state’s obligation to ensure safety in japan and mutual assistance as its supplement · 2018. 7....

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Journal of International Cooperation Studies, Vol.26, No.1（2018.7）

State’s Obligation to Ensure Safety in Japanand Mutual Assistance as Its Supplement

KANEKO Yuka*

１．Introduction

IthascometobequestionedhowmuchresponsibilitytheStatehasforensuring

thesafetyof itspeople. Japan’sBasicLawonDisasterCountermeasuresenacted in

1961setsforththeprotectionof“thenationalterritory,thelifeandlimbofthecitizens

andtheirproperty”initsobjectivesprovision（Art.1）,andforthispurposetheState

hastheresponsibilityto“useallofitsorganizationsandfunctions”to“takeallpossible

measures”（Art.3）.Theprefectures（Art.4）andthemunicipalities（Art.5）alsohave

thesameresponsibilities. It isanadministrativeresponsibilitycalledtheobligationto

ensuresafety（anzen kakuho gimu）.

However, the rangeof theobligation toensure safetyhasbeen limited in the

revisionoftheBasicLawonDisasterCountermeasuresimplementedin2013following

thelessonslearnedfromthe2011GreatEastJapanEarthquake.Anew“fundamental

principles”provision（Art. 2-2）wasestablished,whichprovideda framework for

minimizing damage based on Japan’s natural characteristics and socioeconomic

conditions suchaspopulationand industry（no. 1）,promotingdisasterprevention

activitiesconductedbyresidentsandvoluntarydisasterpreventionorganizations（no.

2）, integrateddisastercountermeasures（no.3）,prioritizingtheprotectionofhuman

lifeandlimb（no.4）,andprovidingappropriateassistancewhilegivingconsiderationto

not impedingself-helpeffortsmadebydisastervictims（no.5）.Theresponsibilitiesof

thenationalgovernment,prefecturesandmunicipalities（Art.3through5）werealso

revisedtoincludedetailedreferencestothese“fundamentalprinciples.”

Itcanbesaidthatanintentionofthisrevisionofthelawwastolimittherange

＊ Professor,KobeUniversityGraduateSchoolofInternationalCooperationStudiesandResearchCenterforUrbanSafetyandSecurity

2 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

of theobligation toensuresafety thathadbeenguidedby the interpretationof the

existingprovisions.Although the existing objectivesprovision（Art. 1）described

theprotectionof “thenational territory, the lifeand limbof thecitizensand their

property”astherangeoftheobligationtoensuresafety,thenewlyaddedfundamental

principles（Art.2-2）prioritizetheprotectionofhumanlifeandlimb（no.4）butthere

isnomentionof“property”.Further,theexistingprovisionsprovidedthatthenational

governmenthadtheresponsibilityto“useallofitsorganizationsandfunctions”to“take

allpossiblemeasures”（Art.3）,but the fundamentalprinciples（Art.2-2）emphasize

“disasterreduction”byminimizingdamagebasedonJapan’snaturalcharacteristicsand

socioeconomicconditionssuchaspopulationandindustry（no.3）,whichisnotaimedat

totaldisasterprevention.Emphasison“self-help”byresidentsand“mutualassistance”

throughvoluntarydisasterpreventionorganizations（no.2）, indicatesanapproachof

narrowingthetargetof“publicassistance”tothosewhoarevulnerablebasedonfactors

suchasage,genderanddisability（no.5）,avoidingamoralhazardthatimpedes“self-

help”.Further,itdoesemphasizetheintegrateddisastercountermeasures（no.3）,with

animplicationtotheideaof“multi-leveldisasterprevention”thatincludesnotonlyhard

countermeasuresbutalsosoftcountermeasures,aswasemphasized in therecovery

planaftertheGreatEastJapanEarthquake, linkedtotheapproachof limitingsafety

standardsinhardcountermeasuresbasedonbudgetconstraints.

ThroughthesechangesintheBasicLawonDisasterCountermeasures, itseems

that, first, theeffectof limiting thesafetystandards that theStateowes toachieve

hasarisen.Second, the invigorationof self-helpandmutual assistance,which is to

compensate for theregressionof theState’sobligation toensuresafety, is tobean

issue. In thispaper, the firsthalfwill confirmhowtheState’sobligation toensure

safetyhasbeenlimited（Section2）,andthe latterhalfwillretracethecircumstances

of thepost-disaster townrecoveryprocessesregardingthe institutional issuesaimed

towardsthecommunity-basedsafetymeasures tosupplement forsuchregressionby

theState（Section3）.Additionally, institutionaldesigns towardscommunity-based

safetymeasureswillbeexploredbasedontheobservationofproceduralflowof land

readjustmentprojectsintheareasaffectedbytheGreatEastJapanEarthquake（Section

4）.

3State’s Obligation to Ensure Safety in Japan and Mutual Assistance as Its Supplement

２．Regression of the State’s Obligation to Ensure Safety

（1）�Safety�Standards�as�an�Obligation�–�Compensation�Standards�for�Defects� in�the�

Establishment�and�Management�of�Public�Facilities

Thespecificationthat theprotectionof “lifeand limb” is thehighestpriorityof

theState’sobligationtoensuresafetyinthe2013revisionoftheBasicLawonDisaster

Countermeasures, or inotherwords, the limitationof theobligation toensure the

safetyof“property”,hasreceivedattention（Art.2-2,Para.4）.Certainly,theideathat

defendingcitizens’privatepropertyfromdisastersisanissueofself-helpandnotwithin

therangeofpublicassistancewhichthestateshouldspendtaxesonisexplainedfrom

aneo-liberalpointofview,butitisalsothoughtthatinawelfarestate,attheveryleast

theprotectionof theminimumstandardsof living, suchashousingandthebasisof

livelihoods,isamatterofstateresponsibilitytosecuretherighttolife（Art.25ofthe

Constitution）.iTheattitudethattheBasicLawonDisasterCountermeasureshasplaced

theprotectionof“property”behindthatof“lifeandlimb”shouldbeconsideredinthe

contextofdefiningthescopeof“publicassistance”basedontherighttolife.

However,regardingthestandardofsafetythattheStateshouldachieve,separate

fromaprogramprovisionthatislefttotheState’sdiscretioninthecontextoftheright

tolife,thereisalsothecontextoftheState’sliabilitytoprovidedamagecompensation

in timesofdisaster, as aminimumbasis of the safetymeasures that theState is

responsible forasanobligation.Forexample,even if theState is freetoplace limits

ontheamountof “publicassistance” itprovides in itsdiscretion, it is illegal toplace

a limitonthestate’s liabilitytoprovidedamagecompensation,which isa liability. It

ispossible toapproachbyplacingthestandard forStatedamagecompensationasa

minimumsafetystandard,andon topof thatamplifiedsafetystandardsbyadding

publicassistancebydiscretion.

Then,whatkindofstandardissuchminimumstandardfortheState’sobligation

toensuresafety?

In relation toStatedamagecompensation in timesofadisaster,Art. 2of the

StateRedressLawdefines the criterion aswhether therewas “a defect in the

placementoradministrationof a road, riverorotherpublic structure”.Thereare

various interpretationsof this “defect” inapublicstructure,andatendency is found

4 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

incourtprecedentstotreatman-madepublicstructuresandnaturalpublicstructures

separately.That is,withregard to theresponsibility toadministerroads,whichare

man-madepublicstructures, if there isanobjective “defect” thennegligencewillbe

presumedwithoutcloselyexaminingthe factorsofnegligence（i.e.breachofaduty

ofcarepremiseduponthe foreseeabilityandthepossibilityofavoidingtheoutcome）,

inotherwordsstrict liabilityhasbeenapplied（SupremeCourt judgmentdated29

August1970,concerninga landslideonroads inKochiprefecture,MinshuVol.24,No.

9,p.1268）.However,regardingrivermanagement,whichisanaturalpublicstructure,

thecourt’s stancehas requiredevidenceofnot just anobjective “defect”but also

subjectivenegligence（breachofdutyofcare）.Prominent judgments includeacase

thatexcludedtheStateliabilityduetoanLawofgod（NagoyaDistrictCourtjudgment

dated22October1962regardingtheIseBayTyphoon,Hanrei Jihou, Issue313,p.4）,

andthefamousDaitofloodcase,whichendorsedprovisionalsafetystandardsthatwere

acceptablebasedonsocialnorms inviewoffinancial, technicalandsocialconstraints

（SupremeCourtjudgmentdatedJanuary26,1984,MinshuVol.38,No.2,p.53）.Inthis

way,theevidentiaryhurdlefornegligenceinrelationtonaturalpublicstructuressuch

asriver levees ishigher,making ithardertoclaimdamagecompensationagainstthe

State.

AthesisbyIchiroKato（Kato1953）,leadingcivil lawscholar,providedatheory

that influencedthebinarystanceof treatingman-madepublicstructuresandnatural

publicstructuresseparately,makingtheevidentiaryrequirementsfor“defects”higher

inrelationtothelatter.Kato’spaperintroducedtheconceptof“plannedwaterlevels”

inrelation toriveradministration,andset forth theviewthat theState’s liability to

compensateextendedtothedamagecausedbythecollapseofleveesthatoccurredat

waterlevelsbelowtheplannedwaterlevel,butitdidnotextendtothedamagecaused

byflooding incircumstanceswhere leveesdidnotcollapse,nortothedamagewhere

leveescollapsedincircumstanceswherewaterlevelsexceededtheplannedwaterlevel.

Thisdisplaysthestanceofconsideringthe“defects”intheplacementoradministration

of natural public structures that arenotbaseduponobjective standards, but are

dependentuponsubjectiverequirements（breachofdutyofcare）thatarerequiredfor

theproofoftraditionalnegligence.It isassumedthat“plannedwater level”standards

arethebasisofjudgingsuchsubjectiverequirements.


（2）Unscientific�“Design�Tsunami”

Therefore,how“plannedwater levels”aredeterminedbecomesaproblem.The

termgivesan impression that feels as if it is objective,but its substance isquite

ambiguous.IntheSupremeCourtjudgmentintheaboveDaitofloodcase,itwasfound

thatprovisionalsafetystandardsthatwereacceptablebasedonsocialnormsinviewof

financial, technicalandsocialconstraintsweresufficient.Sincethenationalfinancesof

Japan’sgovernmentarecurrentlyattheworstlevelofdeficitintheworld,ifthereason

offinancialconstraintsisgiven,itbecomespossibleforthe“plannedwaterlevels”tobe

loweredtosuitthecircumstancesoftheadministration.Towhatextentthislowering

canbestoppedbasedonthe“socialnorms”ofthepeoplecontinuestobequestionedin

eachindividualcase,andultimatelyitislefttobesettledinthenextcourtjudgment.

IntherecoveryaftertheGreatEastJapanEarthquake,settingof“plannedwater

levels” todetermine suchprovisional safety levels is considered tobe called into

question.WhiletheLawonSpecialZonesforRecoveryinResponsetotheGreatEast

JapanEarthquakewasenactedattheendof2011tofacilitatepublicly-financedrecovery

projectssuchasthedevelopmentofseawalls,disasterpreventioncollectiverelocation

projectsand landreadjustmentprojects,envisionedas“recoveryadjustmentprojects”

asawhole, tsunamisimulationshad tobecarriedout repeatedly todetermine the

scopeofapplicationofsuchprojects.AccordingtotheMinistryofLand,Infrastructure,

TransportandTourism’s“Guidelines for Tsunami-Resistant Design of Seawalls（MLIT2013）,a

disasterpreventiongroupwasestablishedundertheportsandharbourssubcommittee

of the transportationpolicy council inMay2011, about amonth and ahalf after

theGreatEastJapanEarthquake,andaccording to itsreportof June2012,Forms of

Earthquake and Tsunami Countermeasures for Harbours,thestandardsofsafetyweredecided

accordingtotwolevelsoftsunamiwhichareassumedbasedonthescaleandfrequency

ofthetsunami.Namely,againsttheclassof“frequentlyoccurringtsunami,”thegoalof

safetywassetonthe“preventionofdisaster（bo-sai）”usingstructuresthatcanprotect

lifeandproperty,butagainsttheveryrarelyoccurring“maximumclasstsunami,”the

aimwas“mitigationofdisaster（gen-sai）“byprotectinghumanlifeattheminimum,yet

in thatcasealso “resilientconstruction”ofseawalls thatmightdeformbutcouldnot

collapsewereintended,whichestablishedanapproachofseekingtodelaythetimeit

wouldtakeforatsunamitoreachthehinterland.Thisguidelineintroducedtheconcept

6 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

of“designtsunami”thatformedthestandardsforthesafetydesignofseawalls,andthat

levelwassetasadesignexternalforcethatwastobedeterminedsomewherebetween

the“frequentlyoccurringtsunami”and“maximumclasstsunami”,whichseemedtobe

anapproachcorrespondingtothe“plannedwaterlevel”describedintheKato’sarticle

mentionedabove.

However, the basis for setting such “design tsunami” levels is extremely

ambiguous.Beforethat,theexpressions“frequentlyoccurringtsunami”and“maximum

classtsunami”thatarethepremiseofsuchsettingarealreadyambiguous.Regarding

themethodofdetermining“frequentlyoccurringtsunami”,basedonthereportMethods

of Determining Design Tsunami Water Levels issued jointlybytheMinistryofAgriculture,

ForestryandFisheriesandtheMinistryofLand,Infrastructure,TransportandTourism

onJuly8,2011, itwassaid that tsunamis that “occuronceeveryseveraldecades to

severalcenturies…canbeusedasareference”, taken fromsurveysof theheightof

marksleftbyprevioustsunamiandhistoricalrecordsandliterature,aswellastsunami

simulationdata（Guidelinep.6（1））.“Maximumclasstsunamis”weredeterminedfrom

asurveybasedonscientificknowledgesuchasanalysisofancientandotherhistorical

documents,investigationoftsunamisediments,andsurveysofcoastaltopography,with

thoseresults“organizedbroadlyandanalyzedfromtheviewpointofdisasterprevention

intheareassurroundingtherelevantport,withconsiderationgiventoallpossibilities”

（Guidelinep. 6（2））. “Design tsunamis”were thendecideddiscretionallybasedon

“frequentlyoccurring tsunami”heightsand“maximumclass tsunami”heights,which

weredetermined in thisambiguousmanner. Inotherwords, “design tsunami”were

generallydecidedatthelevelof“frequentlyoccurringtsunami”,butwhen“protecting

facilitiesofextremelyhighimportancesuchaspowerplants,orprotectingareaswith

ahighconcentrationofpeople,propertyandindustry” inthehinterland,heightswere

flexiblydecidedwithreferencetothe“maximumclasstsunami”height（Guidelinep.6

（2））.

The approach of classifying level 1 tsunami（Meiji SanrikuTsunami class）

and level2 tsunami（GreatEastJapanEarthquakeclass）andgenerallyusing level

1 tsunamias the “design tsunami” for safetystandards in therecoveryadjustment

projectsafter theGreatEast JapanEarthquakewasalreadyshown in thenational

government’s “BasicRecoveryPolicy” thatwas published in July 2011, andwas


finallysettledupon in the “Reportof theCommittee forTechnical Investigationon

CountermeasuresforEarthquakesandTsunamisBasedontheLessonsLearnedfrom

the2011PacificCoastofTohokuEarthquake”bytheCentralDisasterManagement

Councildated28September2011.Afterthat,thebasicrecoveryplansofeachaffected

municipalityfollowedthisnationalbasicpolicy.

However, although the “design tsunami”wasbasically supposed tocorrespond

to level1 tsunami（MeijiSanrikuTsunami）,timeandefforthasbeenspentonsmall

modifications.Thevicinityof siteswhereseawallsare tobeconstructedhavebeen

established as “disaster risk areas” as defined inArt. 39 of theLawonBuilding

Standards, involving thepermanent restrictionofuseof the land fordwellings（in

IwatePrefecture, designationbased onmunicipal ordinancewasdelayed, sowas

initially implementedas theadministrativeguidance）,andmanyofwhichhavebeen

subjecttopromotionofrelocationthroughthedisasterpreventioncollectiverelocation

projects.Regardingthereasonforestablishing“disasterriskareas”,itwasexplainedat

explanatorymeetings forresidentsthat ifa level2classtsunamioccurs, thetsunami

wouldpassover theseawallsandtherelevantareaswereexpectedtobesubject to

inundationexceeding2meters inheight.However, according toexpertswhowere

also involved in thepolicymaking, because the seawalls are intended for “design

tsunami”ofthelevel1tsunamiclass,andthereforeinalevel2tsunamieitheroverflow

willoccuranda tsunamipoolwill form inthehinterlandbehindtheseawallsor the

seawallswillcollapseandconcretepieceswilldamagethesurroundingarea,theareas

facingsuchriskshavebeen labelledas “disasterriskareas”or “relocationpromotion

area”subjecttorestrictionsonresidingandpromotionofrelocation.However,because

theestablishmentof large “disaster riskareas” or “relocationpromotionareas” in

commercialdistrictsordenselypopulatedareas isunrealisticorveryexpensive, it

seemsthattheoptionofrebuildingtheoriginallandthroughlandreadjustmentprojects

aftertheelevationofthelandhasbeenselected,andasaresult,atotalof3,600hectares

hasbeensubjecttolarge-scalelandreadjustmentprojects.

Ontheotherhand, inareaswheretheoppositionbyresidents isdeeplyrooted,

thereareareaswheretherehasbeensuccess in increasingthesafetystandardsby

raisingthe“designtsunami”heightof theseawalls tocloseto level2,orconversely,

byloweringthe“designtsunami”heighttobelowlevel1heightsandmakinganentire

8 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

communitysubjecttothe integratedcollectiverelocation（forexample, theAkahama

areaofOtsuchiTownandNebamaareaofKamaishicity）.

Inthisway,the“designtsunami”thatarethesafetystandardsintheconstruction

of seawalls,which became a pillar of the recovery after theGreatEast Japan

Earthquake, havebeen set at the level of theMeiji SanrikuTsunami thatwas a

“frequently occurring tsunami”, but thebasis for suchdesignation isunclear, and

furthermore,havebeensubjecttounfoundedadjustmentsduetothecircumstancesof

thehinterlandandtheresistanceofresidents.

（3）The�Obligation�to�Ensure�Safety�and�State�Compensation

Given the fact that “design tsunami” are assumed tobe inundated in a level

2 tsunami, and furthermore that “disaster risk areas” have been established in

considerationofthecollapseofseawalls,itcanbethoughtthattheapproachto“planned

waterlevels”conceivedinIchiroKato’sthesishasbeenfollowedinrelationto“defects”

intheplacementandadministrationofpublicstructuresundertheStateRedressLaw.

However,whetherthe“designtsunami” that is theminimumstandardofsafety

whichdelineates the liabilityunder theStateRedressLawshouldbe identifiedas

beingthesameas therangeof theobligationtoensuresafetyundertheBasicLaw

onDisasterControlMeasuresisaseparateissue.Itisclearthatthis“designtsunami”

doesnotinvolvetaking“allpossiblemeasures”（Art.3）toprotectthe“life,andlimbof

thecitizensandtheirproperty”（Art.1）that is thestatedpurposeof theBasicLaw

onDisasterCountermeasures,butrather, theadditionof “disastermitigation”（Para.

1）,multi-leveldisasterprevention（Para.3）,andtheprioritizationoftheprotectionof

“lifeand limb”（Para.4）inthe“fundamentalprinciples”（Art.2-2）added inthe2013

revisionisinlinewiththeconversetrendofregressionfromtheprotectionof“property”.

The ideaof identifyingtheminimumstandardof theobligationtoensuresafety

asthesameastherangeof thestate’s liability toprovidedamagecompensationcan

beoneapproach.Thisapproachassumesthatensuringsafetyuniformlyto the level

of theState’s liability todamagecompensation is theminimumbasis, and that the

safetymeasuresbeyondthat linearenotnecessarily theobligationof thestate,but

discretionarypublicassistance in thesenseofwelfare,whichdependson thesocio-

economiccircumstancesinthehinterlandandnegotiationswithresidents.However,the


thoughtof linkingtherelationshipbetweentheobligationtoensuresafety indisaster

countermeasures and the state’s liability to damage compensation leaves several

problems.

First, there is thequestionoffluctuatingsafetystandardstargetedbytheBasic

LawonDisasterCountermeasures,whichare thebasis for theavoidanceof liability

undertheStateRedressLaw.IntheaboveMinistryofLand,Infrastructure,Transport

andTourismguidelines, it issuggestedthatthe“designtsunami”height,whichisthe

criteria forresponsibilityunder theStateRedressLaw,willberaisedaccording to

theconcentrationofproperty inthehinterland,butthis isaconceptofraisingsafety

levelsinareasofhigheconomicvalueinadvancesoastoavoidthepossibilityofbeing

responsible fora largeamountof statecompensation.Asaresult, landwithhigher

economicvaluereceivesprotectionofnotonly“lifeandlimb”butalso“property”under

theBasicLawonDisasterCountermeasures,but landwith loweconomicvalue, it is

necessary topreserveonly “lifeand limb”,whichcangiverise tounequal treatment

undertheobligationtoensuresafety.

Secondly, if limitingthestate’sresponsibilitytoprovidecompensation isplanned

by restricting the obligation to ensure safety under theBasicLaw onDisaster

Countermeasures, it isgettingtheprioritiesbackwards.Theadministrativeobligation

to ensure the safetyhashad agoal of ensuring that “all possiblemeasures” are

exhausted to theextentpossible, as stated inArt. 3of theBasicLawonDisaster

Countermeasures. Although the fundamental principles added toArt. 2-2 in the

2013revisionof theLawhasgivenpriority to theprotectionof “lifeand limb”and

regressed theprotectionof “property”, there shouldbenodebateabout trying to

lowerthestandardofState’s liabilitytoprovidedamagecompensationforthisreason

bymanipulatingthe“designtsunami”heightsasthesafetystandard. “Defects” inthe

placementandadministrationofpublicstructuresundertheStateRedressLawshould

bedetermined through the accumulation of interpretive judicial precedents, on a

gradationthatshouldbejudgedaccordingtotheindividualcircumstancesofthecase,

asthe“designtsunami”heightwillnotsufficetohaveafirmbinaryclassificationthat

protects“lifeandlimb”butignores“property”.Regardingthescopeofthatgradation,it

seemsthatitisimpossibletodrawafirmlineasthereiscontinuousoverlapbetween

thepolicyelementsoftheobligatoryadministrativesafetymeasuresandothersafety

10 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

measuresaswelfareassistance.Especially indisaster-pronecountriessuchasJapan,

there istherealitythatthepoorhouseholdshavelivedinareaswith lowlandvalues

thatareatriskofdisaster,andthatdisasterpreventionmeasureshavehistoricallybeen

closelylinkedtowelfaresupport.

Third, there is theproblemofdueprocess fordetermining safety standards.

Local residentsarenotalwayssatisfiedwith themethodofdeciding the lowest line

of theStateobligation toensuresafetybasedon thestandardofState’s liability to

providedamagecompensation,which isdeterminedbythe“designtsunami”,which is

difficult tocallascientificmethod.Thedeterminationofsafetystandards is thebasis

fordetermining thescopeof recoveryadjustmentprojectssuchas theconstruction

ofseawallswhich involvethe land-takingsandotherrestrictionsonprivateproperty

rights, invitingconstitutionalquestions. It is a situationofpolice regulationby the

“publicwelfare” that is referred to inArt. 29,Para. 2of theConstitution. Inother

words,safetystandardsaretheverycriteria for interpreting“publicwelfare”,which

is essential to secure theconstitutionality ofplacing restrictionsonprivate rights

withoutcompensationunderpublicprojects. In today’sdemocraticsociety,unilateral

administrativedecisions inthedeterminationof thesesafetystandardsshouldnotbe

permitted.

To summarize theabovepoints, theobligation toensure safety,which is the

aimof theBasicLawonDisasterCountermeasures,can invoketheState’sminimum

responsibility to provide damage compensation as a baseline using a uniform

approach,whilealsoprovidingadditionalsafetyusing“allmeasures”basedonthelocal

circumstances.Duringthis,becauseadministrativedecisionsregardingStatedamage

compensationstandardsare lackingscientifically, it isnecessary for there tobea

supplementarystepusingparticipatorydecision-makingprocedures involving local

residents toprocedurallycorrectsubstantiveambiguities. Iwould liketodiscuss the

formofsuchparticipatoryproceduresinthenextsection.


３．A Framework for Regional Participation in the Setting of Safety Standards

（1）�Experience� from� the�Hanshin-Awaji�Earthquake� –�Two-Stage�City�Planning�

Decisions

In the recoveryprocess after theGreatHanshin-AwajiEarthquake, building

restrictionswereput inplace immediatelyafter theearthquake（extending to two

monthsinaccordancewithArt.84oftheBuildingStandardsLaw）,duringwhichtime

azoningmethodundertheEarthquakeRecoveryEmergencyMaintenanceOrdinance

wasused todesignate5,887haas “earthquakedisaster recoverypromotionareas”

subject tobuildingrestrictions（notificationrequirements,administrativeguidance）,

ofwhich1,225haareawasdesignatedas “critical recoveryareas”subject tostricter

buildingrestrictions（notification,negotiations）.Furthermore,onMarch17,twomonths

aftertheearthquake,cityplanningdecisionsweremadefor125haforlandreadjustment

projectsand26ha forredevelopmentprojects,andbuildingrestrictionsbasedonthe

CityPlanningLawcommenced.Thesezoningandcityplanningmethodsweresafety

measuresprimarily targetingdensely residential areaswhere fires causedby the

earthquakehadspread.

However,becauseofheavycriticismbyresidentsthatthedecisionregardingthe

scopeof suchsafetymeasureswascarriedoutby themunicipality’sadministration

aloneandinashortperiodoftwomonths,theGovernorofHyogoPrefectureimposed

additionalconditionsonthedeterminationof theurbanplans, inaccordancewithan

inquiryby theUrbanPlanningCouncil and requested that residents’ participation

proceduresbe taken intoaccount. In response to this,KobeCityapplied theKobe

CityDistrictPlanningandTownPlanningAgreementsOrdinance,whichwasenacted

in1981andhada recordof implementation, for thepurposeof inviting residents’

participationunder thephilosophyof “two-stageurbanplanningdecisions”.Although

itwaswithinthescopeofroughdesignsrestrictedbytheconditionsofbudgetaryaid

fromthenationalgovernment,aconsultativemethodbetweentheresidentsandthe

administrationdecidedthedesignoffine-leveltownplanningsuchastheplacementof

regionalroadsandparks.

In thisprocessofconsultationbetweentheadministrationandresidents, safety

considerations fromtheuniqueviewpointofcitizenswere incorporated, forexample,

12 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

increasing thenumberofNorth-Southevacuation routeswhichallowevacuees to

see the outline of themountainswhile evacuating,whichplacedemphasis on the

recollectionofresidentswhowereabletoevacuateusingtheoutlineofMountRokko

asalandmarkinthepre-dawndarkness,aswellasinstallingpumpsthatdrawground

water ineverypark,whichwasbasedonthebitterexperienceof thewatersupply

stoppingduetopoweroutagesfollowingtheearthquake.ii

Inthisway,intheexperienceofcreatingsafetymeasuresaftertheHanshin-Awaji

Earthquake,althoughtherewascriticismofadministrative-leddecisionmaking inthe

earlystage,throughtheconsiderationofsubsequentparticipatoryproceduresitbecame

anexampleofcooperationthatincorporatedsafetymeasuresforrebuildingcommunity

developmentthroughcooperationbetweentheadministrationandresidents.

（2）Attempts�at�Participatory�Processes�via�Ordinance

After theGreatHanshin-AwajiGreatEarthquake, inquiries intoordinancesthat

would formasystemic foundationaimedatcitizen-cooperativepre-disasterrecovery

tookplace.Theestablishmentofmunicipal-leveldisasterpreventionordinances, town

developmentpromotionordinances,aswellasmunicipalbasicordinancesandcitizen

participationpromotionordinancesprogressed,whichwasexpected toprovide the

systemicfoundationforparticipationbyresidents.

Asanexample, theTokyoMetropolitanGovernmentestablished theOrdinance

onEarthquakeDisasterCountermeasures in2000,whicheachof thespecialwards

furtherrefined.Forexample, takinga lookat thecaseofKatsushikaWard, through

theestablishmentofa seriesofordinances（suchas theKatsushikaWardDisaster

CountermeasuresOrdinance in2003, theWardResidents’ParticipatoryCommunity

PlanningPromotionOrdinance in2006,and theKatsushikaWardDisasterRecovery

MeasuresOrdinancein2010）,KatsushikaWardformedamasterplanforparticipatory

urbanplanning, and attempts are beingmade to link thiswith the initiatives of

disasterpreventionmeasuresbyresidents, suchas floodhazardmappingandpre-

disaster recoveryplans.Among theseordinances, under theCommunityPlanning

PromotionOrdinance,residents’groupsthatrepresent themajorityof localresidents

arerecognizedas townplanninggroups throughadministrativeregistration,andthe

outcomesofagreementsbythegroupsarepubliclydeclaredandrespectedbytheward


administration（OrdinanceArt.11）,andbyusingthesystemforsubmittingproposals

fordistrictplansandurbanplansundertheUrbanPlanningLaw（Art.16Para.3,Art.

21-2Para.2,etc.）,asystemdesignhasbeencreated thatcanmanifestadegreeof

bindingforceagainstthewardadministration’surbanplanning（obligationtorespond

withoutdelay,theprovisionofreasonsforrefusal）（OrdinanceArt.18,19）.TheTokyo

metropolitangovernment respects these initiativesbywards to create their own

ordinancesanddoesnotimposeguidanceorcontrol.iii

Inthisway,itisnoteworthythatattemptsatinstitutionalinfrastructurebasedon

ordinanceswasdevelopingat the fundamental levelofmunicipalgovernment for the

purposeofcommunityplanningthatincorporatessafetymeasureswithparticipationby

residents.

（3）� The�Special�Zones�Method�under�the�Large-Scale�Disaster�Recovery�Law

The2013Large-ScaleDisasterRecoveryLaw introducednationalgovernment-

leddisasterrecovery.However,where localgovernmentshavecommunityplanning

ordinances thatdefineprocedures forresidents’participation,orwherepre-disaster

recoveryplanshavealreadybeendeterminedbasedonordinances,isthereanintention

toexcludesuch localmeasuresand imposethenationalgovernment’spolicy?Art.94

of theConstitutionofJapanrecognizesautonomousordinancesby localgovernments

“withinthescopeof law”,whichposesaproblemof interpretation.Here,becausethe

Large-ScaleDisasterRecoveryLaw（Art.12,Para.8）referstoexamplesofprocedures

fromtheUrbanPlanningLawandotherlawsandordinancesinrelationtodetermining

andamendingurbanplans,itseemsthatcommunityplanningordinancescanbeargued

asbeingintheformofdelegatedordinancesundertheUrbanPlanningLaw.

However,itseemsthat,usingtheGreatEastJapanEarthquakeasanopportunity,

the trend of selecting safety standardswith citizenparticipationmet resistance.

TheDecember2011LawonSpecialZones forRecovery inResponse to theGreat

East JapanEarthquake（hereinafter “SpecialZonesLaw”）wasadoptedwith three

pillars,namely “recoverypromotionplans” thatencourageeconomicand industrial

recoverythroughderegulationandpreferentialmeasures,“recoveryadjustmentplans”

procedurestospeedupdisasterpreventionplanningbasedpredominantlyuponurban

planningmethods, and “recoverygrant fundedprojectplans” that supplements the

14 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

regionalgovernment’s fiscalburdenarising from theseplans throughallocationof

regionalrecoverytaxationmeasures.Ontheproceduralside,aconsolidateddecision-

makingmethodbasedonone-stop “consultationmeetings” forconsultationbetween

relevant national and regional administrative departmentswas propagated as a

deregulationmeasuretorationalizethevariousrelatedadministrativedecision-making

procedures.Thismethodwasthereappearanceof the“specialzoning”methodwhich

wasamethodofderegulationpolicyadoptedbytheKoizumigovernment’sstructural

reforms in the2000s（Ando2012）. In theprocessof formulating“landrestructuring

plans”,planningdecisionsandprojectdecisionproceduresforrecovery-relatedprojects

suchasurbandevelopment,integratedrecoveryprojects,collectiverelocation,tsunami

protectionfacilitiesandfishingportrecoveryprojectswereconsolidated（Art.46（2）,

Para. 4）, agreementproceduresvia the recoveryadjustment council composedof

administrativedepartmentsfromthenationalandregionalgovernmentswereadded,iv

andthepublishingoftheresultsofsuchagreementsgaveautomaticeffecttothemas

administrativedecisions（Art.50）.

Theeffect of this consolidateddecision-makingprocedurecanbe seenas the

intentiontospeedupadministrativedecisionsbyavoidingparticipationbyresidents.

Only opportunity available for participation by residents envisioned by the law

wasa soleprovision that effort shouldbemade to takemeasures that reflect the

opinionsofresidentssuchasbyholdingapublichearing（Art.46（5））.Participatory

provisionsthathavebeenaccumulatedstepbystepthroughrepeatedreformstothe

urbanplanning legislation inrecentyearswerenotclearlyreferredto,vwithonlyan

ambiguousmentionof“proceduresshallbefollowed”fromtheUrbanPlanningLawand

otherlawsandordinances（Art.48（8））.

Furthermore,inJune2013,the“Large-ScaleDisasterRecoveryLaw”appearedas

apermanentlawgoverningrecoveryafterlarge-scaledisastersandfollowedtheabove

“specialzone”method.Arecoverycouncilcomposedofmayorsandgovernorsof the

affectedmunicipalitiesandrelatedministriesandagenciesisformed（Art.11）andwith

thepublicationof “recoveryplan”afterconsultationwith thecouncil, aconsolidated

decisiongiveseffecttoan integratedurbanplanandthederegulationofconservation

areasunder the relevantLaws（LawonEstablishmentofAgriculturalPromotion

Regions,ForestLaw,NaturalParksLawandLawonDevelopmentofFishingPorts


andGroundsinArt.14（2））.Opportunitiesforparticipationbyresidentsareminimized

inthissimplifiedconsolidatedprocedure,withtheonlyprovision inplacereferringto

minimummeasuresforreflectingtheopinionsofresidentssuchasapublichearing（Art.

10（5））.

４． Resident Participation in Safety Measures in the Areas Affected by the Great

East Japan Earthquake – Comparison of Land Readjustment Projects

（1）Flow�of�the�Administrative-Led�Process�and�its�Result

InthevariouspartsofeasternJapanwheretheSpecialZonesLawwasapplied,

landreadjustmentprojectswere implementedassafetymeasuresover3,600hectares

oflandvialandrestructuringprojects,andtheabovementioned“specialzoning”method

wasapplied intheproceduralprocess.Howcouldresidents inanywayparticipate in

theselectionofregionalsafetymeasuresduringthis time?Theauthorhascontinued

tomonitorthisissueinthecoastalareaofIwatePrefecturesincethedisaster,vibutin

the2017fiscalyear,theseventhyearafterthedisasterandwhenthefinalstageofland

substitutiondecisionscommenced inmanyprojectsites, interviewswereconducted

withrecoveryauthorities,localchambersofcommerce,andresidents’groupsinMiyako

city,Yamadatown,OtsuchitownandKamaishicityandasaresult,severalvariations

werefoundintheinvolvementofresidentsinsafetymeasures.

Theproceduralflowofadministrativeenforcementof landreadjustmentprojects

isasfollows:（1）administrativedecisionontheurbanplan,（2）administrativedecision

on theprojectplan,（3）establishmentof a landreadjustmentcommittee,（4） land

substitutionplanning,（5）provisional landsubstitutiondesignation,（6）administrative

decisiononlandsubstitution,（7）collectionofpaymentforsettlementofgapsonland

valueorpaymentofcompensationforreducedlandvalue.

Theadministrativedecisionontheurbanplanunder（1）tookeffectaccordingto

thepublicationofthe“recoveryadjustmentplans”preparedusingtheabovementioned

“specialzones”methodfrommid-2012onwards,buttherewerenorepresentativesof

residentsat the“consultationmeetings”conductedat thisstage in themunicipalities

wheretheauthorconductedinterviews.Inthemiddleof2011,theyeartheearthquake

occurred, the local autonomous associations and the formation of new resident

16 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

representativeorganizationshadalreadyoccurred invariousplaces, andproposals

for recoveryplanning centered on safetymeasureswere repeatedly submitted to

theadministrativesidewithintheyear,viiyet theseresidents’proposalshadnotbeen

reflectedeven inthe“recoverybasicplans”whichhadalreadybeenadministratively

determined invariousplaces in theendof 2011,prior to thedeterminationof the

“recoveryadjustmentplans”from2012onwards.

Thestageofadministrativedecisiononprojectplanofabove（2）had involved

procedures forpublic inspectionand submissionsperformed inmid-2013, and the

prefecturalgovernormadeimmediatedeterminations.Inresponsetothis,theprocedure

quicklyprogressedwithabove（3）landreadjustmentcommitteesestablished,（4）land

substitutionplanningquickly implementedduring the2013 fiscalyear, and（5）the

designationofprovisionallandsubstitutionattheendofthefiscalyear.Inthisway,as

thecircumstancesquicklyevolvedundertheproceduralflowoftheLandReadjustment

Law, the extent towhich residentswere able to participate in the substantive

discussiononsafetymeasuresisofconcern.

Accordingtosurveysbytheauthor,differencesarefoundinthedevelopmentof

theseprojects invariousmunicipalitiesduring thisperiod. In the landreadjustment

projects in theTaro areaviii andKuwagasaki/Kouganji areaix ofMiyako city, an

explanatorysessionforresidentswasheldateachmilestoneintheprocedure,including

theprojectplanningstageandprovisional landsubstitutiondesignationstage, and

the city emphasized that it hadbeenattempting to achieve resident-ledplanning

decisions.xHowever,intheinterviewsconductedwithresidentsbytheauthor’sgroup,

itwasrevealed that thesesessionswereapretenseandthecitydidnotdisplayan

attitudeofwantingtoreceivesubstantiveopinions fromtheresidents,and fromthe

residents’positionalso,theywereatthestageofgivingup,assubmittinganyfurther

proposalswouldbepointlessdueto thepainfulexperienceof thecity ignoring their

submissionin2011.xiIntheKuwagasakidistrict,amovementinoppositiontoseawalls

was reignitedby some residents in the 2015 fiscal year, but itwaneddue to the

negativeopinionsamongthevictimsthattoopposeadecisionbytheadministrationat

thatstagewouldonly leadtodelay intherebuildingofhousing. Inaddition, the land

readjustmentcommitteewasconductedinsecretandithasbeensaidthatthedetails

of thecommittee’sdeliberationprocesswerenotdisclosedto theresidentsuntil the


stageofprovisionallandsubstitutiondesignation.Accordingtoaquestionnairesurvey

conductedbytheauthor’sgroup,althoughmanyofresidentsintheseareaswereland

leaseholdersxii,therewasnoevidencethattheadministrationhadsufficientlyexplained

theprocedure fordeclaring leaseholds in the landreadjustmentproject（Art.19and

85）, thepartiesperforming theprojectweregenerallyunawareof theexistenceof

the leaseholders, and therewasonlyaperfunctoryappointment of a leaseholders’

representativeto the landreadjustmentcommittee.xiii In thecaseof leaseholdersthe

author interviewed inTaro, theLegalAffairsBureauunder theMinistryof Justice

conducedtheexofficiocancellationofregistrationsofallbuildingslost inthetsunami

simultaneously inMarch2013, twoyearsafter theearthquakedisaster, andat the

sametimelandownerssoldtheir landtothecityadministrationwithoutauthorization

fromthe leaseholders;becausethe leaseholdrightsweretreatedasextinguisheddue

tothe lossofbuildingregistration（whichwasarequirement forraisinganobjection

under theLawonLandandHousingLease）, the leaseholders’ participation in the

landreadjustmentprojectwasnotapproved.Inthiscase,leaseholdrightssatisfiedthe

requirementsthroughconservatoryregistrationofbuildingsonleasedland,butdueto

theexofficioregistrationof lossbytheLegalAffairsBureau,aswellastheabolition

oftheLawonTemporaryTreatmentofLandandHousingLeasesinDisasterStricken

Cities in2013,whichhadpreviouslyhelpedtoprotect leaseholders, itwasconsidered

that the protectionwas lost（Kaneko 2014,Kaneko 2017a）.As a result of this

institutionalobstructionof leaseholderswhosuffereddamage, the landreadjustment

committeewasformedbyrepresentativesofsomeinfluentialabsenteelandownersand

couldnotbeaforumforextensivediscussionofregionalsafetymeasures.Asaresult,

residentssense that theoutflowofpopulationequated toapproximatelyhalfof the

populationinTaroandabouttwothirdsofthepopulationinKuwagasaki.xiv

InOtsuchi town’scaseof theMachikataarea landreadjustmentproject（30ha）,

theprojectprogressedconsistentwiththeprocedure intheLandReadjustmentLaw,

beingledbytheadministrationatalltimes.Localrestorationcouncilsandcommunity

councilswereestablishedunderanordinance,butmeetingswereheldaboutonlytwice

ayear,andthattheycametobedescribedasperfunctoryisthesameasthescenario

inMiyakocitymentionedabove.However, it isnoteworthy that theadministration

persistently feltasenseofcrisisconcerning theoutflowofpopulation,andrepeated

18 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

considerationgiven tomeasures to avoid the scatteredvacant land areas as the

resultof the landreadjustmentproject.During the2016 fiscalyearareportonThe

Current Status of the Central Urban Area and the Direction of Efforts Towards Rehabilitation

（Otsuchitown,2016）waspublished,whichinitiatedindependentprogramssuchasthe

publicationof“visualization”maps,a“vacantlandbank”systemfortheadministration

tomatch landownersand landusers,andmeasures topromotehousingconstruction

that increasedsubsidiestohouseholdsthatrebuilt inMachikata.However, therewas

criticismof thepublicationofvacant landandadditionalsubsidies,withthereception

ofsuchbelatedprogramattemptsbytheadministrationmetwithwhatcanbecalled

indifferencebyresidentswhohadalreadybeenthroughawaitingperiodofseveral

years.xvAsofMarch2018,inafieldsurveybytheauthor’sgroup,acertainamountof

rebuildingofhouseswasseenintheMachikatadistrict,whichcouldbetheresultofthe

housingconstructionpromotionmeasures,butnoticeablechange in therebuildingof

commercialshopswashardlyseen.

�（2）�Governance�Issues�Concerning�Community�Development�Meetings

In theUnosumaidistrict land readjustmentproject inKamaishi city,xvi as the

onlyexamplewithin thedisaster-affectedareasofKamaishicitywherea resident-

led community recovery council was established, which gave an expectation

of incorporating resident participation into the procedural flowunder theLand

ReadjustmentLaw.Thatis,ineachdisaster-affectedareaofKamaishi,theCommunity

RecoveryDiscussionMeetingwasheldbetweenAprilandJuly2012,priortothe“Land

RestructuringPlan”,butat this timetherewasnodisclosureofspecific information

on the landreadjustmentproject, and insteadonlyencouraged theestablishmentof

community recovery councils and landownergroups.After thepublicationof the

“recoveryadjustmentplans”fromAugust2013onwards,communityrecoverycouncils

weregraduallyestablishedasamethodofobtainingresidents’agreement ledbythe

administration,butonly inUnosumai the residents launched theirowncommunity

recoverycouncil.Duetothis, theadministrationrespectedthecouncilmemberseven

moreandmaintainedeffortstodiligentlyconfirmits intentions.xviiHowever,according

tocontinual interviewswithresidents in theregionby theauthor’sgroup, it seems

thatduringtheprocessof implementingthe landreadjustmentproject, thecouncil’s


informationdisclosure to thegeneralpopulationwas insufficientandhaddifficulty in

realizingawiderrangeofparticipation（Kaneko2017）.It isacasethat is instructive

ongovernanceproblems for a community-led recovery, suchas the requirements

for internaldecision-makingandtheexternalrepresentation to fulfill the functionof

representingresidentswhilemaintainingasenseofdistancefromtheadministration.

（3）Private�Sector-Led�Processes

In the case ofYamada area land readjustment project inYamada town, in

responsetotheadministration’srecoveryadjustmentplan,theconceptof“livingtown”

was initiatedasaguidingspiritofarea’srecoveryplanningbytheYamadaChamber

ofCommerceand Industry（YCCI）.This “living town” conceptwas the result of

consciousnessof theYCCI leader that theflowofpeopleshouldnotstopwithmere

restorationtopre-disasterconditions,butshouldbedevelopedsuccessfullythroughthe

communitydevelopment.AccordingtothepresidentoftheYCCI,whatmadeitpossible

wasthevictoryof “TeamYamada”,whichwastheaxis forcooperationbetweenthe

YCCI’s consultantsof thecommerce sideand theUrbanRenaissanceAgency that

was theadministration’sconsultant.xviiiFollowingtheearthquake,bytheendof2011

theYCCIhadalreadycreated the “Commerceand IndustryRevivalVision”and in

2012whichwasdeveloped into the “Commerceand IndustryRecoveryPlan”which

wassuccessfully incorporatedaspartof theYamadaTownRecoveryPlan.ThePlan

centeredontheideaof“townscaperevitalizationplan”toconstructanewurbanareain

frontofJRYamadaStation,torealizewhich,amanagementcompanywasestablished

undertheYCCIChamberofCommerceforthepurposeofseekingthenationalsubsidy

for the reconstructionof commercial facilities,whichwassuccessfulas the second

behindOnagawa town inMiyagiprefecture. Inaddition,byarranging the location

ofparking lotsetc., the towncenterwas linked to theareasof landreadjustment

projectthatconsolidatedintegratedcommercial/residential facilities.Further,disaster-

assistancepublichousingwasplacedadjacent to thisshoppingdistrict,andcultural

facilitiessuchasachildren’slibrarywerebroughtnearby.Itwasaconceptofcreating

anew“livingtown”thatisnotmerelyarestorationofthepreviousshoppingprecinct.

Yamada towngovernmententrusted theconceptionof towncenter’s formationand

subsidyapplicationtotheYCCI’s leadership,xixandinasense, it isanexamplewhere

20 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

therecoveryadjustmentprojectdeveloped ina formthatdependedupontheprivate

sector.Asaresultof that,asofMarch1,2018, thepopulationofYamadatownwas

15,964,adecreaseofonly3,000fromthetimebeforethedisaster,anditcanbeseenas

havingstoppedthelargepopulationoutflowthathadbeenaconcern.

ThoughthecaseofYamadatown iseasyto interpretasmerely thesuccessful

recoveryof theshoppingdistrict, itwasaresultofachoiceof safetymeasuresby

privatesectoras the foundation for thisconceptualizationofcentralurbanarea. In

response to the town’ssafetymeasures that involved theconstructionofauniform

9.7-metre seawall, establishment of a 100-metrewide disaster risk areawhere

inhabitation isprohibitedbehindtheseawall,andraisingtheelevationof the landon

themountain-sideof thedisasterriskareaby3meters, the localprivatesectorused

itsutmostwisdomtoreachanunderstandingwith the towngovernment toseekan

optimalsolutionforsafetyandlivelihoods.

５．Conclusion – Towards A Community-Based Safety Measures

Thefirsthalfof thispaperretracedthetrendofregressionof theState’s legal

obligation toensuresafetyunder theBasicLawonDisasterCountermeasuresand

predicted that the role of “mutual assistance” in futuredisastermanagementwill

strengthen in response.Accordingly, itmust be recognized that there is a high

necessity for thecommunity tobe substantially involved in the selectionof safety

measures inrecoveryplanning insteadof leaving it to theadministration.However,

in the recoveryprocedural lawrepresentedby the2011LawonSpecialZones for

Recovery inResponse to theGreatEastJapanEarthquakeandthe2013Large-Scale

DisasterRecoveryLaw,aswellas theLandReadjustmentLawandother legislation

thatdefinesprojectproceduresundertheumbrellaoftheselaws,theadministrative-led

proceduralflowtypifiedbythe“specialzone”methodhasbeenstrengthened,andthere

isatrendwheretheopportunities forparticipationbyresidents insafetycommunity

planningthathadbeenaccumulated inearthquakedisasterrecoveryordinancessince

theGreatHanshin-AwajiEarthquakehavebeenabandoned.

Yet,despitebeingboundbythenational legal framework, there isstillroomfor

local,grass-rootsinitiativeforsafetymeasurestoprogress.Thesuccessfulexampleof


ChamberofCommerceandIndustryleadershipinYamadatownwasintroducedasan

examplefromtheauthor’s interviewresearchinthecoastalareaofIwatePrefecture.

Localcommercial leadersemphasized thatwhatmadetheir leadershippossiblewas

people,notasystem,andthatthedecisivefactorwasinwhatwaypeoplecanhandle

thesystem.However, it isnotalwayspossible toobtain talentedpeople like “Team

Yamada”whohavetheknowledgeandmotivationtomasterthesystem.Itisnecessary

toelaborateonArt.10（5）oftheLarge-ScaleDisasterRecoveryLawthatcouldbethe

basisoflocalordinancesforresidents’participation.

Reference:-Abe,Y.（1998）Law and Policy on Large Disaster,Nihon-Hyoron-Sha（inJapanese）-Ii,T.（2016）“LawScholarsandLegalPractitioners inGrateEastJapanEarthquake,”Fukko （Recovery）,No.18,p.6-13（inJapanese）

-IkutaN.（2010）Law n Disaster Prevention and Its Systems,Toshin-Do（inJapanese）-Ikeda,T.（2000）“AxisofDisasterResponseandRecoveryLawandtheIssuesofLegalStudiesofDisasterRecovery”inKaiM.GreatDisasterandLaw,KanseiGakuinUniversity（inJapanese）

-Kaneko,Y.（2013）“LawandCommunity inDisasterRecovery:Lessons from2011GreatEast JapanEarthquakeontheCivilRights,”JournalofInternationalCooperationStudies,KobeUniversity,Vol.21,No.1,p.23-51

-Kaneko,Y.（2014）”ConflictofStateandCivilProperties inDisasterRecovery:Lessons fromEastJapanEarthquakeandAsia,”inKoyanagi,S.eds.,Disaster and Law,p.23-48（inJapanese）

-Kaneko,Y.（2016a）“Issuesoftheprotectionofdisaster-affectedleaseholdersastheresultoftheabolitionofRisai-Hou,” Fukkou: Journal of Japan Society of Disaster Recovery Studies,No.18,p.47-56（inJapanese）

-Kaneko,U.（2016b）“LessonsfromPost-2011EastJapanEarthquakeRecovery:IssuesofParticipationandEarlyRecovery,” inKaneko,Matsuoka&Toyoda,eds.,Asian Law in Disasters: Toward a Human-Centered Recovery,Routledge,2016,p.15-46

-Kaneko,U.（2017a）“Community-BuildingSurveyofSafetyandLivingforaLivelyFuture,”inA.Hokugo&Y.Kaneko,eds.Community-Based Recovery of Society: University Involvement and Lessons from East Japan Compared with Those from Kobe, Aceh, and Sichuan,Springer,2017

-Kaneko,Y.（2017b）“Resultof theQuestionnaireonTown-RecoveryfortheFuture inTaro,Kuwagasaki,andUnosimaidistricts,” Report of Research Center for Urban Safety and Security,No. 21,pp. 250-275（inJapanese）

-MLIT:MinistryofLand, Infrastructure,TransportandTourism（2013）“Guidelines for Tsunami-Resistant Design of Seawalls,”MLIT

-Matsuoka,K.Kaneko,Y.&Ii,T.eds.,Law and Legal Policies in Disasters,Seibundo（inJapanese）-OtsuchiTown（2016）The Current Status of the Central Urban Area and the Direction of Efforts Towards

Rehabilitation, OtsuchiTown（inJapanese）-Ushida,H.（2000）”UrbanPlanning inKobe’sPost-DisasterRecovery,”Toshi-Keikaku （UrbanPlaning）Vol.50,No.6,p.13-18（inJapanese）

-Yasumoto,N.（2012）“IssuesforConsiderationontheLawonSpecialZonesforRecoveryafterGreatEastJapanEarthquake,”Meojyo Hougaku,Vol.61,No.4（inJapanese）

-Yamazaki,E.（2013）Natural Disaster and Disaster Relief,Nihon-HyoronSha,2013

Notesi Debates of legal scholarshavebeenaccumulated in Japanon the rangeof thepublic

assistance indisasterpreventionandrecoverysincetheHanshin-AwajiEarthquake.SeeAbe

22 国　際　協　力　論　集　　第 26 巻第 1 号

（1998）,Ikeda（2000）,Ikuta（2010）,Yamazaki（2013）,Ii（2016）,etc.ii Asforthedetailsofthepost-Hanshin-AwajiEarthquakerecoveryinShin-NagataMatsumoto

AreaandRokkomichi-NorthKaze-no-satoParkArea,theauthorreferstotheinterviewswiththeleadersoflocalpost-disasterrecoverycouncilsasofJune2016throughDecember2016withaguidancebythepost-disasterrecoveryconsultantsMr.HisashiUchidaattheKobeInstituteofUrbanResearch.SeealsoUchida（2000）.

iii According to theauthor’s interviewasofMarch2013with theDisasterManagementDivision,Department ofGeneralDisasterPrevention,Bureau ofGeneralAffairs,TokyoMetropolitanGovernment.

iv The recovery adjustment council is an internal consultationmechanism inside thegovernment, and lacks themeaningful opportunities forcivicparticipationby itsnature. Itis formedbytheprefecturalgovernorandthemunicipalmayor,andcapableof invitingthenational-levelministerinchargeaswellasthe“stakeholderswhohasstrongrelation”and“otherparties”recognizedbythelocalgovernment（art.47,para.3）.Asfortheurbanplanning,thecouncilisnotobligedtoinvite“stakeholderswhohasstrongrelation”and“otherparties,”whiletheparticipationofexpertsandtheministerinchargeiscompulsory（art.47,para.4）.

v UrbanPlanningLawof1968provides forcertainmomentsofcivicparticipationsuchasthepublichearings,publicreleaseandperusal,andpublicopinions（art.16and17）, whichhasbeenincreasedbyaseriesoflawamendments,suchasthemunicipalordinanceondistrictplansaddedby1980amendment（art.16,para.2）,civicproposalofdistrictplansbasedonordinance（art. 16, para. 3）, stakeholders’ approvalprocedureon specifiedareas（art. 17,para. 3）, additional procedures for civicparticipationby the local ordinances（art. 17-2）,legalbindinglanduseplanbythedecisionofthelocalassembly（art.18-2）,andtheproposalprocedureofurbanplansbylocaltown-planninginstitutions（art.21-2）,whichareaddedbyaseriesoflawamendmentsduring2000s.

vi Forthedetails,seeKaneko（2013）（2014）（2016）,（2017a）（2017b）.vii IncaseofTaroareainMyakocity,localresidentsestablishedtheNGO“Standing-UpTaro!”

inJune2011,whichrepeatedlysentrecoveryproposalstothecitygovernment.Similarly,intheKuwagasakiareaofMiyakocity,avoluntaryassociation“KuwagasaiRecoveryCommittee”wasestablished inJune2011, incooperationwiththeassociationof localautonomousbodies,andsentarecoveryproposaltothecitygovernment inDecember2011.Noneoftheseproposals,however,werereflectedintherecoveryproposalinFebruary2012,norinthefinalRecoveryPlandecidedbythemayorinMarch2012.

viii TaroareausedbeanindependentmunicipalitybeforethemergertoMiyakoCityin2005,knownasafisherytown,withthemostofthehouseholdsbelongedtotheTaroFishermen’sAssociation.Thepopulationwasmaintained around 3,500. Torohasbeenknownas anadvanced tsunami-preventive town,with theworld’s largest seawalls of 10meterheightconstructedaftertheShowaSanrikuTsunamithatoccurredin1933.Residents’opiniononthesafetymeasuresafterthe2011GreatEastJapanEarthquakewasdividedonwhetherornottoreconstructtheseawallswhichweretotallydestructedbythetsunami in2011.Miyakocity’s“TaroAreaRecoveryPlan”（March2012）andtheMiyakoRecoveryAdjustmentProjectsthatfollowedthePlanenteredonthereconstructionoftheseawallswithanincreasedheight,whilepartiallyincorporatingarelocationprojectandlandreadjustmentproject.

ix Kuwagasaki area ofMiyako city is a historical fishery port city going back to theEdoperiod.The 2011 tsunami affected 800householdswhichhave lived in the area forseveralgenerations. “KuwagasakiAreaRecoveryPlan”（March2012）centeredon the landreadjustmentproject involvingtheconstructionofthe17meter-widthindustrialroadandthemarine industrialcomplex,whichwasonlypossibleafter thepublicpurchaseof largeareasfromthehistoricalland-owners.


x Theauthor’sinterviewwiththeUrbanPlanningDivision,DepartmentofUrbanAdjustmentofMiyakoCityasofMarch2017.

xi Theauthor’sinterviewwithlocalresidentsinTaroareaasofJuly2015andKuwagasakiasofAugust2015duringtheworkshopsheldbytheKobeUniversityDisasterRecoveryPlatform.Forthedetails,seeKaneko（2017b）.

xii InthequestionnairesurveyconductedbytheKobeUniversityDisasterRecoveryPlatformin January2015 in collaborationwithTohokuand IwateUniversities,whichobtained120answersfromtotal340householdsinKuwagasakiArea,20.8%ofthetotalanswersturnedouttobeleaseholders.Forthedetails,seeKaneko（2017b）.

xiii Accordingtotheauthor’sinterviewasofAugust2016withtheon-siteofficeoftheUrbanRenaissanceAgencywhichwas inchargeof the implementationof the landreadjustmentproject,onlyonedeclarationofleaseholdwasmadeaccordingtotheLandReadjustmentLaw

（art.19,art.85）tothecity.AlthoughtheLawprovidesthataleaseholdcanbeautomaticallysucceededon the substituted landafter the completionof the land readjustmentproject

（art.99,para.1）,theon-siteofficeonlynoticedonesuchcaseofleasehold.xiv Theauthor’sinterviewwithlocalresidentsasofAugust2017andMarch2018.xv The author’s interviewas ofAugust 2017with theDivision ofRecoveryPromotion,

DepartmentofRecoveryofOtuchiTownGovernment.xvi UnoshimaiareaofKamaishicityusedbean independentmunicipalityconsistingof four

fisheryvillages（Unosumai,Katagishi,HakozakiandRyoishi）beforethemergerwithKamaishicity in1955. Ithasturnedtoabedtownfortheemployeeshavingworks inKamaishicitycenter,while theratioof fisheryhouseholdshasdecreased to less than10%.TherecoveryadjustmentplanofUnosumaiwasstartedinAugust2013andonwards,whosecompletionwaspostponedtothefiscalyear2018astheresultofrevisionoftheplanin2014.

xvii Theauthor’sinterviewasofMarch2016withtheMainOfficeofRecoveryPromotionoftheKamaishiCityGovernment.

xviii Theauthor’s interviewas ofMarch2018with theChairmanofYamadaChamberofCommerceandIndustry.

xix Theauthor’sinterviewasofMarch2017withDivisionofRecoveryPromotionofYamadaTownGovernment.

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