Report of Investigation

into the Fallen Overboard and

Missing of an Ordinary Seaman

on Hong Kong registered cargo ship

Strait Challenger while at anchor

loading log cargo in Malaysia

on 16 September 2010

3 October 2011

Purpose of Investigation

This incident is investigated and published in accordance with the Code of the International

Standards and Recommended Practices for a Safety Investigation into a Marine Casualty or

Marine Incident (Casualty Investigation Code) adopted by IMO Resolution MSC 255(84).

The purpose of this investigation conducted by the Marine Accident Investigation and

Shipping Security Policy Branch (MAISSPB) of Marine Department is to determine the

circumstances and the causes of the incident with the aim of improving the safety of life at sea

and avoiding similar incident in future.

The conclusions drawn in this report aim to identify the different factors contributing to the

incident. They are not intended to apportion blame or liability towards any particular

organization or individual except so far as necessary to achieve the said purpose.

The MAISSPB has no involvement in any prosecution or disciplinary action that may be

taken by the Marine Department resulting from this incident.

Table of Contents

Page

1 Summary 1

2 Description of the vessel 2

3 Sources of information 4

4 Outline of events 5

5 Analysis 7

6 Conclusions 9

7 Recommendations 10

8 Submissions 11

 

 

 

1. Summary

1.1 At about 0805 on 16 September 2010, while the Hong Kong registered cargo ship

Strait Challenger was at anchor loading logs in Miri Anchorage, Sarawak, Malaysia,

the Ordinary Seaman (OS) “Yu” who was working on the lashings over the deck log

cargoes near the ship’s side fell overboard and disappeared into the water.

1.2 Despite search and rescue (SAR) operation conducted by the ship’s crew immediately,

and afterwards by the ship’s lifeboat and a fishing vessel nearby, and continued for

the next 7 days by a local marine police rescue boat and a Malaysia Coast Guard

rescue boat as well as a diver boat, the missing OS could not be found.

1.3

1.4 The investigation r evealed t he following contributing factors:

At the time of the accident, the weather was fine. The sky was clear and visibility

was good. The wind was southwesterly with force 3. The sea state was smooth but

the water was muddy with current setting northeast at a speed of about 1 knot.

• the OS was inexperienced in working deck log cargoes (he had less than 2

months service on log carrier) and he was not briefed by the experienced officers

or ratings of the risks, such as being liable to slip and fall, in working with deck

log cargoes before he was assigned the work.

• at the time of the accident, the guard lines or rails as well as the lifeline were not

erected yet and the OS was neither equipped with a fall protection system nor

wearing a life-jacket when working on the lashings over the deck log cargoes

near the ship’s side.

1.5 Safety factor:

• ship’s safety management manual did not state that crew members should be

protected by guard lines or rails and lifeline (or alternatively by lifeline and fall

protection system applied to them) in addition to protective clothing and

equipment, such as studded boots or studded overshoes and hard hats, when

working deck log cargoes.

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2. Description of the vessel

Strait Challenger

2.1 Ship Information

Flag : Hong Kong, China

Port of Registry : Hong Kong

IMO No. : 8103200

Call Sign : VRVE3

Type : Bulk and Log Carrier

Keel Laid : 15 April 1982

Gross Tonnage : 14,526

Deadweight : 23,418

Length (Overall) : 160.38 m

Main Engine : 1 x B&W Hitachi Zosen Corp - Japan 7L55GFCA

Engine Output (M.C.R.) : 7,723 kW (10,500 hp) at 155 RPM

Service speed : 17.0 knots

Classification Society : Det Norske Veritas

Shipbuilder : Imabari Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. (Japan)

Registered Owner : Mayo Ltd. Inc. (Hong Kong, China)

Management Company : Well Shipmanagement & Maritime. (Taiwan)

Operator : Wisdom Marine Lines SA. (Taiwan)

Persons onboard : 22

2.2 Strait Challenger is a Hong Kong registered cargo ship with 4 cargo holds and 4 deck

cranes of 25 tonnes Safe Working Load.

2.3 The vessel was manned by a Master, 3 deck officers, 5 engineers and 13 ratings at the

time of the accident. The nationality of all the crew members is Chinese.

2

Figure 1 – Strait Challenger

Figure 2 – location of accident

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3. Sources of Information

3.1 The statements of fact jointly by the Master, the Chief Officer, the Third Officer, the

Bosun, the Able-bodied Seaman “Zhang”, and the Ordinary Seaman “Dai” of Strait

Challenger.

3.2 The ship m anagement company of Strait Challenger.

3.3 The company’s investigation report.

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4. Outline of Events

All times are local (UTC+8)

The Accident

4.1 On 14 September 2010, the Hong Kong registered ship Strait Challenger arrived at

and anchored in Miri Anchorage, Sarawak, Malaysia, and commenced loading log

cargoes on the same day.

4.2 At about 0805 on 16 September 2010, the Ordinary Seaman (OS) “Yu” fell overboard

and disappeared into the water when he was working on the lashings over the deck

log cargoes near the ship’s port side at the after part of No. 1 Hatch, see Figure 3. At

that time, the Bosun, the Able-bodied Seaman (AB) “Zhang” and the OS “Dai” were

also nearby working on the lashings over the cargoes in No. 1 Hatch.

Figure 3 – indicating the position on the vessel where the Ordinary Seaman (OS) had fallen

overboard (the photo was taken at sea after vessel departed from Miri Anchorage).

4.3 At the time of the incident, the weather was fine. The sky was clear and visibility

was good. The wind was southwesterly with force 3. The sea state was smooth

with current setting northeast at a speed of about 1 knot.

5

4.4 After OS “Yu” had fallen overboard, OS “Dai” immediately jumped into the water

attempting to search and rescue “Yu”. Shortly afterwards, the duty crew threw a

lifebuoy with rope into the water, and the duty officer, the Chief Officer and the

Master were informed of the accident. After about 5 minutes, OS “Dai” climbed

back to the ship. He could not locate the missing OS and reported that some blood

was observed in the water and the water was muddy.

4.5 At 0835, starboard lifeboat was lowered and launched into the water to search for the

missing OS. At 0852, a fishing boat nearby was requested to assist in the search and

rescue (SAR) operation. Meantime, the Master telephoned and informed the ship

management company of the accident. He also emailed and requested the company

and the ship’s local agent to arrange for and assist in the SAR operation.

4.6 At 0917, the Master sent a distress message to Rescue Co-ordination Centre (RCC)

via Land Earth Station (LES) Yamaguchi in Japan. At 0931, Japan Coast Guard

(JCG) acknowledged receipt of the distress message. The Master then sent an email

to JCG to request them to transfer the distress message to the RCC in the vicinity of

the vessel.

4.7 At 1020, 1140 and 1330, a local marine police rescue boat, a Malaysia Coast Guard

rescue boat and a diver boat arrived scene and assisted in the SAR operation

respectively. The SAR operation continued, but the missing OS could not be found.

At 1600, 18 September 2011, the vessel set sail for bunkering in Singapore and

discharging in Kandla, India.

4.8 SAR operation continued for the next 7 days, however, the missing OS could not be

located and the operation was finally terminated on 23 September 2010.

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5. Analysis

All times are local (UTC+8)

Experience of the missing O rdinary S eaman

5.1 The missing OS was 38 years old. He started his seafaring career on 31 August

2009 and worked on a bulk carrier for about 7 months as his first ship. Strait

Challenger was his second ship, a bulk and log carrier. He joined the vessel on 9

July 2010. He had no experience in working log cargoes before. By the time of

the accident, he only had a total of about 9 months sea service and had less than 2

months shipboard experience on vessel carrying logs. He is considered

inexperienced in log cargo operation. However, the experienced officers and/or

ratings had not brief him of the risks, being liable to slip and fall, in working with

deck log cargoes before he was assigned the work.

Physical Condition of the missing O rdinary S eaman

5.2 The OS had taken a medical examination prior to joining the vessel. There was no

evidence that the OS had suffered from bad health. The other crew members were

not aware that the OS had any medicine/drug or alcohol consumption prior to work

on the day of the accident. The OS was a day worker and he had a continuous rest

period of slightly more than 12 hours prior to the accident. Fatigue is considered not

an issue in this accident.

Working on Deck Log C argoes – S afety E quipment

5.3 When loading in No. 1 Hatch was completed (loading in other Hatches continued),

the crew was tasked to tighten the lashings over the deck log cargoes in No. 1 Hatch.

However, the guard lines or rails and the lifeline (or alternatively, lifeline and fall

protection system applied to crew member) as recommended in the Code of Safe

Practice for Ships Carrying Timber Deck Cargoes, 1991, were not yet erected. The

missing OS was only wearing safety helmet, coveralls, gloves and studded overshoes

but was neither protected by a fall protection system nor wearing a life-jacket at the

time of the accident. Should he be equipped with a fall protection system, he would

be protected from falling overboard. Should he be wearing a life-jacket, he would

be protected from drowning and missing in case of fallen overboard.

5.4 In the ship’s safety management manual, it was not stated that when working deck log

cargoes, the crew members should be protected by guard lines or rails and lifeline (or

alternatively by lifeline and fall protection system applied to them) in addition to

protective clothing and equipment when working deck log cargoes.

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Weather Conditions

5.5 At the time of the accident, the weather was fine. The sky was clear and visibility

was good. The wind was southwesterly with force 3. The sea state was smooth but

the water was muddy with current setting northeast at a speed of about 1 knot.

Weather conditions are considered not attributing to the accident.

Procedures for requesting as sistance from Rescue Co-ordination Centre

5.6 In using the equipment of the Global Maritime Distress Safety System (GMDSS) to

request assistance for this man-overboard situation, the Master sent a distress message

by the Immarsat system via the Land Earth Station (LES) Yamaguchi in Japan to

request the Japan Coast Guard to transfer the distress message to the Rescue

Co-ordination Centre (RCC) in the vicinity of the vessel. He should also preferably

send the distress/urgency message via VHF DSC, MF DSC and HF DSC which

would address all the stations including RCCs and ships, and would be acknowledged

directly and instantly by the RCC or ships nearby.

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6. Conclusions

 

 

 

6.1 At about 0805 on 16 September 2010, while the Hong Kong registered cargo ship

Strait Challenger was at anchor loading logs in Miri Anchorage, Sarawak, Malaysia,

the Ordinary Seaman (OS) “Yu” who was working on the lashings over the deck log

cargoes near the ship’s side at the after part of No. 1 Hatch fell overboard and

disappeared into the water.

6.2 Despite search and rescue (SAR) operation conducted by the ship’s crew immediately,

and afterwards by the ship’s lifeboat and a fishing vessel nearby, and continued for

the next 7 days by a local marine police rescue boat and a Malaysia Coast Guard

rescue boat as well as a diver boat, the missing OS could not be found.

6.3 At the time of the accident, the weather was fine. The sky was clear and visibility

was good. The wind was southwesterly with force 3. The sea state was smooth but

the water was muddy with current setting northeast at a speed of about 1 knot.

6.5

6.4 Weather, he alth c ondition a nd f atigue were considered not attributing to t his accident.

The investigation revealed the following contributing factors:

• the OS was inexperienced in working deck log cargoes (he had less than 2

months service on log carrier) and he was not briefed by the experienced officers

or ratings of the risks, such as being liable to slip and fall, in working with deck

log cargoes before he was assigned the work.

• at the time of the accident, the guard lines or rails as well as the lifeline were not

erected yet and the OS was neither equipped with a fall protection system nor

wearing a life-jacket when working on the lashings over the deck log cargoes

near the ship’s side.

6.6 Safety factor:

• ship’s safety management manual did not state that crew members should be

protected by guard lines or rails and lifeline (or alternatively by lifeline and fall

protection system applied to them) in addition to protective clothing and

equipment, such as studded boots or studded overshoes and hard hats, when

working deck log cargoes.

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7. Recommendations

 

 

 

7.1 A copy of the report should be sent to the owner/management company and the

Master of Strait Challenger informing them of the findings in this accident.

7.2 The owner/management company of Strait Challenger is recommended to issue

notice/circular to draw the attention of their Masters, officers and crew members to

the findings in this report and ensure that

• crew members, particularly inexperienced ones, are to be briefed of the risks,

such as being liable to slip and fall, in working with deck log cargoes before

they are assigned the work;

• crew members are to be protected either by guard lines or rails as well as

lifeline (or, alternatively, by lifeline and fall protection system applied to them)

in addition to the protective clothing and equipment, such as studded boots or

studded overshoes and hard hats, when working deck log cargoes; and

• the above safety procedure and safety precautions are to be incorporated in the

ship’s safety management manual.

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8. Submissions

8.1 In the event that the conduct of any person or organization is commented in a marine

safety investigation report, it is the policy of Hong Kong Marine Department to send

a copy of the draft report to that person or organization for their comments.

8.2 The draft of the safety investigation r eport was sent to t he following parties:

•   The owner/management company of Strait Challenger.

• The Master of Strait Challenger.

8.3 No submissions were received from the parties listed in 8.2.

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