street-level Bureaucrats and the SocialConstruction of Environmentai Controi*Stephen Rneman

Stephen PinemanSchool ofManagement,Univeisity ofBath. UK

Abstract

This article explores the tnicropolitics of environmental regulation of industrythrough interviews with, and ethnographic observations of, regtilatoiy itispectors.As street-level bureaucrats, inspectors are seen to cope with the legal and socialambiguities of their work mainly through negotiative fbnns of control whichare often idiosyncratic and partial. How inspectors construct local moral orders andstandards, in interaction with industrial operators, is explored in sotne detail, espe-cially the role of organizational ritual, symbols and emotional display as tools ofcontrol. The importance of understanding the processes of negotiated orders in thegrowing regulation of industry is discussed, as well as role of interpretive formsof research in such endeavours.

: environmental regulation, street-level bureaucrats, rituals, emotions,negotiated order

OiganizationStudies1998, 19/6953-974e 1998 EGOS0170-8406/980019-0037 $3.00

Introduction

The importance of external regulation in controlling industrial environ-mental damage is now acknowledged in the management literattire (e.g.Sorell and Hendiy 1994; Beaumont et al. 1993; Stead and Stead 1992).Indeed, there is evidence that, despite self-regulatoiy rhetorics, it is exter-nal regulatory conditions that bite the hardest and command most corpo-rate attention (e.g. Fineman 1997; Fineman and Clarke 19%; Smith 1993).Regulatory conditions are most often presented as a powerful set oflegal-economic conditions that prevail upon industry, but what is notrevealed is how these conditions become realized at the point of contactbetween regulator and regulated.This study explores empirically and qualitatively the role of the field envi-ronmental inspector in die enactment of regulation. In Lipsky's (1980) ter-minology, the inspector, as a 'street-level bureaucrat', is the creator ofregulation-rules in practice, attempting to manage the boundaries betweenhis or her regulatory agency and the organization being regulated. Likeother street-level bureaucrats (e.g. social workers, police officers, taxinspectors) environmental inspectors deal with people who may not vol-untarily desire their services and who experience some ambiguity in exer-cising appropriate control. In what becomes a socially negotiated encounter.

954 Stephen Hinemar

tbe industrial operator and agency inspector position themselves |)artiallyand politically. In holding a social constructionist lens to cnviuinmentalregulation the inspectorial encounter is fluid, shaped by the panicipatingactors. Formal rules and roles and are likely to be more plastic than thcvappear and conceptions of environmental damage and iniprovement con-testable fe.g. see Berger and Luckmann I%7: Hannigan 199.S: Vearlcy1992),Mucb of the 'green' management literature Is unhelpful in illuminating howprecisely regulatory encounters work. It is mainly industry-slanted and treatsthe regulator rather like a sealed box, an out-there stakeholder which tech-nically and legally constrains business (e,g, see Gladwin 1993: Buchhol/1993: Stead and Stead 1992), Little is revealed about tbe dynamic sixrial,political and interpretive features of the regulation process. The picture ismore illuminating from studies that problematize regulation and/or adopt acritical perspective on greening. For example, in its desire to minimize oravoid regulatory costs, powerful industries have been seen to 'capture' theregulatory agenda (Finger and Kilcoyne 1997). Meanwhile, tbe regulatorstrives to reduce or prevent pollution and appear tough and credible to indus-try', government and public without disabling industry and without strain-ing its own litigation resources (Levy 1997: Fineman and Clarke 1996).Some .social policy analysts note that environmental regulation proceeds viaa process of 'value trading' and negotiation amongst interested actors, tbestyle of which varies between different micro and macro social-economicorders (Smelser 1976: Smith 1997: Olsen 1992), Contrasting perceptions olpollution are important here. Lowe et al. (1997) illustrate this well in theirstudy of farm pollution. Traditional dairy farmers are often puzzled by thenotion of pollution: farming has always had its 'waste', but naturally con-tained in the seasonal cycle of farming. Pollution is a concept brought in bythe inspector and the 'town people'.In sum, this study focuses on how environmental agency inspectors sociallyand rhetorically produce regulation. As street-level bureaucrats, how dothey exercise their legal authority in often highly contested terrains? Theresearch reports a grounded analysis of inspectors' work: their roles, stylesand persuasiveness: the way enforcement is socially constructed andapplied. Data are derived from interviews and work shadowing. The latteris particularly emphasized, offering a close portrayal of the dramatic per-formances, politics and emotionality that lend meaning to the regulatoryencounter. This part of the analysis reflects the growing literatures thatreveal organizational settings as dramaturgical and emotional arenas(Fineman 1996a: Mangham and Overington 1987: Hoch,schild 1983).Persuasion and control are 'staged' in situationally-specific rituals, wheretbe crafting of emotional display is a key interactional and control tool, anda particular feature of 'green' management situations (Fineman 1996b), Thepaper concludes with a discussion about the more general texture anddimensionality of regulatory conduct, as well as the wider organizationalimplications of researching street-level negotiated orders.

The Social Constmction of Environmental Control 9 5 5

The Study Setting

The research involved the Environment Agency of England and Wales. Itparticipated in an independently funded research programme on the personaland organizational features of environmental regulation, led by the author.It took place in 1996/97, two years after the Agency's inception.The aims and methods of the Agency broadly parallel those of its Europeanand American counterparts. It regulates approximately 2,(XX) industrialprocesses with the greatest potential for causing pollution, including thedisposal of radioactive waste. It is responsible for the regulation of someSJOOO waste sites and the 70,(XX) waste carriers who use them. It monitorsthe water quality of rivers, estuaries and coastal waters and controls dis-charges from 6.000 sewage treatment works. These duties are performedthrough a system of permits or authorisations, which reflect national andEuropean environmental legislation. Some regulation is 'end-of-pipe' especially water quality, gas emissions and waste disposal. Other regula-tion is tied to the design of a product or process; it aims to reduce its pol-lution potential fix)m the start. The Agency has powers to refuse or revokepermits; it can also prosecute those who contravene the conditions of per-mits or damage the environment for other reasons. The Agency levies feesfrom industry but is otherwise supported by, and reports to, the nationalgovernment. It is organized in three tiers head office, eight regions and26 sub-regions or areas. Area offices, located throughout England andWales, organize the daily, regulatory activities.The Agency's public face is that of an integrated service aiming to satisfyits 'customers' with minimal bureaucratic fuss, while being tough onenvironmental polluters. However, at the time of the study, this imagemasked many internal schisms the legacy of a recent merger of threeseparate, long-standing, regulatory bodies which now comprise the wastecontrol, integrated pollution control and water quality functions of theAgency. Each brought its distinctive cultural identities, allegiances andforms of regulatory practise to the Agency, although all were united in thebelief that industry could not be trusted to regulate its own environmentalperformance.Waste regulation is often akin to street policing unannounced spotchecks, detective work and surveillance of those suspected of illegal dump-ing of waste. Much of it is routine, but it can also be tough and personallydangerous, especially in the murky world of illegal waste disposal. In con-trast, integrated pollution control (TPC) inspectors usually work face to facewith senior corporate executives or specialists in environmental manage-ment, sometimes across the boardroom table. Their credibility hinges upontheir high level of technical expertise (e.g. in chemistry, engineering, powergeneration), their understanding of the polluting potential of an industrialprocess, as well as a sympathetic, 'politic', interpretation of 'Best AvailableTechniques Not Exceeding Excessive Cost' (BATNEEC). BATNEEC is anambiguous rubric, enshrined in British environmental legislation, aimed atensuring that pollution releases to atmosphere, land or water are optimally

956 Stephen Fineman

controlled. Water quality inspectors are literally closer to the eanh in manyways patrolling river bank.s and streams, inspecting sewage treatmentplants, checking on industrial waste discharge to watercourses, visitini:farms. Their feel for, and aesthetic appreciation of. the natural environ-ment, is often palpable.

Semple snd Method

Altogether 82 staff were involved in the study, mainly comprising fieldinspectors and their managers in six area offices. They regulated industryin three contrasting geographical regions. One was densely populated andcontained heavy industry, another was relatively rural and coastal, and thethird was a mix of the two.Two methods of inquiry were employed individual interviews and workshadowing. Individual interviews took place with all participants. Thesewere confidential, semi-structtired discussions, exploring: the dynamics ofthe regulatory encounter; how regulatory standards are determined in fieldpractise; how regulation is policed; and the sources of pressures anddemands on the individual inspector. All interviews were tape recorded andanalyzed thematically with the aid of qualitative analysis software (Peters19%).Work shadowing took place with 14 field inspectors, who together repre-sented water, waste and integrated pollution control. I accompanied theinspectors on their normal site visits. Some of these took place by appoint-ment with an industry operator, often a single site manager with environ-mental responsibility, but sometimes with a senior management team.Others were unannounced spot-checks.Typically, I was introduced by the inspector as '.. . an academic doing astudy on how the Agency goes about its business'. Usually, after a shortperiod of self-consciousness on everyone's part, I was ignored. I wouldthen take notes of what the different actors said, what they did and myimpressions of the industrial processes that were being regulated. On someoccasions, especially when there was no third party present, I was invitedto participate directly in an inspection routine, such as helping with a test-ing process or looking for pollution signs as the inspector talked throughwhat he or she was doing. All site visits were preceded by a briefing onthe history and circumstances of the inspection we were about to make andfollowed by a discussion of what had happened. Soon after, I would writeup my field notes in personal narrative form and these notes would be addedto the data bank.

Rndings

Two types of findings are reported here. The first is a stmunary overviewof key themes from the interviews on regulatory practice. These include

The Social Constnjction of Environmental Control 957

inspectors' accounts of their styles, enforcement attitudes and consultancyroles. The themes are then picked up and further developed for theirdramaturgical, political and emotional significance in the second set of find-ings ethnographic accounts of three inspections: integrated pollutioncontrol, waste regulation and water quality,

liiunVlOW rlnQIngSStylssi PsfBUflsloiif NsQotlBtlon 8nd BluffAll inspectors regarded the regulatory encounter as an opportunity for per-suasion and negotiation with more or less resistant industrial operators.They saw themselves treading an unclear path between appearing too laxand too tough:'It's how can I push him to do as much as possible?''You can tum the regulatory screw and make life hell for them, but that's rarelynecessary. It requires sitting down and talking; chats over lunch.'

Inspectors varied in how confrontational they were prepared to be, but vir-tually all sought a 'prevention rather than prosecution' outcome. It was awidely shared belief amongst inspectors that regulatory outcomes and stan-dards were open to negotiation, but',, that's the last thing you'd admit, soyou keep your cards close to your chest'. Bluff was part of the negotiationprocess. For water quality inspectors, bluff was often a substitute for weaklegislation on water-pollution prevention and a camouflage for 'confusing'classifications on the seriousness of a pollution incident:'There's always interpretation. Even categorizing a pollution incident you're guess-ing what might happen to the environment. And how can you cost the effect of apolluting discharge to a watercourse? Plant life? Amenity value? Restitution?'

IPC inspectors were keenest to present themselves as expert partners withindustry, 'on their wavelength' and 'really a human being'. They spoke oflengthy pre-negotiations with industrial managers to 'talk about issuesbefore they become sticking points'; 'Never dig holes that they, or you,can't get out of, 'Building a relationship' was regarded as the key to effec-tive regulation; 'keep talking'; a preferred option to imposed solutions,which may not carry the operator's commitment. Impositions also meantextra work for the inspector in policing progress.For IPC inspectors, the BATNEEC rubric was central to their endeavours.They would point to the official Agency book, 'the bible', which offeredguidance on BATNEEC standards, and the book was used authoritativelyin regulatory discussions. Some BATNEECs were regarded as relativelystraightforward to calculate, but others were not:'Sometimes it's like tiying to describe an elephant ,,,',Or,,'It's like balancing apples and pears. How much do certain measurable emissionsactually damage the environment? Does x million pounds spent result in x millionpounds of environmental improvement?'

958 Stephen Fineman

The apparent authority of the BATNEEC could be exploited by inspectors,leaving some operators with the impression that standards were legally lixed which they were not. For the 'better informed' operators, often seen inbe in the larger cnterpri.ses. it was expected that a BATNEEC would benegotiated. Generally, larger companies wen; seen to have the edge ovei'smaller ones in such negotiations. Because of their .sophistication amiresources, they were sometimes able to persuade the inspector lo accept iimore favourable, less stringent, deal for themselves.Waste inspectors defined their world as harder edged than IPC or water:newer to regulation and more mistrustful of operators. Dramatic pictureswere painted of some of their site visits to 'very awkward people":

'Therv arc scrap metal merchants who hiisically want to smash your face in. Yea.it must be hard to run a business with all Ihc various inspectoi's calling, but that'snot iny worry.'

Waste inspectors tended to polarize operators into those who acceptedregulation and those who rejected it or. had 'avoided it lor years'. Mostoperators were regarded as hard to move beyond basic compliance, andthen only after tough negotiations. Stylistically, the inspectors mirroredtheir perceptions of their 'customers' (an Agency term almost universallymocked by inspectors). They would set their expectations in tirm language:'I'm always very polite, but they know what I expect: if I say I wantit clean I want it clean'. They would readily resort to confrontation, iftheir 'instructional' approach failed. A number of waste inspectors had hadprior experience of police work, which they claimed helped them in suchsituations.

Enforeemant Qrtdng ToughIssuing an official 'enforcement notice' prohibiting a particular polluting,or environmentally dangerous, industrial process was an option for inspec-tors. Failure to comply invited prosecution, as did a deliberate breach ofthe conditions of an Agency permit.Inspectors were visibly uncomfortable with enforcement and prosecution.a power that was often more symbolic than real. IPC inspectors were themost resistant to using their legal powers as it signalled a failure in theirpreferred regulatory style; a breakdown in collaboration:

'I regard ptosecution as a failure, both on our pan, and on those we're regulating.There's much table thumping, sabre rattling, letters, minded-to-send notices, allsons of documents: but prosecution is very rare.'

Mitigation circumstances would be sought: 'a genuine mistake' or 'just alittle breach', where a firm warning was considered more appropriate thanprosecution.Where prosecution seemed unavoidable, some companies were seen asmore liable than others because of their attitude ('why the hell should wecomply'), their size ('larger companies should know better; they know thescore') or the extent of damage ('wipes out all the fish in river').

The Social Construction of Environmental Control 959

Enforcement and prosecution, however, were two-edged for the inspector.They might be worth the effort if they succeeded, but the criminal justicesystem could prove both laborious and fickle. Gathering detailed legal evi-dence and appearing in court were uncomfortable experiences for theinspector, especially when a company had mustered the services of majorexperts to defend its position. Companies could legally appeal againstAgency decisions or requirements, which could be an onerous experiencefor the inspector. Many of them feh vulnerable, even deskilled, in litiga-tion settings, despite the support of Agency specialists. Ambiguity in inter-preting license conditions meant that a magistrate or judge could ruleagainst the Agency, or impose just a modest penalty on the firm. 'Failedprosecutions really embarrass us' was a common sentiment.

Being ConaultantsHow much 'fiee' advice to give to operators divided inspectors and reflectedsome structural contradictions in the inspector's role. Proffering advice tooperators on BATNEECs, pollution abatement plans and ways to completeAgency application forms, reinforced the desired collaborative ethosbetween the Agency and industry. However, if industry literally followedan inspector's recommendations, and should that advice prove wrong (e.g.it did not prevent pollution), then the Agency could be legally compro-mised. For this reason, the official position was that responsibility and bur-den-of-proof should always rest with the operator. The inspectors took somemarkedly different positions on this issue:

'We mustn't be free consultants; it's not what the public expects. Doesn't leaveour hands fi^ ee for enforcement.' (Waste inspector)'I give as much advice as possible. Don't see why I can't give them the sort ofadvice they get from a consultant. It's part of my job. Consultants often exploitpeople.' (Waste inspector)'The Agency line is confused, so am I. Help people help themselves, but don'tleave yourself legally vulnerable.' (Water inspector)'The company doesn't really need to employ a consultant. The inspector knowsthe processes well and together we can identify the things that need to be done.'(IPC inspector)Clearly inspectors construct their own ethical orders of practise whichmay or may not reflect the 'official' line.The overall picture from this section of the findings suggests that inspec-tors are active agents in constructing regulation. As they shape regulatoryagreements, they deploy the symbols and rhetorics of Agency authority special language, authoritative letters, documents. Many present themselvesas skilled in the arts of persuasion, coaxing and in giving selective informa-tion, as they steer their way through the ambiguities of 'acceptable' regu-latory standards. The standards applied are frequently partial and varyaccording to the mores of the environmental medium in which the regulatorspecializes, the size of the organization being regulated, and the inspector'sevaluation of the intentions of the operator. Preserving an amicable dialogue

960 Stephen Fineman

with an operator is accorded a high priority. Resorting to prosecution is uhassle and also risky, so it is avoided as far as possible. Prosecution is alsoregarded as a personal failure to regulate properly. However, sonic pollu-tion scetiarios are Judged as so unacceptable that prosecution becomesunavoidable. 'Unacceptability', though, is a political/social constmct. ofwhich measurable damage to the environment is but a part.Let us explore the dynamics of these proces.ses further in a clo.scr exami-nation of particular regulatory encounters. The observations of field inspec-tors iit work reveal some of the liner texture of regulatory practi.sc.

Shadowing Inspectors

Three ethnographic accounts are presented below. They are selected to indi-cate each of the regulatory functions integrated pollution control, water-quality regulation and waste regulation. They also represent a range ofregulatory styles from confrontational to appeasing. Each case is ana-lyzed for (a) its social/emotional texture, (b) its political content and (c) itsrituals and dramatic performances. The accounts are further developedusing interview and ethnographic data from other respondents.

Intogratfld PoUutioii Control

Plastieo, .says Martin, an IPC inspector, is a multimillion pound organi-zation built up by an ex-plumber who finds regulators 'a pain inthe neck'. They make plastic, PVC, pipes and gutters for the buildingtrade. Their process is a 'prescribed' one for regulation under theEnvironmental Protection Act. because of the dangerous lead that is addedto the plastic.As a last resort, Martin has had to serve a legal enforcement orderon Plastieo because the powdery PVC svtbstance has been spilling overthe site a fine-graded lead 'blowing around neighbourhood'. Therehave been local complaints with 'risks to kids and animals; possibleasthma connection: it persists in the environment once its there'. Martinadds..

'But they've contested this.' "Only half a percent lead; no prohtem". ttiey claim.However, the onus of proof i.i on them, the operator, and they can't prove i7'.v norliarmful.'Martin has taken photographs of the fine lead spillages around machinery.The company disputes the need for prescription on the process, because ofthe 'very small levels of lead' and the owner is 'not motivated towards reg-ulation'. Relations are 'prickly', says Martin cheerfully. Plastieo has utough style of management, but Martin gives the impression of being some-one who is not easily compromised;'My action has cost them a fair bit of money in improvements 7-figure.sums to achieve BATNEEC. There has been so much aggro that I took my

The Social Construction of Environmental Control 961

Area manager around with me. It was the worst tempered meeting I've everbeen in! He had to keep me and the owner apart. They wanted to be letoff regulation! He told them they have to be prescribed. I was pleased tohave his support. The plant manager still regards me as a threat becauseof the photos I took. He also hates climbing silos and I go up silos. They'vehad an enforcement notice and warning of this visit, so things should beOK.'More calmly, Martin reflected ...'You know, I like visititig these companies to see something happening; see whysome British companies are so sticcessfut and others aren't. I know those I'd pre-fer to invest in. Some I can't resist the urge to put my production engineer's haton and advise them on improving their process. This firm, though, gives me botherout of all proportion to their pollution potential.'

InapecUonDouglas, the plant manager, receives us. Martin is disappointed that the'bolshy MD' is not there. We tour the factory. Martin states exactly wherehe wants to go and Douglas complies, with a look that suggests he can'trefuse.Martin asks lots of technical questions about the processes involved andis particularly focused on the dust spillage from the five massive silos con-taining PVC and its mixes some lOOft high. Where the waste eventuallygoes is, apparently, crucial. If it goes to the municipal incinerator it givesoff poisonous dioxins.Martin makes a beelinefor the silos and sprints up the precarious exter-nal ladder. A less confident Douglas follows. They descend after about 15minutes, Martin disguising his triumph in a business-like tone. On top ofthe silo is an open cover and bags of dust...'Maintenance of the silo tops was part of my last instructions to you, so I'm a bitannoyed'.

Douglas appears embarrassed and annoyed about the discovery. Back inhis office he picks up the phone and delivers a very curt reprimand to anoperator ... 7 left instructions to ensure the top of the silos are clean, andthey're not!' he barks down the phone.Douglas now turns on Martin, as if he's been suppressing his ill feelings.He's disgruntled that Martin can appear any time for an inspection with-out someone 'competent in charge being around, who can explain what'shappening'. Martin shrugs. There then follows a terse exchange.Douglas: (firmly, staring at Martin) 'I'd like to flag a few more things up.We've taken all our tests and we're well below the danger levels! We feelaggrieved to pay you 3.600 a year for such low levels.' (He waves thetest sheets at Martin).Martin: (coolly) 7 agree. But it's accidental releases that are the problem;fugitive releases'.Douglas: (peeved) So if everything's bang-on we're not qualified for excep-tion?'

962 Stephen Fineman

Martin: (caimly) 'Because of the legislation and your volttnw

The Social Construction of Environmental Control 963

about the silo dust onto a subordinate with an outburst of anger, and hefinally turns on the inspector with an animated display of frustration. Theoutcome, in the inspector's eyes, is to reinforce further his own view ofthe company's intransigence. The fight, it seems, will go on.All IPC inspectors claimed, with sincerity, that it was not their aim to jeop-ardize 'UK pic', and many, like the above inspector, made commercialjudgments about the soundness of the businesses they regulated. In a polit-ical sense, they were willingly captured by the broad aims and philosophyof industry, a majority of them being past employees of the very industriesthey were now regulating. Yet some would drive harder environmental bar-gains than others, partly because of their preferred regulatory style, but alsoas a reflection of the way they appraised both the environmental conse-quences of the processes they were regulating and the competence and will-ingness of the managers. In the words of one inspector, 'Is the manager abullshitter or does he really care?'

Social and EmoUonal LeverageGaining control in technical disputes could be tense and problematic forthe IPC inspector, as illustrated above. This was especially evident whenan inspector was dealing with managers whom themselves had once beenregulators ('gamekeepers turned poachers'). Inspectors were then on theirmettle, conscious of the limits of their expertise. Although it was possibleto use their legal authority to terminate debates, it threatened their credi-bility as negotiators and experts. Many, therefore, would delay closing theregulation by giving the operator 'homework'; information for them toobtain before the inspector's next visit. Meanwhile, the inspector could oncheck his or her 'facts'.After site visits, some IPC inspectors described how they could 'recover asituation when the going gets too hot'. In practice, this meant using bureau-cratic and administrative procedures to coerce operators. If the inspector hadlost face, this was added justification for 'really scaring' an operator. Terseletters stating legal obligations, together with hints of enforcement and pros-ecution, provided appropriate leverage. Yet the seemingly unspoken agendabehind this 'sabre rattling' (see 'Findings', pp. 957-959) was for both par-ties to try and avoid the financial costs and possible public humiliation of acourt appearance. To make this less likely, a number of inspectors and man-agers would mark out their territory in terms of hints or boasts about howsuccessful a litigation or appeal had been for them. For example, during oneinspection, the managers involved proudly proclaimed that they had 'takenout' their last inspector in an appeal because he was a '...real bastard,talked prosecution all the time and frequently came unannounced'.There is demonstration here of collusion, albeit camouflaged in threats or'advice'. On occasions, both regulator and regulated saw themselves as one,pitted against a censorious media and a green lobby. An IPC inspector, onan organizational visit to a radioactive waste company, recommended tothe managing director that she changed her application for an Agencyauthorization in specific ways '... which will work in your favour; it's to

964 Stephen Fineman

convince the protesters who have given you and me so much aggrava-tion in this case'.

Waste Control

Jennie, a Waste Control Officer, was busy when I arrived at her crowded,untidy, office. Her colleague Maureen, was keen to bend my ear...'Going out with Jennie? Well, you .should see what I have to face! My area's innercity; really rough, lots of unlicensed .sites. Visits can he dangerous. Illegal siteshave dof>s which do worry me. Recently, an Agency inspector injured himselfrunning away from a Rottweiller. / carry a stun gun for dogs lugh pitch soundfor protection. The other day. I and a male colleague. John, answered a call tovisit an empty house, which was being used for illegal dumping. When we ai rived,the perpetrator was actually there, caught red-handed by the police. The policehadn't heard of the Environment Agency so were puzzled about us. Meanwhile, theman gets more abusive and I got really nervous, trying to calm him down. We toldhim he could be in trouble whereupon the man. now sizzling with rage. pick.\up a .sizeabte traffic cone and makes as if to throw it at John ...'Jennie's now ready. We're off to visit Apple Tree Farm, a transfer stationthat takes in industrial waste to be sorted and transported elsewhere fordisposal recycling, incineration or landfill. The site is hidden away ina beautiful, rural, valley on the outskirts of London.A license to operate the site was issued in the 1980s when the owner. Alf.appealed against some of its conditions, and won. As a result 'it's an opentip; tio hard, concrete surface; a mud bath in wet weather. Water can runoff seams into the ground, which can contaminate ground water. In sum-mer there's much dust, but no dust suppression system. There's neither aproper waste bay nor documentation from skip lorries. Neighbours com-plain of early-morning and late-night traffic'Alf. I am told, is of Gypsy heritage, and works with his five brothers. Hehas 'no education atid the family are difficult to deal with'. Engineers fromthe Agency have assessed the site and its inadequacies. There is asbestoson the site, which really worries Jennie. She will have to write to Alf tellinghim to upgrade the site. She expects a very hostile reception to this,but she has checked out her position with tfie legal department of theAgency.

InapectionWe drive into Apple Tree Farm, unannowiced, past an enamel .sign withapple trees on it. The farm is bleak. Apparently, it is no longer a farm andno one can remember the last apple tree. Big lorries are discharging theirskips of building waste and driving straight off. There are dozens of emptyskips around; business does not appear to be good.As Jennie and I walk across the site, squelching in the mud, Alf homes inon me. 'Am I the Gestapo?' We have a bit of trouble convincing him ofmy neutrality and purpose. He jokes with Jennie while she quietly scansthe .site and makes notes on what she .sees.

The Social Construction of Environmental Control 9 6 5

The 'office' is a wooden shack. There's a rougUy painted sign proclaim-ing it as a licensed site. A few men are mooching around inside. Alfsqffi^onted that a previous inspector ('.. should have been strangled at birth:he should have been a policeman!') wanted him to move the sign to a moreprominent place. 'A stupid waste of time!' In earshot of Jennie, Alf wantsto convince me that he knows his business, as his father did before him when the horse and cart, rag-and-bone, men used the site. He is a fasttalker and obviously has little patience for regulation or any form of offi-cialdom. He is adamant that the .\ite is environmentally sirfe and that the'experts' are misguided. But he quickly adds, with a laugh, that Jennie's'OK'. Jenme acknowledges this with a wry smile.Alf seems to be a canny man. a survivor: 'could talk the hind leg off theproverbial donkey' says Jennie. With a smile, and hardly a look at thepaper, he signed a long list (tf breached regulations that Jennie hadcarefully recorded. As we drive away, Jennie says to me that she'll sendhim a license order with 'the lot' in it. 'He'll not tike me; he'll be furious'.Small transfer .stations like this will get away with whatever they can...'

In this case, the regulatory lines are drawn even more firmly than in the pre-vious encounter. The inspector has decided following prior inspectionsand technical assessments that the site will have to be considerablyimproved and that enforcement is the only way forward. The environmen-tally sensitive setting and pressure from the local community adds furtherweight to this 'necessary' outcome: she has other stake-holders to considerwho are important voices in the political context of this regulation.The actual inspection proceeds as if it is a pre-ordained ritual. The inspec-tor goes about her regulatory business without directly engaging the siteowner; he mechanically and uncomplainingly endorses the list of regula-tions he has breached. Other than the foray with the researcher (a strongindication of the owner's feelings of threat) there is little of the direct, inter-actional, confrontation of the first case. It is more a caricatured expressionof their differences, orchestrated by the owner. Yet there is still an impres-sion of much social-emotional work going on: tacit negotiation, mutualpositioning and attempts at control. Through the researcher, the ownermakes clear 'to' the inspector his negative views about regulators and theirjudgements. His colourful style, humour and teasing are generally met withimplacability from the inspector, a 'cool' professional mask. She appearsto have accepted that they speak different regulatory languages, so there islittle merit in direct dialogue. Her aims now are more legalistic the onlyway she sees to achieve the change she desires.Many waste inspectors had a clear image of the cause they were defending.They were the final backstop to the street-wise, hard-core polluters, peoplewho were potentially untrustworthy and/or of criminal intent (see 'Findings',p. 958) people like Alf 'the Gypsy', or abusive miscreants of the sortdescribed by Jennie's colleague, or white-collar operators illegally dispos-ing of waste, perhaps through a third party. Typically, interactions with these

966 Stephen Fineman

individuals were blunt and plain speaking. Being taken seriousl>. lookingthe part', was of concern to the inspector. Impression management rungeJfrom a 'resolute' demeanour (like the inspector in the present cuse). tocarefully arranging the symbols of authority on a first inspection visit.Nevertheless, such 'dressing' was not always succes.sful as, lor o\amplo.on one occasion, when I observed an inspector on his first cull u* a clinicsuspected of improperly disposing of infected clinical waste. In shirtsleevesand relaxed in the car. he transformed into 'the professional': 'Pui on mystem lace: don't fuck with me.' He adjusted his jacket and tie. held out hisidentity card and firmly rang the from d(X)r bell. The clinic's manageropened the door, but he was singularly unimpressed by the inspectui's cn.^ -dentials. He refused further dialogue and slammed the door shut. Withouta legal permit to search the premises, the inspector could do no more. Unlikethe IPC inspector, waste inspectors could not take lor granted the 'peer'respect of tho.se they visited.

Water QualityTotiy is a water quality inspector, young with an easy-going style. We areoff to inspect a polluted watercourse linked to countiy club called HamptonHouse. Tony's van is packed with jars, bottles, testing equipment, protec-tive clothing, torches, maps, documents and sticky labels. Hampton Hottsvis an unusual mix a golf driving-range, a pub, an equestrian centre anda nursing home. In Tony's words, the complex has 'never quite \it there'and it certainly looked seedy, unkempt, as we approached via a very longdriveway.They have a sewage treatment problem and one that has transgressed theterms of the consent given by the Ageniy to di,scharge treated wa.ste to landdrains and watercourses. The treatment system fails, or is mostly iion-exis-tetit. A combination of septic tanks and illegal soakaways do not do thejob. The outflow pollutes a protected stream, which contains freshwatertrout. The owner, Pete, has resisted all Agency attempts to install properfacilities, histead, he has diverted the outflow into a ditch which takes along route to the main stream. He claims that the pollution degrades bythe time it reaches its destination. It does not. Tony has received an anony-mous report that it is septic ...'This has jione on for years. We've threatened. We now need to up the ami. Petealways has excuses. He's an amiable, slippery character. It would cost him IIOJXMJto put it right. He's claimed he's bankrupt, hut t'tn sure he's got money stashed

This was a surprise visit to collect a 'legal' sample of the water for test-ing. Without the sttrprise, says Tony, Pete would probably pump the tankand ditch clean before we arrive.Because Pete had been making the 'right noises' Tony had resisted pros-ectttion. At his la,st visit Pete claimed to have had some 'goodfortitne' andhad engaged a consultant to do the remedial work. But nothing more liadhappened. Also. Tatty was super-tautiotis about prosecution because he

TTie Social Construction of Environmental Control 967

had had his fingers' burnt when a prosecution of his went 'disastrouslywrong'. It was not until it reached court that he found he had prosecutedthe wrong person. He was on the receiving end of the magistrate's wrathand an official inquiry by the Agency: 7 have to be absolutely clear wherethe responsibility lies before I can prosecute: there are others on this sitebesides Pete'.We could not find Pete on site. Tony tracked him down by phone at his home.No, he did not want to witness the taking of the sample (his legal right), butwe should bring one of the three samples (legally required) to him at hishome. He could not see why it needed to be done, though.We visually inspect the ditch and stream and, indeed, they look and smelldistinctive a grey colour and musty: classic signs of overload fromsewage, says Tony. Tony does the tests, which means carefully scoopingsamples of the water at strategic places, bottling and then labelling them.The seals have to be licked to stick them on the bottles. Tony (wearing pro-tective gloves) points out how dangerous this is, given the disease poten-tial. Another test is with a meter that measures the oxygen, conductivityand other chemicals in the water. The meter shows some poor quality, butnot dangerously so. 'Really not too had' concludes Tony.Tony seemed very much at home as we trudge back over the fields withour sample...

7 have to say this is a perfect job for me; I'm not a political person. And that'smy problem where do I j>o ne.xt? Any promotion takes me away from this, outof the field. I don't want an office job. Already it's changing. I used to know theriver because I walked it; so I knew exactly what someone meant when they rangin. Now I haven't the time to do this; I get ottt of touch.'

Meeting PeteWe cannot find Pete at his farmhouse. We are just abottt to leave when wehe drives up in an old pick-up towing a horsebox. He is familiar with Tonybut subdued about the water testing. Tony carefully lines up the three bot-tled samples of water and asks Pete to choose one for testing himself, shouldhe so desire. Pete takes and signs for his sample and immediately claimsit looks OK to him. Tony becomes firmer, more 'professional' and puts himright. He tells Pete that things are not good and that a major pollutioncould happen with the next major rainfall. What was he going do about it as he had promised? Pete shrugs, claims poverty and says he has towait until he sells some property. Tony perseveres, trying to pin him downand also to find out more about his financial status. He talks about Pete'sbusiness interests and what the prospects are. Pete adopts a hangdogposture: 7 live from day to day: it could all come together soon'.Despite wanting to 'up the anti' Tony appears beaten, lost for a new tack.'Something must be done.'' he says boldly to Pete. 7 can't let this continue.Do you understand? I'll have to bill you for these tests.' 'Sure', says Pete,and we leave.Tony is not surprised at the outcome, 'He's up to his old tricks: all I cando is report this to my boss. He's spinning me a yarn.' The Agency and

968 Stephen Fineman

Tony seems helpless. The pollution is not dire enough to eusiur

The Social Construction of Environmental Control 9 6 9

'Well, is it in the public interest in this particular case? Debatable. Will a prose-cution succeed? Probably not. Will prosecuting an 8S-year-old look good to theAgency? No. We'll put in a large charging bill and he will take it to his insurers.We need his cooperation in the clean up, so getting tough is counterproductive.I'm here to protect the environment as an environmental biologist; I don't want toshock the man into a hean attack. We rely on public suppon. We could spendthousands of pounds taking him to coun and he will be given a conditionaldischarge. Bad PR for us. People in his village would not have helped me if theyknew I'd prosecute. But I guess we're bending the niles. If it had been a youngbolshy fanner we might have prosecuted.'

The effective rules of prosecution are shaped according to the inspector'spersonal feelings and predictions about the consequences of such action fora particular case. A 'fuzzy logic' prevails that is highly interpretive andsignificantly politicized.The expressed personal style of Tony, the inspector, fluctuated accord-ing to his perception of his functions during the inspection and the generaltension between being 'friendly-helper' and 'less-friendly enforcer' (seeearlier interview findings). Water inspectors sometimes had to be particu-larly agile in their impression management, rapidly switching 'masks'.During one site visit, for example, the inspector could be observed in light,friendly, banter with the environmental manager of an engineering plant.She turned a comer to face a stack of chemical drums, with signs of leak-age of a dangerous chemical. She instantly looked serious and 'official'.She took photographs and water samples and legally cautioned the man-ager in the presence of his staff. The manager appeared chastened andembarrassed. Soon after leaving the premises she visibly relaxed, smiledand said how satisfied she was with what she had achieved.

Conclusions

The UK now has some ten statutory agencies regulating the economic, qual-ity and competitive performance of industry, a scenario consistent with thegrowth in Europe of regulatory regimes accompanying privatization andeconomic liberalization (Majone 1996). All work in the shadow of the law.the legal framework providing the skeleton around which different partiesnegotiate and bargain (Graham and Frosser 1991; Veljanovski 1991).However, for organizational researchers, it is the nature of their bargain-ing and field-level interpretations that raises especially important questions.It is here, as revealed in the present study, that moral order is shaped, wherereputations are protected and traded and where collusion is more or lesspossible. The field inspector's 'street-level' bureaucracy is a far cry fromthe Weberian image of monolithic rules and standardized procedures. It ismore an exercise in careful ritual and improvization, where personal style,dramatic skill, emotion and a degree of bluff are used to put flesh on theregulatory skeleton. In this form, regulation is substantially a social/orga-nizational construct, not a legal one.

970 Stephen Fineman

The regulatory inspector is exposed as a key player in creating meaning inenvironmental regulation. He or she is at a crucial interface with industrv.selectively interpreting agency requirements, making judgements about theintentions of the industrial operator and part-managing the intcraclionulprocess. Like other street-level bureaucrats who translate and deliver widerstandants .set by others (e.g. teachers, social workers, police ofticers), whaiinspectors do and assert effectively hecotnes agency policy, and the natureand extent of environmental protection is formed by this process.Street-level bureaucrats share certain patterns of coping, u function of thecharacteristic uncertainty, high load and ambiguity of their work. Thesepatterns include: structuring client interactions, 'teaching' them how tobehave: processing work consistent with their own preferences: using onlyagency policy that is backed up by significant sanctions: working in waysto maintain and expand their autonomy: confronting the 'unfairness' ufwider agency standards which aim to treat all people alike: dealing withthe indeterminacy of their objectives by limiting demand: and organizingwork to meet re.source constraints (e.g. see Lipsky 1980: Zimmerman 1%*-):Ham and Hill 1993).We can see many of these activities with environmental regulators. Forexample:

- the ritualization of inspections and their threats, warnings and officialletters (structuring/control)

- identifying favoured, 'good', 'trustworthy', operators (personal prefer-ences )

- using prosecution only as a final resort (most salient sanction)- separating from other inspectors and from management (autonomy)- resisting Agency attempts to redefine operators a customers (autonomy)- constructing their own moral order(s) about operdtor behaviour and pol-

lution (fairer than same-rules-for-all)- doing more or less consultancy (autonomy: workload management)- getting operators to do 'homework' (workload management)Here. then, we have a picture of the inspector as rule creator, trying tomake a wider organizational system of rules workable. However, this studyreveals that street-level bureaucracy is more than a set of inspector-led cog-nitions and behaviours. It is interactional and requires considerable emo-tiotial and performatory work. What an inspector feels about an operatorand the operator about him/her (e.g. anger, rage. emban:as.sment, fear, pride,admiration, shame), is intrinsic to rule making and the control process.Moreover, the cases show that the dramatization of emotions in 'face work',is a key strategic resource for the actors. It helps them to test each other'sboundaries and relative positions and it adds force or favour to a particu-lar version of events. In such .settings, the inspector's power is alwaysbounded, often more by the social-political context of the encounter thanthe wider agency bureaucracy. This is especially so when the inspector's(and the inspected's) occupational identity hinges upon successful collab-oration or partnership.

The Social Construction of Environmentai Controi 971

Like many street-level bureaucrats, the environmental inspector lionizes thefield (see Lowe et al. 1997: Van Maanen 1988; Punch 198S). It is 'outthere' in, and with, industry where the 'real' business occurs and whereenvironmental legislation is cut down to size and made workable; so muchso, that some inspectors pay scant attention to changes in environmentallaw, relying on well-tested assumptions that have always guided their every-day practise. Field regulation 'law' is self-sustaining and only loosely cou-pled with the broader aims of the agency and the various legislativedemands placed upon it. Such processes complicate centralized attempts atorganizational change and the standardization of regulatory practise. Wherebureaucrats at the centre strive for similarity in practise, their counteipartsin the field look for, and create, differences.The public credibility of regulation hinges upon the impartiality and inde-pendence of the regulator. There is evidence that this is a wistful ideal.Some regulators in the present study had held managerial positions in theindustries that they now regulated, a relationship further complicated bytheir dealings with managers, who themselves had once been regulators.The preferred collaborative style of many inspectors lent itself to mutualcapture (reinforced by beyond-work fraternization see ENDS 1997).Furthermore, industry and related professional associations are oftenheavily implicated in the shaping of national and international environ-mental policy, while both state agencies and industry share a desire to avoidmajor social transformations (e.g. see Lyons 1992; O'Riordan 1988; Luke1995).Hints of regulatory weakness or collusion usually shake confidence in therole and integrity of the regulatory agency and threaten its very survival,so regulatory systems need to proceed as i/regulator and regulated are sep-arate. How is this achieved? At one level, it is managed within the widerbureaucracy and public relations of the agency itself, where results are re-faced for public consumption. The agency in the present study publisheda regular, tabloid-style, newspaper for public distribution. Typical of itsuncompromising headlines were 'Polluters to face exposure shame', 'ICI:a catalogue of errors' and 'Fly tipper jailed' (Environment Action 1997: 1).However, the separatory myth is also maintained in the micro, organiza-tional, processes of regulation, especially where inspectors are protectiveof the symbols and trapping of their autonomy and, ultimately, want to beseen as distinct from the people they regulate. A 'pally' regulatory 'chat',therefore, can switch rapidly into a 'legal caution', and a verbal agreementformalized in cold agency language.The processes revealed in the present study have been derived through inter-pretive methods - 'loose' interviews and ethnographies. The latter reflectsan anthropological approach to cultural analysis and as been particularlyimportant in describing the finer texture of the regulatory encounter. Therehave been some notable organizational investigations and critical paperswithin this tradition (e.g. Watson 1994; Van Maanen 1988; Kunda 1992;Bate 1994; Czamiawska-Joerges 1992) yet it is still a relatively rareapproach within oi^anizational studies. Arguably, though, it is to this kind

972 Stephen Fineman

of methodology that we need to be looking if we are claiming to studydynamic meanings, processes and enactments in organizations. Furthermore,it is one source of 'reading' on emotion which, as argued earlier, is intrinsicto the meanings of social exchanges and the nature of control.Ethnography is probably easier to advocate than actually perform. It requiresan unusual degree of trust between researcher and researched. It requires apositioning by the researcher as 'present, but invisible' or 'present and par-ticipant'. It needs a reasonable sampling period. In the present study, thatperiod was a day-in-the-life of an inspector on site visits. Had it been prac-ticable to shadow for more days, no doubt further insights would haveemerged. It requires some interpretive imagination and patience - siftingthrough much qualitative data, seeking internal consi.stencies and inconsis-tencies and facing possible .surprises, such as unexpected relationships andconceptual connections. Finally, it behoves the researcher to create word-pictures of his or her key findings without over-sanitizing the data, therebylosing the essential texture of the settings explored. With all this in mind,structured interviews and questionnaires may appear as u welcome relief forthe field researcher, but such a convenience is perhaps tix) great u price topay for the loss of 'real time' data and the expressive richness of carefulobservational study.

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