J. EDUCATION POLICY,SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2003 VOL. 18, NO. S, 459-480

Q Taylor & Francis~ T"'&kancisGooup

Public accountability In the age

460 S. RANSON

Yet this 'revolution in accountability', though society's remedy for the loss ofpublic trust, has, ir wiU be argued, generated perverse unintended consequences.The preoccupation with specifying goals and tasks distorts the practice of publicservices as quantifiable models of quality and evaluation increasingly displacesconcern for the internal goods of excellencc. Moreover, rhe regimes of regulariondesigned to enhance public accountability paradoxically strengthen corporate powerat the expense of the public sphere. This paper begins by developing an analyticalframework, before discussing the intensifying patterns neo-liberal of accountabilityembodied in what has become characterized as rhe new puhlic management orgovernance. A critique of this regime, in particular [he erosion oC publicaccountability in public-private partnerships (PPPs), will lead to discussion of analternative mode! of democratic accountabiJity apptopriate to the public sphere.

Understanding accountability

Accountability is a multi-!ayered concept whose meanings need unravelling if senseis to be made of its emerging form (Stewart 1985, 1992, Ranson 1986') and itsconnection to trust, the rationality of which Dunn (1988, 1996) regards as thecentral question of the pOlity4 To be accountable can reveal very different socialrelationsrups, of regulation as against deliberation, and relations that express differentevaluative practices and crireria, of externa! or interna! goods. These relationstllpsand criteria embody potentially divergent modes of securing trust in the publicsphere.

RelatiotlS of reguLation OY reason

To be accountable, conventionally, is to be' he1d lo occount', defining a relationship offormal control between parries, Qne ofwhom is mandatoriJy held to account to rheother for the exercise of roles and stewardship of public resources. Sueh a report,moreover, is always an evaluation ofperformance according to established standards(Elliot 2001). A canonical elaboration of this central, judgemental dimension of'answerability' has been Dunsire's (1978: 41):

Being accounuble may mean . .. no more than having ro answer questions about whar has happened oris happening withn one's jurisciiction ... But mosr usages require an additional implication: the answerwhen given, or the accoullt when rendered, is to be evaluated by the superior or superior body measuredagainsr sorne standard or sorne expeccation, and che differences noted: and rhen praise or blame are ro bemeted Out and sanetions :lpplied. lt is the coupling of informacion wich its evaluaran and applicarion ofsanctions rhac gives 'accountability' or 'answerability' or 'responsibility' cheir full sense n ordinary usage.

Trus understanding locates accountability in the hierarcrucal practices of bUIeau-cracy. Being held to account is experienced as a specific event, such as the annualappraisal, or departmental review, or the annual shareholders (or parents') meeting,in which data on performance is presented for evaluation. Public trust is secured byspecifying pecformance and regulating compliance. It is trus form of accountability,with its potentially punitive image, that has become anathema to professionalcornmuniries who reject its instrumental rationale and techniques. Professionalsbecome subjected to a process that denies their agency (cf. Elliott 2001, Fielding2001, Gleeson and Husbands 2001).

PUBLlC ACCOUNTABILlTY 461

Yet even this conception of formal accountability is rendered problematic inmany parts of the public sphere given the complexity and multilateral nature of'accountable' relationships. Teachers are accountable t governors and che localeducation authority (LEA) but also to parents and the students. Moreover, thepatterns of expectarion and answerability are reciprocaJ. If teachers are required toaccount to parents abour che progress of rheir children, they in turn can havelegitimare expectations that carers reinforce che learning process. Such eomplexitydenies ~ny simple linearity of answerability.

More subtle interpretations follow from che usage of :giving an account' whichemphasizes [he discursive re1ations of accountability. Any request 'to account' forperformance is likely to lead te the giving ofan account, that is, ro offer a srory thatinterprets and explains what has happened and why it has taken place. 'To beaccountable for one's activities is both ro explicare che [easons for them and tosupply the normative grounds whereby they may be justified' (Giddens 1984). The'partners' to education ~ ministers, LEAs, teachers, parents and students - may bringdifferent interpretive schema of what is to count as the purposes and conditions ofeffective achievement. Once accountability is rooted in exchange of accounts ofmeaning and value in contexts ofmultiple and reciprocal answerabilities. conflicts ofpurpose are likely to follow. For Day and Klein (1987) their 'starting point is thataccountability is all about the construction of ao agreed language or currency ofdiscourse about conduct and performance, and the criteria that shoulcl be used inassessing them.' Public trust will be established when the different participants andconstituents of an insticution strive ro reach shared understanding and accountsabout its purposes and practices. Thomas and Martin (1996) he1pfully cal! this rhe'dialogue ofaccountability', recalling Durkheim's (1957: 91) conception ofdialoguebetween governors and the gaverned as the best means of democraticaccountability.

For a number of social theorisrs (Maclntyre 1982, 1999, Habermas 1984,SeanIon 1998) this discursive practice of accountability is not merely confined roorganizational procedure, but defines the reasonableness of communication chatmust inform any just civil society. The obligations we have to each other; that is, togive and cake reasaos/accaunts far our beliefs and actians, enable lTIutualunderstanding and agreement. Accauntability in chis view, as discursive reasan. ische very expression rather chan derna! of our refleetive agency. Our accounts ofaetian make intelligible their intentions and the narrative histories we have authorecland are responsible fOL Accountability in these interpretations is not a surnmons rocompliance but rather provides understanding, as Shotter (1989) argues, ofhow weeonstitute the sense we have of ourselves (our identities) as well as shared ways ofconstructing the meanings that inform our social orders (cf. Wittgenstein 1953,Tully 1995). The positive potential of this intelligible, reflexive accountability hasbeen neglecred in much contemporary theorizing of accountability.

Externai oy internal goods

The relations and purposes of accountability are inescapably evaluative, but thecriteria and judgements vary according to the mode adopted, whether ofhierarchical answerability or cornmunicative [easan. The differences are eaptured inMac1ntyre's (1982, 1988) distinction between 'the extrinsic goods of effectiveness'

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(for example, wealth, status, power) and 'the internal goods of excellence'(such asrealizing the virtues of justice, courage, and friendship). These goods remainendlessly in tcnsian witrun institutional settings.

When rhe emphasis is 00 'holding to account'. rhe orientatian is towardsinstrumentally rational goods ofeffectiveness (Power 1999), creating the culture andtechnology of'performativity' that strives to 'optirnise performance by maxirnisingoutputs (benefits) and rninirnising inputs (costs)' (Lyotard 1997). What begins as anapproach to assessing quality gravitates ro evaluation of efficiency (Elliott 2001).Measures of productivity are created to judge and control the performance oforganizational 'units'. rendering them continualiy accountable. Yer, as Foucaultargues, the accounts produced typically become 'fabrications' of performance,manufactured for their effect as 'accountability' (Ball 2001.). Such regimes ofaccountabiliry dcuy OUT agency, turning liS ioto inauthentic subjects pursuing andresisting rhe imposition of extrinsic goods alone.5

Practices oC communicative rationality, 00 rhe orher hand, rhe mutual givingand taking of accounts, can presuppose a very different habitus of accountability.They entail pursuit of the goods of excellence included in Maclntyre's (1982)understanding of'socially established co-operative activit(ies) through which goodsinterna} to thar form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve thosestandards of excellence which are appropriare to, and partially definitive of, thatform oC activity, with rhe [esult thar human powers to achieve excellence, andhuman conceptions of the ends and goods involved are systematically extended'.Members of the community of practice (embracing the public as well aS theprofession) recognize and draw upon the authority ofstandards which they can trustfor evaluating performance because they have been tested in deliberation. In thepursuit ofexcellence, internal goods replace extrinsic controls, and agency supplantsalienated routines. Reflexive questionjng of achjevement inforn1s the practice ofmutual accountability: things can be done better, the process implies, even whenthey are done well. The accounting for (present) performance and the discursivenegotiating and agreeing of (improved) performance are interrelated processes inthe practice of excellence.

An intensifying regime of neo-liberal governance

The relations and discourses ofaccountability express not only the patterns ofpowerand purpose in public services but teveal the forms of governance of the publicsphere itself6 As Kogan (1988) argued, the task is to get clear the values that shapethe deve10ping forms ofaccountability and distributions of power that they embodyand legitimate. The typology set out in figure 1 conceptualizes the practices,structures and codes of accountability7 within two regimes of governance: the ageof professionalism and the neo-liberal age.

Accountability is a social practice pursuing particular purposes, defined bydistinctive relationships and evaluative procedures. Participating in cornmunities ofpractice shapes the dispositions of its members, their taken for granted ways ofperceiving. judging, imagining, and acting. These socially sanctioned practices arerendered intelligible, Foucault (1991) argues, if we recognize their twofold characteras 'juriclicative and veridicative'. That is on the one hand practices establish andapply norms, controls and exclusions; on the other they render true/false discourse

PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 463

Ace or Tbe Age or Neo-Liberalism

Profrsdonalisll

ProfusionnI ""'"-, Conlraa P~rfoTmQtiw CorporoteAccolUUabilu, AccounUlbility Accollllfabfity Accoumobiry ACCOWlfahility

PRAcnce

Why: Strengthen Strengttlen Strengthen Control

Purpouof elienl nw:I coruUmeT Service(s) Product Fabricl

Accountahility responsiveness EfficicllC)' Quality lnfrastnlcture

Who: Schools lO LENschools Schools lO Schools lO Schools lo

ReUltioll!l 01 LEA lO parents Contractors National Privale/vol.

An.rwerabiliry Guidelincs Corpon..tions

Wlultu

Accounudfor Pupil progress E:llC'ntof c..WVFM $""","'" Capital

choice Efficiency

Haw: Ruluo! ProrC$5iorW Mm" Competitive Public Businesli

AccounJabiry JOOcmcnl Competition Tendwng ,- PI". Critena Specialis! Com_ Tecbnical National ProfitabililY

Knowledge Qloice Efficiene)' $""",_

. n,o Targets.Internal Public Data Costsl VFM Test scoresl Capital gain

Reports (exam results) League tables

STRUCTURE

Administered Client- Ofsted Publicl

Organi;zfllion Administrativc Market Contracto!" Private

Hieran:hy IMSlNC Pannership

p-, LEA Stie/Coosumer COIUJIlC1Or So~ PrivalC 5eCtOI'"Grollndof

"""'rol El"""'" Regulationsl Co"~ SurveiUalJCe! Capital

T~" Change Exil Regulations

CULTURAL

CODE Author;ty of Authority of calculativeJinstrumental racionality

Spedalisl

(dQminan! Knowledge Possessive

di.scol.lr1e; lndividualism lnput/process Output; Surplus

knowledge Tecllnical Valuc-added; Valuel

c1aims Relacive Knowlcdge Technical Profit

Competitive Rationalily

Advantage

Figure 1. A typology oC accountability regimes.

464 S. RANSON

possible. His genealogies sought to understand the descent of practices as a series ofevents - che contrals, disciplines, regulations imposed 00 [he members of apractice.

Stmctures eoneeptualize rhe organizational arrangements, che distribution ofauthority and power and the modes of sanction and regulation, while cultural cadesexpress che regulative principIes, che shared assumptions char constitute what isknown and how it is to be interpreted. Yet, although particular codes are likely rodominare che informing and shaping of institucional practices and structures, oehercodes may be embodied in the dispositions and practices of organizational memberscreating potential conrradictions ofsrructuration and the possibility ofchallenge andchange. Such eontradicrions form distinctive possibilities in che temioos oCaccountability as 'answerability' as against 'cornmunicative acrion'.

The practices of accountability and the dispositions they have engendered havechanged over time since the mid-1970s. Ir will be argued that following the demiseof the age of professional accountability, a regime of neo-liberal corporateaccountability has dominated the governance of education. The distinctivedimensions of chis regime - of consumer choice, of contraer efficiency, quality, andcapital ownership - have been introduced at different times since 1979. While it ispossible ro periodize eheir inception, ir is necessary to see them as, over time,extenmng and intensifying into a coherent regime of regulation. Thus under-standing of the present modes can only be understood by elarifYing the hisroricaland political conditions which have shaped them. Nevertheless, possibilities ofchange may lie in ,he contradictions of accountability within the regime ofgovernance.

Professonal accallntablity ~ate 19705)

The post-war world constituted a political order of social democracy based uponthe principIes ofjustice and eguality ofopportunity and designed to ameliorate elassdisadvantage and elass division (cf. Perkin 1988). Public goods were conceived asrequiring collective choice and redistribution. Thus the significance of systerns ofadministrative planning (the LEA) and institutional organization (the compre-hensive school). Recognition of the complexity ofprofessional purpose and practiceshaped the mode of accountability. Public trust was afforded to the specialistknowledge ofprofessionals and the necessary requirements ofanswerability could befulfilled by delegating authority to heads, teachers, and advisors - only the trainedeye could judge the quality of teaching and the pupil progress (cf. Kogan 1978).Their monitoring of progress was typically informal and ad hoo. Professionalrelationships, though located in administrative hierarchies, formally expressedpartnership, collegiality, and rrust between and within tiers of the service. TheEducation Cornmittee formed the arena for dialogue on public accountability inwhich professional judgements were tested.

It was this professional accountability that the Ruskin speech was designed rochallenge and reform when public trust in professional judgement evaporated. Thequality of public services could not be a private matter for specialists to determinealone. The goods internal to a task couId not be determined alone by teachers andtheir advisors but should be open to deliberation within the public sphere.

PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY

Neo-liberalism - maTkelisalion (from eaTly 1980s)

465

The distinctive interpretive schema that carne to define how the public should holdpublic services to account was that of che Conservative regime of the 1980s. Theirradical reconstruction of education was designed llor merely ro improve 'a service'but also to restructure a purported outmoded poJity (Levitas 1986, King ] 987). Anew poJitica] order of 'neo-liberal' public accountabiJity was constituted, basedupon principIes of rights designed to enbance individual choice. The pubJic (asconsumer) W3S empowered at che expense of the (professional) ptovider. Publicgoods, to achieve equity rather than equality, were conceived as aggregated privatechoices and interests that would better than public planning deliver the goals ofopportunity and social change.

In educaran rhe new system of governance would provide parents withinformation to hold schools to account, choose schools, appeal and registercomplaints. A quasi market of increasingly differentiaced and autonomous schoolswouId, ir was believed,8 [oster eompetition and improvement ofperformance, whileservices would become more accountable when they were marle to respond directlyto [he choiees of individual consumers. tnformation and choice in the marketplaceprovide an aCCQunt for consumers thar secures trust for public services. As in orherforrns of market exchange, the products which thrive can only do so because theyhave the support of consumers.

Neo-libeTalism - controct managemenl: stTengthening legal Tegulation (fTomeaTly 1990s)

Public services, moreover, would fiourish more effectively if they modelled theirmanagement practice 00 (he privare sector. A 'new public management' (pollitt1990, Hood ]992, Stoker 1999) was promoted, asserting that there was one modelof management and it was private. Services, Stewart and Stoker (1995) proposed,wcre encouraged to value [he customer, plan strategically, target resourees and, inparticular, to adopt private sector models oC contraet management:

the sepaTalion of the pUTchaseT Tole fTom the pTovideT Tole: in all parts of the publicservice there has been a separation of the role of determining what shouJd beprovided from the role of the provision of a service. The language varies:principal-agent; purchaser provider; client-eontraetor.

thegrowth cifcontractual or semi-contractual arrangements: traditionally, public sectororganisations have becn structured for direct hierarcrucal control or rebaneeon proCessionalism; the purchaser provider developments reveal a newmovement to control through contracts (Stewart and Stoker, ] 995: 3).

jlexibility ofpay and condition" national scales and conditions are challenged bymarket conditions and by performance related pay as the means ofmotivation.

Many authorities began their iniciation into contracting in the early 1990s byintroducing formal 'service level agrcements' to ensure that scrvices would bedelivered between departments in a businesslike way, defining its range ofcustomers, consulting and negotiating with them agreed levels oC service to be

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incorporated in their development plans. As the contract culture spread (cf. Ainley1999, Ooogan 1999) some LEAs redesignated their whole organization as a client-contractor relationship so char services were rationalized and facused on customerdemand; costs were defined and charging arrangements darified; marketing ofservices was improved. LEAs created self-financing business units (indudingadvisers, professional development and training, careers, and adult education) andbegan to plan for services ro be 'externalized' or 'outsourced' to privare sectorproviders.

Public management, it was argued, is improved by adopting the contract cultureof the privare sector to ensure che efficient delivery of services. Conrracts enforcedear accountabiliry for public servants, ensuring they are answerable for the serviceJevels delivered, the resource targets set, and the outcomes acmeved. Theperfornlance crlreria for accountability embody cIear, technical, means-endrationality. Trust is secured in the increased specification of purpose, task andcondition of service delivery.

Neo-liberalism - product performativity: strengthening the audit state (!romearly 19905)

This preoccupation with specification, wmch accountabiliry generates, began toreach into the pedagogic core as well as the supporting services. A principal purposeof the 1988 Education Reform Act was 'aboye all to raise standards ofattainment forall pupils by a better definition of what is to be taught and learnt .. .' believednecessary for enhancing qualiry and accountabiliry and for securing the trust andconfidence of the parent body in what schools were offering. The NationaJCurriculum provided the vemde for tms greater specification oflearning9 enablingaccounts of achievement to be presented in public league tables that would informparents' market chotees. [o chis way performance accountability and coosumeraccountabiliry wouJd become mutually reinforcing through improved schoo]managenlent.

It has been New Labour, however, that perceived increased definition ofperformance as the central vehicle for improving standards of attainment lO:'standards nat structure' perceived as the key to standards. A new Standards andElfectiveness Unit at the OfEE in 1997 signalled the inrention to draw together andcodity the best knowledge from research and practice of schooJ improvement andeffectiveness and submit them ro the reguJatory power of the state. lmproving theperformance of schools required increasingly meticulous specification of the'inputs', processes, and outputs that are expected of schools (cf. Gleeson andHusbands 2001, Fielding 2001): schemes ofwork are defined, learning outcomestargets set (especially in 'core skilis' and at key stages); teachers' work is monitoredand appraised; and schools prepare development/improvement plans defining asystem of managing performance that head teachers are ro lead and are accountablefOL Husbands (2001: 11) deconstructs the model:

School targets can be derived from natonal targets; and teacher and pupil targets from school targets. In theshort term, it is almost ceruin th.at the sharper focus .and de6ncd t3rgets brought by perform.anceman.agement systems will delivcr higher levels oC .att3inment in exterrul testS and examin.arions ... It is lessde.ar tbat (these s:ystems) will in me medium term produce .a 'narion equipped ror rhe challenges ndopportuniries of a new mllenruum.

PUBLlC ACCOUNTABILlTY 469

accountable to whom, for what, and how is this accountability to be effected overwhat periods of time' Yet specifications at any point of time, because they lacksufficient clarity, inevitabJy fail to realize their purposes and are superseded by evermore comprehensive and detailed specifications. A cycle of accelerating regulationbegins. The purpose of accountability legitimates the creation of detailedregulations that ensure the compliance ofprofessionaJ practitioners. Fielding (2001)and the Gleeson and Husbaneis' (2001) collection ilJuminate the maJaise caused bythe detajJed, prescriptive intervention into educarian at every level from state policymaking to classroom pedagogic practice.

When 'formal answerability' is introduced to organizations, accountability isrypically experienced as an instrumental event, as with [he annual review orappraisal. Yet there is an inexorable tendency Cor [he event t become acontinuous process, an orientaran to shape and reshape rhe ccurse of practice.There is al1 orientation te acrian etnbodied in the putpases and relations ofaccountability. A critical evaluatian of performance implies, and requires, a searchto redeem and enhance performance in rhe future: practice can always beimproved. The accounting for present performance and the improving of futureperformance are embodied in the expectations of accountability. Those whoiniciare schemes of accountability want ir t become a routine disposition ofpublic service professionals, shaping their modes of thinking, feeling, speaking,and acring.

The rwo treneis - of increasingly specific regulation and internalized disposition- fuse together into an intensive system of performativity. Ball (1998, 2001 a, b)captures how the rituals and routines of performance surveillance bite deeply intothe attitudes, practices, and identides of state professionals. Performativity worksfrom the outside in, through reb'U]ations, controls and pressures, but a]so from theinside out, colonizing lives and producing new subjectivities: what we see here is aparticular set of'practices through which we act upon ourse1ves and one another inorder to make us particular kineis ofbeing.'13 Such performativity, experienced as aregime of externally imposed controls, generates identities disciplined by targets,indicators, measures, and records oC performance. The preoccupation with theselneans of effectiveness often leads, moreover,' as Eal] points out, to the perversefabrication of performance, constructions, and selections of the truth produced tocreate the most beneficial account'.

How is this intensifYing regime of performativity to be explained? Organiza-donal theorists have become interested in the tendency for insritutions to developmomentum towards a 'design type', the tendency of organizations to evolve in onedirection, realizing enhanced structural cOl1sistency and coherence: there is a'gravitational puU' towards a design type (Greenwood and Hinings 1993, Ferlie el al.1996, Hinings el al. 1997). An organization which begins to operate with therudiments of a design option will be pulled toward the option by the internalconsistency, the 'Iogics of action', embodied in the dominant organizing principie.Institutiol1s, therefore, find it difficult to move out of a dominant design mould.They become captured by the capacity of a system to institutionalize prevailingassumptions and 'myths' or culturally entrenched rules.

The historicaJ narrative of the accumulating purposes and reguJatory mecha-nisms of accountability suggests the temporal longevity of implementing publicpurpose expressed in the Ruskin speech 25 years ago. Moreover, it does indeedindicate ao institutional system in the grip of a gravitational pull or nlomentum

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rowards a design rype revealed in the drive ro intensify specification and control. Burthe codes of rhis design are to be discovered less in technical prescriptions of aservice than in the organizing principIes of the social and political order. Thedominant relations of accountability are nor value-neutral but reveal rhe practices,structures, and codes that shape the public sphere. The forms of accollntabiliryexpress: the public purposes that are valued; the knowledge claims that are regardedas authoritative; and whose authority acquires legitimacy. Answers to rhesequestions in the public sphere define a conception of the public good underpinnedby a structure oC power and authority: accountability eonstitutes and evaluares cherelationship of the public ro rhe poliry.

The principIes informing the strucruration of accountabiliry over two decadeshave been a key aspeet oC che wider neo-liberal restructuring oC governance: apolitical theory ofperformativiry asserting that an effective public sphere wilJ be one(har makes public services answerable to che pressure of competiran and cheincentive oC relative advantage in che marketplace. The historical coalescing andintensifying specification oC practice - strengthening che consumer, contraer law,state audit, and earparare power - are aH designcd to create the education serviceas a sphere of market exchange relationships, in which the actors are provided withan account of quantifiable performance rliat enables them ro calculate their re!ativeadvanrage in comperition. This neo-liberal governance reveals its informing cade ofthe pllblic sphere: the neutral principIes of negative liberry according rights toindividuals and individual corporations ro pursue their interests unfettered by anypublic authoriry which seeks ro do more than regulate market exchanges in serchofjustice. Rights ofpossessive individllalism override substantive conceptions of thecommon good. What this is eroding is any conception of the public good ascolleetive good dcrcrmined through demoeratic participation, contestation, andjudgement in the public sphere. It seeks to replace politics (substantive rationaliry)with contract (technically rational Sollltions).

This regime of neo-liberal accountabiJiry, designed to restore trust to publicservices has, however, had the unintended consequence of further eroding publictrust in the stewardship ofpublic services because it has embodied flawed criteria ofevaluation and relations of accollntabiliry. The dominant mode of answerabilirycannot deliver achievement because it defines a misraken criteria of evaluatingperformance, emphasizing the external imposition of targets and quantifiableoutcomes as the means of improvement. This is at the expense of a pedagogy thatworks 'inside-out', encouraging learners to recognize their capability andmotivating them to enter into and remake the narratives that give meaning to theirlives (cf. Geertz 1975, Bruner 1996, Bakhurst and Shanker 2001). The financier'saccounts and rabIes cannor provide the conditions for achievement that grow out ofacquiring the internal goods of reflective agency (Taylor 1995, Maclnryre 1999)within learning communities. The dominant system of rolations of publicaccounrabiliry has, moreover, been transmuted into a system of corporate and stareregulation in pursuit of external goods, rhar cannor deliver public trust because ircannot secure the agreements between diverse interests which form the conditionfor trust in the construcrion of public services.

This analysis suggests that an institlltion of public accollntabiliry that wishes rosecure achievement and trust rests upon, at eaeh level of the public sphcre, processcsof deliberation that enable undcrstanding and agreement out of differing accountsofpublic purpose and service. At each leve!, whether the communiry ofstudents or

PUBLIC ACCOUNTABlLITY 471

the wider community of citizens, the accounts to be deliberated are those of whowe are and what we are to become.

This dialogue of accountability presupposes a public sphere informed by verydifferent principies trom the neo-liberal polity: a sphere of public goods to bedetcrmined through participatian in collectlve deliberanon in [he purpases andconditions of citizenship.

In seareh of an aiternative model of publie aeeountability

The age of accountability rejected professional internal regulation and substiruted aregime of neo-liberal corporate regulation. Neither are adequate models of publicaccountability: professional accountability omits the public, empowering theproviders (though at least recognizing a distant representative democracy), while theregime of earparare accountability acomizes che public and empowers secciona!interests. (The intriguing question is raised whether marketization has had theparadoxical effect oC restoring the producer power, now as earparare power?)

Are alternative models of accountability available? Some (Macbeath 1999,Macbeath and Mortimore 2000, Eliiott 2001) strive ro restore the paradigm ofprofessional self-regulation, but the internal goods of learning - its meanings,purposes, and practices - cannot be determined alone by a specialist knowledge thatsuperintends over che cornmunity oflearning rhus diminishing essential voices andaccounts. The most influential proposal for 'resroration' has been O'Neill's (2002b)Reith Lectures, A Question ofTrust. O'Neili (cf. 2002a) demes that there is a crisisoflost trust, while agreeing that the regime of target-setting answerability has beendamagillg, distorting professional purpase and erecting central1zed bureaucraticcontrol. The remedy is not [he surveiUance oC market inspectorates, nor consumeristrights. Democracy and transparency are not the basis of, but rather depend upon,trust, which irself grows out the social capital of active, duties-oriented citizenship.The remedy is, she proposes, ro restore good governance through self-governinginstitutions accountable ro the knowledgeable independent specialisr (for example,HMI). The claims ofprofessionals should be scrutinjzed by an informed public thatcan depend on good libraries and an honest media for its opinions. This describesan archaic polity. The public is expected to restore control of public services to theprofessional specialisr, whose accountability resides in the presentation of informa-tion. There is no recognition here that the internal goods of meaning and purposeare properly the subject of public deliberation requiring shared understanding andagreement if the conditions oflearning are to be realized. More serious is the failureto recognize that it is precisely these democratic processes and conditions thatconstitute the social capital of active citizenship and trust. The conditions for trustmay be established if citizens are included in the public space, and their voice heardjn public deliberations that provide the basis for just public policy and distribution.It is the democratic institutions of the public sphere that constitute the conditionsof trust and mutual accountability. Justice and voice are the foundation ofdispositions of duty in civil society.

Others have sought to reform public accountability by fashjoning a concept ofpartnerslUp that integrates private and public into a ('third way') notion of hybridaccountability. Two models are of interesr here: the lnstitute of Public PolicyResearch (lPPR 2001) Commission on PPPs and the New Local Government

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Netwotk's Submission to House '!f Commons (Stoker and Williams 2001). The PPRargue that accountability is essential for the success of PPPs, which in tum canimprove accountability if they clisplay three principIes: transparetley, clarity of roles,and responsibility and responsiveness to adapt to citizens' needs. These principIesnecessariJy inform difrerent kinds of accountability. Politieal designates theappropriate level of democratic body which has responsibility for cornmissioningand monitoring particular public services. Legal and financial determine thoseprovisions ofpublic law, contract law, and auditing and accounting procedures withwhich the decisions ofministers and oflicials must comply. Managerial designates thesetting of targets for performance, the provision of incentives, speciflcation ofcontracts, measuring of resules to ensure thar [he managers of particular services areresponsible for the quality of services they deliver. Citizen and user designate theprovision of informaran, forms of redress, and opportunjties fOI consultatian andparticipation both to the wider public and to patticular groups of service users.

The IPPR Cornmission condudes that the traditional polarisation betweenpublic (democratic) and private (market) modes of accountability is nowinadequate. Hybrid forms of public service otganization require hybrid forms ofaccountability. Partnersrups allow service users ro exercise their democratic voiee,whiJe service providers will be encouraged by financial pressures to deliver highquality public services. Use of partnership boards a1so enables representatives tomonitor performance whilst a1so acting as guarclian of the public interest. In suchways 'the shift towards pluralism in procurement and/or provision ... can go handin hand with more cliverse and efrective forms of accountability.'

Yet, though helpfully darifYing aspecrs of accountability, this report fails tocapture the defining characteristics of accountability for the public sphere. TheprincipIes climinish the necessity for democratic control ofpartnerships in the publicsphere. Democratic contestability, furthermore, needs to be strengthened toemphasize 'voice' but a1so collective deliberation, judgement and choice ofpartnership deeision-making. Within boards, public representatives are more chanmorutors of performance, and will be unable [O propese new forms oC provision oract as guardians of public interest unless they have a controlling voice. The practiceof'boards' raises issues ofpower and representation in che public sphere. Can boardsbe democratic or are they ilJusrrations of'the new magistracies'? Are 'stakeholder'models appropriate to the public sphere selecting 'representative individuals' ratherthao democratically elected representatives? This illuminates the nature ofboards asadministrative rather than den10cratic public spaces sueh as forums or councils.

The New Local Government Network (NLGN) model of accountabilityimproves on the [PPR Commission's democraric limitations. Public services ofnecessiry require enhanced evels of public accountability to a broader range ofstakeholders. Private or voluntary sector organizations have to work within theseboundaries. Ultimate accountability for the delivery of a public service shoulda1ways rest with the cornmissioner of the service - the public body. Thus public-private partnerships cannot mean 'outsourcing' the accountability for that service.To this extent, local politicians need to take the lead in explaining to the public whythe counciJ is engaging with a voluntary sector panoer.

The NLGN recognize that the picture of accountability is a complex anddeveloping one in local government. Recent changes to politicaJ structures and aclearer distinction between executive and scrutiny responsibilities of individualcouncillors have both helped (in clarifYing responsibilities) and hindered account-

PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 473

ability for the performance ofPPPs (the scrutiny function focusing too much on theprivate sector neglecting the public parrner). Local aurhorities should have thepower to join up public service delivery agents at the locallevel when the effectiveachievement of service outcornes necessitates chis. There is the need, ir is arguedpersuasively, for the Government to impose a duty on other Jocal public bodies tohave regard to the community plan of the local aurhority as a practical tool foraffirming local governmenr's broader community leadership.

This perspective of the Local Government Network signi6cantly strengrhensthe public dimensions of accountability. It emphasizes and secures public control.Ver the question arises whether partnerships can survive the implied hierarchy ofcontrol which privileges the public parrners, and whethet pattnerships survive theflexibility of political choice that is a necessary characteristic of the public sphere. Itis not just that risk cannot be transferred from the public to the sector, but thatjudgements of the collective good may change over time, and require ro beexpressed in the public choice. The NLGN's paper, therefore, although extendingthe scope ofaccountability, nevettheless lacks a conception of the public sphere andthus the de6ning characteristics of democratic public accountability. For this reasonit remains unable to address the signi6cant issues of rhe reconcilability of public andprivate goods, of contract and deliberation in the public sphere. ls an alternativeavailable?

Towards democrarlc accountability in tbe public sphere

Corporate/contract accountability is inappropriate to the public sphere. The goodsof effectiveness need to be subordinated [Q [he internal goods of a service thar canonly be clari6ed thtough delibetation in the public sphere. The discussion aboutanswerability turns on the need to clatify the democratic governance of publicaccountability. Rhodes (1997), Whit6eld (2000), and Newman (2001) emphasizeche need to reconstruct [he governance of accountability as a democratic practice.yet its principal characteristics remain attenuated in eheir writing.

The public sphere is inescapably a political space because it is the space ofcollectivity, constituted to undertake the tasks that individuals cannot do alone butonly together as a collectivity (Ranson and Stewatt 1995, Peters 1996, Coole 2000).These ate ofthree kinds: public goods and setvices (e.g. stteet lighting); establishingcollective efliciency (e.g. regulating ttafrie congestion); and, most significantly,constituting collective ruJes and purposes. These are fundamental because the deeppurpose of the public sphere is to constitute the social and political preconditionsthat make society possible, the agreements that enable sociallife to proceed: who isto be a member, what rights and ducies are expected, and what will CDunt as fairdistribution of goods and opportunities. Such decisions will determine the basis ofjustice and well-being in society: they will remain essentially contested, onlyachieving legitimacy through democratic deliberation.

An alternative perspective ofaccountability begins by recognizing this agonisticplurality and contestation at the centre of the public sphere. Public services andinstitutions, serving and constituted by a plurality of actors, of publics, must reachshared understanding and agreement abollt whar are their incernal goods (meanings,purposes, and practices). Any linear, hierarchical and regulatory concept ofanswerability is misplaced in this contexto The very language and discourse that

474 S. RANSON

construe che purpases and achievements ofa public service will, and should, refIecta social and political process. That process will gain the consent of the constituentpublics when it has enabled each to join a dialogue about the accounts, theinterpretive schema, and normative grounds rhar should inform che pracoces of thepublic service. Accountability, in chis understanding, even if initiatcd in requests foran account, will ensue in a narrative of che comnlunicative acrien, che giving andtaking of [casans, at che centre of che public sphere. Democratic governance oCaccountability, following these principies, wou1d constitute the followingpractices.

Membership and the politics ofpresf>ue: an inclusive democratic cornmunity would gofunher, however, striving to ensure rhar che multiplicity of differences within acornmunity were present, racher rhan merely represented, within the governingbody. Governance needs te be a space responsive to the politics ofdifference (Young1990), recognition (Taylor 1992, Tully 1998) and the politics of presence (Philljps1995) so that the voice of the marginalized is brought into the centre.

Participation, equality 01 voiee and dissent: citizens acquire status and rights as membersof the polity, but their principal obgations are to active1y participate and contributeto hfe and dehberations of the public sphere. Voice is the most distinctivecharacteristic of the public space, capturing its essential feature of citizens spealcingout to cornmunicate their claims and protests (Hirschmann 1970). thersemphasize the need to recognize che source of trus voice in che politics of dilferel1tsocial and cultural identities, as well as the contested nature of public purpose(Gilligan 1982, Williams 1998). Each has a right to speak and have their say,inc1uding questioning, scrutinizing and opposing dominant groups and the statusquo: 'the possibility ofeffective opposition is an essential requirement ofdemocraticjustice' (Shapiro 1999: 39). Questioning enables information te be brought into thepublic eye and te be discussed, it allows evidence te be scrutinized and interrogated.Questions are the vehicle [Q ensure thar the performance of a public institution iscontinually and reflexive1y monitored and evaluated (Giddens 1990, 1994). Scrutinyis the opportuniry for learning in the spaee of governance.

Deliberation and the space of reason: opposition and challenge can only be resolvedthrough a multi-sided conversation that allows the participants to deliberate theirdifferences (cf. Benhabib 1996, Bohman 1996, Bohman and Rehg 1997, Dryzek2000). The principie of democracy classically was that of'proper discussions' - offree and unrestricted discourse, with all guaranteed a right to eontribute in order [Qground decisions in the force of the better argument, the open giving and taking ofreasons as grounds for conc1usions (cf. Dunn 1992).

The deliber:uive process of democratic decision-m3king requires thar each participant not only permit theothen to express their views and offer their judgements bUl uke ornen' views seriously ioto account inarriving at his or her ownjudgement. Clearly this does not require agreement with the views ofothers, butrather scrious a[tenrion to, and respect for, their views. Such reciproca! respect also presupposes thatdisagreements be tolerated and nor suppressed (Gould 1988: 88).

For Habermas (1984, 1990, 1996), the processes of argumentation whicheharaeterize diseourse are oriented towards reaching shared understanding thatgrows out of a mutual eomrmtment to enter the space of public reasons (cf.McDowell, 1998, Scanlon 1998)14

PUBUC ACCOUNTABIUTY 475

Critics, anxious abolle the exclusionary possibilities embodied in any'monolingual' concept ofpublic reason, argue that participants should be allowed tospeak in their own voices and customary ways so rhar by careful listening they canbegin to grasp their cornmon and interwoven histories (Young, 1990, 1997, 2000,Tully 1995). There is no transcendental standard from which to judge theconversaran: lthey can only listen to the voices of daube and dissent within andreconsider their present arrangement'. or should participants be silenced orcons~ained to speak within che tradition of any particular institution. Gadamer(1975, cf. Warnke 2002) argues that this more inclusive process, through whichindividuals and communities enter a more and more widely defined communty ofshared understanding, learn through dialogue to take a wider, more differentiatedview, and thus acquire sensitivity, subtlety and capacity for judgement.

Judgement and colleetive nile: The deliberative processes help them to lead tojudgement about what is to grow out of the understanding - what is to be done.A faculty is required, Beiner (1983) argues, which avoids the illusion ofdeterminingobjective decisions. while at che same time avoiding che immanent possibility ofarbitrary subjectivism. Judgement offers this indispensable faculty which requiresindividuals through deliberaran to reach detached reasans for decisions and acrion.The issues that we face in everyday public life are then made amenable ro reflecrivereason, public discourse, dialogue, and comman choice. Democratic governanceembodies collective choice, and popular control over decisions (Beetham 1994,1999, Weir and Beetham 1999). There is, however, no necessary one best decisionrule for democratic civil society, Shapiro (1999: 36-37) argues: 'the goal is to rakesocial relations as we find them and to discover ways to democratise them ...(appropriate to] ... the different domains of civil society'.

Aaountability: Scrutiny and deliberarion lead to collective choice and a rerurn ropublic accounrability. Accountability is a defining qualiry of the public spherebecause it institutionalizes a discourse about purposes, practice, and perfornlanee. 'Itis a social and political process' (Day and Klein 1990: 2). For Simey (1988) andStewart (1999, 2000) the obligation to conununicate with and explain to the publicis the foundation of a democratic polity because the authority and consent forpublic services derives from the public, and without that the legitimacy of the publicsphere withers. Public accountabiliry arriculares a theory of political authoritygrounded in the consenr of society. That authoriry resides with the public and isdelegated to representatives and officials on candition that they, in turn, account tothe publico The strucruring of the institution implies rhar consent has continually tobe tested and reaffinned. The traditional form of holding to account and of testingconsent has been the periodic election. This by itself is inadequate and needs to becomplemented by an active citizenship which alone can authorize and give consentto the polity.

Such structuration of power will embody the dominant values about the formof governance, of inclusion and exclusion, of eitizenship and social justice. Becausethese c1assificatians of who we are and what we are to become can be recognizedas social constructions, we can also learn that they are amenable to revision. Systemsof governance acquire authority if they are perceived as legitimate, that is, if theyhave wide supporr, and when legitimare they endure over time. This emphasizes theconstructed nature of democratic governance.

476

Contradiction and change in community governance

S. RANSON

The remedy for purported erosion of trust, ofa regime of performativity and publicaccountability, has worked only ro distort performance (by substituting a fabricatedinstrumental rationality) and has displaced the public it was meant to serve. This isbecause any framework of accountability reveals the polity it expresses. Aninstrumental, regulatoty model of accountability has deve10ped with increasingintensity ayer titne because it has served to express and reinforce che neo-liberalpolity of market exchange. and che incentives of relative advantage: competitian,contract, eorporate ownership have becn eonstituted as che mast effective means offormalizing accountability and evaluating performance.

This neo-liberal regime cannot realize its purposes of institucional achievementand public trust. Achievem,ent grows out of che interna] goods of motivatian toimprove (that follows recognition and the mutual deliberation of purpose) ratherthan the external imposition of quanti6able targets, while public trust followsde1iberation ofcommon purpose out ofdifference and discord, rather than forces ofeompetition chat only create a hierarchy of class advantage and exclusion.

Trust and achievement can only emerge in a framework ofpublic accountabilitythat enables different accounts of public purpose and practice ro be de1iberated ina democratic public sphere: eonstituted to inelude difference, enable participatan,voice and dissent, through to collective judgernent and decision, that is in turnaccountable ro the public.

Where is such a democratic accountability to emerge from when the publicsphere is within the iron design type ofneo-liberal corporate regulation? The spacesof contradiction in community governance may provide a glimpse of the possibilityfor securing transformation and renewal (cf. Engestrom 1999a, b, Daniels 2001).The institutional framework of community governance (including neighbourhoodforums, institutional governing bodies, and local councils) are contradicrory spaces,whose members - as Deem, Brehony and Heath (1995) powerfully argue in termsof school governing bodies - are con6gured both as conscripts of the state(implementing regimes of performance regulation) and as citizens (representinglocal communities in the public sphere)ls Yet, whatever the present duality oftension enlbodied in these spaces of governance, they are, nevertheless, constitutedenough as local arenas ofcitizenship to enable local communities to appropriate anddevelop them as democratic spheres. This can take place when conununities learnto recognize that their identities and futures depend upon conunitting themselves rothe internal goods of improvement embedded in institutional practices ofdemocratic citizenship and governance (Hirst 2000, Nixon et al. 2001).

Notes

1. This paper has been devcloped as a background study of governance and accountability for the study ofvoluntcer citizens in che governance of education, a projeet for the ESRC Democracy and ParticipationProgramme (No. L21525243). I would likc to chank a number of colleagues for thcir helpful criticalcommentary: Stephen Sall, David Beetham, Michael Fielding, Jon Nixon, Lindsay PateNon, Helen Sullivan,and John Stew:art.

2. October 18, 1976, Ruskin College, Oxford3. see a!.so Ranson and Stewart, 19944. For John Dunn (1988), trust as 'the capacity to commit oneselfto fulfilling rhe legitimare expectations ofomeN,

is both me constitutive virtue of, and rhe key causal precondition for, the existence of any society', 31so Dunn

PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILlTY 477

(1996: 98) " .. what politics comises in ... is:lo hugc array offree agcnts copiog with eaeh echen' freedom aYertime. In politics so understood che rationality aCerust will a1ways be che mos[ fundamental question'. See alsoRamon and Stewart, 1998.

S. er. che work ofBrian Friel (Tmnslations) andJamcs Kelman (Translattd Aaolmts) who explore che eontesting :londnegoeiatmg of imperial 'official accounts' aver indigcnous accounts in me Celtic narioos.

6. 'Governance' will be defincd, drawing on Stoker (2000), as che system of govcrning collectivc aniao in chepublic sphere :l.nd es partern of legitimating authority. This i5 a neutral de6nition leaving open che particub.rforms governancc ntight cake (cf. Rhodes 1997, 2000. 2002, Peters 2000, and Pierre and Peten 2000, Richardsand Smith 2002). Peters distinguishes between 'tr.l.ditiollill govern;mee' which focused on me eapacity of thesute to steer and conuol society, and 'the new governance' in which politica! insrirutions no longer neeessarilyexercire a monopoly of control, and colleerive aerion is networked through a plurality of differenriared centresof power across public, private, and \'alunury sector boundaries.

7. [heorises ofpracriee: Giddens, Bourdieu, Maclntyre, Foucaulr, Delueze.8. Research srudies have been sceptiea! ofrhe beneficia! effects ofcampetinon: cf. Gerwitz, S., Ball, S. and Bowe,

R. (1995) Marltets, Choiu and &l4iry in Edl4cation (Buckingham: The Open University Press); Gewinz, S. (2002)School markets and locality: an exploranon of difference in the English educanon market place, in C. Hudsonand A. Lidstrom (eds), Local Educaton Polines: compllring Swedcn and Brilain (Landon: Palgrave); Fitz, J., Halpin,D. and Power, S. (1993) Grant Mainlained Schools: education in Ihe market place (Landon: Kogan Pagel; Whitty, G.,Power, s. and Halpin, D. (1998) Devolution atld Choice in Education: the school Ihe slale a/ld the mlJrkel (Buckingham:Open University Press).

9. me process had begun with a Consulutive Document, A Framnro'*Jor che School CUlTUlum (DES 1980), andcontinued wirh me Whire Paper Belfer Schoou (DES 1985).

10. the Ieey instruments of policy have been: White Paper, Excelleuce iu 5"1001s (OrEE 1997); Senool Sralldards amiFramework Aa (1998); Literacy and Numeracy Hours/Strategy; Green Paper 'IeacnerJ Meeting Ihe Challenge 01Change (OlEE 1998).

11. Regular comrnenuries on PPPs have been filOO by Win Hunon in the Obsm;v; Fra.ne~ Becken and GeorgeMonbiat in Ih~ Guardiatl; Niek Cohen in The Nrw Stafesman and me Obsetw1.

12. Whitfield (1999, 2000, 2001) argues th3t it is unlikcly mar [he priv:lte sector will sponsor buildings withoutreg;rd for the performance of me institutions they support: 'In the longer term it is inconeeivable that PFIprojects will be conflllcd tO buildings and support services, or that only a relatively smaU pan of the educationinfrastructure will be privately provided. PFI comortia have a vcsted imerest in [he quality of teaching andperformance of schools rhey operate because this helps t maintain full capacity 3d maximize income &cmthird-party use offaciliries'. The division between core and non---core publie service is nor inflexible. 'By theirnature private companies 3re constandy searching for means of diversifYing and expanding markcts' (2000, p.83). Whitfield envisages that the privatizing of the infi-astructure will cad over time to the more generalcommercialization of education and the involvement ofbusiness in learning and teaching - ror example, salesof JCT Jearning packages.

13. Ball, S. (200la) op cit., p. 213 (quoting Rose, N. (1992)).14. See Pinkard 1996 and 2002 for the rooes ofthe space ofreason in Hegel and in Sellars (1963).15. Cf. Radnor, H., Ball, S. andVincent, C. (1997) 'Whither dcmocratic accountability in educaron?', Researcll

Papers in Educarion, 12(2), 205-222; and Nixon, J., Allan, J. alld Mannion, G. (2001) Educational renewal asdemocratic practice: 'new' community schooling in Scotland, Inlematjonal joumal oJ Inc1usillt Educatjon, 5(4),329-352.

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