Interest in nuclear energy by developing countrieswithout nuclear experience could pose major challengesto the global rules now in place to ensure thesafe, secure, qnd peaceful use of nuclear power.

.$&,$5T 'nd &LSKRY K K W & R F I h $ M X - A Y

on its rapid economic growth and a desire to retain its oiland gas for export rather than domestic use. The federationhas moved aggressively to court foreign reactor vendors, signnuclear cooperation agreements with other countries, andhire foreigners, lured by extraordinary salaries, to run itsregulatory authority. It recently ordered its first nuclear powerplants from a South Korean consortium. The UAE has soughtto be a nonproliferation model by signing an Additional Pro-tocol to its International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) safe-guards agreement, as well as renouncing any ambition to en-rich uranium or reprocess plutonium, and concluding a so-called I23 Agreement with the United States that couldprovide additional legal assurances.

At the other end of the spectrum, Nigeria, which has re-peatedly declared its desire to acquire nuclear power, is theepitome of a bad candidate. Although oil-rich like the UAE,it has a long history of mismanaging large projects, includ-ing its oil industry. Its national electricity grid has one ofthe worst transmission and distribution loss rates in theworld, with only a fraction of its generating units operating

Strengthening GlobalNuclear Governance

otivated in large part by climatechange and the need for carbon-free energy sources, governmentsand companies around the worldare pushing to revive nuclear en-ergy. Developed and developingcountries alike have expressed

rest. For developing countries, however, building a nu-r power plant can be particularly problematic, both forcountries and the world overall. The lack of regulatoryoperating experience of developing countries consider-nuclear power could pose major challenges to the global

now in place to ensure the safe, secure, and peacefulof nuclear energy.

The challenges facing the global governance regime can bein the case of a promising candidate for nuclear energy,

United Arab Emirates (UAE), and a far more worrisome, Nigeria. Although it has the world's sixth largest provenreserves and fifth largest proven natural gas reserves, the

has been making a strong case for nuclear power based

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at a given time. Violence often breaks out in the Niger Deltabecause of various economic, social, ethnic, and religioustensions, seriously disrupting the country's predominantlyforeign-owned oil industry. Of the developing countriespursuing nuclear power, Nigeria's scores, calculated by theWorld Bank, for political violence, government effective-ness, regulatory quality, and control ofcorruption rank sec-ond worst. The country is not a party to key nuclear gover-nance accords. Fortunately, to date its nuclear energyplanshave gone nowhere.

Global governance needs to be prepared to address thechallenges ofthe array ofdeveloping countries seeking nu-clear energy, not just those most likely to succeed. The in-stitutions for doing so are, for the most part, already in place,so the central question is whether they are able to adapt tothe needs of developing countries. They are struggling thusfar and have much work to do.

Nuclear hopes and realitiesThe Survey of Emerging Nuclear Energy States (SENES)compiled by the Nuclear Energy Futures Project-a jointundertaking of the Centre for International Governance In-novation (CIGI) in Waterloo, Canada, and the CanadianCentre for Treaty Compliance (CCTC) at Carleton Univer-sity-tracks the progress of all aspiring nuclear energy coun-tries from an initial governmental declaration of interest tothe eventual connection ofa reactor to the electricity grid.The project has identified the following as having an officialinterest in nuclear power: Central Asia (Kazakhstan andMongolia); Africa (Algeria, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco,Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia); Europe (Albaniaand Belarus); the Middle East (Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, |or-dan, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, andthe UAE); South America (Venezuela); South Asia(Bangladesh); and Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia,Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam).

To track states' progress, SENES uses the IAENs Mile-stones in the Development of a National Infrastructure forNuclear Power, which identifies three broad milestones thatmust be accomplished before a state is considered ready fornuclear power: (1) ready to make a knowledgeable commit-ment to a nuclear program, (2) ready to invite bids for thefirst nuclear power plant, and (3) ready to commission andoperate the first nuclear power plant. The vast majority of thedeveloping states identified in SENES could not now legit-imately claim to have reached or gone beyond the first mile-stone. Only Iran is close to starting up a reactor. No othershave even begun construction. The Philippines has a partiallycompleted reactor in Bataan, on which it may resume work.

Apart from the UAE, only Egypt, which has aspired to nu-clear power for more than 30 years, is known to have in-vited bids for a plant, which puts it at milestone 2.lordanandVietnam are considering several potential vendors.

All states pursuing nuclear power, whether developed ordeveloping, will face problems of cost, industrial bottle-necks, personnel constraints, and nuclear waste, but devel-oping states face unique challenges. Because they are poorer,they often lack the finances, institutional capacrty, and phys-ical infrastructure to support a large-scale, multibillion-dol-lar nuclear power plant project.

For relatively poor countries, paying for a nuclear powerplant is a massive hurdle, even if the costs are spread outoyer several years. There is no precise way to measurewhether a country can afford a nuclear power plant, espe-cially since decisions may be driven by politics, nationalpride, energy security, industrialization strategy, or in theunlikely worst case, nuclear weapons hedging, rather thansound financial analysis or a rational national energy strat-egy. Although stretching a national budget to buy a nuclearpower plant may in theory be possible, this always impliesopportunity costs, especially in the vital energy sector. De-velopment banks do not lend for nuclear energy projects,and private investors are likely to be wary. The only devel-oping countries that may be able to ignore such constraintsare those with oil-based wealth, such as Nigeria, Saudi Ara-bia, Venezuela,,and the small Gulf States. But the recentdrop in the price of oil and international financial turmoilwill probably make even these states wary of committing toexpensive projects such as a nuclear power reactor.

A second major barrier to aspiring nuclear states in thedeveloping world is having the physical infrastructure tosupport a nuclear power plant or plants. This includes anadequate electrical grid (at least 10 times the size of a 1,000-megawatt reactor), roads, a transportation system, and asafe and secure site. The IAEAs milestones document in-cludes a comprehensive list of hundreds of infrastructuretargets, including physical infrastructure, for aspiring nu-clear states to meet before they should commission a nu-clear plant. This includes supporting power generators, alarge water supply, and waste management facilities. Meet-ing all of the targets will be a major challenge for most de-veloping states, requiring them to invest billions of dollarsin infrastructure upgrades for several years.

Finally, there is the challenge of governance. A country'sability to run a nuclear power program safely and securelydepends on its capacity to successfully and sustainably plan,build (or at least oversee construction of), and manage alarge and complex facility and its associated activities. For a

74 I55UE5 IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

The c*mbination of ner,v,complex types cf nuclearthat lack cperational and

relatively untested, and mCIrereactors and developing countriesregutrat*ry experience is

wcrris*me fe:r the global nuelear safety regime"

nuclear reactor, such a commitment stretches over decades,at least 60 years from initial planning to decommissioning.For high-level,long-lasting nuclear waste, some of whichcan remain radioactive for millennia, the commitment isessentially forever. Although the existing nuclear energystates have learned through experience and trial and error,this is not possible or permissible in the current era. Norms,expectations, and standards have evolved. The IAEA esti-mates that it can take at least l0 years for a state with no nu-clear experience to prepare itselffor hosting its first nuclearpower plant. Many aspiring nuclear energy states have strug-gled with managing large investment or infrastructure proj-ects for a wide range of reasons, including political violence,mismanagement, and corruption. It is telling that all of theaspiring developing states except Oman, eatar, and the UAEscore 5 or below on the l0-point scale ofTransparency In-ternational's Corruption Perception Index.

It seems clear at this early stage of the so-called nuclearrevival that for the vast majority of developing states, nu-clear energy will remain as elusive as ever. They will sim-ply be priced out of the nuclear energy market, because ofthe high capital costs of nuclear power plants and the re-quired investment in infrastructure and institutional capac-ity. Most will need to make unprecedented progress in theireconomic development, infrastructure, and governance be-tbre nuclear power is a feasible option. Because of the lowprobability of an influx of developing countries into the nu-clear business, the risk to the current global governance sys-tem is less than what it otherwise would have been. Despitethis, global governance needs to be prepared for the hand-ful of developing states that might succeed in acquiring anuclear energy sector; those that may make the attempt,however ill-advised; and those that seriously consider theoption and need assistance in doing so.

Nuclear safetyIt is impossible to quanti$r the impact of a nuclear revival inthe developing world on global nuclear safety because it isunclear how large that revival is likely to be. However, it is

possible to identi$r some qualitative implications for safety.Some of these arise from the type of country that is acquir-ing a nuclear reactor for the first time. Others arise fromthe new reactor designs that are being purveyed by compa-nies to the newcomers and the terms and conditions underwhich they are sold. The combination of relatively untestedand more complex types of nuclear reactors with develop-ing countries that lack operational and regulatory experi-ence is worrisome for the global nuclear safety regime.

From a global governance perspective, the most obvioussource ofspecific concern is the patchy adherence by de-veloping states to the key safety-related international agree-ments. Astonishingly, considering their announced enthu-siasm for nuclear energy,4 ofthe 30 developing countriessupposedly interested in nuclear energy-Bahrain, Kenya,Namibia, and Venezuela-are not party to any of the relevantnuclear safety conventions.

The most important of them, the 1994 Convention onNuclear Safety (CNS) and the 1997lointConvention on theSafety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Ra-dioactive Waste, commit parties to the highest standards ofnuclear safety for civilian nuclear power plants, spent fuel,and nuclear waste. This implies compliance with an arrayof IAEA safety standards and guidelines. The treaties alsodraw parties into their increasingly effective peer reviewsystems. Thirteen of the 30 developing aspirant states haveneither signed nor ratified the CNS, and only 6 are party tothe |oint Convention. These states are thus neither inte-grated nor socialized into the global nuclear safety regime.They are ineligible to attend and participate in the treaty re-view conferences that conduct peer reviews. Even some nu-clear aspirants that are party to the agreements, includingBangladesh, Kuwait, and Nigeria, fail to participate in theregime by attending the review meetings, despite a legal ob-ligation to do so.

If such prominent developing states cannot even com-mit resources to attending meetings, they're likely to expe-rience difficulty in fulfilling the more significant legallybinding obligations of the conventions. These include es-

e , { .N f8-aA,R p0wxR

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tablishing the necessary legislative, regulatory, and admin-istrative steps to implement their obligations, setting up anational regulatory body, conducting a comprehensive andsystematic safety assessment before a nuclear power plantor waste repository is allowed to operate (and repeating thisthroughout the lifetime of the facilities), and ensuring thatrelevant levels of maintenance, inspection, and testing areconducted by facility operators.

Currently, all of the developing countries seeking nuclearenergy lack the requisite national laws and regulations, agen-cies and practices, trained and experienced personnel, andappropriate safety culture to safely host a nuclear plant. Nonehas the capacity to manage nuclear waste, except that cur-rently resulting from medical or research applications. Somewith relatively advanced nuclear energy plans, such as In-donesia, the UAE, and Vietnam, are beginning to put inplace the necessary prerequisites. Others, such as Algeriaand Egypt, have been operating research reactors and us-ing radioactive sources for peaceful purposes for some time,so they have some institutional elements in place and someexperience to draw on. Few developing states will be ableto afford the UAE approach of buying everything requiredfrom abroad. Even an advanced nuclear state such as theUnited Kingdom is having difficulty finding enough qual-ified regulatory staffto prepare for its national nuclear revival.

No country is able to buy two critical components: aready-made safety culture and a robust independent regu-lator. Since the accidents at Three Mile Island in 1979 andChernobyl in 1986, both caused and exacerbated by humanerror, there has been a realization that the human factor isthe most difficult element to control for in nuclear safety.Hence there is an increasing emphasis on developing andsustaining a nuclear safety culture, where safety is para-mount rather than incidental. With regard to an independ-ent nuclear regulator, the sacking of the Canadian nuclearregulator by the Canadian government in 2008, justifiedpartly on political grounds, indicates that even mature nu-clear energy states have difficulty establishing a truly inde-pendent regulator. Among the aspirant developing states,Algeria, Bangladesh, Libya, Nigeria, Senegal, Syria,Venezuela, and Vietnam all rate especially poorly on theWorld Bank's regulatory control index.

Nuclear securityThe global governance regime for nuclear security is muchless mature than that for nuclear safety. States are more se-cretive, often understandably, about nuclear security thanabout nuclear safety. International cooperation and trans-parency are therefore constrained. Heishtened fears of nu-

76 ISSUES IN SCIENCE ANDTECHNOLOGY

clear terrorism have led to improvements in the global regimesince 9/11. Yet as the April2010 Nuclear Summit convenedby President Obama indicated, concerns remain about un-secured nuclear material and facilities worldwide, includ-ing those connected with current and future peaceful ap-plications of nuclear energy.

The acquisition of nuclear reactors by states with a poorsecurity record and nonexistent security culture would be asignificant challenge to the nascent global nuclear securityregime. Nuclear power reactors and associated facilities,even in the construction phase, may be high-value targets forsecessionist movements, nonstate actors, or potentially evenother states. Inexperienced countries may be more vulner-able to unauthorized access to facilities or seizure ofnuclearmaterials. Many developing states, despite having relativelylarge armed forces and in some cases capable and often op-pressive security apparatuses, may not have the tlpe of so-phisticated rapid response capability necessary for protect-ing nuclear infrastructure. They are likely to be left out of theintelligence-sharing arrangements of the Western states andnot trusted with actionable information. A newcomer willtake years-the IAEA estimates at least five-to establishIegislative and regulatory frameworks and security infra-structure, systems, and practices. As in the case of nuclearsafety, it may take such states much longer to establish anacceptable security culture.

The international conventions in this field are far fromuniversal in adherence and application and nowhere nearas effective as in the nuclear safety field. The principal treaty,the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of NuclearMaterial (CPPNM), currently applies only to internationalshipments of nuclear material. The 2005 Amendment to theConvention, which would extend the regime to the domes-tic realm of each party, is not yet in force. The 2007 Interna-tional Convention for the Suppression of Acts of NuclearTerrorism essentially focuses on criminalizing nuclear ter-rorism. Although legally binding in respect to their broadprovisions, both agreements leave detailed implementationup to each party. International verification of complianceand penalties for noncompliance are unknown, as are re-quirements for peer review

Even so, a number of aspiring developing states are notparty to the conventions. Bahrain, Iran, Venezuela, and Viet-nam are party to none, and other key contenders for nuclearenergy such as Egypt, Malaysia, Syria, and Thailand havenot signed either the CPPNM or its Amendment. Beyondsimplybecoming parties, the extent of compliance with theseagreements is largely unknown publicly because of the lackof transparency and treaty-mandated peer review.

An additional binding instrument is United Nations Se-curity Council resolution 1540 of April2004, with subse-quent reiterations. This obliges all states to put in place im-plementation measures to prevent nonstate actors such as ter-rorists from acquiring any tlpe of so-called weapons of massdestruction, including nuclear or radiological weapons, andto periodically report progress to a Security Council com-mittee. Among the measures expected to be put in place arethose to protect the civilian nuclear industry. But compli-ance by developing countries is mostly episodic and incom-plete. None of this engenders confidence in the ability ofaspiring nuclear energy states to manage the security of nu-clear facilities that they may acquire.

Nuclear nonproliferationFrom the outset ofthe nuclear age, it was feared that stateswould seek to acquire civilian nuclear energy as a cover fora nuclear weapons program. The result is the evolution of aninternational nonproliferation regime based on the 1968Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its safeguardssystem. This has indeed helped prevent the spread of nu-clear weapons to scores of states but has not entirely pre-vented proliferation. Safeguards have been considerablystrengthened since the case of Iraq, but more needs to bedone. Moreover, the regime still suffers from its originalcentral contradiction: Some states have accorded themselvesthe right to retain nuclear weapons apparently in perpetu-ity, whereas all others are under the legally binding obliga-tion never to acquire them.

The current renewed enthusiasm for nuclear electricitygeneration is raising fears of nuclear hedging, in whichstates seek to establish the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle sothey can move quickly to nuclear weapons acquisition whenrequired, either clandestinely or by leaving the NPT. Theinternational regime is currentiy being challenged in thismanner by Iran, which is engaging in the type of ambigu-ous hedging behavior that some say an unbridled nuclearenergy revival could unleash.

Yet it is easy to exaggerate the threat. The handful ofde-veloping countries that can overcome the hurdles to acquir-ing nuclear power will, in all probabiliry acquire only one ortwo reactors in the next two decades. Although some al-ready have varying degrees ofnuclear expertise and researchcapacity, all will be reactor importers and thus reliant onoutside assistance. None, with the sole exception of Iran,will probably acquire an advanced nuclear program with acomplete nuclear fuel cycle. Most of the states that acquirenuclear power will not be able to fabricate their own fuel,much less succeed in enriching uranium, which is a tech-

t \ t ueLseR pCIw€R

nologically challenging and expensive process. None is likelyto be legitimately interested in reprocessing plutonium, ei-ther for dealing with nuclear waste or for fast reactors.

Because all of the aspiring developing states, along withall other nonnuclear weapon states, are party to the NPTand have comprehensive safeguards agreements, they willbe required to apply nuclear safeguards to all of their powerreactors and associated facilities. In addition, there will prob-ably be strong pressure on such states to conclude an Ad-ditional Protocol to their comprehensive safeguards agree-ment, making illicit diversion or a hidden clandestine nuclearweapons program more difficult than in the past. Most have,in fact, either signed one or already have one in force. How-ever, key aspiring states-Eg1pt, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,Syria, and Venezuela-have not yet signed one, which is ofsome concern.

The most worrying development would be if the new en-trants seek the full nuclear fuel cycle, including uraniumenrichment and plutonium reprocessing, which can be usedto make reactor fuel or nuclear weapons. fordan is report-edly resisting the UAE model of foregoing such options, be-cause it may wish to enrich its own domestic uranium re-sources at some stage rather than relying on others for en-richment services. Turkey has also raised this possibility.One developing country with nuclear power already,Brazll,has its own enrichment plant and is an NPT party but refusesto sign an Additional Protocol. Joint enrichment plans byArgentina and Brazil are being aired. South Korea is press-ing the United States to support its plans to reprocess plu-tonium using an allegedly more proliferation-resistant tech-nology cal led pyroprocessi ng.

The quest for energy security is helping legitimize de-mands for the full fuel cycle. New enrichment technologiessuch as laser separation may attenuate the current technolog-ical and cost barriers. The resistance ofkey developing statesto IAEA and Russian attempts to establish nuclear fuel banksthat would provide assurances of supply of nuclear reactor fuelhas added to concerns that the future ofnuclear energy facesa major political impasse. This is partly driven by anti-West-ern political gamesmanship by Cuba, Iran, Pakistan, andSyria, but also by genuine developing-country fears that theyare being deprived ofvaluable technological options.

Although the NPT guarantees its parties the "inalienableright to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy," this is condi-tional on the acceptance ofnuclear safeguards and does notoblige any state to share any particular technology with anyother. The United States and other countries, including keymembers of the G8 and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, areseeking to prevent additional states from acquiring enrich-

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ment or reprocessing capabilities, sometimes to the chagrin

of even their allies such as Canada. One proposal for resolv-

ing this issue over the long term is for the existing posses-

sors of such technology to give up their national capabilities

through multilaterali zation or internationalization of these"sensitive" aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle' Numerous pro-

posals are on the table for pursuing this vision, but its real-

ization would involve enormous compromises on all sides.

The issue ultimately reflects the bitter division between the

nuclear haves and have-nots that is embedded in the NPT,

a resolution of which can come only with the achievement

of nuclear disarmament.

Strengthening nuclear goYernanceGlobal governance must be strengthened to cope with the ex-

pected increase in the number of nuclear facilities operated

by the existing nuclear energy states. But much more needs

to be done about aspiring developing countries. And this

has to be accomplished without giving the impression that

the goal is to deprive such states oftheir rights to the peace-

ful uses of nuclear energy, while at the same time impress-

ing on them that rights come with the fulfillment of obli-

gations that are in the interests of all.A nuclear energy revival ofwhatever size and shape pres-

ents risks and opportunities for the IAEA. The opportuni-

ties include the potential to shape the revival in a way that

did not occur in the early days of nuclear energy or in the first

round of significant nuclear energy expansion in the 1 970s

and 1980s. The most urgent task is for the IAEA to bring

all states into all of the nuclear governance regimes for safety,

security, and nonproliferation as soon as possible, to inform

them of their rights and responsibilities, and to assist them

with implementation and compliance. The IAEA is also well

positioned to provide expanded advisory services to help

new entrants plan their programs from the ground up so as

to ensure that they have in place the best possible regula-

tory, safety, and security measures, are fully compliant with

nuclear safeguards, and have the necessary infrastructure

and personnel. The IAEA is able, for instance' to assist states

in conducting feasibility studies, which it has done for the

member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council and |or-dan. IAEA documents such as Considerations to Launch a

Nuclear Power Programme, Milestones in the Development

of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power, and Evalua-

tion of the Status of National Nuclear Infrastructure are thor-

ough and informative in setting out the requirements for a

successful program. The ideal outcome would be for the

IAEA to quietly use the new interest in the peaceful uses of

nuclear energy as leverage to convince states to put in place

all ofthe prerequisites for a safe, secure, and proliferation-

resistant enterprise.There is, however, a danger that the IAEA will be

swamped by such demands. Yury Sokolov, IAEA Deputy

Director General of Nuclear Energy, estimated in fuly 2009

that during the coming two years, the agency is expected to

assist 38 national and 6 regional nuclear programs' a three-

fold increase from the previous reported period. To be able

to continue functioning effectively, the IAEAs member

states, essentially the Western countries, will need to in-

crease the agency's budget to meet the ever-increasing de-

mands placed on it, as well as ensuring that it is equipped

with modernized facilities, up-to-date technology, and ex-

pert human resources.But the global governance system also needs to be able

to discourage states when nuclear energy appears not to be

an appropriate choice. Although the IAEAs detailed brief-

ings and documentation may deter some from proceeding,

the agency is neither mandated nor competent to provide

advice on more appropriate alternative energy policies. In

these cases, the International Energy Agency in Paris and

the new International Renewable Energy Agency estab-

lished in Bonn in 2009, along with countries with advanced

national energy plans, are better placed to assist. Despite

having a mandate to promote only nuclear energy, the IAEA

should be able to develop partnerships with others to of-

fer comprehensive energy policy advice. The threat of cli-

mate change and the need to urgently reduce carbon emis-

sions may ultimately steer the international community

into collaborating better on rational, comprehensive na-

tional energy plans.Nuclear vendor states and companies are also in a posi-

tion to strengthen nuclear global governance' not least to

protect the long-term interests ofdeveloping countries. Re-

sponsibility for ensuring the safety and security of nuclear

power plants lies not just with the customer states but with

vendor states and their companies. Seller and recipient states

usually sign bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements to

provide a political framework for reactor sales within which

their companies must operate, notably by adhering to their

requirements relating to safety, security, and nonprolifera-

tion. The 2009 US-UAE 123 Agreement is a model in this re-

spect. Some nuclear regulators in vendor countries are be-

ginning to recognize the need to balance commercial inter-

ests with broader considerations. French regulator

Andre-Claude Lacoste has reportedly suggested to Presi-

dent Nicolas Sarkozy that he be "a little bit more pragmatic"

about signing nuclear cooperation agreements with countries

now devoid ofnuclear safety infrastructure. France has in fact

78 ISSUES IN SCIENCE ANDTECHNOLOGY

established a unit within government to assess the institu-tional readiness of potential French nuclear reactor cus-tomers and advise them on how they might be assisted toprepare. It is not clear whether other vendors such as Rus-sia and South Korea are making similar efforts.

In addition to ensuring that their customers are well pre-pared, vendor companies must also ensure that their prod-uct can be operated as safely and securely as possible. Mostof the new entrants will probably purchase the latest nu-clear technology, so-called Generation III or GenerationIII+, especially because it is advertised as being safer, moreefficient, and more likely to achieve economies of scale.Luckily, the new designs will probably be deployed first inexperienced states that have rigorous licensing procedures.Countries with companies that sell reactors need to engagein continuing efforts to harmonize safety requirements andthe licensing and other regulatory requirements for new re-actor types. The Multinational Design Evaluation Program,run in cooperation with the Nuclear Energy Agency andthe IAEA, should be strongly pursued. In addition, vendorstates and companies should assist the IAEA in revising itssafety standards to take account ofthe new generation ofreactors, because its current standards were written withexisting light-water reactors in mind.

Vendor companies have compelling reasons to helpstrengthen global governance, because a major accident, anuclear 9lII, or yet another state that acquires nuclearweapons under the guise of a peaceful program would prob-ably sound the death knell of the predicted nuclear revival.The April 2010 CIGI/CCTC report The Future of NuclearEnergy to 2030 advocates the establishment of an interna-tional forum to bring together all states and companies, in-cluding vendors and utilities, involved in international nu-clear reactor sales in order to harmonize criteria for suchsales. Such a forum could consider an industry code ofcon-

N U C L E A R P O W E R

duct, which could take into account the nonproliferationrecord ofpotential purchasers, along with their safety and se-curity records and intentions, and the security context inthe region where they are located. Industry bodies such asthe World Association of Nuclear Operators should seekmembership by developing-country operators even beforenuclear power plants are built, so that they can begin to ab-sorb the lessons learned from the experience ofothers. Thenew World Institute for Nuclear Security is another avenuefor acclimating newcomers into the norms and require-ments of nuclear security.

Developing countries will need to be convinced thatstrengthening nuclear global governance is not a plot by thedeveloped world to deprive them of the benefits of nuclearenergy, but rather an important way of ensuring that nu-clear energy is used in a safe, secure, and peaceful manner,to the benefit of everyone. The fact that some developingcountries, notably China, India, and South Korea, are en-tering the reactor sales business will help because such statesand their industries will be eager to avoid a disaster arisingfrom their product. But in the longer term, the sting will betaken out of nuclear energy politics only by the resolution ofthe perceived inequality resulting from the most advancednuclear energy states also being the ones in possession ofnuclear weapons.

lustin Alger (justin_alger@carleton.ca) is a researcher at theCanadian Centrefor Treaty Compliance GCTC) at CarletonUniversity in Ottawa, Canada, Trevor Findlay (trevor_

findlay@carleton.ca) is the William and leanie Barton Chairin International Affairs and director of the CCTC at Car-leton's Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. Hisbook, Nuclear Energy and Global Governance: Safety, Se-curity and Nonproliferation, will be published by Routledgein late 2010.

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