stemming the tidepdf document

Stemming the Tide of Flood Losses

Stories of Success fromThe History of Missouri’sFlood Mitigation Program

Missouri State Emergency Management Agency

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State Emergency ManagementAgency

P. O. Box 116Jefferson City, MO 65102

Homepage:http://www.sema.state.mo.us/

semapage.htm

e-mail: [email protected]

Stemming the Tideof Flood Losses:

Stories of Successfrom the History of

Missouri’s Flood Mitigation Program

Mel CarnahanGovernor, State of Missouri

Gary KempkerDirector, Department of Public Safety

MG John D. HavensAdjutant General

Jerry B. UhlmannDirector, SEMA

Beaufort “Buck” Katt,Assistant Director, SEMA

Destin FrostState Hazard Mitigation Officer

Susie Stonner, Editor

This document was produced bythe Missouri State EmergencyManagement Agency (SEMA).

Special Acknowledgement tothis report’s primary authors,

Timothy and Iris Roberts.

Photographs by SEMA, the Mis-souri Department of Transporta-tion, and the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency (FEMA) —Excelsior Springs Photos by LizRoll, FEMA National.

Open space in St. Louis County.

Table of Contents

Overview of the Missouri Flood Buyout Program ...................... 3Breaking Missouri’s Repetitive Flood Cycle ............................... 8Alexandria and Clark County ..................................................... 13Arnold ............................................................................................. 16Buchanan County.......................................................................... 19Cape Girardeau ............................................................................. 21Cedar City ...................................................................................... 24Commerce ...................................................................................... 27Excelsior Springs ........................................................................... 30Hannibal ......................................................................................... 32Hartsburg and Boone County ..................................................... 34Hermann ........................................................................................ 36Jefferson County (including Festus and Crystal City) ............. 38Lincoln County and Winfield ...................................................... 42Neosho ............................................................................................ 45Pattsonburg .................................................................................... 47Perry County ................................................................................. 49Rhineland ....................................................................................... 51St. Charles County ........................................................................ 54Ste. Genevieve ................................................................................ 58St. Louis and St. Louis County .................................................... 63St. Mary .......................................................................................... 68Wakenda ........................................................................................ 70Warren County and Marthasville ............................................... 72Conclusion ...................................................................................... 74

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http://www.sema.state.mo.us/

Overview of the Missouri Flood Buyout Program

From April of 1993 to May of 1995, the State of Missouri experiencedunprecedented flooding of virtually all areas of the state. This situationresulted in Presidential Declarations on five separate occasions. Thesedeclarations became the basis for rather large dollar amounts of assistance forindividuals and public entities alike. As provided by the Stafford Act, hazardmitigation grant program funds also became available on a formula basis fordeclared states. The focus of this report is the process and policies that evolvedin Missouri to put these mitigation funds to use in the shortest possible time.Hopefully, this report will be useful as an historic document, but moreimportantly, it will serve as a “blueprint” for future similar programs shouldflooding again reach the 1993 and 1995 levels.

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Given the fact thatthe State only had $30million available, and thatbuyout projections wereexceeding that figure by athree to one margin, thedecision was made to focusthe HMGP effort on per-manent primary residen-tial structures. Necessityforced the exclusion ofbusiness properties, vaca-tion homes, mobile homes,and building elevations.

Prior to the 1993 major floodevent, the Missouri StateEmergency Management

Agency (SEMA) had, for unknownreasons, passed the responsibility forthe Hazard Mitigation Grant Program(HMGP) to the Department of NaturalResources. With the 1993 flood event,that responsibility was returned toSEMA. Arguably, it should alwaysremain the responsibility of SEMA.The position is enhanced by the factthat Missouri has funded a StateHazard Mitigation Officer Positionwithin the SEMA personnel structure.With that as an aside, the State wasfaced with an unprecedented task ofadministering a hazard mitigationprogram that eventually exceeded$100 million. The purpose of thisoverview is to provide a narrativeconcerning how the various processesand policies were developed and putinto place.

As the individual and public assis-tance efforts during the later summerof 1993 progressed, it became obviousthat the State would have significantfunding for HMGP activities. An earlyestimate was $10-12 million. At thesame time, the U.S. Congress began toaddress various flood assistance issueswith one of the major efforts being theenactment of the “Volkmer Bill” whichchanged the formula for HMGP fund-ing. That bill became law in mid-De-cember 1993, and the HMGP fundforcast was suddenly $30 million. Theawesome HMGP task was now even agreater challenge.

Following this realization, theState’s first overt act was to send a let-ter to known eligible applicants inform-ing them of the program with a furthercomment requesting communities tosubmit project applications. No furtherguidance was provided - no standard ap-plication or direction regarding theState’s priorities was given. Conse-quently, a “flood of requests” in vary-

ing detail was received. Project scopesranged from very large structuralprojects, including levees, storm wa-ter drainage systems, and a buyoutproject for one dwelling. The totalproject requests exceeded $300 mil-lion. The dollar amount and diversityof the projects increased to a signifi-cant degree the already difficult taskof determining which projects to pur-sue.

During late 1993 and early 1994,FEMA Director James Lee Witt andothers began to place emphasis on ac-quisition of flood damaged property.

A review of the projects received re-vealed that they included requests for“buyouts” that would cost $100 mil-lion. The “fog factor” was now beingdiminished to some degree and a logi-cal approach to project approvalemerged.

All the eligible applicants whowere proposing acquisition were toldto revise their applications for residen-tial buyouts only and to be prepared totravel to Jefferson City to present theirapplications. In hindsight, SEMA has

since determined and followed a bet-ter procedure wherein SEMA person-nel travel to each buyout location towork the process. Applicants also wereinformed that all projects for other thanresidential buyouts would be passed onto Missouri’s Department of EconomicDevelopment for subsequent resolu-tion in the event that funds should be-come available through that channel ata later date.

Beginning in very late December1993, and in January and February1994, meetings were scheduled withthe affected communities to reviewprojects for possible funding recom-mendations to FEMA Region VII.These meetings were hosted by a verysmall select committee empowered bythe Administration to review all projectproposals and make specific recom-mendations to the Governor’s Office.Committee members included Mr.Dick Moore, former Executive Direc-tor of the Missouri Housing Develop-ment Commission; Mr. Dick Gross,then Director of the Missouri HousingDevelopment Commission; Mr. TerryMartin, Community DevelopmentBlock Grant Coordinator; and Mr.Buck Katt, SEMA, and the buyoutproject coordinator for Missouri. Thissmall but effective committee listenedto all proposals and took action in sev-eral ways on each project.

The committee recommended thatsome projects be forwarded to FEMAfor funding without modification. Thisrecommendation was applied toprojects that were “clean,” meaningprojects that met all necessary criteriaincluding a reasonable cost benefit. (Atthat time, FEMA had no cost benefitmodel guidance available; the State ofMissouri created its own to gain at leasta basic insight regarding the cost ben-efit for specific projects. Since thattime, FEMA has developed severalcomputer-based models and continuesto refine them.)

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The process movedquickly, at least for thattime frame. Methods havenow been devised, which iffollowed properly will aidthe process to move evenmore rapidly.

In addition, the committee sug-gested that certain projects be modi-fied. This came about especially forcommunities that had includedchurches, schools, and commercialbuildings in their list of projects.Coupled with the foregoing, somecommunities had commercial projectsso large that they would have required75-100 percent of all the funding avail-able to Missouri. The committee be-lieved that funding only one or twovery large projects would not haveproven to be the most enhancing forthe HMGP statewide effort. Manyprojects were therefore only forwardedto FEMA after the scopes were ad-justed. The committee also rejected asmall number of projects because theylargely did not meet the requirementsof Section 206, 434 CFR 44.

The process moved quickly, atleast for that time frame. Methods havenow been devised, which if followedproperly would cause the process tomove even more rapidly. When“buyouts” are anticipated, all effortsmust focus on shortening the amountof time involved in the administrativeprocess. Homeowners, when buyoutsare addressed to them, have only twoquestions - “When and how much?”They perceive all other issues, espe-cially those that generate delays, to bethe result of bureaucratic inefficiency.

Applicant briefings and reviewsreally began in earnest in early Janu-ary 1994. By July 1994, all projects,51 in number, were approved for fund-ing. The Bellefontaine Neighborsproject was among the first to befunded and the first to be completed.On July 9, 1994, Governor Carnahan,FEMA Director James Lee Witt, andothers participated in a ceremony atBellefontaine Neighbors in whichhomeowners for 22 properties receivedchecks for their buyout property.

Demolition of the site followedimmediately. On the same day, the

group traveled to Pattonsburg, Mis-souri, to announce approval of $3.8million for acquisition and relocationof properties in what is now referredto as “Old Town.” By all standards tomeasure progress for such projectsavailable at that time, the effort wasacclaimed a great success. Lessonslearned since that time, if applied ap-propriately, can shorten the buyoutprocess by several months for futuredisaster events.

Once the projects were processedand approved for funding, SEMA’smanagement emphasis shifted to theexecution of the projects. Subpart N,Section 206.433 establishes in part theresponsibility of the State - the“grantee” once projects are funded.Section 206.433(a) reads:

(a) Grantee: The state will bethe guarantee to which fundsare awarded and will be ac-countable for the use of thesefunds. There may besubgrantees within the stategovernment.

SEMA’s management took theforegoing at face value and thereforeestablished various policies and pro-cedures which were designed to ensureproper use and accountability of funds.As each community was approved forfunding, a mandatory meeting wasscheduled with local officials. The pur-pose of these meetings was to conveythe process to be followed for actualacquisitions, draw-down of funds, andresolution of other issues that surfaced.

FEMA VII officials were invitedto attend these meetings; to their credit,they did attend many of them - a courseof action that continues to be advisablefor future programs. The emphasis atthese meetings was on the controls andrequirements that would have to be metbefore funds could or would be re-leased. For example, funds could berequested based upon anticipatedneeds. This prevented a cash flowproblem for small communities thatwould have had to borrow money if theapproach had been on a reimbursablebasis.

SEMA, however, made sure thatthe anticipated need was based on spe-cific acquisitions - i.e., specific dwell-ings to be purchased, along a specifi-cally required time line. This processwas extremely successful, and alsoshould be followed for future HMGPprojects.

Another item that received intensemanagement, once communities werefunded, was a process that becameknown as a Duplication of Benefits(DOB) determination. CFR 44, Section206.434 (f) is quoted as follows:

“Section 404 funds cannot beused as a substitute or replace-ment to fund projects or pro-grams that are available underother Federal authorities, ex-cept under limited circum-stances in which there are ex-traordinary threats to lives,public health or safety or im-proved property.”

The depth to which the above ap-plied to an actual acquisition of adwelling was not understood by many,nor did all agree with the policy onceit was explained. To the specific creditof FEMA VII, a special action officewas established to “clear” the DOB is-sues - which had to be accomplishedfor each property to be acquired. Theclearance process had to be completed

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The message here issimple – all informationsimply must flow throughthe state coordinator. . .most assuredly, the effortwill pay big dividends in thelong term.

Buck Katt,Deputy Director

Missouri State EmergencyManagement Agency

before any specific offers could/wouldbe made to owners. Small BusinessAdministration (SBA) loans, for ex-ample, had to be paid off to the extentpossible before a homeowner was paidfor their buyout property. In addition,all proceeds from National Flood In-surance Policy (NFIP) claims were de-ductible unless owners could showproof that funds had been spent on thedwelling in question.

The important point to be madehere, however, is that the only efficientmanner to “clear” DOBs was forFEMA to do so because of their ac-cess to NFIP, SBA, and other databases. Another key lesson learned thatsurfaced in this process was that ap-praisals had to be in hand before DOBinformation was released tohomeowners and community officials.Strange as it may seem, the value of aproperty changed once the actual de-ductions became known - if the ap-praisal was not already in the file.

The process by which the value ofa dwelling was determined is anotherarea deserving of special comment. Atthe outset, pre-flood fair market valuewas to be the price paid to an owner.What was not clear was the processused to determine this value and themethod by which the inevitable dis-putes would be resolved. Very early,some communities were allowed to usethe accessed fair market value plus afactor which offset any recognizedcommunity-wide shortfalls noted in theassessment. Although this approachworked for the most part, it becameincreasingly clear that the most appro-priate process was to use board-certi-fied appraisers to establish values.

Even this process had flaws be-cause many appraisers wanted to usecomparables located outside of a floodhazard area. This, of course, created afalse value since the property in ques-tion was subject to flooding, a fact thatin turn surely had a negative impacton worth. Even though SEMA usedboard-certified appraisers, problemsstill surfaced. To secure expert adviceon disputed properties and to settle dis-putes in a credible fashion, the Stateretained an independent appraiser witha known favorable reputation. Thisprocess worked. Not all property own-ers got what they wanted, and someeventually refused the final buyout of-fer, but at least the process was one thatcould be explained successfully toelected officials and others who had aninterest. The message is: use a boardcertified appraiser only and have a pro-cess to settle disputes.

Several additional related issuesalso are worth a mentioning. The DOBprocess must for the sake of adequatecontrol of the situation be processedthrough the SEMA. With the need fora speedy resolution of the situation forearlier projects, communities were en-couraged to pass DOB requests directlyto FEMA. In return, FEMA would thenpass its response directly to the request-ing community. This process in factwas counter-productive in that itslowed progress. FEMA Region VII’sDOB office was very small - twopeople at the most.

Because of this, communities attimes had to wait several weeks forFEMA’s response - a delay that wasunknown to the state. Many times, onceSEMA became involved with a prob-

lem, questions could be cleared up rap-idly. A good case in point involved theofficial close out papers; the docu-ments, usually no more than two pages,which contained a summary of the ac-tual property transaction. Earlier in theprocess, communities were told to for-ward close out paperwork directly toFEMA Region VII. If the regional of-fice received a close out with an irregu-larity - maybe a departure from statepolicy - FEMA’s regional office had tocall the state for clarification.

This added to the delays associatedwith processing the action. The state,of course, was suffering from an unin-tentionally self-inflicted problem, be-cause in trying to make the process aseasy for local communities as possible,it had allowed an unfortunate bypassof necessary information to flowaround itself. The message here issimple - all information simply mustflow through the state coordinator.This may seem like a lot of work andneedless layering, but most assuredly,the effort will pay big dividends in thelong term.

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The 1993 disaster related buyout effort was considered a success even in 1994. In fact, however, the effort had its detractors andskeptics. Negative comments for the most part centered around a few issues – destruction or reduction of the visibility of communities;the inability of business to survive if the residents should be relocated away from them; and the loss of tax base revenues should residentsmove to a different community entirely.

The state understood these critics but chose to stay the course. Events of May - June 1995 served to answer almost completely thesecritics. During this time frame, many of the communities devastated by the 1993 flood once again suffered under the raging surge of the“Wide Missouri” and the “Mighty Mississippi.” Recorded flood waters in many locations were the third highest on record.

In Cape Girardeau and Commerce, Missouri, the 1995 flood waters actually reached levels above the 1993 crest. Following the 1995event, Missouri officials wisely produced a small but very effective paper entitled “Out of Harm’s Way: the Missouri Buyout Program.”

This paper serves to showcase the 1993-1995 effort. This small but powerful piece is significant in that it page by page records thereduction in misery and effort that is apparent when the buyout effort for 1993 is considered against the 1995 event.

Buck Katt, Deputy Director, Missouri State Emergency Management Agency

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LEFT: Open space overlooking theMississippi River in Commerce(Scott County). Below: Recre-ational pavilion in Fredericktown(Madison County).

Above: Neosho city parklandsconverted from previously fre-quently flooded areas. Right: Com-munity park in Levasy (JacksonCounty).

Buyout Program Breaks the Repetitive Flood Cycle in....

Frequently FloodedMissouri Communities

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Experts disagree about howbig the Flood of 1993really was. Various re-

searchers rank it as the second,third, or fourth largest flood inMissouri history.1 Nobody ar-gues, though, that in terms ofproperty destruction and econom-ic loss it was the worst. Terms like“hundred year flood” and “feetabove flood stage” are vague waysto measure magnitude, since some“hundred year floods” occurred inthe same place in both 1993 and1995,2 and the government hasperiodically adjusted the heightsthat it considers a “flood stage” atmost locations in the 136 yearssince it instituted that kind ofmeasurement.3 It is safest, there-fore, to ignore these calculationsof magnitude and to concentrateinstead on what is certain: theflood of 1993 ruined more cropland, destroyed more residences and businesses, and cost thetaxpayers more money than any other flood in the state’slong history.

In August, 1993, the New York Times publishedstatistics of flood damage in nine Midwestern statesincluding Missouri. The statistics for Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, SouthDakota, and Wisconsin clearly show the unfortunate factthat Missouri suffered more damage in terms of dollars thanany other state.4 This is not surprising because both theMississippi and Missouri Rivers flow through the state.However, between 1927 and 1993, the federal, state andlocal efforts had variously built 742 flood control leveesthroughout the state. This fact perhaps led some Missouriansto believe that it was safe to build homes and to plant cropson these floodplains.5 By 1993, Missourians had built over216,000 households on the state’s floodplains in the form ofeither single family dwellings, apartments, or trailers.During the 1993 flood, 37,000 people who lived within theseareas were forced to leave their homes. Over 12,000 homeswere damaged and over 3.1 million acres of cropland,representing 34% of Missouri’s overall cropland, were

Former Cedar City during the ‘93 floods.

covered with water and their bounty was ruined.6 Somecounties were hit especially hard. Flood waters covered 43%of St. Charles County for instance.7 This extensive damagewas made worse by exceptionally heavy rains, which causedthis flood to last for eight months—longer than any other inMissouri history. During the five year period that preceded1993, Kansas City averaged 13.39 inches of rainfall betweenMay and the end of July. In 1993, however, the same three

Damage Estimates for 1993 Midwest Floodingin Millions of Dollars

State Total Damage Agriculture DamageMissouri 3,000 1,800Iowa 2,200 1,200Illinois 1,535 605North Dakota 1,500 705Minnesota 1,023 800Wisconsin 909 800South Dakota 595 595Kansas 574 434Nebraska 347 292

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month period brought 24.92 inches. InSt. Louis, the five year average for thesame period was 10.90 inches and in1993 the May through July averagewas 15.76.8

These high levels of rainfallwere matched by equally high costs tothe state in terms of rescuing andproviding emergency services forflood victims, building emergencylevees and later repairing damages,cleaning up, and providing for floodvictims return to normal living. The37,000 Missouri families whose homeswere damaged or destroyed received atotal of over $72.9 million dollars inemergency relief payments: $41.7million in Disaster Housing (DH)assistance, $23.4 million in Individualand Family Grants (IFG) for uninsuredhomeowners, and $7.8 million indisaster unemployment payments. Inaddition to these payments, Missouribusinesses needed $40.1 millionthrough Small Business Administra-tion loans to repair the damage they hadsuffered. In addition to these paymentsto individuals deprived of their homesand businesses, taxpayers had to pickup the tab for $130 million spent torepair damaged public facilities such asroads, water, and sewer treatmentplants.9 The cost of such repairs isstaggering. Only 1,500 feet of highwayon US 54 north of Jefferson City cost$750,000 to repair.10 Fourteen miles ofInterstate 635 near Kansas City cost$21 million to repair. When the finalbill was calculated, the Flood of 1993cost the taxpayers, the state, and thefederal government $4 billion!11

Over and above that $4 billiondollars loomed the statistical probabil-ity of future floods. Since 1973, largefloods in Missouri have compelled thePresident of the United States to issuethirteen separate disaster declarations.The future would certainly not bedifferent.12 With that reality in mind,

Missouri’s Governor Mel Carnahanand officials at the Missouri StateEmergency Management Agency aredetermined to take a new approach tominimizing the impact of floods onMissouri citizens, which would alsoreduce the economic impact ontaxpayers from floods that are certainto occur in the future.

Their solution was the creationof the Missouri Community BuyoutProgram, a plan that removed the threatof repeated flooding from people’slives by simply offering them a meansto leave their ruined homes and moveout of the floodplain. These “at risk”properties would be turned into publicland that would not need to be protectedfrom future floods. The idea was notnew; in fact, it had been available sinceCongress had passed the Robert T.Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergen-cy Assistance Act of 1974.13 However,before 1993, victims living in thefloodplains were reluctant to takeadvantage of the program because theybelieved, despite evidence to thecontrary, that flood destruction to theirhome was a one time event, if at all. In1993, however, the flood lasted foreight months, and the subsequent long-term displacement and disorder floodvictims suffered convinced many thatanything was better than living inemergency housing for an extendedperiod.14 Congressional legislation,sponsored by Missouri CongressionalRepresentative Harold Volkmer andsigned into law by President Clinton onDecember 2, 1993, amended theStafford Act, and offered Missouriofficials increased funding for buyingproperty. This legislation revised theformula that determined the amount ofmoney the Federal Emergency Man-agement Agency could receive in orderto distribute it to the individual StateEmergency Management Agencies forthe purpose of buying threatenedproperty. This act eventually made

$134.9 million available to the nineMidwest states that had been devastat-ed by the 1993 flood. Missouri alonereceived $30 million. A supplementalappropriations bill from the Depart-ment of Housing and Urban Develop-ments (HUD) Community Develop-ment Block Grants (CDBG) added $41million to the total amount available. Inaddition, the Federal Emergency Man-agement Agency (FEMA) suppliedmoney for the demolition of structuresthat had been deemed a publicdanger.15 The money generated by thislegislation was specifically earmarkedto buyout property on the floodplains.An important provision of this econom-ic help was that the state would have tomatch the hazard mitigation money ona 75% to 25% ratio.16 Congress wouldlater make other, separate moneyavailable to help floodplain businessesimpacted by the flood.17

Federal Expenditures by Statefor Hazard Mitigation Funds In

Millions18

MO 30.0IA 27.0IL 26.3

KS 15.2NE 10.0

MN 9.7WS 8.0SD 4.5ND 4.2

Total 134.9

All nine Midwest states thatsuffered flood damage took advantageof the offer of Federal money topersuade people to move from thefloodplains, but Missouri utilized theprogram the most. No doubt this wasdue to the extremely large number of

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National Flood InsuranceProgram’s Insured Buildings

with Repetitive Losses 21

State Buildings withRepetitive Losses

Missouri 3,268Illinois 1.351Iowa 287Nebraska 247Minnesota 201Kansas 175North Dakota 142Wisconsin 66South Dakota 16

buildings that the floodwaters haddamaged compared to other states. ANational Flood Insurance Program(NFIP) study of insured buildings withrepetitive losses between 1978 and1993 revealed that there were 3,268such buildings in Missouri—a figurefar above similar losses in other states.Most importantly, Missouri’s StateEmergency Management Agency esti-mates that many of the owners of theseproperties have made “as many as 23claims within a fifteen year period and,in some cases, the dollar value of therepeat claims have exceeded themarket value of the property severaltimes.”19 Furthermore, these figuresrepresent only those homes insured bythe NFIP and exclude the vast majorityof homes on Missouri’s floodplainsthat were uninsured. Out of the 216,000households affected by the flood, only22,000 had flood insurance.20

Governor Carnahan decided toconcentrate on buying the ruined familyresidences rather than business proper-ties. This decision was based on soundeconomics, since using governmentmoney to buy family dwellings resultedin moving people out of the threatenedfloodplains. As Destin Frost, SEMA’sState Hazard Mitigation Officer put it,

“we could have purchased a $500,000warehouse, or we could use that sameamount to buy over 100 houses and soimpact many more people.”

The ratio between the numberof people helped and the amount ofavailable money was further increasedby the low market value of the averagehouse on the Missouri floodplains. Theprice the state offered to pay wasalways based on the fair market valueof the home before the flood. Yet thelocation and age of most of the housesdictated a market value of between$5,000 and $25,000 per home.22 Againa comparatively modest amount ofmoney could impact a large number ofpeople, move them off the floodplain,and potentially save millions of dollarsin emergency relief and rescueoperations in future floods.

By the fall of 1993, SEMA hadcreated policies and procedures forbuying flooded property and hadcommunicated these policies to flooddamaged cities and towns throughoutMissouri.23 These regulations set forthstrict guidelines. First, the localcommunity, not the State shouldidentify primary residences that werestructurally damaged within the flood-plain and approach the owners with theoffer of a buyout—the decision beingthe homeowners alone.24 In every waythe Governor wanted the decisions tobe made by communities and localcitizens. Missourians are conservativeand individualistic, and are suspiciousof government interference. The pro-gram had to be voluntary or it wouldnot work. Secondly, once the localgovernment acquired the property, theland had to be dedicated in perpetuityfor open space and/or recreational usesor turned back into a natural wetlandsarea. Third, no buildings except thoseconsistent with recreational practicescould be built on the land. Fourth, eachindividual community that participated

in the program had the right to decidewithin the law what it wanted to do withthe land included in the buyoutprogram. Arnold, for instance, turnedthe land into recreational area, bybuilding baseball or soccer fields. 25

Others built municipal picnickingfacilities, fitness trails, or communitygarden plots.26 Still others, like St.Charles County, used the land to createoutdoor educational facilities for localschools and colleges where studentscould undertake environmental stud-ies.27 A number of communities suchas Neosho and Ste. Genevieve usedbuyout money to purchase anddemolish at risk homes. Then withother state, local, and federal funds,these local governments built floodretention basins, drainage ditches, andlevees in order to make the rest of theirtown more secure from future floods.28

While Missouri’s offer to helppeople leave their at-risk homes on thefloodplain was generous, it had built insafeguards that prevented any onehomeowner from realizing an unwar-ranted profit. The most important ofthese safeguards was the requirementcontained in SEMA policy that peoplewho accepted buyout money had toresettle outside the floodplain, or becompliant with the NFIP. Sincehousing outside a floodplain isgenerally more expensive than thatwithin, the amount of money theyreceived in the buyout program wouldusually not completely cover the costof new housing. Despite this inequitymany people accepted the buyoutmoney anyway, realizing that it wouldmake a sizable installment on a newhome located in an area where theywould no longer, as homeowners, facethe uncertainties of flooding and all theaccompanying disruptions. In 1993,SEMA learned that communities hadidentified nearly 2,400 primary resi-dences, 1100 mobile home pads, 4apartment buildings, and 385 vacant

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Although 1995 crests weregenerally two to four feet lowerthan they had been in 1993,much of the same land thatflooded in 1993 was coveredagain in 1995. It was possibleafter the flood of 1995 tocompare the cost of emer-gency relief with that of 1993,and see a dramatic costreduction.

Open Space in Arnold, Missouri

lots that were candidates for the FloodBuyout Program. The vacant lots werethose scattered among primary resi-dences, and the communities believedit was necessary to buy these also, toprevent future building.29 The pro-gram was always voluntary, and inmost communities, most people votedto participate in the Flood BuyoutProgram, some individuals did not.Also, some communities, such asMcBaine, decided not to participate inthe program.30 However, most peoplesaw the advantages to themselves andto their communities, and chose to goalong with the offer of the program.

The program proved so suc-cessful in 1993, that Missouri decidedto continue the program in 1994, usingtheir Community Development BlockGrant (CDBG) monies. The state madenearly $7 million available to 13communities to buy an additional 435at risk homes on the floodplains.31

Then in May, 1995, anotherflood provided dramatic proof that theFlood Buyout Program could dramati-cally reduce the strain on taxpayers,

since ultimately, it is they who mustpay for disaster flood relief. Although1995 crests were generally two to fourfeet lower than they had been in 1993,much of the same land that flooded in1993 was covered again in 1995. It waspossible after the flood of 1995 tocompare the cost of emergency reliefwith that of 1993, and see a dramaticcost reduction. For instance, in St.Charles County the price tag fordisaster assistance in 1993 for disasterhousing, grants to dispossessed fami-lies, and loans to small businesses torebuild was $26,076,311. In 1995, thecost for the same services was $67,000.

What had changed was that1,374 houses in St. Charles County,damaged by flood waters in 1993, weregone. The Flood Buyout Program hadpaid the owners for their homes, theowners had relocated to higher ground,and when the water rose in 1995, therewere fewer people to evacuate and carefor at public expense.32 This sameimpressive result was repeated in townafter town throughout the state. In eachof the Missouri communities that hadtaken advantage of the Flood Buyout

Program in 1993, the cost of disasterrelief and emergency assistance hadbeen drastically reduced.

The successes in these com-munities persuaded other communitiesto examine the Flood Buyout Program.Several other communities decided tojoin after the flood in 1995. Theirdecision was a wise one since in allprobability, Missouri rivers will leavetheir banks again at some time in thefuture. The U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers (COE) reported in August,1998, that the Mississippi River hasbeen flowing at a higher level since1993. On the upper portions of the rivera light rain causes the river leveldownstream to move close to floodstage “almost overnight...Another un-usually rainy spring and summer—andthe whole nightmare could happenagain.”33 Governor Carnahan’s deter-mination to stress this novel programproved to be a positive example of howthe Federal and State governmentworking through communities andindividuals could achieve dramaticresults. Their stories deserve to be toldand lessons learned from them.

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The small farming communityof Alexandria is situated at theconfluence of the Des Moines

and Mississippi Rivers. Most Missouritowns have to contend with floodingfrom a single river, but Alexandria hasto face water coming from two.Because of this enhanced threat, a totalof three miles of levees had protectedthe town on three sides. When thewaters of both rivers began to rise inMay, 1993, Alexandria’s citizens,supported by Mennonite volunteersand 271 members of theMissouri National Guard,raised the height of thoselevees three feet to try tokeep the rivers out of thetown.1 Unfortunately theirefforts failed. On the night ofJuly 6th, with water alreadywithin inches of the leveetops, an additional six inchesof rain fell, pushing thewater over the top and intothe town.2 Even bulldozerspushing rock and sand to thetop could not raise the leveesquickly enough, and all 390of the town’s residentsevacuated on July 7.3 By theend of that day, the town wascompletely covered with 20 feet ofwater that stayed in place for over threeweeks.

Every single one of the 123households within the town sustaineddamage that made the buildingsuninhabitable.5 When the residentscould finally return, they found a starklandscape of mud and piles of debrislodged against their water-loggedhouses.6 The damage was so severethat even a year after the flood, the townlacked potable water in homes, andpeople had to drink bottled watersupplied free of charge by Anheuser-

Busch Brewery in St. Louis.7

Some of Alexandria’s citi-zens found help through Missouri’sFlood Buyout Program. Even beforethe Congress had passed Representa-tive Harold Volkmer’s Hazard Miti-gation and Relocation Assistance Act,some Alexandria residents werehopeful that it might help them. Manyof the town’s inhabitants met in theCommunity Center on November 10to discuss its proposed provisions.8

Since early September, Representa-tive Volkmer, or members of his staff,had been touring Missouri’s flooddamaged communities to explain theproposed legislation. Wiley Hibbard,Volkmer’s assistant, explained therudiments of the plan to the Alexan-drians. He pointed out that theproposed buyout program was volun-tary, that people did not have to haveflood insurance to participate, that theplan was based on a 75% to 25%Federal/State and local funding divi-sion, and that no permanent dwellingcould be built on the property onceownership went to the local govern-ment entity.9

On December 20, 1993, Rep-resentative Volkmer, along with offi-cials from the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency, the MissouriEmergency Management Agency, theMissouri Housing Development Com-mission, and the Northeast MissouriRegional Planning Commission met100 citizens from Alexandria and ruralClark County at Running Fox Elemen-tary School in Weyland, Missouri, tohear details. They learned that Volk-mer’s bill had not only passed both

houses of Congress, but thatPresident Clinton had signedit into law on December 2.

By the end of thethree hour meeting, peoplehad a basic understanding ofhow Volkmer’s buyout pro-gram would work and howto apply for it. Many wereworried that the governmentwas forcing them out of theirhomes and not allowingthem to rebuild. HermanSkaggs of FEMA explainedthat people could stay intheir flood damaged homes,but if their home had been

damaged by more than 50% of its pre-flood assessed value they would haveto raise their home’s foundation onefoot above the 100 year flood level toqualify for federal flood insurance.

If they did not get theinsurance, then the government wouldmake no further payments to them infuture floods. Others were concernedabout the mechanics of filling out theforms, and Representative Volkmertold them that the Missouri Associationof County Governments (MACOG)would allow personnel of Missouri’svarious regional planning commis-sions to assist homeowners with

Alexandria, Missouri flood workers load equipment.

Alexandria and Clark County

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paperwork. Others had heard rumorsthat Alexandria could not participate inthe program because their Mayor,Robert Davis, was against the programand would not sign the papers to beginthe application process. Mayor Davisassured the people that, although hewas not in favor of the buyout, hewould nevertheless sign the necessarypapers.

Immediately after the meet-ing, Alexandria’s city council met andvoted unanimously to begin theprocess of applying to the MissouriDepartment of Economic Develop-ment for a Community DevelopmentBlock Grant (CDBG) to get the moneyfor the matching funds to qualify for thefederal buyout money. At the sametime, David Shoush, representingClark County as the director of theNortheast Missouri Regional Develop-ment Commission—of which Alexan-dria is a part—informed the citycouncil that he would begin the processof applying for buyout funds to buyflood damaged property in ClarkCounty which had also been hit hard bythe flood waters. Acres of farmland thattotaled 32,000 were covered withwater, and 50 residences had beendamaged.10

Under the direction of DavidDavison and David Shoush, theNortheast Missouri Regional PlanningCommission began the process ofapplying for buyout money. Initially,110 of the 114 property owners inAlexandria, and twenty-five of fiftyClark County residents whose homeshad sustained damage, expressedinterest in the buyout program. OnJanuary 26, 1994, Davison and Shoush,members of the Alexandria city gov-ernment, and the three county commis-sioners for Clark County appearedbefore Governor Carnahan’s Reviewand Hazard Mitigation Committee toconsider claims for buyout money. Thecommittee heard requests and passedon those they considered worthy to theGovernor, who in turn passed therequests on to the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency—that ultimatelysupplied the buyout funds.

Davison submitted a requestfor $4,767,200, while Shoush’s appli-cation asked for $1,000,000. Davison,acting on behalf of La Grange,Missouri, a Mississippi River town inLewis County, about forty miles southof Alexandria, also requested$1,649,800 to buy out homes in thattown.11

Support for the buyout pro-gram was not unanimous at thismeeting. Alexandria’s Mayor, RobertDavis, told the committee that heopposed the buyout, and that he basedhis opposition on the fact that manyAlexandria residents had alreadypurchased building permits to rebuildwithin the town, an action, he felt,indicated their desire to return.12

However, Alexandria alderman TomAlberts and the town’s city clerk JulieWilson, countered the mayor’s remarksby stating that most town residents hadapplied for building permits in order toqualify for free building supplies tomake temporary repairs to their flooddamaged homes. Both felt there wasgenuine interest in the buyout pro-gram.13 The Governor’s committee didnot require a community’s unanimoussupport for the buyout program and feltthat Alexandria’s request deserved theGovernor’s consideration.

As the Governor consideredAlexandria’s request for funding,Alexandria’s City Council continuedto work on other requirements of thebuyout program. Even if FEMAapproved the town’s application,Alexandria would still have to matchone quarter of the amount the federalgovernment supplied. The City Coun-cil invited the Missouri Department ofEconomic Development’s Sally He-menway to tour Alexandria to estimatethe extent of damage to Alexandria anddetermine whether the town waseligible for a CDBG grant.

During her visit, Hemenwaymade it a point to stress the voluntarynature of the buyout program, pointingout in a discussion with town residentsthat any applicant was free to back outof the program up to the final momentwhen they signed their land over to thecity. She also assured the townspeoplethat each homeowner would becontacted individually to discuss the

Flood waters destroy a small shed in Alexandria, Missouri.

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buyout process. She did warn theresidents they needed to make adecision soon, because there was alimited amount of money available forthe buyout program and that fifty-fiveMissouri communities were makingapplications similar to Alexandria.14

On February 14, 1994, Gover-nor Carnahan announced that he wasrecommending Alexandria and fifteenother sites for buyout funding fromFEMA. The governor’s approval offunding for Clark County came severalweeks later.15

After approval, events movedquickly. On March 31, the governorannounced that Alexandria had re-ceived approval for buyout funding.On April 7, the Alexandria CityCouncil in consultation with SEMAestablished the buyout criteria for thetown’s homeowners. The council setup categories and procedures forbuying homes, appraising their values,and dealing with disputed appraisals.16

A further meeting betweencity officials and state representativesfinalized the details of the buyout.17 Asimilar process took place outsideAlexandria and by May 25, ClarkCounty residents were able to submitapplications for buyout funds.18

Finally, in February, 1995,Alexandria residents who had agreedto participate in the buyout began toreceive checks for their property. ByFebruary 1, 1995, nine Alexandriaresidents had sold their homes to thecity for amounts ranging from $8,000to $25,000. By February 7, 1995, tenmore residents had turned their homesover to the city and received checks,and by December 31, 1995, fortyresidents had accepted governmentchecks for their homes.19

Today, Alexandria is a vitaland growing town. Despite the fearsthat the buyout might cause a cripplingpopulation decline that could hurt thetax base, the town continues to grow.Perhaps one reason for this is theextensive help Alexandria receivedfrom outsiders. In the midst of thedevastation, Alexandria had foundoutside help. The town was adopted bythe citizens of Mt. Airy, Maryland, andCroton, Ohio. Both of these towns sentworkers to help with rebuilding. Thecitizens of Mt. Airy even collected$50,000 through private donations,dances, and various church sponsoredactivities. One Mt. Airy bartenderoffered to shave his head if his patronswould contribute $4,000 to the cause offlood relief for Alexandria. They didand he had his head shaved.20

Another source of help to thetown came from the Mennonites, wholive on farms in the area. During theflood, they had worked hard filling andmoving sandbags to the tops of thelevees.21 After the flood, whenAlexandria needed help rebuilding, theMennonites came back to help repairthe destruction. This extensive outsidehelp allowed Alexandria to rebuild.Largely because of all the help, manyresidents decided to stay, and to meetfederal regulations by raising thefoundations of their new homes onefoot above the established 100 yearflood mark.22

Along with the rebuildingcame new town ordinances that werepromoted by Mayor Robert Davis.Now there are strict rules about trashand refuse removal, the height of grasson private lawns, and rules governingthe type of dwellings people can build.There are also numerous sites, scat-tered throughout the town that providesites for picnicking and recreation.23

Many of these sites now contain picnictables, basketball goals, and open sidedshelters.24 The town looks good andAlexandria has a revitalized spirit ofpride.

Buyout area in Alexandria, Missouri, adjacent to the former ElementarySchool offers plenty of room to play or to develop future sports fields.

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Near the site where the MeramecRiver empties into theMississippi, a bend has formed

a peninsula; Arnold, Missouri, is onthis peninsula. Since 1973, Arnold hasbeen the site of nine major floods.Consequently, the citizens of Arnoldhave a progressive attitude toward“flood proofing” it. Eric Knoll, the longtime City Administrator of Arnold, is awalking encyclopedia concerning riverheights, federal flood control pro-grams, state flood regulations, floodprevention, and ideas about making histown more secure from rising water.Arnold was one of the first towns toparticipate in the early federal floodbuyout program in 1980, officiallytermed the 1362 program.

Under Knoll’s leadership,Arnold also has passed local ordi-nances that made further efforts toprotect the town.1 For instance,developers must adhere to strictbuilding codes. They must observerigid easement regulations along theMeramec River shore. Since 1980, allnew construction must have valvesinstalled in plumbing systems toprevent the contamination of the citywater system and protect sewer lines inthe event of flooding.2

In 1993, Arnold faced itstoughest battle against flooding onrecord when the rising MississippiRiver caused the water of the MeramecRiver, which flows on the northernboundary of Arnold, to back up into thetown. From July 7 through August 8,100 houses and businesses were hurt byrising water. The nation became awareof Arnold’s plight when PresidentClinton, Vice President Gore, sixCabinet members, and a collection of

senators and representatives met in FoxHigh School’s cafeteria to discuss theflooding in the Midwest.3

While the politicians weretalking, Mayor Marion Becker and her

fellow townspeople were buildingsandbag levees. Wherever the naturallay of the land in the Pleasant Valleyand Bayshore subdivisions seemed topresent a good line of defense againstflood waters, people stacked sandbags.A good portion of the time thetemperature hovered around 100degrees. On July 28, Mayor Beckerissued an appeal for sandbaggers toraise levees high enough to protectagainst a 44 foot crest.4 A few dayslater, she asked people to raise the levelanother foot. To be on the safe side, 500families evacuated the area. Mostlevees stood the pressure, but onAugust 1, a twenty foot sectioncollapsed along the Starling AirportRoad and flooded the CommunityAirport Road Mobile Home Park.5Then, when levees broke on the Illinoisside of the Mississippi River down-stream from the mouth of theMeramec, the water level fell two feet,and the threat to Arnold was gone.6

ArnoldEven before the water level

began to drop, Eric Knoll and the citycouncil had begun to explore thebuyout option. On July 29, Knollcontacted the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency (FEMA) to

request informa-tion about the fed-eral purchase offlood damagedproperty under theoriginal 1980 buy-out legislation.He told FEMAthat as many as100 homeownersmight be interest-ed.7 Many Arnoldcitizens such asthe Flanagan fam-ily were tired of

the constant threat of flooding. Witheight inches of flood water on the floorof their house, Kathie Flanagan told aSt. Louis Post Dispatch reporter,“We’re hurt emotionally. It’s time tofind another place to live.”8

The announcement of Repre-sentative Volkmer’s buyout plan,followed by President Clinton’s sign-ing of the act, and Governor Carna-han’s promise to lobby officials formoney while attending the NationalGovernor’s Conference in Washing-ton, all encouraged Eric Knoll to beginthe application process for some of thepromised buyout money. Knoll beganthe application process by surveyingthe flood damaged areas to finddamaged houses. He then contactedthe owners by mail to inform them ofthe plan and to invite them to severalpublic meetings to expand on the idea.The city then submitted the material toSEMA.10

Ground preparation for a soccer field in Arnold.

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Beautiful open space improves thequality of life in Arnold, Missouri.

On January 25, GovernorCarnahan’s office announced thatArnold would receive $4.1 million tobuy 89 houses in the floodplain plus anumber of mobile home pads.11 Someof the applicants decided not to sell;they chose to rebuild instead.

On April 15, 1994, anotherflood hit Arnold, and many people whohad rebuilt realized that they had madea mistake. Even though the water wasnot as deep, and it stayed only threedays instead of a month as it had in1993, it was enough to damage 20rebuilt houses.13 These people wereglad, after this 1994 flood, to join thebuyout, which brought the totalnumber of single-family dwellings,where homeowners had accepted thebuyout offer, to 72.14

But that was not the end of thebuyout program in Arnold. In May1995, the Meramec flooded Arnoldonce again. This disaster brought riverlevels only a few inches less than in the‘94 flood, but it was the final straw forthose who had chosen to remain in thefloodplain.

Gaylord and Norma West hadresisted the buyout in 1993 and 1994.Just before the ‘93 flood they had spent$100,000 on remodeling. The damagewas severe, but they could not bringthemselves to leave such a heavyinvestment. In ‘94 the house wasdamaged again, but still the coupledecided to stay. In ‘95, however, aftersustaining $45,000 in damage, theywere convinced. The buyout offeramounted to only $69,000, but theywere willing to take the loss to be out ofthe floodplain.15

Other residents like Joe Moorehad taken the initial flood buyout offerafter the ‘93 flood and were living high

and dry when floods came again. Heremembers driving back to his oldhome site on the floodplain andactually laughing at the rising water.

Fortunately, for people likethe Wests who missed the opportunityafter the ’93 flood, there was additionalmoney available for buyouts after the‘95 flood. On August 27, 1995,Governor Carnahan announced that thefederal government had made anadditional $1.3 million available to buyhomes on the floodplains of Missouri.Arnold would get $275,000 to buy 16more single family homes.17

I felt relieved. I was laugh-ing. I even drove down tothe old house. I could seethe water coming up.I didn’t have to sandbag...I was happy because I wasbought out and I’m gone.I don’t have to worry aboutit the rest of my life.16

While Arnold was buyingsingle family dwellings from 1993through 1995, the city was alsoeliminating mobile homes from thefloodplain through another buyoutprogram. Since mobile home ownersoften did not own the land that theirhome sat on, and because underMissouri law a mobile home is classedas a motor vehicle, the federal buyoutprogram could not apply to them. Butthe State Emergency ManagementAgency was able to find moneythrough a separate program of theFederal Emergency Management Agen-cy, to help these mobile home ownersmove.18 Mobile home owners couldalso receive help through the vehicleinsurance that many carried on theirmobile homes. In addition, the city ofArnold also made money available tothese people. On August 14, 1994, afterthe second big flood, the Arnold citycouncil voted to give each mobile homeowner in the Riverside Mobile HomePark $2,000 from federal communitydevelopment block grant money to payfor new utility hookups, awningremoval, shed and air conditionerremoval, and occupancy permits.

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The Jefferson County Youth Association plans tobuild a football field in Arnold to support theirprogram for 400 youngsters on this buyout property.

At the same time, the councilvoted for a housing assistance grantfrom the Missouri Housing Develop-ment Commission to help withrelocation expenses. Individual mobilehome owners could get up to $20,000 tohelp bridge the gap between leaving theproperty and moving to higher ground.19

The results of these buyoutefforts were impressive. By the end of1995, Arnold had purchased 202 singlefamily dwellings and 155 mobile homepads on the floodplain. The almostyearly flood threat to Arnold is nolonger there.

Eric Knoll feels the programwas such a success that he has con-tinued buying out additional properties

on the rivers edge. In 1998, henegotiated with two homeowners fortheir houses, and as of May 25, 1999,he has closed on five more buyouts. Asof this writing, he is negotiating fortwo more.

As for the land acquired in thebuyout, negotiations are under way inconjunction with the Jefferson CountyYouth Association to build on a portionof it, a football field and bleachers. TheAssociation has already leased the landfor ten years for one dollar, and the non-profit organization currently runs afootball program there for 400 kids.

Most importantly, Arnold hasprospered since the flood. Unlike somecommunities that suffered from the

recurring floods, Arnold did not losepopulation. Most of the people whoaccepted buyout money stayed inArnold. The population increased from18,828 in 1993 to 20,473, according tothe last figures of the U.S. CensusBureau. The tax base has remainedhealthy enough for the town to pass atax levee to buy a 120 acre tract near thecenter of town for development as theStrawberry Creek Nature Area.20

The National Association ofFloodplain Managers has recognizedthe success of Arnold’s use of buyoutprogram funds. In 1997, the Associa-tion singled out Knoll for hisinnovation and leadership during thistime and recognized him with itsannual award.21

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Buchanan County

Both Sugar Lake and Rushvilleare unincorporated settlementsthat are located 30 miles

northwest of Kansas City near theMissouri River. Sugar Lake is acollection of approximately 160 housesbuilt around a lake of the same name.Rushville is a settlement of about 60houses that were built along U.S.Highway 59 and Missouri Highway45. Most of Rushville’s residentseither farm or work in Atchison,Kansas, across the Missouri River.Homes in the area are inexpensive,averaging about $31,000.1

Neither of these areas was astranger to flooding. The latest disasterhad been in 1984 when water from theMissouri River broke through theRushville-Sugar Lake Levee andcovered the land for 22 days beforereceding.2 Yet even this unpleasantexperience was minor compared tofour repeated floods that inundated thetowns in July and September of 1993.

The first flooding came onJuly 6, when the Rushville-Sugar LakeLevee broke and the Missouri Riverswept through the gap. The land in thearea is so flat that once that leveebroke, even a normal spring rain couldcause flooding. More than the usualspring rains fell in 1993, and the areaflooded again on July 26, September 2,and September 23.

Each flood caused residents toevacuate and to seek shelter withrelatives, in local churches, or inemergency shelters that the FederalEmergency Management Agency pro-vided.3 Such frequent flooding wasunprecedented, and the people of

Rushville and Sugar Lake decidedthey had suffered enough.

Even before RepresentativeVolkmer announced his new buyoutlegislation and Governor Carnahangave it his unqualified support, manyRushville-Sugar Lake residents wereclamoring for information concerningbuyouts under the original 1980legislation. Approximately 150 peopleshowed up for a meeting about floodrelief on October 7. Many of themwanted to know about the flood buyoutprogram. It took Bud Crockett, theWestern District Commissioner forBuchanan County by surprise. He hadonly the barest knowledge of theprogram.

Yet, his cursory explanationand promise to find out more, wasenough to encourage 42 people to puttheir names on a list indicating theywere interested in a buyout. OnceCrockett had done some research andshared this information with thoseinitial applicants, 34 said they weredefinitely interested in pursuing thematter further.4

With this list, Crockett con-tacted the MOKAN Regional Council,an organization that was in business tohelp residents of the Missouri countiesof Buchanan, Andrew, DeKalb, andClinton, along with Doniphan andAtchison Counties in Kansas, accessgovernment programs. By the timeCrockett had submitted these prelimi-nary buyout requests to MOKAN, thatagency had some of the details ofVolkmer’s new buyout plan whichwere encouraging.5 When SEMAdecided to extend the application

period statewide until February 14,1994, fourteen more residents of SugarLake and Rushville decided to addtheir names to the list, also.6 Follow-ing this show of interest, peoplemet several times in the area toacquaint residents with the new buyoutprogram.

Shelley Temple of MOKANhosted most of these meetings in orderto lay out the ground rules. First, theprogram was voluntary, and applicantswere free to drop out whenever theywished. The county would makeformal appraisals, which would bebased on the pre-flood value of ahouse, minus whatever the homeown-er had already received from floodinsurance or other payments from thegovernment. Once the property wassold, the houses would be demolishedand the land would be returned to itsnatural state.7

Good news came on July 3,when Bud Crockett learned throughMOKAN that FEMA had approved atotal of $473,000 to purchase land andhomes damaged in the flooding. Ashort time later, Missouri awardedBuchanan County $471,000 in acommunity development block grant.8With that funding assured, the buyoutprocess could begin.

Several meetings followed.The largest one, held on August 29 atthe Rushville Christian Church, drew100 people. Shelley Temple told thepeople that within the next severalweeks appraisers would contact themto make a formal appraisal. A fewweeks later they would receive aformal offer, at which point they

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would have two weeks to consider. Ifthey accepted, they signed a letter ofintent, and they would hopefullyreceive their money by February 1995.

Temple also made somestatements about the property once itwas sold. Nothing could be built on theland, but since the individual lots thatmost houses stood on averaged onlyone-half acre, they could be leased toadjoining landowners who had not soldout or who had cropland adjoining; thisland then could be used either forplanting crops or for a garden.9

From there, things movedquickly. On December 17, the 34property owners who were stillconsidering the buyout option re-ceived the government’s offer. ShelleyTemple told them they had two weeksto consider the offer, but after themeeting, Bud Crockett told reportersthat most people seemed happy withtheir offers. Twenty-seven had ac-cepted immediately and six wanted toconsider the offer before making uptheir minds. Only one had absolutelyrefused the offer.10

Homeowner Doug Olson, acabinet maker, was happy with hisoffer; he thought it was fair. In an earlierinterview, after he had applied, butbefore he received any money, Olsontold a Kansas City Star reporter, “It’sstupid to be down there. [Without thebuyout] I’d probably end up selling theland to somebody else and then they’dbe in to bail him out in 10 to 20 years.”

On February 14, 1995, fourproperty owners got their first checks,and within the next two months, 24other people sold their land to thecounty.11 By the end of the year, sixmore residents had sold out, making atotal of 36 participants in the BuchananCounty buyout program.12

Of course not everyonethought the buyout was a good idea.About a dozen families in Rushville(out of 60 before the flood) decided tostay, no matter what. Roger andMarilyn Chatman used cinder blocksto raise their trailer home six feet offthe ground, and then hired a bulldozerto push dirt underneath. They will stayno matter what.13

Rushville, Missouri is home ofMissouri’s Lewis and Clark State Park.

The Chatmans were lucky.Rains brought flooding to Rushvilleand Sugar Lake again in 1995. But thistime the water did not enter their home.The cinder block base had not saved itbut the fact that the Corps of Engineersand the local levee board had repairedthe Rushville-Sugar Lake Levee did.A strenuous effort by Larry Frakes,secretary-treasurer of the Rushville-Sugar Lake Levee Association, andShelley Temple of MOKAN hadraised money through contributionsand a community development blockgrant to meet the 20% in matchingfunds required by the Corps ofEngineers to rebuild the levee. ByJanuary 12, 1995, the Corps hadfinished repairs to the levee and addeda topping of 2,700 tons of stone.14

Today, most of the bought outland is covered with grass or is leasedby farmers who incorporate it into theirtotal cropland. At Sugar Lake, the areamade up of several lots has been usedto build an access road into SugarLake. Residents have talked aboutbuilding a boat dock on the lakefrontage of one of the lots.15

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Cape Girardeau

Like most towns along Missouri’sMississippi River boundary,Cape Girardeau suffers from

frequent flooding. However, unlikethe other river towns, “Cape”—as thelocals call it—did not participate in the‘93 floodplain buyout program.1

The reason for Cape’s notparticipating was not because the flooddamage in ‘93 was slight. One hundredsixty homes flooded, and residentssandbagged furiously around housesin the Red Star neighborhood north oftown and in Meadowbrook to thesouth. A permanent flood wall hadbeen built to protect the downtownarea from crests as high as 54 feet–‘93’s crest was 47.9 feet.2

Cape Girardeau’s city councilbriefly talked about the buyoutprogram at the council’s meeting inOctober, but determined not to pursueit. Their reasoning revolved around amisunderstanding of the “100 yearflood” concept, as both the press andthe Corps of Engineers referred to the‘93 flood. In a literal sense, the phraseseems to imply that such a flood wouldhappen only once in a century. In fact,the precise meaning of the phrase isthat in any one year there is a onepercent chance of such a floodhappening, and in a century such aflood is an absolute certainty. Noguarantee exists that similar floodscannot happen even more frequently.3

Still another reason for thenon-participation might have been thatthe flooded areas received a tremen-dous amount of help from outsidesources. Hundreds of volunteer sand-baggers helped to man the temporary

levees, tons of free food and suppliespoured in from all over the nation, andafter the flood, hundreds of volunteersshowed up to help clean and repair thedamaged houses. Mennonites volun-teered to shovel mud out of people’shomes, various church groups sentcontingents to rebuild and repairstructures, and groups such as theSalvation Army supplied money tohelp people find temporary shelter.4

Unfortunately, the flood of ‘95was different. The flood waters werenearly as high—46.7 in ‘95—but theoutpouring of help did not materialize,and fewer volunteers came to help.Then, too, the ‘95 flood was much moresudden. In ‘93 people had time to buildsubstantial sandbag levees aroundhouses, but the water rose too quickly in‘95, and dozens of homes flooded muchmore quickly and seriously as a result.5

By May 28, 100 homes hadflooded in the Cape Girardeauneighborhoods of Red Star, Smelter-ville, Meadowbrook, and Highway177 (the area is named for thehighway), and city officials were readyto consider the buyout.6 If fact, inJefferson City as Tom Uhlenbrock ofthe Post Dispatch was interviewingBuck Katt, the Deputy Director for theState Emergency Management Agen-cy (SEMA) about the buyout program,he was interrupted by Cape Girardeauofficials calling about the program.7

Unfortunately for a time, itseemed that Cape would not get anyhelp, because the initial federaldisaster declaration did not includeCape Girardeau County. Inclusion onthe list was necessary for an area to

qualify for buyout funds. By June 20,the county was on the disaster list, andCape was eligible to apply.8

The announcement of buyouteligibility sparked action. Ken Eftink,Cape’s Development Services Coordi-nator, scouted through the recentlyflooded areas looking for damagedhouses. He found nearly 150 that hadsustained some damage. He alsocategorized each house by its elevationin the floodplain area. Those that stoodlowest had suffered the most damage,and Eftink reasoned, would be themost eligible for buyout relief.9

At a city council meeting onJuly 17, the councilmen decided tosubmit a formal application to theGovernor’s buyout review committeein Jefferson City requesting funding.Ken Eftink told the council that as aresult of his survey there werepotentially 80 houses that weredamaged badly enough to qualify: 42 inthe Red Star area, 22 in Smelterville, 14in Meadowbrook, and 2 in Highway177. Thirty owners had alreadycontacted him with expressed interest.

The councilmen were awarethat property purchased through thebuyout had to be devoted to “green-way” uses, and that no structures couldbe built on it. City Manager J. RonaldFischer suggested that some of theflood prone land in Red Star might beideal for a park and a boat dock.10

By August 8, the city councilwas ready to act. In the ensuing weeksafter the July 17 council meeting, KenEftink had done additional researchwhich he later used as a base for the

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council’s formal application.Cape Girardeau would ask for$1.6 million in federal andstate money to buy a total of 66homes: 38 in Red Star, 15 inMeadowbrook, 11 in Smelter-ville, and 2 in Highway 177.Eftink had even calculated theongoing cost to the city ofmaintaining the lots after thehouses were demolished; itwould cost the city $13,000 ayear to mow the lots, and thecity would lose $1,000 a yearin real estate taxes. Since thehouses occupied an area that hadflooded 15 times in the last 20 years,those projected costs were acceptable.

The only debate on the matterinvolved whether or not the city itselfshould dip into its own funds to helpfinance the buyout. The assumption onthe part of some councilmen was thatsuch an offer might help the applicationgain approval on the state level.However, Chauncy Buchheit, of theSoutheast Missouri Regional Planningand Economic Development Commis-sion (SEMO) reminded the council thatsuch local funding was not necessary togain approval. On this advice, thecouncil decided to submit the applica-tion without the offer of local funds.11

That decision was the onlypart of the buyout that drew publiccriticism. An August 16, editorial inthe Southeast Missourian praised thebuyout program but criticized thedecision not to offer city funds in itsimplementation. The editorial said“that to do otherwise smacks of thekind of free handout that has put thefederal government in the red ink messthat it is in. . . It should hurt a little totake these government handouts.”

On October 17, the SoutheastMissourian reported that GovernorCarnahan had approved the city’s

application and would submit it to theFederal Emergency ManagementAgency for final approval. Unfortu-nately, the Governor had not approvedthe whole $1.6 million amount, butinstead had given Cape $1.2 million,$742,000 would go to buy the housesand $450,000 to relocate residents.12

The state had reduced Cape’s requestbecause in 1995 it had only $4 milliondollars for this buyout cycle instead ofthe nearly $100 million that it had tospend in 1993, and the $4 millionneeded to stretch in order to help othercommunities as well.13

The amount of money theGovernor had recommended wouldcover the purchase of only 49 houses inthe Smelterville and Red Star areas.Those in Meadowbrook and Highway177 had been dropped because they sathigher on the floodplain and had notbeen as severely damaged.14 The townof Commerce, some twenty milessouth of Cape, was in much greaterneed of buyout funds, and thereforegot $1,756,707 to fund its buyout.15

Still, $742,000 would go along way toward ending the damagefrom flooding in Cape, and officials setto work to implement the buyout. On

December 21, the city coun-cil held a meeting in thebasement of the Red StarBaptist Church to explain thebuyout concept. More than100 residents showed up.Officials from SEMA andSEMO were there to fieldquestions. At that meetingKen Eftink revealed thatthere was only enough mon-ey to buy 50 houses, and thatthese would be purchased instrict accordance with thedegree of damage each

house had sustained. In other words,the properties that were damaged themost would be the first bought. If ahomeowner refused an offer, then thatmoney would be used to make an offerto another homeowner further downthe list. The process would continueuntil there was no money left.16

The problem remained ofgetting the information about thebuyout disseminated in the mosteffective way possible. Many people insoutheast Missouri had a rural suspi-cion of the government, and Ken Eftinkrealized that many homeowners wouldnot trust a formal letter that explainedhow the government was willing to buytheir damaged property. He, thereforecommitted himself and his staff topersonally visiting with each potentialcandidate, explaining the buyout pro-gram face to face, and even transportingthe potential seller around town to viewpotential and affordable homes outsidethe floodplain. This approach lessenedpeoples’ mistrust and Eftink specu-lates, might have informed potentialsellers who were functionally illiterate.In any event, the buyout program beganto experience a high rate of success.17

Beside the personal approachthat Eftink proposed, the CapeGirardeau program had other “userfriendly” aspects. The Salvation Army

Buyout area in Cape Girardeauhelps relieve city congestion.

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and the church-based Interfaith Disas-ter Response Network both helpedbuyout candidates with extra moneyfor moving out of the floodplain. TheSalvation Army spent $82,000 and theInterfaith Disaster Response Groupspent $83,700 to help people withinitial down payments, closing costs,repairs to their new homes, and themyriad financial obligations that makeany move stressful.18

The goal of the InterfaithDisaster Response Group was to helppeople for whom the buyout wouldhave been impossible without a littleextra financial help. The group helpedabout 20 families with grants ofbetween $5,000 and $7,000.19 Be-cause of these many layers of supportranging from appropriations of federalmoney to personal one-on-one contactwith flood victims, the Cape Girardeauprogram was accomplished with morepositive feelings than perhaps any-where else in the state. Not everyoneaccepted the buyout offer, but mostdid, and did so gladly because theywere assured it was being made withthe purest of motives.

The first homeowners toreceive a buyout check were Henry andOma Copeland on March 21, 1996.The city made offers on 15 other homesduring the same week. By May 2, 1996,

the city had made 28 offers and onlyone offer had been declined.20

On September 6, with itsmoney running out, Governor Carna-han announced that Cape Girardeauwas getting an additional $738,585 toexpand their buyout program. Thismoney had been previously allocatedas buyout money for a number of othertowns, but it had been returned. Insome places the buyout procedure wasnot as successful, and for one reason oranother, potential sellers backed out.This “de-obligated” money can beallocated to another buyout project.Cape’s success record made it a goodcandidate for these extra funds.21

The additional money made itpossible to include Meadowbrook, anarea that had applied for buyout moneyin October, but was cut from theprogram. Now with the high riskhomes in Red Star and Smeltervillerapidly being bought up, the extramoney made it possible to make offerson property in lower risk areas. By theend of October, 65 homeowners hadreceived offers. Some of them like,Jimmie Fisher and his neighbor MikeMaglone, had been flooded out yearafter year. Fisher acknowledged that itwould be hard to leave the home he hadlived in for 57 years, but he waslooking forward to a year when he

didn’t have to find a place to stay...when the water gets high. 22

By the time the programended on January 1, 1997, CapeGirardeau had made offers on 114properties. Twenty homeowners whosehomes are flood risks refused the offerto move from the floodplain. Still, thesituation has changed radically inCape Girardeau. On August 8, 1998,the Cape Girardeau city governmentinvited the personnel from SEMA,FEMA, the Missouri Department ofEconomic Development, the SalvationArmy, and The Interfaith DisasterResponse Network, all who hadhelped make the buyout program asuccess, back to Cape Girardeau for afish fry with the buyout recipients. Theletter of invitation to these organiza-tions from Mayor A.M. Spradling, IIIsaid this was “an opportunity for theFlood Buyout recipients to personallythank you ... who have made theProgram the success it has been.”

Ironically, it rained, but, giveneveryone’s mutual experience with theflood of ‘95 the mood was convivial.Martha Lemonds, a buyout participantwho sold her house on the floodplainand now lived high and dry, said “Wecan enjoy the rain now. We live on ahill. We can sit in our family room andenjoy every minute.”23

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Cedar CityFlooded Cedar City during the 1993 flood.

Cedar City is located just acrossthe Missouri River, immedi-ately north of Jefferson City.

Most Cedar City residents believedthat the flood of 1993 was the largestflood that had ever impacted theirtown, and that the flood in 1995 wasonly a little less severe. In both 1993and 1995, water rose in Cedar City tobetween 25 and 30 feet deep, whichclassified both occurrences as “100year floods.”1 Before the 1993 flood,Cedar City was home to about 400people in 115 houses and a number ofbusinesses. Besides three conveniencestores and two gas stations, an antiquestore, a mechanic’s shop, businessesassociated with the small JeffersonCity Memorial Airport, Roettgen AutoRepair, Capital Steel, and LaufEquipment formed the economic baseof the town. The largest employer inCedar City was ABB Transformer andDistribution Company that employedover 700 workers who manufacturedelectrical transformers for small busi-nesses and homes.2

In contrast to the calculatedaverage fair market value of the homesin Cedar City—$15,669.00,3 residentsfelt a deep attachment to their

community. They reported the kind oftown where everyone knew everybodyelse, where front doors were habituallyleft unlocked, children played in thestreets, and people spent pleasantsummer evenings visiting from theirfront porches. It was the kind of place,where long-time resident, LindaNichols, remembers children enjoyingsimple pleasures like riding bicycleswithout concern for cars, trick ortreating door to door on Halloween,and climbing apple trees.4

Yet, despite these bucolicmemories, Cedar City was an area thathad repeatedly suffered from floods.The postmistress of Cedar City, JuneSundermeyer, remembers that before1993, the town had flooded in 1942,1943, 1944, 1947, 1951, 1973, 1983,1986, and 1990. By 1993, Ms.Sundermeyer was ready to move. Shewas one of 98 homeowners, along withthe membership of both the Methodistand the Baptist Churches who decidedto take the buyout money to move tohigher ground.5

In January, 1994, the CityManager’s office in Jefferson Cityinformed property owners in Cedar

City that federal and state money wasavailable to buy out property that hadbeen severely damaged by the flood,and that the proposed prices would beassigned on the pre-flood value of thehome. If residents were interested, theletter invited them to ask for anapplication. The response was imme-diate. The city also hired a professionalappraisal service to establish the valueof the homes—an appraisal for whichthe city paid, and also provided anappeal process if the homeownerdisagreed. This price, minus anydeductions of earlier financial pay-ments from FEMA to the homeownerfor emergency housing and structuralrepairs, plus a moving allowance, wasthe final sum offered to the home-owner. In return for this money, thehomeowner turned the property overto Jefferson City, of which Cedar Citywas a suburb, and agreed that once thehouse is cleared from the land, that thearea will be used only for “usescompatible with open space, recre-ational, or wetlands management.”6

Only a few Cedar Cityresidents had the foresight to buy floodinsurance from the National FloodInsurance Program before the flood.

Cedar City after the Buyout.

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One senior citizen had conscientiouslypaid her premiums for years and hadalso maintained and created an“extremely well maintained property.”The buyout program acknowledgedher efforts, by offering pre-flood fairmarket value, which, with the insur-ance payoff, allowed her to move to adesirable property out of the flood-plain. The officials at SEMA weregenerally willing to adapt the buyoutprogram to fairly compensate citizenswho had accepted responsibility forliving on land that was vulnerable toflood waters.

Cedar City was a kind oftesting ground for the buyout program,because JeffersonCity was the firstmunicipality to of-fer the program toits citizens. Coop-eratively, JeffersonCity and SEMAworked out some“kinks.” For in-stance, officials dis-covered that countyassessors in CedarCity had seriouslyunderestimated thevalue of property inthe years before theflood, and the “fairpre-flood market price of the property”was about 15% undervalued. SEMA,therefore allowed a 15% mark-up inthe offering price to offset thisdifficulty.7 This kind of flexibility andfairness has been typical of the FloodBuyout Program generally. SEMAofficials realized that to make theprogram a success, it had to besensitive to local conditions.

By March 1, 1994, the firstbuyout had been approved, followed bythe first payment to an owner on May11.8 Most of Cedar City’s houses wereempty of people by May, 1995, whenthe water rose again. The effectiveness

to individuals for a token rent of$15.00 a year.10 A few previouslandowners worked out special ar-rangements with the Jefferson CityParks and Recreation Department,whereby they were allowed lifetimegardening rights on their old gardensites.11 The most original use of theland, however, has to be on the sixacres rented to Harry Thompson andhis son Ben. Ben was the president ofhis local Future Farmers of America(FFA) chapter, and the group neededa fundraising project. The Thompsonsteamed up with the organizers of theJefferson City River RendezvousFestival, in October 1998, to producea truly amazing attraction. First, they

planted corn onsix acres of landand then cut outof the 12 foothigh field ofcorn a gigantic500 by 350 footcrop art repre-sentation of theMissouri StateCapitol Build-ing. This giantimage was onlyvisible from theair, but visitorsto the Rendez-vous Festival

could enjoy the “sculpture” in yetanother way. At ground level, theimage, cut from the live corn, wasactually an intersecting maze of paths7-12 feet wide. Visitors to theRendezvous Festival could pay a feeand try to negotiate their way throughthe maze. Unfortunately, four daysbefore the festival, a flash flood on theMissouri River threatened to drownthe whole area in water, and thefestival had to be moved to higherground. It was not a total loss, for thethreatened flood did not overtop thelevee system, and the resourcefulThompsons were able to harvest andsell the corn in the field. Adapting to

were able to save $1,258,247. After1995, most of the remaining citizens ofCedar City decided that they too wouldtake advantage of the buyout offer.Today, only six people live in CedarCity, and the emergency cost of helpingthem has been greatly reduced.9

What has happened to theland where housed once stood?Jefferson City has built a picnicpavilion on part of it along with anextension of the KATY Bike Trailthat connects that trans-Missouribicycle path with the Missouri River.Jefferson City’s Park and RecreationDepartment has rented garden plots

of the program was immediatelyapparent when the floods came thissecond time. In 1993, 473 citizens ofCedar City had applied for individualassistance during the flood. The totalcost to the taxpayer for disasterhousing, Individual Family Grants, andSmall Business Administration (SBA)loans was $1,435,149. When the floodscame again in 1995, most residentswere gone, and consequently thenumber of people applying for emer-gency aid was less. In 1995, only 53people applied for individual assis-tance which totaled $176,902. The twofloods covered almost the same areas inCedar City, but because of the buyoutprogram, the taxpayers of Missouri

Pavilion adjacent to the Katy Trail State Park in Cedar City.

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Today Cedar City ismostly vacant lots. The ABBtransformer plant is still thereas are most of the businessesthat were there before the flood,including the airport, but everyempty lot marks the site of ahome that will never again needto be defended from the risingwaters of the Missouri.

��

��

Even when facing certaindisaster during the floods,Missourians exhibited astrong spirit and wereable to maintain an excel-lent sense of humor.

Due to low elevationand close proximity tothe Missouri River,Cedar City was sub-jected to catastrophicflooding.

the sudden change in location they were also able to build a smaller maze out of hay bails at the new Rendezvous site,which still made money for the FFA chapter.12 Cooperation, innovation, community spirit, feelings of security insteadof dread, relief to taxpayers—these are a few of the results that have made the Flood Buyout Program such a successin the Cedar City/Jefferson City area of Missouri.

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Commerce, Missouri, 20 milessoutheast of Cape Girardeauon the Mississippi, was fa-

mous for two things in the 19thcentury: it was the largest river portbetween New Orleans and St. Louis,and it flooded constantly. In morerecent history, it has lost the firstdesignation, but retains the secondbecause it floods, on the average ofevery two years.1

In 1993, the flooding began inApril and some Commerce residentsspent the entire month out of theirhomes. In July, however, the Missis-sippi flooded the town again, and byJuly 15 water had covered every streetin the lower part of the town, floodingover 70 houses. Of the 94 houses inCommerce, only 17 are built out of thefloodplain. Half the residents moved tohigher ground, and the rest, whosehomes still had any dry floor space,lived without electricity or potablewater.2

Unlike many flooded Mis-souri towns, the flood waters did notrecede quickly from Commerce. InSeptember, the streets and yards werestill covered with mud, there was stillstanding water in the city park, andsome homes were without electricity.3Some residents thought it was time toseek a solution through the federalbuyout program.

CommerceAs early as August 2, at least

40 residents attended the regularCommerce village board meeting tovoice their opinion and to hear debateabout selling out through the buyoutprogram. Under the terms of the early,pre-Volkmer buyout programs, thestate might buy some homes in thefloodplain that had sustained morethan 50% damage.

Debate was fierce, with theboard members and residents clearlydivided into two groups. The anti-buyout forces were informally leadby Ann Huck, the town’s 79 year oldmayor, who had lived in Commercefor 55 years. She asked the assemblyto consider not only how much mightbe lost in revenue, but the expense oftearing down the empty houses oncethe city owned them. With a yearlyreal estate tax revenue of only $1,000to $1,200 dollars, she doubted thetown could afford to tear them down.

The pro-buyout group founda spokesman in board member RoyJones, who felt that the buyout option

offered a chance to escape an ongoingcycle of flooding. As to the expenseof tearing down the houses, DavidMayberry, a supporter of the buyoutoption said: “This town already hassome abandoned houses. What’s afew more? You’re talking about costto tear down houses—how much doesa book of matches cost?”

Mayor Huck told the audiencethat she had talked to Bill Emerson, thetown’s Congressional Representative,and there had been some talk abouttrying to get the Corps of Engineers tobuild a levee in front of the town, but,“with the assessed value of the area solow [she] didn’t see a strong possibilityfor a levee being built here anytimesoon.”4

After the heated meeting, thepro-buyout group, suspecting that themajority of people in the townsupported them, circulated a petitionamong the townspeople, asking thecouncil to pursue a buyout. Although80% of the residents signed thatdocument, when it was presented at

Open Space surrounding the Commerce Post Office.

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the village board’s October meeting,that group voted 3 to 2 againstpursuing a buyout. Ominously, floodwaters returned to Commerce inOctober for three weeks.5

For the time being, the pro-buyout forces could do nothing, since atown could only apply for a buyoutwith the approval of its governingbody. In November and December,1993, many townspeople decided itwas time to change the composition ofthe village board. This group found aleader in board member Roy Jones,who campaigned for re-election to the board as apro-buyout candidate, alongwith three other Commercecitizens. In January, 1994,all four were elected to theboard. The next time Com-merce faced a destructiveflood, the board would beready to favorably considera buyout option.6

The “next time”came in May, 1995, whenflood waters returned toCommerce, in quantities much largerthan 1993. The reason was that theOhio River, which empties into theMississippi down river from Com-merce, was high and acted as a kind ofbarrier to the Mississippi, in turnbacking its waters into towns likeCommerce. This meant that everyhouse that had been damaged by waterin ‘93 in Commerce, was damagedagain, plus a few more. Residents knewthe damage was greater.7 According toresident Connie Thompson, “It’sworse than ‘93. The water this year hasgotten places it has never gotten before.The town’s going to have to havefinancial help to get back on its feet.”8

By May 25, the State Emer-gency Management Agency (SEMA)in Jefferson City was getting calls fromCommerce residents asking about

joining the buyout program this time.9

The village board took action.Acting on the strength of the response,the board took a survey of damage inCommerce and found between 40 and50 houses that had sustained damage.The board also found over 20 vacantlots in the floodplain, and hoped toinclude the purchase of these in aproposal to SEMA. Hoping to doeverything right, the village boardasked SEMA for personnel to helpthem with the paperwork, and theagency sent representatives to the

town. With their help, Commerce senta buyout application to Jefferson Cityon November 8, hoping for a positiveresponse from the Governors BuyoutReview Committee.10

The application coincidedwith the grant of additional money toMissouri to fund another buyoutprogram that was similar to the one in1993. This additional money becameavailable because the state, usingresearch compiled by SEMA, hadbegun to notice drastically reducedcosts for emergency flood relief whencompared to relief figures after the‘93 flood. While the ‘95 flood waterswere generally lower, they were not

that much lower, yet the cost in ‘95was only $23 million dollars ascompared with $390 million in ‘93.

The reason was simple: therewere fewer valuable properties in thefloodplain for flood waters to de-stroy.11 In fact, between the twofloods, Missouri counties and townshad purchased 3,260 homes in thefloodplains and were finalizing pur-chases of 1,000 more. Officials in St.Louis County estimated that by May1995, they had spent $2.7 million tobuy and eliminated 295 houses, which,

in turn, had saved the county$7 million in emergency floodrelief payments during the ‘95flood.12 With savings likethat, Governor Carnahan wasamenable to continuing theprogram.

The federal govern-ment accommodated the Gov-ernor by allocating $2.6 mil-lion to Missouri for a freshround of buyouts. That wasenough money for another 125Missouri families to escape

living in a floodplain. Commerce wasthe single largest recipient of that grantand was allocated $1,756,767. Thestate would provide an additional$680,000 to help Commerce pay the25% matching share.13

SEMA assisted Commerce byholding a local public meeting toexplain the program and sent personnelto help fill out the application forms.By November 30, approximately 20people had signed up as potentialcustomers of the buyout program.14

After the initial help ofSEMA, Commerce hired a grantadministrator, Laurel Moldenhauer, toadminister the program. From heroffice in St. Paul’s United MethodistChurch in Commerce, Moldenhauersigned up an additional 20 residents.15

Open space in Commerce, Missouri,overlooking the Mississippi River

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By the time the program wascompleted in May, 1996, only 31Commerce homeowners had accepteda buyout offer.16 One of them was ex-mayor Ann Huck, who had opposedthe buyout in ‘93. She had accepted$15,000 to move her house five blocksto the top of a hill overlooking thetown. She told Laura Johnson of theChaffee Scott County Signal, “I’vebeen in the floods since I was a littlegirl. . .We should have done this yearsago.”17 Roy Jones, the man who hadrun for mayor on a platform ofaccepting the buyout, was also one ofthe first to accept a buyout offer.

Although most people werehappy, some were not. Many felt thegovernment offers were too low, andin fact four residents left a meetingwith SEMA officials on February 16,at St. Paul’s Church when they found

out what the appraised value of theirhome was.

Tommy and Joyce Cox re-ceived a $57,000 offer on their housethat they considered worth $89,000.Official assessors felt that the homemay have been worth that if it had beensituated outside of a floodplain, but thethreat of almost yearly floodingconsiderably reduced its value.

In the end, 27 property ownersout of 58 applicants rejected the buyoutprice, and 19 residents did not chooseto participate. Many were motivated bya fierce affection for their town andfeared the buyout would encourage toomany people to leave, diminishing thetown.18 Dixie High felt that people whoaccepted the buyout, “didn’t care whathappened to Commerce, they wantedto sell their homes and get out.”

Yet, the current mayor, AllenWright, who owns an auto repair shopin town, did not believe the buyout“hurt us that bad.” Wright points outthat some new businesses came toCommerce: a Bed and Breakfast, awinery, and a new tavern. AnnWilliams is the owner of the new KDsTavern, and says business is good.Also, for the first time in years,somebody is building a new house inCommerce, well above the floodplain.19

Commerce flooded again inMay 1996. When it did, some peoplebegan the almost yearly ritual ofcleaning out their home once again.However, 31 homes will not have to becleaned out this time because nobodylives there. At the time of this writing,the 31 homes are just the shells ofhouses waiting for the wreckers.20

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Throughout every other town inMissouri that suffered from thegreat deluge, flood waters

gradually rose past the ability ofprotecting levees. In Excelsior Springshowever, the damage was caused inone cataclysmic flash flood that roaredthrough the center of town at 11:15 p.m.on August 12. Less than three hourslater the rains stopped and water levelsbegan to slowly recede.1 ExcelsiorSprings, a town of 11,000, situatednorth east of Kansas City, is not on theMissouri River where so much of theflood damage took place. Rather it lieson the Fishing River whose twobranches, East Fork and Dry Fork meetin the center of town. At this point laythe town’s main business area, itsmunicipal buildings, and the ElmsHotel where generations of touristshave stayed while they enjoyed thefamous springs that give the town itsname.2

When the flooding began inearly July throughout Missouri, itseemed that Excelsior Springs mightescape serious damage, despite theevacuation of both Missouri City andOrrick which are south of ExcelsiorSprings. The flood waters came towithin four miles of ExcelsiorSprings, and the water crews carefullywatched the town’s well fields thatsupplied water to Excelsior Springs.In mid-July crews built temporarysandbag levees around these wellheads.3 Assistant City AdministratorMolly McGovern and her husband,Police Chief John McGovern, beganto hope that perhaps this time,Excelsior Springs might escape flooddamage.4 Instead, the town got the“worst flood in history,” according tothen city manager, Craig Hubler.5Almost all of the city’s services weredestroyed. Municipal water was notonly contaminated, but the city water

system lost all pressure. City Hall,called the Hall of Waters, after thesprings that flow into pools in thebasement and give Excelsior Springsits name, was flooded. In addition, thetelephone system, police station, andfire station all flooded, as was thelower level of the Daily Standardnewspaper, along with RooseveltMiddle School. In addition, the city’sthree Omni buses were swept downstream.

But the center of town alsowas the site of sixty homes andapartment buildings, built alongKennedy Street and South MariettaStreet, that were filled with sleepingpeople when the flash flood hit.Nobody was killed, but a 5 ½ footwave that struck with tremendousforce damaged all structures in itsway. Jerry Gartner was in his housewhen a wall of water tore out the backwall, filled the living room, and swepthis couch with Patches, the family cat,aboard outside and down the river.“...it sounded like a freight trainrolling through the house,” was theway Mr. Gartner described the event.The next day his couch was foundone-half mile down the river lodgedten feet up in a tree. Patches returnedhome that evening.7

By the next day, city officialshad met with representatives fromFEMA who briefed them on emer-gency housing, food, and medicalcare.8 A week later, other governmentofficials explained the procedure forgetting flood buyout money and loansfrom the Small Business Administra-tion, although officials cautioned thatloans were scarce.9 Clearly there wasneed for a better financial solution,especially when a similar floodrocked the town again on September22, creating similar havoc in the samearea.10

Of course an answer came tomany Excelsior Springs residentswhen Harold Volkmer’s legislation toexpand and simplify the buyoutprogram was enacted. Before Christ-mas, 1993, Molly McGovern, asAssistant City Administrator, beganprocessing applications for residentsinterested in the buyout program. Withthe assurance on May 6, 1994, that atleast some of the funds had been

Excelsior Springs

Hall of Waters in Excelsior Springs.(Photo by Liz Roll of FEMA.)

Local businesses also wereruined by the flash flood. John Davis,the owner of United Auto Services, alocal repair shop, lost his shop andtools but was able with the help offriends to drive most of the cars out ofthe building to safety. An addedtragedy for the town was the floodingof the lower floor of the Elms Hotelthat ruined the indoor track andswimming pool. A week later, hotelstaff were using nets to capturecatfish that were caught in the pool.6

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approved, McGovern was able toarrange for Excelsior Springs toborrow money to begin the buyoutprocess. Most people who had lost orseen their homes damaged in Augustand September were willing to apply.A few hold outs were convinced to joinwhen in April, 1994, another flashflood crashed through the center oftown, and devastated the same areaonce more.12

Initially, some of the home-owners were suspicious. Some ques-tioned the wording of an informationalletter McGovern had sent explainingthe buyout program. They weredisturbed by a statement that said ahomeowner’s future use of theproperty could be compromised iftheir home had received greater than50% damage in last year’s flood. Ofcourse this only meant that it would bedifficult to live in such a home, not thatthe government was using the 50%damage mark to force people out.

At an August 7 meeting,McGovern stressed the voluntarynature of the buyout program. At thesame time she clearly stated theobvious, that damaged “homes wouldprobably not find [other] buyers...because they are in the floodplain...” Itwas possible she said that if they didnot take advantage of the offer “theycould lose their entire investment” andwould eventually have to “just walkaway from a home.” She reassured theowners that the damage estimates totheir homes were done by the local firedepartment, and that those who stayedin the area would have to raise theirhomes above the usual level of a flood.

Another group of homeown-ers had heard rumors that money hadbeen received in May and were angrybecause it had not been distributed.Obviously this rumor was related to theMay approval of the grant; no moneyhad, at this point, been received.

McGovern also told her audi-ence that 12 homeowners had ex-pressed interest and three had gone sofar as to request appraisals. Further-more, one family had already closedthe deal for the buyout the day before.13

The buyout program soongained momentum in Excelsior Springs.On August 16, the City Councilapproved a new application for a$360,000 grant to assist propertyowners who had been flooded out andwho wanted to move out of the flood-plain. This was supplemental to theearlier approved funds and was made tothe Missouri Housing DevelopmentCommission. Its goal was to providegap financing, or the difference be-tween what a family received from thebuyout and the price of a replacementhome. At the same meeting, theCouncil took control of two propertiessold in the buyout program.14

From that point the programtook off, and subsequent issues of theDaily Standard listed house after house—frequently with pictures—beingtorn down by wreckers.15 An article inthe January 16, 1995, issue of the DailyStandard reported that a total of $1.8million had been approved at state andfederal levels. The article also said thatmore than 70 properties had beenpurchased, with 14 already demol-ished. The article granted the processwas slow “given the necessary paper-work, like appraisals and title work, yetthe tone of the article was positive.”

A detailed article appears inthe Daily Standard on May 8, 1996,under the title “Flood buyout programabout to end.” The article, written byGene Hanson, who had done some ofthe first reporting on the flood and thebuyout, gave a detailed breakdown ofthe money spent so far to move 78families out of the floodplain.

It listed the total amountspent so far as: $1,190,583 spent foracquisition of sites, $199,349 spentfor demolition, relocation costs of$156,985, title work $14,122, ap-praisals $2,650, administrative costs$52,657, and National Flood Insur-ance Program refunds at $3,180.FEMA through Missouri’s StateEmergency Management Agencysupplied $897,000 for the programand community development blockgrants provided the remainder.

SEMA officially listed thebuyout project closed on October 6,1996. The “payoff” for this buyoutproject came during the first week ofOctober, 1998, when Excelsior Springssuffered another flash flood. This timeonly two residences were at riskinstead of more than 70 that had stoodin the area in 1993. Using the amountof water in the basement of City Hall asa guide, Assistant City Manager MollyMcGovern estimated that the latestflood and the one in 1993 involvedroughly the same amount of water.Obviously the buyout program hadonce again proved to be effective.16

Excelsior SpringsBuyout Propertyflooded in 1998floods (photo byLiz Roll of FEMA).

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west for six blocks along the northedge of Bear Creek.3 After the ‘93flood, the Corps of Engineers esti-mated that the flood wall had morethan paid for itself by preventingmore than $14,500,000 in damage todowntown Hannibal.4

But the flood wall did notprotect all of Hannibal. South of theflood wall , along the northern bank ofBear Creek, were hundreds of homes,that sustained substantial damage inthe flood of ‘93. As early as April 15,1993, the Mississippi River rosenearly six feet above flood stagewhich caused the waters of BearCreek that run into the big river toback up, overflow the rivers banks,and wash into homes on Jefferson andEly Streets. This became only a tasteof what was to come. Heavy rainsthroughout April and on into May andJune raised the Mississippi to 28.7feet. This was higher than the 28.59feet recorded in the 1973 flood, andthe Corps of Engineers estimated theriver would go higher still. Thisrecord level spurred the people of

Hannibal to action. Many feared thatfloodwaters might reach 32 feet andovertop the levee. So by July 10,volunteers began to fill and stacksandbags on top of the levee raising itanother two feet.5

Other volunteers also put aprotective collar of sandbags aroundthe city’s electrical substation at CaveHollow and around the water pumpingstation at Bridge Street.6 Theseprotective measures paid off. On July25, floodwaters reached 31.6 feet withevery indication of going still higher.Then, Hannibal got a break at theexpense of people living across theMississippi in East Hannibal and inHull, Illinois. The Sny Levee guardingthose two towns broke and watercovered 45,000 acres of Illinoisfarmland. That break, however, causedthe river level at Hannibal to drop fourfeet in eight hours.7 Although the riverwould rise again, it never again cameclose to the 31.6 feet mark.

Nevertheless, a lot of damagehad been done. In August when City

Hannibal, Missouri, was oneof the lucky towns that faceddestruction from a flooded

river and survived. That this hap-pened was due to Tom Sawyer andHuck Finn. Ever since Mark Twainwrote about these two mid-nine-teenth century boys, Hannibal hasderived a good part of its incomefrom the tourist trade. The towns-people have carefully nurtured thehistoric buildings in the town tocreate a historic atmosphere. Morethan 100 buildings in the downtownarea are on the National HistoricRegister.

Yet, the Mississippi Riverhas always been a real threat to thistourist Mecca. As far back as 1950,the Army Corps of Engineers hadrecommended that Hannibal build aflood wall to protect its historicdowntown. Townspeople were re-luctant because of the projected costof such a structure. That reluctancegradually changed when the Missis-sippi River threatened to inundatethe town eight times between 1960and 1986.1 In l989, local business-men, banks, and the city governmentraised $850,000 as the city’s share ofthe $5,800,000 price tag for a floodwall. The Federal government hadalready agreed to pay most of thecost.

Construction began in April1990, and was completed barely oneyear before the 1993 flood began. Theflood wall sits 12 feet high and 3,650feet long.2 It runs from just north ofthe Mark Twain Memorial Bridgebetween the Mississippi River and thetown for 25 blocks and then turns

Hannibal

Flood Disaster Relief Center in Hannibal, Missouri

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Engineer, Bob Williamson, inspectedhomes in the Bear Creek area betweenCollier Street and Woodrow Avenue,he found 100 homes that had beenflooded for more than a week,8Williamson made a later appraisal offlood damage and found that 77 ofthese homes needed to be con-demned.9

Over 400 people who hadlived in other inundated structureswere forced to find emergencyshelter, returning to their homeswould require extensive repair.10

Before the flood, city ordinances hadbeen in effect that required residentsforced by a flood to evacuate theirhomes and to raise their foundationsabove the 100 year flood mark, ifthose homes had sustained damage ofmore than 50%. Most of the homesalong Bear Creek had.11 For many ofthese people, the buyout programwould be a godsend.

The number of homes dam-aged in Hannibal was so large, thatstate government moved quickly tooffer help through the buyout pro-gram. On December 10, 1993,Governor Carnahan’s office an-nounced that Hannibal could get asmuch as $1.5 million through ahazard mitigation grant from SEMAand a community development blockgrant from the Department of Eco-nomic Development to buy flooddamaged homes, if the owners wouldsign the property over to the city andmove out of the floodplain.

Hannibal’s Mayor, RichardSchwartz, was supportive of theprogram. He felt the buyout could“immunize the community from futuredestruction.”12 The Mayor hoped thatas many as 200 families would relocateout of the Bear Creek area.13

Because of the historical sig-nificance of Hannibal, the Depart-

ment of Natural Resources had tostudy the condemned homes, butonly a few of the Bear Creek houseswere historically significant, and thebuyout program continued withoutsignificant delays. Williamson andcity officials distributed question-naires, held meetings, and explainedthe process to homeowners.

The conditions were the samein Hannibal as for so many otherMissouri towns. Homes were pur-chased at their fair market, pre-floodvalue. The dollar amount given thehomeowner at closing had deductedfrom it any previous federal insurancepayments and emergency advancesfor temporary repairs. The cityreceived title to the land with thestipulation that no dwellings orbusiness buildings could be builtthere in the future.

Bob Williamson also appliedfor more money, and in April, 1995,Hannibal received word that anadditional $376,000 was comingfrom SEMA to add to the block grantmoney. The money meant thatHannibal could buy additional prop-erty, and Williamson added 25additional properties to the 80 the cityhad originally designated for thebuyout.14

By April 18, the city hadfinished negotiations and paid for 14flood damaged homes, and wasnegotiating for 10 more.15 Thesehomes were purchased with theblock grant money. On May 21,however Hannibal used some of theSEMA money to buy five morehomes. These payments were deliv-ered to the owners on the steps ofCity Hall with RepresentativeVolkmer handing checks to eachowner collectively totaling $42,600.At that time, Bob Williamsonestimated the city would buy 38more homes by June 3.16

The closing on houses con-tinued until January 23, 1996, bywhich time Hannibal had purchased116 properties.17 By that time,Hannibal had experienced anotherflood when in 1995 the MississippiRiver and Bear Creek once moreoverflowed their banks. This time, ashad happened in so many otherMissouri towns, no people weredriven out of their homes, and nohomes were ruined. The people hadmoved to higher ground and thehouses had been bulldozed down.18

Hannibal has plans for theland that had once been vulnerablefloodplain housing. On 7th Street, nearBear Creek, Hannibal has just closedthe city dump that operated there since1995. The land will be raised seveninches to get it above the usual floodlevel, and then three soccer fields andsix basketball courts will be built withaccompanying parking lots andrestroom facilities. Soccer has recentlybecome popular in Hannibal amongthe young, and the land that once was aburden, can now be an asset.

Along the riverfront, in frontof the levee that saved the town, thecity acquired more lots with thebuyout program. The city will usethe land to build a public recreationaltrailer park/campground where tour-ists can stay while participating inthe National Tom Sawyer DaysFestival that runs from July 1-4every year. Hannibal’s normal popu-lation of 18,000 swells to nearly90,000, as people come to watch orparticipate in fence painting and frogjumping contests, buy crafts, tourhistoric homes, and watch or partici-pate in the Tom Sawyer/BeckyThatcher contest.19 Once this projectis completed and the trailer park/campground is finished, land thatonce cost the City of Hannibal andthe State of Missouri money, willgenerate dollars instead.

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The south Boone County townof Hartsburg, population 131,sits about three-fourths of a

mile from the Missouri River. Thispicturesque town’s residents eitherfarm or commute to jobs in eitherJefferson City or Columbia, both ofwhich are about fifteen miles away -Columbia to the north; JeffersonCity to the south. In 1993, about theonly businesses in town were tworestaurants whose best customerswere bicycle riders who rode theKATY Trail from Jefferson City orColumbia.

Before 1993, a flood had notfound Hartsburg for 30 years. Highwater had threatened, but a Corps ofEngineers levee had kept Hartsburgdry for years. Throughout June in1993, however, Hartsburg residentswatched the Missouri rise. Citizensorganized into shifts to raise theCorps’ levee even higher. Thisworked, until five inches of rain fellover the area in less than 24 hoursbetween Wednesday July 7, andThursday July 8. The Missouri crestedThursday morning at 33 feet, one foothigher than the height of the levee andits additional sandbag reinforcement.A hole 400 feet wide opened, lettingwater pour through. Next, part of thelevee south of town also broke and 2-8 feet of water soaked all but 12 out of50 houses in the town.1

By July 22, it seemed to beover. The water dropped a foot, andsome families began to cautiouslycreep back to their homes to surveythe damage. Then on July 25, theheavy rains came back, and the waterstarted to rise again; this time it roseeven higher. Both the Baptist Churchand United Church of Christ had only

Hartsburg and Boone Countyendured flooded basements in the firstonslaught. This time water rose intothe sanctuaries, and church membershauled the pews and pianos out of bothbuildings to high ground. MayorFloyd Steelman ordered the sewerpumps shut off, and Union ElectricPower Company shut off electricityand gas in the town. The Post Officeclosed temporarily while the postmas-ter moved operations to Ashland,seven miles away.

Yet, the town’s people refusedto give up. Instead they retreated to thecenter of town and hastily built asandbag wall five feet high, to protectthe twelve buildings that had escapedthe first flood. Termed the “HartsburgWall” by the approximately 90 peoplewho maintained it, the wall ran from theHartsburg Hitching Post Café severalblocks through town to the SeniorCitizens Center.2

By July 31, the water wasdropping—this time permanently. ByAugust 12, the water was out of thetown. Somebody put up a sign on mainstreet: “Hartsburg Thanks Everyone,Hell of a Try!”3

People patiently began torebuild. Many houses were notcovered by flood insurance becausethe residents honestly believed thattheir homes were not in the flood-plain.4 Most people in Hartsburg hadreally not considered flooding a threat.They neither knew where the flood-plain was, nor were they familiar withflood regulations. Many were incredu-lous when the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency’s Sharon Reigelcame to town to inform them during atown meeting, that in order to rebuild ahouse in the floodplain that had

sustained damage of over 50%, theowner would have to raise it a footabove the 100 year floodplain level.In most of Hartsburg, that meant fourfeet. Nancy Grant, the town’s FloodRelief Coordinator, feared that theindependently-minded citizens mightsimply defy that rule and rebuildwithout raising their homes.

Grant reminded the citizensthat failure to comply could result inthe town being dropped from theNational Flood Insurance Program.To compound these problems, MayorFloyd Steelman resigned and the mostactive of the town’s city councilmen,Glen Klemme died.5

In the midst of this disorgani-zation and confusion, some residentsreceived first word of RepresentativeVolkmer’s new buyout program. Atfirst, the program received littlesupport. Linda Hilgedick, a Hartsburgresident, felt few people would applybecause the majority of people hadalready moved into their homes orwere in the final stages of paintingand carpeting.6

On December 16, TheHartsburg Hot Line, written for theAshland Boone County Journal byNancy Grant and Shirley Thomasmentioned that the Hartsburg CityCouncil was studying Volkmer’sbuyout bill. Two weeks later, onDecember 30, the Ashland BooneCounty Journal mentioned in a frontpage article that Southern DistrictCommissioner Karen Miller wouldhold a meeting on January 5 inHartsburg to inform flood victimsabout the buyout program. Shereminded people that the buyoutapplication deadline was January 15,

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Broken flood control levee

and that this meeting would provideinformation for Hartsburg and BooneCounty citizens alike who might wantto apply for assistance under theprogram. Miller noted however, thatmany Hartsburg families had alreadyrebuilt their homes. A separate notestated that the city council hadalready begun to contact homeownerswhom they suspected might bepotential candidates. It further invitedpeople who might be interested tocontact the city council.7

On January 5, the city counciltalked to a number of residents whowere interested in the buyout. Commis-sioner Miller’s presence was helpfuland necessary because a number ofhouses in the Hartsburg settlement areawere actually not in the corporate limitsof the town, but in Boone County. Shereminded people that the rules of thebuyout program stipulated there mustbe separate applications for houses inBoone County and ones in Hartsburg,even though the houses might sit nextto each other. This meeting made clearthe basic rules of the buyout program,and five Hartsburg residents began theapplication process at the meeting,along with twelve people whosehouses were in Boone County.

At this meeting, the council-men and Commissioner Miller in-formed the residents that they esti-mated the houses outside of Hartsburgin Boone County were collectivelyworth $350,000 and those in Hartsburg$195,000. These would be the valuesthey would forward with the applica-tions. However, they warned theapplicants that FEMA’s appraisalmight determine the houses to be worthless. John Thomas, a councilman toldapplicants that the property, if sold,would revert to the city or county. Hespeculated that the lots, once cleared,might be used as a park or a parking lotfor one of the local churches.8

The buyout process became amajor news item in the Ashland BooneCounty Journal. An article from theJanuary 20 issue explained that thelocal officials and the State EmergencyManagement Agency in Jefferson Citywere helping residents fill in the 404Hazard Mitigation Grant Application,and although it had been a complicatedprocess, the documents were finishedby the January 15 deadline.9 ByFebruary 10, the Journal noted that “allapplications and information havebeen forwarded to the various agenciesfor consideration on the buyoutprocess. It is now a wait and seeattitude for the ... residents affected.”10

By February 15, the Journalcarried the news that the Governor’sBuyout Review Committee inJefferson City had recommendedfunding for three homes in Hartsburgand seven in Boone County. TheGovernor had accepted this recom-mendation and had moved theapplications on to FEMA.

The buildings that did notreceive the committee’s approval werebusinesses that did not qualify for theprogram; the buyout targeted onlyprimary residential dwellings. Harts-burg Mayor Mike Rodemeyer cau-tioned residents that FEMA stillneeded to review the applications.However, if they were accepted, andthe buildings were torn down, the citycouncil hoped to definitely use one ofthe lots for a church parking lot,another for a small park next to the

KATY Trail bicycle path, and the thirdas a green space between two houses.The Governor recommended a total of$100,500 to buy the houses inHartsburg, and $221,000 to buy theBoone County homes.11 At that point,the formal assessment of the propertybegan. City officials presented theowners with an offer based on theirpre-flood assessment of a house’svalue, minus money that might havebeen received previously from FEMAor paid out in flood insurance.12 Overthe ensuing month, the ownersconsidered and accepted the offers.

On February 2, 1995, MayorMike Rodemeyer presented eachowner with a check.13 According toBuck Katt, Deputy Director of SEMA,in an interview with the ColumbiaMissourian, the average price paid was$25,000.14

By May 18, 1995, Hartsburghad contracted with Enoch Construc-tion Company to tear down the fourhouses at a total cost of $23,400, withdemolition to start by May 27.15

Ironically the demolition had to bedelayed until June 1.

On May 25, the Hartsburgarea flooded again. Happily most ofthe town was safe behind the nextlevee that the Corps of Engineers hadcompleted in September 1994, buttwelve houses, whose owners haddecided not to participate in thebuyout, sustained minor damage fromwater.16

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took advantage of additional govern-ment money to protect the commer-cial basis of the town.

Like any town afflicted withnatural disaster, Hermann quicklyapplied to FEMA for disaster reliefmoney, and by November 23, it hadreceived the first payment from thatagency to repair infrastructure thatthe flood had ruined.3 But the townwas also interested in the long-termsolutions, and so the city council wasalso interested in the buyout program.

Officials from Hermann heardthe first rumors about the buyoutprogram on September 7, 1993, whenthey, along with leaders from neigh-boring communities met with person-nel from Missouri’s State EmergencyManagement Agency.4 On October24, Harold Volkmer, whose congres-sional district included Hermann,Missouri, explained his proposedplan to improve the existing legisla-tion governing buyouts of property onfloodplains. His plan made morefederal money available for theprogram, and revised the formula by

Hermann

Hermann, Missouri, the countyseat of Gasconade County,is no stranger to flooding, but

the flood of ‘93 was memorable. Thewater levels were higher than everbefore, more commercial and resi-dential property was devastated, andthe flood waters stayed for weeksinstead of days. The flood waters of1986, the second worst flood inHermann’s long history covered partsof the city for only four days; whereasin 1993, the river at Hermann wasabove flood stage for 51 straight days.Furthermore, the flood waters seemedto recede only to suddenly reappear -three times between July 6 and 31,and once again in September.

The town was also nearlyisolated by water and was cut in halfwhen water from Frene Creek, whichflows into the Missouri, overflowedthe bridges on East First and SixthStreet.1 Hermann’s police chief, BobSitton, supervised the building ofemergency roads to keep the cityconnected. The town lost its phonesystem, the schools had to be closedsince one quarter of the students lived

across the Missouri River, and someworried that giant fuel tanks floatingdown the river might destroy theHighway 19 Bridge over the Mis-souri.2

Yet, Hermann is resilient; itsinhabitants are the descendants ofGerman settlers who came to centralMissouri in the mid-nineteenth cen-tury. An editorial, appearing in theNovember 23, 1993, issue of theHermann Advertiser Courier, writtenby Mayor John Bartel, takes the crisisof the flooding in stride. He thankedthe community for their united effortsin battling the flood, he characterizedthe summer of flooding as an excitingand challenging time, and he invitedHermann’s citizens to become part ofthe solution.

A good portion of thatsolution proved to be Hermann’swholesale acceptance and participa-tion in the buyout program. Not onlydid Hermann’s residents quickly andsuccessfully apply for money topurchase residential homes habituallythreatened by the floods, but they also

Herman purchased whole blocks of flood-proneproperties under the buyout program.

Open space enhances the appearances of privatelyowned homes in the community of Hermann, Missouri

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which the Federal Emergency Man-agement Agency calculated howmuch it could distribute to stateemergency management agencies foruse in buying flood threatenedproperties. To everyone’s surprise,Volkmer’s bill moved quickly throughthe House and the Senate, and wassigned into law by President Clintonon December 2, 1993.5

Hermann’s City Council,lead by City Administrator TerryHelton, moved just as quickly toapply for the buyout money. OnFebruary 22, 1994, the Councilsubmitted the paperwork to thefederal government through theMeramec Regional Planning Com-mission for $2.2 million in buyoutfunds.6 The request asked for moneyto repair infrastructure and to buyoutresidential and commercial property.7

Hermann’s prospects for re-ceiving money improved when in thelast week of May 1994, Missourireceived additional money from theFederal Department of Housing andUrban Development. Jill Friedmanassured the reporter that GovernorCarnahan was committed to fundingthe residential buyout program first,and that “commercial property wouldbe helped after the residentialrequests were addressed.”8

By July 5, Hermann’s appli-cation for money was approved, andon August 9, 1994, the first residentialbuyout money arrived. Hermannreceived $494,750 to buy residentialproperty, along with $150,000 fromanother government grant to pay fordemolition of the houses.9 Later, inOctober, 1994, Hermann receivedadditional money to fund a buyout ofcommercial property from the Mis-souri Department of Economic De-velopment.10

In May 1995, Hermann oncemore faced record floods. This timethe floodwaters were not as high, butthey remained over flood stage for 85straight days—a month longer than in1993.11 Despite these repeated inun-dations, there was room for optimism.

Before the 1993 flood, 69property owners had flood insurance.An article in the Advertiser Courieron September 6, 1995, reported thatnow there were 58. The article statedthat the reason for the decline could“be attributed to property ownersparticipating in the federal and statebuyout programs.”

By October 4, 1995, the firstbuyout homes in Hermann were beingdemolished on West Eighth and NinthStreets. An additional thirteen resi-

dences were on the list for demolition,and Barbara Bohley, the administra-tor of Hermann’s buyout program,reported that Hermann had requestedadditional money to buy “five or sixmore homes.”12

At the end of the buyoutprogram, 22 residential propertieshad been purchased.13 The onlyproblem with an otherwise smoothbuyout occurred when demolitionbulldozers demolished a home at 200E. Fifth Street. Although a pre-demolition investigation indicatedthat the house was a modern structure,the inner core of the house wasactually an “old frame house dating to1840.” The destruction was unfortu-nate, but unavoidable, since thehistoric section of the house had beencompletely covered by later construc-tion, and was only discovered afterdestruction of the house had begun.14

Today, the land that waspreviously devastated by flood watersin 1993 and 1995 is empty, except fora few holdouts who have raised theirhouses to what they hope will be alevel above the next flood. Most ofthe land is covered with grass. Aportion has been turned into a soccerfield, and another part is being used asa parking lot for businesses located onnearby higher ground.15

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Floods have always threatenedJefferson County because threerivers flow through its area. Six

times between 1973 and 1993, floodwaters from the Mississippi, Mer-amec, and Big River have devastatedthe county’s towns and unincorporat-ed areas. The worst was in 1993.Although the threat began in May, byJuly floodwaters threatened most ofthe county.

In Arnold, 500 families evacu-ated areas near the Meramec River onJuly 28, and on August 1, a main leveealong the Starling Airport Roadcollapsed which released flood waterover a mobile home park. In Festus,37 businesses and 35 houses wereflooded. Crystal City lost its watertreatment plant, its post office, themain intersection in town wasflooded, and 30 families were forcedfrom their homes. In tiny Kimmswickthe threat of flooding, at one point,caused the entire population toevacuate.

In Herculaneum, flood waterscovered the town’s main intersection,caused the evacuation of two trailercourts, and forced The Doe Run leadsmelter, the towns largest employer,to shut down. At Kimmswick andHerculaneum, the Mississippi rose to45 feet which was six feet higher thanits record crest in 1973; this waterforced hundreds from their housesand flooded the downtown areas ofboth towns.2

The unincorporated parts ofJefferson County were also flooded.

Rising water from the Big Riverforced 200 people out of trailer courtsand isolated houses. Flood watercovered roads and isolated peopleincluding the 30 residents of thehamlet of Sulpher Springs. All alongthe banks of the Mississippi, Mer-amec, and Big River, throughout themonth of July, hundreds of JeffersonCounty residents joined together inspontaneous groups dictated bygeography to build makeshift leveesprotecting mobile homes and houses.

On Sunday, July 18, Jeffer-son County officials met in Hillsboroto assess the damage, and to makecontingency plans for recovery. Thecounty’s economic development di-rector, Patrick Lamping, reported that350 businesses in the county had beenforced to close, sewers had collapsedor were backed up, 3,000 workerswere involuntarily idle, $800,000 inwages had been lost, and retail saleshad declined by $2.5 million.

Bill Koehrer, the county’sdirector of public works reported that14 roads in the county wereunderwater, and an official fromUnion Electric reported that 400people were without power. JeffersonCounty Presiding Commissioner, Eliz-abeth Faulkenberry noted that by July20, the county had spent “$975,000on flood prevention and emergencyservices.”3

By the evening of July 31,county officials told levee buildersand residents to stop working and toevacuate. With river crests predicted

to rise another two feet during thenext two days, with leaks appearingalong three week old levees, and withmore rain predicted, the situation atthe end of July appeared hopeless.Faulkenberry believed “it was allabout to go under.” Everyone agreedwith her.4

However, levees in Colum-bia and Valmeyer, Illinois, broke.This ruined thousands of acres ofIllinois farmland, but it eased thepressure on dozens of JeffersonCounty levees. Water levels droppedat Arnold, Festus, Crystal City, andKimmswick. The dropping level ofthe Mississippi also eased thebackflow on the Meramec and BigRivers. On Monday, August 2, itlooked as if the worst was over.Kimmswick Mayor Martha Pattersoncould boast, “We’ve fought it, andwe’re winning.”5

During the next week, thethreat of flooding seemed to bepassed. The cities and hamlets ofJefferson County began to clean up.In Crystal City and Festus, cityofficials called for volunteers toremove the sandbags, and RickTurley, City Administrator for Fes-tus, invited other municipalities tobring their discarded sandbags toFestus. The sand could be used tobuild an extension onto the runwaysat the Festus Municipal Airport.

Herculaneum officialscleaned up refuse from the flood offtheir streets, and Elizabeth Faulken-berry and the other Jefferson County

Jefferson County(Including Festus and Crystal City)1

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Commissioners contracted with Mer-amec Hauling to collect and haulaway debris throughout the county.6

These clean up efforts alsocaused county and municipal officialsin Jefferson County to think aboutprevention. In fact, as early as theHillsboro conference on July 18,Elizabeth Faulkenberry, had broachedthe topic of a possible buyout ofhouses, along the Meramec andMississippi Rivers, as a means ofminimizing future flood damage.7

The buyout idea quicklybecame a “hot” topic throughout thecounty. On September 10, at the FestusCity Hall, county officials as well asofficials from Crystal City and Festusheld a meeting with SEMA officials todiscuss various kinds of relief. Abuyout was at the top of the list.Commissioner Faulkenberry and Fes-tus City Administrator Rick Turleywere both interested. SEMA officialsexplained that the buyout option wasavailable only to flood victims, andthat, while the buyout program wouldpay the pre-flood value of a home, thecounty or municipality would have tosecure a 25% match.

After the meeting, Turleytold reporters that perhaps Festuscould seek a community developmentblock grant to pay its share, but “itwas unclear if a town could use thatfor its share.” Mayor Clifford Bins ofCrystal City said that he would notseek a buyout, although 30 to 40individual homeowners in CrystalCity had asked for one.8

Following that meeting, theconcept of a buyout attracted moreattention. Citizens of Arnold encour-aged the idea. Arnold, the largesttown in Jefferson County had beenactively interested in the buyoutoption for over a decade. Over one-

half of the 65 buildings in the Arnoldfloodplain had been bought out sincethe US government first initiated abuyout program in 1980. The clearedland totaled 400 acres and had beenturned into a greenway made up ofwildlife and recreation areas. EricKnoll, Arnold City Administrator,saw the flood of ‘93 as an opportunityto continue the buyout policy that hefelt would eliminate the floodproblem for Arnold completely. Hehad plans to remove more than 200houses and mobile home pads fromthe floodplain.9

With this endorsement, otherJefferson County officials and resi-dents were bound to be interested. Atfirst, FEMA officials gave littleencouragement. In an interview withthe St. Louis Post Dispatch, StephenHarrel, a FEMA official from KansasCity explained. . . [that a] “buyoutwill come slowly.” . . . [He was] “con-cerned that a whole lot of people aregetting their hopes up for somethingthat may not materialize.”

Harrel did, however, correctthe false impression that only home-owners with flood insurance couldapply for the program. He clarifiedthat it was possible for uninsuredhomeowners to participate too. Healso cited Arnold as “the region’sbuyout expert,” because it had gotten“federal aid for three floodplainbuyouts in the last decade.” Ofcourse, when the Post interviewedHarrel on September 20, he wasspeaking of the flood buyout programthat was already in place. Representa-tive Harold Volkmer’s bill had not yetbeen introduced to Congress.10

Even in the wake of thisdiscouraging announcement, the buy-out idea continued to grow, especiallywhen newspapers began to carryaccounts of the progress of Volkmer’s

bill through Congress. Encouraged bythe possibility of the bill’s passage,Jefferson County, Festus, and CrystalCity began surveys of flood-damagedproperty within their boundaries inanticipation of the bill’s passage intolaw. When President Clinton did signthe bill on December 2, people inJefferson County were ready toparticipate.11

In Festus, Rick Turley hadcompiled a list of 25 possible buyoutproperties as early as November 5. Itincluded houses in the vicinity ofSouth 4th Street and South Adamsand estimated the city would need$894,000 to buy the homes and$100,000 to tear them down.12

Jefferson County also hadidentified 554 structures in unincor-porated areas of the county that mightbe buyout candidates. Tabulation ofthe positive responses to a question-naire sent to the owners of theseproperties revealed that 106 propertyowners of 266 of the structures mightbe interested. The questionnaire alsorevealed that only 22 of those 106owners had flood insurance. Many ofthe structures, the documents re-vealed, had been repeatedly damagedover the last decade by flooding.

The specific sites includedmobile homes at Covered BridgeMobile Home Park in the northeastcorner of the county; 41 houses andlots in the River Bend Subdivisionnear the Big River; trailer homes atthe Blue Bell Mobile Home Park offOld Highway 141; and 19 otherproperties scattered throughout thecounty. The estimated cost of thebuyout was $3.5 million.

Although Crystal City’s May-or, Clifford Bins, had earlier indicat-ed his town would not participate,some residents had been insistent,

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and 17 of them had persuaded the citygovernment to investigate the buyoutoption and to put their names on a listas interested candidates. Their 17houses were valued at $343,000.Crystal City’s City Clerk, DebbieJohns, felt that “this was anopportunity for them [the owners] tohave a base to purchase a housesomewhere else.”13

One reason for the generallypositive response to a buyout was theattitude many Jefferson Countyresidents had towards SEMA andFEMA, the two agencies they knewwould administer any buyout pro-gram. In the ‘93 flood both agencieshad collectively been responsible forfinding most of the relief dollars tohelp flood victims.

For instance, Stephenand Donna Roberts, whosemobile home was in Fenton(part of the town is inJefferson County), praisedFEMA for helping them withemergency money to repairtheir mobile home and helpthem with rental of a newmobile home pad. “They[FEMA] came down to Mc-Donald’s in Arnold and theplace was full of families. Butin 10 minutes we gave themall the information theyneeded and [we] were on ourway.”14 FEMA’s word of mouthreputation had already gone a longway towards legitimatizing the buy-out process. People in the area hadevery reason to expect a similar levelof help from the two agencies during abuyout effort.

With a head start, JeffersonCounty, including Festus and CrystalCity, sent its municipal officials toJefferson City to meet with GovernorCarnahan’s Buyout Review Commit-

tee on December 29, 1993.15 Oncethat committee heard a presentation,it either rejected an application, orrecommended it to the Governor. TheGovernor then made the request toFEMA.

By March 5, all applicantshad received positive answers fromFEMA. Jefferson County received$3.5 million. The grant allowedJefferson County to begin negotia-tions on 91 flood damaged houses aswell as Covered Bridge Mobile HomePark and Blue Bell Mobile HomePark.

Elizabeth Faulkenberry toldthe Post that the money would “help alot of people and will prevent

properties from being flooded againin future years with the governmentpaying for repairs.” Arnold, Festus,and Crystal City submitted requests,and these towns received positivenews also.

Arnold received $4.1 millionto buy 89 homes as well as severaltrailer courts. Crystal City received$232,800 to buy 17 homes, and Festusreceived $288,000 to buy 15. Thesethree cities and Jefferson County

submitted requests for communitydevelopment block grants to add tothis buyout money. Some communitydevelopment block grant funds couldbe used for buyouts, and some couldbe used to pay for administrativecosts, demolition, and moving ex-penses of buyout participants.16

A reminder of what thebuyout program was supposed toprevent came in April, 1994, whenthree days of heavy rain dropped teninches of rain over the Big River andMeramec River basins. The threat offlooding returned to some areas inJefferson County. Along the BigRiver, the tiny settlements of CedarHill and Morse Mill experienced thewaters rising so suddenly that

residents had to be evacuat-ed by helicopter or boat.

At Arnold, floodwa-ters rose to within three feetof the crest in 1993, andseveral residents who hadresisted the idea of a buyoutsaid they would reconsider.Jerry Dunn, who spent April10 and 11 sandbagging hishouse near the StarlingAirport Road, told TimO’Neil of the Post Dispatchthat he had moved back tohis house after the flood of‘93 “because he never couldget much information about

federal buyouts.” He said, “[he’d]study it harder this time.”17

Soon after the flooding inApril, Jefferson County and itsmunicipalities began the mechanicsof the buyout process. Festus, CrystalCity, and Jefferson County all hiredappraisers to assess the pre-floodvalue of houses.

In Festus, under the NationalHistoric Preservation Act of 1966,

Red Cross volunteers deliver mealsto victims and emergency workers.

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some houses were old enough tomake a historical study mandatory,and the city had to hire historiansfrom the State Historic PreservationOffice to make analyses. After thesepreliminaries, the city officials gaveeach homeowner a price value andtime to evaluate.18

In Crystal City, the cityadministration followed the sameprocedure. Fourteen of the original 17applicants accepted the governmentsoffer. In Festus, all applicants hadaccepted the offer.19

Jefferson County also fol-lowed the same procedure, butbecause of the large numbers ofapplicants, the process took longer.Of the 106 homeowners who hadoriginally expressed an interest in a

buyout, the state approved funds for89. Later, funds were available for anadditional 41 houses whose ownershad expressed interest in the programin June 1994. By May 28, 1995,Jefferson County had closed on 75houses and was negotiating with 11more homeowners.20

As Jefferson County wasnegotiating for these houses, anotherbout of heavy rain had causedflooding of the Meramec and BigRivers. Many of the people whosehomes were threatened had decidedto take the buyout offer and werealready gone, but the onslaughtfrightened some additional peopleinto exploring the buyout program.21

To help these individuals andothers throughout the state who had

also been victimized by floods in1995, Governor Carnahan announcedhe would try to find additional fundsto accommodate any homeownerwho had missed an opportunity to trythe buyout in 1993.22 True to hisword, the Governor found additionalmoney. For Jefferson County, thatmeant an additional $900,000.23

By February 1997, JeffersonCounty had finished its buyoutprogram. It had acquired 131 proper-ties along with a total of 118 pads attwo mobile home parks and one largeapartment complex.24 The cost ofthese purchases had been $3,122,758,ranking Jefferson County third inbuyout funds expended after St.Charles County ($14,617,424) and St.Louis County ($ 5,502,746).25

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calling county surveyor Bill Shea toask for details.6

Other Lincoln County resi-dents were calling The BoonslickRegional Planning Commission,where Andrew Riganti placed theirnames on a list and forwarded it to theState Emergency ManagementAgency. By November 30, Rigantihad a list of 83 people who hadexpressed interest.

At this time much of theinformation that people were gettingwas confusing. Newspaper accountsshow that the information was acombination of what RepresentativeVolkmer proposed in his as yet un-passed bill, and what the originalbuyout bill stipulated that had beenpassed back in 1980.7

Finally, once PresidentClinton signed the bill on December2, Congressman Volkmer scheduleda meeting for officials from all overthe state on December 10 on theColumbia Campus of the Universityof Missouri, to discuss details. At thismeeting people learned that the oldfederal/state cost share of 50/50 hadbeen changed to 75/25, and that the25% could be financed with moneyfrom a variety of sources includingcommunity development blockgrants.

The same meeting also laiddown rules about the voluntary natureof the bill, outlined the process ofinspection and appraisal for eachproperty, and emphasized that anyhomeowner could appeal the ap-praised price and back out at any timeduring negotiations. In addition, the

Lincoln County lies just north ofSt. CharlesCounty and has a 25mile border with the Missis-

sippi. The floodplain along the greatriver is a rich agricultural area with afew small towns scattered among itsfields. Winfield with 592 citizens in1993, was the largest of these towns,but Old Monroe, Silex, and Foleyformed satellite communities.

Each of these farming commu-nities had experienced frequent flood-ing. The last big one before 1993 hadbeen in 1973, when the Pin Oak Leveesome three miles east of Winfield hadbeen overtopped and hundreds oflocal farms flooded. Still, the resi-dents were confident that this time theseven large levees maintained by theCorps of Engineers along the riversedge would hold.

On June 30, however, excep-tionally heavy rains began accompa-nied by high winds that blew the roofsoff some trailers in Winfield. Theriver level steadily rose because afterweeks of rain the ground could absorbno more. By July 1, when weatherforecasters predicted a 36.3 foot crest,just 6 tenths of a foot below thebreakthrough crest of 1973, nervouscounty residents gathered to reinforcelocal levees.1

Their efforts were no matchfor the force of the water. During thenight of July 3rd, part of the leveelocated 1.5 miles from MississippiLock and Dam 25 gave way. BySunday morning, floodwater had cuta 400 foot hole through the levee andthe eastern edge of Winfield wascovered. At least 150 people fled theirhomes, and 4,000 acres of farm land

were covered. Sandbaggers, joinedby National Guard troops of the3175th MPs (Warrenton), fell back tothe Pin Oak Levee and began to try tostop the water. But on July 10 thislevee gave way, flooding morefarmland and forcing another 100people to evacuate Winfield. North ofWinfield, flood waters covered al-most all of Foley and Silex, forcing allof its residents to leave. South ofWinfield, Old Monroe’s levee held,but residents prepared to leave.2

From then on, levee afterlevee collapsed, 1100 homes sufferedflood damage (200 in Winfield),2,700 parcels of farmland wentunder—representing 30% of the farmland in Lincoln County, with anappraised value of $29,304,310—andmost of the county’s roads werecovered.3 Sandbaggers did manage tosave part of Winfield by building alevee along the top of Highway 79,and in Elsberry, 12 miles north,workers saved the town by usingcranes to lift and place concretehighway dividers for a makeshiftlevee atop the Burlington NorthernRailroad embankment.4

Residents moved into trailerssupplied by FEMA and into sheltersmaintained by the Red Cross, andwaited for the waters to go down.5

On August 11, 1993, the TroyFree Press carried a story aboutRepresentative Harold Volkmer’s“Relocation” bill. That bill wouldeventually help 323 Lincoln Countyand Winfield residents to relocate outof the floodplain. The article gener-ated interest among flood victims,and within a week, residents were

Lincoln County and Winfield

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buyout would concentrate on homesinstead of businesses.8

The county commissionersselected the personnel at BoonslickRegional Planning Commission, head-quartered in Warrenton, to organizeand administer the buyout. Residentsof Winfield, with a local governmentseparate from the county, had to file aseparate buyout application throughits city council. The council alsoselected Boonslick Regional Plan-ning Commission to guide themthrough the process.9 No matter whoadministered the buyout procedure,the process was the same in bothLincoln County and Winfield.

First, a survey had to ascer-tain damage. In Lincoln County, asurvey in March, 1994, revealed that1,100 homes had sustained damage,and nearly 300 homes scatteredthroughout the eastern edge of thecounty had suffered more than 50%damage.10 An earlier inspection inWinfield revealed that about 100homes, mainly in the Winfield Acresarea, had suffered damages above50%.11

The initial survey was fol-lowed by a contact through the mail toowners whose property qualified for abuyout. The questionnaire askedpeople whether they were interestedin the program; it also asked them tosupply financial information aboutthe home. Owners had 30 days toreturn the application.

In the initial mailing, 243homeowners in the county and 50homeowners in Winfield receivedquestionnaires. Once returned, prop-erties were appraised and assigned avalue based on the market value of thehouse prior to the flood. This value,minus any prior government pay-ments such as flood insurance or

money to repair the home, was theprice offered to the homeowner. Theowner was free at that point to acceptthe offer, reject the offer, or appeal theoffered price.12

SEMA approved funds fornumerous buyouts in both LincolnCounty and Winfield. Initially SEMAhad offered $3,479,360 to buy 243homes in Lincoln County, and$713,000 to buy 30 homes inWinfield.19 In October, 1994, LincolnCounty and Winfield received ap-proval for each to spend an additional$1 million if necessary to buyhomes.20

In one original program,encouraged by Boonslick RegionalPlanning Commission, Winfield of-fered a new lot, well out of thefloodplain, as an even exchange forthe floodplain lot of any homeownerflooded out in ‘93. There were 75 lotsavailable.17 About 12 floodplainvictims took advantage of the offer.18

By February 7, 1995, LincolnCounty had completed 140 buyouts.21

The first buyout took place on July26, 1994, when Alice Reimers signedher flood damaged home over to thecounty. She had lived there for 15years. She owned Alice’s Restauranton Highway 79, and the business,spared by floodwaters, had been anunofficial meeting place for peopleparticipating in the buyout program.She moved to a new home in thenearby Darla Home Subdivision inWinfield. She told reporter GreggOchoa of the Lincoln County Journalafter she received her check, “I’mhappy. I could have ended up withnothing.” She also credited countyofficials with how they had helped herwith the buyout process.22

By November 7, 1995, Lin-coln County had purchased 270

homes, at an average cost of $13,000each.23 A month later that number hadgrown to 280, and the county hadreceived an award for its handling ofthe buyout program. The award wasthe gift of the Missouri Association ofCounties and praised Lincoln not onlyfor the efficiency of the buyout processbut also for its unique demolitionprocess of the ruined homes.24

The award winning demoli-tion technique was the brain child ofChuck Freidrichs, Lincoln County’sengineer and buyout coordinator. Hefelt the usual demolition methodwhich involved a bulldozer smashinga ruined home to rubble and cartingthe ruined remains off to a landfillwas wasteful.

Realizing that up to 80% of ahome could be recycled, the materialsused to build new houses, he hired 30people, most of them unemployed, totake each home apart and separatereusable items from the non-usable.Then the items were sold to peoplewho wanted to rebuild or repair ahome. Freidrichs told reporters fromthe Post Dispatch that doors, ceilingjoists, bathtubs, vinyl siding, toilets,sinks, attic insulation, plywood, two-by-fours, and roof trusses were “hotitems.” “Everything has a value tosomebody,” he said. “Other placesburn and bury, or come in with a highlift and crush an entire house and put iton a truck. It’s stupid. These are goodmaterials.” The program raised a halfmillion dollars, paid the demolitioncosts, and managed to tear down 260houses.25

By October 26, 1996, whenbuyout program ended, 323 houseshad been sold to the county.26 InWinfield, the program resulted in thebuyout and demolition of 37 homesthat traditionally had been most at riskduring floods.27

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Unlike other areas, where theeffectiveness of the buyout could bemeasured during floods in 1994 and1995, neither Lincoln County norWinfield suffered much. This timewhen the flood waters came, thelevees that the Corps of Engineers hadrepaired, held and there was littledamage to homes in Lincoln Countyor Winfield.26

The only exception was inSilex, a small unincorporated townnear Winfield that had escapedserious damage in the ‘93 flood. In

1994, however, the threat came notfrom the Mississippi breaking throughlevees, but from the Cuivre River,where heavy rains on April 12, 1994,sent a sudden flash flood through thetown causing the evacuation of mosttown residents.29 In 1995, Silexescaped serious flood damage as didmost of Lincoln County andWinfield.30

Since the flood of ‘93,Lincoln County has prospered. Thepopulation has grown, and theassessed valuation of property has

increased.31 However, people do stilllive in the floodplain. A recentinvestigation by the National FloodInsurance Program, reveals that manywho have rebuilt have done so eitherwithout securing a valid permit thatrequires homes there be elevated onefoot above the 100 year flood mark, orhave elevated their homes usingshoddy and inadequate buildingmaterials and methods. In January,1996, high winds actually twisted onesuch home off its foundations andbroke it in half.32

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Neosho, Missouri, located inNewton County is inextreme southwestern Mis-

souri about 15 miles from theOklahoma border. Because Neosho ismore than 150 miles south of theMissouri River and nearly 300 milesfrom the Mississippi River, floodingwould not seem to be a problem forthis community. Yet, Neosho lies atthe bottom of the watershed forHickory Creek, and a branch ofHickory Creek, known locally asHigh School Branch. Being at thebottom of this combined watershedarea has brought flooding to Neosho15 times since 1979. As the city grew,the problem increased, and by the1990s, the periodic floods werecausing an annual average damage tothe city of $855,000 a year. Theannual average damage to homes,businesses and public buildings was$760,000 and $95,000 was the annualaverage damage to roads and bridges.

Faced with this reoccurringproblem, the City of Neosho, inconjunction with the U.S. Depart-ment of Agriculture’s (USDA) Natu-ral Resources Conservation Services(NRCS), conducted a series of studiesbetween 1949 and 1989 that resultedin a suggested solution known as theNeosho Watershed Plan. It involvedbuilding two dams, 11 retentionponds, and a concrete waterway 45feet wide and 8 feet deep runningfrom south to north through thenorthern part of Neosho calledWheeler’s Addition. Designers envi-sioned the waterways directing therunoff, which usually becameNeosho’s floodwater, through the cityto Hickory Creek north and east of thetown. Several times throughout theyears, the various members of the citygovernment submitted the plan to the

City Council only to have it rejectedas “desirable but too expensive (in1949 the projected cost of the projectwas $18,000—in 1986 the projectedcost of essentially the same plan was$13.5 million).1

The most expensive part ofthe plan was purchasing 52 residentialproperties, with a present day averagefair market value of $26,388.29 each.2These properties had to be destroyed inorder to make way for the waterway.Unfortunately, the price tag hadalways seemed out of the reach forNeosho; the community simply did nothave an adequate tax base. Thesolution was obvious, but there was noway to fund it.3

Then came the flood of ‘93,and soon after the announcement ofMissouri’s State Emergency Man-agement Agency (SEMA) of theFlood Buyout Program. Jim Cole,City Manager of Neosho, saw anopportunity since Newton Countyhad been declared a disaster area.Cole reasoned that Neosho might beeligible for money because of its longstanding problems with periodicflooding. He contacted Buck Katt,Assistant Director of Missouri’sSEMA, to inquire about the possibil-ity of Neosho being eligible for helpwith its waterway project. When helearned that the answer was yes,Neosho could qualify, he presentedthe idea to the City Council during itsregular February meeting. After moremeetings, the community eventuallyapproved the plan, and 100% of thepeople living in the path of theperiodic floods accepted a buyout oftheir properties.4 Subsequently,SEMA awarded Neosho a $1.4million grant. This money, plus agrant from the NRCS, and $400,000

that Neosho City officials werewilling to pledge gathered from StateDisaster Relief Money and Commu-nity Development Block Grant money,gave the city the funds needed tobegin the project.5

When the floods came againMay 1995, most of the residents inharm’s way had moved out. Thissaved hundreds of thousands ofdollars in emergency relief payments.

The buyout prior to 1995saved the taxpayers money inemergency relief, but it also rein-forced the wisdom of the Buyoutprogram. The citizens of Neosho nowhoped to end the flood threat to theircity, permanently. After the 1995floods, 26 additional property ownersliving on the margins of the floodplain area also wanted to takeadvantage of the Buyout option, butthere was not enough buyout moneyto purchase their homes. To meetthis additional need, the citizens ofNeosho passed a 3/8th cents salestax on themselves by a 75% marginto continue the buyout program ontheir own.

The new tax continues toproduce over $600,000 annually.6 Itis money divided into three parts: athird goes to park development, athird to city recreation programs, anda third to pay for continued develop-ment of the Floodplain WaterwayProject. With this money serving as abase, Neosho adds an additional$120,000, raised by an alreadyexisting transportation tax, to pay offa $1.5 million bond issue financed bythe local Nation’s Bank that will payfor the purchases of more propertiesand complete construction of theFlood Plan Waterway.7

Neosho, Missouri

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The Neosho Flood Plain Waterway is an example of how a local community was able to turnthe tragedy of the 1993 and 1995 floods into a positive and successful community solution.

Jim Cole’s realization thatthe Flood Buyout Programcould help his town, and hisskill at presenting it to hisfellow citizens, so impressedJerry B. Uhlmann, Director ofMissouri’s SEMA, that inNovember 1998, he nomi-nated Jim Cole for FEMA’sOutstanding Public SectorEmployee.9

Planned recreational facilitiesinclude a community soccerfield, baseball diamonds, hik-ing and fitness trails, and ahandicapped fishing area.Thefishing area, when complete,will include a level concreteslab, with a guard rail that willallow individuals in wheel-chairs to safely fish from thebanks of Hickory Creek.8

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While the concerns of mostMissourians were fixed onthe Mississippi and Mis-

souri Rivers, Pattonsburg in the north-western corner of Missouri was

Pattonsburg

threatened by the rising waters of theGrand River. Originally settled a mileand a half north of its position in 1993,in 1871 the town moved south to thebanks of the Grand River to be close tothe railroad.1 Unfortunately, thatprosperity never came, chiefly be-cause of constant floods that haveinundated the town 33 times in the last100 years. Still, it was home to 512people. The town was centered arounda three block main street. Its economydepended upon soybeans and corn.2That fragile economy was ruined inJuly 1993, when the Grand Riveroverflowed its banks, broke throughtwo levees, and flooded the town withthree feet of water. This first floodlasted only two days, July 6 and 7,before the waters receded. On July 23,

however, the river rose again and oncemore flowed through town with a crest16 inches higher than on July 6 and 7.3Most residents assumed the worst wasover and had already begun to clean

up when the second flood hit. Thissecond flood was the worst in livingmemory. Gene Walker, the localsuperintendent of schools lived in ahouse that had not flooded since 1875.He described the floodwaters in thefollowing way: “The mud sticks toeverything, the smell sticks toeverything....It’s not just water, it’sfloodwater. It’s slick, slimy and youhave no idea what’s in it.”4

The history of repeated flood-ing, and the dreaded job of cleaning uptwice in two weeks, convinced manypeople in Pattonsburg that it was timefor a change. On November 3, about200 Pattonsburg residents met in theschool cafeteria with Denise Stottle-meyer of the Green Hills Regional

Planning Commission, David War-ford, Pattonsburg’s mayor, and StateRepresentative Phil Tate.

Ms. Stottlemeyer had the ideato approach Missouri’s SEMA withthe idea of moving the town awayfrom the floodplain using money fromthe FEMA and HUD’s CommunityDevelopment Block Grant program.The citizens learned that the programwas voluntary, that the planned loca-tion would need 90% resident approv-al, and would take two to five years tocomplete.5 Furthermore, if the citi-zens made the decision to relocate thetown, there was federal moneyavailable to build new sewers, streets,and utilities.

Representative Tate andMayor David Warford were positiveabout the proposal. RepresentativeTate told the audience that “arelocation would not close the bookon Pattonsburg, but it might open awhole new chapter.”6

A survey of all the town’scitizens found that 92% approved ofthe idea.7 The townspeople drew up aproposal, submitted it to SEMA, andafter approval by FEMA, the firsthomeowner received a check onSeptember 21, 1995.8 Most of thepeople moved into contemporaryhouses or mobile homes, but 14 of thehouses, whose owners, for a variety ofreasons, did not want to part with theirhomes, were moved to the new site.

The average cost for movinga house was $20,000, not includingthe cost of building a new founda-tion, basement, and hook up ofutilities.9 The new site lay two miles

Old Pattsonburg became the setting for a civil war film,“Ride with the Devil.”

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closer to Interstate 35, a location thatthe townspeople hoped would attractnew businesses.

The move was not accom-plished without problems and com-plaints however. The move wasstressful, chiefly because of theconfusion of government paperwork,and there were times, in the words ofthe present Mayor Mark Smith, when,“. . . this thing could have died ... ifpeople hadn’t been hardheaded andpersistent.”10

The move was especially hardon Pattonsburg senior citizens thatmade up 75% of the town’s population.At a time of their lives when order andstability are reassuring, the flood andthe process of recovery threw theirlives into disorder. They also resentedthe fact that they lost money on themove, especially those who wereliving in homes that were paid for. Yet,all in all, they, along with most ofPattonsburg’s citizens, later felt thatmoving the town was a better idea thankeeping it where it was — according toMayor Smith who now has a new

automobile repair shop. His business is“about the same as before.”

In the end, acquisition andrelocation cost $ 3,851,920, most ofwhich was spent on acquiring 235damaged properties.12 Part of thatsum came from an unlikely source,proceeds from the sale of houses andtheir contents. Ten houses wereauctioned off to non residents ofPattonsburg who then moved thehouse away. This money was addedto the funds available for buying otherhomes or for moving houses to thenew site of Pattonsburg.13 The newPattonsburg sits on 600 acres with100 new houses plus 24 housesmoved from the old location. Onehundred vacant lots optimisticallyawait new arrivals, and there is roomfor optimism in Pattonsburg. Newbusinesses have moved in on the newmain street including a conveniencestore, four craft shops, an officesupply store, a bank, and a bakery.Nearby is a new filling station.14

A new elementary school,built in a unique style that includes

three insulated domes designed to cutdown on heating and cooling costs, isalso part of new Pattonsburg. Downin the old site of Pattonsburg there areeight families who choose livingamid about 40 derelict houseswaiting to be destroyed,15 and someof the land has been leased to a localfarmer who now grows soybeans andcorn on the floodplain.16 Whateverhappens, the harmful cycle of floodand rebuilding has ended, and itseems a new era in Pattonsburg hasbegun.

There is a final chapter in thehistory of old Pattonsburg. Duringthe summer of 1998, a Hollywoodfilm crew used the abandonedbuildings as a movie set in filming“Ride With The Devil,” a dramaticrecreation of William Quantrill’sinfamous raid on Lawrence, Kansas,in the midst of the Civil War. Thefilming offered a chance for Pattons-burg’s citizens to gain somethingfrom this flood disaster, when manywere hired as extras in the film ortemporary workers to perform themany jobs of a movie set.17

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Perry County lies along theMississippi River south ofSte. Genevieve. It is a rich

agricultural area producing corn,soybeans, and wheat. Much of thisagricultural wealth consists of an areanortheast of Perryville, the countyseat, called The Bottoms. TheBottoms totals 26,000 acres of mostlycrop land, farm steads, and five smallunincorporated settlements; Menfro,Clayville, Belgigue, McBride, andSereno. The huge 50-foot high BoisBrule Levee, protects The Bottomsarea from periodic flooding of theMississippi River. This massive leveehad successfully held back the riverfor years, but the flood of ‘93 waslarger than any previous flood, and onthe night of July 25, 1993, thesouthern end of the Bois Brule Leveebroke.

Witnesses reported that theinitial break was 300 to 400 feet wide,but the water rushed in like a “tidalwave” according to one witness. Thewater came so suddenly that HaroldSmith, an employee of the U.S. ArmyCorps of Engineers was swept off thetop of the levee in his truck andwashed a mile downstream.1 Smithwas able to escape the onslaught, butthe breech in the levee soon widenedto 1,200 feet, and within a few hours,90 homes and businesses wereflooded and settlements like McBridewere covered with 10 feet of water.

Workers rushed onto thecentral and northern part of the leveeto strengthen it with rock, fearing thatif more of the structure collapsed,water might reach all the way toPerryville. They were successful insaving what remained of the levee.

Yet the damage was still consider-able, and the State Emergency Boardfor Perry County estimated the loss insorghum, wheat, soybeans, and cornat $13 million.2

The land behind the BoisBrule Levee was much too rich anagricultural area to abandon, and thelevee there had protected the farmland – with this single exception –since it was built in 1947. Almostimmediately Perry County receivedassurances that the levee would berebuilt, and by October 26, the countyhad the specific promise of $7 millionin federal money for rebuilding.3 Yetwhile this assured the land would besaved for farming, the sudden andunexpected rupture of the leveeconvinced most residents that TheBottoms was too dangerous an area inwhich to live. Fortunately, a weekbefore the levee break, 54 families,living closest to the levee itself,evacuated their homes for higherground, but everyone realized thatnext time the loss of life was apossibility.

Yet, residents of The Bot-toms were faced with a dilemma.They had nowhere else to live, andmost lacked the resources to moveaway. However, local ordinancespassed in 1986, made it financiallydifficult to move back. Perry County,like many other counties in Missouri,had passed an ordinance mandatingthat no repairs to a flood damagedhome could be made if the cost ofrepairs was higher than 50% of theassessed fair market value of thehome. The excessive force of thewater breaking through the levee onthe night of July 25, followed by the

fact that water stood for a month onthe flood site, so severely damagedthe structures that nearly all weredamaged beyond the 50% level.4

Faced with this dilemma,Representative Volkmer’s legislation– proposed in October, 1993, andsigned into law on December 2nd –proved a godsend. It gave theresidents of The Bottoms a way out.On January 25, 1994, PresidingCounty Commissioner Karl Klaus,and Kathy Mangels of the SoutheastMissouri Regional Planning Com-mission, went to Jefferson City tosubmit a request for $1,644,065which would buy out 54 homes andbusinesses in The Bottoms. Klaus andMangels submitted this request to theReview and Hazard Mitigation Com-mittee that Governor Carnahan hadappointed to oversee the program.5The proposal included requests formoney to buy 39 flood damagedresidences, 14 agricultural tracts, andfour businesses.6

The request was initiallydenied because the buyout programwas specifically designed to buyresidences. However, when the South-east Missouri Regional PlanningCommission resubmitted the pro-posal, omitting the businesses, theReview and Hazard Mitigation Com-mittee approved it, and on February14, 1994, Governor Carnahan ap-proved $578,303 to buy 40 homes inThe Bottoms.7 A month later, onMarch 9, Perry County received anadditional $296,352 in the form of acommunity development block grant.8Yet, the county could not begin thebuyout program until the MissouriDepartment of Economic Develop-

Perry County

904522bp 47-87.p65 3/21/00, 2:33 PM49

ment approved a community devel-opment block grant of $144,000which would allow the county to meetthe local matching funds requirementfor the federal buyout program. Whenthat approval came and the moneybecame available in early December,Perry County officials closed on thefirst property buyout on January 10,1995.

Although the county origi-nally planned to buy 40 residences,eight homeowners backed out of thebuyout because they felt the buyoutprice was too low. This “change ofheart” was entirely in keeping withthe basic philosophy of the buyoutprogram that mandated the programbe voluntary and flexible enough so

that homeowners could back out ofthe program right up to the actualreceipt of a check.9

Because some residentschose to back out at the last minute,the county did not have to spend allthe money that the government hadgiven it, and in 1996, the SEMA wasable to “de-obligate” $40,000 fromthe program and reallocate it to otherbuyout projects.10

The county completed demo-lition of 32 homes by August 6, 1996,and in most cases leased the landback to the original owners asagricultural land since most homesites were contiguous with farm landthat the homeowners still owned. In

May, 1995, the Mississippi Riveronce more reached flood stage inPerry County, but this time the BoisBrule Levee, which the Corps ofEngineers had rebuilt in 1994, heldback the water. None of the sites thathad flooded in 1993 flooded again.11

Still, nothing is more certain inMissouri than the eventuality offuture flooding, and the cost of thebuyout program of 1993 will un-doubtedly prevent major outlays offlood relief money to disaster victimsin the future. SEMA estimates that thecost-benefit ratio for Perry County is2.14, meaning that within the next 15years Missouri will save $2.14 forevery dollar spent in the 1993 buyoutprogram.12

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Rhineland, Missouri, a smalltown on the MissouriRiver in Montgomery Coun-

ty, was a relocation site that capturedworld wide attention. ABC, NBC,and CBS, as well as televisionstations from Japan and France, sentcamera crews to record the dramaticevent of the whole town being pulledby tractors, house by house, to a newlocation on top of a hill above thefloodplain.1

Rhineland residents were thefirst flood victims in Missouri orIllinois to make the decision to movetheir entire town and its dozens ofhistorically significant buildings outof the floodplain to a place ofpermanent safety. Once Rhinelandinitiated the idea, Pattonsburg innortheast Missouri and Valmeyer,Illinois, also decided to abandon theirflood prone sites and move to higherground.2 Historically Rhineland waspart of a group of towns near theMissouri River including Hermann,Dutzow, Augusta, Holstein, andMarthasville that German immigrantschose to settle in the mid-nineteenthcentury. Topographically it remindedthem of their homeland. That wascertainly true of the Germans who

A view of the former Rhineland village site afterthe buyout.

Rhineland now sits on a hill overlooking theMissouri River.

Rhinelandsettled Rhineland in 1853. Their newhome in Missouri reminded them oftheir homeland along the Rhine Riverin western Germany.

Since its foundation in 1853,Rhineland had experienced flooding,especially in 1951 and 1986, butnever to the degree of the ‘93 flood.3In 1993, along the Missouri Riverbetween Rhineland and Hermannbetween January and June, a total of27.11 inches of rain fell. Thatcompared with only 13.08 inches inthat same area for 1992.4 People inRhineland kept less formal, butequally revealing records. In 1986,five feet of water stood in the People’sSavings Bank of Rhineland. In 1993,however, the flood waters in the samebank rose as high as the top of a sixfoot coat rack.5 By Wednesday, July7, the town was underwater with 80%of the houses and business flooded.6Between that date and the end ofSeptember, Rhineland would experi-ence four record crests and was totallycut off from dry land except for oneemergency route that cut through afield.

As they had in previousfloods, the Rhinelanders greeted this

crisis with cooperative effort and grimcheerfulness. Cindy Engemann, whosehusband Gary owned the RhinelandGrain Elevator, told a reporter that shereferred to the flood waters asAlternate 94, and that instead of going“over the hill and through the woods,”it was “over the hill and through thepasture.” One picture that got nation-wide exposure showed three Rhine-landers in a boat rescuing a two-weekold fawn from atop the brokenRhineland Levee.7

However, the intensity of theflood this time convinced some peopleit was time for a permanent change. Inthe midst of their crisis, the people ofRhineland heard rumors about a newprogram. On October 24, HaroldVolkmer, the area’s CongressionalRepresentative, held a meeting inHermann and revealed details of a newbill he was soon to introduce in theHouse of Representatives. As Volk-mer explained, his bill would changecurrent legislation regarding federalrelocation and buyout programs ad-ministered through FEMA, by increas-ing the amount of money available forsuch programs. The plan seemedpromising, and the magnitude of thecrisis seemed to indicate, according to

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Volkmer, that Congress wanted to dosomething significant to help victims.He promised to put the bill on the fasttrack.8 He was as good as his word.The Bill moved quickly through theHouse Water Resources and Environ-ment Subcommittee on October 27,and was passed 19 days later as theFlood Damage Reduction Bill (HB3445). From there it went to the Senatethat passed the billa week later, andon December 2,President Clintonsigned it into law.9

However,the Rhinelandershad not waitedpassively as thebill progressedrapidly throughCongress. MayorErvin Elsenraatand the RhinelandCity Council hadutilized the re-sources of theBoonslick Re-gional PlanningCommission, andits Director Steve Etcher, to apply for acommunity development block grantfrom Missouri’s Department of Eco-nomic Development. On November 4,during a 2 ½ hour meeting in theRhineland Firehouse, Rhineland’scitizens discussed the proposed move,based on the block grant application aswell as the anticipated money fromVolkmer’s proposed bill.

The Rhinelanders decided torelocate the town by moving to a new40 acre site on top of a hill less than aquarter of a mile north of the site of OldRhineland. Citizens would swap theirhome site at the bottom of the hill for anew one at the top. They could chooseto move their old house or to build anew one on a new site. The block grantwould buy the new site and prepare the

new infrastructure. The citizens antic-ipated that Volkmer’s bill would pass,and the money it generated could beused for a government buyout of theirold homes.

At the Firehouse meeting,State Representative Charles Nor-wald of Warrenton, whose districtincluded Rhineland, spoke in favor of

the plan and felt it would be the kindof innovative solution that othertowns would emulate. He alsorealistically reminded people that themove would not be cheap. It wouldcost the residents money. “It mightcost them $10,000 to move up thehill,” but if they didn’t take advantageof the idea, “the next flood will costthem $10,000.”

The town’s mayor, ErvinElsenraat, felt the program would keepRhineland economically viable, keepthe community intact, and would be a“good investment of federal dollars”because afterwards there would be nomore money spent for flood insuranceor damage repair. He also remindedresidents of a bit of good luck. Justbefore the flood, Rhineland had

received a community developmentblock grant of $357,000 to build a newsewage treatment plant. Since none ofthat money had been spent, it would bean easy matter to use it to build asewage treatment plant compatiblewith the new town site.10

In one week the idea of arelocation had the support of a

majority of Rhine-land’s citizens.Mayor Elsenraatwas quoted in theNovember 16 is-sue of the Her-mann Advertiser-Courier “that 40out of 50 home-owners had indi-cated that theywere ready to re-locate on highground either bybuilding a newhouse or movingan existing oneon... higherground.” Lessthan a month lat-er, on December

9, Governor Carnahan announced thatRhineland would get a block grant of$999,500, to implement part of themove. Concurrent with this announce-ment, Mayor Elsenraat reported thatfive more homeowners had agreed tothe move.11

On January 10, 1994, Eisen-raat announced details of the move.The town would hold a lottery todecide the awarding of lots in the newcity site. Three types of residentialareas would delineate the new site:relocated homes, new constructions,and modular or mobile homes.Residents would then draw lots thatdetermined the order of selection forthemselves within the type of lot theyhad occupied in the old town.Meanwhile the property owners would

Houses being moved from old Rhineland to the town’s new location.

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deed their old lots to the city, thatwould in turn oversee that land turnedinto open spaces for parks, recreation,wetlands, or agriculture.12

Then on May 24, GovernorCarnahan had more good news forRhineland: FEMA had approvedhome relocation money for theproject. With the $328,281 fromFEMA, homeowners in Rhinelandcould relocate their ruined homes andlook forward to the move up the hill.The FEMA grant was part of apackage that went into the totalproject. There was $1.3 million fromthe Community Development BlockGrant program for infrastructure atthe new site and relocation, $343,000from the Missouri Housing Develop-ment Commission for down pay-ments on new homes and repairs toold ones, and $585,000 from thestate’s Economic Development Ad-ministration to build roads in andoutside Rhineland.

Finally, the town voted a$150,000 bond issue to help withinfrastructure improvements. On thepurely commercial side, anotherblock grant directed $1,325,000toward buyout of commercial proper-ty, and the Small Business Adminis-tration provided loans to townbusinesses to rebuild.13

For the next 15 months, thetown moved. On September 14, 1994,

the first house moved slowly upHolzum Street towards the top of thehill. This street had been widened to50 feet to accommodate the movinghouses. Steve and Janet Wehrle’shouse was the first.

The move had the trappingsof a parade. In front of the tractortrailer truck two kids carried a bannerthat read “Up Up and Away.” Acrossthe front of the house was anotherbanner reading, “Expert House Mov-ers Inc. 1-800-305-8938,” just in caseanyone watching on TV neededanother house moved. Right behindthe first house came another that JanetWehrle’s parents owned. Within aweek, five houses had made the trip.

Once the houses reached thetop of the hill, they sat at their newsites supported on 25 foot pillarswhile the house movers poured afoundation underneath them. Onlywhen that foundation was dried werethe houses lowered into place.14

In case anyone doubted thewisdom of the move, the site of oldRhineland flooded again in May1995. This time the water was almostas high as in the ‘93 flood, but, ofcourse, everyone had moved and theflood caused no harm to anyone.15

The rising waters caused Hermannfive miles east of Rhineland to cancelits 42nd annual Maifest, an event thatusually drew thousands of visitors to

the area. The 1995 water stayed aboveflood level for 88 days.16

Once the residences weremoved, it was time to relocate thecommercial properties. Instead ofmoving existing buildings, however,the town’s businesses moved intonew commercial buildings north ofhighway 94, at the bottom of the hilladjacent to the residential area.

In addition, the two highwaysleading into the new site were alsoraised above the 1993 flood level toinsure that floodwater would neveragain cut off Rhineland.17

By July, 1996, the lastbuilding had been moved, the sewers,electricity, water, and other infra-structure items were in place, andRhineland celebrated in a day longevent called “Rhineland Celebration‘96.” There was a barbecue, music,and a parade with floats. The winningfloat was “Noah’s Ark,” an appropri-ate and clever reference to anothertriumph over a flood.19

Today, the only remainingstructures in Old Rhineland are awarehouse that was once the generalstore, and one inhabited dwelling thatwas raised above the flood level of the1986 flood. There are plans todevelop part of the area as a trail headfor the KATY Trail bike path thatruns through the town.18

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St. Charles County is a county atrisk anytime there is a floodalong the Missouri and Missis-

sippi Rivers in Missouri. The countylies at the confluence of the MissouriRiver and the Mississippi River, andwhen these rivers rise, the easternportion of St. Charles County can becut off entirely from the rest of thestate. One of the county’s towns,Portage Des Sioux, largely escapesperiodic flooding. But the floodwaters have made most of the town anisland so often that its residents referto the rest of the state as “themainland.”

During times of flooding, theonly means of travel in and out ofPortage Des Sioux is courtesy of theMissouri National Guard’s 1438thEngineer Company that brings a 90foot section of a portable militarybridge to town to use as a giant raft toferry people to their jobs in the rest ofSt. Charles and St. Louis counties.1

Usually, however, an exten-sive system of levees protects thetowns of the county from most of thesmaller flooding events. A serious anddisruptive major flood had occurred in1986 and caused extensive damagewith the highest water on record alongthe Missouri River. People may havefelt they had nothing to fear for acentury, and so the population of thefloodplain in St. Charles County beganto grow after World War II as peoplemoved into inexpensive housing ormobile homes scattered over the “100year floodplain.”

Unfortunately people misin-terpreted the phrase, not realizing thatthe phrase is a statistical estimatesignifying that a really large flood has

only a 1 in a 100 chance of happeningin any one year in the area. As GaryDyhouse, a hydrologist with the U. S.Army Corps of Engineers, explains it:“When the year ends, the slate iserased. We start all over again, at a 1percent chance.”2

The 1 in a 100 chance came in1993, and from late April to earlyAugust there was a steady accelera-tion of one disaster after another. ByApril 28, rains had saturated the soilalong the Missouri and MississippiRivers so that the levels of both riversrose so high that Governor Carnahandeclared a state of emergency in St.Charles County. Then, on July 3, theMissouri River rose past flood stageat St. Charles, and 100 people innorthern St. Charles County fled theirhomes.

Later that same day, a leveenear the Mississippi River town ofWinfield, Missouri, just north of St.Charles County, broke and 100families had to evacuate their homesand find temporary shelter.3 Fourdays later, the levee protecting WestAlton, situated on a narrow peninsulabetween the two mighty rivers, brokeand forced county officials to order anevacuation of the eastern part of thecounty.4 Rising flood waters began tolap against hastily constructed sand-bag barriers, around water pumpingstations, and electrical substations,and on July 9, 7,000 St. CharlesCounty residents found themselveswithout electricity.

Some of those without elec-tricity were among the 7,000 resi-dents forced to evacuate later thatday.5 On July 10, flood waterscovered Route H leading into Portage

Des Sioux cutting the townspeople offfrom their jobs and schools, and theresidents were completely dependenton the makeshift rafts of the 1438thEngineer Company for communica-tion with “the mainland.”6

Then, on July 16, bad thingsgot worse. St. Charles County’s majorlevee, a 23 mile-long berm runningbetween St. Charles and West Altonalong the north shore of the MissouriRiver, tore open, and most of thecounty’s floodplain was underwater.7On August 1, a levee running alongHighway 94 failed and 400 previous-ly-dry homes in the city of St. Charleswere flooded. St. Charles Countybecame the most flood damagedcounty in Missouri with a total of2,109 houses condemned throughoutthe whole county.8

To add to the county-widecatastrophe, three tornadoes struck St.Charles County. One came down inthe rural area of the county, but theother two hit St. Peters, and PortageDes Sioux, two county towns alreadyheavily damaged by floodwaters.While the tornadoes did little directdamage, they generated winds thatwhipped up the floodwaters andfurther damaged homes that water hadalready damaged.9

While St. Charles County hadthe dubious distinction of being“first” in having sustained the mostflood damage, it nevertheless has themore favorable distinction as the areathat was first in Missouri to seek waysto repair that damage. On November23, in the St. Charles County CourtsAdministration Building, the countycalled a meeting of residents toconsider a buyout option.

St. Charles County

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The members of the St.Charles City Council, which was theadministrative head of the city, knewthat the damage was extreme andrealized that the amount of moneynecessary for repair, relief, andprevention would be great. Theydecided from the onset to hire theCommunity Program DevelopmentCorporation, an outside consultingfirm, to help them make applicationfor government money and to presentprograms to thecitizens.

The mostimmediate con-cern of the Com-munity Develop-ment Corporationwas to test citizenreaction to buy-ing out the floodravaged mobilehomes on a 58acre tract on NorthRiver Road, ShortS t r e e t , T r a n s i tStreet, and NorthMain Street.The revenue wasto come from$3,525,000 in Community Develop-ment Block Grant Program moneythat the city had received following amuch less damaging flood thesummer before. At that time fewresidents seemed interested in abuyout program. The catastrophe ofthe summer of ‘93, however, mighthave changed residents minds to takea second look at this option. Thereaction of the people attending theprogram was positive, and Communi-ty Planning Development began theprocess of application.10

Only a few days later, onNovember 28, an article in the NewsSection of the St. Louis PostDispatch, gave the residents of St.Charles County some additional goodnews. The momentum for a buyout

solution was growing. The article byRobert L. Koenig, the Post Dispatchcorrespondent in Washington D.C.,announced Representative Volkmer’sintention to present a buyout plan toCongress that would make a greatdeal of money available to floodplainhomeowners. This money, the articleexplained, eased restrictions on pre-vious buyout programs. It increasedthe federal share of buyout moneyfrom 50% to 75%, and allowed cities

and counties applying for the moneyto use community development blockgrant money to pay their 25% share ofthe money.

Koening reported that therewas bipartisan support for the bill.Republican senators Tom Harkin ofIowa and John C. Danforth ofMissouri would help assure that thebill would not get “bogged down inCongress.”

St. Charles County did notwaste time, and by November 30,Development Strategies, in associationwith Jerry King, had submitted anapplication for $19 million in federalmoney to the county council forapproval. That approval came onDecember 2, and on January 12,

Governor Carnahan announced that heintended to use part of his time whileattending the National GovernorsAssociation Conference in Washingtonto lobby for a large share of the newbuyout money for Missouri. During hisvisit, he lobbied Congress and Admin-istration officials for a totalof $340 million, that included $35million to move 960 single familyresidences out of areas that mightflood in coming years, $40 million

in a special grantfrom the Com-munity Develop-ment Block GrantProgram, and $30million for the Fed-eral Hazard Miti-gation Program.11

The Fed-eral Governmentdid not award allof the money re-quested by Gov-ernor Carnahan,but by May, thestate had received$156 million andsubsequently al-located $13.2 mil-

lion for property buyouts in St.Charles County. Other money of that$156 million total was designated topay for demolition of ruined homes,provide for replacement housing,purchase junk-yard sites that werepolluting ground water, and repairflood damaged roads and sewers.Some of the money came from theEarthquake Relief Bill signed onFebruary 12. Although that billmainly supplied money to earthquakevictims in California, Congress hadtacked on an amendment giving moremoney to flood victims in theMidwest.13

The actual buying of flooddamaged homes began on June 1,1994, when two St. Charles Countyfamilies, Ted and Linda House and

Volunteers performing sandbagging operations in St. Charles County.

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Roger and Jeanne Vaughn, receivedbuyout checks. Neither the Housesnor the Vaughns would tell RalphDummit, the reporter for the St. LouisPost Dispatch, the amount of theirchecks; but official records show thatthe average amount paid for homes intheir subdivision was $16,100.14

In time, St. Charles Countywould oversee the acquisition of 1,160parcels of land (not all had homes onthem), including 650 mobile homepads. In an interview with the St.Charles Post, reporter King said thebuyout program was a “giant stepforward” towards reducing the popula-tion on the floodplain, which was a goalof the federal government program.Fewer people living on the floodplainwould mean fewer people who woulddraw on the Federal Government’sresources in future floods.

In the same interview, Kingadmitted there were problems. Thebuyout program reduced the numberof inexpensive housing units in St.Charles County, thus creating afinancial burden for previous resi-dents. However, the county wastrying to help by using part of acommunity block fund grant to build100 single family homes out of thefloodplain in an area called BoscherTown and by applying for grants tohelp build a new mobile home parkout of the floodplain.15

Still other flood victims werehaving trouble affording homesoutside the floodplain where housescost an average of $30,000 to $65,000more than houses had cost in thefloodplain. Again the governmenttried to help with relocation money,paid in addition to the cost of avictim’s home.16

An additional problem re-mained for some flood victims whohad lived in mobile homes. In

Missouri, mobile homes are classi-fied as personal property just asautomobiles are. Because they are notreal estate they are ineligible for abuyout with buyout money. The padon which the mobile home sits,however, is eligible for buyoutmoney, but many mobile homeowners rented the pad, making themineligible to receive buyout moneyfor their home. Jerry King admittedthat mobile home owners who renteda pad were, “a big group [who] hadslipped through the cracks.”17

A solution was possible forthese people, however. Many mobilehome owners had insured theirtrailers as personal property in thesame way that people insure a car. Inaddition, the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency, through aseparate program, could pay a floodvictim up to $11,000 for damage topersonal property.18 This programfinally paid mobile home owners atotal of $769,000.19

For mobile home owners,this was only a partial solution to theproblems the flood of ‘93 had caused.Like most victims, they realized thatfor the next few years they were goingto be more financially burdened thanthey had been before the disaster. Yetmost floodplain residents who tookadvantage of the various offers thegovernment made had to measure thestress and anxiety of continuing tolive in a floodplain area and dealingrepeatedly with future devastatingfloods against the one-time financialstress and anxiety of moving out ofthe threatened area with the help ofthe government.

By mid August 1994, St.Charles City had begun to demolishbuyout houses. The first home to gobelonged to Rosa Sims who had livedthere for 37 years. Ms. Sims had usedthe $21,000 in buyout money to put a

down payment on a new house onlytwo blocks away. Initially, she hadresisted the buyout program. Likemany people, she was suspicious ofthe government’s motives. She hadworried that the buyout program waspart of a government plan to buy landcheap and build parking lots for thegambling boats that were a majortourist draw for St. Charles. However,once St. Charles City Mayor, GraceNichols, assured her that buyout landcould not be used for that kind ofdevelopment, she was willing to sell.

By the time Rosa Sims’house had been bulldozed into rubbleon August 16, 12 more houses werescheduled for destruction and 50other homeowners were waiting tofind what kind of offer the govern-ment would make on their homes.Most of these homes were north of theHighway 370 bridge on the east sideof North Main Street, an area next tothe Ed Bales Memorial Park. The planwas for these sites to become anextension of that park.20

While derelict homes werewaiting their turn for the wreckers,local arsonists turned to torchingseveral of them. By mid-September,11 homes had been destroyed, and theSt. Charles Fire Department decidedto burn down the remainder to preventthe possibility of future deliberatefires spreading to nearby homes thatwere still inhabited. Firefightersbegan deliberately burning aban-doned houses on September 21, andby the end of the month, they haddestroyed 31 homes that were closeenough to inhabited homes to be apotential risk.21

While these permanent hous-es were either torn down or burneddown, wreckers began destroying 120mobile homes that the county hadpurchased at the Princess Jodi and St.Charles Mobile Home Parks along

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Highway 94 north of the McDonnellDouglas Plant. Before the flood, 200mobile homes had stood on 64 acresof land. Approximately 80 trailershad either been moved beforefloodwaters destroyed the homes, orif they had suffered marginal damage,had been sold to re-builders inArkansas. However, 120 ruinedtrailers remained, and once St.Charles County bought the trailerparks from their owners for $1.365million, these had to be cleared out.

Wreckers carefully removedenvironmentally dangerous materialslike asbestos floor tile, stripped eachmobile home of recyclable metal andfixtures, and dug up, and then buriedthe concrete from the pads and theasphalt from the streets in each park.By the end of November both parkswere gone, and the land was waitingfor grass seed in the spring.22

In November, St. CharlesCounty offered to lease the newly

cleared lots to neighboring home-owners. The buyout had not been100%. Some owners had determinedto stay in spite of the threat offlooding. Such people could leaseadjacent cleared home sites for onedollar a year on condition that theypromise to keep the lot in grass, orplant gardens. The lots ranged from7,000 square feet to three acres.

St. Charles County experi-enced other benefits from the buyoutprogram—a drastic reduction in thedamage suffered because of floodingthat occurred after 1993. In May,1995, the county faced another floodnearly as destructive as that of 1993.Floodwaters covered much the samearea as two years before, but therewas little left to damage in thefloodplain because over 900 familieshad taken buyout money in 1993 andlived elsewhere in 1995.25

Steve Lauer, St. CharlesCounty Planning Director, estimated

that 95% of the 1,374 propertiesacquired in the 1993 buyout programwould have flooded again in 1995.The differences in the dollar amountsspent to help flood victims in St.Charles County in 1993 versus 1995are the most dramatic evidence of thebuyout programs success. In 1993,Missouri and the Federal Govern-ment spent $14,177,717 to helpindividual flood victims find disasterhousing and live during the floodcrisis. In 1995, however, that total forthe same services in the same areawas only $216,194.26

The total cost to the taxpayersfor buying out individual residencesin the St. Charles County floodplainwas $14,617,424. The fact that thecost of helping floodplain victims inthe 1993 flood alone was $439,707less than that amount is dramaticproof that in future floods the buyoutprogram will pay for itself manytimes over.

Community spirit was highly evident at manysandbagging operations. Volunteers camefrom all over Missouri and other states to helpthose who were threatened by flooding.

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Since its founding, sometimebetween 1732 and 1735, Ste.Genevieve has suffered from

chronic flooding. In 1785, floodwaters washed the town completelyaway, and its people decided toreestablish the town on higher groundthree miles up the river on ground theythought would never flood, but theywere wrong. Ste. Genevieve continuedto flood often over the next twocenturies. Most recently in 1951, 1968,and 1973.1 Each flood was hard on thetown’s inhabitants, but it has madethem resilient. An article in theChristian Science Monitor describedSte. Genevieve’s citizens as having “akind of tough radiance. . . from farmersto the mayor.”2

In 1993, when the Mississippirose above flood stage (38 feet) on July8, 1993, and kept on rising over thenext five weeks, most of the 4,400people of the town simply set to workto try to save their town as they had sooften done in the past.3 Over the nextthree days, the river rose four feetquickly covering the airport runways,the water works, the city power plant,and the sewage treatment plant.4

Surprisingly, despite its longtradition of flooding, Ste. Genevievehad never built adequate protectivelevees. The U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers had offered to build a rockand earth levee along the front of thetown back in 1986, for $48 million, ifSte. Genevieve could raise $11 millionin matching funds.5 The town of 4,400could not. For years, therefore, Ste.Genevieve had to depend on six milesof county levees built with state aidover the years.6

Ste. Genevieve

Extensive flooding in St. Genevieve.

Ste. Genevieve marker showsflood stages from 1844.

Nevertheless, the citizens weredetermined to fight back. Theirpugnacious attitude impressed Gover-nor Carnahan when he visited to assessthe damage. He liked the town’sspunk. “It’s the attitude that you’regoing to fight back with.”7 The peopleof Ste. Genevieve and their Mayor BillAnderson, repeatedly drew a parallelbetween the town’s plight and a war. Areporter from the Warrensburg DailyStar Journal wrote:

The flood made Ste. Gene-vieve famous. Once the national andinternational newspapers publicizedthe problem, volunteers from all overthe country came to help. Mostvolunteers were from Missouri, ofcourse, but people came from all overthe nation and the world. “People fromOhio met people from Denver,bagging sand in Missouri,” was onereporter’s way of putting it with asentence that captured the spirit of thewhole event.9

Besides the lack of anadequate levee system, the terrain andlayout of the town made defense from

The people sit behind bunkersof sandbags and watch the frontline, as if they are anticipatinga battle. . . There’s a wall sizedaerial photo in a conferenceroom at the Marina, where thebattle plans are being drawn.We’ve got a war going onhere. . . we’re fighting theMighty Mississippi.8

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floodwaters difficult. Most of thetown’s historic part—and this was theeconomic heart of Ste. Genevieve—was in an area near the river that wasprone to flooding. In addition twosmall streams called North GabouriCreek and South Gabouri Creek,flowed into the Mississippi on eitherside of this historic district. Tocompound the problem, water fromthe Mississippi backed up into thesesmaller streams which caused them tooverflow into downtown and into thesuburbs to both the north and the south.To protect Ste. Genevieve, it wasnecessary to build sandbag levees oneither side of these creeks. From theair, the levee system resembled three“Us” lying on their sides with thecurved ends toward the Mississippi.Another levee, called Farmer’s Levee,protected 7,000 acres of rich bottomland south of the town.10

The fight to save Ste. Gene-vieve involved raising these makeshiftlevees along the Gabouri Creek banksto accommodate a river level of 50feet; this necessitated filling andplacing over a million sandbags. As aspur to action, National Guard troopspainted green lines on trees as a visualgoal for sandbaggers to work to-ward.11 However, along the banks ofthe Mississippi levees had to be moresubstantial, and volunteers along withmembers of the 1140th EngineerCompany of the Missouri ArmyNational Guard reinforced parts of thelevee with 400,000 tons of rock andmine tailings that bulldozers andheavy trucks moved.12

By August 6, this strenuouseffort had paid off. The Mississippicrest, at 49.67 feet, came within inchesof the tops of the 50 foot levees.Nevertheless, they held, and onAugust 7, the water level was goingdown.13 The crisis was past—for thetime being.

Many citizens realized thetown’s escape had been a near thing,and many echoed Mayor Bill Ander-son’s comment, “We want to get ridof the houses there [on the flood-plain]. . . Then we won’t have toworry about it.”

The Mayor’s comments re-flected knowledge of RepresentativeVolkmer’s proposed buyout legisla-tion. Mayor Anderson felt that at least150 people might be interested in thebuyout.14

Even before President Clintonsigned Volkmer’s bill into law, the Ste.Genevieve board of aldermen, assuredby Speaker of the House RichardGephardt that the proposal would pass,made themselves familiar with itsprovisions and drafted an initialapplication for $2 million in buyoutmoney from the state’s communitydevelopment block grant program andthe hazard mitigation grant program.This proposal targeted 127 parcels inthe north end of Ste. Genevieve thathad been particularly hard hit by floodwaters.

The Missouri Army National Guard reinforced parts of the leveeat Ste. Genevieve with 400,000 tons of rock and mine tailings.

Yet, after the board ofaldermen had prepared the request, butbefore they had submitted it, the citycouncil hit a snag. The problemrevolved around 46 houses, wellknown for their historic value, thatwere included in the total of 127houses. Alderman Frank Myers wasconcerned that if the board submittedthe proposal, Ste. Genevieve receivedthe money, and the 46 historic homeswere torn down, it would jeopardizethe town’s chances of getting a federallevee. Myers reasoned that the U. S.government’s willingness to help Ste.Genevieve build a permanent levee,was partially based on the historicvalue of many Ste. Genevieve houses.

The board spent an entiresession debating the topic. MayorAnderson proposed a compromisethat included the board’s submittingthe grant application to buy only non-historic homes, but with an addendumdeclaring “the intention of theapplication to include those historicproperties after those houses hadundergone review by the MissouriDepartment of Natural Resources.”Nevertheless, the board delayedsending the application.15

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At their next meeting thealdermen, with Volkmer’s bill safelypassed, the board authorized submit-ting another proposal so that Ste.Genevieve could get additional mon-ey under the new law. This proposalasked for $1.4 million to cover 75% ofthe proposed buyout of 89 non-historic homes on the floodplain inthe northern part of Ste. Genevieve.Again several aldermen expressedconcern that the proposed addendumin the earlier proposal for floodbuyout money might slow downacceptance of this second proposal,but Mayor Anderson assured themthat he had received assurances fromClaire Blackwell, the Department ofNatural Resource’s director of theHistoric Sites Division, that theapplication could still be “fasttracked.”16 With this assurance, thealdermen voted to send the buyoutapplications, and Mayor Andersontook the SEMA application toJefferson City on December 20.17 Ashort while later, the Aldermen sentthe request for CDBG money along toJefferson City.18

The answer was not long incoming, but it was not all that Ste.Genevieve had hoped for. Instead ofthe nearly $4 million that the city hadrequested from SEMA and communi-ty development block grant funds, itgot only $1,337,000 for the purchaseof 57 flood damaged residences andan additional $706,000 for the cost ofdemolishing the houses.19

Unfortunately, it would benearly a year before any homeownerwould receive his/her buyout check.Just as some aldermen had anticipat-ed, the delay revolved around thehistoric houses. It had nothing to dowith the proposed levee as they hadfeared, but with the legal requirementto evaluate historic homes before theycould be demolished. Under provi-

sions of the National Historic Preser-vation Act of 1966, before the FederalEmergency Management Agencycould authorize funds to demolish ahouse, it had to “take into account theeffects of their undertakings onproperties included in . . . the NationalRegister of Historic Places.” SinceOctober, 1970, nearly every buildingin Ste. Genevieve was within theboundaries of the Ste. GenevieveHistoric District, and therefore subjectto a historic survey before any of themcould be torn down.20

Once such surveys werefinished, the law required that aconcerted effort be made to eithermove the house or, failing that, make aformal photographic record of thehouse, catalog its contents and disposeof them by sale or gift to museums orother suitable institutions.21

Such surveys were the job ofpersonnel of the Missouri Departmentof Conservation, and the buyoutprocess ground to a halt, while theymade their study. City AdministratorDavid Angerer knew that SEMA waseager to get on with the buyout, butcould not because of the HistoricPreservation Act. The delay, he said,“is a victim of dueling federalprograms: SEMA which is built forspeed and quick relief of people introuble, and the Historic PreservationAct that says federal money can’t beused for buyouts unless a slowdeliberate process is followed.”22

By July, 1994, residents whohad expressed an interest in thebuyout were growing impatient. Agroup of them met with MayorAnderson and Aldermen Frank Myersand Martha Reisinger on July 1 to askofficials to try to speed up the process.They were impatient because nearbySt. Mary and Perry County weremoving quickly with their buyout

programs. The three town officialscould do little but sympathize,although Anderson offered somehope that the first buyout might takeplace in late July.23

Unfortunately, Anderson waswrong. By the end of July all that hadbeen accomplished was the Board ofAldermen’s award to Southeast Mis-souri Regional Planning Commission(SEMO) of a contract to administer thebuyout and the adoption of a formalprocess concerning the procedures thebuyout would follow. These proce-dures offered some financial help tohome owners who wanted to movetheir historic homes out of thefloodplain. They also offered proce-dures under which the city might buyhistoric property, and/or handle thesalvage and sale of architecturalelements saved from historic houses.24

By August, 1994, there wasstill no progress. Cathy Mangles,SEMO’s coordinator for the program,called a meeting where disgruntledproperty owners could meet withofficials from SEMA, FEMA, theNational Trust for Historic Preserva-tion, and the Missouri HousingDevelopment to discuss the status ofthe buyout. Mangles assured thehomeowners that the formal historicalanalysis of homes would start soon,and it would require only two to threeweeks after that to start the buyouts.25

Still, it was six months beforethe surveys were done, and ownersbegan to get their checks. In the interimthe Board of Aldermen helped bycreating legal machinery for the city tobuy some of the historic propertieswhen they were available.26 InNovember, there was another positivemove when the Missouri HousingDevelopment Commission announcedSte. Genevieve would get an addition-al community development block

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grant of $441,000 to help buyoutcandidates with relocation costs.27

By February 18, 1995, thehistorical analysis of buyout propertieswas complete. In addition, Ste.Genevieve and the Missouri Depart-ment of Natural Resources (DNR) hadentered into an agreement to jointlybuy four of the historic homes toprotect them for further developmentas historic sites. The city and DNRjointly put up $58,000. The city’sportion was raised by private dona-tions from individuals and the FrenchHeritage Relief Committee.28

On Febru-ary 29, 1995, thefirst Ste. Gene-vieve residents re-ceived their buyoutchecks. The firstcouple to get acheck was Kirkand Denise Rhine-hart. The checkwas for $20,570.76,and Rhinehart ad-mitted to reportersthat “. . . its been astruggle. But thismakes it a lotbetter. It’s beenalmost two years,and the first 18months were very rough. Nobodyseemed to know what was going on. Itwas very frustrating.”29

After these initial buyouts,the city made every effort to findbuyers for the historic buildings in thefloodplains whose owners took ad-vantage of the buyout. City officialslisted properties for sale in historicpreservation magazines and advert-ized in newspapers. The April 12,1995, issue of the Ste. GenevieveHerald listed the Train Depot on FrontStreet as a property for sale. Thebuilding was a 19th century design by

St. Genevieve historic home surrounded by blocks of vacant Buyout land.

the famous architect Henry HobsonRichardson who had designed TrinityChurch in Boston and the MarshallField Wholesale Store in Chicago.30

Unfortunately no buyer appeared.

Problems existed with mov-ing the structures. Most of the historicstructures were built in older parts ofSte. Genevieve where the streets weretoo narrow to move houses. A furtherdifficulty lay in the overhead powerand telephone wires that added anadditional expense to the alreadyheavy cost of moving a house.31

In the end, the only buyer forthese historic houses was the City ofSte. Genevieve itself. In July, 1995,Ste. Genevieve, acting in conjunctionwith Missouri’s Historic PreservationFund, bought three historic houses.The plan was to “mothball” the houses,a term that meant stabilizing thebuildings until they could be moved orraised above the level of flooding.32

Earlier Ste. Genevieve hadpurchased a smaller house, whoselocation allowed movers to move itout of the floodplain to the city parkwhere it was later refurbished, and

made the headquarters for Ste.Genevieve’s Parks and RecreationDepartment.33

Unfortunately, for most of thehouses there were no buyers. Oncethese houses were examined by theState Office of Historic Preservationand a photographic and writtennarrative prepared for each, the ownerreceived a buyout check, and the citytook possession. They were cleared ofsalvageable material and 38 historicproperties were demolished.34

Four other houses in this areawere demolishedthat had beenjudged to haveno historic val-ue, another acci-dentally burneddown beforedemolition, andSte. Genevievewas able to buyand preserve fourothers. Five buy-out properties inthe area werevacant lots ac-quired throughthe buyout pro-cess to precludefuture buildingon them.35

Despite the loss of so manyhistoric homes, the wisdom of thebuyout in Ste. Genevieve was obviousin 1995 when Ste. Genevieve facedflooding again. On May 15, 1995, theMississippi, swollen by heavy rainsbegan to rise. By May 24, it hadexceeded the 1973 flood level, andpeople prepared for a replay of 1993.36

Fortunately, the river level did not goabove 44 feet which was nearly 6 feetlower than the 1993 crest, but thisevent served to remind people not onlyof the danger they had faced in 1993,but also of the wisdom of the buyout.37

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Peaceful present day view of Ste. GenevieveBuyout property from the top of the rock andearth levee protecting the town (above) standsin sharp contrast to the flurry of volunteeractivity that took place during the flood (right).

In 1995, the rising watercovered two-thirds of the area that ithad in 1993, including the buyout sitesthat had been flooded two yearsbefore.36 It was clear that the buyouthad done its job by removing at riskpeople from the floodplain. In fact, onehomeowner who had not joined thebuyout after 1993, did ask to be boughtout after the 1995 flood.39

Ste. Genevieve is a prosper-ous town today. An estimated 100,000

tourists visit the historic town everyyear according to Betty Seibel.Frances C. Ballinger, head of Ste.Genevieve’s Tourist InformationBoard, feels the figure should be135,000. The high point is the annualJour de Fete celebration the secondweek in August, although the annualcelebration of Bastille Day on July14th is gaining in popularity.40

The clearest sign of prosperityfor the little town is the great Corps of

Engineer’s levee that is rising betweenSte. Genevieve and the Mississippi. Itwill be completed in mid-2001, willrun 3.5 miles, and be from 21 to 28 feethigh. To qualify for the levee, citizenshad to vote a 1 ½ cent sales tax onthemselves to raise $1.5 million—partof the matching fund amount the Corpsneeded before they could start on thelevee. It is a mark of the confidence thepeople of Ste. Genevieve feel abouttheir town that the sales tax proposalpassed by a margin of 4-1.41

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St. Louis was used to big floods,and when the Mississippi Riverrose 14 feet in 48 hours on

March 4 and 5, 1993, residents werenot worried. They still were notworried when water began to creepacross Leonor K. Sullivan Boulevardand cover the bottom step of thefamous Gateway Arch.1 After all, St.Louis legends spoke of really bigfloods, like the one in 1844, when theriver rose so high that steamboats tiedup to the front porches of businesses indowntown St. Louis.2

The Corps of Engineers warnedSt. Louis on June 25 to expect seriousflooding, but then the rain stopped andthe waters began to recede. St.Louisans smiled, said “I told you so,”and went on with plans for July 3opening of the Veiled Prophet Fair.3

Then it began to rain again.This time the river really began to rise.By July 15, the level of the Mississippiat St. Louis was 43.23 feet, 13 feetabove the river level of 30 feet thatmarked what was considered flood-stage at St. Louis. St. Louis, however,is protected by a giant earth andconcrete levee that rises 22 feet highand runs 11 miles from the mouth ofMaline Creek, near the Chain of RocksBridge to the foot of Cherokee Street insouth St. Louis. Floodwaters wouldhave to rise to 52 feet before theywould go over the top of this levee.4 ByJuly 22 the Mississippi’s crest was at47.05 feet, 3.82 feet higher than thesecond highest river level in historyrecorded in 1973.5

St. Louis andSt. Louis County

Then suddenly on July 24things became serious. Four childrenand two adult counselors from St.Joseph’s Home For Boys, weredrowned in a flash flood inside theCliff Cave at Cliff Cave Park in southSt, Louis,6 and a section of theconcrete flood wall at the 9100 Blockof Riverview Boulevard threatened tofail when flood waters dug a 60 foot-wide hole underneath it. Workersstruggled all day to fill the hole with6,000 tons of rock dumped on bothsides of the wall at the break site and tobuild a seven-foot high ring dikearound where the water emerged onthe dry side of the wall.

The ring dike allowed a poolto form over the site where the watergushed out in order to equalize theforce of the water that exerted pressurefrom the other side. The water comingthrough the wall took the course ofleast resistance and rejoined thenormal course of the flood’s flowdownstream. The patch reduced theflow by 75%, and only a few industrialsites were flooded.7

On the 26, to further reducethe threat of water’s undercutting theflood wall, engineers bored holes inthe inside base of the wall and pumpedin 111 cubic yards of concrete tostabilize the concrete and steel base ofthe wall. This finally stopped the flowand the flood wall was safe.8

The flood waters still neededa place to go as they rushed past St.Louis and its flood wall at about 7.4

million gallons of water per second.9As they swept past the city theybacked up the water in the River DesPeres (the boundary between St.Louis City and St. Louis County in thesouth) causing it to flood out of itsbanks. In order to prevent theflooding of houses along GermaniaSt. north of the River and those alongCarondelet Blvd. and Weber St. southof the river, residents on both sides ofthe River Des Peres had franticallybuilt a sandbag levee to contain therising backwash.

Unfortunately, on July18, a 15foot section of that levee gave way andcollapsed. Approximately 264 houseswere either flooded or suffered frombacked up sewers and flooded base-ments.10 Residents repaired the dam-age, but on July 20 a section of thelevee on the north side of the river eastof Alabama Avenue gave way andseveral more homes were damaged inaddition to the Monsanto CarondeletPlant. Undaunted, volunteers began aback up levee and determined to buildit high enough to withstand a 49 footcrest. Uncertain as to where thestructure would break next, residentsfilled city trucks with sandbags,stationed them behind the levee wall,and waited for the next threat todevelop.11

The crisis compounded inthe area when the St. Louis FireDepartment ordered 11,800 resi-dents in the area to evacuate theirhomes for fear that fifty-one 30,000gallon propane tanks in the Phillips

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Petroleum Company Tank Yard at8722 South Broadway might ex-plode.12 Divers tried to minimize thedanger of explosion by arranging forthe endangered tanks to floatharmlessly out of the yard, into anatural cul-de-sac, but the potentialfor explosion remained.13 Neverthe-less enough local residents re-mained, or returned every day tocontinue building the levee higher.Their goal was to build it highenough to withstand a 50 footcrest.14 In the end their efforts paidoff. The levee held until theMississippi River level dropped farenough to allow the River Des Peresto flow east again lessening pressureof the levee.15 By August 6,authorities allowed some residents toreturn to their homes, but manyhomes were ruined.16

Just up the River Des Peresfrom these houses was an unincorpo-rated section of St. Louis Countycalled Lemay. Like their neighborsfurther down stream, Lemay’s resi-dents had built their own sandbaglevee only to see it give way and allowflood water into 150 homes. Becausethe area was so near the Mississippi,James White, St. Louis CountyEmergency Management Director,estimated residents would not be ableto return until mid-August. People inLemay faced the same danger as theirneighbors when concerns rose aboutthe same propane tanks in the Phillipstank yard, and were also forced toevacuate because of that samedanger.17

In addition to floodwaterand propane tanks, other problemsfaced the people in the Lemay/RiverDes Peres area. Many homes in bothareas remained vacant for nearlythree weeks. Such a large number ofuninhabited houses brought out theworst in some people, and looting

Volunteers work to erect a sandbag levee in the St. Louis area.

became a problem. Police, theirresources already stretched to thelimit throughout the city and county,asked for the assistance of MissouriArmy and Air National Guardmilitary police to help protect thearea.18 At first, unarmed Guardsmenassisted armed police, but soonpotential danger to these unarmedtroops resulted in the order to carryloaded .45 caliber pistols.19 Duringthe 19 days the residents wereabsent, two man teams of militaryand civilian police set up roadblocks and patrolled the area oneither side of the River Des Peres.They dealt with numerous acts ofvandalism, arson, assault, attemptedrape, drunkenness, and disorderlyconduct. Fortunately they were ableto do so without firing a singleshot.20

The flooding along the RiverDes Peres and in Lemay was some ofthe most dramatic and widelypublicized in the St. Louis/St. LouisCounty area. Many other locations,however, while they did not receivethe notoriety, were just as disturbingfor the people who lived there.

In Bellefontaine Neighbors,the residents erected a sandbag leveealong Maline Creek that, in normaltimes, empties into the Mississippi. Butby July 6, water from the Mississippiwas backing up into Maline Creek, andthreatening houses along its banks. OnJuly 22, the water appeared to bereceding, and sandbagging residentsrelaxed. However, by July 25, thewater rose to threatening levelsagain.21 By July 28th, the situation wasso desperate that residents needed helpfrom National Guard troops withsandbagging. Nevertheless, on August1 the levee broke and flood waterreached 41 homes. Workers quicklybegan a secondary levee to save whatthey could. By the time the water levelbegan to fall on August 3, l51 homeshad been flooded.22

Fenton, in western St. LouisCounty was luckier than manyMissouri communities. Only 12 hous-es were threatened by the flood. Two ofthese were in the historic Old Townpart of the city, and the rest werescattered along the banks of theMeramec River and a local tributary,Fenton Creek. Most of “Old Town,”

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the heart of Fenton, was too high for theflooding Meramec River.23 Elsewhere,however, homeowners built individuallevees around their houses. Ten ofthese individual levees held, but twogave way causing extensive damage totwo houses.24

In Brentwood, both DeerCreek and Bear Creek, flow into RiverDes Peres, and both of these creeks hadflooded 10 times since 1975. So, by1993, flooding was a repeat of an alltoo familiar occurrence. Althoughresidents made concerted efforts tothrow up sandbag levees, nearly 100buildings suffered some kind of waterdamage. Twelve homes along Pendle-ton and Hilldale Avenues were ruinedbeyond repair.

The Buyout Programin


Taken together, there werenearly 700 individual homesin St. Louis City and St. Louis

County seriously damaged beforefloodwaters began to fall on August3rd.25 Most of these homeownerswelcomed the announcement onDecember 2, 1993, that PresidentClinton had signed RepresentativeHarold Volkmer’s Hazard Mitigationand Relocation Assistance Bill.

The first official mention ofthe possibility of a buyout program forSt. Louis and St. Louis County areacame in an article of the St. Louis PostDispatch on November 10. Robert L.Koenig, the Post’s Washington D.C.correspondent, reported that theHouse of Representative’s HousePublic Work Committee was discuss-ing a bill of Representative Volkmer’sthat would provide money to purchase

A flooded home in the St. Louis area.

flood damaged homes. In that article,Koenig wrote that the governmentestimated that 230 homeowners insouth St. Louis and Lemay alonewould be interested in pursuing thebuyout program. The article did notgive a figure for the whole of the St.Louis/St. Louis County area, but it didstate that under the bill, Missouricould get as much as $24.7 million inbuyout funds.26

Soon after that initial article,on December 22, Koenig reportedmore specifics. His article, “NewFlood Assistance Will Go To Buy-outs,” stated that St. Louis City wasplanning to buy 235 homes, and St.Louis county planned to propose thebuyout plan to 550 homeowners. Themoney would come not only from theHazard Mitigation Grant Programadministered by the State EmergencyManagement Agency, but from Com-munity Development Block Grantmoney administered by the MissouriDepartment of Economic Develop-ment.

Following those announce-ments, various towns and sections ofSt. Louis and St. Louis County began

to explore how the money would affectthem specifically. Many small com-munities like Bellefontaine Neighborslacked the employees to process thepaperwork that was necessary in orderto launch a buyout program. Theyfound it efficient to hire a consultant todo these things for them. For $19,430,Bellefontaine Neighborhoods hiredJerry King, of RJK Inc., to help themwith the application process. King,whose Community Planning Develop-ment Corporation, had already con-tracted to help St. Charles County toadminister their $13.2 million recov-ery program, would prove equallyeffective in running BellefontaineNeighbors’ smaller program. Not onlyhis results, measured in terms ofmoney, but the numbers of residentsparticipating in the buyout programwere impressive.27

In Bellefontaine Neighbors,100 houses had received some kind ofwater damage from floodwaters orsewers backing up, but 20 houses hadsustained major damage, having floodwater up to their roofs. These homeswere total losses.28 Some of theowners briefly considered rebuildingon the same site, but they changed their

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minds when they learned that newfederal regulations required houses inthe area be rebuilt on foundations highenough to prevent future flooding. Thecost was just too high, and the ownersfinally agreed with Mayor MartyRudloff that the best use of the landwas a permanent seven acre greenspace. They had faced floods before,but nothing like the magnitude of the‘93 flood, and while average buyoutoffer of $25,085 would not makeanyone rich, it would allow them tomake a fresh start and escape theyearly spring anxiety about floods.This feeling was so strong, and theowners so disgusted with living in afloodplain area, that none of themdisputed the value that buyout apprais-ers put on their homes.30

By July 2, 1994, 10 residentsof Bellefontaine Neighbors had re-ceived buyout checks from MayorMarty Rudloff, and on July 22, the last10 homeowners got their checks at aceremony attended by both GovernorMel Carnahan and James Lee Witt,Director of the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency. Mark Schlink-mann, reporter for the St. Louis PostDispatch, asked one of the recipients,60 year old Marian Dishon, who hadlived in her house 32 years, if she wassatisfied with the payment she hadreceived from the buyout. Her answer:“You have to be, what are you going todo?,” reflected the attitude of manyflood victims worn out by too manysprings fighting flood waters. It was acase of too much too often.31

The buyout program hadremoved those homes most at risk.Since that time Bellefontaine Neigh-bors has turned the lots of the 20houses into a park. In 1995, floodwaters again came to St. Louis, butcompared to the 1993 water levels, the41.8 foot river level was “puny” as thePost Dispatch described it.32 Even

though the ‘95 flood damaged fewhomes in Bellefontaine Neighbors, itmade some residents there nervous.One woman told a reporter from thePost Dispatch that if they offer abuyout again, “This old lady is goingto take the money and run tosomeplace high.”33

In Brentwood, another St.Louis County town, the flood of ‘95also reinforced that the ‘93 buyoutprogram was a success. In 1995, Deerand Black Creeks once more left theirbanks to flood the exact same area theyhad in 1993. But this time, all thehouses damaged in the ‘93 flood weregone, and the water covered only grassfields.34

“we can’t force anyone to participate,and we hope the offers will bereasonable. Nobody deserves to betormented like these people have.” Hewas referring to flood damage that hadoccurred 10 times since 1975.35

On September 25, 1995, theFederal Emergency ManagementAgency approved $31,715 in buyoutmoney. The city used $6,455 of its ownrevenue and $4,116 from a communitydevelopment block grant to raise the25% in matching funds, to raise the$42,286 dollars necessary to buy the13 most heavily damaged homes in thefloodplain.36

After the flood of ‘93, theBrentwood Board of Aldermen hadmoved quickly to take advantage ofthe buyout opportunity. They draftedan application and sent it to thehomeowners whose homes had suf-fered damages and encouraged themto return it quickly. However, at thetime, Chris Seemayer, BrentwoodCity Administrator stressed, in aninterview with the Post Dispatch that,

Seemayer is still the Brent-wood City Administrator and is stillenthusiastic about the program. Hesaid the buyout program was “greatfrom start to finish,” and that officialsfrom SEMA and FEMA “were ashelpful as they could be.”37

Another enthusiastic support-er of the program is Fenton’s PublicWorks Director Mark Sartors. Mea-

Bellefontaine Neighbors made a community park on Buyout property.

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The buyout program wasproving to be an unqualifiedsuccess measured not only inthe alleviation of suffering, butin dollars and cents.

sured in numbers, the Fenton buyoutprogram was small, only nine housespurchased at a cost of $276,099. Butthe rewards came early in the spring,1994, when a flash flood sweptthrough the same area as that where the‘93 flood waters had been, andalthough water once more entered thesame homes along Fenton Creek andthe Meramec River, there was nobodyliving in them. The owners had movedout and, after deciding to participate inthe buyout, and were waiting for thebuyout money to arrive. The housesstood empty waiting for the wreckingcrews.

The force of the ‘94 flood wasespecially violent, and could havecreated considerable danger to humanlife had those homes been occupied.One empty house was picked up by therushing water and deposited in themiddle of the street.

Looking back, Mark Sartorsconsidered the money well spent.Fenton handled the buyout itself.Valerie Adams, City Clerk, coordi-nated the application of residents andpassed them along to SEMA offi-cials.36 The process moved rapidlythereafter. SEMA approved the buy-out on April 12, 1994, the first ownersreceived their checks on August 1,1994, and the city purchased the lasthouse on December 21.39

In St. Louis County, MaryCampbell, County Community Devel-opment Director, helped process thepaperwork for the buyouts in the RiverDes Peres area and the unincorporatedLemay area.40 By August 1, 1994, 108

residents of Lemay had submittedapplications. These people understoodthey were not making a hard and fastcommitment. Most were merelycurious about the price that SEMAwould agree to let the county pay fortheir homes.41 However, when theseindividuals received the official as-sessments of the pre-flood values oftheir homes, 90 decided to accept theoffers.42 By May of 1995, St. LouisCounty had acquired 210 moreproperties in the River Des Peres/Lemay area.43

These totals, added to otherbuyout offers in the unincorporatedareas of St. Louis County, meant that atotal of 425 properties scatteredthroughout the area, had been acquiredunder the buyout plan. By that samedate 120 of them had been demol-ished.44 Nick Gragnani, an emergencymanagement specialist for St. LouisCounty, summed up the situation in thearea, “Having far fewer residentsmeans far fewer problems. Mitigationworks.”45

The success of the programquickly bore fruit. In late April, 1995,heavy rains brought flooding back toMissouri. By May 22, the flood stageof the Mississippi stood at 41.8 feet,well below the levels of 1993, but highenough to see many of the same areasof St. Louis/St. Louis County—including the River Des Peres andLemay— flooded again. Yet this time,the bill for flooding, measured interms of costs for disaster housing,emergency monetary grants to floodvictims, emergency evacuation, wasdramatically less.

In 1993, for instance, SEMAreported that in the Lemay area, 492people had applied for either disasterhousing and/or individual familygrants. The cost of these two combinedfigures was $571,918. In 1995, withthe same area only a little less seriouslyhurt by floodwaters, the number ofapplicants was 16, and the cost for thesame two basic services was $7,956.The difference was that 105 Lemayhouses, located in the flooded areawere empty in 1995. The owners hadalready sold their “at risk” real estate toSt. Louis County and had movedelsewhere.46 In fact at the time of the‘95 flood, only three occupied homesremained in Lemay’s floodplain.47

Similar statistics continued tobe recorded throughout the St. Louis/St. Louis county area. The AmericanRed Cross, whose statistics did notbreak down relief costs by neighbor-hoods, but instead dealt with the wholeeastern Missouri/southern Illinois to-gether, told the Post Dispatch that in1993, they served 13,000 householdsin that area, but only 2,700 during the1995 flood.48 Mary Campbell, Direc-tor of Community Development for St.Louis county estimated that the buyoutprogram, by removing people fromflood prone area after the ‘93 flood,had saved the county $7.2 million bythe end of the ‘95 flood. Campbell alsopointed out that the buyout program inthe county had saved the federalgovernment $4.7 million in floodinsurance payments to homeownersand businesses.49

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Few places in Missouri can claimto have utilized the buyoutprogram as completely as St.

Mary. Encouraged by Governor Car-nahan’s support for the residentialbuyout program, and combining fundsfrom the state’s community develop-ment block grant program with moneyfrom the hazard mitigation grantprogram, this small Mississippi Rivertown moved 90% of its threatenedcitizens out of an area that habituallyflooded; this has saved the state ofMissouri hundreds of thousands ofdollars in emergency services toevacuate, maintain, and ultimatelyreturn 22 families to homes that wouldultimately be at risk again. A costbenefit ratio, computed by Missouri’sState Emergency Management Agen-cy (SEMA), estimates that in the next15 years, the state and federalgovernment will save $3.74 cents forevery dollar spent in the program.1

St. Mary’s problem area wasfive acres of land at the southern edgeof town where houses had beenconstructed. Two sloughs ran throughthis problem area, named St. LawrenceCreek and Regular Slough, both ofwhich overflowed regularly duringtimes of high water, especially in theannual spring runoff every April andMay. This high water usually affectedonly a few houses, but in times ofserious flooding, every residence andbusiness was either threatened ordamaged. Because flooding was sofrequent, the residents simply becameinured to the inconvenience andaccepted these periodic bouts of highwater; these properties were inexpen-sive and most of these people couldafford to live nowhere else. Many hadalso grown used to periodic govern-ment grants that allowed them torebuild their homes in this substandardarea. Only six of the 22 families in thearea bothered to carry flood insurance.For people on the low end of the

St. Mary

Working all across the state, Governor Mel Carnahan, members of theMissouri National Guard, and hundreds of other local, state, and federalworkers spent hundreds of hours away from their families to help othersduring the floods of ‘93 and ‘95.

poverty scale, the several hundreddollars a year in Flood Insurancepremiums were simply too expensive.2

When the flood waters cameagain in ‘93, the town’s citizensbanded together to do what they hadso often done before – build amakeshift levee between Pine andWalnut Street in an effort to save thebuildings and residences along MainStreet. This area included the postoffice, a service station, the MFAgranary, the bank, and two residenc-es. In 1993, the citizens of St. Marybuilt a levee, 12-14 high around thesestructures and saved them, but theycould not prevent the water fromflooding the other homes in this area.Once the water came, it stayed for amonth, making a total loss of everystructure outside the levee.3

The extensive damage andthe longevity of the flood convincedpeople that it was time to seek a

solution. City Clerk JoAnn Donzeorganized a meeting of affectedfamilies on October 19, 1993, andKathy Mangels of the SoutheastMissouri Regional Planning Com-mission explained the mechanics of abuyout. This proposal was not basedon the proposed legislation ofRepresentative Volkmer, which hadnot passed Congress at this time, butwas based on pre-existing legislation.Almost everyone at the meeting votedto pursue a buyout option. OnNovember 12, 1993, the city councilvoted to seek buyout funds through acommunity development block grantfrom the Missouri Department ofEconomic Development, to buy allthe residences in the 100 year floodplain, demolish them, and permanent-ly eliminate this source of miseryfrom St. Mary.4 The request askedhomeowners to accept a post-floodvalue assessment of their homesinstead of the more usual pre-floodassessment.

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Blocks of flood prone propertyare now open space in St. Mary.

In this case the pre-flood pricewas based on an appraisal that was inturn based on the frequency offlooding in the area, and that was verylow, averaging only $4,946.54. Whenthe value of previous governmentloans and grants to repair earlier flooddamage was deducted from thisamount, the average amount offered ahomeowner was less than $600.00.This low amount made it impossiblefor anyone to get enough money tomove out of the floodplain. However,the special provisions of the communi-ty development block grant made itpossible for each homeowner to notonly receive a small amount of moneyfor his/her home, but also a substantialgrant of up to $22,500 to relocate out ofthe floodplain.5 Governor Carnahan’soffice approved this arrangement onFebruary 14.6

But St. Mary did not stop withthe community development blockgrant request. On December 28, 1993,again acting on advice from KathyMangels of the Southeast MissouriRegional Planning Commission, thecity council submitted another request.This time it could take advantage ofRepresentative Harold Volkmer’s leg-islation that aimed at buying flooddamaged residences throughout Mis-souri’s floodplains. On April 12, 1994,Governor Carnahan’s office approvedthat request for funds and awarded St.Mary $142,987 to add to the town’searlier grant.7 The town now had$491,593 to spend on its buyoutprogram, and an additional $22,165from a separate public assistance grantto pay for the cost of demolishing thehomes.8

Purchase of home sites start-ed on June 27, 1994, with thepurchase of a house trailer lot. Theowner received $2,503 for his trailerpad and a relocation allowance of$20,639.9 On August 14, 1994, the

city handed16 property owners checksfor their homes, and announced plansto buy 20 more in the floodplain.When the residential buyout programwas completed on May 31, 1995, thecity government had purchased 32homes.10

Two of the homes wereconsidered historically significantand St. Mary had to take specialprecautions with them. It was neces-sary to hire individuals from theMissouri Historical Society to do astudy of the homes, take pictures, andidentify any historically significantmaterials in the homes. This materialhad to be stripped out of the structureand offered for sale. Any moneyreceived from such sales was sub-tracted from the total awarded to thecity.11 In this case, the sale ofhistorically significant light fixtures,flooring, doors, and trim, netted only$154.00.12

Yet, St. Mary did not stopthere. Ms. Donze, along with KathyMangels of the Southeast MissouriRegional Planning Commission, sub-mitted another community develop-ment block grant for money to buycommercial properties that had beenruined by the flood. Ms. Donze hadoriginally included a request to buyout six commercial properties withher first request for federal funds fromFEMA in Novem-ber, 1993. However,at that time, Gover-nor Carnahan hadalready determinedthat the state wouldconcentrate its ef-forts on residentialbuyout to impact thelargest number ofpeople, so that partof the request wasdenied.13

By November of 1994, how-ever, when it appeared that mostpeople who were going to takeadvantage of the residential buyoutprogram had done so, GovernorCarnahan decided that some statecommunity development block grantmoney could be made available tobuy out commercial properties. OnNovember 9, 1994, St. Mary’s CityCouncil learned that the state hadapproved $261,000 to buy commer-cial properties. The City Council hadalready annexed land south of thetown, but out of the floodplain. Thisland allowed six businesses a placeupon which to relocate.

As in most cases, the pay offfor St. Mary’s energetic buyoutprogram came in 1995, when thesame area flooded again. This time,however, almost everyone had gone,and only four families were thenliving in the area. This second floodconvinced even these hold outs, andSt. Mary is currently seeking funds toget these people out too.

As for the land, St. Mary hasseeded it with grass, so that the onlyexpense to the town is mowing it.15

Now every spring, when the St.Lawrence Creek and Regular Sloughback up, the rising water serves onlyto remind people of the successfuloutcome of an innovative program.

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On December 20, 1996, thecitizens of Wakendavoluntarily dis-incorporated

their town and simply left. They leftbehind only a granite monument tomark the site where 43 families hadlived before the flood of ‘93.1 Locatedfive miles southeast of Carrollton inCarroll County, Wakenda had beennear the tracks of the Atchison Topekaand Santa Fe Railroad, and had been asuccessful little farming community.In 1910, the town had a population of400, two hotels, three churches, and arailroad station where trains of theAtchison Topeka and Santa FeRailroad made four stops a day.However, when the railroads begancutting back service to small ruraltowns in the 1950s Wakenda began todie.2 By 1993, there were 90 peopleliving in the town, and the businesseswere a grain elevator, an auto repairshop, and a grocery store. The townhad a school that contained eightgrades; at the ninth grade level, thestudents were bussed to Carrollton.

The flood of ‘93 was totallyunexpected. Unlike other towns onMissouri’s various floodplains thathad experienced numerous floods,Wakenda had not experienced onesince 1952.3 On July 8, 1993,however, the levee systems guardingWakenda from Wakenda Creek to thenorth and the Missouri River to thesouth began to fail and two days laterseven inches of water had risen inWakenda. That water level would riseto an average of six feet by mid-Julyand remain for 13 weeks. Some of the55 houses in Wakenda simplycollapsed, while others were twistedoff their foundations. The town was atotal loss, a fact that was magnified inthe residents’ minds because damage

Wakendaof this magnitude had never happenedbefore in the town.4

The flood water quicklydevastated the whole of southernCarroll County. Crop lands totaling122,000 acres were soon coveredwith water, the southern end ofCarrollton was flooded, and 70% ofthe businesses in that area werethreatened.5 By July 12, CarrollCounty had been declared a disasterarea, and emergency assistance fromthe Federal government becameavailable to Carroll County floodvictims in the form of low interestloans, emergency housing, and othertypes of assistance. This governmenthelp kept hope alive, and in earlyAugust when the water started torecede, Carroll county citizens beganto rebuild and repair.

In Wakenda, however, thedamage was severe to the pointwhere, after viewing their homes,many residents began to feel thatrebuilding was futile. Nearly everyhome in the town was damagedbeyond repair, total rebuilding ofeach home seemed the only option.6 Itwas this gloomy appraisal that led 60citizens of Wakenda, two-thirds ofthe town, to attend a buyout meetingOctober 7th in the Carroll CountyCourthouse. The Green Hills Re-gional Planning Commission, anorganization that helps 11 counties innorthwest Missouri with governmentprograms, called this October 7thmeeting. Citizens learned the outlineof the buyout program built into theFederal Emergency ManagementAgency’s 404 program. Unfortu-nately, while the general provisionsof the buyout program seemedpromising, the officials of the Green

Hills Commission did not have all thedetails; their goal had been to testpublic opinion to the buyout idea tosee whether people were interestedenough to attend a second meetingwhere FEMA officials could tell themmore details. In fact, the presentationsconfused many people, and theOctober 11th issue of the CarrolltonDaily Democrat reported that most“left with more questions thananswers.” Some Wakenda residentsexpressed displeasure with the buyoutidea. Alvin Yuille, made the state-ment that “the money you pay us forour property in Wakenda will onlypay about a fourth of the price inCarrollton.”7

Most of the people from thefirst meeting, however, were inter-ested enough in the idea to attendanother meeting on October 18, at St.Mary’s Catholic School in Carrolltonwhere Robert Fretteluso, a FEMAofficial, explained the intricacies ofthe buyout program. This was thebuyout program that had been inexistence since 1980, which wassubstantially different than the oneRepresentative Volkmer would pro-pose a month later. Still, Fretteluso’spresentation introduced residents tothe concept of a property buyout.Denise Stottlemeyer, the Director ofthe Green River Regional PlanningCommission, also laid out the processof applying for a buyout grant. Shewarned some of the people thinkingof rebuilding and “flood proofing”their homes that they had “theopportunity to do something now. Ifyou stay where you are, with [floodproofing], the opportunity may notcome along again.”8

From October to December,the residents of Wakenda and Ms.Stottlemeyer moved through theintricacies of the applications thatwould be submitted to SEMA for finalapproval by FEMA. There were

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Aerial view of Wakendabuyout area in Carroll County.

A granite monument six feet tallthat includes the bell from theWalnut Grove Baptist Church is allthat remains of Wakenda after thetown moved following the floodsof ‘93 and ‘95.

delays. In October, Wakenda residentsdelayed the application process brieflywhile they studied different types ofassessment processes.9 In November,seven Wakenda families returned toWakenda determined to make re-pairs.10 In December, SEMA delayedthe application process. The delay hadsome merit. If Wakenda dis-incorpo-rated, there would be no corporateentity to supervise demolition of thearea, or oversee the abandoned areaafterwards. SEMA wanted CarrollCounty to become the sponsor forthese post buyout activities.11

Finally, on April 12, 1994,SEMA accepted Wakenda’s applica-tion that asked for $408,000 to beginthe buyout. Later, The Green HillsRegional Planning Commissionsought additional funds on behalf ofWakenda homeowners, and by theend of the buyout program in June of1997, Wakenda residents had pro-cured a total of $654,027, with FEMAproviding $216,966, and a commu-nity development block grant supply-ing $436,561. Once the money wasapproved, homeowners could apply,and The Green Hills RegionalPlaning Commission opened anoffice in the Carrollton Courthouse tohelp applicants.12 Wakenda citizensadopted a wait and see attitudetowards the government offers, andgenerally complained about the longwaits for a buyout offer. “If the

buyouts are reasonablewe’ll move,” stated oneowner. “Either way, wewish the governmentwould just tell us theprices. Until then there’sa lot of people lefthanging on a stringhere.”13 As with mostbuyout sites, there werehold outs. Seven fami-lies refused to moveuntil May of 1995 whenit appeared that there

would be a repeat flooding of the area.This time, the flood water inWakenda was only seven and a halfinches, but it persuaded all but two ofthe hold outs to evacuate. The last twofamilies were located on slightlyhigher ground in the town site, andremain to this date, along with thegrain elevator that is still operating.14

By September 5, 1995, 30 homes hadbeen demolished at Wakenda, at anaverage cost of between $5,300 and$6,000.15

On December 27, 1996, theCarrollton Democrat carriedWakenda’s final epitaph, “WakendaBecomes Dis-incorporated as aTown.” The article reviewed thebuyout process and reported that theland had been leased to a local truckfarmer, Peter Gunn, who planned togrow watermelons, cantaloupes, andother fruits. It also reported that anadvisory board, made up of ex-Wakenda citizens had formed tocommission a monument to the nowvanished town. That board hadordered a granite monument six feettall that included the bell from theWalnut Grove Baptist Church. Thetown of Wakenda had endowmentfunds both to build the monument andto maintain a small area around themonument. At the time plans weremade for a dedication ceremony.However, that ceremony never tookplace. Although Ms. Stottlemeyer

tried to organize the affair, it was justtoo painful for many of Wakenda’scitizens to attend, and so sheabandoned the idea.16 Ms. TrellaWard, who grew up in Wakenda, andnow lives in Carrollton, has neverbeen out to see the monument, notfrom lack of interest, but because itwould be too emotional.17

But Wakenda’s story is notover. The United States Forest Servicehas planted a stand of 30 trees near themonument in order to study the longterm effects of flooding on Missouritrees.18 The site of Wakenda is nowpart of a 250,000 acre watershedproject managed by the NationalResources Conservation Service(NRCS) that will attempt to reduce thepotential for floods in the area.19

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Warren County, a predomi-nately agricultural area, isin east central Missouri.

Most of the county escaped flooding inboth 1993 and 1995. Where theMissouri River forms the southernboundary of the county, however, wasthe exception. Prosperous farms domi-nate this part of the county, and itspredominately German descendantsare culturally similar to those whosettled Hermann and Rhineland in themid 19th century. Like the citizens ofthose other two towns, the WarrenCounty citizens, who live beside theMissouri River, are philosophicalabout floods. They seem to take acertain pride in their ability to springback from these periodic naturaldisasters. An editorial in theMarthasville Record, written by editorReuben Eichmeyer, not only describesthe disruption of a flood, but reflectspride in the ability of the local peopleto adapt:

WarrenCounty andMarthasville

“It’s the uncertainty, thewaiting, waiting, waiting, thatgets you. And then the knowl-edge for those of us who havebeen there before of the back-breaking massive clean upwhich must be done when itsover. Add to that the despairof lost income, lost posses-sions, and the foul-mouth tast-ing stench you breathe day af-ter day, and you have a flood-plain dweller’s worst night-mare come true.

It takes a strong person togo through one flood and snapback, and an even strongerperson to bounce back from re-peated floods over their life-time.”

Reuben Eichmeyer, wasspeaking from personal experience.When the waters began to rise alongthe Missouri in early July, he movedthe printing equipment for theMarthasville Record above the highwater mark of 1986 and waited for thewater to rise. Other business ownersdid the same. Lictenberg FuneralHome moved their supply of caskets tohigher ground, David Gaddie movedthe cars in his Marthasville Auto BodyShop up the hill, senior citizens at theCharrette Senior Citizen’s Apartmentsmoved to motels or went to live withrelatives, the U.S. Post Office madearrangements to operate out of MurrillWohler’s Garage, and the streetdepartment cut an emergency roadthrough Steve Lochirco’s apple or-chard to Highway 47 so the townwould not be isolated by high water.1

By the end of September,Marthasville had flooded three times,and water lay 18 to 24 inches in thecity streets. Although there was noofficial way to measure the waterlevel, it seemed that this was thehighest the water had been in livingmemory, according to Lydia Zillgitt,who had either lived in or maintaineda property in Marthasville all heryears. In 1993, she took photos of theflooded town from a rowboat. Shenoted that flood water measured eightfeet high on the telephone poles.2Ruby Buchholz, a one time residentwho was well acquainted withMarthasville’s history, also reportedthat before the flood of ‘93, floodwaters had never been high enough tocross the railroad embankment andenter downtown Marthasville.3

As difficult as the flood wasfor Marthasville, the local farmersliving along the Missouri east andwest of the town suffered more.While townspeople could move theirproperty, these farmers had to watch

as flood water ruined bumper corncrops. Their farm houses, that hadusually stood above the high watermark, also suffered the mud and muckof the flood water. The flash flood inSeptember was especially destruc-tive, and several farm houses wereeven swept off their foundations. Onewoman, Gertrude Hogard, died whenher house crashed into Tugue Creek, ausually small stream that flowed intothe Missouri east of town.4

People in Marthasville andalong the Missouri River first learnedabout the buyout program when theMarthasville Record announced ameeting December 10th at theHearnes Multipurpose Center on theUniversity of Missouri Campus inColumbia, Missouri. The articleexplained that RepresentativeVolkmer had organized the meetingand would explain his recentlyapproved bill that made moneyavailable to buyout residential dwell-ings and that also simplified theapplication process.5

Under the leadership of SteveEtcher of the Boonslick RegionalPlanning Commission, over twodozen families in Warren Countybegan the initial application processfor buyout money. By April 28, 1994,the Marthasville Record reported thatWarren County had received a total of$131,500 to buy 14 properties, andMarthasville—which had made aseparate application—had received

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$123,900 to buy five properties.6Surprisingly with the money avail-able, a number of home owners in thecounty, as well as four Marthasvilleresidents, decided to pull out of thedeal.7 Despite their earlier promise toparticipate, there was no penalty ordemand that they honor their earliercommitment.

The Missouri State Emer-gency Management Agency (SEMA),which administered the FEMA fundswas committed to the philosophy thatthe buyout program was voluntary.An individual homeowner could backout at any time before the check wasactually handed to him/her.8 Whilethat policy could make administrativeheadaches for SEMA, it went a longway to assuring people that they werein control of their own destinies.

On May 19, 1995, high wateragain devastated Warren Countyalong the Missouri River. Residentssaw this flood as the third worst inliving memory. Once again,Marthasville businesses moved tohigher ground, and people had to usethe emergency road through theLochirco orchard.9

During this second flood,however, many in Warren Countywere angry when, at first, PresidentClinton’s disaster declarations forMissouri excluded their county. It wasironic, but the very success of thebuyout program up to that time mayhave been responsible for the exclu-

sion. In the June 15, 1995, issue of theMarthasville Record, editor ReubenEichmeyer identified the reason for theexclusion. “The fact that WarrenCounty had such a large buyoutprogram after the 1993 flood affectedthe county’s damage assessment” bySEMA. Eichmeyer’s point was thatwith so many houses out of harm’sway, the usual formula that SEMAused, including number of homesdamaged, value of contents, andnumber of people affected, did not riseto the level of a Presidential DisasterDeclaration.

Regardless of official for-mula, the people of Warren Countyknew they should be declared part ofthe disaster area. County Commis-sioner Pat Spoonster told countyresidents to call SEMA to complain.“Just because we don’t have a lot ofpeople living in the flood area doesn’tmean we don’t have flood damage,”Spoonster said in the sameMarthasville Record article thatreported Warren County’s beingexcluded. The Commissioner went onto say that “there were 27 to 37 countyroads under water. . . 38 homes havewater. . . 33 to 38 businesses [are]affected. . . . There were also 22,000acres of farm land inundated.” Aweek later, whether because of higherwater levels, or calls to SEMA madean impression, the President addedWarren County to the disaster list.10

On August 1, 1995, WarrenCounty received an additional

$179,000 in money from SEMA toboth buy family residences and payfor the demolition of these houses.At the end of the buyout program,SEMA had presided over thepurchase of 13 properties with anaverage final offer of $29,519.68.11

Only one of these buildings was inMarthasville itself, the rest wereresidences of farm families scatteredthroughout the county. The SEMAmoney did not go to buy outagricultural crop land, but wasconfined to purchase of the land onwhich a residence stood.12 Thereasoning was simple, while a farmerwould not want to live in a floodthreatened home, the farm land couldstill be extensively farmed. Since1995, in fact, those fields havecontinued to produce bumper crops.13

Since 1995, additional threatsfrom flooding have come to WarrenCounty. Recently, some citizens ofMarthasville have reconsidered thebuyout philosophy, and have decidedunder the guidance of the BoonslickRegional Planning Commission, toapply for grant money. The goal thistime is to use money from the NRCSand Community Development BlockGrants to buy homes withinMarthasville that are subject toflooding, and to build a watersheddetention system consisting of adamn and 16 acre lake to preventfuture damage to the town. Theproject will take a year and a half tocomplete, and will cost approxi-mately $1.2 million.14

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The buyout program was anunqualified success by anymeans of measurement. Eco-

nomically, the amount of moneyMissouri spent in flood relief duringand after the 1995 flood was markedlyless than similar costs for the 1993flood. Emergency assistance in 1993to 37,000 Missouri households totaled$34.5 million; in 1995, 4,000 house-holds received $4.1 million.1 Thereason is simple; fewer people were inharm’s way during the second flood.Money that might have been neededfor relief in ‘95 could be spentelsewhere.

For individual communities,the results are equally impressive. InCedar City, that part of Jefferson Citynorth of the Missouri River, 473residents needed $941,149 in emer-gency aid for disaster housing andemergency family grants during theflood of ‘93. After flood waterscovered substantially the same area in1995, there were only 53 emergencyaid applicants who consumed $45,503dollars for the same services.

The same general story can befound in Lemay, where 492 peopleused $571,918 for disaster housingand emergency family grants in the ‘93flood, but in the same area during theflood of 1995, only 16 people needed atotal of $7,956. Again in Lemay, theflood waters covered approximatelythe same area in 1993 as in 1995.

The same picture emerges inSt. Charles County. Following the1993 floods, 4,277 people needed$14,174,717 to pay for disaster housingand emergency grants. However, in

Conclusion1995, only 333 people applied for atotal of $216,094 for the sameservices.2

However, some may arguethat figures like these are suspect,because they have been collected byMissouri’s Emergency ManagementAgency (SEMA), the very agencythat was charged with administeringthe buyout program for the FederalEmergency Management Agency(FEMA). The fact remains however,that over the three and one half yearsthat have elapsed since the end offlooding in 1995, the buyout programhas been the subject of severalinvestigative reports by major report-ers from Missouri’s major newspa-pers. Like all good reporters thesewriters are are always on the lookoutfor stories about corruption, waste, oreven fraud. Those kind of storiesmake exciting reading and sellnewspapers. Had there been largenumbers of people who were cheatedby the government, or a group ofpeople who made inordinately largesums of money from the buyout, thesejournalists in all likelihood wouldhave exposed anything suspect.Instead, the state’s major newspapershave published mainly positive sto-ries about the program without a hintof scandal or mismanagement.

Tim O’Neil, reporter for thePost Dispatch, cited the buyoutprogram as the chief reason that theemergency relief cost of the 1995flood was only 5% of the cost of the‘93 flood. His article also pointed outother reduced costs besides emergen-cy housing and living grants. Repairsto public roads, bridges, water, and

sewage facilities totaled $127 millionafter the ’93 flood, but only $9.5million after the ‘95 flood.3

Tom Uhlenbrock, also of thePost Dispatch, reached the samegeneral conclusion in an article titled“The Big Flood Buyout Program ThatWorked.” The article’s subtitle,“Across Region, Many Low-LyingCommunities Are Now Ghost TownsOf Abandoned Homes,” reinforcedthe idea that the buyout program hadsimply given people who previouslylived in the floodplain the opportunityto move elsewhere after the ‘93 flood,so there were fewer people for floodwaters to impact in ‘95.4

Most recently Kevin Mur-phy’s article titled “Flooded-propertybuyout is paying off” in the Kansas CityStar, explains that Missouri’s positiveexperience matches similar, but small-er experiences in other flood-impactedstates like Kansas and Illinois.5

Even outside the UnitedStates, the flood buyout program haselicited positive remarks. The Econo-mist, Britain’s prestigious weeklyeconomic publication, reporting onthe fight against the flood in Ste.Genevieve, went on to credit thebuyout program throughout Missouriwith saving money and being welladministered. It estimated that, hav-ing spent $100 million after the ‘93flood to buyout flooded homes, theprogram will save Missouri $200million over the next 20 years.6

Still, with all this positivereaction some people who werevictims of the flooding still were not

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Buyout property used as open space encourages community picnicking.

happy, not because they perceiveddishonesty, but because they simplydisagreed either with the price theywere offered for their flooded homeor how the program was adminis-tered. Perhaps nothing can be doneabout complaints about assessingprices; some people naturally wantmore—yet concerning the complaintsabout administration perhaps somelessons could be learned.

People complained about thecomplicated procedure of filling outthe buyout applications. Complaintssurfaced about “red tape” andconfusing forms. Certainly experi-ence may alleviate some of theseproblems in the future. The programwas new after the ‘93 flood, and someofficials also were confused about theprocess. After the ‘95 flood, therewere fewer complaints about “redtape” and complicated forms becauseSEMA and local officials had workedout many kinks.

Still, the complaints aboutred tape and difficult forms conceal areality. When the government handsout money, the possibility that somecitizen will try to get more than he/sheis entitled to, exists. Recent Americanhistory is littered with stories about“Welfare Fraud.” Government formsare meant to minimize this possibili-ty. One can only imagine the publicoutrage that would have resulted hadsome individual received money for ahouse he/she did not own, or receivedmore money than they deserved.While future buyout programs be-come more streamlined, there mustalways remain adequate safeguards.

Secondly, the success of thebuyout program often depended onthe enthusiasm of the people runningit. Most often the program workedbest where buyout managers werelocal individuals that local peopleknew and trusted. The enthusiasm forthe program in Arnold due to EricKnoll, in Cape Girardeau due to KenEftink, in Excelsior Springs due toMolly McGovern, and in Neosho dueto the efforts of Jim Cole, areevidence of this.

Finally, there is certainly aplace in the program for the contribu-tions of private organizations like theSalvation Army and the InterfaithDisaster Response Network. Com-pared to the huge sums the state andlocal government spent, these agen-cies did not contribute large sums, but

what they had, they distributed wiselyin such ways that they minimized theimpact of flood victims when theywere forced to leave a home andmoving elsewhere. These payments ofbetween $5,000-$7,000, that were inaddition to the big federal and stategrants made a world of difference topeople suffering extreme distress and/or discomfort.

The buyout program is her-alded by most people as a realsuccess. One measure of that feelingis that the program continues to thepresent time. Large scale buyouts areno longer going on, but a few do go onunder the auspices of SEMA, thatevery year receives about $500,000 tohelp communities make additionalbuyouts and to remove even morepeople from the flood plain.7

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Introduction

1 Darryl W. Levings, “Among KCFloods, This One Ranks No. 4,” Trial byWater, Special Supplement to the KansasCity Star, September, 1993, pp. 29 and31.

2 Sharing the Challenge: FloodplainManagement into the 21st Century,Report of the Interagency FloodplainManagement Review Committee to theAdministration Floodplain ManagementTask Force, US Government PrintingOffice, Washington D.C., June 1994, p.59.

3 Timothy R. Roberts, The Great Flood of93, Published by the Missouri NationalGuard, 1999. p.3.

4 Ayers B. Drummond Jr. “What’s Leftfrom the Great Flood of 93,” The NewYork Times, (August 10, 1993).

5 “Economist Questions Levee Study,”Columbia Daily Tribune, October 22,1993, and “Bond Continues to Push toExpand Levee Repairs,” Columbia DailyTribune, October 23, 1993.

6 Sue Schneider and Kate Kline, “Out ofHarms Way: Missouri’s Flood BuyoutProgram,” Missouri State EmergencyManagement Agency (SEMA), 1996,p.1. Sharing the Challenge: FloodplainManagement into the 21st Century, p. 16.“Flood-Policy Review Just Beginning,”Post Dispatch, October 24, 1993.

7 “Out of Harms Way: Missouri’s FloodBuyout Program,” p. 6.

8 Weather Data Service, US Army Corpsof Engineers.

9 “Out of Harms Way,” pp. 1-2.

10 “Waterlogged Roads Disintegrate,”Kansas City Star, August 5, 1993.

11 “Flood Raises Road Repair Ques-tions,” Columbia Daily Tribune, Novem-ber 15, 1993.

12 “Out of Harms Way,” p. 1.

13 Public Law 93-288: as amended byPublic Law 100-707.


15 The Response, Recovery and LessonsLearned from the Missouri Floods of1993 and 1994, Missouri State Emer-gency Management Agency, p. 17.

16 Personal communication with Melva

Fast, Flood Buyout Coordinator, forJefferson City, MO. January 25, 1999.

17 Economic Development Administra-tion (EDA) Grants and the NationalFlood Insurance Section 1362 FloodDamaged Property Purchase Program.

18 Sharing the Challenge: FloodplainManagement into the 21st Century, p. 23.

19 “Out of Harms Way: Missouri’s FloodBuyout Program,” p. 4.

20 The Response, Recovery and LessonsLearned from the Missouri Floods of1993 and 1994, Missouri State Emer-gency Management Agency, 1994. p. 9.“Out of the Mud, Some Lessons,” TheEconomists, May 27, 1995, p. 28.

21 Sharing the Challenge: Flood Manage-ment into the 21st Century , p. 126.

22 Sharing the Challenge: FloodplainManagement into the 21st Century, p. 7.

23 Personal communication with DestinFrost, State Hazard Mitigation Officer,Missouri SEMA, January 22, 1999.

24 The Response, Recovery and LessonsLearned from the Missouri Floods of1993 and 1994, p. 17.

25 “Out of Harms Way,” pp. 5- 6.

26 “Remembering and Recovering fromthe Great Flood of ‘93,” Section D,Columbia Daily Tribune, August 9,1998.


28 “City of Neosho, Missouri: SummaryReport to Missouri’s SEMA on CDBG,FEMA, and NARCS Grants to BuyProperty,” November 1998. “Out of theMud, Some Lessons,” The Economists,May 27, 1995, p. 28.

29 The Response, Recovery and LessonsLearned from the Missouri Floods of1993 and 1994, p. 17-18.

30 “Remembering and Recovering fromthe Great Flood of ‘93,” Section D, TheColumbia Missourian, August 9, 1998.

31 The Response, Recovery and LessonsLearned from the Missouri Floods of1993 and 1994, p. 18.


33 Paul Hamper, “Some SurvivorsRebuild, Others Moved on, But the Floodof ‘93 Changes Lives Forever,” St. LouisPost Dispatch, August 24, 1998.

Alexandria/Clark County

1 “After Action Report, 29 October,Mississippi and Missouri River FloodDuty 4 July to 5 October, 1993.”Memorandum for NGB-ARO-OM, Re-port as of 8 July, 1993. Missouri NationalGuard Headquarters, Skelton TrainingSite, Jefferson City, MO.

2 Hazel Bledsoe Smith, “A Look Back at1993,” The Media (Kahoka, MO.),January 5, 1994.

3 “After Action Report, 16 August 1993,Battery B, 1st Battalion, 128th FieldArtillery, Missouri National Guard,” p. 1.135th Military History Detachment,Missouri National Guard, Ike SkeltonTraining Site, Jefferson City, MO.

4 Jack Anderson and Michael Binstein,“Missouri Community Survives,” St.Joseph News-Press (St. Joseph, MO.),November 27, 1993. The actual popula-tion of Alexandria is open to question,and ranges from a low of 390 to a high of500. The 390 number is the population inJuly 1993, according to Mayor BobDavis.

5 Hazel Bledsoe Smith, “Flood ReliefCommittees Oversee Distribution andSpending of Donated Funds,” TheMedia, November 3, 1993.

6 Hazel Bledsoe Smith, “Flood WatersRecede, Alexandria Residents Return,”The Media, August 11, 1993.

7 “Water Service Restored in Alexan-dria,” Quincy Herald Wing (Quincy,IL.), June 15, 1994.

8 “City of Alexandria to Hold MeetingConcerning Buyout,” The Media,November 10, 1993.

9 Shelly Chapman, “Governmental &Agency Representatives Answer Ques-tions Concerning Buy-Out & Delays,”The Media, November 10, 1993.

10 Hazel Bledsoe Smith, “Volkmer &Panelists Explain Buyout & OtherPrograms to Help Flood Victims,” TheMedia, December 29, 1993.

11 Hazel Bledsoe Smith, “BuyoutApplication Made to State for Alexandriaand Clark County,” The Media, February2, 1994.

12 Hazel Bledsoe Smith, “DecisionNeeded from Alexandria Residents Soonto Establish Buyout Funding,” TheMedia, February 9, 1994.

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13 Hazel Bledsoe Smith, “Buy-OutApplications Made to State For Alexan-dria and Clark County,” The Media,February 2, 1994.

14 Hazel Bledsoe Smith, “DecisionNeeded From Alexandria ResidentsSoon to Establish Buyout Funding,” TheMedia, February 9, 1994.

15 “Alexandria to get $1.1 Million,County to get $1 Million in Federal andState Buyout,” The Media, February 23,1994, and Hazel Bledsoe Smith, “Gover-nor Approves Clark County FloodBuyout Request,” The Media, March 23,1994.

16 Hazel Bledsoe Smith, “City ofAlexandria Establishes Buyout Criteriafollowing Meeting with CDBG Offi-cial,” The Media, April 13, 1994.

17 Hazel Bledsoe Smith, “Federal andState Representatives Meet with LocalOfficials to Discuss Details of floodBuyout Program,” The Media, June 1,1994.

18 Hazel Bledsoe Smith, “County BeginsAcceptance of Flood Buyout Applica-tions,” The Media, May 25, 1994.

19 A number of articles in The Media givethe details: “Properties Purchased UnderFederal Buyout Program in Alexandria,Other Buyout Agreements Nearly Com-pleted,” February 1, 1995; “AlexandriaCouncil Discusses Buyout and Demoli-tion,” February 8, 1995; and “Final Phaseof Federal Flood Buyout Program toBegin soon in Alexandria,” September27, 1995.

20 Personal communication with MayorRobert Davis of Alexandria, Mayor JerryJohnson of Mt. Airy, MD, and NeilShoemaker of Croton, OH.

21 Personal interview with CaptainWalton Westbrook, Commander ofBattery B, 1st Battalion, 128th FieldArtillery, Missouri Army National Guard,January 7, 1996.

22 Personal interview with Robert Davis,April 19, 1999.

23 Personal interview with Robert Davis,April 19, 1999.

24 Personal interview with DavidDavison, Director of the NortheastMissouri Regional Planning Commis-sion, April 19, 1999.

Arnold

1 Robert I. Koenig, “Uncle Sam’s RightHand. . .,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, NewsAnalysis, September 4, 1994. From 1980to 1994, only 4,000 properties had beenacquired under this earlier buyoutprogram throughout the whole nation.

2 Personal communication with EricKnoll, Arnold City Administrator, May25, 1999.

3 Mike Schlinkmann, “Flood MeetingPuts City on the Map, I Guess,” St. LouisPost Dispatch, Metro Post South, July 22,1993.

4 “Many Communities Gear Up For TheNext Wave Of Flooding,” St. Louis PostDispatch, News, July 28, 1993.

5 “A Few Enjoy Waters Ebb: Others GirdFor The New Crest,” St. Louis PostDispatch, News, August 1, 1993, and TheFlood In Perspective, St. Louis PostDispatch, News, August 2, 1993.

6 “Water Falls A Bit In Some Towns, ButProgress Is Slow,” St. Louis PostDispatch, News, August 3, 1993.

7 “Alton Finds Gift Tucked In Truck OfBottled Water,” St. Louis Post Dispatch,News, July 29, 1993.

8 Leo Fitmaurice, “We’re Hurt Emotion-ally, Says Family Enduring FloodDamage,” St. Louis Post Dispatch,News, August 5, 1993.

9 “Clearing Floodplains House ByHouse,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, Edito-rial, February 8, 1994.

10 Personal communication with EricKnoll, May 25, 1999.

11 Terry Ganey, “Buyout Money OK’dFor Flooded Areas,” St. Louis PostDispatch, News, January 25, 1994.


13 Tim O’Neil, “River Gets 20 HousesHit in 93,” St. Louis Post Dispatch,News, April 16, 1994.

14 “At A Glance,” City of Arnold,Disaster 0995, Residential AcquisitionProject, State Emergency ManagementAgency, Jefferson City, MO. April 15,1997.

15 Nicholas C. Wishart, “Flood BuyoutPleases Couple: When The Water CameUp, We Said We’ve Had It,” St. Louis

Post Dispatch, Metro Post South, May 6,1996.

16 Schneider and Klise, “Out of HarmsWay: Missouri’s Flood Buyout Pro-gram,” p. 7.

17 “State Allocates $1.3 Million ForFloodplain Buyouts Here,” St. Louis PostDispatch, Metro Post South, August 28,1995.

18 Personal communication with DestinFrost, Hazard Mitigation Officer, Mis-souri State Emergency ManagementAgency (SEMA), May 4, 1999.

19 Sheri L. Gaddy, “Council Agrees ToPay For Relocation,” St. Louis PostDispatch, Metro Post South, August 15,1994, and a personal communicationwith Eric Knoll, May 26, 1999.



Buchanan County

1 Scott Canon, “Flood victims stillweather uncertain times: Many inRushville are waiting to help get theirlives back on track,” Kansas City Star,National/World, March 1, 1994. Alsotwo articles by Pat Spencer, reporter forthe Buchanan County News (Fawcett):“Battling The Flood Waters: RecoveryBegins in Agency; Sugar Lake ResidentsWaiting For Waters to Recede,” July 15,1993, and “Flood Strikes Agency Again,South Side Evacuates,” July 29, 1993.

2 Pat Spencer, “Battling the FloodWaters.”

3 Pat Spencer, “Flood Waters Hit WearyResidents Again,” Buchanan CountyNews, September 30, 1993, and a captionto a photo, in the Buchanan CountyNews, September 9, 1993.

4 Pat Spencer, “Meeting is Packed asBuyout Interest Grows,” BuchananCounty News, October 7, 1993.

5 Mike Jones, “2 counties interested inbuyouts,” St. Joseph News/Press (St.Joseph), November 11, 1993.

6 Pat Spencer, “Extension for FloodAssistance Slows Grant ApplicationProcess,” Buchanan County News, Feb-ruary 3, 1994.

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7 “Flood buyout hearing to be held inAgency,” St. Joseph News Press, MetroRegion, June 30, 1994, and “Informa-tional Meeting Set On Sugar Lake Buy-Out,” Buchanan County News, August25, 1994.

8 Pat Spencer, “Buyout Funds ApprovedFor Sugar Lake Residents,” BuchananCounty News, July 7, 1994.

9 Pat Spencer, “More Steps TakenToward Finalizing Buyout Plans,”Buchanan County News, September 1,1994.

10 Steve Everly, “Sugar Lake buyoutsoffered: 34 property owners have untilJan. 1 to accept flood relief,” Kansas CityStar, Metropolitan Section, December19, 1994.

11 Gary Chilcote, “Council announces 30flood buyouts,” St. Joseph News/Press:Metro Region, February 14, 1995.

12 “At A Glance,” Buchanan County 404Hazard Mitigation Grant Project, StateEmergency Management Agency,(SEMA), Jefferson City, Missouri, April,1996.

13 Scott Canon, “Flood victims stillweather uncertain times: Many inRushville are waiting for help to get theirlives back on track,” Kansas City Star,National/World Section, March 1, 1994.

14 Pat Spencer, “Final Work Completedon Rushville Levee,” Buchanan CountyNews, January 26, 1995.

15 Pat Spencer, “Sugar Lake PropertyOwners Finish Buyout,” BuchananCounty News, January 12, 1995.

Cape Girardeau

1 Virginia Baldwin and Tim O’Neil, “HotTopics: Insurance, The Pros And ConsOf Buyouts,” St. Louis Post Dispatch,News, August 27, 1993.

2 Tim Poor, “Crest Is Gone For Good.Water Drops A Foot Here In 24 Hours,”St. Louis Post Dispatch, News, August 9,1993.

3 High and Mighty: The Flood of ‘93,published by the St. Louis Post Dispatch,1993, p. 10.

4 Personal communication with KenEftink, Development Services Coordina-tor for Cape Girardeau, June 14, 1999.

5 “500-year floods don’t have calendar orclock to follow,” Southeast Missourian(Cape Girardeau, Missouri), Editorial,May 26, 1995, and Tim O’Neil, “CrestsMay Go Higher Upriver,” St. Louis PostDispatch, News, May 26, 1995.

6 Martha Shrik, “Sandbaggers, BoatersAre Busy This Weekend. Some Work,Some Play Through The HolidayRainstorms,” St. Louis Post Dispatch,May 28, 1995.

7 Tom Uhlenbrock, “The Big FloodBuyout Program That Worked. AcrossRegion Many Low-Lying CommunitiesAre Now Ghost Towns Of AbandonedHomes,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, News,May 28, 1995.

8 Kathleen Best, “12 Missouri CountiesTo Get Federal Flood Aid,” St. LouisPost Dispatch, News, June 3, 1995, andBill Heltland (S.E. Missouri NewsService), “Of 24 counties eligible forassistance, only 1,240 people haveregistered,” Daily Dunklin Democrat,(Kennett, Missouri), June 20, 1995.

9 Personal communication with KenEftink, June 14, 1999.

10 Mark Bliss, “Cape Girardeau will seekflood buyout funds after all,” SoutheastMissourian, July 23, 1995.

11 Mark Bliss, “Cape seeks money forflood buyout,” Southeast Missourian,August 8, 1995.

12 Marc Powers, “Cape gets state nod forbuyout,” Southeast Missourian, October17, 1995, and Marc Powers, “Govern-ment OKs flood buyouts,” Daily DunklinDemocrat, November 9, 1995.

13 Bill Heitland, “Meadowbrook wantsbuyout, not sewer,” Southeast Missou-rian, July 7, 1995.

14 Marc Powers, “Cape gets state nod forbuyout.”

15 “Briefs, Flood Buyout,” St. Louis PostDispatch, News, November 10, 1995.

16 Marc Powers, “Flood buyout planoutlined,” Southeast Missourian, De-cember 22, 1995.

17 Personal communication with KenEftink, June 14, 1999.

18 Peggy Scott, “Headed for higherground,” Southeast Missourian, August9, 1998.

19 Personal communication with LindaReed Brown, Associate Director of

Interfaith Disaster Response Network,June 16, 1999. The group had donesimilar work in Pattonsburg andRhineland.

20 Southeast Missourian, Editorial, May2, 1996.

21 Mark Bliss, “Buyout plan extended tonorth Cape,” Southeast Missourian,September 7, 1996.

22 Scott Moyers, “City to make all buyoutoffers by Jan.1,” Southeast Missourian,October 6, 1996.

23 Peggy Scott, “Collaboration called keyfor flood buyout,” Southeast Missourian,August 9, 1998.

Cedar City

1 Quote from Allen Garner, JeffersonCity’s city attorney, in “Out of Harm’sWay,” p. 5.

2 John Egan, “ABB manager deniesshutdown rumors,” Jefferson City PostTribune (Jefferson City, Missouri), July30, 1993.

3 “Final Report,” Missouri SEMA,January 10, 1997.

4 Brent Johnson, “The knockout blow,”The Columbia Missourian (Columbia),August 9, 1998.

5 Tom Uhlenbrock, “The Big FloodBuyout Program That Worked,” St.Louis Post Dispatch, News, May 28,1995.

6 “State Policy for Flood MitigationProjects,” State Administration Plan forSEMA, p. 10. Also Personal communica-tion with Melva Fast, January 25, 1999.

7 Personal communication with MelvaFast, January 25, 1999.

8 “Final Performance Report,” MissouriSEMA, January 10, 1997, p. 2.

9 “Out of Harm’s Way,” p. 5.

10 “The knockout blow,” ColumbiaMissourian, August 9, 1998.

11 Personal communication with MelvaFast, January 25, 1999.

12 Personal communication with bothSally Sprague, Coordinator of theRendezvous Festival and Harry Thomp-son, January 22, 1999.

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13 Personal Communication with TerryRackers, President of Jefferson CityFlying Service, January 22, 1999.

Commerce

1 Laura Johnston, “Flood buyouts inCommerce commence; not everybodyhappy; government offers consideredlow,” Chaffee Scott County Signal(Chaffee), February 26, 1996.

2 Ron Eifert, “Water Overtakes Com-merce,” Scott County News, (Chaffee),July 15, 1993, and Mark Bliss, “Com-merce seeks buyout: Scott County townapplies for $1.7 million,” SoutheastMissourian, Cape Girardeau, August 11,1995.

3 Also “Flood waters down, Commercecleaning up,” Scott County News,September 9, 1993.

4 Cathryn Maya, “Commerce residentsdebate FEMA buyout,” Scott CountyNews, August 5, 1993.

5 Cathryn Maya, “Commerce slowlyrebuilding, awaits the spring,” ChaffeeScott County Signal, January 20, 1994.

6 “Commerce mayor hopes for buyout,”Chaffee Scott County Signal, NewsDigest, June 18, 1995.

7 “500-year floods don’t have calendar orclock to follow,” Southeast Missourian,Editorial, May 26, 1995.

8 Martha Shrik, “Sandbaggers, BoatersAre Busy This Weekend. Some Work,Some Play Through The HolidayRainstorms,” St. Louis Post Dispatch,News, May 28, 1995.

9 Tom Uhlenbrock, “The Big FloodBuyout Program That Worked. AcrossRegion, Many Low—Lying Communi-ties Are Now Ghost Towns of Aban-doned Homes,” St. Louis Post Dispatch,News, May 28, 1995.

10 Mark Bliss, “Commerce seeks buyout;Scott County river town applies for $1.7million,” Southeast Missourian, August11, 1995.

11 Tim ONeil, “Public Costs Plummet for1995 Floods. Buyout Of PropertyDestroyed In ‘93 Gets Credit ForSavings,” St. Louis Post Dispatch,January 26, 1996.

12 Tom Uhlenbrock, “The Big FloodBuyout Program That Worked,” St.Louis Post Dispatch, News, May 28,1995.

13 “Briefs: Missouri Flood Buyouts,” St.Louis Post Dispatch. October 17, 1995,“Cape gets state nod for flood buyout,”Chaffee Scott County Signal: NewsDigest, October 22, 1995, and “Briefs:Flood Buyout,” St. Louis Post Dispatch,News, November 10, 1995.

14 “Government OKs flood buyouts inCape, Commerce,” Chaffee Scott CountySignal. News Digest, November 12, 1995.

15 Laura Johnston, “Officials open officeto manage flood buyout plan: About 20property owners have applied for theprogram,” Southeast Missourian, No-vember 30, 1995.

16 Personal communication with DestinFrost, State Hazard Mitigation Officer,Missouri Emergency ManagementAgency, (SEMA), June 29, 1999.

17 May 5, 1996.

18 Laura Johnston, “Commerce floodbuyout program ended today,” ChaffeeScott County Signal, May 5, 1996.

19 Scott Moyers, “Commerce treadingwater after buyout; Flood buyout leavesbitter taste for some,” Southeast Missou-rian, November 24, 1996.

20 Laura Johnston, “41.5 foot crestexpected here: Commerce residentsbattle river one more time,” SoutheastMissourian, May 1, 1996.

Excelsior Springs

1 Gene Hanson, “Flash flood of 93recalled,” Daily Standard, (ExcelsiorSprings) August 12, 1994.

2 Personal communication with MollyMcGovern, Excelsior Springs City Ad-ministrator, February 9, 1999.

3 Gene Hanson, “City crews monitorwater levels,” Daily Standard, July 29,1993, and “Flood hits close to Excelsior,”July 30, 1993.

4 Personal communication, MollyMcGovern, February 9, 1999.

5 Janis Kincaid, “Flood called worstever,” Daily Standard, August 13, 1993.

6 The damage summary is taken from thefollowing articles in the Daily Standard,Janis Kincaid, “Downtown flooded,”August 12, 1993, “Flood called worstever,” August 13, 1993, and “Lower leveldamage extensive,” August 17, 1993.Also articles by Gene Hanson, “City

monitors reserves, leak,” August 17,1993, “City damage widespread,” Au-gust 24, 1993, and “Flash flood of ‘93recalled,” August 12, 1994. Additionalinformation came from City Administra-tor Molly McGovern and town residentKevin Bennett (interviewed on February13).

7 Brad Fischer, “Power of flood blowsout house,” Daily Standard, August 16,1993.

8 Brad Fischer, “Fire Chief Bill Stewartdiscusses emergency plans with FEMA,”Daily Standard, August 13, 1993.

9 Gene Hanson, “Aid packages ex-plained,” Daily Standard, August 19,1993.

10 Gene Hanson, “Downtown floodedagain,” Daily Standard, September 22,1993.

11 “At a Glance,” Final Report of the 404Hazard Mitigation Grant Program: Resi-dential Buyout, Missouri EmergencyManagement Agency (SEMA), revisedJanuary 13, 1998, p. 2.

12 Personal communication with MollyMcGovern, February 9, 1999.

13 Nicole Raulie, “Flood buyout proce-dure is explained” Daily Standard,August 8, 1994.

14 Gene Hanson, “More flood buyoutfunding is sought,” Daily Standard,August 16, 1993.

15 See for instance photos in theSeptember 8th, September 23rd, October12th, 1994 issue of the Daily Standard, aswell as articles in the January 16th and19th, 1995 issues.

16 Personal Communication with MollyMcGovern, February 9, 1999. Also:“Excelsior Springs, Missouri: 1998 FlashFlooding of Little Concern to ResidentialProperty Owners,” Summary Publishedby Missouri Emergency ManagementAgency, Jefferson City, MO. 1998.

Hannibal

1 “Hannibal’s worst floods,” HannibalCourier-Post (Hannibal), July 1993,1993.

2 J. Hurley Hagood and Roberta Hagood,Hannibal Flood ‘93, published byHannibal Courier-Post, Hannibal, Mis-souri, 1994. pp. 3-5.

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3 Hagood and Hagood, p. 28.

4 Gil Stuekel, “Corps: Levee paid foritself, and then some,” Hannibal Courier-Post, July 20, 1993. The statistics werequoted by Doyle W. McCully, deputydistrict engineer, Army Corps of Engi-neers.

5 Hagood and Hagood, pp. 16-17.


7 Martha Parsons, Sny breaks: 45,000acres flooded, Hannibal Courier-Post,July 26, 1993.


9 “Rhineland is approved for relocation,”Hermann Advertiser Courier (Hermann),December 14, 1993. The HermannAdvertiser Courier also carried stories onthe Hannibal buyout project.


11 Brien Murphy, “City: Many floodplain homes may be uninhabitable,”Hannibal Courier-Post, July 22, 1993,and Bev Dar. “FEMA changes buyoutrules,” Hannibal Courier-Post, Septem-ber 3, 1993.

12 Brien Murphy, “City gets $1.5 millionflood buyout grant,” Hannibal Courier-Post, December 10, 1993.

13 “Rhineland is approved for reloca-tion,” Hermann Advertiser Courier,December 14, 1993.

14 “City to receive additional funding tobuy 111 flood-damaged homes,” HannibalCourier-Post, April 5, 1993.

15 Martha Parsons, “Flood Buyoutprogram expands,” Hannibal Courier-Post, April 22, 1994.

16 Martha Parsons, “First federal funds toflood families,” Hannibal Courier-Post,May 20, 1994.

17 “At a Glance,” City of HannibalDisaster 0995; FEMA 404 ResidentialAcquisition Project, June 26, 1997.

18 Personal conversation with JohnWheeler, Building Inspector for Hannibal,Missouri, April 30, 1999.

19 Personal communication with BillLankford, Director of Parks and Recre-ation, Hannibal, Missouri, April 30,1999.

Hartsburg / Boone County

1 Articles by Chuck Geary in the AshlandBoone County Journal (Ashland), “Wa-ter tops levees in south county,” July 8,1993, and “Levees give way; river winsagain,” July 15, 1993. Also MikeRodemeyer, “The 1993 flood: A story ofheartbreak and loss,” Ashland BooneCounty Journal, July 22, 1993.

2 “The flood of 93: it ain’t over till itsover,” Ashland Boone County Journal,July 29, 1993. Also Mike Rodemeyer,“The 1993 flood: A story of heartbreakand loss,” Ashland Boone CountyJournal, July 22, 1993.

3 Photo in the August 12, 1993 issue ofthe Ashland Boone County Journal.

4 Caption on a photo in the AshlandBoone County Journal, August 19, 1993.

5 Chuck Geary “FEMA regulationsstagger Hartsburg,” Ashland BooneCounty Journal, September 23, 1993.

6 Bill Foreman, “County short on moneyto match buyouts,” Columbia DailyTribune , November 30, 1993.

7 “Meeting in Hartsburg Jan. 5 willdiscuss buyout program,” Ashland BooneCounty Journal, December 30, 1993.

8 “Cities, county decide use of buyoutland,” Ashland Boone County Journal,January 13, 1994.

9 Karen Miller, “The County Line:Buyout applications,” Ashland BooneCounty Journal, January 20, 1994.

10 Karen Miller, “The County Line: Timeand change for the commission.”

11 Lisa Yorkgitis, “Hartsburg area homesrecommended for buyout,” JeffersonCity News Tribune, February 15, 1994.

12 Two articles in the Ashland BooneCounty Journal, Nancy Grant and ShirleyThomas, “Hartsburg Hot Line,” June 16,1994, and Karen Miller, “The CountyLine: Approval for buy-out, July 7,1994.”

13 Nancy Grant and Shirley Thomas,“Hartsburg Hot Line,” Ashland BooneCounty Journal.

14 Alson Sharp, “Federal aid to pour intolocal flooded areas,” June 9, 1995.

15 Nancy Grant and Shirley Thomas,“Hartsburg Hot Lline,” Ashland BooneCounty Journal, May 18, 1995.

16 R.C. Adams, “Experience helps townsfight a rampaging river,” Ashland BooneCounty Journal, May 25, 1995.

Hermann

1 Personal communication with DoloresGrannemann, Hermann City Clerk andActing City Administrator, February 9,1999.

2 Don Kruse, “River reaches record36.98,” Hermann Advertiser-Courier(Hermann), August 3, 1993, “Hermannschools remain closed due to high water,”September 28, 1993, and “River couldfall below flood stage Wednesday, July5, 1995.”

3 “City and county receive FEMA floodpayments,” Hermann Advertiser-Courier,November 23, 1993.

4 Local Government Leaders Briefed onRelief Programs, Hermann Advertiser-Courier, September 7, 1993.

5 Don Kruse, “Rhineland Close toApproval of Relocation,” HermannAdvertiser-Courier, November 16, 1993.“City awarded nearly half-milliondollars for buyout program,” HermannAdvertiser-Courier, July 5, 1994.

6 Personal communication with DoloresGrannemann, February 9, 1999.

7 “Hermann submits $2.2 millionapplication for buyout program,”Hermann Advertiser-Courier, January25, 1994.

8 “Hermann’s buyout request improveswith new funding,” Hermann Advertiser-Courier, June 7, 1994.

9 “City’s flood assistance grants givenapproval,” Hermann Advertiser-Courier,August 9, 1994, and “City awardednearly half-million dollars for buyoutprogram,” Hermann Advertiser-Courier,July 5, 1994.

10 “Hermann is approved for buyout,”Hermann Advertiser-Courier, October19, 1994.

11 “River here still not below flood stage;it could be Friday,” Hermann Advertiser-Courier, July 12, 1995.

12 “Residential demolition underway,”Hermann Advertiser-Courier, October 4,1995.


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14 “Historic house discovered in demoli-tion of fifth street,” Hermann Advertiser-Courier, October 18, 1995.


Jefferson County

1 Although Arnold is in Jefferson County,that city’s buyout program was unique,and its story is recorded separately.

2 In the St. Louis Post Dispatch, News andin Metro Post South: Linda Eardley,“Flood Widens Reach, Stretches South,”July 3, 1993, and William Adam and AlStamborski, “Sandbag Soldiers Fight On:Levee Fails in St. Charles County.” Alsosee: Robert Steyer, “Doe Run Shuts LeadSmelter,” July 20, 1993, “A Few EnjoyWater’s Ebb: Others Gird For The NewCrest,” August 1, 1993, and, “The Flood InPerspective,” Stephen Kirkland, “JeffersonCounty Watches, Worries,” August 1,1993, and August 2, 1993, In the FestusWeekly News Democrat (Festus), see:Tim Rowden, “High water mark ahead:Worst flooding in years expected,” “Floodveterans watch rising waters warily,” July9, 1993, and David Benson and KathleenSullivan, “National Guardsmen are de-ployed in county,” July 16, 1993, TimRowden, “Weather pattern shifts, but moreflooding expected,” July 30, 1993.

3 Leo Fitzmaurice, “Officials WeighDamage From Record Flooding,” St.Louis Post Dispatch, Metro Post South,July 22, 1993, and Tim Rowden andDavid Benson, “Officials: One eye onwater, other on recovery,” Festus WeeklyNews Democrat, July 23, 1993.

4 Stephen Kirkland, “Jefferson CountyWatches, Worries,” St. Louis PostDispatch, Metro Post South, August 1,1993.

5 Carolyn Tuft and Roy Malone,“Jefferson County Relieved: We’re Win-ning,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, News,August 3, 1993.

6 Tim Rowden, “Officials: don’t rush toremove sandbag levees,” Festus WeeklyNews Democrat, August 13, 1993.

7 Leo Fitmaurice, “Officials WeighDamage From Record Flooding,” St.Louis Post Dispatch, Metro Post South,July 22, 1993. The initial report in thePost Dispatch mentioned a buyout formobile homes. However, the Post printeda correction on July 26th, stating thatFaulkenberry had specified “flood dam-aged homes.” St. Louis Post Dispatch,Correction, July 26, 1993.

8 Tim Rowden, “Flood and red tape:Meeting may help local officials,” FestusWeekly News Democrat, September 10,1993.

9 Kathleen Best, “One Town FollowedThe Rules—And Won,” St Louis PostDispatch, November 21, 1993, alsopersonal communication with Eric Knoll,May 25, 1999.

10 Theresa Tighe and Jo Mannies,“Facing Still Another Crisis, FederalRescue Could Be Slow, Meager,” St.Louis Post Dispatch, News, September20, 1993.

11 Terry Ganey, “Buyout Money OK’dFor Flooded Areas,” St. Louis PostDispatch, News, January 25, 1994, and“Clearing Flood Plains House by House,”St. Louis Post Dispatch, Editorial,February 8, 1994.

12 Jennifer Price, “Federal flood reliefefforts are under way,” Festus WeeklyNews Democrat, November 5, 1993.

13 Roy Malone, “$11 Million Sought InFederal Funds For Flood Buyout,” St.Louis Post Dispatch, Metro Post South,December 6, 1993.

14 Thom Gross, “Families Full Of PraiseFor Flood Agencies’ Victims; We WereTreated With Respect,” St. Louis PostDispatch, News Analysis, December 16,1993.

15 Tim Rowden, “County seeks $5million in flood buyouts,” Festus CourierJournal, January 5, 1994.

16 Ron Malone, “Buyout Set On Flood-Damaged Properties,” St. Louis PostDispatch, Metro Post South, March 14,1994. Faulkenberry’s quote is from thisarticle.

17 “Meramec Reclaims More Land, RiverFalls; Missouri Tops Levees: More RainFeared,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, News,April 15, 1994, also Jennifer Price,“Flooding not expected to reach ‘93levels,” Festus Weekly News Democrat,April 15, 1994.

18 Jennifer Price, “City to begin buyout offlooded property,” Festus Weekly NewsDemocrat, April 15, 1994.

19 Jennifer Price, “Flooded propertybuyout begins,” Festus Weekly NewsDemocrat, December 30, 1994.

20 Tom Uhlenbrock, “The Big FloodBuyout Program That Worked,” St.Louis Post Dispatch, May 28, 1995.

21 Tim O’Neil, “Great, Big Flash FloodTops Levee: Missouri River BringsTrouble From Near KC to St. Charles,”St. Louis Post Dispatch, May 20, 1995.

22 Tim O’Neil, “2 Rivers May Drop InAbout A Month; But it Depends On NOMore Downpours,” St. Louis PostDispatch, News, June 1, 1995.

23 “State Allocated $1.3 Million ForFloodplain Buyout Here,” St. Louis PostDispatch, Metro Post South, August 28,1995. This grant was divided betweenArnold ($275,000), Valley Park (100,000)and Jefferson County ($925,000).

24 “At A Glance,” Jefferson CountyFEMA-HMGP 404 Residential Acquisi-tion Project, State Emergency Manage-ment Agency, (SEMA), October 16,1997.

25 “At A Glance Reports,” published byState Emergency Management Agency,(SEMA): St. Charles County, Disaster0995 Residential Acquisition Project,December 6, 1998; Jefferson County,FEMA-HMGP 404, Residential Acquisi-tion Project, October 16, 1997; and St.Louis County, Disaster 0995, ResidentialAcquisition Project, November 16, 1998.

Lincoln County

1 Ralph Dummit, “Levee WatchersAround Winfield Expecting Worst,”Nation/World, July 3, 1993, and GreggOchoa, “Levees are holding their ownthanks to dry holiday weekend,” TroyFree Press (Troy), May 31, 1995.

2 Gregg Ochoa chronicled the floodingin: “County flooded; Winfield leveebursts,” Troy Free Press, July 7, 1993,“No relief for flood victims,” Troy FreePress, July 14, 1993, and “Flood of ‘93Day by Day,” Newspaper insert pub-lished by the Lincoln County Journal(Troy), September 21, 1993.

3 Gregg Ochoa, “2,700 parcels of landwere flooded in county,” Lincoln CountyJournal, September 7, 1993, and, GreggOchoa, “No relief for flood victims,”Troy Free Press, July 14, 1993.

4 Gregg Ochoa, “Water down, someroads now open,” Troy Free Press,August 11, 1993.

5 Gregg Ochoa, “Flood fight rages on incounty; More than 400 seek.” Troy FreePress, July 21, 1993.

6 Gregg Ochoa, “Officials field questionson buy-outs and repairs,” Troy FreePress, August 25, 1993.

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7 Three articles by Gregg Ochoa,“Volkmer bill awaits Clinton’s signa-ture,” Lincoln County Journal, Novem-ber 30, 1993, “Area officials to holdworkshops on flood programs: Buyoutsand other topics to be discussed” TroyFree Press, September 8, 1993, and“Officials field questions on buyouts andrepairs,” Troy Free Press, August 25,1993.

8 “Seminar to be held to discuss federalflood relocation program,” LincolnCounty Journal, December 7, 1993.

9 Gregg Ochoa, “Buyout process beginsfor 1993 flood victims,” Lincoln CountyJournal, June 14, 1994.

10 Gregg Ochoa, “County set to receive$3.4 million for buyouts,” Troy FreePress, March 23, 1994.

11 Chuck Herron, “Getting out: Buyoutprogram will help hundreds of LincolnCounty families find higher ground,”Hannibal Courier-Post, May 11, 1994,and Gregg Ochoa, “Some interestexpressed in buyout of land: 83 residentshave asked to participate,” LincolnCounty Journal, November 30, 1993, andPhil Linsalata, “Uncle Sam’s Left Hand.. . ,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, NewsAnalysis, September 4, 1944.

12 Two articles by Gregg Ochoa:“Buyout process begins for 1993 floodvictims,” Lincoln County Journal, June14, 1994, and “County working on planto buy flooded homes: Commission OKsought on plan,” Lincoln County Journal,May 10, 1994.

13 Gregg Ochoa, “Foley consideringmoving the town to higher ground,”Lincoln County Journal, June 21, 1994.

14 “Rhineland is Approved for Reloca-tion,” Hermann Advertiser-Courier, De-cember 14, 1993.

15 Gregg Ochoa, “Foley consideringmoving the town to higher ground.”

16 Personal communication with SteveEtcher, May 28, 1999.

17 Jackie Hoeltge, “Winfield CityCouncil awards excavating contract forHighland Acres Subdivision,” LincolnCounty Journal, June 18, 1996.

18 Personal communication with SteveEtcher, Boonslick Regional PlanningCommission, May 28, 1999.

19 Gregg Ochoa, “County set to receive$3.4 million for buyouts,” Troy Free

Press, March 23, 1994, and “Aftermath:Government moves to purchase homes,”Lincoln County Journal, February 2,1995.

20 Gregg Ochoa, “County set to receive$3.4 million for buyouts,” Troy FreePress, March 23, 1994, and Gregg Ochoa,“Aftermath: Government moves topurchase homes,” Lincoln County Jour-nal, February 2, 1995.

21 Gregg Ochoa, “Request by Foley torelocate is rejected,” Lincoln CountyJournal, November 8, 1994.

22 Gregg Ochoa, “Aftermath: Govern-ment moves to purchase homes,” LincolnCounty Journal, February 7, 1995.

23 Gregg Ochoa, “Buyout marks end ofpainful ordeal,” Lincoln County Journal,August 2, 1994.

24 Gregg Ochoa, “County flood insur-ance is under fire,” Lincoln CountyJournal, November 7, 1995.

25 “State Group Honors Flood-BuyoutProgram,” St. Louis Post Dispatch: St.Charles Post, December 4, 1995.

26 Tom Uhlenbrock, “Water WorksCrews Raze, Recycle Homes Hit ByFlood,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, News,October 29, 1995.

27 Personal communication with SteveEtcher, Boonslick Regional PlanningCommission, May 28, 1999.

28 “At A Glance,” City of Winfield,Disaster 0995, Residential AcquisitionProject, State Emergency ManagementAgency, SEMA, April 14, 1997.

29 John Sonderregger, “Residents StepBack, Wait For The Water EvacuationPlans,” St Louis Post Dispatch, St.Charles Post, May 19, 1995, and GreggOchoa, “Levees are holding their ownthanks to dry holiday weekend,” TroyFree Press, May 31, 1995.

30 Gregg Ochoa, “Cuivre River swallowsup ground,” Troy Free Press, April 13,1994.

31 Personal communication with SteveEtcher, Boonslick Regional Develop-ment Commission, May 28, 1999.

32 “No end predicted in county’s growthtrend,” Lincoln County Journal, Febru-ary 13, 1996.

33 “Officials warn of hazards,” LincolnCounty Journal, February 6, 1996.

Neosho

1 Personal communication with Jim Cole,City Manager, Neosho, Missouri, January26, 1999, and with Heidi Quinanes, GrantAdministrator, Neosho, Missouri, January25, 1999.

2 Final Performance Report, MissouriSEMA, February 25, 1999.

3 “State of Missouri Hazard MitigationMakes Sense,” p. 2.

4 Personal communication with JimCole, January 26, 1999.

5 Final Report, SEMA, February 25,1998.

6 Personal communication with JimCole, Neosho City Manager, January 26,1999.

7 “State of Missouri: Hazard MitigationMakes Sense,” p. 3.

8 Personal Communication with HeidiQuinanes, January 25, 1999.

9 Letter of Recommendation, November23, 1998.

Pattsonburg

1 Mike Jones, “Pattonsburg mappingmove,” St. Joseph Opinion (St. Joseph),November 13, 1993. Personal communi-cation with Denise Stottlemeyer, GreenHills Regional Planning Commission,January 27, 1999.

2 Margaret Stafford, “Pattonsburg Re-makes Itself After ‘93 Flood,” MissouriMonitor, August, 1998.

3 “Two floods in two weeks: too much,”Chillicothe Constitution-Tribune(Chillicothe), August 3, 1993, and photocaption from the Bethany RepublicanClipper (Bethany), July 28, 1993.

4 “Pattonsburg Remakes Itself After ‘93Flood,” Missouri Monitor, August 1998.

5 “Pattonsburg’s options include buyout,relocation,” Gallatin North Missourian(Gallatin), November 3, 1993.

6 “Dry future for Pattonsburg?” St.Joseph Opinion, November 13, 1993.

7 Personal communication with DeniseStottlemeyer, January 27, 1999.

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8 “Final Performance Report,” MissouriSEMA, November 13, 1998.



11 “Two floods in two weeks: too much,”Chillicothe Constitution-Tribune, Au-gust 3, 1993.

12 “Final Performance Report,” MissouriSEMA, November 13, 1998.


14 Personal communication with MarkSmith.


16 Personal communication with MarkSmith, January 27, 1999.

17 Personal communication with BuckKatt, Assistant Director, Missouri StateEmergency Management Agency,(SEMA), May 21, 1999.

Perry County

1 High and Mighty, The Flood of ‘93,Published by the St. Louis Post Dispatch,1993, p. 58.

2 The summary of damage is from:“Levee breaks near Menfro,” The PerryCounty Republic-Monitor (Perryville),July 27, 1993, Bob Scott, “Break in BoisBrule Levee lets tidal wave into bottomlands,” Perryville Sun Times, July 28,1993, and “Crop loss estimated at over$13 million,” Perry County Republic-Monitor, July 29, 1993.

3 “Contracts awarded on Bois Brulerepair,” Perry County Republic-Monitor,October 26, 1993.

4 Cecilia Fallert, “The Bottom Line:Severely damaged homes may not berebuilt in the Bois Brule Bottoms,” PerryCounty Republic-Monitor, August 31,1993.

5 Cecilia Fallert, “County seeks 1.7million buyout,” Perry County Republic-Monitor, February 3, 1994. Also: ArtSchwent, “Perry county proposes to buy54 flood-damaged properties,” PerryvilleSun Times, February 2, 1994.

6 Art Schwent, “Perry county proposes tobuy 54 flood-damaged properties,”

Perryville Sun Times, February 2, 1994.

7 “Gov. acts of buyout,” Perry CountyRepublic-Monitor, February 15, 1994.

8 “$296,352 block grant begins localbuyout,” Perry County Republic-Moni-tor, March 10, 1994.

9 “Perry county awaits state grant to buyflood damaged properties,” PerryvilleSun Times, November 23, 1994, and “AtA Glance,” Perry County FEMA-HMGP404 Residential Acquisition Project,Missouri Emergency ManagementAgency (SEMA), May 9, 1997.

10 “Application and Grant Approval forPerry County,” State Emergency Man-agement Agency (SEMA), no date.Personal communication with DestinFrost, State Hazard Mitigation Officer,State Emergency Management Agency,June 29, 1999.

11 Personal communication with BrianBalsman, Southeast Missouri RegionalPlanning Commission, February 28,1999.

12 “Application and Grant Approval forPerry County,” State Emergency Man-agement Agency (SEMA), no date.

Rhineland

1 “First House in Rhineland is Scheduledto be Moved up the Hill on Wednesday,”Hermann Advertiser-Courier (Hermann),September 13, 1994, and “RhinelandBegins to Move up the Hill,” HermannAdvertiser-Courier, September 20, 1994.

2 Don Kruse, “Plan Would RelocateRhineland,” Hermann Advertiser-Cou-rier, November 9, 1993.

3 “Rhineland Begins Move up the Hill,”Hermann Advertiser-Courier, September20, 1994, and “Rhineland Hit Hard byFlood; Gasconade, Chamois and Bergerfeel record crest,” Hermann Advertiser-Courier, August 3, 1993.

4 “Area Rainfall is on Record SettingPace,” Hermann Advertiser-Courier, July6, 1993.

5 “Rhineland Hit Hard by Flood,”Hermann Advertiser-Courier, August 3,1993.

6 “Area Rainfall is on Record SettingPace,” Hermann Advertiser-Courier, July6, 1993.

7 “Rhineland Mood is Upbeat: ChurchGroups Help Clean, and The 1993 Flood

Makes its Mark,” Hermann advertiser-Courier, August 24, and July 13,respectively.

8 “Volkmer Legislation Would HelpArea,” Hermann Advertiser-Courier,October 26, 1993.

9 Don Kruse, “Rhineland Close toApproval of Relocation,” HermannAdvertiser-Courier, November 16, 1993.

10 Don Kruse, “Plan Would RelocateRhineland,” Hermann Advertiser-Cou-rier, November 9, 1993.

11 “Rhineland is Approved for Reloca-tion,” Hermann Advertiser-Courier, De-cember 14, 1993.

12 “News Expected Soon of Rhineland’sFederal Grant,” Hermann Advertiser-Courier, January 11, 1994.

13 “Rhineland Relocation Project,” videoproduced by Video Production Com-pany, Columbia, Missouri, 1998.

14 “Rhineland Moves up the Hill,”Hermann Advertiser-Courier, September20, 1994.

15 Personal communication with SteveEtcher, Director of the BoonslickRegional Planning Commission, Febru-ary 5, 1999.

16 “Missouri River Crests at 36.3,”Hermann Advertiser-Courier, May 24,1995, and “River Falls Below FloodStage After 88 Days Above 21 Feet,”Hermann Advertiser-Courier, July 19,1995.

17 “Downtown Rhineland Starts to Moveto New Location Across the KATYTrail,” Hermann Advertiser-Courier,September 13, 1995.

18 Personal communication with SteveEtcher, Director of the BoonslickRegional Planning Commission, Febru-ary 5, 1999.

19 “Living It Up In Rhineland,” HermannAdvertiser-Courier, July 10, 1996.

St. Charles County

1 Timothy R. Roberts, “The Great Floodof 93” Missouri Army National Guard,1999. p. 22.

2 High and Mighty: The flood of 93,published by the St. Louis Post Dispatch,1993. p. 10.

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3 High and Mighty, p. 23

4 High and Mighty, p. 33.

5 “Here’s What’s Happening, Town ByTown,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, News,July 11, 1993.

6 After Action Report, 1438th EngineerCompany (Assault Float Bridge, Ribbon)Missouri Army National guard, 15September 1993.

7 High and Mighty, p. 22-23.

8 Jim Gallagher, “Levee Break SwampsNorth St. Louis,” St. Louis PostDispatch, News Analysis, August 2,1993, and “Tally Begins On Damages as93 Costs Keep Coming,” St. Louis PostDispatch, St. Charles Post, May 24, 1995.

9 High and Mighty, p. 23.

10 Ralph Dummit, “Floodplain FutureMay Be Decided Tonight,” St. Louis PostDispatch, St. Charles Post, November 23,1993, and Tommy Robertson, “MoreFlood Aid Headed to Area,” St. LouisPost Dispatch, St. Charles Post, May 26,1994.

11 “Clearing Floodplains House ByHouse,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, Edito-rial, February 8, 1994.

12 Tommy Robertson, “More Flood AidHeaded to Area,” St. Louis PostDispatch, St. Charles Post, May 26, 1994.

13 Judith Vande Water, “Governor OK’sMore Money To Clear Floodplain,” St.Louis Post Dispatch, St. Charles Post,February 16, 1994.

14 Ralph Dummit, “Farewell to Water-logged Home Flooded Out—Bailed outFirst Two St. Charles CountyHomeowners Pick Up Checks,” St. LouisPost Dispatch, News, June 3, 1994.

15 Ralph Dummit, “First Buyouts InFloodplain Begin, Officials Told,” St.Louis Post Dispatch, St. Charles Post,May 13, 1994.

16 Ralph Dummit, “Farewell to WaterLogged Home Flooded Out,” June 3,1994.

17 Ralph Dummit, “Flood Aid Missing,Some Say. Mobile-Home Parks AreGetting Left Out,” St. Louis PostDispatch, St. Charles Post, July 5, 1994.

18 Personal Communication with DestinFrost, Hazard Mitigation Officer, Mis-souri State Emergency ManagementAgency, May 4, 1999.

19 “Tally Begins on Damages as ‘93Costs Keep Coming,” St. Louis PostDispatch, St. Charles Post, May 24, 1995.

20 Ralph Dummit, “First of Flood-Damaged Buyout Properties Razed,” StLouis Post Dispatch, St. Charles Post,August 17, 1994.

21 Nordeka English, “Firefighters ToTorch Flood-Devastated Houses,” St.Louis Post Dispatch, St. Charles Post,September 21, 1994.

22 Al Stamborski, “Waiting for the End,129 Flooded Mobile Homes to beRazed,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, St.Charles Post, September 1, 1994.

23 Tommy Robertson, “Turn FloodedLand Into Park Areas, Firm Recom-mends,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, St.Charles Post, April 27, 1995.

24 Tommy Robinson, “Flood BuyoutMoney Hearing Set For Tonight,” St.Louis Post Dispatch, St. Charles Post,February 6, 1996.

25 “Tally Begins on Damages as ‘93Costs Keep Coming,” St. Louis PostDispatch, St. Charles Post, May 24, 1995.

26 Sue Schneider and Kate Klise, “Out ofHarm’s Way: Missouri’s Flood BuyoutProgram,” Missouri State EmergencyManagement Agency (SEMA), 1996, p.5.

Ste. Genevieve

1 Duane Meyer, The Heritage ofMissouri, State Publishing company, St.Louis, Missouri, 1963, pp. 35-36, and“Missouri Floods,” Missouri HistoricalReview, July 21, 1993.

2 “A View From Atop A Levee,” July 21,1993.

3 Timothy R. Roberts, The MissouriNational Guard: The Great Flood of 93,Published by the Missouri NationalGuard, 1999, p. 35.

4 “Governor examines damage,” South-east Missourian (Cape Girardeau), July12, 1993, and “Twelve hour shifts makelong days for Company C,” StandardDemocrat (Sikeston), August 5, 1993.

5 Terry Ganey and Robert L. Koenig,“River Town May Get To Stop It’sWaitin’ On The Levee Soon,” St. LouisPost Dispatch, News, August 25, 1994.

6 “Governor examines damage,” South-east Missourian, July 12, 1993.

7 “Governor examines damage.”

8 “Guard unit helps fight floodwater atSte. Genevieve,” July 23, 1993.

9 “A View From Atop A Levee,”Christian Science Monitor, July 21,1993.

10 Timothy R. Roberts, Missouri Na-tional Guard, pages 39-40. The descrip-tion of the levee system is from: “TheBattle Zone,” Drawing of the leveesprotecting Ste. Genevieve, appearing inthe Ste. Genevieve Herald, July 14, 1993.

11 Scott Charton, “Ste. Genevieve’sMayor Leads Careful War AgainstMississippi,” St. Louis Post Dispatch,July 24, 1993, and “Its Us Against TheRiver: Ste. Genevieve Shows Its Grit,”St. Louis Post Dispatch, July 21, 1993.

12 “Workers Are Pushing to Keep LeveeTops Above Water,” St. Louis PostDispatch, News, July 27, 1993, and“Twelve hour shifts make long days forCompany C,” Standard Democrat,Sikeston, August 5, 1993. Reports on theamount of rock dumped on top of thelevee vary with the reporter. JeanRissover, project spokeswoman for theNational Guard used 400,000 tons, whileColonel Calvin Broughton, commandingNational Guard troops in the area said thefigure was 100,000 tons.

13 Margaret Gillman, “Ste. GenevieveDraws Cautious Breath As Crest Passes,”St. Louis Post Dispatch, August 7, 1993.

14 “Residents of small Missouri townsseek help in move to higher ground,”Hermann Advertiser Courier, November23, 1993.

15 Art Schwent, “Ste. Genevieve cutsflood buyout plan,” Perryville SunTimes, December 1, 1993.

16 Art Schwent, “Aldermen to seek morebuyout funds,” Perryville Sun Times,December 15, 1993.

17 Art Schwent, “Ste. Genevieve seeksfunds to buy properties in flood plain,”Perryville Sun Times, December 29,1993.

18 Art Schwent, “Ste. Genevieve waitsfor word on flood buyout application,”Perryville Sun Times, February 2, 1994.

19 Jim Ward, “Buyout Program Ap-proved, But Money Not Available Yet,”Ste. Genevieve Herald, April 27, 1994.

20 Missouri Emergency ManagementAgency Manual on Project Management,p. 9.

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21 “City Gets Authorization For FEMABuyout Funding,” Ste. Genevieve Her-ald, February 8, 1995.

22 Jim Ward, “Buyout Awaits OnlyFEMA Approval,” Ste. Genevieve Her-ald, February 2, 1994.

23 “Residents Ask City To Speed BuyoutProcess,” Ste. Genevieve Herald, July 6,1994.

24 Two articles in the same issue:“Buyout Contract Awarded to SEMORegional Planning,” and “Buyout Pro-gram Agreement Details Released,” Ste.Genevieve Herald, July 27, 1994.

25 “Buyout Candidates Get Informationon Program,” Ste. Genevieve Herald,September 7, 1994.

26 “Aldermen Approve Buyout Policies,”Ste. Genevieve Herald, September 28,1994.

27 “City Gets $441,000 For RelocationAssistance,” Ste. Genevieve Herald,November 8, 1994.

28 “Houses Deemed To Be Of HistoricValue Include Vertical Log, Queen AnneStyle, and 1925 Bungalow,” Ste.Genevieve Herald, February 18, 1995.

29 “First Buyout Checks Are Issued BySte. Gen. City,” Ste. Genevieve Herald,February 29, 1995.

30 “Ste. Genevieve Historic Train DepotCould Be Yours,” Ste. GenevieveHerald, April 12, 1995.

31 Personal communication with BettySeibel, Ste. Genevieve City Clerk, June2, 1999.

32 “DNR and City Purchase 3 MoreHistoric Properties,” Ste. GenevieveHerald, July 26, 1995.

33 Personal communication with BettySeibel, June 2, 1999.

34 Personal communication with DestinFrost, State Hazard Mitigation Officer,Missouri Emergency ManagementAgency, June 3, 1999.

35 Missouri Emergency ManagementAgency Manual on Project Management,pp. 10 through 12.

36 “Mississippi Tops 1973 Flood Level,”Ste. Genevieve Herald, May 24, 1995.

37 “The Way We Were,” Ste. GenevieveHerald, December 27, 1995.

38 Personal communication with BettySeibel, June 2, 1999.

39 “More FEMA Buyouts Will BeOffered” Ste. Genevieve Herald, Febru-ary 21, 1996, and SHPO Comment in theMissouri Emergency ManagementAgency Manual of Project Management,p. 12.

40 William Flannery, “Two Years AfterHistoric Flood, Ste. Gen. On FirmFooting Again,” St. Louis Post Dispatch,Business Plus, May 8, 1995.

41 “$48 million levee planned in historicSte. Genevieve,” Daily Capital News,(Jefferson City), May 10, 1995.


1 High and Mighty, The Flood of 93, p.13.

2 “Among KC Floods, This One RanksNo. 4,” in Trial by Water, a specialsupplement to the Kansas City Star,September, 1993, p. 29.

3 High and Mighty, The Flood of 93, p.23.

4 Harry Levins, “What a Flood StageMeans,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, News,July 7, 1993, and Harry Levins, “WhatCity’s Flood Wall Protects,” St. LouisPost Dispatch, News, July 27, 1993.

5 Virgil Tipton, “Rivers Remain NearCrest, On Attack: Venice FishermanMissing,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, News,July 22, 1993.

6 Lane Beauchamp, “Six die inside cave;one boy found alive,” in Trial By Water,a special supplement to the Kansas CityStar, September, 1993, p. 27, and MarthaShrink and Kim Bell, “Outing Turns IntoA Disaster For Children,” St. Louis PostDispatch, News, July 24, 1993.

7 Tom Uhlenbrock and ChristineBertelson, “City Workers Plug 60-FootHole Under Flood Wall For St. Louis,”St. Louis Post Dispatch, News, July 24,1993. Information on how the ring dikeworks comes from a personal communi-cation on January 7, 1996, with CaptainWalter L. Westbrook, commander ofBattery B, 1st Battalion, 128th FieldArtillery, Missouri Army National Guard.

8 Virgil Tipton, “2 Crests Pinch KC;Levees Hold: Residences, BusinessesAre Spared,” St. Louis Post Dispatch,News, July 28, 1993.

9 Terry Ganey, “Residents Flee St.Joseph, MO.” St. Louis Post Dispatch,News, July 27, 1993.

10 Jo Mannies, “Rivers Remain NearCrest, On Attack: Resolute Sentry DigsIn,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, News, July22, 1993.

11 Lori Teresa Yearwood and CarolynTuft, “Baggers Set Sights On 49 Feet,”St. Louis Post Dispatch, News, August 1,1993.

12 Joe Holleman, Cynthia Todd, andRobert Duffy, “Evacuees Also HaveRush Hour,” St. Louis Post Dispatch,News, August 3, 1993.

13 Daniel Browning, “Divers Try toStabilize Floating Propane Tanks,” St.Louis Post Dispatch, News, August 2,1993.

14 Christine Bertelson, “SandbaggedSouth City Flees Propane Threat,” St.Louis Post Dispatch, News, July 31,1993, and “Water Falls A Bit In SomeTowns, But Progress Is Slow,” St. LouisPost Dispatch, News, August 3, 1993.

15 Joan Little, “River Des Peres Retreat:It’s Trying To Go East,” St. Louis PostDispatch, News, August 3, 1993.

16 Stephen Kirkland, “Some South SidersCan Go Home” St. Louis Post Dispatch,News, August 6, 1993.

17 “Donations, Some Drops in WaterLevels Boost Flood Victims,” St. LouisPost Dispatch, News, July 22, 1993,“Towns Stockpile Water, Move Books,Man Pumps,” St. Louis Post Dispatch,News, July 24, 1993, and “Sandbags AreBoth Coming Down and Going Up,” St.Louis Post Dispatch, News, July 31,1993.

18 “Flood News Update,” MissouriNational Guard and State EmergencyManagement Agency, Jefferson CityMissouri, July 18, 1993.

19 “Emergency Operations Center Mes-sage Log,” Missouri National GuardHeadquarters, Jefferson City, Missouri,July 12, 1993, p. 7.

20 “After Action Report of the 1137thMilitary Police Company,” MissouriArmy National Guard, August 11, 1993.

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21 “Donations, Some Drops in WaterLevels Boost Flood Victims,” St. LouisPost Dispatch, News, July 22, 1993, and“Outsiders Bring Aid; Home TownersJust Keep Working,” St. Louis PostDispatch, News, July 25, 1993.

22 “Many Communities Gear Up ForNext Wave of Flooding,” St. Louis PostDispatch, News, July 28, 1993, “A FewEnjoy Waters Ebb; Others Gird For NewCrest,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, News,August 1, 1993, and “Water Falls a Bit inSome Towns, But Progress Is Slow,” St.Louis Post Dispatch, News, August 3,1993. Arthur Goldgaber, “BellefontaineNeighbors Aiming to Be First ToComplete Buyout,” St. Louis PostDispatch, St. Charles Post, May 10, 1994.

23 Personal communication with ClairePyre, Fenton City Clerk, May 21, 1999.

24 Personal communication with MarkSartors, Public Works Director forFenton, Missouri, May 21, 1999.

25 Linda Eardley, “Flood Buyouts AtHand: New Grants Cover About 671Buildings Damaged by Floods,” St.Louis Post Dispatch, St. Louis Region,February 27, 1993.

26 “Flood Aid Swells With Vote; PanelAction Bolsters Buyouts,” St. Louis PostDispatch, November 10, 1993

27 Arthur Goldgaber, “BellefontaineNeighbors Aiming to Be First ToComplete Buyout,” St. Louis PostDispatch, St. Charles Post Section, May10, 1994.

28 Personal communication with Char-lotte Youngman, Bellefontaine CityClerk, May 21, 1999.

29 Arthur Goldgaber, “BellefontaineNeighbors Aiming to Be First toComplete Buyout,” St. Louis PostDispatch, St. Charles Post Section, May10, 1994.

30 Personal communication with Char-lotte Youngman, May 21, 1999.

31 Mark Schlinkmann, “Flood BuyoutChecks Ease Horrible Year : BellefontaineNeighbors Fulfills $557,600 Program,”St. Louis Post Dispatch, News, July 23,1994.

32 Harry Levins, “On Books, 95 FloodLooks Puny,” St. Louis Post Dispatch,News, June 3, 1995.

33 Tom Uhlenbrock, “The Big FloodBuyout Program that Work: AcrossRegion Many Low-Lying Communities

Are Now Ghost Towns of AbandonedHomes,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, SectionB, May 28, 1995.

34 Personal communication with ChrisSeemayer, Brentwood City Administra-tor, May 21, 1999.

35 Carolyn Bower, “US Buyout of HomesAdvances: Board Agrees To First StepWith Federal Flood Officials,” St. LouisPost Dispatch, News, January 6, 1994,and “Pact Lines Up Buyout For TwelveHomes,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, News,January 13, 1994.

36 “At A Glance,’ City of BrentwoodFEMA-HMGP 404 Residential Acquisi-tion Project Report, State EmergencyManagement Agency, Jefferson City,MO. October 23, 1997. The number ofhomes damaged is from a personalcommunication with Chris Seemayer,May 21, 1999.

37 Personal communication with ChrisSeemayer, May 21, 1999.

38 Personal communication with MarkSartors, May 21, 1999.

39 At A Glance, “City of Fenton,”Disaster 0995, Residential AcquisitionProject, State Emergency ManagementAgency, Jefferson City, MO. December26, 1996.

40 “Out of Harm’s Way: Missouri’sFlood Buyout Program,” State Emer-gency Management Agency (SEMA),Jefferson City, MO. 1995.

41 Mark Schlinkmann, “Flood BuyoutChecks Ease Horrible Year,” PostDispatch, News, July 23, 1994.

42 Linda Eardley, “Flood Buyouts AtHand: New Grants Cover About 671Buildings Damaged By Floods,” St.Louis Post Dispatch, St. Louis Region,February 27, 1994.

43 “Buyouts keep flood costs down,”Columbia Daily Tribune, May 25, 1995.

44 “St. Louis and the Flood of ‘93, BuyoutBulletin,” State Emergency ManagementAgency, Jefferson City, MO., Summer1995.

45 Tom Uhlenbrock and Joe Holleman,“River Crests Fall Short of Predictions,but ‘95 Flood still third Worst,” St. LouisPost Dispatch, News, May 22, 1995.

46 “Out of Harm’s Way: Missouri’sFlood Buyout Program,” State Emer-gency Management Agency (SEMA),Jefferson city, MO. 1995., p. 14.

47 “Flood of ‘93’s legacy still being felt ayear later,” St. Joseph News/Press, June27, 1994.

48 Tim O’Neil, “Flood Aid Won’t Match‘93,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, NewsAnalysis, June 2, 1995.

49 “Government Buyout Keeping Mis-souri Flood Costs Down,” Jefferson CityPost Dispatch, May 26, 1995.

St. Mary

1 “Application and Grant Approval forSt. Mary, Missouri,” Missouri StateEmergency Management Agency(SEMA), Jefferson City, MO., 1994.

2 Personal communication with JoAnnDonze, City Clerk, St. Mary, Missouri,February 23, 1999.

3 Art Schwent, “St. Mary constructslevee,” Perryville Sun Times, (Perryville),July 22, 1993.

4 Art Schwent, “St. Mary plans to buyflood damaged property,” Perryville SunTimes, November 17, 1993.

5 Personal communication with JoAnnDonze, February 23, 1999, and ArtSchwent, “St. Mary applies for moremoney to expand flood buyout program,”Perryville Sun Times, July 20, 1994.

6 “Gov. acts on buyout,” Perry CountyRepublic-Monitor, February 15, 1994.

7 “Application and Grant Approval forSt. Mary, Missouri,” Missouri StateEmergency Management Agency(SEMA).

8 Art Schwent, “St. Mary gets approvalfor flood funds,” Perryville Sun Times,April 20, 1994.

9 Art Schwent, “St. Mary applies formore money to expand flood buyoutprogram,” Perryville Sun Times, July 20,1994.

10 Art Schwent, “St. Mary completesbuyout of properties,” Perryville SunTimes, August 17, 1994.

11 Personal communication with JoAnnDonze, February 23, 1994.

12 “At A Glance,” Final PerformanceReport on St. Mary, Missouri, MissouriState Emergency Management Agency(SEMA), November 4, 1996.

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13 Art Schwent, “St. Mary may getFEMA funds” Perryville Sun Times,February 16, 1993.

14 Art Schwent, “Grant Advances St.Mary flood recovery program,” PerryvilleSun Times, November 9, 1994.

15 Personal Communication with JoAnnDonze, February 23, 1999.

Wakenda

1 Mike K. Johnson, “Wakenda BecomesDis-incorporated as a town,” CarrolltonDemocrat (Carrollton), December 27,1996.

2 “Early History Reveals Wakenda’sOriginal Name,” Carrollton Daily Demo-crat, October 11, 1994. On July 11, 1995,the Carrollton Daily Democrat changedfrom a daily to a twice weeklynewspaper, and also changed its name tothe Carrollton Democrat.

3 Personal communication with TrellaWard, Emergency Planning Director forCarroll County, February 1, 1999.

4 Personal communication with DeniseStottlemeyer, Director of the Green HillsRegional Planning Commission, Febru-ary 1, 1999.

5 Supplement to the Carrollton DailyDemocrat, the Waverly Times, and theNorborne Democrat, September 16,1993.

6 Trish Sailer, “Wakenda Citizens AwaitInformation to Decide Future,” CarrolltonDaily Democrat, June 14, 1994.

7 Kristi Madison, “Two-Thirds ofWakenda Attends Meeting,” CarrolltonDaily Democrat, October 11, 1993.

8 Kristi Madison, “Wakenda BuyoutAnswers Lead to Decisions,” CarrolltonDaily Democrat, October 19, 1993.

9 Kristi Madison, “Wakenda CitizensDelay Decision,” Carrollton Daily Demo-crat, October 25, 1993.

10 Kristi Madison, “Families Return toWakenda,” Carrollton Daily Democrat,November 3, 1993.

11 Kristi Madison, “Application ProcessDelayed,” Carrollton Daily Democrat,December 2, 1993.

12 “Green Hills Opens Carrollton Officeto Aid with Buy-out,” Carrollton DailyDemocrat, August 25, 1994.

13 Quote from Doug Womack in“Demolition to Begin” Carrollton DailyDemocrat, June 14, 1994.

14 Personal communication with DeniseStottlemeyer, February 1, 1999.

15 Jon Flatland, “Flood Buyout Under-way in City of Carrollton,” CarrolltonDemocrat, September 5, 1999, and“Application Process Delayed,”Carrollton Daily Democrat, December 2,1993.

16 Personal communication with DeniseStottlemeyer, February 1, 1999.

17 Personal communication with TrellaWard, February 1, 1999.

18 Jon Flatland, “Conservation Dept.Studies Effects of Floodwaters on Treesin Wakenda,” Carrollton Democrat,September 8, 1995.

19 Jon Flatland, “Water Officials andLandowners Pursue Wakenda WatershedProject,” Carrollton Democrat, Septem-ber 29, 1995.

Warren County

1 “Flood Waters Threaten Marthasville,”July 15, 1993, Editorial Page July 22,1993, and “Flooding Missouri DisruptsThis Area Again,” May 25, 1995.

2 Personal communication with LydiaZillgitt, February 16, 1999.

3 Personal communication with RubyBuchholz, July 5, 1999.

4 “Heavy Rains Last Week WednesdayCause Widespread Flash Flooding,”Marthasville Record (Marthasville), Sep-tember 30, 1993.

5 “Seminar To Be Held To DiscussFederal Flood Relocation Program”Marthasville Record, December 9, 1993.

6 “Volkmer Announces FEMA Reloca-tion Funds,” Marthasville Record, April28, 1994.

7 Personal Communication with SteveEtcher, Director of Boonslick RegionalPlanning Commission, February 9, 1999.

8 Personal communication with DestinFrost, State Hazard Mitigation Officer,Missouri Emergency ManagementAgency, February 16, 1999.

9 “Flooding Missouri River Disrupts ThisArea Again,” Marthasville Record, May25, 1995.

10 “Warren County Included on DisasterArea List,” Marthasville Record, June22, 1995.

11 “Final Performance Report,” MissouriSEMA, March 17, 1997, p. 2.

12 Personal communication with ChuckEichmeyer, Boonslick Regional Plan-ning Commission, February 16, 1999.

13 Personal communication with LydiaZillgitt, Marthasville resident, February16, 1999.

14 Personal communication with ChuckEichmeyer, Boonslick Regional Plan-ning Commission, February 16, 1999.

Conclusion

1 “Flood of ‘95 cost less than ‘93 flood,”Southeast Missourian (Cape Girardeau),January 27, 1996.

2 Sue Schneider and Kate Klise, “Out ofHarm’s Way: Missouri’s Flood BuyoutProgram,” Missouri State EmergencyManagement Agency (SEMA), pp. 3, 5,and 14.

3 Tim O’Neil, “Public Costs PlummetFor 1995 Floods. Buyout of PropertyDestroyed in ‘93 Gets Credit ForSavings,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, NewsAnalysis, January 26, 1996.

4 Article dated May 28, 1995, section 1B.

5 Article dated May 31, 1999, p. A1.

6 “Out of the mud, some lessons,” TheEconomist, May 27, 1995, p. 28.

7 Personal communication with DestinFrost, State Hazard Mitigation Officer,Missouri’s State Emergency Manage-ment Agency (SEMA), Jefferson City,Missouri, June 15, 1999.

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