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  • 7/25/2019 State, Office of Public Advocacy, Office of Elder Fraud & Assistance v. Estate of Jean R., Alaska (2016)

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    Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFICREPORTER.

    Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,

    303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email

    [email protected].

    THESUPREMECOURTOFTHESTATEOFALASKA

    STATEOFALASKA,OFFICEOFPUBLICADVOCACY,OFFICEOFELDERFRAUD&ASSISTANCE,

    AppellantandCross-Appellee,

    v.

    ESTATEOFJEANR.,Deceased,andSIDNEYF.,

    AppelleesandCross-Appellants

    .

    ) ) ) ))))

    ))) ) ) ) ) )

    SupremeCourtNos.S-15326/15356

    SuperiorCourtNo.1JU-12-00179PR

    O P I N I O N

    No.7098April22,2016

    AppealfromtheSuperiorCourtoftheStateofAlaska,FirstJudicialDistrict,Juneau,PhilipM.Pallenberg,Judge.

    Appearances: RuthBotsteinandDarioBorghesan,AssistantAttorneysGeneral,Anchorage,andMichaelC.Geraghty,Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.RobertS.Spitzfaden,Gruening&Spitzfaden,APC,Juneau,for Appellees/Cross-Appellants. Deborah A. Holbrook,Juneau,Co-CounselforAppellee/Cross-AppellantSidneyF.

    Before:Fabe,ChiefJustice,Winfree,Stowers,Maassen,andBolger,Justices.

    FABE,ChiefJustice.

    mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]
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    I. INTRODUCTION

    TheStateOfficeofPublicAdvocacy(OPA)filedapetitionforanexparte

    protectiveorderonbehalfofanelderlywomanagainstheradultdaughterandcaregiver,

    afterreceivingallegationsoffinancialabusemadebytheelderlywomansotherfamily

    members. Thesuperiorcourtfoundthoseallegationstobeunfoundedanddeniedthe

    protective order. The elderly womans other daughter had previously initiated a

    conservatorshipproceeding,inwhichtheStatethenparticipatedinsupportofthe

    conservatorship after the denial of the protective order. Ultimately the

    conservatorshipcasewassettledthroughmediation.Theelderlywomansestateandthe

    caregiverdaughtersoughtattorneysfeesagainsttheStateinconnectionwithboththe

    protectiveorderandconservatorshipproceedings.

    Thesuperiorcourtawardedfullreasonablefeesarisingfromthedenialof

    theprotectiveorder,findingthatOPAsprotectiveorderpetitionwasbroughtwithout

    justcause,underthefee-shiftingprovisionofAS13.26.131(d). Thesuperiorcourt

    declined to award attorneys fees arising from the proceeding to establish a

    conservatorshipbecausetheStatehadnotinitiatedtheconservatorshipproceedingas

    requiredforfeesunderAS13.26.131(d). TheStateappealsthefirstaward,andthe

    caregiverdaughterandtheestateofthewoman,whoisnowdeceased,cross-appealthe

    denialofthesecondaward.

    ButweconcludethatAS13.26.131doesnotapplytoelderfraudprotective

    orderproceedings;nordoesAlaskaCivilRule82apply. Instead,AS44.21.415setsup

    acost-recoverymechanismthatdoesnotallowprivatepartiestorecoverattorneysfees

    againsttheStateinsuchproceedings.Sowevacatethesuperiorcourtsfeeawardintheelderfraudprotectiveorderproceeding. AndbecausetheStatedidnotinitiatethe

    conservatorshipproceedinghere,noattorneysfeesareavailableagainsttheStateinthat

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    proceeding. Wethereforeaffirmthesuperiorcourtsdenialoffeesinconnectionwith

    theconservatorshipproceeding.

    II. FACTSANDPROCEEDINGS

    Whenthiscasefirstarosein2012,92-year-oldJeanR.1

    livedinJuneau

    withher55-year-olddaughterSidneyF.,whoservedashercaregiver. Sidneyhad

    movedfromAnchoragetoJuneauin2004tocareforhermotherandfather. In2009her

    parentsrequestedthatSidneyquitherjobtoprovidefull-timecare,andSidneydidsoin

    April2010. LaterthatyearJeanwasdiagnosedwithdementia,andinOctober2010

    Jeanshusband(Sidneysfather)died. Sidneycontinuedtolivewithhermotherfull

    time,providingcareandholdingapowerofattorneyauthorizinghertomanageallof

    Jeanspersonalaffairs. ThiscasearisesoutofallegationsaboutSidneysexpenditures

    raisedbytwoofJeansotherchildren,ShelleyandGeoffrey,wholivedoutsideof

    Alaska.

    InJuly2012Shelley petitionedtoestablisha conservatorship forher

    mother,allegingthat Sidneywaswastinganddissipating Jeansmoney andassets

    withoutbenefittoJean,andthatSidneywasfinanciallyexploitingJean.Shelleysought

    athirdpartytoserveasafullguardianwiththepowersofaconservatortoprotectthe

    rightsandwell-beingof[Jean]. ThroughthisactiontheOfficeofElderFraudand

    Assistance,asectionofOPA,learnedofShelleysallegationsaboutSidneysconduct.

    InAugust2012OPAfiledanexpartepetitionforanelderfraudprotective

    orderunderAS13.26.207-.208toprotectJeanfromallegedfinancialabusebySidney.

    Prior tofilingthepetition,OPAexaminedJeansbank recordsandother financial

    documents,whichlargelycorrelatedwiththeallegationsmadebyShelley. OPAalso

    Weuseinitialsinlieuofthepartieslastnamestoprotectthefamilysprivacy.

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    1

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    interviewedShelleyandGeoffrey.ButOPAevidentlydidnotinterviewSidneyorJean,

    eventhoughitknewthattheywerebothalreadyawareoftheallegationsoffraud

    becausesimilarallegationshadbeenmadeinShelleysconservatorshippetition.

    Inits petition OPAasserted that ownershipofJeans home hadbeen

    transferredtoSidney;thatJeansbankaccountshadbeenoverdrawnby$2,623between

    JanuaryandAugustof2012;thatlargeexpenditureshadbeenmadeforthesolebenefit

    ofSidney,includingairlineticketstoSeattleandMinnesota,suppliesusedtorepaira

    trailerforSidneysboyfriend,andveterinarianbillsforSidneyspet;andthatSidneyhad

    generatedinordinatelyhighgrocerybills. OPAestimatedthevalueatrisktobe

    $54,000 per year and declared therisk tobeimmediate orurgent,citing recent

    overdraftsandchecksmadeouttoSidneyfromJeansbankaccounttotaling$1,500.

    OPArequestedthatthecourtlimitSidneyspowersofattorneytomedicaldecisions;that

    housing decisions be shared between Sidney, Shelley, and Geoffrey; and that a

    temporary six-monthconservatorshipbeestablished to handleall financialmatters

    followingtheinitial20-dayexparteprotectiveperiod.

    JeanreceivedacopyofOPAsprotectiveorderpetitionthedayafteritwas

    filed,andshequicklyfiledabriefopposingthepetition. 2 Sheexplainedthatthehome

    hadbeendeededtoSidneyinordertohelpsecureadditionalgovernmentassistancefor

    Jeaninheroldage. Shealsodispute[d]thefactualbasisoftheallegationsrelatingto

    theairplanetickets,trailerrepair,andveterinarianbills. Shemaintainedthatshewas

    welltakencareofandthatnofinancialabusehadtakenplace.

    Thesuperiorcourtdeniedtheexpartepetitionthreedaysafteritwasfiled.

    Thecourtbrieflyexplainedthatitreachedthisdecisionbecauseitd[id]notfindthat

    ItdoesnotappearfromtherecordthatSidney,therespondent,receivedacopyoftheexpartepetitionorfiledaresponsetoit.

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    thereha[d]beenashowingofprobablecausedemonstratingthatanexparteorderwas

    necessarytopreventfraudbySidneyagainstJean.Butthesuperiorcourtindicatedthat

    itwouldconvertOPAsexpartepetitionintoapetitionforasix-monthprotectiveorder

    underAS13.26.208.3 SoOPAcontinuedtoproceedwiththispetitionforasix-month

    protectiveorder,evenafterthecourtsdenialoftheexpartepetition.

    ThesuperiorcourtconsolidatedOPAsongoingprotectiveorderpetition

    andtheearlierconservatorshippetitionfiledbyShelley,anditscheduledanevidentiary

    hearinginSeptember2012.Atthathearing,thecourtheardtestimonythatthehomewas

    transferredonadviceofcounsel;thattheallegedflighttoMinnesotabySidneyandher

    boyfriendwasinfactatriptoJuneauthatShelleytooktohelpcareforJean;thatSidney

    hadreimbursedmoneytohermothersaccountforaflightshehadtakentoSeattleto

    obtainmedicaltreatment;andthatthemoneyspentonSidneysboyfriendstrailerwas

    actuallycompensationinexchangeforre-roofingandpaintingJeanshouse. Thecourt

    alsoheardtestimonyfromSidneyexplainingthatthemoneyshespentandthechecksshe

    drewfromJeansaccountwerecompensationunderanagreementreachedbetween

    SidneyandherparentsbeforeSidneyquitherjobandbecametheirfull-timecaregiver.

    3 Althoughthesuperiorcourtstatedthatitwouldconsiderwhethertoissuea6-monthorderunderAS13.26.209,weassumeitintendedtorefertoatemporary

    protectiveorderasdefinedunderAS13.26.208. WenotethatAS13.26.209dealswithmodifications to existing protective orders, while AS 13.26.208 provides for theconversionofa20-dayexparteprotectiveorderintoasix-monthtemporaryprotective

    order. AS13.26.208provides,inpart: Onapplicationfiledwiththecourtbeforetheexpirationofa20-dayexparteprotectiveorderissuedunderAS13.26.207,thecourtshallscheduleahearingonwhethertoconverttheprotectiveordertoatemporaryordereffectiveforuptosixmonths. BriefingfromOPA,whichfocusesonAS13.26.207.208,confirmsthatthesewere theprovisionsunderwhichOPAsoughtaprotectiveorderhere.

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    Attheendofthehearing,thesuperiorcourtenteredanoralorderdenying

    OPAs petition for anelderfraudprotectiveorder. The court creditedJeans and

    SidneysexplanationsfortheexpendituresOPAhadchallenged,explainingthatitfound

    JeansandSidneys testimonymorecrediblethan thetestimonyfromJeansother

    children and OPAs staff. The superior court thus found that OPA had failed to

    demonstratefraudbyapreponderanceoftheevidenceandhadnotmadeanyshowing

    thatthere[had]beenfraudinthiscase.Thecourtallowedthatamoreformalized

    compensationarrangementmighthavebeenbetterbutnotedthatitdidnotfindthe

    currentarrangementtobeexploitation,andthatitwashardtounderstandhowonegets

    to[the]placewhereitisfelttobeexploitation. Thesuperiorcourtthereforedenied

    OPAspetitionforanelderfraudprotectiveorder.Thecourtallowedlitigationofthe

    conservatorshipissuetocontinue,however.

    Afterthesuperiorcourtsruling,Sidneyfiledamotionseekinganaward

    of$14,025 for attorneys feesand costsagainstOPA. Jeanmoved for a separate

    attorneysfeesawardagainstOPAfor$8,607.75. Sidneyallegedthatafeeawardwas

    justifiedunderAlaskaCivilRule82,thestandardfee-shiftingschemeforcivilcases;

    AS13.26.131,thefee-shiftingstatuteforguardianshipandconservatorshipcases;or

    AS13.26.353(c),whichprovidesa causeofactionforfailuretohonora powerof

    attorney. JeanassertedthatAS13.26.131wasnotapplicablebutthatanawardwas

    justifiedunderRule82orAS13.26.353(c). OPAopposedthemotions,denyingthatit

    hadfileditspetitionforaprotectiveorderinbadfaithorwithoutjustcause.

    Meanwhile,thepartiescontinuedtolitigatetheconservatorshippetitionthat

    Shelleyhadfiled.OPA,participatinginthisproceedingasaninterestedparty,soughtadditionaldiscoveryandopposedSidneyandJeansmotionforsummaryjudgment. In

    Decemberthepartiessettledtheremainingissuesfromtheconservatorshippetition

    throughtheAdultGuardianshipMediationProgram. Thepartiesagreedtodismissthe

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    conservatorshippetitionwithprejudiceandagreedtosupportJeanswishtoremainin

    herJuneauhomeuntilherdeath.Theyestablishedaformalcompensationschemefor

    Sidney,andSidneyagreedtomakemonthlyreportstoShelleyandGeoffreyabouther

    expendituresascaregiver.SidneyalsoagreedtoputthehomeupforsaleuponJeans

    death. Finally,SidneyandJeanagreednottopursueanattorneysfeeawardagainst

    ShelleyorGeoffrey.SidneyandJeanexplicitlyreservedtheirrighttoseekattorneys

    feesfromOPA.

    Followingthesettlementoftheconservatorshipaction,Jeanagainfileda

    motionforafeeawardagainstOPA. ShearguedthatOPAscontinuedlitigationofthe

    conservatorshipproceedingwasinbadfaith,vexatious,frivolous,andwithoutjust

    cause,therebyjustifyingafeeaward. Sheargued thatallfactualissueshadbeen

    resolved by the denial of the protective order and that continuing to litigate the

    conservatorship petition violated principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata.

    SidneymovedtojoinandsupplementJeansmotionshortlythereafter.Sheassertedthat

    thesumofhertotalincurredfeeshadrisento$36,195andreiteratedthatCivilRule82,

    AS13.26.131(d)andAS13.26.353(c)justifiedafeeaward.InresponseOPAargued

    thatnothingintheProbateRules,Title13,orapplicablecaselaw...support[sthe]

    viewthatinterestedpartiesaresubjecttoattorneyfeesunderRule82andarguedthat

    AS13.26.353(c)didnotapply.

    ThesuperiorcourtawardedfullreasonablefeesagainstOPAintheelder

    fraudprotectiveorderproceeding,findingthatOPAselderfraudpetitionwasbrought

    without justcausebecauseanobjectiveobserverwhomadereasonableinquirieswould

    [not]concludethattherewasjustcauseforbelievingthattherewasfraudorfinancialexploitation. Infactthesuperiorcourtfoundthat,farfromcommittingfraud,Sidney

    hadbeenprovidinglovingcareforhermotherafterquittingherjobandmovinghome

    atherparentsrequest. Itwasevidentthattheproceedingsarisingfromtheallegations

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    offraudhadcostthefamilysignificanttimeandexpense,whichthesuperiorcourt

    soughttorectifywiththisawardofattorneysfees.

    Intheconservatorshipproceeding,however,thesuperiorcourtdeclinedto

    awardattorneysfees. Therethesuperiorcourtfoundthatbycontinuingtolitigatethe

    conservatorshipproceedingfiledbythefamilymembers,OPAhadnotinitiateda

    proceedingthatwasmalicious,frivolous,orwithoutjustcauseasrequiredforafee

    awardunderAS13.26.131(d).OPAappealsthefeeawardintheprotectiveorderaction,

    whileSidneyandJean(nowJeansestate)cross-appealthedenialoffeesrelatedtothe

    conservatorshipaction.

    III. STANDARDOFREVIEW

    Although we review the reasonableness of fee awards for abuse of

    discretion,4weindependentlyreviewwhetherthetrialcourtproperlyappliedthelaw

    whenawardingattorneysfees.5 Whensuchaninquiryrestsonaquestionofstatutory

    interpretation,weapplyourindependentjudgmentininterpretingthestatute. 6 Indoing

    so,welooktothemeaningofthelanguage,thelegislativehistory,andthepurposeof

    thestatuteandadopttheruleoflawthatismostpersuasiveinlightofprecedent,reason,

    andpolicy.7

    4 Foster v. Profl Guardian Servs. Corp.,258P.3d102,107(Alaska2011)(citingDeNardo v. Cutler,167P.3d674,677-78(Alaska2007)).

    5 Baker v. Ryan Air, Inc., 345 P.3d 101, 106 (Alaska 2015) (quotingDeNardo,167P.3dat677).

    6 Adamson v. Municipality of Anchorage,333P.3d5,11(Alaska2014)

    (citingPouzanova v. Morton,327P.3d865,867(Alaska2014))(applyingthisstandardtoaquestionofstatutoryinterpretationonanissuethatisnormallyreviewedforabuseofdiscretion).

    7 In re Protective Proceedings of Vernon H.,332P.3d565,572(Alaska(continued...)

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    IV. DISCUSSION

    A. It Was Error To Award Attorneys Fees In The Elder Fraud

    ProceedingBecauseNeitherAS13.26.131NorCivilRule82Applies.

    Alaska Statute13.26.131(d) provides for fee shifting in guardianship

    proceedingsifthecourtfindsthattheproceedingwasmalicious,frivolous,orwithout

    justcause. Thesuperiorcourtappliedthisfee-shiftingprovisiontotheelderfraud

    protectiveproceedingatissuehere,interpretingthetextofthestatuteassuggestingthat

    itshouldapply. OurdecisioninIn re Vernon H.,whichwasdecidedafterthesuperior

    courtsorderinthiscase,explainedthatAS13.26.131(d)appliestoconservatorship

    proceedingsaswellasguardianshipproceedingsandthatitdisplacesCivilRule82in

    bothtypesofproceedings.8 Butwehavenotyetaddressedthequestionwhetherour

    holdinginVernon H.alsoencompasseselderfraudprotectiveorderproceedings. We

    conclude that elder fraud protective order proceedings are subject to a separate

    cost-recoveryschemethatwasestablishedwiththecreationoftheOfficeofElderFraud

    andAssistance,theofficethatprosecuteselderfraudcasesandseeksprotectiveorders

    onbehalf ofvulnerableelders. Accordingly, these proceedingsare not subject to

    AS13.26.131orCivilRule82.1. Thefee-shiftingprovisionofAS13.26.131(d)doesnotapplyto

    elderfraudprotectiveorderproceedings.

    Title13,Chapter26oftheAlaskaStatutessetsupastatutoryregimefor

    protectiveproceedings,includingguardianship,conservatorship,andotherprotective

    ordercases. Thesetofprovisionsunderwhich OPAfileditselderfraudpetition,

    AS13.26.207-.209,wasaddedtothischapterin2012inanefforttoaddressthegrowing

    7(...continued)2014)(quotingEnders v. Parker,66P.3d11,13-14(Alaska2003)).

    8 Id. at577.

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    problemoffraudagainsteldersinAlaska.9Theseprovisionsdonotcontaintheirown

    fee-shiftingscheme;insteadtheyrelyonfee-shiftingprovisionscodifiedelsewherein

    thestatutoryregime.

    Thecost-allocationstatuteappliedbythesuperiorcourt,AS13.26.131,

    generallyallocatescostsinaguardianshiporconservatorshipproceedingbetweenthe

    petitioner,therespondent,andtheState:

    (a) Subjectto(d)ofthissection,the[S]tateshallbearthecosts of the visitor and expert appointed underAS13.26.106(c).

    (b) Subjectto(c)and(d)ofthissection,therespondentshall bear the costs of the attorney appointed underAS 13.26.106(b), of the expert appointed underAS13.26.109(d),oftheguardianadlitemappointedunderAS 13.26.025,andofothercourtand guardianshipcostsincurredunderthischapter.

    (c) The[S]tateshallpayallorpartofthecostsdescribedin(b)ofthissectionifthecourtfindsthatthepaymentisnecessarytopreventtherespondentfromsufferingfinancialhardshiporfrombecomingdependentuponagovernmentagencyoraprivatepersonoragency.

    ThefinalsectionofAS13.26.131thenprovidesforcost-shiftingincertainlimited

    circumstances:

    (d) Thecourtmayrequirethepetitionertopayallorsomeofthecostsdescribedin(a)and(b)ofthissectionifthecourtfinds that the petitioner initiated a proceeding under thischapterthatwasmalicious,frivolous,orwithoutjustcause.

    9 Ch.71,10,SLA2012;see Minutes,S.JudiciaryComm.HearingonSenateBill(S.B.)86,27thLeg.,1stSess.1:40-1:46(Feb.21,2011)(testimonyofKellyHenriksen,AssistantAttyGen.)(describingtheproblemofelderfraudinAlaskaasthemotivationforthebill).

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    AlaskaStatute13.26.131fallswithinchapter13.26,whichalsoincludestheprotective

    orderprovisionsofAS13.26.207-.209underwhichOPAfiledtheelderfraudprotective

    orderin thiscase. AndthetextofAS13.26.131(d)suggeststhatthiscost-shifting

    provisionappliestoallproceedingsunderthischapter. Bythislogic,thesuperior

    court concluded that the cost-shifting provision applied to the protective order

    proceedinghere. Jeansestateurgesustoadoptthisreasoningaswell. Butalthoughit

    isunderstandablethatthesuperiorcourtfocusedontheplaintextofthisprovision,our

    analysisdoesnotendthere.

    Wheninterpretinga statute,webegin with the plainmeaningofthe

    statutorytext.10 Thenweapplyaslidingscaleapproach,where[t]heplainerthe

    statutorylanguageis,themoreconvincingtheevidenceofcontrarylegislativepurpose

    orintentmustbeinorderforustoconcludethatanalternativeinterpretationofthe

    statuteismoreappropriate. 11 Here,althoughthemeaningofthephraseunderthis

    chapter at first appearsplain, the textof the other sectionswithinAS13.26.131

    convincesusthatthelegislaturecouldnothaveintendedforthatstatutetoapplyinelder

    fraudproceedings.Specifically,subsections(a)-(c)ofthestatuteallocatecostsbetween

    theStateandtherespondent,butthedefinitionofrespondentintheelderfraudcontext

    isentirelydifferentfromthedefinitionintheguardianshiporconservatorshipcontext.

    The guardianship statutes define respondent as the person who allegedly needs

    10

    Hendricks-Pearce v. State, Dept of Corr.,323P.3d30,35(Alaska2014)(citingWard v. State, Dept of Pub. Safety,288P.3d94,98(Alaska2012)).

    11 State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commn v. Carlson,270P.3d755,762(Alaska2012),as modified on rehg (Apr.13,2012)(quoting Govt Emps. Ins. Co. v.Graham-Gonzalez,107P.3d279,284(Alaska2005)).

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    protection.12 Butthepersonwhoallegedlyneedsprotectionisnotmentionedasaparty

    inanelderfraudprotectiveorderproceeding. Instead,theelderfraudprotectiveorder

    statutereferstotherespondentasthepersonwhoisaccusedofcommittingthefraud. 13

    Itwouldmakelittlesenseforthecost-allocationprovisionsofAS13.26.131toapply

    equally toboth sets ofrespondents,because the parties are in entirely different

    positionswithrespecttotheproceedings.

    Ifwetrytoharmonizethisconflictbyapplyingauniformdefinitionof

    respondentunderAS13.26.131,itcouldleadtoabsurdresults. Whathappensifwe

    trytoapplytheelderfraudstatutesdefinitionofrespondenttotheguardianshipcost

    statute? Undersubsection(b),theaccusedisthenrequiredtopaythecostsofappointed

    counsel,arespondentsexpert,aguardianadlitem,andallothercourtandguardianship

    costsincurredunderthischapter.14 Theaccusedrespondentmustpaythesecosts,

    whetherinnocentorguilty,unlessthecostsareshiftedtothepetitionerundertherare

    circumstancesdescribedinsubsection(d).15 Ontheotherhand,undersubsection(c)the

    Statemayberequiredtopayanyofthesecostsifsuchanorderisnecessarytoprevent

    the[accused] fromsufferingfinancialhardshiporotherwisebecomingdependent.Such

    12 AS13.26.005(11).

    13 See AS13.26.207(a)(Ifthecourtfindsthatthe[protectiveorder]petition

    establishesprobablecausethattherespondentisfinanciallydefraudingthepetitioner...thecourtshall...issueaprotectiveorder.).

    14 AS13.26.131(b).

    15 See AS13.26.131(d).

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    anoutcomeisentirelyinconsistentwiththeelderfraudstatutesgoalofprotectingthe

    financialwell-beingoffraudvictims.16

    Different problems would arise if we tried to apply the definition of

    respondentfromtheguardianshipcoststatute. Underthisalternative,therespondent

    wouldbethepersonwhoallegedlyneedsprotection,thatis,thevulnerableadultina

    protectiveorderproceeding.17 UnderAS13.26.131,thevulnerableadultwouldthenbe

    responsibleforpayingthecostsofappointedcounsel,arespondentsexpert,aguardian

    adlitem,andallothercourtandguardianshipcostsincurredunderthischapter,even

    thoughthevulnerableadultisnottypicallyanamedpartyinanelderfraudproceeding. 18

    Ifthevulnerableadultcannotaffordtopaythesecosts,thentheStatewouldpay,even

    ifitisnotpartytotheproceeding.19 Thepetitionercouldberequiredtopayonlyifthe

    filingwasmalicious,frivolous,orwithoutjustcause. 20 Inthisscenario,theaccused

    wouldneverberequiredtopayanycosts,evenifheorshewerefoundguiltyoffraud.

    Ultimatelybothoftheseinterpretationscouldleadtoabsurdresultsthat

    wouldconflictwiththepurposeofelderfraudproceedings,whichistoprotectelders

    againstfinancialabuse.21 Asaruleofstatutoryinterpretation,wedisfavorstatutory

    16 AS13.26.131(c).

    17 AS13.26.005(11).

    18 AS13.26.131(b).

    19 AS13.26.131(c).

    20 AS13.26.131(d).

    21 Minutes,S.JudiciaryComm.HearingonS.B.86,27thLeg.,1stSess.1:401:46(Feb.21,2011)(testimonyofKellyHenriksen,AssistantAttyGen.).

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    constructionsthat reachabsurdresults.22 Moreover,AlaskaProbateRule1(e)mandates

    thatanyprocedureappliedtoprobateproceedingsincludingtheelderfraudprotective

    ordersatissuehere23maynot...interferewiththeuniquecharacterandpurposeof

    probateproceedings.24 ThusweconcludethatAS13.26.131,whenreadasawhole,

    cannotapplytoelderfraudprotectiveorderproceedings.

    ThisconclusionisconfirmedbythetitleofAS13.26.131,whichcanbe

    aninterpretivetool...wherelegislativemeaningisleftindoubt.25 Theprovisionis

    titledCostsinguardianshipproceedings,asthesuperiorcourtnoted,andindeedmost

    of the costs described in subsections (a) and (b) are unique to guardianship and

    conservatorshipproceedings.26 Itmakessense forAS13.26.131 toapply toguardianship

    and conservatorship proceedings but not to elder fraud cases. Guardianship and

    conservatorshipproceedingsarecloselyrelated:A guardianshipcoversallaspectsof the

    protectedpersonslegalandfinancialrights,anda conservatorshipinvolvessimilar

    powersbutdealsonlywithfinancialprotection. Theyareoftendescribedtogetherin

    statutoryprovisionsandtheprobaterules.27 Elderfraudproceedings,ontheotherhand,

    22 See Premera Blue Cross v. State, Dept of Commerce, Cmty. &Econ. Dev.,

    Div. of Ins.,171P.3d1110,1120(Alaska2007).

    23 See AlaskaR.Prob.P.1(b)(governingallproceedingswithinTitle13oftheAlaskaStatutes).

    24 AlaskaR.Prob.P.1(e).

    25 Tweedy v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Bd. of Adjustment & Appeals,332P.3d12,18(Alaska2014)(citingBoyd v. State,210P.3d1229,1232(Alaska2009)).

    26 See In re Protective Proceedings of Vernon H.,332P.3d565,577(Alaska2014)(concludingthatAS13.26.131(d)appliesinconservatorshipcases).

    27 See, e.g.,AS13.26.380(c)(1)(Thepublicguardianshall...establishand(continued...)

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    aremoreprosecutorialinnatureandaretargetedattheperpetratorofthefraudrather

    thantheprotectedperson.28 Wethereforeconcludethat,whileAS13.26.131appliesto

    guardianship and conservatorship proceedings, it does not apply to elder fraud

    proceedings.

    2. AlaskaStatute44.21.415createsaspecificcost-recovery scheme

    forelderfraudproceedings,whichdisplacesCivilRule82.

    Tounderstandhowthelegislatureintendedtoallocatecostsinelderfraud

    proceedings,welooktothetextandhistoryofthestatutethatcreatedtheOfficeofElder

    FraudandAssistance(theOffice). The2006enactmentofAS44.21.415createdthe

    OfficeasadivisionofOPAtoinvestigateandprosecuteelderfraudcases.29 Thestatute

    containsacost-recoveryprovisionallowingtheOfficetocollectitslitigationcostsand

    feesfromthedefendant(thepersonaccusedoffraud)orfromtheprotectedelderwhen

    theOfficeprevailsonbehalfoftheelder:

    Subject to the discretion of the court and standardsestablishedinregulation...andtakingintoconsiderationthefinancialconditionofthepartiestoacivilsuitbroughtunderthissection,theofficeofpublicadvocacymayseekrecoveryofall orpartoflitigation costsand feesfromanyparty,

    includingcostsincurredduringtheinvestigationofthecase,

    27(...continued)maintainrelationshipswithgovernmental,public,andprivateagencies,institutions,andorganizationstoassurethemosteffectiveguardianshiporconservatorshipprogramfor

    each ward and protected person); Alaska R. Prob. P. 14(e) (Guardianship andconservatorshipproceedingsmaybecombined.).

    28 See AS13.26.207.

    29 Ch.64,2,SLA2006.

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    whentheofficeofpublicadvocacyisfoundtobeaprevailingpartyaftertrialorsettlementnegotiation.[30]

    ThissectionalsoprovidesthattheOfficemustgenerallyenterintoafeeagreementwith

    aclient,31 whoisdefinedtobetheelderinneedofprotection.32 Thestatutedoesnot

    provideforanyawardofattorneysfeesagainst OPA.33

    Although not determinative of the legislatures intent, the regulation

    implementing this statute further supports our interpretation of this cost-recovery

    scheme. Theregulationclarifiesthatiftheclientprevails,the[Office]willfirstseek

    recoveryof[its]attorneysfeefromthedefendantandthen,ifthedefendantisunable

    tosatisfytheawardofthe[Offices]attorneysfee,the[Office]willnextseekrecovery

    fromtheclient[theprotectedelder].34 Likethestatuteitself,theregulationcontainsno

    provisionforafeeawardagainsttheOfficeeveniftheOfficedoesnotprevailinthe

    case.35

    Thus, this statutesets upa cost-recovery scheme that allows OPA to

    recoveritscostsfirstfromtheperpetratorofthefraudandthenfrom theprotectedperson

    who benefited from the elder fraud proceeding. And although the legislature

    contemplatedthattheOfficemightnotalwaysprevailintheelderfraudproceedingsit

    30 AS44.21.415(e).

    31 Id.

    32 2AlaskaAdministrativeCode(AAC)60.390.

    33 AS44.21.415(e).

    34

    2AAC60.310(1).

    TheregulationalsosuggeststhatRule82mightapplyin addition to thecost-recoveryschemedescribedinAS44.21.415(e),butweconcludethatthelegislatureintendedforthisstatutorycost-recoveryschemetodisplaceRule82,asdiscussedfurtherbelow. See infrapp.20-23.

    35 2AAC60.310(2).

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    initiated,36 the legislature nonetheless chose not to allow other parties to recover

    attorneysfeesfromtheOffice. Thisoutcomeisconsistentwiththelegislativehistory

    surroundingthepassageofAS44.21.415,whichexpressedconcernwithkeepingthe

    Officescostslow. Forinstance,onelegislatorinquiredabouthowtomaketheOffice

    asefficientandeffectiveaspossibleandnotedthatquestionsregardingwhowillbe

    responsibleandhowthecostswillbebornewereimportanttoaddressincraftingthe

    bill.37 Similarly,theOPAdirectorstestimonybeforethelegislaturecalledattentionto

    theconservativefiscalnoteonthebill,seemingtoindicatethatthecreationofthisnew

    OfficewouldnotraiseOPAscostssignificantly. 38 AndtheOPAdirectorspecifically

    suggested adding a cost-recoverymechanism tokeep the Offices costs low.39 In

    responsetothisrequest,legislatorsdraftedanamendmentthatultimatelycreatedthe

    cost-recoveryprovisioncontainedinthefinalstatute.40 Werecognizethatthisoutcome

    mayappearharshincaseswheretheOfficedoesnotprevailandthecourtfindsthatno

    fraudoccurred,leavingtheaccusedandsometimestheprotectedpersonwhowasnot

    36 See AS44.21.415(e)(providingforcostrecoveryonlywhenthe[Office]

    isfoundtobeaprevailingparty).

    37 Minutes,H.StateAffairsComm.HearingonHouseBill(H.B.)399,24thLeg.,2dSess.8:39-8:44(Feb.7,2006)(testimonyofRep.MaxGruenberg).

    38 Minutes,H.FinanceComm.HearingonH.B.399,24th Leg., 2dSess.9:259:34(Mar.7,2006)(testimonyofJoshFink,Director,OPA).

    39 Minutes,H.StateAffairsComm.HearingonH.B.399,24thLeg.,2dSess.8:30-8:31(Feb.7,2006)(testimonyofJoshFink,Director,OPA)(Thecommitteemay

    wanttoconsiderifwelitigateonbehalfofindividualsthattheredbesomemechanismbywhich,ifweweresuccessful,wecouldrecoverouractualcosts,iftherewasnotfinancialhardshipontheindividualwewerelitigatingfor.).

    40 Compare H.B.399,24thLeg.,2dSess.(Jan.27,2006)(lackingcost-recoveryprovision),with ch.64,2,SLA2006(containingcost-recoveryprovision).

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    infactinneedofprotectiontobeartheirowncosts. Butwemustalsorecognizethat

    thelegislatureevidentlytrustedtheOfficetofocusitseffortsonthemostmeritorious

    cases,anditstructuredthecost-recoveryschemeaccordingly.

    SidneyarguesthatAS44.21.415couldnothaveintendedtosetupa

    one-waycost-recoverymechanism. Butthisisnottheonlycontextinwhichsucha

    mechanismexists. Indomesticviolenceproceedings,forexample, thecourt may require

    therespondenttopaythepetitionersattorneysfeesifaprotectiveorderisgranted;yet

    thereisnoparallelprovisionallowingtherespondentinadomesticviolenceproceeding

    tocollectattorneysfeesfromthepetitionerifthepetitionerdoesnotprevail. 41 The

    legislative history of the elder fraud protective order provisions indicates that the

    legislaturemodeledtheseprovisionsonthedomesticviolencestatutes, 42 soitmakes

    sensethatthelegislaturechosetocreateasimilarone-wayfeemechanisminelderfraud

    proceedings.43

    41

    AS18.66.100(c)(14).42 Minutes,H.FinanceComm.HearingonS.B.86,27thLeg.,2dSess.1:44

    1:48(Mar.1,2012)(testimonyofKellyHenriksen,AssistantAttyGen.);Minutes,S.JudiciaryComm.HearingonS.B.86,27thLeg.,1stSess.1:35-1:36(Apr.11,2011)(testimonyofSen.HollisFrench);Minutes,S.JudiciaryComm.HearingonS.B.86,27thLeg.,1stSess.1:53-1:55(Feb.21,2011)(testimonyofKellyHenriksen,AssistantAttyGen.).

    43 Inbardisciplineproceedings,similarly,anattorneyisliableforattorneys

    feesandcostswhenthereisafindingofmisconduct. AlaskaBarR.16(c)(3). Butifitisultimatelydeterminedthattheattorneydidnotengageinmisconduct,therulecontainsnoprovisionthatwouldenabletheattorneytorecoverfromtheDisciplinaryBoardanycostsorfeesincurredindefendingagainsttheallegations.See id. Thus,farfrombeingan anomaly here, one-way fee schemesare used in several other types of quasi

    prosecutorialproceedings.

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    Anumberofotherstatesuseasimilarapproachintheelderfraudandelder

    abusecontext. Oregon,forinstance,allowstheStatetorecovercostsofinvestigation

    andpenaltiesofupto$25,000ifitprevailsinanelderfraudcase,butithasnoparallel

    provision allowing cost recovery if the accused prevails.44 In fact, Oregon law

    specificallyprovidescivilimmunityto[a]nyoneparticipatingingoodfaithinthe

    makingofa reportofelderabuseandwhohasreasonablegroundsformakingthe

    report.45 Washington,similarly,providesthataprevailingplaintiffinanelderfraud

    orabusecaseshallbeawardedhisorheractualdamages,togetherwiththecostsofthe

    suit,includingareasonableattorneysfee, 46butitmakesnoprovisionforcostrecovery

    intheotherdirection47andinfactprovidesimmunityfromcivilliabilityforanyonewho

    makesagood-faithreportofelderfraud.48 Californiausesthesameapproach,allowing

    theStatetorecovercostsfromtheotherpartiesbutnotallowingtheseotherpartiesto

    recovercostsfromtheStateiftheyprevail.49 Sothecost-recoverymechanismdescribed

    inAS44.21.415(e)isconsistentwiththeapproachusedbyotherstates,theapproach

    usedinatleastoneotherrelevantareaofAlaskalaw,andtheintentofthelegislaturein

    adoptingAS44.21.415andcreatingtheOfficetoprosecuteelderfraudcases. Forallof

    thesereasons,weconcludethatthecost-recoverymechanismofAS44.21.415(e)applies

    toelderfraudprotectiveorderproceedingsbroughtunderAS13.26.207-.209.

    44 OR.REV.STAT.124.125(2015).

    45 OR.REV.STAT.124.075(2015).

    46 WASH.REV.CODE74.34.200(2016).

    47 See id.

    48 WASH.REV.CODE74.34.050(2016).

    49 CAL.WELF.&INST.CODE15657.5(a)(West2016).

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    HavingconcludedthatAS44.21.415(e)appliestotheseprotectiveorder

    proceedings,wereasonthatCivilRule82cannotalsoapply. First,Rule82(a)itself

    dictatesthatRule82doesnotapplywhenfeeshiftingisotherwiseprovidedbylaw.

    In Vernon H., we concluded that the fee-shifting provision of AS 13.26.131(d)

    constitutesaspecificstatutoryschemethattriggersCivilRule82(a)sprovisionthat

    CivilRule82shallnotapplywhenfeeshiftingisotherwiseprovidedbylaw.50 Thus

    wereasonedthatAS13.26.131(d)entirelydisplacesCivilRule82inguardianshipand

    conservatorship proceedings.51 Here, similarly, the cost-recovery mechanism in

    AS44.21.415(e) and 2AAC60.310 constitutesaspecificstatutory schemethat

    entirelydisplacesRule82inelderfraudprotectiveorderproceedings.

    AnexaminationoftheProbateRulesleadsustothesameconclusion.

    ProbateRule1(e)prohibitstheapplicationofproceduresthatwouldinterferewiththe

    unique character and purpose of a probate proceeding, including the elder fraud

    protectiveproceedingsatissuehere.52 AsOPAhaspointedout,thelegislaturespurpose

    inenactingtheelderfraudprotectiveorderprovisionswastoenhanceOPAsabilityto

    addresselderfraudcasesinAlaska.53 ThelegislaturegaveOPAmultipletoolstoachieve

    50 In re Protective Proceedings of Vernon H.,332P.3d565,577(Alaska2014).

    51 Id.

    52 The elder fraud protective order provisions, AS 13.26.207-.209, aregovernedbytheProbateRulesbecausetheyfallwithinTitle13oftheAlaskaStatutes.See AlaskaRuleProb.P.1(b)(Theserulesgovernpracticeandprocedureinthetrial

    courtsinallphasesofproceedingsbroughtunderTitle13oftheAlaskaStatutes....).53 Ch.71,10,SLA2012;see Minutes,S.JudiciaryComm.Hearingon

    S.B.86,27thLeg.,1stSess.1:40-1:46(Feb.21,2011)(testimonyofKellyHenriksen,AssistantAttyGen.)(describingtheproblemofelderfraudinAlaskaasthemotivation

    (continued...)

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    thisgoal;theprovisionforexparteprotectiveorders,inparticular,indicatesthatthe

    legislatureclearlyintendedtogiveOPAsignificantpowertoaddresstheproblem.54

    BecauseRule82allowsanawardofattorneysfeestotheprevailingpartyineverycivil

    case,55 applyingRule82totheseproceedingswouldsubjecttheOfficetosignificant

    liabilityforattorneysfees. Wehaveconcludedinsimilarcontextsthatthefearofan

    adverseawardcouldsignificantlychillthewillingnessofapetitionertocommence

    protectiveproceedingsinthepublicinterest.56 Here,too,thespecterofRule82feesin

    anycasewhereOPAdoesnotprevailcouldsignificantlychillOPAswillingnessand

    abilitytopursuecasesundertheelderfraudprovisions. Sucharesultwouldundermine

    thelegislaturesverypurposeincreatingthismechanismforaddressingelderfraud. In

    sum,applyingRule82totheelderfraudprotectiveorderprovisionswouldinterfere

    withthe uniquecharacter and purposeoftheseproceedings.57 ProbateRule 1(e)

    thereforedictatesthatRule82mustnotapplyhere.

    53(...continued)

    forthebill).

    54 See AS13.26.207.

    55 AlaskaR.Civ.P.82(a).

    56 See Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst.,167P.3d701,703(Alaska2007)(concludingthatthereisnobasisforanattorneysfeeawardincivilcommitmentactions);Cooper v. State,638P.2d174,178(Alaska1981)(decliningtoawardsuchfeesinCINAcases).

    57 WereachedasimilarconclusioninVernon H.,whereweexplainedthatCivilRule82couldnotapplybecauseitwouldinterferewiththeuniquecharacterand

    purposeofguardianshipandconservatorshipproceedings inviolationofProbateRule1(e).In re Protective Proceedings of Vernon H.,332P.3d565,577(Alaska2014)(quotingAlaskaRuleProb.P.1(e)).

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    ApplyingRule82wouldalsoconflictwiththelegislaturesevidentintent

    tokeepcostslowwhilegivingOPAthesetoolsforaddressingelderfraud.Asdiscussed

    above, this concern was the precise reason the legislature created a cost-recovery

    mechanismwhenitestablishedtheOfficeofElderFraudandAssistance. Applying

    Rule82 to elder fraudcases brought by the Officewould entirelyundermine the

    legislaturespurposeincreatingthiscost-recoveryscheme.Inaddition,ourconclusion

    thatRule82doesnotapplyisconsistentwiththelegislaturesdecisiontomodeltheelder

    fraudprotectiveorderstatuteontheprovisionsfordomesticviolenceprotectiveorders, 58

    whichagaindonotprovideforanawardofattorneysfeesagainstthepetitioner. 59

    Accordingly, in the context of elder fraud protective orders under

    AS 13.26.207-.209, we conclude that thecost-recovery mechanismestablishedby

    AS44.21.415(e)entirelydisplacesCivilRule82. 60 Andbecausethatcost-recovery

    mechanismdoesnotalloweitherthepersonaccusedofelderfraudortheprotected

    58

    Minutes,H.FinanceComm.HearingonS.B.86,27thLeg.,2dSess.1:441:48(Mar.1,2012)(testimonyofKellyHenriksen,AssistantAttyGen.);Minutes,S.JudiciaryComm.HearingonS.B.86,27thLeg.,1stSess.1:35-1:36(Apr.11,2011)(testimonyofSen.HollisFrench);Minutes,S.JudiciaryComm.HearingonS.B.86,27thLeg.,1stSess.1:53-1:55(Feb.21,2011)(testimonyofKellyHenriksen,AssistantAttyGen.).

    59 AS18.66.100(c)(14)(providingthatadomesticviolenceprotectiveordermayrequiretherespondenttopaycostsandfeesincurredbythepetitioner).

    60

    AlthoughtheregulationinterpretingAS44.21.415suggeststhatRule82mightapplyinproceedingsbroughtbytheOffice,specifyingthattheOfficecanseekastandardfeerecoveryfrom thedefendantunlessthecourtfindsjustificationforahigherawardunderAlaskaRuleofCivilProcedure82,forthereasonsexplainedaboveweconcludethatafeeawardunderRule82wouldbeinconsistentwiththestatutoryschemeestablishedbyAS44.21.415. See 2AAC60.310;AS44.21.415(e).

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    persontorecoverattorneysfeesfromOPA,nofeesareavailabletoSidneyorJeanR.

    inthiscase.

    Jeansestatearguesthatafeeschemethatdoesnotprovideforafeeaward

    againstOPApromotesunnecessaryorvindictivelitigationsin[c]ethepetitionerneed

    notworryaboutanadversefeesaward.Butagain,thelegislaturechosenottocreate

    a fee-shifting mechanism that might act as such a check on OPAs elder fraud

    prosecutions, evidently trusting that the States limited resources and OPAs

    prosecutorialdiscretionwouldleadtheOfficetofocusonthemostmeritoriouselder

    fraudcases. Here, the superiorcourtwasunderstandablyconcernedthatOPAhad

    imposedsignificantcostsonJeanandSidneybypursuinganelderfraudprotectiveorder

    basedonallegationsthatwereultimatelyfoundtobeentirelywithoutmerit.Onthe

    otherhand,OPAdidhavesomeevidentiarybasisforitspetitionatthetimeoffiling:

    The recordindicatesthattheOffice reviewedbankstatements,subpoenaedandreviewed

    financial records,interviewedShelleyandGeoffrey,communicatedwith theAdult

    ProtectiveServicescaseworkerincontactwithJean,andrevieweddocumentsrelated

    tothefinancialexpendituresatissue. Furtherinvestigation,ofcourse,eventuallyledthe

    courttoconcludethatSidneysexpenditureswerenotfraudulentandthatSidneyhadin

    factprovidedlovingcaretohermother. Butthisultimateresultcannotchangethefact

    thatthelegislaturecreatedacost-allocationschemeunderAS44.21.415(e)thatdoesnot

    permitanawardofattorneysfeesagainstOPA.

    We therefore reverse the superior courts award ofattorneys fees in

    connectionwiththeelderfraudprotectiveorderproceeding.

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    B. TheSuperiorCourtDidNotErrInDenyingAttorneysFeesAgainstOPAInTheConservatorshipProceeding.

    Oncross-appeal, Jeans estate and Sidney also challenge the superior

    courtsdenialoffeesintheseparateconservatorshipproceeding.Inreviewingthis

    decision,wefirstnotethatthesuperiorcourtproperlyconcludedthatAS13.26.131(d)

    istheapplicablestatute. Iftherewasanydoubtastoitsapplicabilityatthetimeofthe

    superiorcourtsorder,ouropinioninVernon H.hassinceclarifiedthatAS13.26.131(d)

    applies in every guardianship or conservatorship case.61 Accordingly,

    AS 13.26.131(d) entirely displaces Civil Rule 82 in [this] conservatorship

    proceeding[].62

    Byitsplainterms,AS13.26.131(d)allowsafeeawardonlyagainstaparty

    whoinitiated aproceedingunderthischapterthatwasmalicious,frivolous,orwithout

    just cause.63 The superior court found that OPA, by continuing to litigate the

    conservatorshipproceedingthatwasbroughtbyShelley,didnotinitiateaproceeding

    withinthemeaningofthatprovision. Incontinuingtolitigatetheconservatorship,OPA

    tooktheroleofaninterestedparty,butthatinvolvementdidnotconvertOPAintothe

    initiatoroftheproceeding.SidneynowarguesthatOPAactedasapartyfromtheverybeginningof

    thecase becauseOPAslawyersconsultedwithShelleyand,accordingtoSidneys

    allegations,OPAslawyersactuallypreparedtherevisedconservatorshippetitionthat

    wassubmittedinShelleysname. ButthesuperiorcourtfoundthatevenShelleys

    amendedpetitionwassignedpersonallyby[Shelley],andnotbycounselforOPA[]

    61 Vernon H.,332P.3dat577.

    62 Id.

    63 Emphasisadded.

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    andthat[t]hecasewasinitiallyfiledby[Shelley]...and[therewas]noreasonto

    believe that she wasprompted todo so byOPA[]. Given that Shelleyfiled the

    conservatorshippetition,itisclearthatsheinitiatedtheproceedingwithinthemeaning

    ofAS13.26.131(d). ThusthesuperiorcourtcorrectlyconcludedthatOPAhadnot

    initiatedtheproceeding,andthereforenofeeawardagainstOPAwasavailableunder

    AS13.26.131(d).

    ThesuperiorcourtwasjustifiablypuzzledbyOPAsdecisiontocontinue

    thelitigation,particularlywhenfactssuchasthecorrectnamesofthepassengersonthe

    airlineticketshadalreadycometolight,andthesuperiorcourtaptlynotedthat[o]ne

    couldsecondguessthewaythiscasewaslitigated. ButweagreethatOPAsdecision

    tocontinuelitigatingtheconservatorshipcannottriggertheprovisionforfeesagainstthe

    initiatoroftheproceeding,evenifthatdecisionmayhaveprolongedthecaseandraised

    costs for all parties involved. And in the settlement agreement reached in the

    conservatorshipproceeding,JeanandSidneyagreednottoseekfeesagainstShelley,the

    onlypartywhomightotherwisebesubjecttofeesastheinitiatorofthatproceeding.

    JeansestateandSidneyalsoarguethatafeeawardisjustifiedbecause

    collateralestoppelorresjudicatashouldhavebarredOPAscontinuedlitigationofthe

    conservatorshippetitionaftertheelderfraudproceedingwasclosed,makingOPAs

    continuedlitigationvexatious,frivolous,notingoodfaithandwithoutjustcause.But

    weneednotreachthisissuegivenourconclusionthat,asathresholdmatter,afeeaward

    under AS 13.26.131(d) is not available against a party who did not initiate the

    proceeding.64

    64 We also note that AS 13.26.230 provides that, unless otherwisecompensatedforservicesrendered,anyvisitor, lawyer,physician,conservator, orspecialconservatorappointedinaprotectiveproceedingisentitledtoreasonablecompensation

    (continued...)

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    Lastly,SidneyandJeansestatearguethatAS13.26.353(c)justifiesafee

    award. ButAS13.26.353(c)isnotafee-shiftingstatute. Rather,itprovidesastatutory

    causeofactionagainstthirdpart[ies]whofail[]tohonoraproperlyexecutedstatutory

    formpowerofattorney....65 Pursuingformaladjudicationofaconservatorship

    petitionthroughthecourtsystemisnotafail[ure]tohonorapowerofattorneybut

    ratheranexplicitrecognitionofitslegitimacy. Here,accordingly,nofeesareavailable

    underAS13.26.353(c).

    For these reasons, weconclude that the superior court did not err in

    decliningtoawardfeesagainstOPAintheconservatorshipproceeding.

    V. CONCLUSION

    WeREVERSEandVACATEthesuperiorcourtsfeeawardintheelder

    fraudprotectiveorderproceeding. WeAFFIRMthedenialofattorneysfeesinthe

    conservatorshipproceeding.

    64(...continued)fromtheestate. See In re S.H.,987P.2d735,742(Alaska1999)(holdingthatthe

    petitioners costs in a conservatorship proceeding should be charged against therespondentsestate). Noneofthepartieshascitedthisstatute,anditdoesnotappeartoaffecttheresult inthiscase. We thereforeexpressnoopiniononthe relationship

    betweenAS13.26.131andAS13.26.230inothercases.

    65 AS13.26.353(c).

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