states of conflict: a case study on peace-building in bosnia and herzegovina
TRANSCRIPT
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StatesofConflictAcasestudyonpeace-buildingin
BosniaandHerzegovina
BeritBliesemanndeGuevara
November2009
ippr2009
InstituteforPublicPolicyResearchChallengingideas Changingpolicy
WWW.IPPR.ORG
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Aboutippr ............................................................................................................................. 3
Abouttheauthor.................................................................................................................. 3
Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................. 3
StatesofConflict................................................................................................................. 3
Abbreviations........................................................................................................................ 4
Introduction........................................................................................................................... 6
BosniaandHerzegovinaanoverview ............................................................................... 8
TheinternationalinterventioninBosniaandHerzegovina................................................. 12
Conclusions:somethoughtsonfutureforeignpolicyformulation..................................... 23
References .......................................................................................................................... 25
Contents
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TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUKsleadingprogressivethinktank,producingcutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticand
sustainableworld.Since1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakingintheUK.Throughourindependentresearchandanalysiswedefinenewagendasforchangeandprovidepracticalsolutionstochallengesacrossthefullrangeofpublicpolicyissues.
WithofficesinbothLondonandNewcastle,weensureouroutlookisasbroad-basedaspossible,whileourinternationalandmigrationteamsandclimatechangeprogrammeextendourpartnershipsandinfluencebeyondtheUK,givingusatrulyworld-classreputationforhighqualityresearch.
ippr,30-32SouthamptonStreet,LondonWC2E7RA.Tel:+44(0)2074706100E:[email protected]
www.ippr.org.RegisteredCharityNo.800065
ThispaperwasfirstpublishedinNovember2009.ippr2009
Aboutippr
BeritBliesemanndeGuevaraisaResearcherattheInstituteforInternationalRelations,HelmutSchmidtUniversity,Hamburg,fromwhereshehasaPhD.
Thispaperisbasedontheresultsoftheauthorsfive-yearresearchproject(20032008)ontheeffectsofstate-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina,publishedinBeritBliesemanndeGuevara(2009) StaatlichkeitinZeitendesState-building.InterventionundHerrschaftinBosnienundHerzegowina, Frankfurta.M.:PeterLang.
Abouttheauthor
ipprisgratefultotheUKDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentandtheSwedishForeignMinistryfortheirgenerousfundingofthispieceofwork.
Acknowledgements
Thispaperisoneofaseries.TheotherpaperscoverMacedonia,Kosovo,AfghanistanandHaiti.DueforpublicationinAutumn2009,theywillbeavailablefromwww.ippr.org/publicationsandreports
StatesofConflict
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AFBiH ArmedForcesofBosniaandHerzegovina
BiH BosniaandHerzegovina
CARDS CommunityAssistanceforReconstruction,DevelopmentandStabilisation
CSA CivilServiceAgency
DPA DaytonPeaceAgreement
DFID DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment[UK]
EUPM EuropeanUnionPoliceMission
EUSR EuropeanUnionSpecialRepresentative
FBiH FederationofBosniaandHerzegovina
GDP Grossdomesticproduct
IDC ResearchandDocumentationCenter,Sarajevo
HJPC HighJudicialandProsecutorialCouncil
HR HighRepresentative
IDP Internallydisplacedperson
ICTY InternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslavia
IFI Internationalfinancialinstitution
IFOR ImplementationForce
IMF InternationalMonetaryFundIPTF InternationalPoliceTaskForce
ITA IndirectTaxationAuthority
JISB JournalofInterventionandStatebuilding
NATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganisation
NGO Non-governmentalorganisation
ODA Officialdevelopmentaid
OHR OfficeoftheHighRepresentative
OSCE OrganisationforSecurityandCo-operationinEuropePfP PartnershipforPeace
PIC PeaceImplementationCouncil
PRSP PovertyReductionStrategyPaper
RS RepublikaSrpska
SAP StabilisationandAssociationProcess
SBS StateBorderService
SFOR StabilisationForce
SFRY SocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia
SIPA StateInvestigationandProtectionAgency
Abbreviations
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UNECE UnitedNationsEconomicCommissionforEurope
UNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme
UNHCR UNHighCommissiononRefugees
UNMIBH UnitedNationsMissioninBosniaandHerzegovinaUSAID UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment
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Inearly2009,BosniaandHerzegovina(BiH)1 witnessedafamiliarspectacle:duringnegotiationsonthefuturedesignofthestate,theprimeministeroftheRepublikaSrpska,
oneofthecountrystwomainpolitical-territorialdivisions,demandedtherightofsecessionforthisSerb-controlledentity,whileBosnianMuslimrepresentativeswarnedthatifthedisputeoverconstitutionalreformswasnotsettled,anewwarcouldbetheultimateconsequence.Priortothedispute,theBosnianMuslimmembersofthestatepresidencyhadthreatenedtodismantlethecountrysentitystructure,disregardingSerbianinterests.Thepoliticiansadversepositionsledtosplitswithinbothethno-national2 communities.
ThesituationboreastrikingresemblancetotheperiodbeforetheBosniancivilwaratthebeginningofthe1990s.Aftermorethan13yearsofinternationalinterventionandtenyearsofexplicitstate-building,fundamentalproblemsthatcoulddestabilisetheBosnianstateremainunsolved.
SincethesigningoftheDaytonPeaceAgreement(DPA)3 inDecember1995,Bosniahas
experiencedextensiveinterventionbywesternstatesandinternationalorganisationswiththeobjectiveofconsolidatingpeaceandbuildingastabledemocraticstate.Duringthefirstfouryearsofpeace-building,internationally-prescribedreformsfollowedthedictatesofpoliticalandeconomicliberalisationtheories.In19992000,however,thenegativeeffectscausedbypoliciesaimingtoestablishdemocracyandamarketeconomypriortostrengtheningthestateledtoastrategicshifttowardsinstitutionalisation.4 Sincethen,Bosniahasbecomethearenaforamassiveinternationalstate-buildingprojectconcentratedontheestablishmentofcentral-stateinstitutions.
Aimsandstructureofthepaper
Thispaperexplorestheeffectsofinternationalstate-buildingeffortsontheBosnianstate.It
addressesthecentralquestionofwhathappenswhenexternalideasaboutwhatconstitutesamodernstateconflictwithlocalcontexts,asking:
Whatkindofstatehastheinternationalstate-buildingprocesscreatedinBosnia?
Whatarethelimitsofthisapproach?
IstheexportoftheliberalstatemodelappropriateasameansofpromotingthesecurityandwelfareoftheBosnianpopulation?
Whatdoesthisallmeanforfutureforeignpolicyformulationregardingstate-buildingingeneral?
Toanswerthesequestions,thepapertakesastepbackfromtheexigenciesandchallenges
ofday-to-daypoliticsandlooksatthestructuraldeterminantsofstate-buildingbeyondthepracticesofsingleactors.Fromthisperspective,explanationsofthesetbacksofinternational
1.HereafterweusethenameBosniaasanabbreviatedwayofreferringtoBosniaandHerzegovina.
2.Anethno-nationalgroupusuallyreferstopopulationswhichexpressanethnicidentityandmakea
claimtobeingrecognisedasanation(Cashmore2003:148).3.Officially:GeneralFrameworkAgreementforPeaceinBosniaandHerzegovina.
4.Themainlessonlearnedregardingtheliberalisationstrategyisthatexternaldemocratisationand
marketliberalisationsetsfreemechanismsofpoliticalandeconomiccompetitionwhichareunproblematic
inconsolidatedstates.Inunconsolidatedstates,however,theytendtoendangerthepeacebecause
regulatoryinstitutionsarestillmissingorweak(Paris2004).InBosnia,theprolongingofethno-
nationalistruledespiteinternationalelectoralengineering(Belloni2004,ManningandAnti 2003),and
theappropriationofstateassetsbypowerfulelitesintheprivatisationprocess(Donais2002a,Pugh2002)werebuttwosymptomsofthisproblem.Therefore,bytheendofthe1990s,institutionalisation
cametobeseenasapreconditionforliberalisation(onthegenesisofthestate-buildingapproachsee
BliesemanndeGuevara2008a:350-1).
Introduction
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state-buildingcannotbelimitedtolocalspoilingorcorruption.Rather,localresistanceandinformalpracticeshavetobeseenasevidenceofstructurallimitstostate-buildingwhoseresultsaremuchmoreambiguousandlesscontrollablethanmightbeexpected.
Themainargumentisthatstate-buildinginBosniahascontributedtotheestablishmentof
whatresemblesaPotemkinstatetheproverbialvillagesmadeupofpaintedfaadesthatFieldMarshalPotemkinbuiltforRussianEmpressCatherineIIduringhervisittothenewly-conqueredCrimeain1787inordertohidethetrue,desolateconditionoftheregion.Inotherwords,state-buildinginBosniahasstrengthenedaformalstatefaadebymeansofaninternationally-ledprocessofinstitutionalisationbutbehindthisfaadetheBosnianstatescapacityandlegitimacyhaveremainedprecarious.
Thepaperstartswithabriefoverviewofthecountryanditsrecentexperienceofconflict,andgoesontodescribethemostimportantinternationalactorsandtheirapproachestowardspeace-buildinginBosnia.Thesubsequentsectionanalysestheeffectsofstate-buildingontheBosnianstate.Itarguesthattheinterventionhascausedsimultaneous,contradictorydynamicsofstate-strengtheningandstate-weakeningwhichhaveresultedin
anexternallysupported,butinternallyunconsolidatedPotemkinstate.Thefindingsareillustratedwithexamplesfromthethreecorestatefunctionsofprovidingsecurity,enablingafunctioningnationaleconomy,andensuringtheruleoflaw.Theyarebolsteredbytheviewsgarneredfrominterviewsbetweentheauthorandrepresentativesofinternationalandnationalagencies,organisationsandministriesinBosnia.Thepaperfinisheswithsomeconclusionsregardingfutureforeignpolicyformulationintheareaofinternationalinterventionandstate-building.
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Historicalbackground:state-formationandwar 5
ThestateofBosniaandHerzegovinacameintoformalexistencein1992,whenitdeclared
itsindependencefromtheSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(SFRY),followingthelattersdemise.Yugoslaviascollapsehadbeenforeshadowedintheearly1970swhentherewasextensivetransferofstatefunctionsfromthecentralgovernmenttothesixYugoslavrepublicsthatwererunbypowerfulelites.Bytheendofthe1980s,andagainstthebackgroundofasevereeconomiccrisis,Yugoslaviasprocessofeconomicandpoliticalliberalisationfundamentallychallengedthestructuresofrule,leadingtostrugglesamongtheelitesovereverscarcerpowerresourcesandpositions.
Multi-ethnicBosniawasparticularlyaffectedbytheseevents.Intheprocessoffragmentation,andduetothelackofhorizontalstratification,afeatureinheritedfromsocialisttimes,newpoliticalpartiesweredeeplydividedalongethno-nationalistlinesduringtheirstruggleforpower.ThethreemainpartiesofBosnianMuslims(Bosniaks),Serbsand
Croatssoonstartedtocarveupthepolitical,economicandsocialinstitutionsofBosniaamongthem,creatingthreeethno-nationalistsystemsofrule.
FollowingthedeclarationsofindependencebySloveniaandCroatia,Bosniaalsoconfrontedthequestionofitspoliticalfuture.WhileBosniaks(around44percentofthepopulationin1991)andBosnianCroats(around17percent)supportedthecreationofanindependentstate,theBosnianSerbs(around31percent)boycottedthereferendumonindependenceanddeclaredtheseparationofSerb-inhabitedareasfromBosnia.
Inthespringof1992,warbrokeoutbetweenBosnianSerbs(backedbySerbiaunderSlobodanMiloevi)andaloosecoalitionofBosniaks,BosnianCroatsandCroatiaundertheleadershipofFranjoTudjman.TheSerbianobjectivewastocreateaGreaterSerbia
encompassingSerbia,MontenegroandallSerb-inhabitedareasinCroatiaandBosnia.Fromthestart,theaggressorsreliedheavilyonethniccleansingtoestablishaterritoriallinkbetweenallSerbianareasandtohomogenisethepopulation.
InApril1993theBosnianCroatsalsodeclaredanindependentrepublicwithinBosniaanditspossibleunificationwithCroatia,creatingasecondconflictlinebetweenCroatsandBosniaks.Again,expulsionsandethniccleansingwereamongthemaininstrumentsofthearmedfactions.InMarch1994,theBosniak-CroatianwarwithinawarendedwiththeWashingtonAgreement,whichformallyestablishedafederationbetweenthetwogroups.ThestateofBosniaremainedsplitintothreepara-statescontrolledbytheethno-nationalistwarparties.IttookuntilDecember1995beforethewarbetweenthefederationandtheSerbsfinallycametoaninternationallybrokeredendwiththesigningoftheDaytonPeace
Agreement.Politicaldevelopmentsafter1995:theDaytonsystemanditsconflictive
transformation
TheconstitutioninAnnex4oftheDPAestablishedafederalstatecomposedoftwoentities:theRepublikaSrpska(RS),whichismostlySerb-inhabited,andtheFederationofBosniaandHerzegovina(FBiH),whichispredominantlyinhabitedbyBosniakandCroatianpopulationsandisadditionallydividedintotencantons,eightofwhicharedominatedbyoneofthetwogroups.6 Thisconstitutionaldivisionofcompetenciescementedtheprofoundweaknessofthecentralstateandprovidedthetwoentitieswithmarkedstate-likequalities.Allmain
5.Forfurtherreadingfromdifferentperspectives,see,forexample,Bennett(1995),BurgandShoup
(1999),Cohen1995,DykerandVejvoda(1995),Ramet(1996),Schierup(1999),Woodward(1995).
6.ForcriticalassessmentsoftheDPA,seeCousens(2002),Cox(1998),OBrien(2005),SoliozandVogel
(2004).
BosniaandHerzegovinaanoverview
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responsibilitiesrestedwiththeentities,includingtherighttolevy,administerandredistributetaxes,andtomaintainseparatemilitaryandpoliceapparatusesaswellasspecialrelationswithCroatiaandYugoslavia.Thecentralstate,bycontrast,lackedthesemostbasiccharacteristicsofstates,thatis,themonopoliesofviolenceandtaxation.
Whilethisarrangementreflectedthedivisionofpowerattheendofthewar,thecreationofapoliticalsystemgearedtowardsmulti-ethniccooperationindicatedthewishofinternationalactorstorestoreamulti-ethnicBosniansociety.Theconstitutionestablishedatripartitepower-sharingsystematthecentral-stateleveltoensuretheparticipationofallethno-nationalgroupsinthepoliticalprocessandtopreventdecisionsbeingmadebyjustonegroup.Besidesethno-nationalquotasforpoliticalrepresentation,severalvetomechanismswereestablishedagainstdecisionsbelievedtoimperilagroupsvitalinterests.However,whilethesearrangementsweredesignedtopromoteconsensusandcompromise,inpracticetheyofferedethno-nationalistpoliticiansconsiderableleewayforblockingthepoliticalprocess.7
Morethan13yearson,Bosniasinstitutionalsettinghaschangedconsiderably.Relyingon
directimplementationstrategies,especiallythepowersoftheinternationalHighRepresentativeinBosnia,aswellasconditionalcarrotsandsticksfromtheEuropeanUnion,NATOandothers(seebelow),theinternationalactorshavesucceededintransferringimportantcompetencesfromtheentitiesandcantonstothecentral-statelevel.Therehavebeenvisiblesuccessesregardingthecorestatefunctionsofsecurityandtaxation,forexampleinmilitaryreform,whichhasresultedinthecreationoftheunifiedArmedForcesofBosniaandHerzegovina(AFBiH),andoftheIndirectTaxationAuthority(ITA),whichprovidesrevenuetothecentralstate.Thesereformshavereducedthestrengthoftheentitiesquasi-statequalitiesandpowersandcontributedinsteadtothestrengtheningofthecentralBosnianstate.
However,thelimitationsofotherreformprocessesmeanthatBosniaisstillfarfrom
sustainingpoliticalstability.Reformstoconstitutionalmattersandtothepolice(seeJISB2007)whichbothinvolvedsubstantialchangesoftheDaytonsystemgotwaylaidbyseverepoliticalstrugglesnotonlyamongBosnians,butalsobetweenlocalandinternationalactors,indicatingthattherearelimitstotheexternalstate-buildingapproach.ThreatsofseparationoftheRepublikaSrpska,warningsaboutthepossibilityofanewwarandattemptstoplaytheethno-nationalcardaredevicesthatarestillusedinpoliticaldiscourses,andtheBosniancentral-stateinstitutionsareapparentlystillunabletocopewithelitepowerstrugglesinthewaythatconsolidatedstatesare.
Socio-economicdevelopment:reconstructionandgrowthwithout
integrationandwelfare8
Attheendofthewar,theeconomicsituationinBosniawasdire.TheWorldBankestimatedthattotalwardamagescametoUS$5070billion.Morethanhalfofallbuildingsweredamaged,andlargepartsoftheelectricity,road,railwayandtelecommunicationsnetworkswereaffected.GDPhadsunkby80percentcomparedwith1990levels,andin1997remainedaslowasUS$500percapita.Industrialproductionhaddecreasedto90percentofthepre-warlevelandmanyassetsweredamaged(Hertietal2000,WorldBank1996).Theeconomic,financialandfiscalsystemsweredividedalongethno-nationalistlines,withdifferentcurrenciesbeingusedinthethreepara-states,therebyerectingquasi-customsborderswithinBosnia.
7.OnthepoliticalsystemandtheexternaldemocratisationprocessinBosnia,see,forexample,Bose
(2002),Chandler(2000),Perry(2005),SchwarzandHrges(2003),SoliozandDizdarevic(2003).8.Onsocio-economicdevelopmentinBosnia,see,forexample,Bojii-Delilovi,auevi andToma
(2003),InternationalCrisisGroup(2001),PughandCooper(2004),Pugh(2002,2005),UNDPBiH(2006,
2007).
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Thephysicaldislocationofpeoplecausedbythewarwasalsosevere.Morethan97,000peoplediedintheviolentconflict.9 Around2millionofthe4.4millioninhabitantscountedinthe1991censusweredisplacedfromtheirhomes,eitherseekingasyluminforeigncountriesormovingasinternallydisplacedpersons(IDPs)tootherpartsofBosnia(Tuathailand
Dahlman2004).In1995,unemploymentstoodat90percent,andaround90percentofthepopulationdependedonhumanitarianassistanceforbasicsurvival(Hertietal2000).
PhysicalreconstructionandhumanitarianassistancewerethereforetheinitialprioritiesforinternationalactorsworkinginBosnia.Thehighlevelsofofficialdevelopmentaid(ODA)10
flowingintoBosniaduringthefirstfouryearsofinterventionprovidedthefinancialbasisformaterialreconstruction.Atthesametime,themarket,monetaryandbankingsystemswerereunifiedasthebasisforeconomicgrowth.In1997,theinternationalactorsalsostartedtheprocessofprivatisingsocially-ownedassets.Theinternationalaidandliberalisationstrategiesweresuccessfulwithregardtophysicalreconstruction,humanitarianassistanceandthecreationofacommonBosnianmarketwithanationalcentralbankandcurrency.However,thestrategiesalsoenabledlocalelitestosiphonoffrevenuesforpersonalenrichmentandto
financeparallelpowerstructures,challengingtheauthorityoftheBosnianstate(Andreas2004a,2004b,Donais2002a,Festi andRausche2004,Pugh2002).
Sincethestrategicshifttoinstitutionalisationin19992000,economicintervention,mainlybytheWorldBank,theIMFandtheOHR,hasbeengearedtowardsthecreationofaresilientbusinessandinvestmentenvironmentandpromotionofmacroeconomicstabilityasthebasisforeconomicgrowth.Strictbudgetarydiscipline,effectivetaxationandstructuraladjustmenthavebeenthemainaimsguidingthepoliciesofinternationalactors.
Therehavebeenseveraltaxreforms,includingtheintroductionofavalue-addedtaxandaprogressiveincometax,whichhavecontributedtohigherandmorepredictablestaterevenues.However,theseeconomicstrategieshave,todate,beenunabletofightthehighlevelsofunemploymentandpoverty.Althoughrealgrowthbetween2001and2007reached
anaverageof5.4percent(withpeaksofalmost7percentin2006and2007),theunemploymentratewasstillmorethan47percentin2006(UNECE2009).Activitiesintheinformalsectorwereestimatedatforming43percentoftotalemploymentin2004(KrstiandSanfey2006).Officially,remittancesamountto20percentoftheGDP,withactualnumbersprobablymuchlarger(WorldBank2007).ThepovertyrateinBosniawasnearly20percentin2004(CouncilofMinistersofBiH2004)andtheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP)saidthataround50percentoftheBosnianpopulationwassociallyexcludedinonewayoranother,withwomen,pensionersandyoungpeoplebeingthosemostaffectedandvulnerable(UNDPBiH2007).In2008nearlytwothirdsofyoungpeoplebetween18and35yearssaidtheywouldemigrateiftheycouldduetothelackofsocio-economicprospects(EarlyWarningSystem2008:47).
Inthesocialsector,amainfocusofthefirstphaseofinterventionwasonthereturnofrefugeesandinternallydisplacedpersonstotheirplacesoforigin(asprovidedforintheDaytonPeaceAgreement,Annex7)andontheimplementationofhumanandminorityrights(DPA,Annexes4and6).Bothprocesseswerehampered,however,byproblemsarisingfromweakandpoliticisedinstitutions,includingethnicisedpoliceforces,judiciariesandpublicadministrations(InternationalCrisisGroup1999a,1999b,1999c,JudicialSystemAssessmentProgramme2000).
In1999,theinternationalactorsinitiatedreformsofthejudiciaryandpublicadministrationswhichaimedtoincreaseefficiencyandeffectivenessandtopromotemoreindependence
9.PreliminaryresultofthePopulationLossProject1992-1995conductedbytheBosniannon-governmentalorganisationResearchandDocumentationCenter(IDC)(seewww.idc.org.ba).
10.OnODAleveldevelopmentsinBosnia,alsoascomparedtootherinterventions,seeSuhrkeandBuckmaster(2006).
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frompoliticalandsocialinfluences.Theseprocessesalsoledtotheestablishmentofnewcentral-stateinstitutions,suchastheHighJudicialandProsecutorialCouncil(HJPC)andtheCivilServiceAgency(CSA).
Inthematterofpropertyrestitutiontheinternationalactorswereabletogivebackalmostall
occupiedhouses,flatsandlandstotheirpre-warowners.However,althoughtheprocessofreturningpeopletotheirhomesgainedsomemomentum,propertyrestitutioncannotbeequatedwithreturn,asmanyrefugeesandIDPssoldorrentedtheirproperties(seeDonais2002b,Heimerl2005,TuathailandDahlman2004).Alltheseprocessesfellundertheheadingruleoflaw,whichbecamethecentralcatchphraseoftheinterventionandhassincebeenabenchmarkagainstwhichlocalpracticesaremeasured.Thisincluded,amongotherthings,moreemphasisonthefightagainstcorruptionandthedetentionofindictedwarcriminals(seeChandler2007,Tuathail2005forcriticalassessments).
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Who?CoreinternationalactorsinBosnia
Inthissection,whichisnotintendedtobeexhaustive,wegiveanoverviewofthemain
actorsandareasofcommitment.TheinternationalinterventioninBosniaconsistsofamilitaryandacivilcomponent.ThemilitarycomponentstartedasaNATO-ledImplementationForce(IFOR)consistingof60,000internationaltroopswitharobustmandate.In1997,itwastransformedintotheStabilisationForce(SFOR).Itsmandateincludedpreventingaresurgenceofviolence,facilitatingthesafereturnofrefugeesandIDPsanddetainingwarcriminals.DuringtheinitialphaseofinterventionSFORwasamainguarantorofpeaceandenforceroftheinternationalcivilagenciesdirectinterventionsintolocalpowerconstellations.By2004thesecuritysituationhadimprovedsignificantlyandthemilitarycomponenthadbeenreducedto7,500troops,atwhichpointSFORwasreplacedbytheEU-ledEUFOR/OperationALTHEA.Todate,thisforceamountsto2,500soldiers.11
Onthecivilside,thePeaceImplementationCouncil(PIC)12,itsSteeringBoard13 andespeciallyitsappointee,theHighRepresentative(HR),havebeenatthecentreoftheintervention.AsperAnnex10oftheDPA,theHRsinitialtasksweretomonitor,coordinateandfacilitatethepeaceprocess.Inviewoflocalblockades,however,thePICextendedtheHRspowersconsiderablybytheendof1997.Theso-calledBonnpowersenabletheHRtodivestelectedpoliticiansandotherstateofficialsofofficeandtodecreelegislature,turningBosniaintoasemi-protectorate.AsthemaincoordinatoroftheinternaleffortsinBosnia,theOfficeoftheHighRepresentative(OHR)hasbeeninvolvedinallreformprocessesinonewayoranother,buildingthegravitationalcentreoftheintervention.14
AnothermainactoristheOrganisationforSecurityandCo-operationinEurope(OSCE),
whichhasbeenactiveinagreatnumberoffieldsrangingfromoperationaltaskslikeregionalmilitarystabilisationanddemobilisationandtheorganisationandoverseeingofelections,topolicyformulationandmonitoringtasksintheprocessesofmilitary,judicial,publicadministrationandeducationreforms.15
Theinternationalfinancialinstitutions(IFIs)particularlytheWorldBankandtheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)havebeenatthecoreofeconomicreconstructionandreforminBosnia,coordinatingtheseprocesses,providingloansandcredits,buildingcorefinancialandeconomicinstitutions,anddefiningandcontrollingeconomicandfiscalpoliciesbymeansofconditionalityandmonitoring.
TheUnitedNationsanditssub-organisationshaveplayedalesserroleinBosniathaninotherinterventioncases.Mostimportantly,theUnitedNationsMissioninBosniaand
Herzegovina(UNMIBH)deployedtheInternationalPoliceTaskForce(IPTF)whosemaintasksweretoscreenpoliceofficersandtosupportotherreformprojectsgearedtowardsdemocratic,multi-ethnicpolicingandthedepoliticisationofthepolice.IPTFwasreplacedbyaEuropeanUnionPoliceMission(EUPM)in2003.16 UNMIBHwasalsoengagedinjudicial
11.Seewww.euforbih.org12.ThePICcomprises55countriesandagenciesthatsupportthepeaceprocessviafinancialassistance,
providingtroopsforSFOR,ordirectlyrunningoperationsinBosnia,plusprovidingobservers
(www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/#pic)
13.Members:Canada,France,Germany,Italy,Japan,Russia,UK,US,thePresidencyoftheEU,the
EuropeanCommission,andtheOrganisationoftheIslamicConference(OIC),whichisrepresentedby
Turkey(www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/#pic)14.Seewww.ohr.int
15.Seewww.oscebih.org
16.Seewww.eupm.org
TheinternationalinterventioninBosniaandHerzegovina
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reforms.TheUNRefugeeAgency(UNHCR)assistedintheprocessofrefugeereturn,whiletheUNDevelopmentProgrammehasassumedmonitoringandassistancefunctionsintheareasofdemocraticgovernance,povertyreduction,crisispreventionandrecovery,andenergyandenvironment.17
ApartfromtheirrepresentationinthePICanditsSteeringBoard,westerncountrieshavealsobeenpresentintheformofbilateraldevelopmentagencies,takingtheleadincertainreformareas.18 Inrecentyears,keyplayersprovidingbilateralaidhavebeentheUS,Sweden,Germany,theNetherlands,Austria,JapanandFrance.19 TheworkofthegovernmentalinterventionagencieswasaccompaniedbyahighbutdecliningnumberofinternationalandlocalNGOs.
Since2000,theEuropeanUnionsrolehasexpandednoticeably,resultingnotonlyintheaforementioneddeploymentofEUFORandEUPM,butalsoinadouble-functionoftheHRasEuropeanUnionSpecialRepresentative(EUSR)since2002.TheobjectiveoftheEuropeanCommissionDelegationtoBosniahasbeentoprovidethecountrywithsupportforthestabilisationandassociationprocess,includingpeaceconsolidation,ethnicreconciliation,
refugeereturn,institution-building,democratisation,ruleoflaw,humanrights,sustainableeconomicdevelopment,andfacilitationoftheharmonisationwithEUstandardsandprinciples.WithintheframeworkoftheCommunityAssistanceforReconstruction,DevelopmentandStabilisation(CARDS)programme,theEUprovided4.6billionEurostosupportinstitution-buildinginBosniabetween2000and2006;since2007furtherassistancehasbeenprovidedthoughthenewPre-AccessionInstrument(IPA).20
Finally,NATOhasalsoplayedamajorrolethroughitsPartnershipforPeace(PfP)programme.Inadditiontoprovidingassistanceforsecuritysectorreforms,aspirationstoNATOaccessionexpressedbytheStatePresidencyofBosniain2001providedtheinternationalcommunitywithconditionalcarrotsandstickstofurthertheprocessesofmilitaryreformandthedetentionofindictedwarcriminals.Indeed,accessiontalksweretied
toanumberofrequirements,suchasthecreationofunifiedarmedforcesinsteadoftwoseparatearmies,theadjustmentofequipmentandorganisationtoNATOstandards,and,mostimportantly,astrongercommitmentofBosnianSerbrepresentativestocooperatewiththeInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslavia(ICTY). 21
How?Peace-andstate-buildingstrategiesinBosnia
TheinternationalinterventioninBosniahasbeendominatedbytwotypesofstrategies:operativeandconditional-structuralones(seeRichter2009:94-96).Operativestrategiesaredirectformsofinterferenceorprojectimplementationbyinternationalactors.InBosnia,theinterventionagencywhichhasmostfrequentlyresortedtooperativestrategiesistheOHRwithitsBonnpowers.Thetwomainadvantagesofdirectinterventionsarethatthey
facilitatecrucialreformsandinstitution-buildingprocesseswhichotherwisemightnotcomeintobeingduetoalackofcapacityorwillingnessonthesideoflocalactors,andthattheyensuretheprotectionofvulnerablegroups.TheHRsdecisiontoestablishcarlicenceplatesthatwouldnotrevealapersonsorigin,forexample,isoftencitedasacentralsuccessof
17.Seewww.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmibhforUNMIBH,www.unhcr.baforUNHCRand
www.undp.baforUNDPinBiH.
18.Forexample,theUSAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID)waslargelyresponsibleforthe
privatisationprocess,theUKsDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID)hasengagedinpublicadministrationreform,andtheGermanGTZhastriedunsuccessfullytoestablishadirecttaxsystemin
theBrkodistrict(seewww.usaid.baforUSAID,www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/europa-kaukasus-
zentralasien/651.htmforGTZandwww.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Europe/Bosnia-Herzegovinafor
DFID).19.Ofthese,onlytheUS,Germany,JapanandFrancearealsomembersofthePICSteeringBoard.
20.Seewww.delbih.ec.europa.eu21.Seewww.nato.int/issues/nato-bosnia-herzegovina/index.html
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operativestrategies,asitprovidedforfreemovementofallpersonsalloverBosnia.Themostimportantdisadvantagesofdirectinterventionsarethattheytendtoprioritisepragmaticsolutionswhichtakealeastcommondenominatorapproachtoendingacuteconflictsbutwhichmightimpedefurtherreforms,thattheytendtopolariseconflictlinesbetween
antagonisticactorsandtohindercompromise,andthattheyfurtherlocaldependencyatthecostofownership.
Conditional-structuralstrategies,bycontrast,arebasedonthepremiseoftheexistenceofrationalactorswhichcanbeinfluencedbyconditionalitiesthatis,tyingspecificreformdemandstoaid,loansoraspiredmemberships,incentivesandmonitoring,aslongastheyarealsoprovidedwithcapacitythroughtransfersofknowledgeandtechnologies.InBosnia,suchstrategieshavebecomeastrongincentiveforreformssincetheconvergenceprocesswiththeEUstartedinthelate1990snotonlybecauseofthecarrotofpossibleEUaccession,butalsobecausetheEUsgeneralenlargementapproachinvolvesanemphasisonreformownershipaccompaniedbytechnicalassistance.
Conditional-structuralstrategiesaresupposedtoensureacomplianceofvaluesand
standardswithoutjeopardisinglocalownershipwhetherareformisimplementedideallydependsonlocalactors.InBosnia,however,conditionalitieshaveworkeddifferentlyinsofarastheyhaveinmanycasesbeenovershadowedbytheDamoclesswordoftheBonnpowers.Themostimportantdisadvantageofthesestrategiesisthatthepoliticalelitesmightgetbetweenthefrontlinesofinternationalandlocaldemands:iftheytaketheinternationalside,reformswillmostlikelylacklocallegitimacy,whilethedecisiontodefendthelocalpointofviewmightconsiderablylimitthepossibilitiesofexternalassistance.
InBosnia,thecentralisationeffortsinthecourseofthepolicereformillustratedthisproblem(seeJISB2007).Caughtinthemiddle,theSerbianrepresentativesdecidedtoignoreinternationalconditionalitiesandtodefendtheethno-nationalpositionoftheirconstituencypartlyduetomerepowerconsiderations,yetalsobecausetheywouldotherwisehavelost
theirsocialbasis.Asresearchhasshown,suchsocialconstraintsdonotonlyaffectethno-nationalistsbutallpoliticalactors:Insuchapoliticalenvironment,whichisdominatedbythesearchforprotectionofnationalrightsandinterests,moremoderatepartiesinsistthattheyhavetoadjusttotheprevailingmindsetofthevotersinordertoensuretheirownpoliticalsurvival(Kosti 2007:343).
Bothstrategytypes,operativeandconditional-structural,facethechallengeofhowtotransferinternationally-supportedstateinstitutionsintolocalhandswithoutjeopardisingtheattainmentsofstate-building.AsignificantdisputeamonginternationalactorsinBosniatodayconcernsthequestionofwhethertheHRshoulddefinitelyrefrainfromuseoftheBonnpowers.TheUShasstucktoaninterventionapproachcharacterisedbypowerfuloperativeinstruments,wishingtomaintainitsinfluenceonreformoutcomes.TheEU,by
comparison,hastendedtosupportactorswhoputmoreemphasisontheownershipofthepoliticalprocessitself,arguingthatonlyconditional-structuralstrategiescanensurethestrengtheningoflocalstatecapacityandlegitimacy.
Asthesubsequentanalysisofthesuccessesandfailuresofstate-buildinginBosniawillshow,bothinternationalstrategiesareflawedwhenitcomestothequestionoftransferringcontrolofthestateintolocalhands.Institutionsbuiltbyoperativestrategiestendtolacklegitimacybecausetheyhavenotemergedorganicallythroughagenuinepoliticalprocess,resultinginaPotemkinstate.Conditional-structuralstrategies,bycontrast,leavemoreroomforlocalinitiativeandacceptance,buttheoutcomeofreformsusuallydiffersfromtheoneenvisagedbecausereformsimplementedbylocalactorstendtobetwistedtosuittheirownpurposes,andnewformsofruleusuallymeldwitholderformsintohybridstructures.
Theoutcomemightnotbeastatethatishollow,yetitwillprobablydifferfairlysignificantlyfromthewesternmodelsunderlyingstate-building(BliesemanndeGuevara2008a,Ottaway2002).
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Internationalstate-buildinginBosnia
Internationalstate-buildingisbasedonthepremisethatastate,understoodasasetofinstitutionsandfunctionsaccordingtowesternmodelsandnorms,canbebuiltandstrengthenedviacomprehensiveinstitutionalengineeringbyexternalactors.Intheory,
thesestatesarethenabletoimplementandenforceinternationalnormsinordertocontributetothesecurityandwelfareoftheirpopulations(Bickerton2007,Ottaway2002).LookingatthecaseofBosnia,however,thequestionarisesofwhetherexportingthewesternstatemodelisthebestwaytostrengthenstatecapacityandresponsibility.
ThepeaceprocessinBosniaseemsstuckbetweenaviolent,conflictivepastandanenvisionedstateofsecurity,politicalstabilityandsocio-economicwelfarewhichhasyettobereached.WhetherBosniasglassishalffullorhalfemptydependsverymuchonthebeholderspointofview.Foradvocatesofthestate-buildingapproach,theBosnianexampleshowsthatinternationalinterventionsarecapableofendingviolenceandrebuildingstatesbasedonmoderninstitutionsandnorms;inthisview,Bosniajustneedsmoretime,internationalcommitmentandpossiblyEUaccessionprospectstoconsolidateitsstate.22
Critics,ontheotherhand,arguethatthemainaimsofstate-buildinginBosniatheconsolidationofstateinstitutions,someformofnation-buildingamongthethreeethno-nationalgroups,andeconomicdevelopmentthathaspositiveeffectsonindividualshavestillnotbeenachieveddespitetheextensiveintervention.
Thesemixedfindingshintatacentraltensioninthestate-buildingprocessinBosnia:state-strengtheningandstate-weakeningdynamicscoexist,23 creatingsomeinstitutionalisationsuccessesbutatthesametimeleavingthestateunconsolidatedanditsfutureunclear.State-weakeningdynamicsarenotpredominantlyrootedinlocalunwillingnesstocooperate,assomemightsuggest,butratherinthestructurallimitstotheinterventionitself,aswillbediscussedinthefollowingsections.
State-strengtheningdynamicsPoliticalexpropriationofstateantagonists
Theweakeningoftheethno-nationalistelites(whoatfirstmaintainedparallelprojectsofrule)bytheinterveningagencies,especiallytheOHR,wasthemostimportantpreconditionforfurtherprocessesofstrengtheningthecentralstateinBosnia.Thedismantlingofillegalfinancingchannels,thereduction,reformandcontroloflocalmilitaryandpoliceforces,aswellasstructuralreformsofpublicadministrationandjudiciarywerekeystrategiesdesignedtocurtailtheabilityofethno-nationalistelitestomaintainparallelpowerstructures,topoliticisestateagencies,andtoaccommodateclientsthroughredistributionofmoneyandposts.Theinternationalagenciespolitical,economicandmilitarypowersgavethemparticularstrengthtotargettheethno-nationalistantagonists.
Thepoliticalexpropriationofstateantagonistswasanecessarypreconditionforstateconsolidationandpavedthewayforthelaterinstitutionalisationofcorefunctionsatthecentral-statelevel.Yet,asthisdependedonthepowersoftheinternationalactors,itwasnotsufficientandledneithertoanautomaticstrengtheningofcentral-statepowerandcapacitynortotheestablishmentofsupremacyofthecentralstateoveritsconstituentparts.
22.SeeforexampleParis2004.Thetimeargumentcanoftenbereadinpolicyrecommendationsandis
convincingatfirstsightbecausestructuralreformstendtoneedgenerationstotakehold.However,from
thestructuralperspectiveontheeffectsofstate-buildingpresentedhere,therearenotmanyhintsthata
prolongationofinternationalcommitmentwouldchangethemaindilemmasofstate-buildingoutlined
below.
23.Practicesarestate-strengthening whentheyareconsistentwiththeidealofamodernstateinthattheyfavourtheinstitutionalisationofpowerandpromotetheexpansionofstaterule.State-weakening
practiceshinderstateinstitutionalisationandlegitimacyandfavourbehaviourthatescapes,resistsor
bendstherulesofthestate(MigdalandSchlichte2005).
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Institution-building
Theestablishmentofinstitutionsandfunctionsatthecentral-statelevelwasakeysuccessoftheinstitutionalisationapproachadoptedbytheinternationalactorsin19992000.Theestablishmentofnewcentral-stateinstitutionsandagenciesliketheIndirectTaxation
Authority(ITA),theStateBorderService(SBS),theStateInvestigationandProtectionAgency(SIPA),theArmedForcesofBosniaandHerzegovina(AFBiH),theHighJudicialandProsecutorialCouncil(HJPC)andtheCivilServiceAgency(CSA)testifiestotheeffectivenessofthestate-buildingapproachinbuildingformalstatestructures.
ThenewstateinstitutionswerepartlytheresultofreformprocessesinitiatedbytheOHRandotherinterventionagenciesandpartlyconnectedwiththeexigenciesoftheEUsStabilisationandAssociationProcess(SAP).Thisprocessofmember-statebuildingprovidedstrongimpetusesforinstitutionalisationandmodernisation,forexamplethroughtheEuropeanCommissionsfeasibilitystudyforBosniawhichlistedtheareasinneedofreformifBosniawantedtojointheSAP(EC2003)andthroughseveralsectorreportspreparedbytheECDelegationtoBosnia(2004,2005a,2005b).Allinall,theinternationalinstitution-
buildingeffortsbroughttheformandfunctionsoftheBosnianstateinlinewithinternationalisednorms.
Alessacknowledgedmechanismthatalsoledtothetransferoffunctionstothecentral-statelevelwaswhatcouldbetermedlocalproblem-orientedstate-building,orformsofvoluntarytransferofresponsibilitiesfromthesub-statetothestatelevelinordertosolvecommonproblems.Thisismostlyfoundinareasoflowprestigeandoutsidethemainfocusofinternationalintervention,likethevoluntarycentralisationoffunctionsinthehealthsector.Suchlocalstate-buildingeffortstendtobeoverlookedduetotheoverwhelmingimportanceoftheinternationalisedreformprocesses,buttheyhavecontributedtostate-strengtheningdynamicsinBosnia.
Staterationalisationandmodernisation
AthirdfactorcontributingtothestrengtheningofthestateinBosniawastheestablishmentofmanyinternationalreformprogrammesaimedatthecreation,modernisationandrationalisationofstateagenciesfromthecommunitytothecentral-statelevel.Thesereformprogrammes,whichincludedthecomputerisationoftaxprocessing,personneltrainingandproceduralreformsinthepolice,judiciaryandpublicadministration,ledtoincreasesintheefficiencyofstateservices.24 Theyalsocontributedtoloweringthehighlevelsofcorruption,patronageandprivateappropriationofstateresourcesthathadcharacterisedthefirstyearsofpost-conflictpeace-building.
AmongyoungerBosniancivilservants,theseeffortsalsoseemtohaveresultedinaformofmentalstate-building.Thenormativestrategiesofinterventionforexampletheinclusion
oflocalexpertsintheprocessofPovertyReductionStrategyPaper(PRSP)formulationorthemanyformsofpersonneltrainingandadvicehavehadeffectsontheformationofamodernbureaucraticculture.However,enduringcorruptionandstatepoliticisationindicatethatthequestionofwhethertherationalisedworkingroutinesandnewly-erectedcontrolagencieswillfunctionwithoutinternationalsupportandmonitoringandwhethertheycaninfiltratethegeneralbehaviourofBosnianstateagentsremainsunanswered.
State-weakeningdynamics
Structuralandpower-relateddeterminantsofstateformation
Amainproblemofthestate-buildingapproachoutlinedaboveisitstechnocraticnatureanditsneglectofthehistorical,politicalandsocialprocessesthatnecessarilybenditscourseand
influenceitsoutcome.Post-conflictstate-buildingdoesnottakeplaceinavacuumbuthas
24.Intheareaoftaxadministration,forexample,seeRozneretal (2005).
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tobuildonthesocial,politicalandeconomicstructuresinplace.Forexample,internationalstate-buildingeffortshavehadtocontendwithBosniasdependencyoninternationalisedrevenuesourcestofinanceitsrule,andwiththeworkingroutinesbasedonpersonalrelationshipsinsteadofimpersonalproceduresthatcharacteriseBosnianstatebureaucracy
bothofwhicharestructuralinheritancesfromitsYugoslavpast.Structuralpathdependenciesarenotpredeterminedorunchangeable,buttheytendtobequitepersistentandtoendureinhybridmixtureswithnewstructuresimposedfromoutside.
Internationalstate-buildingprojectsarealsoinfluencedbythereactionsoflocalactorswithspecificinterestsandrepertoiresforaction.TheBosnianstate,justasanyother,isadynamicfieldofpowerinwhichmultiplestateandnon-stateactorsfromtheinternationaltothelocallevelstruggletohavetheirrules,whetherstatelaworsomeotherimplicitcode,becometheroutinebasisuponwhichpeopleact(MigdalandSchlichte2005:15).AlthoughtheBosniakwishtostrengthenthecentralstatehasoftenconvergedwithinternationalobjectives,thispositionhasbeenasorientedtowardspowerandgroup-specificinterestsastheoftenresistingpositionsofBosnianCroatsandSerbs.Bosniakpoliticianssupporttheideaofa
Bosnianstatebecause,asthebiggestpopulationgroup,theyhopeforgreaterpoliticalinfluenceinamorecentralisedstate.
ThecongruencybetweenBosniakandinternationalobjectivesenabledtheformertotakeadvantageoftheinternationalpowersinordertofurthertheirinterestsandpowerpositionswithrespecttoothergroups.ThisisoneofthemainreasonswhytheBosnianSerbsarescepticalaboutfurtherstatecentralisationandcriticiseinternationalpartiality.AlthoughatfirstglanceitappearsthattheBosniakstacticalstate-buildingiscontributingtotheinstitutionalisationprocessinBosnia,thedownsideisthatithashinderedthelegitimacyofnewstateinstitutionsamonglargepartsofthenon-Bosniakpopulation.TheapproachestakenbyinternationalactorsinBosniahaveprovedunsuccessfulinresolvingthesestructuralandpowerdilemmasofstate-building.
Theresourcedilemma
Thereductionofresourcescentraltotheprocessofpoliticalexpropriationofstateantagonistsalsohadstronglynegativeeffectsoncentral-stateinstitutions.After1999,internationalaidtoBosniafelldrastically.In1999officialdevelopmentaid(ODA)stillamountedtooverUS$1billion;by2000ithadshrunktoaround$737millionandtoonly$565millionin2002.Thesumofinternationalgrantsandloans,includingexternally-financedstateinvestmentprojects,hadstoodatnearly27percentofBosniastotalstateincomein1998butdecreasedsteadilytoaround10percentin2005(OECD.stat,DatasetDAC2aandIMF2003,2005,2006).
DecliningODAandstrictbudgetconstraintshaveleftthecentralstatewithlittlefinancialleewaytoinitiatepoliticalprogrammesofitsown.Furthermore,theIFIshaveconstrictedthestatesfinancial,economicandfiscalpolicies.AlthoughtheaimoftheIFIsneoliberalpoliticsistoimpedecorruption,budgetaryrestrictionshavedeprivedthestateoftheresourcesnecessarytoaddresssocietalproblemsanddemands,andtogeneratebasiclegitimacythroughmaterialredistributionandthecreationofindividualeconomicopportunities.Theneoliberaladjustmentofstateinstitutionsandtheoftentechnocraticformsofeconomicinterventionhavealsohinderedlocalinitiatives.LackofmoneyandtheneedtoeconomisehavethereforelimitedtheBosnianstatescapacityandlegitimacy.25
Localinformalpractices
Localactors,caughtbetweeninternationalreformdemandsandresourceconstraintsontheonehand,andtheirsocio-historicalembeddednessinlocalcontextsontheother,have
resortedtoinformalinstitutionsandpracticestocopewiththesituation.Whilethehigh
25.FormoredetailseeBliesemanndeGuevara(2008b).
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levelsofprivateappropriationofstateresourcesthatdominatedthefirstphaseofpeace-buildinginBosniaweresuccessfullycurtailedbyinternationalactors,otherformsofinformalstatestructuresaremoreenduring,Persistingformstodayconsistmainlyofpettycorruptionlikethepolicesillegalroadchargesystemsandpracticesofbriberyinthestatebureaucracy.
Thecircumventionofthestateinthiswayhasparticularlycometotheforeintheeconomicsphere,wherethestatesystemoftaxationandredistributionissystematicallyunderminedbyactivitiesintheinformalsector(seeBliesemanndeGuevara2008b).
Internationalisedfaade,unconsolidatedcontent
Soitappearsthatstate-strengtheningdynamicsespeciallytheestablishmentofnewcentral-stateagenciesandthemodernisationandrationalisationofexistinginstitutionshaveledtostructureswhich,atleastformally,areverysimilartomodernwesternstates.However,atthesametimestate-weakeningeffectsofstate-buildingaremakingthemselvesfelt,creatingformalstateinstitutionsthatlackthecapacitiesandlegitimacycharacteristicofaconsolidatedmodernstate.Themaintenanceofthestatestilldependsinmanywaysoninternationalsupport,andtherearefewsignsoftherebeinganysustainableconsolidationof
statecapacityandlegitimacy.Understandingthesehurdlesiscrucialtounderstandingthelimitsofinternationalstate-building.
Internationalisation
State-buildinginBosniahasledtoanextensiveinternationalisationofthestatethatis,adeepembeddednessintoanddependenceoninternationalstructuresandactorswhichpersiststoday,eventhoughtherehasbeenachangeintheformofinternationalisationoverthecourseofintervention.
Intheareaofstaterevenuesandnationaleconomy,thischangecanbedetected,firstly,inthereducedamountofODAflowingintoBosnia,andsecondly,inalteredinterventioninstruments.InthecontextoftheIFIsgeneralstrategyshiftawayfromtheorthodox
neoliberalWashingtonConsensus,andrelyingonthenewcentral-stateinstitutions,theinternationalagenciesnowresortmoretoinstrumentsbasedonlocalparticipationandahigherdegreeofownership,suchastheWorldBanksPovertyReductionStrategyPapers.However,thewayinwhichtheBosnianstateisinternationalisedhasremainedlargelyunchanged.Bosniaisstilldependentoninternationalcreditandloanstofinancebudgetdeficits,foreigndebtsandpublicinvestmentprojects.Furthermore,theunderlyingneoliberalideologywithitsemphasisonbudgetarydisciplineandsustainabilityhasremainedlargelyinplace.Despitemoreparticipatoryformsofeconomicstrategyformulation,IMFandtheWorldBankstillhavethefinalsayoneconomic,fiscalandfinancialpolicyissues,andthereislittleroomfornationalpolicyinitiativesintheeconomicsector.
Inthesecuritysector,theevidenceregardingstateinternationalisationisambiguous.For
instance,thepolicehaveremainedrelativelyresistanttointernationalinfluences.ThankstointernationalreformprojectsbyIPTFandEUPM,therehasbeenanadaptationofworkingroutinestointernationalpolicingstandards.Thecreationofnewcentral-stateinstitutionssuchastheStateBorderServiceandtheStateInvestigationandProtectionAgency,whicharecompatiblewithinternationalstructures,canalsobeseenasformsofinternationalisationofthepoliceinBosnia.However,localinterestsandresistancehavelimitedreformsofthecorepoliceapparatusesintheentitiesandcantons.Theinternationalactorshavebeenunabletoenforcethemodel,envisionedbytheHR,ofcentralisedpoliceforceswithentity-crossingoperationaldistricts.
Themilitarysector,bycontrast,isalmostcompletelyinternationalised.Theformofthemilitaryapparatusitsoperationalorganisation,equipment,trainingandsoonhasbeen
adaptedtoNATOstandardsinthecourseoftheaccessionprocesstothePartnershipforPeaceprogramme.Theroleofthemilitarywithinthestatehasalsobeeninternationalised:ithaschangedfromthatofanethno-nationaldefendertothatofapost-modern,multilateral
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peacebuilder.Internationalandlocalactorsalikepromotethisnewrole,theformerbecausetheyhopeforpositiveeffectsfromthecommonparticipationofsoldiersfromallthreeethno-nationalgroupsininternationalinterventions,thelatterbecausetheywanttoshowthatBosniaisreadyforequalandresponsiblemembershipintheinternationalcommunityof
sovereignstates.Thethirdformofinternationalisationinthemilitarysectoristheoutsourcingofitssecurityanddefencefunctiontointernationaltroops.Althoughlessthanonequarterofthepopulationfearsanotheroutbreakofwariftheinternationalsecurityforceswithdraw(EarlyWarningSystem2007),mostlocalactorsstilldonotseethestateasacentralguarantorofsecurityinthecountry,preferringtorelyontheinternationalcivilandmilitaryagenciesinthisrespect.
Intheareaoflaw,theinternationalisationoftheBosnianstatecanbedetected,firstly,inthefunctionoflawproduction.AccordingtotheDaytonPeaceAgreement,theEuropeanHumanRightsConventionisdirectlyapplicabletoBosniaandhaspriorityoverallotherlaws.Additionally,Bosniahassigneduptootherinternationalhumanrightstreaties,makingthe
stateformallyaccountabletothehigheststandardsofinternationallyrecogniseduniversalrights.Furthermore,theinternationalagenciesinBosniahaveinfluencedthelaw-makingprocessbydraftingoradvisingonthecreationofnewlaws.Inthefirstphaseofintervention,theOHRwasthemostimportantlocusofsuchactivities;latertheEUanditsCopenhagencriteriacametobeastrongincentiveforlawproduction,leadingtoahighdegreeofinternationalisationofthelaw-makingprocess.
Secondly,thefunctionoflawimplementationandenforcementhasbeeninternationalised.ThisisnotonlythecaseinareassuchasinternationalcriminallawwheretheindictmentofwarcriminalsbytheInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslavia(ICTY)inTheHagueisavisibleformofinternationalinterference.Thedeploymentofjudges,prosecutorsandjudicialexpertstoBosniascourtshasalsoensuredanatleastpartialinfluenceof
internationalactorsandnormsonthefunctioningofthejudicialsystem.Leewayforlocalinterpretationsandroomformanoeuvreremainlimited.
Fromaninternationalstatebuildersperspective,theinternationalisationoftheBosnianstateisapositivething,aslongasitleadstotheestablishmentofstateinstitutionswhosecapacityandlegitimacycontributetoaconsolidationofthestateasanintermediarybetweentheinternationallevelandthelocalsociety,abletoproceedandimplementinternationallyproducednormsandvalues.ButtheinternationalisedBosnianstatescapacityandlegitimacyhaveremainedhighlyprecarious,callingintoquestionthesebasicpremisesofstate-building.
Limitedstatecapacity
Statecapacitymeansbeingabletosetandenforcebindingrules.Theidealforamodern
stateistohavesupremacyover,andautonomyfrom,allgroupsofsociety,withanall-encompassingregulatorycapacityandnoparticulargroupsareabletoeludestateregulations.Acorepreconditionforstatecapacityisresourcesrevenues,aboveall,butalsotrainedpersonnelandfunctioningworkingroutines.
StatecapacityinBosniahasremainedlimitedbyactorsatboththeinternationalandthelocallevels.Inareasinwhichthestateishighlyinternationalisedandhastosubmittotherulesoftheinterventionagencies,thestateisdecoupledfromthelocalpoliticalprocess.Thisisespeciallyvisibleintheshiftofthestatesreferenceofaccountabilityfromthesocietaltotheinternationallevel.TheconsentandcontrolofpublicbudgetsbytheIFIsonthepremiseofeconomicneoliberalism,theinternationalisationoftheformandfunctionsofthemilitaryanditsdefinedroleaspost-modernpeacebuilder,andthepriorityofinternationalover
nationallawsandcustomsareexamplesofthisdynamic.Theseinternationallydeterminedrulesdonotleavemuchleewayforalternativenationalpolitics.
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Inareasthatarelessinternationalised,bycontrast,thereareindicationsofstaterulebecominglessformalisedandofthestate-buildingprojectbecomingderailedinthecourseofconflicts,negotiationsandcompromisesbetweenthediverseinternationalandnationalactors.Thecircumventionofrigidbudgetaryreformsviainformalfinancingpractices,political
actorsinformalstrategiestokeeptheircontroloverthepolice,aswellasthenumerouspracticesbystateagentstointerprettheofteninternationally-dictatedrulesandcategoriesofadministrationintheirfavouraresomeexamplesofthetendenciesofstateinformalisation.26 Theeffectoftheseinformalpracticesisthatthestatesautonomyfrompoliticalandsocialinfluenceshasremainedlimitedandtheinternationallysupportedstatefaadehasnotbeenbackedupwiththelegal-rationalformsofrulethataretheprimarysourceoflegitimacyinamodernstate.
Thelimitsofstateautonomywithregardtopowerfulelitesaremostvisibleregardingthepoliceatthelevelofentitiesandcantons.Despitevisibleadvancementsinpoliceperformanceandalthoughtheyarenolongerasethnicisedasduringthewar,thepolicearestillpoliticisedandtendtoservepoliticalleadersratherthancitizens,providingpowerful
politicalandeconomicactorswiththeleewaytocircumventthelaw.Thisalsohasimplicationsforthejudicialsystem.Althoughrelativelyautonomousfrompoliticalandsocialinfluencestoday,thejudiciarysabilitytotakeactionagainstpowerfulpoliticalandeconomicactorsremainslimitedbythelattersinfluenceonpoliceandpublicprosecution.
Itisnotonlypowerfuleliteswholimitthestatesautonomy.Thereisamutualdependencybetweenassociationsofwarveterans,invalidsandfamiliesoffallensoldiersontheonehand,andpoliticalpartiesontheother,thatwasestablishedduringthewartoensuretheinternalcoherenceofthewarparties.Thismutualdependencyisthereasonwhybigpartsofthestatessocialexpendituresflowtowardstheseclientswho,duetotheirnumericalstrengthandmoralweight,areabletoexertinfluenceonpoliticalelites.Althoughthesekindsofnetworkshavebeenweakened,theproblemisthattherearefewalternativestofill
thevoidthisleaves.27
Aslongasthesocio-economicsituationinBosniaremainsprecarious,anysocialreformsmightdestabilisethenascentandstillpoliticallyandsociallycontestedstate.Policiescushioningthemid-termnegativeeffectsofnecessarystructuralreformsinthesocialsector,suchastheprovisionofworktounemployedwarveteransbylocalcommunitiesinordertocushioncut-backsinwelfaretransfers,arefeasiblebutcostlyandwoulddependontheconsentoftheinternationalactorsinBosnia.Unsurprisingly,theIFIscoreprioritiesuntilnowhavebeen:economicgrowth,realisedbyrelyingalmostentirelyoncreatingastablebusinessenvironment,andstrictdisciplineoverthepublicbudgetastrategythathasprovedtobeinsufficientasameansofexpandingthelabourmarket(Pugh2007);thereductionofpoverty(UNDPBosnia2007);andstrengtheningofthewelfaresystem.
Localpolicyinitiativessuchas(limited)protectionismorstateemploymentintheindustrialandagriculturalsector(seePugh2008)havebeensystematicallyblocked.Forexample,anattemptbyBosnianactorstoincludeaninterimtariffprotectionforagriculturalgoodsinthePovertyReductionStrategyPaperinordertostrengthentheprecariousagriculturalsectorwhichisanimportantpartoftheBosnianlabourmarketwasblockedbytheIFIs.Likewise,Bosnianparliamentariansconcernsthattheintroductionofasingle-ratevalue-addedtaxwouldadverselyaffectthepoorweredismissedbytheinternationalactors(BliesemanndeGuevara2008b).ThisdeepinternationalisationoftheeconomicspherehasstronglylimitedtheBosnianstatesroomformanoeuvre.
26.Onthepowergamesevolvingaroundbureaucraticcategorisations,seeVetters2007.
27.Ontheroleofwarveterans,seeBojii-Delilovi (2006),Bougarel(2007),Grandits(2007),Gregson
(2000).
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Lackofstatelegitimacy
Aseconddimensionofthemodernstateisitssocialembeddednessandlegitimacy.Functionally,statesgenerateacertaindegreeoflegitimacybyprovidingbasicformsofsecurityandwelfare.Beyondthat,themodernstateisideallycharacterisedbyaservice-
oriented,impersonalbureaucracyandastrongandimpartiallegalsystem.Fromthislegal-rationalfunctioningitcanthenderivefurtherlegitimacy.Indeed,onlyifpeopleacceptandmakeuseofstateinstitutionscantheinstitutionalisationofstaterulebeenduring.
Intheinternationalisedsecuritysector,thecontainmentofethnicviolencehasbeenconducivetoacertainbasiclegitimacyofthestateregardlessofthequestionofwhethernationalorinternationalactorsprovidefortheenforcementofthemonopolyofviolence.Beyondthisverybasiclevelhowever,itisdifficulttojudgetheextenttowhichthereformedandpartlycentralisedapparatusesofthemilitaryandpoliceareseenaslegitimatebyBosniancitizensandthesecurityforcesthemselves.Enduringethno-nationaldifferenceswithinthecentralisedArmedForces(AFBiH)aswellasthelastingpoliticisationandpettycorruptionofthepolicegivereasontosupposethattheconsolidationprocessofthesecurity
apparatusesofBosniahasnotyetbeencompleted.Thecurrentchancesoftheeconomicsectorservingasapossiblesourceoflegitimacyforthestatearenothigh.Forthemajorityofthepopulation,internationalstate-buildinghasnotresultedintheirpersonaleconomicsituationsimproving,andsocio-economicprospectsremainlimited.Atthesametime,therehavebeencutbacksinthewelfaresectorwhich,despiteitsdeficienciesandinequalities,hadatleastservedasamomentarycushionagainstdistress.TheIFIshaveespeciallycriticisedtransferstodisabledwarveterans,whichin2004amountedto66percentoftotalwelfarespending(althoughsinglepaymentsweresmallandoftenirregular),therebyconstrainingthebudgetsofsocialprogrammesforotherneedybutlesspoliticallyimportantgroupssuchaschildrenandtheelderly(UNDPBosnia2007,WorldBank2002).
Asoutlinedabove,Bosniaseconomic,financialandfiscalpolicieshavebeendeterminedbyinternationalactors,theneoliberalinterventionsfiscalfocushasbeenonadjustmentsandausterity,andthemodusofreformshasoftenbeentechnocraticanddecoupledfromlocalconcernsandinitiatives.ThishasleftthestateofBosniawithlittleleewayfornegotiationprocesseswithlocalinterestgroups,fortheconsiderationofsocietysdemandsorthedevelopmentofalternativeeconomicstrategies,contributingtotheimpressionofapowerlessstateanddecreasingthelegitimacythatflowsfromastatesgoodeconomicperformance.
Regardingthelegal-rationalfunctionofthestate,itappearsthattherearestructurallimitstostate-building.Firstly,theconsolidationofamodernpublicadministrationhasremainedincomplete.Despitetheall-encompassinginternationalreformproject,personalrelationshipsarestillveryimportanttoeverydaybureaucraticpracticeshavinginfluentialconnectionsremainsthemostimportantcriterionintheinteractionbetweencitizensandthestate.Theenduranceofpersonalrelationsindicatesthefailureofattemptstoseparatethepublicandprivatespheres.Thereasonsforthisarestructuralratherthanpersonal:thelegal-rationalformsofstate-societyinteractiondonotresonatewithallstateofficialsyet,notleastbecauselowpaymentsencouragecorruptionandrecruitmentquotasputethnicityovermerit.Thenegativedailyencountersthatcitizenshavewithcorruptorinefficientstateofficials,ontheotherhand,fostertheirimpressionthatpersonalconnectionsremainthebestwayofensuringthattheirdemandstothestateareprocessedintheirfavour.28
State-societyrelationsinBosniaarealsocharacterisedbythelastingsignificanceofthethreeethno-nationalcollectives.Thishaspersistedinpost-wartimesandhasbeenfurther
28.OncorruptioninBosniaseeDivjakandPugh(2008),TransparencyInternational(2004),Transparency
InternationalBosnia(2004).
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institutionalisedbytheinternationalactorswhohavebasedtheDaytonpower-sharingsystemandmanyoftheirlaterreformsonthefundamentalideaofthreeseparatepopulationgroups.Throughtheinternationally-backedconstitutionalcourtsdecisiononthethreeconstituentpeoplesofBosnia,ethno-nationalquotasbecamethegeneralprincipleofstate
organisation(Bieber2004,InternationalCrisisGroup2002).ThebackgroundtothisistheinternationalactorswishtorestoreamultiethnicsocietybutitignoresthefactthateveninYugoslavtimesBosniasallegedmulticulturalismcameclosertoapluralmono-culturalism(Sen2006)thatwaslargelylimitedtoaneighbourlycoexistence,givingwaytoamodern,individualisedidealofnationalcitizenshiponlyinthesmallurbanmiddleclassandsmallpartsoftheworkingclass(Bougarel1996,2003).
Giventheinstitutionalisationofethnicdivisionsthroughtheprocessofstate-building,itislikelythatcollectiveorganisationwillcontinuetostandinthewayofanindividualisationofsocietyasthebasisforlegal-rationalstaterule.Attemptsbyinternationalactorstocontributetoanintegrationofthethreeethno-nationalcollectivesthroughsymbolicpoliticsthrough,forexample,thecreationofBosniasstatesymbolssuchastheBosniannational
flagandanthemhavenotsucceededinovercomingtheethno-nationaldifferences(Kostic2007).Ina2005survey,only9.8percentoftheBosnianCroatsand2.5oftheBosnianSerbssaidtheywereproudofBosniasnationalsymbols,comparedwith79.2percentoftheBosniaks(ibid).Thesefindingsconfirmtheimpressionthatnation-buildingthecreationofaffectivebondsbetweenstateandpopulationcannotbeinitiatedbyexternalactorsbutmustcomefromwithin.
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Afteradecadeofstate-buildinginBosnia,itishightimeweassessedtheadvantagesandlimitationsofthisinternationalapproach.Theanalysispresentedherepointstothe
importantstructurallimitstostate-buildingthatshouldbetakenintoaccountinfutureforeignpolicyformulationandtothegenerallessonsthatcanbelearnedfromthecaseofstate-buildinginBosnia.
Firstly,thetransferofnewinstitutionsbuiltupbytheinterveningagenciesintolocalhandsexposesthemaindilemmaofinternationalstate-building,regardlessofthestrategyapplied.Manyoftheoperativestrategiesareveryeffectiveandexercisegoodcontrolofreformsbuttheyalsoimpedelocalownership,hinderingthedevelopmentofstatecapacityandlegitimacy.Meanwhile,conditionalstrategiesaredesignedtofacilitatelocalinitiativeandcapacityandtogeneratelegitimacybylettinglocalactorstakethefinaldecisionsbutwheretheyinvolveconditionalitiesthatarestrongandinflexible,theireffectsonstatecapacityandlegitimacytendtobejustlikethoseofoperativestrategies.Theymayevenhelpwestern
statebuilderstoevaderesponsibilityfortheoutcomeoftheirinterventions(e.g.Chandler2006).Whereconditionalitiesareweak,bycontrast,localactorscandecidetoignorethem,whichmeansthatlegitimacymightbehighbutstatestructureswilldivergefrominternationalmodels.Inanycase,theresultsofstate-buildingwillfallshortofnormativeexpectationswhichshouldthereforebeadjustedtothestructurallylimitedpossibilitiesofstate-building.
Thiscouldbeachievedthroughaparadigmshiftinwesternpeace-buildingpoliciesawayfromtheconcentrationonmeans(thatis,institution-buildingandliberalisationaccordingtowesternmodels)towardsafocusonends:theglobalprovisionofsecurityandeconomicwelfare.Fromthisperspective,theremightbeseveralwaystoreachthesameeffectapossibilitythathasbeenexcludedfromthestate-buildingdiscoursesofar(seePughetal
2008).Ascriticalstudiesonwar-torncountriessuggest,forexample,non-stateactorsprovisionsofsecurityandeconomicwelfaremightinsomecasesorareasbebettersuitedtomeetthesocio-economicneedsofthepeoplethaninternationally-dictatedstatestrategies.Insuchsituations,insistingontheestablishmentofcentralisedstatestructuresaccordingtothewesternmodelimperilsexistingsocialarrangements,leadingtomoreuncertaintyandinsecurityandunderminingtheinterventionsaimofstabilisingthestate(seeKhn2009).Whilethehistoricalprocessofstate-formationintheWesthasledtoapacificationofsocietalrelationsonlyaftersocialhardshipswereinstitutionallyovercome,contingentmodernisationprocessesinothersocietiesmightwellopposetheideaofauniversalisationofthewesternstate.
Secondly,economicandfinancialinterventionstrategies,andtheireffectsonthesocio-
economicsituationofthecountryconcerned,arearguablyacruxofstate-building.Ontheonehand,theweakeningofpowerfulelitesbylimitingtheavailabilityoffinancialresourcescreatesthebasisforformalstateinstitutionalisation.Ontheotherhand,however,thestatespossibilitiesforbuildingupcapacityandautonomyarelimitedbyinternationally-definedbudgetconstraints.Yetheavilysubsidisingthecentralstatewouldnotofferawayoutofthisdilemmabecausethiswouldfostertheproblemsofrent-basedstaterule,ascaseslikeAfghanistansuggest.Thetax-orientedapproachtakeninBosniaisalsolimited:althoughtheinternationalinterventionhasbeenabletoerectcentral-statetaxagencies,theeconomicinterventionhasnotachievedasustainedstrengtheningofthestatesextractionanddistributioncapacity.TheBosnianstateistrappedinaviciouscircleoflimiteddomesticrevenuesources,acostlywelfaresysteminneedofreform,adisappointedpopulationandatightfinancialandpoliticalframeworklargelycontrolledbytheinternationalcommunity.
Therecentglobalfinancialcrisisandrecessionhaveclearlydemonstratedthatwar-tornsocietiesareespeciallyvulnerabletotheupsanddownsoftheworldeconomy.Althoughthe
Conclusions:somethoughtsonfutureforeignpolicyformulation
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Bosnianfinancesectorwasnotdeeplyaffectedbythecasinocollapseduetoitslimitedintegrationintotheglobalfinancialmarket,thetradeandservicesectorsexperiencedtheeffectsofrecessionintheformoffallingdemand.Remittancesformanyfamiliesafinanciallifelinearealsoexpectedtofall.RethinkingtheEUsvisaregimefortheSoutheast
Europeancountrieswouldbeagoodfirststepinaddressingthelatterpointtoincludeallcountriesintheregioninthemid-terminordertoavoidfurthereconomicdisparitiesandpoliticalanimositiesintheregion.
Theaimofareformedpeace-buildingpolitics,notleastfromanethicalangle,shouldbetosavepost-conflictsocietieswhosevulnerabilitytotheupsanddownsoftheworldmarketis,atleastpartially,aneffectoftheveryliberaleconomicstructuresdictatedbytheinterveningagenciesfromtherisksinherentintheglobaleconomy.Therefore,areformedpeace-buildingstrategywillhavetofocusnotonlyonconcreteinterventionstrategies,butalsoonstructuralconstraintstothedevelopmentandsecurityofpost-warsocietiesposedbythecontemporarystructuresandinstitutionsoftheworldeconomy.AsPughetalstate:
Aparadigmshiftwouldinvolveinterrogationofthewayinwhichthe
globalsystemexacerbatesthesubalternstatusofwar-tornsocieties(alreadyreinforcedbyovertviolence)andadvocateacommensurately
greaterfocusontheoutsideofthepost-conflictsociety,ontheneedfor
far-reachingtransformationofthestructuresandinstitutionsthat
determinewhatmightbetermedthelimitsofpotentialforhuman
securityinwar-tornsocietiesasawhole.(2008:395)
Thatmeanssubstitutingthepoliticsofliberalstate-buildingwithapoliticsofwelfare-state-building.
Therearenumerouspolicymeasuresthatmightpromotesuchawelfare-stateapproach.Howappropriatetheyareultimatelydependsonthespecificcase.Forexample,oneofthekeysto
breaktheviciouseconomiccircleinBosniadescribedabovecouldbemassivejobcreationthroughlong-termemploymentstrategiesbyanactivestate.Throughanexpansionoftheformallabourmarket,unemploymentandinformalsectoractivitiescouldbereduced,thetaxpayerbasisenhanced,andconsumptionandtherebyindirecttaxlevelslifted.Thatwouldresultinanexpansionofstatecapacity,andtheoutputefficiencywouldproducediffusesupportofthepoliticalsystemonthesideofthepopulationinthelongrun.
TheinternationalagenciesinBosnia,bycontrast,havemerelyfocusedonthecreationofafavourableprivatebusinessenvironment.Yetitisthecountrysoligarchythatwouldhavethemeanstoinvest,andtheyhavebecomeuninterestedintheproductionandinfrastructuresectors.Insuchasituation,moreactivestateinvolvementseemsnecessarytospureconomicdevelopmentandcreateworkingopportunities.Internationalpeace-buildingstrategies
shouldconsidernon-neoliberalmeasuressuchasinterimformsofprotectionismorthefosteringofstateenterprisesandcommunitypropertyaspossiblealternativestotheneoliberalapproach.Inwar-tornsocieties,suchpoliciespromisetobemoresuitablethantheIFIsneoliberalone-size-fits-allmodels.
Finally,policymakersshouldbeawarethatstate-buildingisfacedwith,andcauses,manyproblemswithoutsolutions.Understandingthesestructuraldilemmasisthebasisonwhichtoconsciouslydecidewhichofseveralsub-optimalpoliticalalternativestochooseunderwhichpremises,andwhatconsequencestobear.Takingthelessonsofstate-buildinginBosniaseriouslydoesnotmeandisengagementfromzonesofcrisis.Itmeansrealisticallyrethinkingtheunachievablenormativeaimsofinternationalstate-buildingandsubstitutingthemwithpoliticalalternativesthatarelessself-referentialandmoregearedtothesecurity
andwelfareoflocalpopulations.Thiscouldmeanthatthestatesbeingbuiltdifferfromthewesternmodel;however,itmightbeworthdeliberatingonalternativelocalgovernancemodelsthatcouldprovetobemorelegitimateandeffectiveintheeyesoftheirsocieties.
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