status of modern aviation security · 2019-11-12 · status of modern aviation security 10...
TRANSCRIPT
Status Of Modern Aviation Security
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE:
SECURITY AND FACILITATION
A specialized agency of the United Nations, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was created
in 1944 to promote the safe and orderly development of international civil aviation throughout the world. It sets
standards and regulations necessary for aviation safety, security, efficiency and regularity, as well as for aviation
environmental protection.
The Organization serves as the forum for cooperation in all fields of civil aviation among its 191 Member States.
© 2016, International Civil Aviation Organization
Published in Montréal, Canada
International Civil Aviation Organization 999 Robert-Bourassa Boulevard Montréal, Quebec, Canada H3C 5H7
www.icao.int
Disclaimer: This report makes use of information, including economic and air transport related statistics, which is furnished to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) by third parties. All third party content was obtained from sources believed to be reliable and was accurately reproduced in the report at the time of printing. However, ICAO specifically does not make any warranties or representations as to the accuracy, completeness, or timeliness of such information and accepts no liability or responsibility arising from reliance upon or use of the same. The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect individual or collective opinions or official positions of ICAO Member States.
3STATUS OF MODERN AVIATION SECURITY
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
List of Acronyms
ACI:
ASK:
AVSEC:
CAGR:
FAL:
FTK:
ICAO:
ITF:
LCC:
LF:
MDWG:
RPK:
UNWTO:
VFR:
YoY:
Airports Council International
Available Seat-Kilometres
Aviation Security
Compound Annual Growth Rate
Facilitation
Freight Tonnes-Kilometres
International Civil Aviation Organization
International Transport Forum, Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development
Low cost carrier
Load factor
Multi-disciplinary working group
Revenue Passenger-Kilometres
World Tourism Organization
Visiting friends and relatives
Year on Year
4STATUS OF MODERN AVIATION SECURITY
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
Table of Contents
Status of Modern Aviation Security
Security Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Universal Security Audit Programme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Securing the Air Cargo Supply Chain- ICAO Regulatory Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Cybersecurity/Cooperation with Other Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Security Statistics
7STATUS OF MODERN AVIATION SECURITY
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Security Statistics
In 2015, there were 14 acts of unlawful interference during
which 403 persons were killed and 6 were injured. This
compares with 21 acts of unlawful interference carried out
in 2014 during which 334 persons were killed and 44 injured.
Of the 14 acts of unlawful interference which took place in
2015, there were 3 each in Asia/Pacific, the Middle East and
North America, 2 each in Africa and South America and one
in Europe.
Chart 1 shows the number of actual and attempted acts of
unlawful interference carried out between 2006 and 2015.
These include seizures, facility and in-flight attacks, sabotage,
and other acts of unlawful interference.
Chart 1- Acts of unlawful interference
Chart 2 – Persons killed or injured
Universal Security Audit Programme
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10STATUS OF MODERN AVIATION SECURITY
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The Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP)
In February 2002, a high-level Ministerial Conference on
Aviation Security convened by ICAO endorsed a global strategy
for strengthening aviation security worldwide with an ICAO
Aviation Security Plan of Action as its central element. The
Plan included regular, mandatory, systematic and harmonized
audits to enable the evaluation of aviation security in all
Member States. The Plan was adopted by the ICAO Council in
June 2002, with the first aviation security audit taking place
in November 2002.
The first cycle of USAP audits and follow-up visits
Between 2002 and 2007, 181 Member States and one Special
Administrative Region benefited from the ICAO security audits
under the first cycle of the USAP (nine Member States could
not be audited during the first cycle due to the United Nations
security phase in effect).
The objective of the Programme was to promote global aviation
security through the auditing of Member States, on a regular
basis, to determine the status of the implementation of ICAO
Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs). The USAP
first-cycle audits were designed to determine the degree of
compliance of a State in implementing Annex 17 Standards,
and to measure the extent to which a State’s implementation
of its aviation security system is sustainable through the
establishment of appropriate legislation, national policies
and an appropriate aviation security authority provided with
inspection and enforcement capabilities.
A programme of follow-up visits with respect to the first cycle
of audits was initiated in 2005 and completed in 2009. One
hundred and seventy-two follow-up visits were conducted
in order to validate the implementation of States’ Corrective
Action Plans (CAPs) to address the recommendations
resulting from the audits and to provide support to States
in remedying identified deficiencies. Several States did not
receive follow-up visits, either due to their security level, as
assigned by the United Nations Department of Safety and
Security (UNDSS), to the absence of a CAP, or to the lack of
progress in the implementation of the CAP.
The follow-up visits revealed significant improvement in the
rectification of the deficiencies that were identified during the
initial audits. However, a substantial amount of work remained
in order to achieve full compliance with all Annex 17 Standards.
To be highlighted, in particular, is the need for States to
continue their efforts in establishing comprehensive security
oversight systems to ensure the effective implementation
of national aviation security requirements and the SARPs
contained in Annex 17.
The second cycle of USAP audits
The results of the audit follow-up visits demonstrated that,
overall, States had made improvements in meeting their
Annex 17 Standards obligations. However, varying levels of
improvement were identified from region to region, and, in
many cases, from State to State within a region. States having
difficulties in addressing deficiencies identified during their
audit were offered the opportunity to request assistance from
ICAO through the Implementation Support and Development
Security (ISD-SEC) Programme in coordination with the
Technical Cooperation Programme.
Recognizing that the USAP had proven to be instrumental
in identifying aviation security concerns and in providing
recommendations for their resolution, the ICAO Council
moved to ensure the continuation of the USAP following the
initial cycle of audits, which ended in 2007.
Aviation security audits under the ongoing ICAO USAP second
cycle commenced in January 2008 and were completed in
June 2013. The primary objectives of the second-cycle audits
were to:
a) determine the State’s capability for aviation security
oversight by assessing whether the critical elements of an
aviation security oversight system had been implemented
effectively;
b) determine the State’s degree of compliance with Annex 17
Standards and the security related provisions of Annex 9;
c) assess the State’s adherence to security procedures,
guidance material and security related practices
associated with the relevant ICAO SARPs; and
d) provide recommendations to the audited State on how to
improve its aviation security system and security oversight
capabilities.
A total of 177 audits of ICAO Member States were conducted
under the second cycle of USAP audits, as well as an audit
of the Macao Special Administrative Region of China and an
assessment of the European Commission aviation security
inspection system. It should be noted that, as was the case in
the first cycle of USAP audits, it was not possible to conduct
a second-cycle audit of all ICAO Member States. Some States
were not audited due to their security level, as assigned by
the UNDSS. In other cases, an analysis of first-cycle audit
11STATUS OF MODERN AVIATION SECURITY
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and follow-up mission results, and/or a review of CAPs and
information supplied in Pre-Audit Questionnaires (PAQs)
identified certain States that would benefit from referral to
the ISD-SEC Programme for the provision of appropriate
assistance prior to the conduct of a USAP audit.
The move to a USAP-CMA
In order to prepare for the completion of the second cycle of
Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP) audits in 2013, in
2012, ICAO recommended that the Programme move towards
a Continuous Monitoring Approach (CMA) specific to aviation
security while incorporating risk-management elements.
Following approval by the ICAO Council of the plan including
a transition period, full implementation of the USAP-CMA
began on 1 January 2015.
Current status
In 2015, a total of 26 States were audited under the USAP-CMA
during which four Significant Security Concerns (SSeCs) were
identified in one State. There are now ten unresolved SSeCs
in four States posted on the USAP secure website.
In the first half of 2016, ICAO carried out 14 USAP-CMA audits,
bringing the total number of USAP-CMA audits conducted to
10 documentation-based and 30 on-site audits. Figure 1 shows
the aggregated global audit results of the USAP second cycle
and the USAP-CMA at 30 June 2016 measuring the Effective
Implementation (EI) of States of the eight Critical Elements
(CEs) of an aviation security oversight system.
The chart above shows a global average EI of 71.75 per cent
over all of the CEs. These results indicate that there is still
significant room for improvement and that States’ quality
control obligations remain the critical element that is the least
effectively implemented.
One ICAO Validation Mission took place in 2016, validating
actions taken by one State to resolve its Significant Security
Concern (SSeC). Over the course of 2016, three new SSeCs
involving one State were posted on the USAP secure website,
and one SSeC in another State was removed. As at 30 June
2016, there remained twelve unresolved SSeCs in five States.
In conclusion, the ICAO USAP has successfully transitioned
to the Continuous Monitoring Approach. The engagement
of Member States in the USAP-CMA confirms States’
commitment to implement ICAO security-related Standards
and strengthen aviation security. USAP audits continue to play
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cases, an analysis of first-cycle audit and follow-up mission results, and/or a review of CAPs and information supplied in Pre-Audit Questionnaires (PAQs) identified certain States that would benefit from referral to the ISD-SEC Programme for the provision of appropriate assistance prior to the conduct of a USAP audit.
The move to a USAP-CMA
In order to prepare for the completion of the second cycle of Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP) audits in 2013, in 2012, ICAO recommended that the Programme move towards a Continuous Monitoring Approach (CMA) specific to aviation security while incorporating risk-management elements. Following approval by the ICAO Council of the plan including a transition period, full implementation of the USAP-CMA began on 1 January 2015.
Current status
In 2015, a total of 26 States were audited under the USAP-CMA during which four Significant Security Concerns (SSeCs) were identified in one State. There are now ten unresolved SSeCs in four States posted on the USAP secure website.
In the first half of 2016, ICAO carried out 14 USAP-CMA audits, bringing the total number of USAP-CMA audits conducted to 10 documentation-based and 30 on-site audits. Figure 1 shows the aggregated global audit results of the USAP second cycle and the USAP-CMA at 30 June 2016 measuring the Effective Implementation (EI) of States of the eight Critical Elements (CEs) of an aviation security oversight system.
The chart above shows a global average EI of 71.75 per cent over all of the CEs. These results indicate that there is still significant room for improvement and that States’ quality control obligations remain the critical element that is the least effectively implemented.
One ICAO Validation Mission took place in 2016, validating actions taken by one State to resolve its Significant Security Concern (SSeC). Over the course of 2016, three new SSeCs involving one State were posted on the USAP secure website, and one SSeC in another State was removed. As at 30 June 2016, there remained twelve unresolved SSeCs in five States.
In conclusion, the ICAO USAP has successfully transitioned to the Continuous Monitoring Approach. The engagement of Member States in the USAP-CMA
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12STATUS OF MODERN AVIATION SECURITY
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a central role in the identification of deficiencies, providing
useful information for the targeting of assistance activities
and the development of aviation security policy, thus serving
as a catalyst for Member States’ continued efforts to meet
their international obligations in the field of aviation security.
Nevertheless, the results of both the second-cycle audits and
USAP-CMA audits indicate that a number of States continue to
experience difficulties in meeting aviation security obligations.
Ongoing monitoring of progress made by States in this regard
will continue to be provided under the USAP-CMA.
Sovereignty. Every State has complete and exclusive
sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.
Accordingly, ICAO fully respects a sovereign State’s
responsibility and authority for oversight of aviation
security, including its decision-making powers with
respect to implementing corrective actions related to
identified deficiencies.
Universality. All Member States will be subject to
continuous audit and monitoring activities by ICAO,
in accordance with the principles, methodology,
processes and procedures established for conducting
such activities, and on the basis of the Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) signed by ICAO and each Member
State.
Transparency of methodology. The USAP-CMA activity
procedures and processes will be made available to all
Member States.
Timeliness. Results of USAP-CMA activities will be
produced and submitted on a timely basis in accordance
with a predetermined schedule for the preparation and
submission of these results.
All-inclusiveness. The scope of the USAP-CMA
includes Annex 17 Standards and security-related
Standards of Annex 9. It is expected to expand the
scope of the USAP-CMA at appropriate times to include
other security-related provisions contained in other
Annexes to the Chicago Convention, in order to ensure
their effective implementation in Member States’ civil
aviation systems.
Consistency and objectivity. USAP-CMA activities will
be conducted in a consistent and objective manner.
Standardization and uniformity in the scope, depth and
quality of USAP-CMA activities will be assured through
training and certification of all auditors, the use of
standardized Protocol Questions and the provision of
relevant guidance material.
Fairness. USAP-CMA activities will be conducted
in a manner such that Member States are given the
opportunity to monitor, comment on and respond to the
USAP CMA processes within an established time frame.
Quality. The quality of USAP-CMA activities will be
ensured by assigning trained and certified auditors
to conduct USAP-CMA activities in accordance with
widely recognized auditing concepts, as well as by
implementing an internal quality control system within
ASA that continually monitors and evaluates feedback
received from USAP-CMA stakeholders to ensure their
ongoing satisfaction.
Confidentiality. Sensitive security information
collected as part of the USAP-CMA will be protected
from unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, USAP-
CMA audit reports will be confidential and will only
be made available to the audited State and ICAO staff
on a need-to-know basis. However, in the interests of
promoting global aviation security, a limited level of
disclosure will apply whereby charts depicting the level
of implementation of the Critical Elements of an aviation
security oversight system by a Member State and an
indication of compliance by a Member State with Annex
17 Standards, as well as information pertaining to the
existence of unresolved Significant Security Concerns
(SSeCs) in a Member State, will be made available to all
Member States on the USAP secure website.
The Universal Security Audit Programme is based on the following nine principles:
Additional information on the ICAO Universal Security Audit Programme is available with the online subscription version
of this publication.
Securing the Air Cargo Supply Chain- ICAO Regulatory Framework
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Securing the Air Cargo Supply Chain - ICAO Regulatory Framework
The ICAO regulatory framework for the air cargo secure
supply chain has been developed incrementally over a
period of time and is set out in a series of Standards and
Recommended Practices (SARPs) in Annex 17 Security to
the Chicago Convention, supported by guidance material in
the Aviation Security Manual (Document 8973 – Restricted).
This regulatory framework remains under constant review
and is updated periodically to provide the best responses
to evolving threats. This section is based on standards and
guidance materials in force in July 2016.
The framework provides for the following entities in the supply
chain:
Aircraft operators
In principle, as shown in Figure 1, an aircraft operator can
bear the entire responsibility of applying security controls,
including screening of 100 per cent of cargo and mail before
loading on to an aircraft.
However, while all passengers and their baggage are
screened immediately before departure, this is generally
not a practical proposition for all outgoing cargo.
The alternative is a secure supply chain, where security
controls are applied at the point of origin or at an intermediate
point before the airport. This:
• respects existing obligations of businesses operating in
the air cargo supply chain;
• shares costs and responsibilities among all stakeholders
and allows cargo to be secured upstream in the supply
chain to reduce the burden of security controls imposed
on aircraft operators;
• facilitates the flow of cargo transported by air and
reduces or limits possible delays generated by the
application of security controls;
• applies appropriate security controls for specific
categories of cargo that cannot be screened by the usual
means due to their nature, packaging, size or volume; and
• preserves the primary advantages of the air transport
mode: speed, safety and security.
ICAO and its Member States have developed Standards to
support the implementation of a secure supply chain through
the regulated agent and known consignor regimes. These
entities are approved by the appropriate authority and may
apply security controls, including screening, upstream in
the air cargo supply chain. They ensure that the cargo and
mail to be carried on commercial aircraft is protected from
unauthorized interference from the point where screening
or other security controls are applied until departure of the
aircraft.
The implementation of the secure supply chain reduces the
burden on aircraft operators while facilitating the processing
of secure cargo when it arrives at an airport.
Regulated agents
A regulated agent is a freight forwarder or any other entity
(e.g. ground handler) that conducts business with an aircraft
operator and provides security controls that are accepted or
required for cargo or mail by the appropriate authority. Once
approved as a regulated agent, an entity may conduct security
controls for cargo, including the screening of goods (Figure 2).
An aircraft operator may receive cargo secured by a regulated
agent, which accounts for the security status of consignments.
Candidates for regulated agent status must meet specific
requirements determined by the appropriate authority.
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Securing the Air Cargo Supply Chain - ICAO Regulatory Framework
The ICAO regulatory framework for the air cargo secure supply chain has been developed incrementally over a period of time and is set out in a series of Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) in Annex 17 Security to the Chicago Convention, supported by guidance material in the Aviation Security Manual (Document 8973 – Restricted).
This regulatory framework remains under constant review and is updated periodically to provide the best responses to evolving threats. This section is based on standards and guidance materials in force in July 2016.
The framework provides for the following entities in the supply chain:
Aircraft operators
In principle, as shown in Figure 1, an aircraft operator can bear the entire responsibility of applying security controls, including screening of 100 per cent of cargo and mail before loading on to an aircraft.
However, while all passengers and their baggage are screened immediately before departure, this is generally not a practical proposition for all outgoing cargo.
The alternative is a secure supply chain, where security controls are applied at the point of origin or at an intermediate point before the airport. This:! respects existing obligations of businesses operating
in the air cargo supply chain;! shares costs and responsibilities among all
stakeholders and allows cargo to be secured upstream in the supply chain to reduce the burden of security controls imposed on aircraft operators;
! facilitates the flow of cargo transported by air and reduces or limits possible delays generated by the application of security controls;
! applies appropriate security controls for specific categories of cargo that cannot be screened by the usual means due to their nature, packaging, size or volume; and
! preserves the primary advantages of the air transport mode: speed, safety and security.
ICAO and its Member States have developed Standards to support the implementation of a secure supply chain through the regulated agent and known consignor regimes. These entities are approved by the appropriate authority and may apply security controls, including screening, upstream in the air cargo supply chain. They ensure that the cargo and mail to be carried on commercial aircraft is protected from unauthorized interference from the point where screening or other security controls are applied until departure of the aircraft.
The implementation of the secure supply chain reduces the burden on aircraft operators while facilitating the processing of secure cargo when it arrives at an airport.
Regulated agents
A regulated agent is a freight forwarder or any other entity (e.g. ground handler) that conducts business with an aircraft operator and provides security controls that are accepted or required for cargo or mail by the appropriate authority. Once approved as a regulated agent, an entity may conduct security controls for cargo, including the screening of goods (Figure 2). An aircraft operator may receive cargo secured by a regulated agent, which accounts for the security status of consignments.
Candidates for regulated agent status must meet specific requirements determined by the appropriate authority.
Figure 1 – Security controls applied by aircraft operators
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The regulated agent must develop and maintain a security
programme that describes all the security measures
implemented on the premises and during all operations to
secure cargo and maintain its integrity until delivery to the
next entity. Such measures should include, inter alia: access
control to secure areas; monitoring of premises; protection
and surveillance of cargo against unauthorized access;
screening processes; delivery and reception processes;
security training for all staff who may access the premises;
and monitoring of subcontractors.
However, a regulated agent can only maintain the security
of a consignment or screen it, and there are some types of
cargo that are time-consuming to screen thoroughly. In these
instances the implementation of a known consignor regime
offers the possibility of conducting effective security controls
at the manufacturing/assembly/packing stage.
Known consignors
An entity may act as a known consignor when it originates
cargo or mail for its own account and when its procedures
meet common security rules and standards sufficient to allow
the carriage of cargo or mail on commercial aircraft. Once
a known consignor has accounted for the security status of
cargo, the consignment may be delivered to a regulated agent,
other approved entity, or directly to the aircraft operator, who
then takes over the responsibility for keeping it secure until
it is loaded on to an aircraft.
In order to be designated as a known consignor, an entity
such as a manufacturer or assembler should demonstrate
compliance with the known consignor security programme
under which business will be conducted, as recognized
and approved by the appropriate authority or other entity
authorized by the State to act on its behalf.
Known consignors should apply for designation, approval or
listing by the appropriate authority at regular intervals not
exceeding five years. Their placement in the supply chain is
shown in Figure 3 below.
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The regulated agent must develop and maintain a security programme that describes all the security measures implemented on the premises and during all operations to secure cargo and maintain its integrity until delivery to the next entity. Such measures should include, inter alia: access control to secure areas; monitoring of premises; protection and surveillance of cargo against unauthorized access; screening processes; delivery and reception processes; security training for all staff who may access the premises; and monitoring of subcontractors.
However, a regulated agent can only maintain the security of a consignment or screen it, and there are some types of cargo that are time-consuming to screen thoroughly. In these instances the implementation of a known consignor regime offers the possibility of conduct ing effect ive security controls at the manufacturing/assembly/packing stage.
Known consignors
An entity may act as a known consignor when it originates cargo or mail for its own account and when its procedures
meet common security rules and standards sufficient to allow the carriage of cargo or mail on commercial aircraft. Once a known consignor has accounted for the security status of cargo, the consignment may be delivered to a regulated agent, other approved entity, or directly to the aircraft operator, who then takes over the responsibility for keeping it secure until it is loaded on to an aircraft.
In order to be designated as a known consignor, an entity such as a manufacturer or assembler should demonstrate compliance with the known consignor security programme under which business will be conducted, as recognized and approved by the appropriate authority or other entity authorized by the State to act on its behalf.
Known consignors should apply for designation, approval or listing by the appropriate authority at regular intervals not exceeding five years. Their placement in the supply chain is shown in Figure 3 below.
Figure 2 – Security controls applied by regulated agents
Figure 3 – Security controls applied by known consignors
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The regulated agent must develop and maintain a security programme that describes all the security measures implemented on the premises and during all operations to secure cargo and maintain its integrity until delivery to the next entity. Such measures should include, inter alia: access control to secure areas; monitoring of premises; protection and surveillance of cargo against unauthorized access; screening processes; delivery and reception processes; security training for all staff who may access the premises; and monitoring of subcontractors.
However, a regulated agent can only maintain the security of a consignment or screen it, and there are some types of cargo that are time-consuming to screen thoroughly. In these instances the implementation of a known consignor regime offers the possibility of conduct ing effect ive security controls at the manufacturing/assembly/packing stage.
Known consignors
An entity may act as a known consignor when it originates cargo or mail for its own account and when its procedures
meet common security rules and standards sufficient to allow the carriage of cargo or mail on commercial aircraft. Once a known consignor has accounted for the security status of cargo, the consignment may be delivered to a regulated agent, other approved entity, or directly to the aircraft operator, who then takes over the responsibility for keeping it secure until it is loaded on to an aircraft.
In order to be designated as a known consignor, an entity such as a manufacturer or assembler should demonstrate compliance with the known consignor security programme under which business will be conducted, as recognized and approved by the appropriate authority or other entity authorized by the State to act on its behalf.
Known consignors should apply for designation, approval or listing by the appropriate authority at regular intervals not exceeding five years. Their placement in the supply chain is shown in Figure 3 below.
Figure 2 – Security controls applied by regulated agents
Figure 3 – Security controls applied by known consignors
Figure 2 – Security controls applied by regulated agents
17STATUS OF MODERN AVIATION SECURITY
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
Screening
For aviation security purposes, screening is the application of
technical or other means which are intended to identify and/
or detect weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices,
articles or substances which may be used to commit an act of
unlawful interference. ICAO recognizes a range of screening
options, including hand search, x-ray and explosives trace
detection.
The entity that secures the cargo must ensure that screening
is carried out using an appropriate means or methods, taking
into account the nature of the consignment, as not all means
or methods will be suitable for all consignments. Also, some
consignments may be categorized as ‘high risk’, for instance
on the basis of intelligence information, and should in these
circumstances be subject to additional screening or other
security controls1.
Consignment Security Declaration (CSD)
All along the supply chain, including at transfer points, it is
crucial to share information about the security status of cargo
and mail to ensure that anything that needs to be secured or
re-secured is properly identified and screened.
To assure this transmission of information, an entity that
renders cargo secure should issue a Consignment Security
Declaration that specifies the security status of the cargo
and mail and displays other important security information.
This is transmitted to each party involved later in the secure
supply chain in order for them to apply the appropriate
security measures to the consignment and protect it from
unauthorized access.
The electronic version of the CSD (or eCSD) complements
the increasing automation of air cargo processes and allows
operators to exchange and store security information
electronically.
When accepting a consignment, a regulated agent or an
aircraft operator will automatically refer to the CSD in
order to determine the way to handle, prepare, store and, if
necessary, screen the cargo. The CSD should only be issued
once the appropriate security controls, have been applied. If
no security status is indicated, or no consignment security
declaration is issued, it should be deemed that no security
controls have been previously applied.
The CSD should be completed at each step along the secure
supply chain, to indicate that another authorized entity acting
within the secure supply chain is taking responsibility for the
security status of the cargo.
Only entities accredited by a State as regulated agents, known
consignors or aircraft operators are entitled to issue or
complete such a declaration, and their unique identification
number should be recorded, to indicate their responsibility
and administrative accreditation. The CSD can be transferred
either as a hard copy or in an electronic format.
In the express business model, the relevant cargo security
information is instead usually available in in-house
information technology systems. Postal consignments also
usually have different documentation.
Additional information on moving air cargo is available with
the online subscription version of this document.
1 Currently, the possibilities of electronically analysing shipment related data to identify shipments which may represent a higher risk are under consideration. Any consignments so identified would be subject to additional scrutiny and possibly extra security requirements. Such preloading advance cargo information (PLACI) systems have the potential to provide an additional layer of screening in the future.
Cybersecurity/Cooperation with Other Organizations
20STATUS OF MODERN AVIATION SECURITY
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
Cybersecurity
The December 2014 signing of the Industry High-level
Group (IHLG) Civil Aviation Cybersecurity Action Plan
by ICAO, Airports Council International (ACI), the Civil Air
Navigation Services Organization (CANSO), the International
Air Transport Association (IATA) and the International
Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industry Associations
(ICCAIA) represented an important development in efforts
to address cyber threats. This document establishes
clear timeframes for the achievement of goals and targets
facilitating the development of a common understanding of
cyber threats and risks and the development of information-
sharing mechanisms necessary fo r prompt communication
between government and industry stakeholders.
Throughout 2015, the IHLG continued to promote consistent
and coherent approaches in managing cyber threats and risks.
It also encouraged the development of a robust cybersecurity
culture in all organizations involved in international civil
aviation while identifying and sharing best practices.
Recognizing the importance of consolidating all relevant
publications on cybersecurity for the benefit of ICAO Member
States, the IHLG created a secure repository site entitled
“Cybersecurity”. It can be accessed from the ICAO Secure
Portal. The repository is continuously updated and currently
includes a number of publications addressing sector-specific
cybersecurity needs.
Cooperation with other United Nations Bodies and
International Organizations
ICAO worked closely with international organizations, such as
the United Nations Security Council and its Counter-Terrorism
Committee (CTC), the United Nations Counter-Terrorism
Executive Directorate (CTED) and the Counter-Terrorism
Implementation Task Force (CTITF). ICAO provided CTED
teams with expertise in aviation security for State visits and
supplied them with relevant, mission-specific information.
ICAO participated in the CTC’s Extraordinary Meeting in
Madrid regarding Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) on
stemming the flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs). Held
in July, this meeting was attended by over 400 experts and
Member State representatives, including those from States
most affected by foreign terrorist fighters. In order to advance
the follow-up on the Resolution, three principal themes were
discussed:
i) detection, intervention against, and prevention of
incitement, recruitment, and facilitation of foreign
terrorist fighters;
ii) prevention of foreign terrorist fighters’ travel, including
through operational measures, the use of Advance
Passenger Information (API), and strengthening border
security; and
iii) criminalization, prosecution (including prosecution
strategies for returnees) , international cooperation, and
the rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees.
The meeting recommended that Member States consider:
a) providing dedicated resources and automated tools,
including API, access to watch lists, and centralized
databases;
b) introducing measures and practices to enhance the
capacities of competent border authorities, including with
respect to the type of information required at the border,
the sources of information, and the methodologies for its
processing in order to detect potential FTFs, and consider
sharing this information with competent authorities;
c) as API is an essential source of information about
passengers, both prior to their departure and prior to
their arrival, standardizing the data transmitted and
the means of transmittal; establishing a single point of
collection of the information; and using interactive API.
ICAO is working closely with the International Air Transport
Association (IATA), the World Customs Organization (WCO)
and the CTED to establish the way forward, particularly with
regard to the implementation of those recommendations
relating to API.
Additional information on Cybersecurity is available with
the online subscription of this publication.
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