirmed that we had

35

OSS

brought a set with us as well as charts to convert French to British andAmerican military symbols. - If that is the case," he said, - I have a staff of oldexperienced civilian cartographers who could trans pose all of the informationfrom our Maginot maps on to yours. There is one condition, however. M y menhave been virtually without food for the past few weeks. If you can arrange tofeed them, 1 guarantee they will work for you twenty-four hours a day untilthey finish the job."

"General," I told him, "we shall be hack tomorrow morning with thesupplies." The general promised to have the plans available in the morning.

Rations and Plans

We spent the rest of the day and ni ght scrounging supplies from variousUS Army depots in the Paris area, and succeeded in loading our jeep with doz-ens of cases of "Ten-in-One" rations. The following morning, Sunday, we wereback at the SCA; this time the old janitor opened the door and smiled broadlywhen he saw the cases of rations. We drove into the court yard, where aboutten of the cartographers were waiting. They expressed their gratitude whenwe handed over the food supplies, and we had made instant friends. For thenext two days they worked without a break, and produced a magnificentprofessional set of plans with the complete information trans posed on to ourmaps.

Before leaving the SGA, as an afterthought, I asked General Huraultwhether he had any information on the Siegfried Line. He checked in his filesand came up with a copy of a typewritten five-page intelligence report,classified secret, and prepared on 20 November 1939 by the G-2 section of theGeneral Staff of the French High Command. He handed it to me, and said wecould keep it with his compliments. By the evening of 11 September we wereback in Chalons.

The report on the Siegfried Line failed to interest Third Army G-2,probably because it was five years old, and I kept it as a souvenir. In retrospectI think Third Army G-2 was mesmerized at that time by the potential strengthof the legendary Maginot Line, with its underground railways and lavish forts,and somewhat contemptuous of the makeshift Siegfried Line of small pillboxesand dragon's teeth antitank obstacles, doubting that it could sto p the victoriousAllied armies of September 1944 facing a demoralized enemy.

The Maginot Line information we had obtained proved useful in thesubsequent months. General Patton underestimated German resistance on theMoselle River, and it was not until 22 November that Metz was captured. Thereversed fortifications of the still-formidable Maginot Line, designed for all-around defense, and capitalizing on the wooded and com partmented terrainof Lorraine, were overcome only after deadl y day-by-da y slugging. InDecember 1944, the 4th US Armored Division of Third Army broke throughthe Maginot Line in the Singling-Rohrbaek-Bitche area. One hopes thatGeneral Hurault's information contributed to this success. The Siegfried Lineor "West Wall" was to prove an even more formidable harrier for the Alliedarmies; it was to cause their heaviest casualties in World War II in fightingthat lasted from September 1944 to March 1945.

36

OSS

Siegfried Line Report

The French G-2 intelli gence report on the Siegfried Line of November19:39, given to me by General Hurault, is professionally done. The informationit contains, of the so-called "Phony War" period, was undoubtedl y obtainedfrom German prisoners, as well as aerial reconnaissance and French infantrypatrolling. Although dated 20 November 1939, it was distributed to the front-line units as late as 3 Januar y 1940, as is attested by ni), copy which was that ofthe French 306th Infantry Regiment.

The report is entitled, "The First German Position between the Rhineand Moselle rivers and the Activit y of the Different German ServiceBranches." It is divided into four parts covering the German Infantry,Artillery, Cavalr y, and Engineers, with a concluding statement. The Infantrypart is subdivided into six sections:

A. Battalions in contact.

B. Battalions of the Second Echelon.

C. Reserve Battalions.

D. Attitude of the German Infantry.

E. The Life of the Infantr y in the bunkers.

F. Impressions produced on the German Infantry by the first combats.

The report states that, as of November 1939, the German line wasdefended, between the Rhine and Moselle, a distance of about 150 kilometers,by some fifteen divisions. The defense line between Neuburg (Rhine) andMettlach on the Saar River consisted of permanent fortifications. In front ofthe fortifications was an observation line in the Lauter and Hardt regions,where the first line battalions occupying the bunkers were hidden by woodedareas and surrounded by zones of minefields and booby tra ps. The second linebattalions were in support, preparing a line of defense with antitank obstaclesin the Nennig-Tettingen-Oberleuken-Orscholz region, • between the Moselleand Saar river at Mettlach. The reserve battalions were billeted in villagesabout ten to fifteen kilometers behind the front line.

The report describes in detail the active attitude of the German infantry,their aggressive patrolling and raids at night by the specially trained "Stos-struppen - equipped with the new machine pistols (Schmeissers). The Germanfortifications are then depicted as offering few comforts to the occupants, asthe pillboxes were designed only for combat and not for living purposes, withthe communications between the bunkers left in the open. The bunkers werewithout running water and cots, and lacked air. The defenders received no hotfood. The command posts were in special bunkers designed for observation butwhich also could be used for firing.

• By coincidence the Nennig-Orscholz area, known as the Siegfried Line Switch position,was to cause in January 1945 heavy casualties to the attacking US 94th Division, which was thenewly activated division to which 1 was assigned when I first joined the Army in 1942.

37

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The report also stresses the effective lire of German light and heavymortars. even without the support of divisional artillery. Except for a fewantitank guns in bunkers. the fortifications had virtually no fixed artillenpieces. The report expresses surprise that German en gineers attacked as frontline infantry. usin g flame throwers, smoke screens and demolition charges.

It concludes: the enemy occupation of the Saar-Palatinate front ischaracterized by the presence of only a few infantry units. The strength of thedefense lint .. however, is not to be doubted as it depends, not only on the per-manent fortifications. but on the morale, a ggressiveness, and the maneuveringabilit y of the German infantry.

The document is si gned hy Colonel Gauche. Chief of the DeuxiemeBureau. Gauche was a remarkable intelligence officer. In December 1938 hePredicted with extraordinary Precision that German y would soon overcomePoland and. with its eastern frontier secure. turn against France. lie correctlyestimated that the Germans would use massed tanks with close air support inthe attack. He forecast. moreover, that the Nazis' final objective would beRussia.

One begins to understand in reading this report why the French Army of19:39-40, indifferently trained and equipped, had little enthusiasm for anassault on the Siegfried Line. despite the vast French numerical superiority.while the German Army was subjugating. Poland. The spartan aspect of theSiegfried Line was obviously a source of wonder for the French used to theluxuries of the Maginot Line with its underground barracks, hospitals, messhalls, and movie theaters. The few half-hearted attacks in the Saarland metwith complete failure. and until the German assault of Ma y 1940 in Holland.Belgium, and the Ardennes, the French chose to observe the Siegfried Lineand avoid provoking its defenders.

After the German victory over France in 1940, the Siegfried Line wasabandoned until the British and American armies arrived at the Germanfrontier in September 1944. The Germans hastily reoccupied the line, at firstmainly with second-rate troops: teenagers, old men, and battalions formed ofmen suffering from the same ailment, such as stomach ulcers. The Americansfound the Siegfried Line very much as described in the 1939 report: small pill-boxes in depth, well sited in wooded terrain surrounded b y antipersonnelmines. Even second-rate troops pnwed to be formidable opponents, firingfrom the protection of their concrete bunkers. The Allied infantry had toca pture the pillboxes one by one, often more than once, as German counter-attacks succeeded in temporarily reoccupying them. The effectiveness of thespartan Siegfried Line was never better demonstrated than in the bitter andbloody struggle for the Hurtgen Forest, where the US Arm y suffered 33,000casualties. virtuall y decimating some of its finest veteran divisions.

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