stratj urnal

STRATJ URNALOFFICE OF NAVAL STRATEGIC STUDIES M A R C H - A P R I L 2 0 1 9

3 | Special Report:Understanding China’s Gray Zone Maritime Operations: What Threats It Brings

6 | Non-Traditional Security Threats:How 5G technology will revolutionize the future of security

9 | Naval Defense and Military Trends:Enhancing the Navy’s Maritime Air Patrol Capabilities through Unmanned Aerial Systems

12 | Naval Diplomacy:The BRP Rajah Humabon (PS 11):A Museum Ship for a Maritime Nation

15 | Naval Defense and Military Trends:Is a Philippine Navy Hospital Ship Feasible?

18 | Indo-Pacific Strategic Dynamics:Call to Review the Mutual Defense Treaty

The StratJournal is a bi-monthly publication of the Office of Naval Strategic Studies devoted to strategic, national, regional, and international issues, and developments that have significant impact on maritime security and naval defense.

About US: The Office of Naval Strategic Studies (ONSS) is one of the research institutions of the Philippine Navy primarily mandated to examine the dynamics of the strategic and policy environment and the developments in military affairs in order to provide sound and research-based recommendations for the PN Command. The Office provides avenues and platforms for open and constructive discussions on prevailing and evolving defense and security issues to broaden perspectives, and cultivate a culture of strategic thinking in the PN.

3STR ATJOURNAL MARCH - APRIL 2019

Understanding China’s Gray Zone Marit ime Operations: What Threats It Br ingsBy: Ivy Marie L. Ganadillo

This special column provides insights and analyses on latest issues and topics of particular interest to the

Philippine Navy and Philippine national security.

SPECIAL REPORT

PHOTO: CSIS AMTI

• China’s gray zone tactics enable China to challenge the existing status quo and rules-based system without employing coercive methods

• When the lines of aggression blur, maritime agencies should be prepared to operate and respond to different conditions and use to a maximum advantage all possible instruments

China employs gray zone coercion across multiple domains – economic, cyberspace, and maritime – that causes a serious challenge for policymakers

of various countries affected, and also for their military and law enforcement forces in different levels.

The AFP, particularly the Western Command of Palawan, has been recently put in the spotlight due to reports of the growing number of Chinese fishing vessels near Pag-Asa Island. These fishermen are believed to be deployed by China as paramilitary forces or armed fisheries militia. In January 2019, Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana, responding to questions arising from the report of US-based think tank Center for Strategic

and International Studies (CSIS) on the presence of large fleets of Chinese fishing vessels in the South China Sea, states that in good faith, these are perceived as ordinary fishermen.1 This is also despite the fact that Secretary Lorenzana said that they know this could be an organized maritime militia working under the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). He added that it would be too risky for the Philippine government to confront these vessels. According to Greg Poling, who heads the CSIS study, the extensive Chinese fishing fleet spends more time serving as an

4 OFFICE OF NAVAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

arm of the state in the seas than fishing.2 In April 2019, the Department of Foreign Affairs released a statement on the presence of Chinese vessels within the KIG.3 It calls the Chinese government to adhere to the consensus between both governments to exercise self-restraint with respect to activities in the South China Sea, especially those that would complicate or escalate disputes.

Gray-zone maritime strategy employs hybrid warfare, in which the lines between military, economic, diplomatic and intelligence means of aggression are blurred. In the context of the South China Sea, the reports released by international think tanks and studies of other countries on China’s maritime militia are quite alarming. The actors in grey zone strategy break, ignore, and diminish the rules-based international order and upend established rules of conventional conflict, hence making the rules of engagement (ROEs) unclear. In cases in the sea, when the boundaries between civilian and military norms erode, it risks eroding the rules that protect civilians/fishermen, and violates norms which identify who lawful combatants are.

The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM)4

In the early 1950s, when the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) had no strong maritime capability yet, the

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) looked for ways to fend off Nationalist incursions along the coast of Taiwan. As there were very few experienced mariners to support the PLA, it made use of its huge coastal fishing population. From then, these coastal defense militias evolved to what is now considered the 3rd sea force, the sea Maritime Militia. The PLA Navy, the first sea force; China Coast Guard (CCG), the second, which serves as its maritime police under its People’s Armed Police; and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) as the third. These sea forces are the largest of its type. According to the Pentagon’s 2019 China Military Power Report5, it has around 310 major naval units that include surface ships, submarines, amphibious ships, and patrol crafts. It also has the world’s largest coast guards and maritime militia. These three sea forces work in a well coordinated manner, especially in pursuing China’s unresolved sovereignty claims and other interests. The PAFMM is a critical enabler of its gray zone operations over the East and South China Seas. From a traditional type of militia, where they have both civilian jobs and full-time military duties without fishing responsibility, it becomes a key component of China’s armed forces. According to reports made by Andrew Erickson6, in one of the militia headquarters in the Paracels, it has the Sansha City Maritime Militia

with 84 large militia fishing vessels, and has more professionalized, militarized, and well-paid units that include military recruits. Their vessels are built with the capability to bump, ram and obstruct other vessels, and are mounted with powerful water cannons.

China’s PAFMM under a direct military chain of command conduct state-sponsored activities. It has been involved in different incidents such as the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident and the 2014 rig drilling standoff between China and Vietnam off the Paracel Islands. The 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident was an encounter with Tanmen militias.7 In April 2012, 12 of its fishing boats were caught operating at the shoal and six inside the lagoon – with two confirmed maritime militias – poaching giant clams and blocking Philippine vessels.8 The six were boarded by the Philippine Navy but were able to call China Maritime Surveillance ships (CMS 75 and 84) to intervene. And in the case with Vietnam, in May 2014, China’s CNOOC oil rig was placed inside Vietnam’s EEZ accompanied by ships from the CCG, PAFMM, and PLAN. The Chinese ships protecting the rig repelled Vietnamese vessels that tried to intervene.9 It was reported that there were 35-40 coast guards, 30 transport ships and tugboats, 35-40 “fishing

SPECIAL REPORT


vessels,” and four naval ships that assembled into a cordon around the oil rig.10 There are also cases with PAFMM in the East China Sea involving Japan. Japan’s coastguards (JCG) encountered intrusions by Chinese fishermen around the Senkaku islands (the disputed area claimed by China and Japan). For instance, in September 2010 Chinese fishermen deliberately rammed twice JCG vessels patrolling in the area.11

From different reports published, it shows that these paramilitary forces are deployed in contested areas and seek to assert and expand control over the disputed and reclaimed islands and reefs. They have a large and diverse force, and thousands of vessels and personnel. They gather information and conduct surveillance, escort protection missions, assist in construction and reclamation of sea features, and are trained to assist in actual wartime. They move using “salami slicing” and “cabbage strategy” tactics in contested waters. These involve long-term incremental approaches and calibrated actions. While it is a coercive tactic during peacetime, it does not immediately escalate the situation but takes advantage of the low intensity climate, therefore not provoking a stronger response. However, at the same time, it intimidates and challenges less capable neighbors, their allies, and other claimant countries. They seize control and secure

the area without firing a single shot. They are “slicing” incrementally and protecting what they are doing in layers to invite the least escalation possible.

In light of this ambiguity, maritime agencies should not be complacent but be prepared to operate and respond to different conditions, and use to maximum advantage all possible instruments. The PAFMM has direct implication for regional stability, security, and a rules-based system. As China’s 3rd sea force operates in the shadow, its presence and actions should be acknowledged, documented, and publicly mentioned. Concerned countries may raise these issues to China in various meetings including international summits and emphasize violations of important international laws. At the operational level, the presence of PCG patrols may be increased, as well as the deployment of maritime personnel in the current military posts, features, and islands surrounding the South China Sea. The Philippines may also utilize the potential of its alliances to improve maritime domain awareness, and promote information exchanges and diplomatic coordination. The joint patrol and exercises in international waters should also be enhanced and continued. These gray zone tactics should be revealed (made public), and deterred. Definitely, these deserve more attention.

SPECIAL REPORT

END NOTES:

1 Mangosing, Francis. ‘Chinese fishing vessels in WPS are military-controlled’. Inquirer. 18 January 2019. <https://newsinfo.inquir-er.net/1074592/chinese-fishing-vessels-in-wps-are-military-controlled>

2 CSIS. The Launch of the Stephenson Ocean Security Project. 10 Janauary 2019. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/launch-ste-phenson-ocean-security-project>

3 Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs. “Statement: On the Presence of Chinese Vessels Near and Around Pag-asa.” 4 April 2019. < https://dfa.gov.ph/dfa-news/state-ments-and-advisoriesupdate/21089-state-ment-on-the-presence-of-chinese-ves-s e l s - near- and - around - pag - a s a ? f b -c l i d = Iw A R 1 M B 5 s OW J LYO e I k n N -3VrzRDxGpnB8QLDmbS9FH6kUVN-QqQW1odDF1vWS08>

4 Erikson, Andrew. China Maritime Militia Conversation. China Power Podcast Ep-isode. 2017. <https://www.csis.org/pod-casts/chinapower/chinas-maritime-mili-tia-conversation-andrew-erickson>

5 Defense Intelligence Agency. “2019 China Military Power Report”. <https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Mil-itary%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf>

6 Erikson, 2017.7 Tanmen Maritime Militia Company is

one of China’s best-known maritime mili-tia units at the eastern shore of Hainan. It gained popularity after Chinese President Xi Jinping’s high-profile visit on the first anniversary of the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident. (Erickson, 2016).

8 Erickson, Andrew and Conor Kennedy. “Model Maritime Militia: Tanmen’s Lead-ing Role In The April 2012 Scarborough Shoal Incident.” 21 April 2016. Center for International Maritime Security. <http://cimsec.org/model-maritime-militia-tan-mens-leading-role-april-2012-scarbor-ough-shoal-incident/24573>

9 Leaf, Paul. “Learning From China’s Oil Rig Standoff With Vietnam.” 30 August 2014. The Diplomat. <https://thediplomat.com/2014/08/learning-from-chinas-oil-rig-standoff-with-vietnam/>

10 Erickson, Andrew and Conor Kennedy. “From Frontier To Frontline: Tanmen Mari-time Militia’s Leading Role Pt. 2”. Center for International Maritime Security. < http://cimsec.org/frontier-frontline-tanmen-mar-itime-militias-leading-role-pt-2/25260>

11 Fukuda, Junichi. “A Japanese Perspective on the Role of the U.S.-Japan Alliance in Deterring—or, If Necessary, Defeating—Maritime Gray Zone Coercion” in “The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Deterring Gray Zone Coercion in the Maritime, Cyber, and Space Domains”. RAND. (2017)


How 5G technology wil l revolutionize the future of securityBy: Joseph Mari I. Fabian

PHOTO: Radware

This column covers non-traditional elements which threaten national

security such as transnational crimes, terrorism, climate change, public

health, etc.

NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS

• 5G’s international rollout poses security risks as well as benefits for increased global connectivity.

• Security concerns involve 5G being used by foreign intelligence services for cyber espionage.

The anticipated realization of cutting-edge fifth generation (5G) wireless technology in 2020 means more than just faster movie downloads, driverless cars, and self-governing vacuum cleaners. Our conventional understanding of connectivity in this age of information will profoundly change forever as 5G technology breaks

the glass ceiling between real life and science fiction: think, machine-to-machine communication independent of satellite support, high-performing wearable devices with low energy consumption, ultra-fast data transfers that will ensure sound decision-making in sensitive situations, all redefining how humans traditionally carry out daily activities. What sets apart 5G technology most from its predecessors 2G, 3G, and 4G – the game changer – is its low network latency (i.e., response time) that stretches the limits of what we consider as ‘real time’.1 Briefly put, 5G enables the

transmission of 10 gigabytes worth of data per second, and latency stands a fraction of a millisecond (or around 1% that of 4G)2. This new wave of ‘hyperconnectivity’ will permit the execution of activities even across remote distances, giving rise to new industry models such as telesurgery and telewarfare, wherein geography does not factor as a constraint. Each generation of telecommunications technology providers will constantly seek to improve its products’ speed and capacity as a response to this era’s ultramodern industrial


NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATSpressures and hunger for data consumption.

However, behind all this novelty surrounding 5G’s international rollout lies a strong irony: the more we develop this technology, the more security vulnerabilities we create. The current controversy surrounding telecom giant Huawei illustrates this, which as much as some quarters have attempted to frame as a purely trade issue, ultimately spilled over to the realm of national security. Analysts see that Huawei is the only ICT company presently that has the capacity to introduce 5G tech globally but the US confronted this with firm opposition because it is convinced that Huawei’s 5G is a dual-use tech that can be used by foreign intelligence services tied to the Chinese government. This has since been a question between the demands of national security versus the national interest to remain technologically competitive. For those seeking a pragmatic approach to this impasse, the challenge lies in securing the real-world benefits of 5G tech, but without turning a blind eye to its equally real security risks.

Huawei’s 5G tech: a case for resistance or acceptance?

In its boldest move yet against Chinese telecoms, Washington charges Huawei Technologies for involvement in “a conspiracy threatening national security.” Acting US Attorney General

Matthew Whitaker formally announced on 28 January 2019 criminal indictments against Huawei, its affiliates, and Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou for theft of trade secrets and espionage.3 Beijing countered this by claiming that its technology does not have any ‘back doors’ that permit intelligence gathering and manipulation in end-users. Geng Shuang, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson also rebuffed the accusations by saying that the US is discrediting legitimate Chinese enterprises because of its own political motivations. All this takes place amidst the ongoing trade war between the world’s two largest economies, which went as far as putting into question existing security relations between longstanding allies. Washington may have scored political victories when it was able to influence Australia, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand into restricting Huawei’s access to their markets, but the European Union resisted this, specifically Germany and the United Kingdom. EU countries are unconvinced to fully ban Huawei in their soil because a total embargo could set back the continent years in technology and innovation, something it says could compromise its plans to tap into future technologies to spur economic growth and reinforce security.4

Weaponizing 5G?

In its first National Security Strategy (NSS) released

in 2017, the Trump administration identified a secure, nationalized 5G network as crucial in improving America’s digital infrastructure. The US’ Director for National Intelligence Daniel Coats echoes the same sentiments when he remarked that the global shift to 5G and [enabling] artificial intelligence will increasingly test US security and competitiveness.5 By 2020, 20 billion Internet of Things6 (IoT) such as smart devices (e.g., Apple Watch, home security systems, wearable heart monitors) will be in use – translating to 20 billion entry points for cyberattacks. Huawei’s 5G tech is strongly believed to provide the digital infrastructural component capable of supporting the envisioned IoT ecosystem, and the US is a big market for IoT smart devices.

Evidently, the US is the most vocal critic of China’s 5G capabilities. FBI Director Christopher Wray stressed that integrating Chinese devices and 5G tech into the US’ telecommunications network poses a serious national security risk. The US intelligence community argues that it can be weaponized and used for malicious ends such as corporate espionage, and intelligence operations. Whether these fears are exaggerated or not, the synergy between the Chinese government and


with hyperconnectivity merits greater attention.

Searching for a balanced 5G telecommunications policy

Critics and proponents of Huawei’s 5G tech both have their merits. Arguably, it would be ill-advised to seek security at the complete expense of technological innovation. To reconcile this, it is necessary to have a government telecommunications policy that interrogates both the security risks of 5G tech and the national interest to remain technologically competitive in this age of information. The World Economic Forum, a leading not-for-profit organization championing pressing global agendas, advises that: (1) leaders should look beyond an organization’s four walls and; (2) integrate cyber risk management in all decisions rather than confining it to the IT department. Huawei’s ascent to the global stage as a leader in 5G tech, with all its risks and benefits, will undoubtedly challenge how each state promotes its national security. Furthermore, the WEF’s advise should make governments tap reliable industry partners to assess the security and privacy risks of data transmitted through millions of 5G networks and IoT devices, while also maximizing the pluses of future technologies. Achieving a balance between public and private collaboration in the promotion of telecommunications

technology might provide the healthy checks and balances between the two sectors to prevent monopoly in its use and development. Ultimately, 5G’s advanced deployment will fully commence one way or another, giving rise to a new generation of powerful devices so revolutionary that security and connectivity will be harder to situate on the same page.

companies provides a clear case for increased suspicion. Particularly, Beijing treats all Chinese companies operating abroad such as Huawei and ZTE Corporation to be subject to Chinese law, and “and multiple new Chinese laws dictate that telecoms operators must provide the Chinese intelligence services with unfettered access to networks for intercept.”7 As an apparent countermeasure, Washington passed the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2019. Section 889 of the act expressly prohibits federal agencies from acquiring t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s equipment from companies linked to China.

From a security standpoint, if there is one thing that will prevent IoT devices from augmenting daily applications, it will be a breakdown in cybersecurity. There are vulnerabilities unique to the IoT which raises privacy concerns such as weak authentication and verification, SQL injections which can spoof identity, and theft of user credentials, with 5G tech allowing for this form of remote exploitation. Emerging reports also reveal that ‘smart’ household appliances can in fact be remotely hacked and used for surveillance purposes in unknowing homes.8 Following this, the prospect of weaponizing this 5G-IoT capability for greater purposes should not be too far-fetched for the rational observer. The risk of infiltration that comes

END NOTES:

1 Liu, Zhen. ‘Why 5G, a battleground for US and China, is also a fight for military supremacy.” South China Morning Post. 31 January 2019. Web. 27 March 2019. <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/2184493/why-5g-battle-ground-us-and-china-also-fight-military-supremacy>.

2 Ibid. 3 Ma, Josephine. “Huawei ban won’t stop

spy threat when US and others are doing it too, says ex-Singapore minister George Yeo.” South China Morning Post. 30 March 2019. Web. 1 April 2019. <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/arti-cle/3003856/huawei-ban-wont-stop-spy-threat-when-us-and-others-are-doing>.

4 Chee, Foo Yun, and Emmott, Robin. “Ex-clusive: EU to drop threat of Huawei ban but wants 5G risks monitored – sourc-es.” Reuters. 23 March 2019. Web. 1 April 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-huawei-tech-exclusive/exclusive-eu-to-drop-threat-of-huawei-ban-but-wants-5g-risks-monitored-sources-idUSKCN-1R32K3>.

5 Gallagher, Jill and DeVine, Michael. “Fifth-Generation (5G) Telecommunica-tions Technologies: Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service. 30 January 2019. Accessed 1 April 2019.

6 The Internet of Things (IoT) is the exten-sion of Internet connectivity into physical devices and everyday objects. It is also the network of devices connected to the Inter-net which can be remotely monitored and controlled.

7 Gallagher and DeVine, 2019. 8 Popken, Ben. “Hacked Home Devices Can

Spy On You.” NBC News. 27 October 2017. Web. 3 April 2017. <https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/hacked-home-devices-can-spy-you-n814671>.

NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS


Enhancing the Navy’s Marit ime Air Patrol Capabi l it ies through Unmanned Aerial Systems By: Kirk Patrick S. Pablo

• UAV systems will be highly instrumental in creating a common maritime operating picture for the armed forces

• Military campaigns will benefit from UAVs due to the reduction of personnel and logistical requirements, as well as the lessened risk of operational losses in the battlefield

In the era of new informational technologies, awareness has become one of the most vital factors in warfighting. Due to the intermodalities

of a “new spatial awareness”, the interconnectedness of information gathering gave birth to new realities in combat. We can concur that a new dimension in understanding space has been created, and this will definitely have an effect on perceiving and realizing the effectiveness of naval operations. ‘Knowing’, therefore, becomes an important point for the effective management of forces, making battlespace awareness a crucial component in determining the viability and success of

missions. Considering these facts, the ability to know when and where to deploy forces is highly dependent on multiple Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) systems, which enable operational units to assess and calculate their actions in the area of operations. One of the major components of these systems are Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), which in principle, can cover vast amounts of space without the need to constantly sustain human operators. And in the vast expanse of our maritime borders, such systems could

This column covers developments in naval strategies, trends, and

revolutions in naval military technology affecting the Navy’s role

in the security realm.

NAVAL DEFENSE AND MILITARY TRENDS

Scaneagle | PHOTO: Insitu


entail numerous material and logistical requirements, which consume a large chunk of limited resources. This is especially true for integrated systems that require specialized personnel, as well as support systems that take a substantial amount of time and resources to maintain. In addition, it goes without saying that the removal of ‘man on the loop’ at the forefront of these operations lessens the risk of harm and loss of lives. A perfect example for such complex value chain problems are the personnel assignments, and operational and materiel requirements needed by maritime patrol aircraft. Currently, the Philippine Navy relies on manned assets, both rotary and fixed wing aircraft, in conducting its

Maritime Air Patrol missions. With such limitations in both the number of platforms and technologies, as well as the burden of MAP operations left to manned platforms and systems, human bodies have to work double time to effectively accomplish missions and tasks. In this light, UAV Systems augment the operational capabilities and limitations of our MAP operations, making it a vital strategic asset.

Folding and Maintaining Spatial Awareness

The vast expanse of our maritime borders leaves our forces stretched. Such realities leave certain spaces

be of great benefit in ensuring the territorial integrity of the state.

In this discussion, we shall explain unmanned systems in relation to our growing need for an effective ISR given ever-looing threats that challenge our territorial boundaries, the undeniable merits of expanding our Maritime Air Patrol (MAP) capabilities, and the necessity of procuring such assets and its added value to the capabilities of the Navy.

Reducing Human and Material Costs

Most, if not all ISR assets of the Philippine Navy still rely on human operation. Entire systems, platforms, and other related materiel



END NOTES:

1 “Striation” means a series of ridges, furrows, or linear marks.

2 Wilcox, Lauren. “Drone warfare and the making of bodies out of place.” Critical Studies on Security 3.1, 2015: 127-131.

3 Perkins, James. “Enabling Maritime ISR through the ‘Family of Systems’.” Joint Air Power Competence Center. 2017. Retrieved from https://www.jap-cc.org/enabling-maritime-isr-through-the-family-of-systems/

4 Ibid.

NAVAL DEFENSE AND MILITARY TRENDSspaces, wherein increased awareness contributes to the ability of our forces to define the behavior of actors in a given terrain. Both space and bodies are asymmetrically produced,2 wherein the awareness brought by such technologies to planners and operational staff alike creates a definite distance between itself and the threat, as well as the operators, considerably preventing the threat from pursuing its agenda because of the prospect of immediate interdiction. The sustainment of UAV Maritime Air Patrol operations therefore provides the Navy a capability to complete its awareness in two prongs: in securing our maritime borders vis-à-vis the need for joint operations for all branches, as well as denying the enemy the momentum in mounting its ill-driven motivations through a “striation” of defined spaces.

Dronifying the Navy: A Glimpse of the Future

With unmanned vehicles quickly gaining foothold in the evolving domain of warfare, the need for the Navy to keep up with such developments should be not lost in the minds of the leadership. As numerous armed forces such as the United States recognize the viability and applicability of such technologies, the face of the global strategic environment also changes. A further example of these changes

is the family of systems concept. This perspective on ISR changes the platform-centric view to one based on capabilities spread over multiple platforms,3 which in turn, create a blanket of interoperability and integration, and therefore amplifying the ability to share information.4 The arrival and subsequent incorporation of these technologies into the Navy will make it more able to respond to challenges and threats encountered in a systematic, as well as cost-effective way (both in materiel and personnel dimensions). Although this will definitely take time given the recent history of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the armed forces, we shall eventually see this development as a path towards the attainment of a strong and credible Navy.

with limited coverage, therefore reducing the spatial awareness for our deployed forces. Not only that this produces “areas of void” which surface and subsurface threats can navigate, it also produces a break in the common maritime operating picture, rendering force awareness compromised. With the utilization of UAV systems, the completion of the common maritime operating picture remains possible. Its ability to enfold spaces completes the operational and strategic dimensions, therefore increasing and extending the reach and grasp of our forces in the designated area. Such approaches consequently create operational and strategic advantages for the benefit of our forces: the reduced strain on personnel and platforms requiring human operations, and the ability of UAV systems to influence the conduct and behavior of threats. This is all due to the UAV’s capacity to fold maritime spaces. It grants the user the benefit of ‘predictability’ in the possible enemy or. intruder’s courses-of-action because of heightened situational awareness.

Although manned assets can also create these realities, the intermodality between manned and unmanned systems create better possibilities of further seeking the “striation”1 of these


Rajah Humabon

• The illustrious career of the BRP Rajah Humabon spans 75 years which included action during World War II and almost four decades of service in the Philippine Navy.

• By preserving the BRP Rajah Humabon, we are preserving a historical reality of the Philippine Navy and the personal memory of our sailors who sailed with her.

• The BRP Rajah Humabon as a museum will also serve as a tangible evidence of the historical and enduring naval alliances of the Philippines, United States and Japan.

On 19 February 2018, Flag Officer-in-Command Rear Admiral Robert Empedrad ordered the decommissioning of the BRP Rajah Humabon (PS 11).1 After almost four decades of service in the Philippine Navy, Rajah Humabon was retired from service on 15 March 2018.2 The decommissioning of the ship was in line with the ongoing modernization program of the Philippine Navy. Before her decommissioning, she was considered as one of the oldest warships in world still in active service. She was also the last ex-Cannon/Datu Kalantiaw Class ship to be

decommissioned by the PN. After its decommissioning, the Rajah Humabon was berthed in Naval Station Pascual Ledesma under the jurisdiction of LTJG MILLAN KRISTOFFER S LAPINID PN, waiting for further instruction. The illustrious career of the Rajah Humabon spans 75 years which included action during World War II and service in the navies of three countries. For her service and immense historical significance, Rajah Humabon then deserves to be the first Naval Museum Ship of the Philippine Navy.

This column covers the strategic role of navies in the context of

national foreign affairs. It discusses the developments of naval roles in advancing national interests as a medium of a state’s international

affairs.

NAVAL DIPLOMACYThe BRP Rajah Humabon (PS 11) :A Museum Ship for a Marit ime NationBy: Patrick John F. Mansujeto


The Rajah Humabon started its career in the US Navy as the USS Atherton (DE-169), a Cannon-class destroyer escort.3 She was launched on 27 May 1943 at Federal Drydock & Shipbuilding Co. and commissioned on 29 August 1943.4 On her first assignment, she was assigned to escort convoys and hunt Axis submarines in the Caribbean and the Atlantic Ocean. On 5 May 1956, USS Atherton together with USS Moberly sunk the U-853 off the coast of Rhode Island.5 This engagement earned the Atherton a battle star. When the war in Europe ended, the USS Atherton was transferred to the Pacific theater, arriving in Pearl Harbor on 29 June 1945.6 Her assignments in the Pacific theatre included escorting convoys to Western Pacific and air-sea rescue duties in Saipan. After the war, Atherton returned to the United States and was placed out of commission at Green Cove Springs, Florida on 10 December 1945. After staying out of commission for almost a decade, she was transferred to Japan under the Mutual

Defence Assistance Program on 14 June 1955.7 She served under the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force as JMSDF Hatsuhi for 20 years from the years 1955-1975.

The Philippines acquired the ship from Japan on 22 December 1978.8 For almost a year, the ship was repaired and rehabilitated in Pusan, South Korea. After the repair, she was commissioned in the active service of the Philippine Navy as BRP Rajah Humabon with a bow number of PF-6 under the command of CAPT VICENTE C ESCALA JR PN (GSC).9 She was deployed in Mindanao, Palawan and Northern Luzon. More importantly, she was also steadfast in enforcing Philippine sovereignty over the Kalayaan Group of Islands and Scarborough Shoal. Rajah Humabon also proudly flew the Philippine flag, and colors of the Philippine Navy during her visit to certain ASEAN countries and China. She also participated in various naval exercises with allied navy such as during the RP-US Balikatan and

Carat Exercises. The Rajah Humabon was designated as a training ship from 1993-1995 but deployed again as a frigate with a new hull number (PF 11). She also became the flagship of the PN until 2011 when she was replaced by BRP Gregorio Del Pilar (ex PF-15 now PS-15). During her service in the PN, she earned numerous distinctions for her service.

Institutional History, Personal Memory and Shared Naval Heritage

The Philippines as maritime nation has no museum ship that celebrates its maritime heritage and the contribution of its navy in protecting its seas. Rajah Humabon is a perfect candidate for this role. Museum Ships or memorial ships are an integral part of many countries’ naval history. These museum ships are considered institutions of memory, as well as pioneer institutions in maritime heritage.10 The essence of a museum ship is that it acts as a place that stores memories of the naval organization, and presents and organizes what a navy does to a public audience.11 In addition, navies around the world create museum ships in order to “tell their stories, in their own way, to themselves and to others.”12 A museum ship also serves as a cultural institution that caters individual interests as well as academic and institutional interaction.13

NAVAL DIPLOMACY


agencies can assist or partner with the Philippine Navy in making this possible. PN can partner with the National Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP), the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA), the National Museum (NM) and other cultural and historical organizations. This will also be in compliance with Republic Act No. 10066 or the “National Cultural Heritage Act of 2009” which declares that any structure or object 50 years old or above is considered as national heritage worthy of preservation.16 Funding can also be requested from various development agencies of the United States and Japan. Rajah Humabon as a museum ship will attract local and foreign tourists as history is becoming a booming industry.17 Hence, the museum ship, with proper management and planning, can hopefully sustain itself financially.

We cannot deny the importance of the Philippine Navy in the country’s maritime security. Therefore, it is important to instill the organization’s role and sacrifices in the national consciousness of the Filipino people through creative ways and platforms. Converting the BRP Rajah Humabon into a museum ship will be an effective approach in pursuing this goal of historical and cultural preservation for generations to value and remember. In these times where the Philippines faces mounting challenges to its

Turning Rajah Humabon into a museum ship is also preserving historical evidence important to the Philippine Navy and the country. According to Elaine Heumann Gurian, “historical evidence has something to do with the spirit, will, pride, identity, and civility of people and destroying such material may lead to forgetting, broken spirits, and docility.”14 The preservation of Rajah Humabon will surely raise the morale and pride not only of our people, but most importantly, our naval personnel. This will send a strong message to them that their hard work and sacrifices are worthy of preservation and celebration.

By preserving Rajah Humabon, we are safeguarding important historical realities of the Philippine Navy, and the personal memory of our sailors who sailed with her.15 Rajah Humabon as a museum ship will also be the tangible evidence of the historical and enduring naval alliances of the Philippines, United States and Japan. Its preservation will also immortalize the history of USS Atherton as it served the US Navy, and JMSDF Hatsuhi as it served the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force. It will be a testament to the shared naval heritage of the three countries as well their joint effort to preserve peace and cooperation in the Western Pacific.

If ever converting the BRP Rajah Humabon into a museum ship will push through, different government

territorial sovereignty, let the motto of grand old Rajah Humabon continue to remind and guide us: be “Valiant and Vigilant”.

END NOTES:

1 Decommissioning of Vessel. Headquarters Philippine Navy, 2018.

2 Ibid.3 Office of the Chief of Naval Operation. Dic-

tionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol 1. (Washington DC: United States Gov-ernment Printing Office) 70.

4 Ibid.5 Ibid.6 Ibid.7 Ibid.8 Ship’s History from the record aboard BRP

Rajah Humabon9 Ibid10 Gurian, Elaine Heumann. “What is the

Object of this Exercise: A Meandering Ex-ploration of the Many Meanings of Objects in Museums.” Daedelus, ‘America Museum’ issue Vol 128, No. 3 Summer 1999, pp 26 and Crane, Susan. “Memory, Distortion, and History in the Museum”. Museum Studies: An Anthropology of Contexts, 2nd ed, Messias, Bettina (ed) (West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2012) , pp 304.

11 Gurian, “What is the Object of this Ex-ercise” 26, Dillenburg, Eugene, “What if Anything, Is a Museum?”. Exhibition. (Spring, 2011) pp 9.

12 Dillenburg, “What if Anything, Is a Mu-seum?, 9

13 Crane. Memory, Distortion, and History in the Museum, 306.

14 Gurian, What is the Object of this Exer-cise?, 25.

15 Hogan, Michael J. “The Enola Gay Con-troversy: History, Memory and the Politics of Presentation”. Hiroshima in History and Memory, Hogan Michael (ed). (Unit-ed Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 21

16 The National Commission for Culture and the Arts. Republic Act No. 10066. https://ncca.gov.ph/republic-act-no-10066/. Ac-cessed 26 March, 2019.

17 David Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

NAVAL DIPLOMACY


Is a Phi l ippine Navy Hospital Ship Feasible?By: Mariano M. Aguilar Jr.

• Hospital ships help improve the navies’ afloat HADR capabilities.

• This vessel may also prove to be a valuable tool for promoting goodwill and naval diplomacy.

“Indonesia designates sixth LPD as hospital ship

The Indonesian Navy’s (Tentara Nasional Indonesia – Angkatan Laut: TNI-AL’s) sixth landing platform dock (LPD) vessel has been configured as a hospital ship, and will undertake mainly humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) missions.The vessel, which will be in service as KRI Semarang (594) once commissioned, has

received Red Cross liveries on the lateral surfaces of its hull that are consistent with the Geneva Conventions of 1949.”1

Although the Indonesian Navy classifies its hospital ship as Semarang Class, it is based on the Makassar Class. The Philippine Navy acquired 2 brand-new Makassar ships, classified locally as the Tarlac Class, namely the BRP LD-601 Tarlac (commissioned in 2016) and the BRP LD-602 Davao del Sur (commissioned in 2017).2

Thus, one is tempted to ask: can the Philippine Navy also have its own hospital ship?

Logic demands us to do so, at least on the following premises:

− The Philippines has more than 7,000 islands;

− More tropical cyclones (TCs) are entering the Philippine Area of Responsibility (PAR) than anywhere else in the world. With the average of 20 TCs in this region per year, with about 8 or 9 of them crossing the Philippines;3

− Major military

This column covers developments in naval strategies, trends, and

revolutions in naval military technology affecting the Navy’s role

in the security realm.


Indonesian Navy Hospital Ship | PHOTO: Liputan6.com


(DBM) announced on 24 October. Further, the DBM said that the Philippine Army will receive PHP89 billion (or 48.5%) of the proposed 2019 defense budget, while the Philippine Air Force and the Philippine Navy will be allocated PHP24.6 billion (13.4%) and PHP27.8 billion (15.2%) respectively.6

The budget will go to their programs on defense operations to attain the desired level of mission capability of their respective unit—all in an effort to reinforce the country’s border security and patrol measures to protect the Philippines’ borders from illegal incursions, resource exploitation, maritime disputes, smuggling of firearms and contrabands, human trafficking, and other transnational crimes.7 Thus, the Navy does not seem to have a budget to refurbish a current ship to a hospital configuration, much less acquiring even a second hand one. At best, the 2019 budget states that “SPECIAL PROVISIONS 1. Hospital Income. In addition to the amounts appropriated herein, all income generated from the operations of the Philippine Navy General Hospital shall be deposited in an authorized government depository bank and used to augment the infirmary’s MODE and Capital Outlay requirements, subject to the following conditions : (1) at least twenty five percent (25%) of said income shall

e n g a g e m e n t s , for example, the Zamboanga and Marawi incidents, require hospital services;

− Possible conflict in the West Philippine Sea, Benham Rise and other maritime areas will require timely support of hospital facilities in the vicinity.

In addition, hospital ships are valuable means of promoting goodwill among nations. For example, China is an increasingly important diplomatic partner for Timor-Leste, with many in Dili positively dispositioned toward Beijing given its financial support for Timor-Leste’s independence in the early 2000s. Thus, on December 15, 2017, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army-Navy’s (PLAN) hospital ship, the Peace Ark, visited Dili, the capital of Timor-Leste.4 The same Chinese vessel was deployed to the Philippines in November 2013 because of the devastation wrought by Typhoon Yolanda (International Codename Haiyan), this despite the “Philippine lawsuit (served in January 2013 which) says China has no ‘historical rights’ to a section of South China Sea”5.

Do we have the budget? The 2019 budget for the Philippines’ Department of National Defense (DND) will increase to PHP183.4 billion (USD3.4 billion), Department of Budget and Management

be utilized to purchase and upgrade hospital equipment used directly in the delivery of health services.8

If there are no plans, one option is the ship may be owned and operated by the Navy, but the medical aspect may be financed and managed by, say, the Department of Health or the Philippine General Hospital.

However, assuming some financing may be available, we need to consider whether it will have RORO (roll on/roll off) capabilities or will be littoral or ships “designed for operation in near-shore environments yet capable of open-ocean operation”9. However, a littoral ship will limit the size of the hospital ship.

The littoral ships of the US Navy, the Freedom Class, have a displacement of only 3,450 tons10 while the Independence Class is 3,200 tons11. Displacement wise, the Philippine Navy ship that has comparable tonnage at 3,250 tons12 is the Del-Pilar Class which is a former Hamilton Class US Coast Guard, but it is not a littoral. The nearest Philippine ship which can qualify may be the Bacolod Class, a logistics support vessel and main amphibious operation platform. It has a displacement of 4,265 tons13 and has bow and stern ramps and the ability to beach



NAVAL DEFENSE AND MILITARY TRENDSthemselves, giving them the ability to discharge 900 short tons of vehicles and cargo over the shore in as little as four feet of water, or 2,000 short tons as an intra-theater line haul roll-on/roll-off cargo ship.14

Worth considering is an LST (Landing Ship Tank) which “are the largest of amphibious vessels designed to run onto a beach and discharge armored vehicles directly ashore by the way of extending ramp generally projected through a clam-shell or visor-type door”.15 The US Navy decommissioned the Newport Class of LST which “can deliberately beach itself, whereupon they would lower a ramp and unload cargo directly on to dry land (or at least in shallow water). However, this ship-type is more likely to unload cargo onto specially built pontoon causeways that are carried on the side of the hull”.16 Maybe available is Newport Class, the USS Boulder, LST 1190, which is awaiting disposal. In other navies, the Newport Class available nearest to the Philippines are in Taiwan (Chong ho, LST 23217and ChongPing, LST 23318).

Any hospital ship also needs to have a landing platform for helicopters. Ideally it should have hangar and/or maintenance facilities. How many ships do we need? Perhaps at least 2 in case the Visayas and Mindanao need to be served simultaneously.

Having air-cushion vehicles or hovercrafts in the hospital ship is a plus. It is an amphibian vehicle capable of moving over both land and water and that mixture of the two we call swamps, marshes of coastal areas, the mud banks of tidal streams and canals and flooded rice paddies.19 Remember, in a natural disaster or even in a military conflict, the roads may not be passable.

The bottom-line is: it is knowledge that will enable to do the most good for the largest number of people, with limited time and equipment, in a mass casualty situation.20

About the Contributor

Mariano M. Aguilar Jr. is a civilian interested in military affairs due to the influence of his father and namesake, the late Col. Mariano V. Aguilar (PA) who was a USAFFE and PEFTOK veteran and retired as Quarter Master General of the AFP assigned in Camp Aguinaldo. A graduate of UST, Mariano Jr.’s passion in writing is evident in many articles written for professional organizations to newsletters of employers. He has a collection of military-related reading materials such as History of World War II (by Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart), Jane’s Recognition Guide, magazine journals to name a few. He is also a licensed Security Officer by the PNP SOSIA.

END NOTES:

1 Ridzwan Rahmat, Singapore.“Indonesia designates sixth LPD as hospital ship”. - Singapore Jane’s Navy International. Janu-ary 17, 2019

2 Montero, Max (30 May 2016). “Discussing the Philippine Navy’s First SSV, the Tar-lac-class Landing Platform Dock”.Max-Defense Philippines. Retrieved 21 October 2018.

3 http://bagong.pagasa.dost.gov.ph/climate/tropical-cyclone-information

4 Ankit Panda. “Chinese Navy Hospital Ship Visits Timor-Leste, Highlighting Growing Tie”. The Diplomat. December 18, 2017

5 Ted Regencia. “Philippines sues China over sea claims”. Al Jazeera. March 2014

6 Jon Grevatt, Bangkok and Craig Caffrey, London. “Philippines out-lines 34% defence budget increase”. Jane’s Defence Weekly. 24 October 2018

7 https://www.dbm.gov.ph/index.php/secre-tary-s-corner/press-releases/list-of-press-releases/1250-dnd-to-receive-34-percent-increased-budget-for-2019

8 https://www.dbm.gov.ph/wp-content/up-loads/NEP%202019/DND/DND.pdf, p. 549

9 https://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_dis-play.asp?cid=4200&tid=1650&ct=4



12 wikipedia13 wikipedia14 https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/

systems/ship/lsv-a.htm15 Geoffrey Wood. “Amphibious Assault Ves-

sels”. Asian Defence Journal. February 1997, p. 38.

16 Weber, Louie. The Complete Book of US Naval Power. Publications International, Ltd. 1991. P. 173

17 Naval Vessel Register - MANITOWOC (LST 1180)”. www.nvr.navy.mil. Retrieved 2018-01-27

18 “Naval Vessel Register - SUMTER (LST 1181)”. www.nvr.navy.mil. Retrieved 2018-01-27.

19 “Monsters That Float On The Air”. Army. June 1968. P. 80

20 Maj. Thomas L. Sack, USAF. “Improved Combat Casualty Medicine”. Air Force Magazine. August 1981. P. 50


President Duterte and Secretary Pompeo | PHOTO: PCOO

The debate on whether or not the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) merits a review between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States calls for neither its abrogation nor renegotiation. The MDT is considered a landmark defense treaty between the former colonizer and its former Asian colony – the Philippines is the US’ oldest ally in Asia. The nearly seven-decade old accord was signed in Washington on 30 August 1951 and ratified on 27 August 1952. It has recently invited criticisms as to its relevance to the Philippines’ contemporary security requirements. Particular

attention has been given to the old military pact’s wording, if indeed the US would still respond to the Philippines’ defense in the case of the South China Sea dispute in the event of an attack.

While Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. deems that “in vagueness [of the MDT] lies the best deterrence,” Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana counters this by remarking that “too much vagueness lends itself to doubt the firmness of the commitment,” [of the United States]. SND originally opened the Pandora’s

box for the review of the defense treaty since December last year. His arguments mostly stem from the premise that the glaring ambiguity of the treaty only leads to greater confusion on the part of the Philippines given that it is at the receiving end of this arrangement.

Might these criticisms from two bigwigs of the Philippines’ defense sector indicate an anticipated new direction in the country’s foreign and defense policies? These rousing developments all take place as we are still processing the extent of the country’s ‘independent foreign policy’ under Southeast Asia’s strongman President Rodrigo Duterte. The firebrand leader is bent on diversifying

Call to Review the Mutual Defense TreatyBy: Dr. Chester B. Cabalza

This column covers political, economic, social, environmental, and leadership developments in the Indo-

Pacific region.

INDO-PACIFICSTRATEGIC DYNAMICS

• The changing demands of the current strategic environment put into question the relevance of the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) between the Philippines and United States

• Any irreversible escalation in the South China Sea dispute would be the ultimate litmus test for the US’ treaty obligations to the Philippines as its defense ally


the Philippines’ bilateral relationships from Beijing to Moscow, Washington’s apparent rivals for regional and global influence.

The opposing remarks came after US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that, “we have your back” to the Filipino people, the strongest reassurance yet the Philippines recently received from its western Big Brother. It is said that this promise guarantees helping hand in the event that the Philippines’ territorial integrity and national sovereignty are compromised by China’s aggressive actions and military adventurism. Hence, there still appear continuities in the foreign policy of past US administrations and President Donald Trump as he attempts to cement the US’ presence in the region despite growing ambiguities surrounding the much vaunted ‘Indo-Pacific’ security concept.

Pompeo’s promise came during his overnight visit to Manila last 1 March 2019 which echoes the mutual defense obligations under Article 4 of the treaty: “each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.” Arguably, its archaic provisions were constructed amidst the prevailing political climate of Cold War era where Filipino soldiers were involved in the United States’ war effort in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, respectively.

The MDT was also instrumental for the Philippines’ participation in the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) under the presidency of George W. Bush. This military campaign aimed

at eliminating international terrorism as sparked by the 9/11 attacks on the US mainland – an event which forever changed the contours of international security. Southeast Asian nations struggled with their own terrorism and violent extremism problems prior 9/11. Nevertheless, the MDT aided the Philippines, through indirect support from American counterintelligence and counterterrorism operations, in halting the five-month old Marawi siege in 2017 between the Philippine government security forces and Islamic State (IS)-inspired Maute and Abu Sayyaf Salafi jihadist groups.

However, the United States’ ‘Pivot to Asia’ foreign policy still fell short on certain fronts as it failed to demonstrate expected interventions from its side at the height of China’s continued militarization and island-building in the contested South China Sea. The US under Trump, despite all its foreign policy overtures in the region, is seen as a major power in the region struggling to maintain rebalancing act, one that should have been an Asia-centered security strategy to contain China. Nonetheless, it still continues to assert its presence by championing freedom of navigation and overflight in the world’s biggest defense flashpoint and economic bottleneck. The US’ indecisiveness, arguably, became one of the conceivable reasons why the Philippines toned down its expectations of US commitment, and resorted to pragmatism by hedging against perceived threats. Its diversification of defense and security relations with other major powers such as China also led it to set aside its legal triumph in the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016 which invalidates China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea.

In turn, Beijing responded with economic guarantees by attracting the Philippines to join the Belt and Road Initiative.

The current strategic environment certainly varies from the imperatives of the Cold War era. It has evolved tremendously so much so that the Philippines has to proactively respond to changing times and new systems of structure. Nevertheless, a review of the MDT in light of these changes does not necessarily mean its total revocation or renegotiation, but to revisit what has been done before to address new threats that challenge the Philippines’ national security. As the Philippines has to beef up its own arsenal to navigate the uncertain security environment of the region, this has to be coupled with clear commitments from external partners to avoid casting doubt if longstanding alliances do really have to be put on the negotiating table all over again, or worse, ultimately dropped in search of better options.

About the Contributor

Dr. Chester B. Cabalza is a security analyst. He is the Executive Fellow of the Council of Fellows and Vice President of the Center for Research and Strategic Studies at the Development Academy of the Philippines. He teaches as Senior Lecturer in the graduate program at the University of the Philippines Diliman. He is also formerly Associate Professor and Module Director at the National Defense College of the Philippines, Fellow at the US Department of State’s Study on US Institutes under the University of Delaware, and Fellow of the National Defense University in Beijing, China.

INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGIC DYNAMICS

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