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State, Power, and State, Power, and Authority: Authority: Case study on contemporary Case study on contemporary Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghan flag, 2003 Afghan flag, 1978

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State, Power, and State, Power, and Authority: Authority:

Case study on contemporary Case study on contemporary AfghanistanAfghanistan

Afghan flag, 2003 Afghan flag, 1978

Map of AfghanistanMap of Afghanistan

Afghan girls, 1977. Photo: Joanne Warfield.

Context of state Context of state failurefailure

Some points on the trajectory Some points on the trajectory of state-building in of state-building in

AfghanistanAfghanistan

#1- “Rentier state”: Building #1- “Rentier state”: Building an Afghan state from the an Afghan state from the

outsideoutside Crossroads and buffer state:Crossroads and buffer state:

– Est. of monarchy 1747-1973Est. of monarchy 1747-1973– ““The great game”: Russia and BritainThe great game”: Russia and Britain

No independent economic base (state resources No independent economic base (state resources from outside)from outside)

Soviet invasion, Dec. 1979 (to prop up Soviet invasion, Dec. 1979 (to prop up communist government)communist government)– Soviet-supported government ($$, troops, new Soviet-supported government ($$, troops, new

president)president)– Soviet weapons imports make Afghanistan world’s 5Soviet weapons imports make Afghanistan world’s 5thth

largest importer of weapons , 1986-1990largest importer of weapons , 1986-1990

Sources of Government Sources of Government Income, some figuresIncome, some figures

1952: 74% domestic; 16 % foreign aid1952: 74% domestic; 16 % foreign aid 1959: 48% domestic; 53 % foreign aid1959: 48% domestic; 53 % foreign aid 1962: 22% domestic; 60 % foreign aid1962: 22% domestic; 60 % foreign aid 1976: 62 % dom.; 29 % foreign aid; 1976: 62 % dom.; 29 % foreign aid;

10% natural gas10% natural gas 1979: 40 % dom.; 36% foreign aid; 13 1979: 40 % dom.; 36% foreign aid; 13

% natural gas % natural gas 1982: 37% dom.; 28% f.aid; 34 % n.gas1982: 37% dom.; 28% f.aid; 34 % n.gas

Source: Barnett RubinSource: Barnett Rubin

#2- Diverse society: #2- Diverse society: competition for authority & competition for authority &

controlcontrol Social organization: Qawm (solidarity Social organization: Qawm (solidarity

network)network) Ethno-linguistic groupsEthno-linguistic groups

– Pashtun (40%), Tajik (30%), Uzbek (10%), Pashtun (40%), Tajik (30%), Uzbek (10%), Hazara (Shiite- 8%), etc.Hazara (Shiite- 8%), etc.

Afghan urban elite: Pashtun Afghan urban elite: Pashtun dominateddominated– Urban vs ruralUrban vs rural

Little sense of unified Afghan nationLittle sense of unified Afghan nation

#3- History of Afghan #3- History of Afghan resistance to central & external resistance to central & external

authority (often aided by authority (often aided by external powers for their own external powers for their own

benefit)benefit) Uprisings against the BritishUprisings against the British Uprisings and war against the SovietsUprisings and war against the Soviets Soviet withdrawal 1988Soviet withdrawal 1988

Early Resistance to the Early Resistance to the Communist government Communist government

Original Original resistance resistance (1978-79): (1978-79): mass-based, mass-based, fragmented, fragmented, diverse, diverse, locally fundedlocally funded

Islam & Jihad Islam & Jihad as mobilizing as mobilizing ideology ideology Ahmad Shah Massoud (center), an

ethnic Tajik, in 1978. He rose to lead the Jamiat Islami. Photo: R. Depardon.

Under Soviet Occupation: Under Soviet Occupation: the Mujahidinthe Mujahidin

7 main parties, all 7 main parties, all based in Pakistan; based in Pakistan; by 1990, at least by 1990, at least 4,000 bases & an 4,000 bases & an estimated 1 million estimated 1 million fightersfighters

Who gave what to the Who gave what to the MujahidinMujahidin

U.S.:U.S.:$3 billion covert aid $3 billion covert aid

(1980s); around (1980s); around $700 million per $700 million per year official aid. year official aid. Largest covert CIA Largest covert CIA op. in history.op. in history.

Saudi Arabia:Saudi Arabia:(reportedly) matches (reportedly) matches

these fundsthese funds

Pakistan Pakistan administers aid; administers aid; supplies training supplies training and basesand bases

1986-1990 USAID 1986-1990 USAID gives $150 million gives $150 million for health, for health, agriculture, food, agriculture, food, to Mujahidin areasto Mujahidin areas

Effects of external aid on Effects of external aid on rebels and societyrebels and society

Mujahidin become Mujahidin become more autonomous more autonomous from local from local populations; populations; dependent on dependent on powerful sponsorspowerful sponsors

Creation of refugee Creation of refugee warrior communities warrior communities in neighboring in neighboring countriescountries

Uzbek Warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum.

Hezb-I Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar

#3- The fragmentation of #3- The fragmentation of powerpower

Fragmentation Fragmentation – 1988: Soviet 1988: Soviet

withdrawalwithdrawal– Fight for Kabul, Fight for Kabul,

1992-1996 (division 1992-1996 (division of the city)of the city)

– 50,000 die50,000 die Afghanistan as Afghanistan as

mini-fiefdomsmini-fiefdoms Youth sift through war ruins in Kabul. Photo: Muhammad Bashir.

Maps of powerMaps of power

Map by Gilles Dorronsoro in Revolution Unending.

Map by Gilles Dorronsoro in Revolution Unending.

Map by Gilles Dorronsoro in Revolution Unending.

Who ruled where: Who ruled where: Afghanistan’s mini-states, Afghanistan’s mini-states,

early 1990searly 1990s

Effects of Civil War, 1978-Effects of Civil War, 1978-19961996

Afghan child with prosthesis, Kabul, 1996. Photo: David Turnley

Physical Destruction of Physical Destruction of Place and PeoplePlace and People

““Rubble-ization” of Afghani Rubble-ization” of Afghani countryside: 12,000 out of 24,000 countryside: 12,000 out of 24,000 villages and towns destroyed (mostly villages and towns destroyed (mostly as part of Russian-led pacification as part of Russian-led pacification campaign)campaign)

Nearly 2 million people killed; around 2 Nearly 2 million people killed; around 2 million people injured or maimedmillion people injured or maimed

Refugee crisis: nearly 6 million people Refugee crisis: nearly 6 million people flee to Pakistan, Iran, and elsewhere. flee to Pakistan, Iran, and elsewhere.

LandminesLandmines

Economic & Cultural Economic & Cultural DisarrayDisarray

Decimation of pre-war elites and its social Decimation of pre-war elites and its social system (royalty, leftists, intellectuals); system (royalty, leftists, intellectuals); replaced by new elites (mujahidin, Taliban)replaced by new elites (mujahidin, Taliban)

Destruction of institutions of the state, Destruction of institutions of the state, especially the Afghan Army (replaced by especially the Afghan Army (replaced by militias)militias)

Normalization of violence: “Kalishnikovization”Normalization of violence: “Kalishnikovization” Destruction of economic infrastructure Destruction of economic infrastructure

(factories, power, transportation, agriculture): (factories, power, transportation, agriculture): encourages rises of opium-heroin tradeencourages rises of opium-heroin trade

Rentier Effect: Why War Rentier Effect: Why War Continued After the Soviet Continued After the Soviet

WithdrawalWithdrawal CIA and Pakistani intelligence (ISI) still CIA and Pakistani intelligence (ISI) still

want to overthrow Najibullah (transition want to overthrow Najibullah (transition president, leftist). Continued funding president, leftist). Continued funding fighters, especially most radical ones.fighters, especially most radical ones.

External “volunteers – Arab fighters External “volunteers – Arab fighters and others joined Afghani mujahidin in and others joined Afghani mujahidin in late 1980s and linked to transnational late 1980s and linked to transnational Islamic movementsIslamic movements

Warlordism: no sense of common Warlordism: no sense of common interestinterest

#4- The Taliban revolution, #4- The Taliban revolution, 1996-20011996-2001

Taliban fighter in Kabul, 1996; Photo: David Turnley

Who are the Taliban?Who are the Taliban? Began as movement Began as movement

out of Islamic schools out of Islamic schools in Pakistan & s. in Pakistan & s. Afghanistan. Most run Afghanistan. Most run by conservative by conservative Islamist Pakistanis.Islamist Pakistanis.

Emergence of rural Emergence of rural religious elite. Leaders religious elite. Leaders young (mid 30s to young (mid 30s to early 40s)early 40s)

Dominated by Dominated by Kandahari Pashtuns, Kandahari Pashtuns, especially Durannis especially Durannis (traditional Afghani (traditional Afghani royalty). royalty).

Afghan flag under the Taliban.

Very narrow Very narrow interpretation of interpretation of Islam.Islam.

Taliban fighters praying, 1996. Photo: David Turnley.

Taliban TakeoverTaliban Takeover

Kandahar 1994, Kandahar 1994, capture southern capture southern border town & border town & “rescue” Pakistani “rescue” Pakistani trade convoytrade convoy

Herat 1995, Kabul Herat 1995, Kabul 1996; Mazar 19981996; Mazar 1998

By 2001 controlled By 2001 controlled 85-90% 85-90% AfghanistanAfghanistan

Taliban commander in Kabul, 1996. Photo: David Turnley.

Reasons for Taliban successReasons for Taliban success

Pakistani support, $$ from S. ArabiaPakistani support, $$ from S. Arabia Emphasis on piety and war-weariness Emphasis on piety and war-weariness

of the populationof the population security security Common Pashtun ethnicityCommon Pashtun ethnicity Relative lack of corruption (in early Relative lack of corruption (in early

days)days) Use of violence & forceUse of violence & force

Life under the Taliban: Life under the Taliban: PoliticsPolitics Mujahiddin Mujahiddin

commanders driven out commanders driven out of the country (Except of the country (Except Ahmad Shah Massoud)Ahmad Shah Massoud)

Afghanistan becomes Afghanistan becomes more secure; roads more secure; roads more passablemore passable

““Town” controls the Town” controls the center: Supreme center: Supreme Council of 30-40 Council of 30-40 members, headed by members, headed by Mullah Mohammad Mullah Mohammad Omar, based in Omar, based in Kandahar. Kandahar.

Civil service at Civil service at regional levels virtually regional levels virtually unchanged.unchanged.

Application of hard-Application of hard-line Sharia law, line Sharia law, modified by Pashtun modified by Pashtun tribal codes.tribal codes.

Afghan flag under the Taliban.

Post-2001 mistakes?Post-2001 mistakes?

(According to Thomas (According to Thomas Barfield)Barfield)

Explaining the weak state: Explaining the weak state: mistakes and problems?mistakes and problems?

““Light footprint”Light footprint” process vs substanceprocess vs substance Centralized vs decentralized stateCentralized vs decentralized state Reconstruction vs nation-buildingReconstruction vs nation-building KarzaiKarzai Relying on PakistanRelying on Pakistan

Explaining the insurgency: Explaining the insurgency: What does Seth Jones say?What does Seth Jones say?

What is Jones’ puzzle?What is Jones’ puzzle? What two main arguments explaining What two main arguments explaining

the Taliban insurgency does Jones the Taliban insurgency does Jones refute?refute?

What is his main argument (answer)?What is his main argument (answer)? What two indicators suggest a “state of What two indicators suggest a “state of

emerging anarchy,” according to Jones? emerging anarchy,” according to Jones? Why do they contribute to insurgency?Why do they contribute to insurgency?

How does Jones define insurgency? What How does Jones define insurgency? What is it and what is it not?is it and what is it not?