strategy for defeat the luftwaffe 1933-1945

8/7/2019 Strategy for Defeat the Luftwaffe 1933-1945

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Strategy f o r Def eatThe Luf t waf f e1933- 1945By

WLLIAMSONMURRAY

AI RUNVERSI TYAIRUNVERSI TYPRESSMAXWELLAIRFORCEBASE, ALABAMA

J anuary 1983


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DSCLAI MER ABSTAI NERThe vi ews expr essed do not necessar i l y r e f l e c t any f or mal posi t i on by t heAi r power Research n s t i t u t e t he Ai r Uni ver si t y t he Ai r Tr ai ni ng Command or t he

Uni t ed S t a t e s Ai r Force Cl ear ance f o r publ i c rel ease of t h i s work under t he pr ovi si ons of AFR190 1 hasbeen acc ompl i shed

Pur sal e by the Superi ntement of Doeuments US overnment Pri nti ng OficeWshington 20402


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Library of Congress Catal ogi ng i n Publ i cati onDataMurray, Wl l i amson

Str ategy f or Defeat The Lut f waf f e 1933-1945At headof t i t l A rpower Research I nst i tute J anuary 1983

Bi bl i ogr aphy pI ncl udes i ndex Worl dWar, 1939-1945-Aeri al operati ons German

2 Germany Luftwaffe-H story-Worl dWar, 1939-19453 Germany Luftwaffe-Hstory I A r Uni vers i ty US) A rpower Research I ns t i tute T i t l e D787.M841982 940. 54 4943 82-73232

ISBN1 58566 1 8

Fi rst Pri nti ngJanuary1993Second Pri nti ng J ul y 1999Thi rd Pri nti ngDecember 2


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WLLIAMSONURR Yr Wl l i amson Murray earned BA MA and PhDdegrees i n hi story f r omYal e

Uni versi t y f ormer Ai r Force mai nt enance o f f i c e r D Murray pr esent l y t eaches t Ohi o t a t e Uni ver si t y wher e he s rapi dl y acqui r i ng a reput at i on as one of t hef or emost US aut hori t i es on t he German Luf t waf f e An avi d schol ar on ml i t a r ya f f a i r s r Murrayhas wri t t en numer ous a r t i c l e s i n pr of essi onal j our nal s on var i ousf a c e t s of m l i t ar y h i s t o r y Anot her maj or research e f f o r t The Pat h t o Rui n Thehange i n Eur opean Bal ance of Power 1938- 1939 has j u s t been accept ed f o rpubl i cat i on by t he Pr i ncet on Uni ver si t y Pr ess D Mur r ay s t r e t a i n s hi scomm ssi on i n t he USAF Ready Reser ve ser vi ng as a maj or i n t he Ai r ForceI nt el l i gence Ser vi ce


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CHAPTER

CONTENTSPage

DSCLAMER-ABSTANER BIOGRAPHCALSKET H . vLI STOFI LLUSTRATIONS xLI STOFM PS x vKNOWEDGEMENTS x x

FOREWORD xxiI NTRODUCTION x x

I THELUFTWAFFE ORGNSNDPREPARATION TheEconomc Pr obl em TheDevel opment of t he Luf twaf f e 1933- 39 3TheLuft waf f e s I mpact 1933- 39 . 14Concl usi on 19Notes Chapt er I

I I THEE SYW RGERM NYTRUMPHANT SEPTEMBER1939-SEPTEMBER1940 . 27Bac kgr ound t o Pol and 27The Pol i sh Campai gn and t he Phony Wr . 30Scandi navi a andFrance 35The Battl e of Bri tai n 39Concl usi on 55Notes Chapt er I I 7

I I I THETURNTORUSSIA 69The Str ategi c Pr obl em . 69D str acti ons 72Barbarossa Bac kgr ound 77Barbarossa The I nvasi on 81Pr oduct i on and Strategy 1940- 41 . 88Concl usi on . 103Notes Chapt er I I I . 108


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V

PageV ONTHEBRINK J NU RY OCTOBER1942 . 113

The East . 113TheMedi t er r anean 126TheWest r i t i s h Ef f o r t s 127TheGermanResponse Ai r War i n t heWest . 132GermanProduct i on 1942 Per f ormance and

I mpl i cat i ons 136Concl usi on . 139Not es Chapt er V 141

ATTR TIONONTHEPERPHERY NOVEMBER1942-UGUST1943 . 147TheWar i n t he East November 1942-August 1943 . 147TheMedi t er r anean 159The Ai r War i n t he West TheCombi ned

Bomber Of f ensi ve 166The Def ense of t heRei ch 174Losses Product i on and St rat egy . 182Concl usi on . 191Not es Chapt er V 193

V ATTR TIONOVERTHEREICHSEPTEMBER1943-M RCH1944 . 209Ni ght Defense of theRei ch 210The ay Batt l e Vi ct ory Sept ember - Oct ober1943 . 222The Day Batt l e The Pause November

December 1943 . 226Def eat J anuar y- Mar ch 1944 . 234War i n t he E a s t t he Medi t er r anean andOver r i t a i n 245Pr oduct i on and Tr ai ni ng 251Concl usi on . 255Not es Chapt er VI 256

VI I DEFEAT APRIL SEPTEMBER1944 . 263Over l or d andSt r at egi c Bombi ng 264Def ense of t he Front i er s TheLUFTWAFFEApr i l - Sept ember 1944 . 277


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PageConcl usi on . 291Notes Chapt er VI I 293VI I I CONCLUSION . 299The Resul t s . 299The Ot her Si de of t h i l l . 302Not es Chapt er VI I I 320

BIBLIOGRAPHY 7INDEX . 357

APPENDX THEPREW RDEVELOPMENTOFBRITISHND

MERC NDOCTRINEND RPOWER 321The Royal Ai r Force 321TheDevel opment of Ai r power i n t he Uni t ed

States . 331Not es Appendi x . 3372 EFFECTON 10,000-AIRCRAFTFORCESTRUCTUREOF

3 . 6-PERCENTLOSSR TE . 3413 AIRCRAFTWRITTENOFF, BOMBERCOMM ND1941 1944 . 3434 EIGHTHAIRFORCE, PERCENT GESORTIELOSSRATEHEAVYBOMBERS . 345


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LI STOF I LLUSTRATI ONSTabl e PageI Pl anned and Act ual Ai rcraf t Output 1938 and 1939 . 12 Ai r c rewReadi ness- August 1938 . 17 German A i r c r a f t Losses Damaged and Dest royed -

May J une1940 . 40I V German Ai rcraf t Losses 1940 Al l Types . 41V German Fi ght er Losses 1940 . 42VI GermanBomber Losses 1940 . 43VI I Ai rcraf t andCrewLosses August 1940 50VI I I Per cent age of Fu l l y Operat i onal ReadyCr ews,J ul y- Sept ember 1940 . 51I X A i r c r a f t Losses- J ul y- Sept ember 1940 . 53X A i r c r a f t Losses May September 1940 . 54XI Luf t waf f eBomber Losses- - Oct ober - December 1940 55XI I German A i r c r a f t Strength . 80X I I I Crewand Ai r craft Losses ont he East er n FrontJ une22 November 1 1941 89X V GermanAi rcraf t Losses 1941 Al l Types . 90XV GermanBomber Losses 1941 91XV German Fi ght er Losses 1941 92XVI I German Losses, Al l Causes 1941 Not I ncl udi ng

November . 93XVI I I Luf t waf f e I n-Commssi on Rates 1941 . 95XX f Fu l l y Operat i onal Cr ews, J u l y 1941- J anuar y

1942 . 97XX Pr oduct i on of German Ai r cr af t - 1939- 1941 100XX Aut hor i zed and Act ual St r ength, Combat Ai r c r af t -Sept ember 1939- Mar ch 1942 . 101


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PageXXI I AverageMonthl yProduct i on byHal f Years

Fi ghters . 104XXI I l Average Mont hl y Product i onby Hal f Years Tw n- Engi ne Ai rcraf t 105XXIV Average Mont hl y Product i onby Hal f Years Four - Engi ne A i r c r a f t 106XX GermanLosses, J un Dec 1942, byTheater 114XXVI GermanAi rcraf t Losses 1942 Al l Types 115XXVI I GermanBomber Losses 1942 . 116XXV II GermanFi ghter Losses 1942 . 117XXIX GermanLosses, Al l Causes- J anuar y-Oct ober 1942 . 140XXX GermanLosses byTheat er, J an Nov 1943 . 148XXXI GermanFi ght er Losses, 1943 Number of A i r c r a f t . 149XXXI I German A i r c r a f t Losses, Medi t err anean Theater

November 1942 May 1943 . 163XXX II A i r c r a f t Wri t t en Of f Ei ght h Ai r Force, 1943

Heavy Bomber s . 175XXXI V CrewLosses Ei ghth Ai r Force, 1943 Heavy Bombers 176XXX GermanAi rcraf t Losses 1943 Al l Types 184XXXVI GermanBomber Losses 1943 . 185XXXVI I German Fi ghter Losses 1943 186XXXV I I Fi ghter P i l o t Loss, J an Aug 1943 . 187XXXI X Fi ghter andBomber St rengt h i n Frontl i ne Uni t s 188XL Bomber CommandSt rengt h andAi rcraf t Losses 1943 . 212XLI Bomber CommandLosses, J anuary 943 March1944 . 220XLI I B r i t i s h Bomber Losses 1944 220XLI I I A i r c r a f t Losses, Schwei nf urt - Oct ober 1943 . 226XLIV Fi ghter P i l o t Losses Sept - Dec 1943 227X Product i on of Newand Recondi t i oned Fi ghterAi r cr af t - J une- December 1943 . 229


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PageXLVI Product i onof NewFi ght ers . 230XLVI I Frontl i ne Str engt h and Operati onal Ready Rate,

Fi ght er Force August December 1943 233XLVI I I Losses i n J agdgeschwader 26 234XLIX Bomber and Fi ght er Strength, Ei ght h Ai r For ce 234L i r c r af t W i t t e n Of f Ei ght h Ai r Force, 1944 Heavy Bomber s . 235LI German i r c r af t Losses, J an- J un 1944 l l Types . 238LI I German Fi ght er Losses, J an- J un 1944 . 239L I I I Fi ght er P i l o t Losses J an May 1944 240LI V GermanBomber Losses, J an- J un 1944 . 241LV Number of LoadedWagons Excl udi ng a Rel at i vel ySmal l Number OwnedPr i vat el y Or i gi nat i ng i nRegi on Nort h Weekl y Tot al s . 268LVI Number of LoadedWagons Excl udi ng a Rel at i vel ySmal l Number OwnedPr i vat el y Or i gi nat i ng i n

Regi on West Weekl y Tot al s . 269LVI I Number of Tr ai ns Passi ng Al ongt he Rout e Val ent on- J uvi syi n Rel at i on t o t he Tonnages of Bombs Di rectedAgai nst Rai l way Centres Al ongt he Rout e 270

LVI I I German Fuel Product i on 275LI X Fi ght er Forces Avai l abl e, L u f t f l o t t e Rei ch . 275X Di str i buti on of German Fi ght ers, End of J une 1944 . 284LXI Ai rcr ewSur vi val Rate, Bomber Command 939 945 . 303LXI I GermanAi rcraf t Losses, 6- Mont h Peri ods . 304LXI I I Bomber Losses, 6 MonthPeri ods 305LXI V Fi ghter Losses, 6- Mont h Per i ods . 306LXV No t i t l . 307LXVI No t i t l e . 308LXVI I f Ai rcraf t Aut hor i zed Strength 309


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PageLXVI I I oss Fi ght er P i l o t Strength J an 1942- J un1943 Part 310

Part . 311

LXX Fl yi ng Hour s i n B r i t i s h , Amer i can and GermanTr ai ni ng Pr ogr ams . 314LXXI Number of Vi ct or i es Achi evedEach5 M ssi ons

Fl own 4German Aces . 315

Phot ogr aphsFol l ow ng Page 61

Gener al Wal t her Wever f i r s t Chi ef of StaffRei chsmarschal l HermannGbr i ng and General oberst Hans J eschonnekErnst Udet and W l l i Messer schmt tMai nst ay of t he f i g h t e r force t he Bf 9GThe f l awed f i g h t e r t he Bf 110The f as t bomber t he J u 8 8The i n t e r imbomber t he He 111The cancel l ed str at egi c bomber t heo 19The f l awed s t r at egi c bomber t he He 177Russi an Ai r Force Base a t Kovno a f t e r German a t t a c k , 22 J une 1941F i e l d Mar shal Al ber t Kessel r i ng

Fol l ow ng Page 199F i e l d Mar shal ErhardM l c h v i s i t i n g t he 55th BombWng

xv

LXIX f Crews Oper at i onal Ready F ul l y . 313


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B- 17 f ormati on at t acki ng Br unsw ckB- 17 s under a t t a c k by 190 29 Nov 1943 t a r g e t BremenThecost B- 17 s t r a ggl e r under t he guns of an 190ThecostThe c o s t B- 17 f a l l i n g out of f ormati onThe c o s t B- 17 muni t i on handl i ng acci dentThe def ender s Gal l and and Hermann at war game w t h s t Fi ght er Wng Nov Dec1943The def ender s t he 190The def ender s mai nst ay of the ni ght f i g h t e r f o r c e - t h e Bf 11 GAi r s uper i o r i t y meri can f i g h t e r s over B- 17 f ormati onA t t r i t i o n destr uct i on of a Bf 109A t t r i t i o n Bf 109 p i l o t bal es outAi r s uper i o r i t y He 177 under s t r a f i n g a t t a c kDef eat occupi edGermana i r f i e l d 1945Gori ng i n def eat t he Rei chsmar schal l r emoves h i s medal s f or hi s Amer i can captors


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LI STOFM PSPage

The I nvasi on of France 1940 ThePl ans 34B a t t l e of B r i t a i n 49The I nvasi on of Russi a 85TheGermanSummer Of f ensi ve 1942 123The Sovi et Count er Attack St al i ngrad 153The Medi t err anean 161Maj or Targets The St r a t e gi c ombi ngOf f ensi ve 168Escort Fi ght er Range 172GermanAi r Defense Oct 1943 178Kassel 22/ 23r d Oct ober 1943 Out war d Rout e 211P l o t s on ombersPassed OverRTWt o

Ni ght f i ght ers Rai d onNur ember g30/ 31 44 219

The Sovi et Advance Nov 942 Dec1944 287


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KNOWEDGEMENTSI n a work of t h i s nature, i t i s not surpr i s i ng t h a t many peopl e pl ayed a

consi derabl e r o l e i n advi s i ng me as began and conduc ted my research Thes t r e n g t h s of t h i s book r e f l e c t t h e i r hel p ; i t s weakness es , my f a i l i n g s I n par t i c ul arwoul d l i k e t o t hank Professor P h i l i p Fl ammer of Br i ghamYoung Uni ver s i t y whoi ntr oduced me t o t he Ai r Wr Col l ege and pl ayed a maj or r o l e i n devel opi ng myi n t e r e s t i n doi ng a study of t he Luf t waff e t t he Ai r Uni vers i t y, Col onel Thomas Fabyani c, f ounder of t he Ai r powerResear ch I n s t i t u t e ARI ) , deser ves s p ec i a l ment i on f or h i s gener ous suppor t of t h i sp r o j e ct as does t he cur r ent Di r ect or of t he I n s t i t u t e Col onel Kennet h Al nw ck Wthout t he whol ehear t ed suppor t of Maj or Gener al Davi d Gr ay, f or merCommandant of t he Ai r Wr Col l ege, t h i s st udy coul d not have been conduct ed woul d a l so l i ke t o t hank t he f ol l ow ng i ndi vi dual s at t he Ai r Wr Col l ege f or t h e i rhel p and gui dance Col onel Donal d F r i z z e l l Li eut enant Col onel s Donal d BaucomDavi d Macl ss ac, Davi dLupt on, and J ames True ; and my col l eagues i n t heRI Dr Davi d Met s and Dr Kennet h Wer r el l My s p ec i a l t hanks t o J ohn Schenk andDor ot hy McCl uski e of t he ARI f or t h e i r t hor ough and de t a i l ed edi t o r i a l assi st ance woul d a l so be remss i wer e not t o expressmyt hanks t o those who hel ped w t h t het ypi ng of t h i s manuscr i pt and w t h ar r angement s f or my t r a v e l s espec i al l y EdnaDavi s, J o AnnPer due, Mary Schenk, Betty Br own, and NormaTodd mus t t hankRose McCal l f or t h e excel l ent gr aphi cs and St eve Gar st , Ai r Uni ver s i t y Revi ew, f o rdesi gni ng t he cover I n t he academc worl d, mycol l eagues Professors B Hol l eyand Hans Gat zke deser ve t hanks f or t h e i r hel p and advi ce t t he Ohi o StateUni versi t y, Kennet h Wtman and Br uce Nardul l i wer e espec i al l y hel pf ul i nr evi ew ng t he cont ent of t he f i n a l manuscr i pt shoul d al so l i k e t o t hank Har r yFl et cher for h i s cons i der abl e hel p i n gui di ng me t hrough t he archi ves at t he Al ber tF Si mps on H stor i cal Research Cent er I n a ddi t i o n r ecei ved s u bs t an t i a lassi st ance whi l e wor ki ng abr oad i n Eur opean archi ves I n Gr eat r i t a i n GroupCapt ai n Tony Mason afforded me access t o c r i t i c a l mte r i a l s i n t heR FStaffCol l ege archi ves ; J P. McDonal d gui ded me through t he mter i al s avai l abl e i nt he Publ i c Recor d Of f i ce PRO) f r om h i s post i n t he Ai r Hi s t o r i c al Br anch ; and Fr eddi e Lamber t and Suzanne Marshpr ovi ded i nval uabl e research assi st ance mus t al so t hank Professors Paul Kennedy, J ohn Gooch Br i an Bond, and Ri char dOver y f or t h e i r hel p as wel l as f r i endshi p t h a t they ext ended t o me whi l e was i nGr eat r i t a i n Dr Nobl e Fr ankl and provi ded hi s t i me and h i s vast knowl edge at t heI mper i al Wr Museum a l so mus t t hank t he s t a f f s at t he PRO t he I mper i al WrMuseum and t he RAF S t a f f Col l ege I n Germany t he s t af f s at t he ml i t ar y archi ves i n Fr e i bur g and t heM l i t drgeschi cht l i ches Forschungsam pl ayed an i nval uabl e r o l e i n fur t her i ng mywor k I n p a r t i c u l a r must t hank Dr Manf r ed Messer schmdt , Dr Ju rgen Forster,Dr Hor s t Boog, and espec i al l y Dr Wl hel mDei st and Obers t l eut nant Kl aus Mai e rf or t h e i r hel p and f r i endshi p Maj or Gener al HansAsmus pr ovi ded enor mous


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p at i e nc e w sdom as wel l as gr eat court esy and hospi t al i t y dur i ng my s t a y i nermny shoul d al so l i k e t o t hank Ober st erner Gei ssi nger f o r hi s consi derabl ehel p i n pr oof r eadi ng t he ermn as wel l as t he Engl i sh i n t he vari ous d r a f t s of t h i swor k I n t he ml i t ar y archi ves i n Fr ei bur g Fr au El eonor e Mi i l l er w s most he l pf u lal ways f r i e n d l y and i nvari abl y pl easant

i n a l l y must t hank myw f e Mar j or i e andmy chi l dr en l exandr a and Spencerf o r t h e i r suppor t and l ove i n al l t he separ ati ons t h a t t h i s pr oj ect ent ai l ed


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M l i t a r y h i s t o r y i s a wndowt hr ough whi ch wemay st udy t he l essons of pastcombat These l essons become c l e ar onl y a f t e r t hought f ul examnat i on of event sand f a c t o r s t h a t i nf l uenced t hem Or gani zat i ons t h a t have not been w l l i ng t oexamne t he p a s t especi al l y t h e i r own have usual l y pai d a pr i ce f or t h a t over si ght Westand t oday on t he f ar s i d e of a gul f of t i me whi ch separat es us f r om t he

exper i ences of t he Second Worl dWar Near l y f o r t y years ago, t he A l l i e d Ai r For cesf ought an extens i ve, cos t l y b a t t l e f or ai r super i or i t y over t he Eur opean conti nent The ai r war over Eur ope represented a gr eat st r uggl e bet ween f u l l y mobi l i zedi n d u s t r i a l power s Thi s c o n f l i c t had t he s c al e c har a c t e r i s t i c s and bal ance ofs t r e n g t h bet ween both s i d es whi ch we mght wel l exper i ence i n a f u t u r e c o n f l i c t Though over t i me we wer e abl e t o br i ng our mass i ve pr oduct i ve s u p e r i o r i t y t o beari n t hi s war , nevert hel ess was a st r uggl e whi ch chal l enged our stayi ng power andstamna The l engt h and a t t r i t i o n of t h a t c o n f l i c t suggest t h a t shoul d we ever f aceanot her war on a si ml ar s c al e t h e cl ash of powermay nei t her be s h o r t nor qui ckl ydeci si ve Wmay agai n have t o f ace a b a t t l e f i e l d envi r onment and s et of chal l engeswhi ch ar e whol l y d i f f e r e n t f r omwhat wehave f aced i n r ecent c o n f l i c t s nl y a f ew of our seni or o f f i c e r s can c a l l d i r e c t l y upon t he exper i ence of Worl dWar t o gui de t hem i n l eadi ng t he Ai r For ce Our combat exper i ence base i sl i m t e d mai nl y t o t he event s of Kor ea and Vi e t nam Shoul d wehave t o f i g h t a l arges c al e war agai n, onl y h i s t o r y can pr ovi de t he necessary i n s i g h t s f h i s t o r y has hadone d i r e c t l es son f or the st udent of war , i s t h a t nati ons and t h e i r armed f or ces wi l lnot be f u l l y pr epar ed f or t he war t h a t comes f t h i s i s s o we mus t acqui r e by anext ensi ve st udy of past c o n f l i c t s a f l e x i b i l i t y ofmnd and i n t e l l ec t ual r i go r t hat wi l lpermt us to deal w t h t he unexpect ed and adapt t o changi ng condi t i ons as t hey a r enot as we f or ecast themt o be Hi st or y c l e a r l y poi nt s out t h a t t hose who i gnor e t hepast are doomed t o r epeat ol d mstakes Thi s book i s a compr ehensi ve anal ysi s of an ai r f o r c e t he Luf t waf f e, i n Worl dWar t f ol l ows t he Germans from h ei r pr ewar pr epar at i ons t o t h e i r f i n a l def eat Ther e ar e many di st ur bi ng p a r a l l e l s w t h our cur r ent s i t u a t i o n ur ge every st udentof m l i t a r y sci ence t o r ead care ful l y The l essons of t he nature of warf are and t heappl i cati on o f ai r power can pr ovi de t he gui dance t o devel op our f i ght i ng f orces andempl oyment concept s t omeet t he si gni f i cant chal l enges we ar e c e r t a i n t o f ace i n t hef u t u r e

RO ERTM THSGener al , US F Reti r ed

FOREWOR


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r econnai ss ance, and a i r super i or i ty as i mmat er i al . Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , he al so ar guedt h a t ai r power el i m nated t he r equi r ement f or arm es and navi es ; consequent l y, therewas no need f or i nt er servi ce cooper at i on .The t h e o r i e s of Douhet and other ear l y ai r power advocat es, w t h t h e i r s t r e s s ont he not i on t h a t st rat egi c bombi ngwas t he excl usi ve a i r m ssi on, have exerci sed ag r e a t i nf l uence on t he deve l opment of a i r forces s i n c e t h a t t i me . Comment at or s onai r power have al l t oo of ten t i e d t he i r subj ect d i r e c t l y and excl usi vel y t o s t rategi cbombi ng, whi l e i gnor i ng other possi bl e appl i cati ons . Ai r f o r c e s , however , havehad t o perform a wi de var i et y of t asks ot her than str at egi c bombi ng The r e a lcont r i but i on of ai r power t o f i n a l vi ct ory i n t he Second Worl d War l ay i n t he veryd i v e r s i t y of i t s capabi l i t y . I r o n i c a l l y , t he conduct of a i r operat i ons i n t h a t warr esembl ed, i n mny f a c e t s , the s t ra tegy of t he pr evi ous c o n f l i c t except t h a t a t t r i t i o ncamenow n t er ms of a i r c r a f t and ai r cr ews rather than mud- st ai ned i n f a n t r y . Montha f t e r mont h, year a f t e r year, cr ews cl i mbed i n t o t he i r a i r c r a f t t o f l y over t heEur opean cont i nent . Those i n charge of t he ai r b a t t l e cam t o measur e success bydr ops i n per cent age poi nt s of bomer and f i g h t e r l o s s e s rather than i n t er ms of yardsgai ned . As one comment at or has poi nt ed out :

Despi t e t he visi ons of i t s pr otagoni st s of prewar days, t he ai r wardur i ng t h e Second Worl d War . . was a t t r i t i o n war . I t di d notsuppl ant t he operat i ons of convent i onal forces ; i t compl ement edthem Vi ct ory went t o t he ai r forces w t h t he greatest dept h, t h egreatest bal ance, t h e g r e a t e s t f l e x i b i l i t y i n empl oyment . The r e s ul twas anai r strategy compl et el y unf oreseen by ai r commanders . 6Thus, a i r war proved t o have none of t he deci si ve el ement s t h a t pr ewar t h i n k e r s andadvocat es had so conf i dent l y pr edi ct ed . Rather, ai r super i or i ty and t he u t i l i z a t i o n ofai r power t o break t he opponent proved t o be el us i ve and i n t r a c t a b l e pr obl ems .Enem ai r forces coul d and di d l i v e t o f i g h t anot her daydespi t e setbacks and def eat .Onl y t he e l imna t i on of t h e i r suppor t i ng i ndust r i es and resources , or the occupat i onof t h e i r bases by gr ound f o r c e s , guar ant eed compl et e vi ctory . The accompl i shmentof t he f or mer task pr oved ext r aor di nar i l y d i f f i c u l t , whi l e t he l a t t e r i ndi cated adegree of i nt er dependence amng a i r , gr ound, and naval forces t h a t ai r poweradvocat es had so casual l y di sm ssed before t he war . I f t he a i r c r a f t had added a newdi mensi on t o war f ar e, i t had not changed t he under l yi ng pr i nci pl es .Whi l e t he concept of s t rategi c bombi ng i nt r i gued pr ewar ai r f o r c e s , p r a c t i c a lfac to rs - the real wor l d of i n t e r s e r v i c e r e l a t i o n s h i p s , def ense p r i o r i t i e s , p o l i t i c a la t t i t u d e s , and econom c l i m ta t i ons - exerci s ed an i mpor t ant i nf l uence over t h e i rest abl i shment and devel opment . Ent i re l y d i f f e r e n t s t r a t e g i c f a c t o r s det erm nedc o n t r o l over t he const i t ut i on and s t r a t e g i e s of each d i f f e r e n t Eur opean a i r f o r c e , nott o ment i on t he ArmyAi r Cor ps i n t he Uni t ed States . To under s t and t he course ofthose devel opment s as wel l as t he doct r i ne t h a t gui ded t he eml oymnt of ai r poweri n t he Second Worl dWar , one mus t grasp not onl y those f a c t o r s i nf l uenci ng t he ai rf o r c e s t hemsel ves but al so t he l a r ge r pr obl ems of nat i onal pol i cy and s t r a t e g y t h a ti nf l uenced both p o l i t i c i a n s and t he m l i t ar y .

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The Luf t waff e, as w t h a l l m l i t a r y or gani zati ons, was a chi l d of i t s t i me . Thet h e o r i e s current t hr oughout Eur ope i n t he 1920' s and 1930' s w t h r es pect t o t hef u t u r e course of warf are i n gener al and ai r war i n par t i cul ar a l s o wer e pr esent i nGermny . Conver sel y, and not s u r p r i s i n g l y , the pecul i ar f orces t h a t had gui ded andmol ded Germn h i s t o r y exerci sed t h e i r i nf l uence on t he growt h and deve l opment oft he Luf t waff e . Li k e t h e i r counterparts i n other n at i on s , Germn ai r men bel i eved t h a tt h e i r ai r force woul d be abl e t o exer ci se an i mport ant , i f not de c i s i v e, i mpact on af u t u r e war . To them a i r c r a f t woul d be t he d e f i n i t i v e str at egi c weapon i n t hecom ng c o n f l i c t . ' Those c u r r e n t s w t h i n t he Germn m l i t a r y , t y p i f i e d by Er i chLudendorf f ' s concept i ons of t o t a l war and t he mobi l i zat i on of t he popul at i on, notonl y mde t he mass mvemnt of t he Nazi Par ty a t t r a c t i v e t o mny o f f i c e r s but a l s ol ed t o a g r e a t e r accept ance of ai r power t h e o r i e s amng t he ai r force o f f i c e r corps . 'On t he other hand, Germany' s l ocat i on and s t r at e gi c s i t ua t i on pr esent ed t he Germnm l i a r y w t h a r e a l i t y t hat t hey coul d not i gnor e ; one maj or def eat on l and m ghtwel l sea l t he f a t e of t he Rei ch before t he Luf t waff e coul d have an i mpact . Thatrepresented a s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n qui t e d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h a t f aci ng B r i t i s h andAmer i can ai r men .Besi des r e f l e c t i n g i t s s o c i e t y , t he Luf t waff e r e f l e c t e d t he t r a d i t i o n s and val ues oft he Pr ussi an o f f i c e r corps . Li k e t h e i r brother o f f i c e r s i n t h e ar my, Luf t waff e o f f i c e r swoul d prove i magi nati ve, i nnovat i ve, and hi ghl y compet ent i n operat i onal andt a c t i c a l mat t ers . They woul d, however , pr ove t hemsel ves l os t i n t he hi gher r eal msof s t r a t e g y and grand s t r a t e g y , and i t woul d be i n those r eal ms t h a t t he Rei ch woul df ounder . After t he war , t he Germn general s and adm ra l s woul d rush i n to p r i n t t oprove t h a t def eat had been l argel y t he r e s u l t of H i t l e r ' s l eader shi p . I n f a c t , t h e i rs t r a t e g i c concept s i n t he war proved t o be as f l awed as had t he Fi i hr er ' s . TheGermn general s and adm ra l s ai ded and abetted H i t l e r ' s s t ra tegy in 1940 and wheni t succeeded beyond t h e i r w l des t expect at i ons w t h t he f a l l of Fr ance, they reactedi n awe, suspendi ng reason f or a bl i nd f ai t h i n t he i n v i n c i b i l i t y of t he Rei ch and i t sFi i hre r . The s t r a t e g i c adv i ce t hey t endered f r o m t h a t poi nt f or war d i gnor ed t hei n d u s t r i a l , econom c, and p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s of war bet ween i n d u s t r i a l i z e d nat i onst h a t have exi st ed s i n c e t he Amer i can Ci vi l War . The f a i l u r e of Germn grands t r a t e g y and mobi l i zat i on i n 1940-41 i nsured not onl y t he def eat of t he Germnarmed forces and t he Luf t waff e i n t h e comng years but a catastrophe f or t he Germnnati on as wel l . Therefore, expl or i ng t he causes f or t he def eat of t he Luf t waf f e, t hef ocus of t h i s st udy, expl ai ns more than t he downf al l of an ai r force .


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Notes1 . For a d e t a i l e d di scussi on of t h i s p oi n t , see t he e xc e l l e nt workby Barry D Power s, Strategy Wt houtS l i de - Ru l e , B r i t i s h Ai r Strategy, 1914-1939 ( London, 1976) .2 . Rober t F . F u t r e l l , I deas, Concepts, Doct r i ne : AH s t or y o f Bas i c Thi nki ng i n t he Uni t ed States Ai rForce, 1907- 1964 ( Mont gomer y, 1971), pp 38-393 . For t he pur poses of t h i s study, t he use of t he t e rm st rategi c bombi ng wi l l have t he word s t r a t e g i ci ncl osed w thi n quot a t i on mar ks , as t h i s aut hor bel i eves t h a t t he use of t he wor d s t r a t e g i c by ai r powere nt h u s i a s t s t o connote a p a r t i c u l a r f o r m of bombi ng d i s t o r t s t h e c l a s s i c a l meani ng of t he word Thed i f f i c u l t y i n t o whi ch t he m suse of t h i s word has l ed h i s t o r i a n s m ght be best charact eri zed by t h ef ol l ow ng quest i on : I n May 1940, gi ven Ger many' s m l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n , what was t he best s t r a t e g i c use t owhi ch t he Luf t waff e coul d be put : support i ng t he army' s dri ve t o t he channel and t he cr ushi ng of Fr enchand B r i t i s h l and power , or a t t a c k i n g Fr ench f a c t o r i e s and c i t i e s ? The answer i s cl ear i n a c l as s i c al sense .W t h i n t he exist i ng d e f i n i t i o n s of s tr at egi c and t act i cal bombi ng, i t i s not so c l e ar .4 General Gi ul i o Douhet , TheCommndof t he Ai r ( London, 1943), pp 16-17, 44, 55, 218, 2395 Edward War ner , Douhet , Mt chel l , Seversky : Theor i es of Ai r Warf are, Makers of ModernS t r a t e g y , ed . b yEdwardMead E a r l e , 2nd edi t i on (Pr i ncet on, 1971), p 489 .6 W l l i a m Emer son, Oper at i on Poi nt bl ank, Harmn Memor i al Lecture, No . 4 ( Col orado Spr i ngs,1962) , p 41 .7 For t he basi c gr oundbreaki ng work ont h i s poi nt , I amndebt ed t o a l e c t ur e gi ven i n Sept ember 1980at t he Ai r War Col l ege, Maxwel l AFB, Al abama, by Ober st l eumant Kl aus Mai er of t h eMl i t argeschi cht l i ches For schungsamt , Feder al Republ i c o f Germny See t h e further di scussi on andampl i f i cati on of t h i s poi nt i n Chapt er I and i n my a r t i c l e , TheLuf t waff e Bef ore t he Second Worl d War :AM ssi on, AStrategy?, J our nal of Str ategi c Studi es ( Sept ember 1981)8 See, i n pa r t i c u l a r , t he a r t i c l e s deal i ng w t h ai r power t h a t appear ed i n t he Ml i tdrw ssenschaft l i cheRundschau f r om 1936 t hrough 1939 .


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CHAPTER

TheLuf t waf f e : Or i gi ns and Pr epar at i onSi nce Worl d War I I , Ameri can and B r i t i s h advocat es of str at egi c bombi nghave c r i t i c i z e d t he Luf t waff e as bei ng i n e f f e c t t he hand mai den of t he Germnarmy. ' Such a v i ew does not do j u s t i c e t o t he compl exi t y of t he r ear mamentpr obl emf aced by t he Thi r d Rei ch i n gener al and t he Luf t waff e i n part i cul ar . I t al somsses e n t i r e l y t he f a c t t h a t a s i g n i f i c a n t body w t h i n t he Luf t waff e' s hi gh commndwer e converts t o t he doct r i ne of str at egi c bomi ng before t he out br eak of Worl d

War 11 . That Germny was not abl e t o wage a successf ul s t rategi c bombi ngcampai gn i n 1940 r e f l e c t e d mer el y t he f a c t t h a t Germn a i r s t r a t e g i s t s i n t he prewarp er i o d, l i k e those i n other n at i on s , had consi der abl y overest i mated t he i r abi l i t y t oi n f l i c t puni shi ng s t r a t e g i c damge w t h t he weapons at hand . Before t he war , t hesame trends t h a t mar ked t he ai r forces of Gr eat B r i t a i n and t he Uni t ed States a l s ower e pr esent i n t he o f f i c e r corps of t he Luf t waff e . But an i mpor t ant geogr aphi ccons i derat i on, the f ac t t hat Germnywas a cont i nent al power , had an addi t i onali mpact on Germn s t r a t e g i c t hi nki ng . I n any concei vabl e c o n f l i c t i nvol v i ng t hem l i t a r y f o r c e s of t he Rei ch, Germny f aced the probabi l i t y of l and operat i ons at t heo u t s e t of h o s t i l i t i e s . Thus, i t woul d scarcel y i mpr ove Ger many' s s t r a t e g i c posi t i oni f - a t t he same t i me t h a t t he Luf t waff e l aunched a e r i a l a t t a c k s on London, P a r i s ,and WarsawGermny' s enem es def eated t he Wehrmcht on t he bor der andoverran S i l e s i a , East Pr ussi a, and t he Rhi nel and .

THEECONOMCPROBLEMConst r ai ni ng and gui di ng t he course of Germn r ear mament t hr oughout t he1930' s was an econom c s i t u a t i o n consi der abl y di f f e r e nt f r o m t h a t whi chdet erm ned B r i t i s h or Ameri can r ear mament . ' The onl y rawmateri al possessed byGermny i n any abundance was coa1 . 3 Al l other r aw materi al s r equi r ed f or t he

cont i nued f unct i oni ng of t he Germn economy, not t o ment i on t he success f ulpr osecut i on of war , had t o be i mpor t ed t o one ext ent or anot her . I mpor t s of o i l ,rubber, a l um num and other c r i t i c a l mat er i al s necessary f or t he cont i nuedf unct i oni ng of t he Luf t waff e and t he Wehrmcht wer e a l l subj ect t o bl ockade .Mor eover , i n peacet i me t he Germns had t o use a s ubs t a n t i a l por t i on of t h e i ri n d u s t r i a l pr oduct i on t o export goods i n order t o earn t he f or ei gn exchangenecessary t o pay fo r these s t r a t e g i c r aw mater i al i mport s needed f or r ear mament .Sympt omat i c of t h i s Germn econom c vul nerabi l i ty was t he s i t u a t i o n i n t hepetr ol eum i ndust r y . I n or der t o mai nt ai n an i ncr easi ngl y motor i zed econom and t ocut down on dependence f r o m f ore i gn sources, t he Germns pushed const r uct i on ofs y n t h e t i c f u e l pl ant s ( i . e . , pl ant s t h a t used coal t o mke petr ol eum pr oduct s) .


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STRATEGYFORDEFEAT

Nevert hel ess, i n s p i t e of s ubs t a nt i a l i nvest ment s i n a s y n t h e t i c f u e l i n dus t r y ,s y n t h e t i c pr oduct i on never caught up w t h demnd dur i ng t he 1930' s . Whi l e t heper cent age of synt het i c f u e l i n t er ms of consumpt i on s t e a d i l y i ncr eased i n t h i sper i od, Germny i mpor t ed more f u e l i n 1937 t han she had at t he begi nni ng of t hedecade . ' Demnd had si mpl y i ncr eased f a s t e r t han pr oduct i on . The f ue l s i t ua t i oni n t he summr of 1938 r e f l e c t s t he ext ent of t he pr obl em. I n J une of t ha t y e a r ,s u p p l i e s i n storage t anks coul d cover onl y 25 per cent of mobi l i zat i onr equi r ement s- - on t he average, four mont hs of f u l l war t i me needs . Suppl i es ofa v i a t i o n l u b r i c a n t s wer e as l owas 6 per cent of mobi l i zat i on r equi r ement s . ' Thi swas, of course, a re f l ect i on of Germany' s i nher ent i n a b i l i t y t o meet petr ol eumr equi r ement s f r o m her own resources and her consi der abl e pr obl em i n ear ni ngf ore i gn exchange t o pay f or s t r a t e g i c rawmat eri al i mpor t s .

I n f a c t , t he mos t s e r i ous const r ai nt onGermn r ear mament i n t he 1930' s was t hel ack of f ore i gn exchange . Wthout hard cur r ency t o cover i mport s, Germn i ndust r ycoul d not reach t he l e ve l of armament pr oduct i on demndedby t he Wehrmcht andH i t l e r . I ndeed, t he Rei ch exper i enced i ncr easi ng di f f i c ul t i es i n acqui r i ng these rawmat er i al s r equi r ed f or m l i t ar y pr oduct i on. A s e r i e s of more d i f f i c u l t econom cc r i s e s , caused by a l ack of f ore i gn exchange, marked t he course of Germnr ear mament t hr oughout t he 1930' s . ' Begi nni ng i n 1930, a wor l dwi de depr essi onhad caused a sharp dr opof f i n t he val ue of Germn exports t h a t cont i nued through1934 . Thereafter, onl y a mar gi nal recovery took pl ace . As a r e s u l t , hol di ngs off ore i gn exchange s t e a d i l y dw ndl ed, and t h i s shortage of hard cur r ency i n t het h i r t i e s s e t d e f i n i t e l i m t s on t he l e ve l of rawmat eri al i mport s a v a i l a b l e t o suppor tr ear mament . 'As ear l y as t he f a l l of 1934, t he Germn cotton i ndust r y hel d reserves f or nomrethan t wo weeks' pr oduct i on, r ubber pl ant s f or two mont hs , and t he petr ol eumi n d u s t r y f or t h r e e t o t h r e e and one-hal f mont hs . Mor eover , f ore i gn suppl i ers al r eadywer e becom ng doubt f ul as t o t he l i qui d i t y of t he Germneconom and, as a r e s u l t ,woul d not del i ver on c r e d i t . 9 By 1935, t h i s s i t u a t i o n had caused s i g n i f i c a n t port i onsof Germn i ndust r y t o drawdown st ockpi l es . FromMarch t o Decemer 1935,st ockpi l es of maj or i n d u s t r i a l r aw materi al s f e l l dr amati cal l y ; and f or t he r emai nderof t he 1930' s , t he Germn econom l i v e d a hand- t o- mout h exi st ence, scrat chi ng t of i n d s u f f i c i e n t f ore i gn exchange t o pay f or i mport s .By 1937, t he Germn econom was suf f er i ng ser i ous shortages of s t e e l becauseof a l ack of or e i mport s, whi l e t he i ndust ry i t s e l f was operat i ng at barel y 83 per centof capaci t y . 1 0 These econom c d i f f i c u l t i e s af f ect i ng r ear mament mos t l i k e l y pl ayeda r o l e i n pushi ng H i t l e r i n t o t he conf r ont at i ons of 1938 . Her e agai n, despi t es u b s t a n t i a l f i n a n c i a l gai ns mdeby t heAnschl uss w t h Aust r i a, e f f o r t s t o expand t her ear mament program t o bui l d up synt heti c and muni t i on i n d u s t r i e s , t o begi n t hemassi ve const r uct i on of t he Wes t wal l p r o j e c t , and t o mobi l i ze f or t he Czech c r i s i ssever el y s t r a i n e d t he Germn econom I n Novemer 1938, Hermnn G6ri ng

adm t t ed t h a t t he Germn econom c i n f r a s t r u c t u r e had r eached a poi nt of mxi mumeconom c d i s t r e s s . As a d i r e c t r e s u l t , t he Oberkommndo der Wehrmacht (OKW,t he Germnarmed f o r c e s hi gh commnd, mdemaj or r educt i ons i n s t ee l and r aw


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ORGNSANDREPARATIONma t e r i a l al l ocat i ons t o ar mament pr oduct i on . Cont i nui ng d i f f i c u l t i e s l ed H t l er t oannounce t o t he Rei chst ag on J anuary 30, 1939, t h a t Germny mus t wage an expor t bat t l e (Export schl acht ) t o r a i s e f ore i gn exchange . Si mul t aneousl y, heannounced further r educt i on i n Wehrmcht al l ocat i ons : s t e e l , 30 per cent ; copper ,20per cent ; a l um num 47 per cent ; rubber, 14per cent . sPr obl ems st emm ng f r o m bot h i n s u f f i c i e n t f ore i gn exchange and rawmat er i al sgui ded t he course of t he Germn r ear mament . Nei t her wer e avai l abl e i n s u f f i c i e n tquant i t y t o bui l d a massi ve s t rategi c bomi ng force . Mor eover , t he ar my, gi venGer many' s s t r a t e g i c pos i t i on as a cont i nenta l power , l a i d cl ai ms t o resources t h a tany r ear mament program had t o meet . F i n a l l y , t he count r y' s doubt f ul access t of ore i gn suppl i es of petr ol eumpr oduct s r a i s e s t he quest i on as t o whet her Germnycoul d suppor t an i ndependent s t rategi c bomi ng of f ensi ve . Thus, i t i s cl ear t h a td e f i n i t e econom c const r ai nt s l i m t e d Germn a i r pl anner s i n t he cr eat i on of t heLuf t waf f e, and the fo rce they mol dedboth before and dur i ng t he war was i nf l uencedby d i f f e r e n t s t r a t e g i c f a c t o r s than those gui di ng e i t h e r t he B r i t i s h or t he Amer i cans .THEDEVELOPMENTOFTHELUFTWAFFE, 1933- 39

The Germns f aced consi der abl e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the creat i on of an ai r capabi l i t yw t h t he onset of r ear mament i n 1933 . Gi ven t he f a c t t h a t no Germn a i r forcesur vi ved f r o m t he Gr eat War except as a camouf l aged pl anni ng s t a f f w t h i n t hear my and t h a t t he capaci t y f or c i v i l a i r c r a f t pr oduct i on was l a r g e l y i nadequat e f orm l i t a r y purposes , t he devel opment of t he Luf t waff e was an enor mous l y compl exand d i f f i c u l t task . Consi der i ng t he f a c t t ha t w t h i n s i x and a hal f year s t h i s forcewoul d go t o war and r ender v i t a l suppor t i n t he ear l y campai gns, t he Germns wer emos t success f ul i n t h e i r e f f o r t s .The f i r s t s t r a t e g i c pr obl em on H i t l e r ' s ascensi on t o power i n J anuary 1933 wast he per cept i on t h a t a s t i l l di sar med and vul nerabl e Rei ch f aced t he p o s s i b i l i t y of apr event i ve war , waged by her nei ghbor s t o s t op the resurr ect i on of Germny as am l i t a r y power . As H t l e r t o l d h i s general s short l y a f t e r hehadcom t o power , i fFrance possessed any st at esmen, she woul d wage war i n t he i mmedi at e future . ' 4Thus, what ever t h eo r et i c a l advant ages m ght accr ue t o Germny through t hepossessi on of a s t rategi c bomi ng f or ce i n t he l a t e 1930' s , t he Thi rd Rei ch f acedt he p o s s i b i l i t y of an i mm nent war . Future str at egi c bomi ng c a p a b i l i t i e s woul ddo nothi ng f or pr esent m l i t a r y d i f f i c u l t i e s , whi l e t he t a c t i c a l p ot e nt i a l of a l e s ss op hi s t i c a t e d, more convent i onal a i r force woul d be mre qui ckl y r e a l i z e d f oru t i l i z a t i o n i n a cont empor ar y m l i t a r y conf r ont ati on .Germn i n t er es t i n a str at egi c a i r weapon goes back t o t he e a r l y days of t heF i r s t Worl d War . Frustrated a t t he i mposi t i on of a d i s t a n t bl ockage i n 1914 by t heRoyal Navy, Germn naval s t r a t e g i s t s l ooked f or a mans t o s t r i k e at t he B r i t i s hEmpi r e . As ear l y as August 1914, Rear Adm r al Paul Behncke, Deput y Chi ef of t heNaval S t a f f , urged t h a t t he navy' s Zeppel i ns attack London, t he h e a r t of t he B r i t i s hEmpi r e . Such a t t a c k s , he ar gued, mybe expect ed, whet her they i nvol ve Londonor t he nei ghbor hood of London, t o cause pani c i n t he popul at i on whi ch my


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STRATEGYFORDEFEATpossi bl y r ender i t doubt f ul t h a t t he war can be cont i nued . 15 GrandAdm r al Al f redvonT i r p i t z not ed i n a l e t t e r of Novemer 1914 t h a t :

The Engl i sh a r e nowi n t e r r o r of t h e Zeppel i n, perhaps not w t houtreason . I cont end here . . . . I go f or t he st andpoi nt of war t o t hekni f e , but I amo t i n favor of f r i ghtf ul ness . . . . . . Al so, s i n g l eboms f r o m f l yi ng machi nes a r e wrong they a r e odi ous when theyhi t and k i l l ol d womn, andone gets used t o themI f [however] onecoul d s e t f i r e t o London i n t h i r t y pl aces, then what i n a smal l way i sodi ous woul d r e t i r e bef ore somet hi ng f i n e and power f ul . 16When t he Zeppel i n campai gn f a i l e d , t he Germns attacked London w t h t heheavi er- t han- ai r bomer . That campai gn, even i f i t di d not achi eve great mat er i aldamage, di d l ead to the creat i on of t he Royal Ai r Force .The def eat of 1918 and t he condi t i ons of the Versai l l es Treaty el i m nat ed a i r c r a f tf r o m t he Germn a r s e n a l . Not onl y was Germnydeni ed access t o newt echnol ogyas represented by t he submar i ne, the ai rpl ane, and t he t ank, but t he peace a l s osever el y l i m t ed t he s i z e and capabi l i t y of Ger many' s m l i t a r y ser vi ces . Thevi ct ori ous A l l i e s , however , coul d not pr event t he Germns f r o m t hi nki ng aboutt h e i r exper i ences and t he weapons of t he l a s t war .Hans von Seeckt, father of t he Rei chswehr , i nsur ed t h a t t he m ni scul e army l e f tt o Germny i ncl uded a smal l body of o f f i c e r s (180) who had had exper i ence i n t heconduct of t he a i r ba t t l es i n t he Gr eat War . As was t he cas e w t h t he deve l opment ofmot or i zed/ mechani zed war f ar e, Seeckt showed consi derabl e pr esci ence w t hrespect to ai r power and sawt o i t t h a t i t s advocat es possessed at l e as t som voi cew t h i n t he army . ' 9 Li m ta t i ons i mposed by Versa i l l es forced Germn avi at i on i nt o anarrow f r amewor k . Never t hel ess, ext ensi ve subs i di es t o c i v i l a v i a t i o n cont r i but edt o t he s ur v i v al of Germany' s a v i a t i on i n dus t r y , and pr eparat i ons f or ai r r ear mamentdur i ng t he Wei mr Republ i c pl ayed a s i gn i f i c a n t r ol e i n t he est abl i shment of t heLuf t waff e dur i ng t he Nazi peri od . z Germany' s l ead i n c i v i l avi at i on was such t h a tby 1927, Germn a i r l i n e s f l e w greater di st ances w t h more passengers than t h e i rFr ench, B r i t i s h , and I t a l i a n compet i t ors together . z ' Thi s exper i ence i n l ong-di st ancef l y i n g , navi gat i on, and i ns t r ument f l yi ng obvi ousl y had a p o s i t i v e i mpact ondevel opi ng t he Luf t waff e i n t he i nt erwar peri od .S t i l l , t he pr obl ems f aci ng t he Nazi s i n J anuary 1933 i n the creat i on of an ai r forcet h a t coul d ser ve as an e f f e c t i v e t o o l of di pl omati c and m l i t a r y pol i cy wer eenor mous . Onl y a t i ny cadr e of exper i enced o f f i c e r s exi st ed w t h i n t he army andnavy ; Luf t hansa exper i ence was not d i r e c t l y conver t i bl e i n t o a m l i t ar y f or ce ; andt he Germn a i r c r a f t i ndust r y, weakened not onl y by t he depr essi on but al so byi nt erneci ne quar r el s amongst i t s al most bankr upt f i r ms, was not pr epar ed f ormassi ve expansi on .The Luf t waff e was favored at i t s b i r t h , however , by t he f a c t t h a t i t s patron andf i r s t l e ade r , HermnnGor i ng, was H i t l e r ' s r i ght - hand mn Gori ng' s p o l i t i c a l p u l li nsur ed t h a t t he Luf t waf f e gai ned pos i t i on as an i ndependent servi ce and t h a t i tenj oyed a pr i vi l eged s t a t u s i n i nt erservi ce ar gument s over al l ocat i on of f undi ng andresources . Whi l e f undi ng di d not represent a pr obl em i n t he ear l y days of


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f r om t he ar my' s gener al s t a f f transferred t o t he Luftwaffe. Bl ombergoffered Gor i nga choi ce bet ween Wal t her Wever and t he f u t u r e Fi el d Mar shal Er i ch vonMans t ei nf or t he posi t i on of Chi ef of S t a f f of t he Luftwaf fe; Gor i ng chose t he f or mer . WhenWever di ed i n an a i r c r a f t crash i n 1936, Bl omberg i n i t i a l l y consi der ed of f er i ngGor i ng t he f u t u r e chi ef of t he ar my' s gener al s t a f f , Gener al Franz Hal der , as ar epl acement . Al ong w t h Wever , other army l um nar i es such as Al bert Kessel r i ngand Hans J eschonnek transferred t o t he Luftwaffe . J eschonnek, amng ot heraccompl i shment s , had f i ni shed f i r s t i n hi s c l a s s at t he Kri egsakademe, usual l y as u r e s i gn of pr om se f or a qui ck r i s e t o t he t op of t he m l i t ar y pr of essi on . 2 8 ByOct ober 1933, 228 o f f i c e r s up t o t he r ank of col onel had transferred f r o m t he ol ders e r v i c e s . By J anuary 1939, a f u r t h e r 70 had f ol l owed al ong w t h 1, 600noncomm ss i oned o f f i c e r s (NCOs) and e n l i s t e d mn . Bl omberg demnded t h a ti ndi vi dual s sel ect edf or t r a n s f e r represent t he best of t he be s t . 29The hi gh q u a l i t y of t hese o f f i c e r s shoul d not obscure t he f a c t t hat t he Luftwaffe' so f f i c e r corps and gener al s t a f f , never i n t he i r short c a r e e r s , r eached a l e ve l ofhomogenei t y and compet ence t h a t t he army o f f i c e r corps and gener al s t a f f enj oyed .The si mpl e mechani cs of expansi on al one rul ed out such a p o s s i b i l i t y . From1933 t o1935, t he Luftwaffe devel oped a per sonnel s t rength of appr oxi mat el y 900 f l y i n go f f i c e r s , 200 f l a k ( a n t i a i r c r a f t ) o f f i c e r s , and 17, 000 mn . I n addi t i on t o t he ar my,t he o f f i c e r corps cam f r o m w del y d i f f e r e n t sources ; mny p i l o t s ent ered t heLuftwaffe d i r e c t l y f r o m c i v i l avi at i on, whi l e veterans of t he F i r s t Worl dWar f u r t h e rf l e s h e d out t he o f f i c e r corps . From hi s m xt ure, t he Luftwaffe expanded t o as t r e n g t h of 15, 000 o f f i c e r s and 370, 000 mn by t he out br eak of t he war . 3 W t h i nt he o f f i c e r corps al one, t he sheer magni t ude of t he expansi on resul t ed i n an e n t i r e l yunder st andabl e l ack of coher ence and a notabl e l ack of s t r a t e g i c compet ence .Short l y a f t e r t he s u r p r i s e J apanese attack onHawai i when H i t l e r asked hi s m l i t ar ys t a f f f or t he l ocat i on of Pear l Har bor , none, i ncl udi ng h i s Luftwaffe o f f i c e r s , coul dl o c a t e t he Amer i can naval base . Luftwaffe o f f i c e r s , under s t andabl y gi ven t heshor t ness of t h e i r servi ce' s l i f e s p a n , had an i mmnse t a s k of cat chi ng up andmai nt ai ni ng cur r ency i n t he . t e c hn i c a l aspect s of t h e i r ser vi ce . The r e s ul t was t h a tthey became a t best t echnocr at s and oper ati onal exper t s w t h l i m t e d v i s i o n . Thus,w t h per haps t he except i on of Wever and t o a l e s se r ext ent M l ch, t he o f f i c e r corpsshowed a l ack of under st andi ng of t he l a r ge r i s s ues r evol v i ng ar ound t hei n t e r r e l a t i o n of ai r power t o nat i onal s t r a t e g y , def ect s whi ch may, i ndeed, have beennothi ng l e s s than f a t a l .At t he o u t s e t of r ear mament i n 1933, Germnpl anner s f aced t he pr obl em as t owhat r o l e t he Luftwaffe woul d pl ay w t h i n t he l arger f r amewor k of nat i onal s t r a t e g y .I n May 1933, M l ch, t he key f igure i n t he Luftwaffe' s or gani zat i on anddevel opment i n t he 1933- 36 per i od, r ecei ved a maj or st udy f r om one of h i sLufthansa subordi nat es, Dr . Rober t Knauss , on t he s t r a t e g i c concept f or t he newai rforce . 3 3 Knauss' r e p o r t cont ai ned maj or el ement s of Douhet ' s st rat egi c bomi ngphi l osophy, T i r p i t z ' s r i sk theory, and what woul d t oday be regarded as det er r ence doct r i ne . He bel i eved t h a t t he purpose of t he r egi me was t he resto rat i on of Ger many' s great power posi t i on i n Europe and argued t h a t si nce


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ORGNSANDREPARATIONPol and, and part i cul ar l y Fr ance, woul d r e s i s t such a devel opment , Germny f acedt he i mmedi at e p o s s i b i l i t y of a pr event i ve war waged by those t wo power s . Toover come Germn m l i t a r y weakness through r ear mament , thereby r e-establ i shi ngGer many' s g r e a t power s t a t u s , Knauss suggested t he r api d creat i on of a strong a i rf o r c e . The deci si ve el ement i n t hi s force woul d be t he det err ent e f f e c t of a f l e e t of400 f our - engi ne bomber s . Knauss argued t h a t modern i n d u s t r i a l i z e d soci et y offeredt a r g e t s whi ch, when dest r oyed, woul d ha l t t he enemy' s i n d u s t r i a l pr oduct i on andt h a t popul at i on centers offered t he p o s s i b i l i t y of br eaki ng t he enemy' s mor al e .Nat ur al l y, he f e l t t h a t t he newl y created t o t a l i t a r i a n soci et y of Germny coul dendur e t he pressures of bombi ng b e t t e r than t he fractured s o c i e t i e s of t he B r i t i s h andFr ench democr aci es . Thus, i f Germnypossessed a s t rategi c bombi ng f l e e t , herput ati ve enemes-Pol andand France-woud t hi nk s e r i o u s l y before i ncur r i ng t her i s k of a i r a t t a c k on maj or popul at i on centers . Above a l l , Knauss argued t h a t t hecr eat i on of such a bombi ng f l e e t offered a greater p o s s i b i l i t y f or af f ect i ng t heEur opean m l i t a r y bal ance than di d t he est abl i shment of army di vi s i ons or t heconst r uct i on of naval surface u n i t s .The cr eati on of such a bomer force aborted f or s e v e r a l reasons . F i r s t , t he armywas hardl y e n t h u s i a s t i c about such a s t r a t e g i c concept i on . Col onel Konr ad Gossl er,head of t he Tr uppenamt ' s operat i on s e c t i o n , argued t h a t a c l e ar separat i on bet weent he homel and and t he combat f r o n t no l onger exi st ed . Thus, bot h opposi ng a i rforces possessed t he sameopport uni t y t o a t t a c k t h ei r enemy' s homel and . Mor eover ,s i nce the begi nni ng of t i me, Gossl er argued, each newweapon had l ed mny t oconcl ude t h a t t he ol d weapons of war wer e no l onger needed . Thi s had si mpl y nothappened . F i n a l l y , he obj ect ed t h a t such a concept i on, i f r e a l i z e d , m ght destroywar bymaki ng i t i mpossi bl e f or bot h s i de s . Such ar gument s woul dl ead i nevi t abl yt o paci f i sm 14More deci si ve f or t he act ual est abl i shment of t he Luf t waff e was t he di scovery t h a tGermn a i r c r a f t i ndust r y l acked t he desi gners , i n d u s t r i a l capaci t y, or exper i ence t ob u i l d such a s t rategi c bombi ng f l e e t . Dur i ng t he summr of 1933, M l c h and hi spl anner s f ound t h a t they coul d bar el y squeeze 1, 000 a i r c r a f t out of i ndus t r y f or t hef i r s t pr oduct i on program Most of t h a t e f f o r t consi st ed of t r a i n i n g a i r c r a f t t o expandt he f l y i n g base . ' 5 The comat a i r c r a f t hardl y deserved t h a t charact er i zat i on .Froma J anuary 1933 i n d u s t r i a l bas e of 4, 000 wor ker s, t he a i r c r a f t i ndust r yexpanded t o 16, 870 workers i n 1934 and t o 204,100 workers by t he f a l l of 1938 . 36To a g r e a t extent, t h i s represented M l ch ' s great t r i umph as an organi zer andbureaucrat .Whi l e M l ch pl ayed t he deci si ve r o l e i n t he adm ni str at i ve and i n d u s t r i a l t a sks ofc r e a t i n g t he Luf t waf f e, Wever pl ayed a no- l ess- i mport ant r o l e i n f or mul ati ng t henew s e r v i c e ' s doct r i ne and s t r a t e g y . He was not an unabashed advocat e of str at egi c bombi ng but rather argued f or a br oadl y based a i r s t r a t e g y . Wever di dnot bel i eve t h a t t he Luf t waff e' s exi st ence as a separate serv i ce gave i t a mss i one n t i r e l y i ndependent of t he arm and navy . Rat her , he ar gued t h a t i t s m s s i o nshoul d compl ement those of t he other servi ces . Thus, t he Luf t waf f e' s cont r i but i ont o vi ctory coul d i nvol ve attacks on an enemy' s ai r f o r c e s , hi s ar my, h i s f l e e t , or


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even t he dest r uct i on of h i s resources and armament i ndust r y . The condi t i ons of t hegener al s i t u a t i o n and overal l nat i onal s t r at egy woul d deter m ne i n what f orm onewoul dwage t he a i r ba t t l e . Whi l e not denyi ng t he p o s s i b i l i t y of ai r def ense or t hei mpor t ance of f i g h t e r s , Wever f e l t t h a t t he deci s i ve weapon of ai r warf are i s t hebomber . Meanwhi l e, a c a r e f u l anal ysi s of Germany' s s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n r a i s e d doubt s as t owhet her str at egi c bomi ng shoul d be t he Luf t waff e' s s o l e mss i on . Awar gamconduct ed dur i ng t he w nter of 1933- 34 i ndi cated t h a t abomer f l e e t al one coul dnot i mmedi at el y destroy t he enemy' s a i r f l e e t . The concl usi on was t h a t strongf i g h t e r f o r c e s , as wel l as a n t i a i r c r a f t guns, wer e necessary t o pr ot ect t he Rei ch' si n d u s t r i a l and popul at i on centers . 3 8Wever ' s t hi nki ng on the subj ect of ai r power was best summd up i n t hef or mul at i on of Germn a i r doct r i ne t h a t f i r s t appear ed i n 1935 : Conduct of t he Ai rWar (Di e Luf t kr i egf uhr ung) . 39 As w t h most Germn m l i t a r y doct r i nalst at ement s, t h i s one was a c l e a r , conci se f or mul at i on . I t was not meant t o r e s t r i c t ordogmat i ze but r at her t o gi ve a i r force commnders t he w dest l a t i t u d e and t oencour age mxi mumf l e x i b i l i t y . Amng t he chi ef poi nt s enunci at ed was t her e i t e r a t i o n of Wever ' s poi nt t h a t t he empl oyment of t he Luf t waf f e shoul d r e f l e c t t heov er a l l f r amewor k of nat i onal gr and strategy . W t h i n gr and s t r a t e g y , t he c r i t i c a lt a s k s of t he Luf t waff e woul d be t he at t ai nment and mai nt enance of ai r s u p e r i o r i t y ,suppor t of t he army and t he navy, attacks on enem i n dus t r y , and i n t e r d i c t i o nbet ween f r o n t and homel and . The nature of t he enemy, t he t i me of year , t hes t r u c t u r e of h i s l a nd , t he character of hi s peopl e, as wel l as one' s own m l i t a r ycapabi l i t i es woul d deter m ne howone shoul dempl oy ai r power . 4 Wever ' s doc t r i n al st at ement s t r e s s e d t h a t ai r resources shoul d not be us edpi ecemeal nor s houl d f r equent changes be mde i n goal s . I n al l l i kel i hood,however , one coul d pr obabl y not c l e a r l y separate t he s t r uggl e w t h an enem ai rforce f r o m suppor t pr ovi ded t o t he army and navy . Unl i ke mos t ai r power t h e o r i s t s ,he showed a r eady under s t andi ng f or t he f a c t t ha t a i r super i or i ty woul d be a mos te l u s i v e goal . Changi ng t echni cal c a p a b i l i t i e s , newpr oduct i on, and r epl acement ofl os s e s woul d al l combi ne t o a l l ow t he enem t o f i g h t anot her day . Whi l e Wever f e l tt h a t str at egi c bomi ng attacks on t he enemy' s i n d u s t r i a l and econom c sour cesof power coul d have an absol ut e i mpact , he war ned t h a t such an of f ensi ve m ghttake t oo l ong t o be deci si ve and m ght t hus be t oo l a t e t o hel p t he army and t henavy . He emphasi zed t h a t onl y t he strongest cooperat i on amng t he t h r e e servi cescoul d achi eve t he overa l l obj ect i ves of nat i onal gr and strategy . The a i r war agai nstt he enem i n d u s t r i a l base shoul d occur onl y when ( 1 ) an opport uni t y exi st ed t oa f f e c t qui ckl y t he war' s course, ( 2) when l and and naval pr eparat i ons hadpreparedt he way, ( 3) when a st al emate had occur r ed, or ( 4) when a deci si ve e f f e c t coul donl y be achi eved t hr ough t he dest r uct i on of t he enemy' s econom c sources ofpower .Wever ' s deat h i n t he spr i ng of 1936 was a maj or bl ow t o t he Luf t waff e .However , i t di d not r e s u l t i n cancel l ati on of t he f our- engi ne s t r at egi c bomerp r o j e c t as some have cl ai med . 4 ' I n 1936, t he Ai r M n i s t r y cancel l ed t he


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ORI GI NSANDPREPARATIONdevel opment of t he f our - engi ne Dormr Do 19 and J unkers J u 89, because s u i t a b l eengi nes wer e not yet avai l abl e fromt he Germn a i r c r a f t i ndust r y t o pr ovi deadequat e power . * The f a i l u r e t o have a s u i t a b l e engi ne avai l abl e i n 1936 and 1937r e f l e c t e d t he f a c t t h a t Germn ai r r ear mament had onl y begun i n 1933 . As a r e s u l t ,Germn engi ne research and devel opment was i n som i mpor t ant respects behi ndwhat was occur r i ng i n Gr eat Br i ta i n and t he Uni t ed S t a t e s . Mor eover , t he l ongl ead- t i me r equi r ed f or engi ne devel opment const r ai ned Germn a i r c r a f t desi gnt hroughout t he 1930' s . The Germns di d embark on t he He 177 p r o j e c t i n 1937 i nt he be l i e f t h a t Hei nkel coul d desi gn and bui l d a l ong-r ange str at egi c bomer byt he e a r l y 1940' s . The desi gn of t he He 177, i n e f f e c t , represented an e f f o r t t os h o r t c u t t he deve l opment pr ocess of a hi gh- power ed engi ne f or a heavy bomer bypl aci ng f our engi nes w t h i n twonacel l es . Hei nkel desi gner s expect ed t h a t bycut t i ngdown on the drag, they woul d have a bomer compar abl e t o other f our - engi nea i r c r a f t w t h mor e power f ul engi nes . Unf or t unatel y f or t he Luf t waf f e, t hey wer enever abl e t o over come t he d i f f i c u l t i e s i nherent i n the desi gn ; hence t he f a i l u r e oft he program r ef l ect ed the f a i l u r e of engi neeri ng and not a l ack of i n t e r e s t i n str at egi c bomi ng 42

Wever ' s br oadl y based appr oach t o t he quest i on of ai r power shoul d not obscuret he f a c t t ha t h i s wr i t i ngs never deni ed t he p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t s t rategi c bombi ngcoul d pl ay an i mpor t ant p a r t i n ai r warf ar e . Mor eover , a s i g n i f i c a n t por t i on of t heLuf t waff e' s doc t r i n al t hi nki ng r emai ned enamor ed w t h s t rategi c bomi ngt hroughout t he t h i r t i e s . There was an obvi ous reason why t h i s shoul d be so : Theconcept s of t o t a l war and t o t a l mobi l i zat i on had proved a t t r a c t i v e t o much of t heGermn m l i t a r y t hr oughout t he i nt erwar peri od . Whi l e Seeck t argued f orest abl i shment of an e l i t e ar my, Ludendor f f a r t i c u l a t e d t he concept t h a t modernwarhad become t o t a l . Unl i ke mos t i nt erwar m l i t ar y t hi nker s who sought t o escape t hehorrors of Wor l d War I ' s mass war f are, Ludendor f f embr aced what had happenedand argued t h a t Germnymus t prepare i n r u t h l e s s f ashi on dur i ng peace f or t he nextwar . Amng other t h i n g s , Ludendor f f ar gued t h a t war i nvol ved t he e n t i r epopul at i on i n t he c o n f l i c t , not j u s t a rmes . I n h i s vi ew, econom c pr oduct i on hadbecome as i mpor t ant as bat t l es on t he f r o n t l i n e . 4 1 The 1918 col l apse convi nced hi mt h a t Germnyr equi r ed a di cta tor shi p fo r t he next war and, even more i mport ant l y,t h a t some met hod mus t be f ound t o i n s p i r e the nat i onal uni ty t h a t had com apart i nt he l a s t mont hs of t he war . 44Fromhe f i r s t , t he Nazi Par ty appear ed as a p a r t i c u l a r l y a t t r a c t i v e means t o i nsur esuch a uni t y of nat i onal w i l l . H i t l e r ' s popul ari t y w t h t he mas ses offered t hep o s s i b i l i t y of es t abl i s hi ng a n at i o na l cohesi on t h a t t he concept i on of t o t a l wardemanded 4 5 Thus, what mde t he Nazi mvemnt a t t r a c t i v e t o t he m l i t ar yt hroughout t he 1930' s was t he f ac t t ha t t he Nazi s seem ngl y pr ovi ded t hepsychol ogi cal basi s and pr eparat i on necessary f or t o t a l war . Ei n Vol k, ei n Rei ch,

*Germana i rcra f t desi gnati ons donot contai nahyphen betweenmnufacture andmdel numer . Amri candes i gnat i ons do . The t ext w l lr e f l ect nat i ona l preferences .


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ei n Fi i hr e r was more than a sl ogan ; i n t he mass r a l l i e s and pr opaganda di spl ays, i tguar ant eed t h a t t he 1918 col l apse woul d not recur . Thus, Ludendorf f ' s concept i onof t o t a l war and t he mass mvemnt of t he Nazi Par ty pr ovi ded an a f f i n i t y bet weent he m l i t a r y and t he Nat i onal S o c i a l i s t mvemnt t h a t hel ps expl ai n t he r eadi ness oft he o f f i c e r corps t o s er ve a par t y t h a t hardl y represented t h e i r upper- cl ass a t t i t u d e s .Many w t h i n t he Luf t waff e f ound i n t hi s pol i t i c al and psychol ogi cal pr eparat i onf or war a basi s t o argue t h a t t he next war woul dbe a t o t a l war of t he ai r and t h a tbecause of t he nat i onal uni t y t h a t t he Nazi s had created, Germny coul d b e t t e rw t hstand such a s t ruggl e . I n t he May 1933 mmrandumdi scuss ed above, Knaussargued t h a t t he t e r r o r i z i n g of t he enemy' s chi ef c i t i e s and i n d u s t r i a l r egi onsthrough bombi ng woul d l ead t h a t muchmore qui ckl y t o a col l apse of mor al e, t heweaker t he nat i onal character of h i s peopl e i s , and t he more t h a t s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a lr i f t s cl eave h i s soci et y . Knauss as sumed t h a t a t o t a l i t a r i a n soci et y l i k e NaziGermnywoul dprove more capabl e of endur i ng bomi ng a t t a c k s than t he f ract ureds o c i e t i e s of Br i ta i n and Fr ance . 4 6 Such a t t i t u de s pl ayed an i mpor t ant r o l e i nLuf t waff e t hi nki ng t hr oughout t he r emai nder of t he t h i r t i e s .Knauss hi msel f went on f r o m t he Ai r M ni st r y t o becom t he head of t he newAi rWar Col l ege i nGatow There, under h i s l eadershi p, the emphasi s r emai ned s o l i d l yon st rat egi c bomi ngu n t i l t he outbreak of t he war . Near l y a l l l e c t u r e s concer nedt he s t rategi c uses of ai r power ; v i r t u a l l y nonedi scuss ed t a c t i c a l cooperat i on w tht he army . 4 7 Si m l ar l y, t he emphas i s i n t he m l i t ar y j our nal s cent er ed on s t rategi cbombi ng The pr esti gi ous M l i tdrw ssenschaf t l i che Rundschau, t he new our nal oft he War Mni s t ry , f ounded i n 1936, publ i shed a number of t h eor e t i c a l pi eces onf u t u r e devel opment s i n ai r war . Near l y a l l di scuss ed t he use of s t rategi cai r power w t h some emphasi zi ng t h a t aspect of ai r warf are t o t he excl usi on ofo t h e r s . 48 One aut hor commnted t h a t Eur opean m l i t a r y power s wer e i ncr easi ngl ymaki ng t he bomber force the hear t of t h e i r ai r power . The maneuver abi l i t y andt e c hn i c a l capabi l i t y of t he newgenerat i on of bomber s wer e such t h a t al r eady i nt oday' s ci r cumst ances t he bomer of f ensi ve woul d be as unst oppabl e as t he f l i g h t ofa s he l l . - 49 Maj or Her hudt von Rohden, event ual l y t he head of t he gener al s t a f f ' sh i s t o r i c a l s e c t i o n , went so f a r as t o argue t h a t unl i ke t he arm and t he navy, onl y t heai r f o r c e was i n t he pos i t i on to at t ack the enem i n dept h and t o l aunch i mmedi at el y dest r uct i ve at t acks agai ns t t he econom c resources of t he enem f r o m a l ldi r ect i ons . Mor eover , von Rohden s t r e s s e d , t he Luf t waff e shoul d not be ana u x i l i a r y t o t he ot her two ser vi ces . I nt er ser vi ce cooper at i on di d not man di vi di ngt he Luf t waff e up and parcel i ng out i t s per sonnel and mat eri el t o suppor t gr ound ornaval t a c t i c a l purposes . Rat her , i nt erservi ce cooper at i on meant usi ng t he Luf t waff ei n a u n i f i e d and mas sed ` s t r a t e g i c ' a i r war t h a t coul d pr ovi de f or b e t t e r l ong-range suppor t . The f a i l u r e of t he Luf t waff e t o progress further t owar ds a str at egi c bomi ngcapabi l i t y i s a t t r i b u t a b l e t o s ev e r a l f a c t o r s . The f i r s t i s t h a t mny w t h i n t heLuf t waff e t hought t h a t they possessed s u f f i c i e n t capabi l i t y w t h t h e i r t w n- engi nea i r c r af t t o l aunch str at egi c attacks agai nst Ger many' s mos t l i k e l y cont i nent alopponent s - Fr ance, Czechosl ovaki a, and Pol and . Engl and pr esent ed greater

1 0


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pr obl ems, but even here Gener al Fel my, Commnder of Luf t f o t t e 2 and char gedw t h pl anni ng of an ai r war agai nst B r i t a i n i n 1939, sawp o s s i b i l i t i e s . Concl udi ngt he 1939 spr i ng pl anni ng e f f o r t , Fel my adm t t ed t o h i s subordi nat es t h a t t heLuf t waff e di d not yet possess any of t he pr er equi si t es f or a successful str at egi cbombi ng of f ensi ve agai nst Gr eat Br i ta i n . He di d suggest , however , t h a t t he pani ct h a t had broken out i n London i n Sept ember a t t he hei ght of t he Muni ch c r i s i si n d i c a t e d t h a t a massi ve a e r i a l onsl aught di rected agai nst London m ght breakB r i t a i n ' s power s of r esi st ance . Asecond f a c t o r l ay on t he t echni cal s i d e : Theengi neers never sol ved t he He 177 des i gn d i f f i c u l t i e s . Mor eover , not onl y di dGermny not possess t he econom c strength and resources t o bui l d a st rat egi cbombi ng force on the scal e of t he B r i t i s h and Amer i can e f f o r t of 1943- 44 but f ewai r men of any nati on i n t he prewar peri od had foreseen t he enor mous magni t ude oft h e i n dus t r i a l andm l i t a r y e f f o r t t h a t str at egi c bomi ngwoul dr equi r e . Thus, i t i snot surpri si ng t h a t Germnywas not much b e t t e r prepared t o l aunch a str at egi cbombi ng campai gn than B r i t a i n i n 1939 .As pr evi ousl y ment i oned, Wever ' s deat h i n 1936 was di sast r ous f or t he f u t u r ecourse of t he Luf t waff e but i n a sense ot her than t h a t whi ch most hi st or i ans havesuggest ed . F i r s t , he pr ovi ded t he gl ue t h a t hel d t he Luf t waff e together i n t he ear l yr ear mament years . He got onr e l a t i v e l y wel l w t h other Luf t waff e l e ade r s , i ncl udi ngM l ch, and al l respected h i s q u a l i t i e s of i n t e l l e c t and l eader shi p . Second, andequal j y i mpor t ant , Wever possessed both a p r a c t i c a l m l i t a r y mnd and a f i r s t - c l a s ss t r a t e g i c sense t h a t t hought i n t er ms of t he l ong p ul l and not j u s t i mmedi at e,, op er a t i on al pr obl ems . Gi ven t he f i n a n c i a l and raw mat er i al const r ai nt s onr ear mament , Wever coul d not have created a s t rategi c bombi ng f or ce i n t het h i r t i e s i n t er ms of what t he Uni t ed States ArmyAi r Forces (USAAF) woul d have i n1943 and 1944 . Never t hel ess, hi s pr esence woul d have mt iga t ed t he r at herhaphazar d appr oach t h a t charact eri zed t he Luf t waff e i n t he l a t e t h i r t i e s and ear l yf o r t i e s .The cal i ber of Wever ' s successors underl i nes hi s i mpor t ance t o t he Luf t waff e .Al bert Kessel r i ng, h i s i mmedi at e successor, was a t r oop l eader par excel l ence, butov er a l l he was not an e f f e c t i v e Chi ef of Staff and di d not get al ong wel l w t h M l c h .The back-bi t i ng bet ween t he two l e d t o Kessel r i ng' s r epl acement by Hans- J ur genSt umpf f w t h i n a year . The l a t t e r proved l i t t l e b e t t e r than Kessel r i ng ; and i nFebruary 1939, Gor i ng namdHans J eschonnek as Chi ef of t he Luf t waff e' s Gener alS t a f f . Despi t e h i s b r i l l i a n c e a t t he Kr i egsakadem e, J eschonnek pr oved no b e t t e rthan h i s predecessors . He was arr ogant , shor t s i ght ed, and had had several b i t t e rr un- i ns w t h M l c h . s ' Mor eover , J eschonnek f e l l under H i t l e r ' s s pe l l and swal l owedt he l i n e t h a t t he Fi i hre r was t he greatest commnder i n h i s t o r y . As a r e s u l t , henever possessed t he i ndependent j udgment t h a t h i s posi t i on requi r ed . Short l y a f t e rMuni ch, H t l e r demnded a f i vef ol d i ncr ease i n t he Luf t waff e by 1942, ani mpossi bl e goal gi ven t he econom c const r ai nt s and t he megal omani acal pr opor t i onof t he program (Such a force woul dr equi r e 85 percent of t he wor l d' s av i at i on f u e land woul d cost 60m l l i o n RM a t o t a l equi val ent t o a l l Germn def ense spendi ngf or t he 1933- 39 peri od . ) Seni or of f i c e r s c or r ec t l y concl uded t h a t t h e r e was no


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STRATEGYFORDEFEATpr ospect of accompl i shi ng such a pl an . J eschonnek, however, announced,Gentl emn, i n my vi ew i t i s our duty t o suppor t t he Fuhr er andnot work agai nsthi m 54 Suchan att i t ude was not consi st ent w th t he t r adi t i ons of t he genera l s t a f f ,but f u l l y conformdt o H t l e r ' s bel i ef t hat hi s general s were there not t o gi v e advi cebut t o car ry out orders .

The al most year l y changes i n t he pos i t i on of Chi ef of S ta f f f rom1936 t o 1939was not t he onl y resul t of G6r i ng ' s mshand i ngof t he Luf t waff e . He nowsevere l yconst r ai ned Ml ch by bal anci ng t he State Secretary w th others w t hi n t heLuf t waf f e' s bureaucracy Er nest Udet, a great f i ghter pi l ot i n Worl dWr I andbar nst or mer of t he 1920' s , r ecei ved an appoi ntmnt as head of t he Luf t waff e' st echni cal departments as wel l as t he Of f i ce of Ai r Armmnt wherehe cont r ol l edresearch anddevelopmnt f or t he Luf t waff e . Udet di dnot possess t he t echni cal orengi neeri ng s k i l l s t o handl e such respons i bi l i t i es andwas a dr eadf ul adm ni s t r at or .Hehadno l e s s than 26 separate departments r epor t i ng di rect l y t o hi m

I n sum G6ri ng possessed nei t her t he a b i l i t y nor background t o run t heenormusl y expandedLuf t waff e . Ml chwas i ncreas i ngl y i s ol ated from he centersof power ; andt he ot her t op l eaders, such as Kessel r i ng, Udet, andJ eschonnek, di dnot possess Wever' s s t r ategi c i ns i ght . Long-range pl anni ng and s t r ategi c t hi nk i ngwent by t he boards , andt he Luf t waff e i ncr eas i ngl y becam a fo rce that reacted t oday-to-day pol i t i cal andoperat i onal pressures .

The resul t of t h i s i ncreas i ngl y chaot i c organi zat i onal s i tuat i on showedupmstdi rect l y i n t he pr oduct i on program of t he l a t e prewar per i od . Even consi der i ngthei r rawmat eri al shortages and t hei r economc and f or e i gn exchange di f f i cul t i es ,t he Germns under cut t he pr oduct i on capaci t y of thei r a i rcra f t i ndust r y . Waste,obso l ete pr oduct i on methods, andbadpl anni ng charact er i zed t he e f fo r t s of even t hemj or manuf act urer s . Throughout t he l a t e 1930' s , t he Germnsproducednumrouspl ans f or a i r c r a f t pr oduct i on due t o const ant l y changing goa l s andpr i o r i t i e s . By1939, a i r c r a f t pr oduct i on was onl y 70 percent of stated pr oduct i on goal s (goal s thatwere s i gni f i cant l y under H t l e r ' s demnd f or qui nt upl i ng of t he Luf t waf f e) . 57 Thef ol l owi ng f i gures i n Tabl e I ' s re f l ect t he shor t f al l between pl anned expansi onandactual pr oduct i on f i gures i n t he l a s t years of peace

1 2

TABLEPl anned and Act ual Ai rcraf t Output-1938and 1939

1938P l anNos . Al l Types Comat 1939P l anNos . Al l Types Comat6 5, 800 4, 129 8 9, 957 7, 0957 6, 021 3, 971 10 8, 299 6, 0517/ 8 6, 154 3, 710 10/ 11 8, 619 6, 357Act ual Act ualProduct i on 5, 235 3, 350 Producti on 8, 295 4, 733


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concom t ant l o s s i n speed f r o m 500 kmh t o 300 kmh . Mor eover , these changesdel ayed actual pr oduct i on by a t l e a s t a year . 64 The addi t i onal r equi r ement t h a t t heHe 177 be abl e t o di ve bom cam i n t he m ddl e of program devel opment andv i r t u a l l y i nsur ed t h a t , gi ven an i nher ent l y compl ex engi ne desi gn, t he model woul dnever evol ve i n to an e f f e c t i v e heavy bomer . 6 5Gori ng' s and H i t l e r ' s f asci nat i on w t h number s a l s o served t o d i s t o r t t hemai nt enance and suppl y sys tem. Theor et i cal l y, t he Luf t waff e based i t s appr oach t oai r power on t he bel i ef t h a t a f l y i n g un i t was not combat - r eady unl ess i t possessedmoder n, r e l i ab l e a i r c r a f t backed up by a f i r s t - c l a s s mai nt enance or gani zat i on andsuppl y system Usi ng t h i s r a t i on a l e , f r o n t l i n e un i t s had t o r ecei ve adequat e numbersof r epl acement a i r c r a f t and reserves of spare parts . I n an after act i on r e p o r t ont he Czech c r i s i s , t he chi ef of t he Luf t waff e' s suppl y servi ces reported t h a t theser equi r ement s had not yet been met . 6 6 Amng ot her i t ems, he under scor ed t he f a c tt h a t t he number of a i r c r a f t engi nes i n mai nt enance and suppl y depot s representedonl y 4 t o 5 per cent of t o t a l engi nes i n servi ce . The basi c reason why t h i s s i t u a t i o ne x i s t e d was i n Gori ng' s r e f u s a l t o f o l l o w r ecommendat i ons t h a t t he Luf t waff edevot e 20 t o 30 per cent of pr oduct i on t o pr ovi de adequat e i nvent or i es of sparep a r t s . 6 ' I n s t e ad, t he Germns assi gned pr oduct i on al most excl usi vel y t o f i r s t l i n es t r e n g t h because of t he pol i t i c al out l ook of the t op l eaders and t h e i r f asci nat i on w t hnumber s . Thi s pr act i ce cont i nued t hr oughout t he war . As a r e s u l t , t heLuf t waff e waschroni cal l y shor t spare p a r t s and had t o canni bal i ze w t h a di r e c t and negati vei mpact on operat i onal r eady r a t e s .THELUFTWAFFE'S I MPACT, 1933- 39

The Luf t waff e' s i n i t i a l s t r a t e g i c purpose had been t o det er Pol and and Fr ancef r o ml aunchi ng a pr event i ve war agai nst the Rei ch . I t was nei t her not abl y success f ulnor unsuccess f ul i n t h i s r o l e . H i t l e r ' s di pl omati c s k i l l s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t he 1934 NonAggr essi on Pact w t h Pol and, wer e more i mpor t ant i n a l t e r i n g t he Eur opeandi pl omati c bal ance of power . The Fr ench, at l e a s t i n t he ear l y peri od of Germnr ear mament , wer e somewhat bl ase about t he i mpl i cati ons of t he Luf t waff e . As l a t eas Sept ember 1937, one m l i t ar y l eader t o l d t he B r i t i s h t h a t w t h a v e r i t a b l e f o r e s tof guns over t he Magi not Li ne, Fr ance coul d pr event t he Germn ai r force f r o mi nt erveni ng i n t he l and b a t t l e . 6 The f ol l ow ng mont h, t he Fr ench assured t hev i s i t i n g B r i t i s h Chi ef of t he I mper i al Gener al S t a f f t h a t they pl anned t o strengthent he Magi not Li ne t o count er Germn a i r c r a f t super i or i ty and t h a t they bel i eved anyenem woul d r equi r e an unr eal i zabl e s upr emacy of machi nes t o get over t hea n t i a i r c r a f t def enses . . . . 69

I f at f i r s t t he ai r t h r e a t di d not i mpr ess t he Fr ench, i t c e r t a i n l y upset t he Br i t i s h .St anl ey Bal dwi n' s r emar k t h a t t he bomer woul d al ways get t hr ough i s ampl et est i mony t o B r i t i s h f e a r s about t he ai r t h r e a t . There i s , of course, some i rony here,because at l e as t u n t i l 1937-38 H t l e r di d not s e r i o u s l y consi der Gr eat B r i t a i n as apossi bl e opponent . Never t hel ess, B r i t i s h al ar ms over t he gr owi ng ai r threat andt h e i r hopes of r e a l i z i n g an a i r l i m t a t i o n agr eement bet ween t he Eur opean power swer e a usef ul di pl omati c t oo l t h a t al l owed H i t l e r t o mani pul at e t he i s l andpower .14


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ORGNSANDREPARATIONI f t he t h r e a t of t he Luf t waf f e, al ong w t h t he ar my' s bui l dup i n t he m d - t h i r t i e s ,i mpr ess ed mny Eur opeans w t h t he resurgence of Germn m l i t a r y power , t he

r e a l i t y was a d i f f e r e n t mat t er . The concl usi on drawn f r o m an assessment of anApr i l 1936 war gam i n t he Luf t waff e s t a f f war ned t h a t Germna i r r ear mament thusf ar was i n s u f f i c i e n t and i n f e r i o r t o t he Fr ench ai r force . ' Not u n t i l 1938 di d t heLuf t waff e begi n t o r e a l i z e i t s p ot e nt i a l . Bef ore t h at po i n t , event s i n southern Eur opehad al r eady i nf l uenced t he Luf t waff e' s devel opment .Whi l e t he Germns compl et ed t he f i r s t s t a g e s of r ear mament , t he Spani sh Ci v i lWar occurred . H i t l e r w l l i ngl y pr ovi ded s ubs t a nt i a l ai d t o t he r ebe l s , especi al l y i nt he a i r , but regarded t he war most l y as u s e f u l i n d i s t r a c t i n g Eur ope' s a t t e n t i o n f r o mt he gr owi ng danger of Nazi Germny. For the Luf twaf f e, Spai n was a hel pf ult e s t i n g gr ound f or i t s a i r c r a f t and t a c t i c s . The J u 52 qui ckl y showed i t s l i m t a t i o n sas a bomber and was soon re l egated t o i t s Worl dWar 11 r o l e as a t ransport ; t he He51 bi pl anes pr oved i n f e r i o r t o Russ i an a i r c r a f t suppl i ed t o t he Republ i c . By 1937,t he Germans had i nt r oduced t he Bf 109 f i g h t e r , t he He 111, and Do 17 bomber s , aswel l as a f ew J u 87 di ve bomber s . Al l these a i r c r a f t soon i ndi cated t h e i r r e l a t i v ewor t h . On t he gr ound, t he 88mm l a k gun proved i t s e l f e f f e c t i v e not onl y as ana n t i a i r c r a f t weapon but a l s o agai nst gr ound t a r g e t s . 7 2 The f i g h t e r commnderAdol ph Gal l and, however , f e l t t h a t t he combat exper i ence gai ned i n Spai n l ed theLuf t waff e t o overest i mat e t he per f or mance of a n t i a i r c r a f t weapons, therebyd i s t o r t i n g f u t u r e pr ogr ams f or t he ai r def ense of t he Rei ch . ' sPer haps of greater i mpor t ance, t he Germns l ear ned i nval uabl e combat l essons i nSpai n whi ch they qui ckl y absor bed i n to t h e i r doct r i ne . The devel opment of cl ose ai rsuppor t and cooper at i on w t h t he army cam d i r e c t l y f r o m t he Spani sh C i v i l War .Wol f ramvon Ri cht hof en, Manf r ed' s cousi n, arr i ved i n Spai n out of favor w t h t heAi r M n i s t r y i n Ber l i n . H s concept i on of a i r war upon a r r i v a l was not s u b s t a n t i a l l ydi f f e r e nt f r om mos t ot her Luf t waf f e o f f i c e r s at t ha t t i me ; i n ot her wor ds, cl ose a i rsuppor t f or t he army ranked at t he bottom of h i s p r i o r i t i e s . However , once i n h i sp o s i t i o n as Chi ef of Staff t o t he Condor Legi on, Ri cht hof en r ecogni zed t h a t t het h e o r i e s of ai r power and Spani sh p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s di d not have much i n commn.The st al emate on t he gr ound, t he l ack of s u i t a b l e str at egi c t a r g e t s , and t he greatNat i onal i st weakness i n a r t i l l e r y l ed Ri cht hof en t o consi der usi ng h i s f or ces t osuppor t d i r e c t l y Fr anco' s of f ensi ve agai nst Bi l bao . 74Agai nst cons i der abl e opposi t i on and w t hout o f f i c i a l s a nc t i on , Ri cht hof endevel oped t he t echni que and t a c t i c s of cl ose a i r suppor t f or gr ound forces i nof f ensi ve operat i ons . ' S None of t he el ement s r equi r ed f or such operat i ons exi st edw t h i n t he Luf twaf f e bef ore t he of f ensi ve agai nst t he Basque Republ i c . To begi nw th, t h e r e was an ov er a l l l ack of exper i ence and t echni cal expert i se, f orcommuni cat i on bet ween ground and ai r un i t s ( p a r t i c u l a r l y r a d i o ) di d not yet e xi s t .By t he t i me Ri cht hof en was t hr ough devel opi ng t he concept and t a c t i c s , t heGermans had r ecogni zed t he necessi t y f or cl oser cooper at i on and i mpr ovedpl anni ng bet ween ground and ai r u n i t s , had est abl i shed cl ose communi cat i on l i nksand r ecogni t i on devi ces, and had det ai l ed Luf t waff e l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s t o serve d i r e c t l yw t h f r o n t l i n e u n i t s . Al l of t h i s was due t o Ri cht hof en' s dr i ve and i magi nat i on . ' 6

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The l e s s on s of str at egi c bombi ng wer e more mut ed . On t he one hand, onea f t e r act i on r epor t (Er f ahr ungsberi cht ) went so f a r as t o emphasi ze t he i mpact uponmor al e of bombi ng t he Republ i c' s work f o r c e , i . e . , attacks r e s u l t i n g i n supposedl ybad d i s c i p l i n e amng t he wor ki ng c l a s s . Cont i nuous a t t a c k s even by smal l bomi ngu n i t s agai ns t a s i n g l e c i t y , especi al l y wher e a n t i a i r c r a f t def enses wer e i n s u f f i c i e n t ,had deepl y i mpres sed and depr essed t he popul at i on. Nevert hel ess, t heLuf t waff e' s year book f or 1938 suggested t h a t s t rategi c ai r warf are i n Spai n hadnot occurred f or a var i et y of reasons . The Nat i onal i st s had been i n a posi t i on t odestroy u t t e r l y Madr i d, Bar cel ona, and Val enci a w t h i ncendi ari es but had not doneso because of t he d e l i c a t e p o l i t i c a l pr obl ems i nvol ved i n a c i v i l war . Franco had notat t acked t he maj or ports because these l ay w t h i n t he i nt ernati onal zone and hadnot aut hor i zed a t t a c k s on armament f a c t o r i e s si nce Spai n possessed so f ew. ' e

Conver sel y, Capt ai n Heye of t he Seekri egsl ei t ung (naval hi gh commnd) gai neda d i f f e r e n t i mpr essi on a f t e r t a l ki ng w t h Luf t waff e o f f i c e r s dur i ng a 1938 v i s i t t oSpai n . He reported on h i s r e t u r n t o Ber l i n :Di sr egardi ng t he m l i t a r y success accomanyi ng theLuf t waff e' s usei n i mmd ate suppor t of arm operat i ons, one gets t he i mpr ess i onthat our attacks on obj ect s of l i t t l e m l i t a r y i mportance, throughwhi ch i n mst cases mnywomenandchi l dren . . . were h i t , ar enot a sui tabl e mans t o break anopponent' s res i s tance . Theyseemt o s trengthen hi s res i s tance . . . The mmry of the ai r attack onGuemca by t he (Condor] Legion s t i l l today af fects t he popul a t i onandpermt s no f r i endl y f eel i ngs f or Germny i n thepopul a t i on oft he Basques, whoear l i er were thoroughl y f r i endl y t o Germnyandi n no mnner Communi st i c . 79

S i g n i f i c a n t l y , what ever t h e i r a t t i t u de s t owar ds t he e f f e c t s of bombi ng, t heSpani sh Ci vi l War conf i r med i n somGer mans' m nds t he b e l i e f t h a t f i g h t e r a i r c r a f tand c i v i l def ense measur es woul d be of i mport ance i n t he com ng war . I n 1937,Udet i ncr eased t he pr opor t i on of f i g h t e r s t o bomber s f r o m t he e x i s t i n g 1 - t o - 3 r a t i ot o 1 - t o - 2 . e Mor eover , unl i ke t h e i r counterparts i n B r i t a i n , Germn ai r power experts bel i eved t h a t c i v i l def ense measur es coul d appr eci abl y r educe casual t i es i n an ai ra t t a c k . 8'Spai n al so i ndi cat ed t he d i f f i c u l t i e s of h i t t i n g t a r g e t s by both day and ni ght . Theexper i ence gl eaned f r o m ni ght a t t a c k s pr oved general l y b e n e f i c i a l , whi l e t hepr obl emof h i t t i n g t a r ge t s accur at el y i n dayl i ght m ssi ons hel pedpush Udet t owar dshi s concept i on t h a t every bomer shoul d have a di ve- bombi ng capabi l i t y . At ni ght ,t he Germans di scovered t he d i f f i c u l t i e s not onl y i n f i ndi ng t a r g e t s but i n h i t t i n gthem. Thi s l ed t o a r ecogni t i on t h a t navi gat i onal a i ds wer e c r i t i c a l f or bad weat herand ni ght operat i ons . I n March 1939, Kessel r i ng adm t t ed t h a t even gi ven a hi ghl e ve l of t echni cal compet ence, he doubt ed whet her t he average bomer crew coul dhi t t h ei r t a r ge t w t h any degr ee of accur acy a t ni ght or i n bad weat her . To hel pover come t h i s d i f f i c u l t y , Luf t waff e s c i e n t i s t s exper i ment ed w t h r adi o di r ect i onsys t ems as an a i d t o navi gati on and as a t echnol ogi cal answer t o t he pr obl em ofbombi ng t a r g e t s i n condi t i ons of l i m t e d v i s i b i l i t y . The Kni ckebei n system f i r s tused i n t he Batt l e of B r i t a i n , was a d i r e c t r e s u l t . 8416


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The i nt r oduct i on of a newgenerat i on of bomber s and f i gh t e r s a f t e r 1936causeds e r i ous t r a n s i t i o n pr obl ems . H gh acci dent r a t e s coupl ed w t h l ow i n-comm ss i onr a t e s cont i nued t o pl ague t he t r a n s i t i o n program as l a t e as t he summr of 1938 Att

strategy for defeat the luftwaffe 1933-1945

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