MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2020ME91Docket: Aro-19-203SubmittedOnBriefs: April14,2020

Decided: June18,2020Panel: MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HUMPHREY,HORTON,andCONNORS,JJ.Majority: MEAD,GORMAN,HUMPHREY,andHORTON,JJ.Concurrence: CONNORSandJABAR,JJ.

STATEOFMAINEv.

WAICHANHORTON,J.

[¶1]WaiChanappealsfromajudgmentofconvictionenteredbythetrial

court(AroostookCounty,Stewart,J.)afterajuryfoundhimguiltyofburglary

(ClassB),17-AM.R.S.§401(1)(B)(4)(2020),andtheftbyunauthorizedtaking

ortransfer(ClassC),17-AM.R.S.§353(1)(B)(4)(2020).Hearguesthatthetrial

courterredwhen itdeniedhismotiontosuppressportionsofasurveillance

videorecording,whereotherportionsoftherecordingwerenotpreserved.He

also contends that although he did not object, the court committed obvious

errorbyfailingtointerveneafterseveraloftheprosecutor’scommentsmade

duringtheState’sclosingargument.Weaffirmthejudgment.

2

I.BACKGROUND

[¶2]Viewingtheevidenceadmittedattrialinthelightmostfavorableto

theState, the jurycouldhave found the following factsbeyonda reasonable

doubt. See State v. Bethea, 2019 ME 169, ¶ 2, 221 A.3d 563. During the

afternoonofSeptember3,2017,whilethevictimswereatwork,Chandroveto

theirhomeinCaribou.Althoughheknewthathewasnotlicensedorprivileged

todoso,heenteredtheresidencethroughthelockedfrontdoorusingakey

thatwashiddeninanunlockedentryway.Onceinside,hegatheredsomeofthe

victims’property,includingalaptopcomputer,anelectricshaver,abackpack,

andcash. Hecarried theproperty tohisvehicle,placed it inside,anddrove

away.Thevalueofthepropertyexceeded$1,000.

[¶3]Chanwasfamiliarwiththevictimsandtheirworkschedules,aswell

astheresidenceandthelocationofthehiddenkey,becausehehadpreviously

livedwiththevictimsattheresidenceandworkedwiththematarestaurant.

Hehadalsohelpedoneof thevictimspickout the laptopcomputerandhad

accompaniedthevictimtothestoretopurchaseit.Abouttwoweeksbeforethe

burglaryandtheftoccurred,hehadendedhisemploymentattherestaurant

andmovedoutoftheresidence.

3

[¶4]Bycomplaint,andthenbyindictment,theStatechargedChanwith

onecountofburglary(ClassB),17-AM.R.S.§401(1)(B)(4),andonecountof

theft (Class B), 17-AM.R.S. §353(1)(B)(1) (2020). After Chan pleaded not

guiltytobothcharges,hemovedtosuppresstwosurveillancevideorecordings

thatthepolicehadobtained.Hearguedthattherecordingswereexcerptsfrom

a longer recordingand that theState’s failure topreserve the full recording

violatedhisdueprocessrights.1Thecourtheldasuppressionhearingandthen

deniedChan’smotion.

[¶5] The court’s order denying the motion included the following

findings, which are supported by competent evidence in the suppression

record.SeeStatev.McNaughton,2017ME173,¶10,168A.3d807.Afterthe

burglary and theft were reported to the police, an officer contacted a

conveniencestore locatedacross theroad fromthevictims’hometo inquire

whetherthestorehadsurveillancefootageofthearea.Thestoremanagertold

theofficerthatthestoredidhaveasurveillancecamerafacinginthedirection

of the victims’ home. The officer asked the store manager to review the

1 Chanalsocontendedthat the failure topreserve theoriginalrecordingdeprivedhimof the

abilitytocross-examineawitnesseffectivelyandthatthatwitness’sidentificationwasinfluencedbyundulysuggestiveproceduresbythepolice.Hehasnotraisedeitherofthoseargumentsonappeal.

4

recordingsforthedayinquestion“frommorning(8a.m.)untildark”and“to

lookforanythingunusual,oranyonecomingandgoingatunusualtimes.”

[¶6]Thestoremanagerassignedthetasktoanemployee,instructingthe

employee“towatchthevideofortheentireday,andtorecord...alltimeswhen

someonewasseencomingorgoing fromthehouseacross thestreet.”2 The

employeewatched thevideoand identified threespecific times for thestore

manager: first, 9:40 a.m., when people left the home; second, shortly after

2:00p.m.,whenapersonparkedacarinthedrivewayandenteredthehome;

andthird,shortlyafter4:00p.m.,whenapersonleftthehome,walkedtothe

parkedcarwhilecarryingthings,anddroveaway.

[¶7] The storemanager placed two separate video clips onto a data

storage device—one showing the activity around 2:00 p.m., and the other

showingtheactivityaround4:00p.m.—andprovidedthedevicetotheofficer.

The officer did not ask anyone who worked at the store to preserve any

recordingsortoprovideanyadditionalrecordings.Asthestore’ssurveillance

systemaccumulatednewdata,itautomaticallyrecordedoveranydatathathad

2NeitherChannortheStatecalledthisemployeeasawitnessduringthesuppressionhearing.

5

notbeenspecificallypreserved. Atsomepoint,allofthestore’ssurveillance

videodatafromSeptember3,2017,waswrittenoverandlost.3

[¶8]Applyingthelegalstandardswehavesetforthin,forexample,State

v.Cote,2015ME78,¶15,118A.3d805,thecourtconcludedthattheState’s

failure toobtainorpreserveotherportionsof the store’s surveillancevideo

recordings did not constitute a violation of Chan’s due process rights. In

reachingitsconclusion,thecourtfoundthatChanhadnotmethisburdento

demonstrateeither(1)thatitwasapparentthatanyunpreservedportionsof

therecordingshadexculpatoryvalue,or(2)thattheStateactedinbadfaithin

failing to preserve the remainder of the store’s recording from the day in

question.

[¶9] The court held a two-day jury trial in April 2019. Among other

instructionsthatitgavebeforeclosingarguments,thecourtinstructedthejury

that statements by the attorneys, including closing arguments, were not

evidence. The court also explained the presumption of innocence and the

3TheevidencesuggeststhatthisoccurredbeforeChansubmittedamoreparticularizeddiscovery

requesttotheStatepursuanttoM.R.U.Crim.P.16(b)(7),(c).

6

State’sburdenofproofbeyondareasonabledoubt,andinstructedthejurythat

Chanhadnoburdentopresentanyevidenceortoproveanything.4

[¶10] During Chan’s closing argument, he suggested that he was a

scapegoat and that someone else who worked at the restaurant must have

knownaboutandstolen themoney. Inresponse,during theState’s rebuttal

closing argument, the prosecutor suggested that Chan’s theories were

inconsistentwiththeevidencethathadbeenadmittedandcommentedonthe

lackofevidencetosupportthem.ChandidnotobjecttoanypartoftheState’s

closingargument.

[¶11]Thejuryreturnedguiltyverdictsontheburglaryandtheftcounts,

andfoundthatthevalueofthestolenpropertywasmorethan$1,000butnot

morethan$10,000.5ThecourtsentencedChantothreeyearsinprisononthe

burglarycount,andtwoyearsinprison,concurrent,onthetheftcount.6The

courtalsoimposed$1,000inrestitutionforthebenefitofthevictimsand$70in

4Chandidnotrequestaninstructiononspoliationofevidencerelatedtotheunpreservedvideo

recording.Cf.Statev.St.Louis,2008ME101,¶¶3,5,951A.2d80.5ThetheftconvictionwasthereforeforaClassCoffense,see17-AM.R.S.§353(1)(B)(4)(2020),

insteadofaClassBoffense,see17-AM.R.S.§353(1)(B)(1)(2020),astheStatehadalleged.6 The judgment indicates that Chan received credit for time served, which, by the time of

sentencing,wasabouteighteenmonths.

7

surcharges.Thecourtenteredajudgmentontheverdict.Chantimelyappeals.7

See15M.R.S.§2115(2020);M.R.App.P.2B(b)(1).

II.DISCUSSION

[¶12]Chanarguesthatthetrialcourterredwhenitdeniedhismotionto

suppress the preserved surveillance recordings, and that the prosecutor’s

comments during the State’s closing argument constituted misconduct

requiringanewtrial.Weaddresshisargumentsinturn.

A. UnpreservedEvidence

[¶13]Whenreviewingthedenialofamotiontosuppressevidence,we

reviewthetrialcourt’sfactualfindingsforclearerroranditslegalconclusions

denovo. Cote, 2015ME78,¶9, 118A.3d805. We “will uphold the court’s

denialofamotiontosuppressifanyreasonableviewoftheevidencesupports

the trial court’s decision.” State v. Diana, 2014 ME 45, ¶ 11, 89 A.3d 132

(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶14]InCote,wediscussedandclarifiedthelegalframeworkthatapplies

when a defendant contends that his constitutional right to a fair trial was

violated by the State’s failure to preserve certain evidence. 2015 ME 78,

¶¶9-15,118A.3d805.Weexplainedthattheinquiryrequiresthetrialcourt

7TheSentenceReviewPaneldeniedChan’sapplicationforleavetoappealfromhissentence.See

M.R.App.P.20;Statev.Chan,No.SRP-19-222(Me.Sent.Rev.PanelSept.10,2019).

8

“toconductabifurcatedanalysis.”Id.¶15.“First,thecourtmustdetermine

whether the evidence possessed ‘an exculpatory value that was apparent

before the evidence was destroyed.’” Id. (quoting California v. Trombetta,

467U.S.479,489(1984)).“Ifso,thenthedefendantmustshowonlythatthe

evidencewas ‘ofsuchanaturethatthedefendantwouldbeunabletoobtain

comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.’” Id. (quoting

Trombetta,467U.S.at489).“If,however,theexculpatoryvalueoftheevidence

wasnotapparentatthetimeofitslossordisappearance,thedefendantcannot

establishaconstitutionaldeprivationwithoutproofthattheStatealsoactedin

badfaithinfailingtopreservetheevidence.”Id.(citingArizonav.Youngblood,

488U.S.51,57-58(1988));seeYoungblood,488U.S.at58(“[U]nlessacriminal

defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve

potentiallyusefulevidencedoesnotconstituteadenialofdueprocessoflaw.”

(emphasisadded)).

[¶15] Wenoteat theoutset thatthecasesapplying thisanalysishave

examinedthegovernment’sfailuretopreserveevidencethat,foratleastsome

period of time, had comewithin its possession or control. See Youngblood,

488U.S.at52-54,57;Trombetta,467U.S.at481-83,487-88,488n.7;seealso,

e.g.,Cote,2015ME78,¶4,118A.3d805;Statev.Cruthirds,2014ME86,¶27,

9

96A.3d80;Statev.St.Louis,2008ME101,¶3,951A.2d80.Whenpresented

withallegations that thegovernment failed todisclose information,wehave

madeclearthatthedueprocessclausedoesnotrequiretheState“tosearchfor

informationtheStatedoesnotknowexistsandthat isnotwithinitscontrol.”

Statev.Hassan,2018ME22,¶19,179A.3d898(emphasisadded).Absentat

leastsomereasontoknowthattheevidenceexists,itwouldbeimpossiblefor

theStatetopreservetheevidenceinthefirstplaceortodiscloseitlater.Seeid.

¶22(“Anallegationthatprosecutorshavefailedtoturnoverinformationthat

theydonotactuallyorconstructivelypossessorcontrol...canneverserveas

the basis for aBrady violation.”);8 see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,

280-81(1999).

[¶16]Wedonotdepartfromthoseruleshere.Inthiscase,however,the

trialcourt,byapplyingthestandardsweexpressedinCote,implicitlyfoundthat

theunpreservedportionsofthestore’ssurveillancevideorecordingsforthe

dayinquestionwerewithintheknowledgeandatleasttheconstructivecontrol

of the investigating officer, and therefore of the State, before they were

destroyed. In the particular circumstances of this case, that finding was

8InBradyv.Maryland,373U.S.83,87(1963),theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtestablishedthat

adueprocessviolationoccurswhenthegovernmentfailstodiscloseevidencethatis“favorabletoanaccused”and“materialeithertoguiltortopunishment.”

10

supportedbythesuppressionrecord.Theevidencesuggestedthattheofficer

wasinformedthatthestorehadarecordingthatcoveredtheentiretimeperiod

duringwhichthevictimsclaimedtheyhadbeenawayfromtheirresidenceon

thedayoftheallegedburglary,andthattheofficercouldeasilyhaveobtained

that entire recording. In addition, all of the store employees’ investigatory

conductwasperformedatthedirectionof,andinconsultationwith,thepolice.

[¶17]ContrarytotheState’scontention,thiscaseisunlikeHassan;there,

theStatehadnoreasontosuspectthattheevidenceinquestionexisteduntila

potential witness told the prosecutor new information shortly before trial.9

2018 ME 22, ¶¶ 3-4, 19, 179 A.3d 898. It is like Trombetta, where the

government had “[t]he capacity to preserve” the breath samples at issue,

467U.S.at488n.7.Althoughthepolicehavenoconstitutionaldutytopursue

anyparticularcourseof investigation,seeStatev.Robbins,1997ME21,¶7,

689A.2d603,oncetheofficerherebecameawareofthenatureoftheavailable

recording, it became material over which the State could have obtained

9WearesimilarlyunpersuadedbytheState’sattemptstoanalogizethiscasetoStatev.Robinson,

2015ME77,118A.3d242,andStatev.Robbins,1997ME21,689A.2d603,neitherofwhichinvolvedadueprocesschallengebasedonunpreservedevidence.InRobinson,weheldthatthetrialcourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretionwhenitallowedtestimonyaboutavideorecordingwheretheStatedidnotknow that the recording existeduntil after it hadbeendestroyed. 2015ME77,¶¶9-13, 22-36,118A.3d242.InRobbins,acasethatdidnotinvolvethelossordestructionofevidenceatall,weheldthatthetrialcourtdidnoterrinpermittingtherebuttaltestimonyofcertainwitnesseswheretheStatewasunawareoftheexistenceofthewitnessesuntiltheendofthefirstdayoftrial.1997ME21,¶¶4-7,689A.2d603.

11

possessionorcontrol,cf.Statev.Foy,662A.2d238,242(Me.1995)(explaining

that evidence that the State “had no reason to assume” existed “was not

materialthatwas,orshouldhavebeen,inthe[State’s]possessionorcontrol”).

[¶18]WethereforeevaluateChan’sargumentpursuanttothebifurcated

analysissetforthinTrombetta,467U.S.at489,andYoungblood,488U.S.at58,

as described inCote, 2015ME 78, ¶¶ 10-15, 118 A.3d 805.10 As discussed

above,supra¶14,thefirststepintheanalysis is forthecourtto“determine

whether the evidence possessed ‘an exculpatory value that was apparent

10WehaveunambiguouslyadoptedtheTrombettaandYoungbloodstandardswheninterpreting

theMaine Constitution in this area of the law. See State v. Anderson, 1999ME 18, ¶¶ 1, 7-12,724A.2d1231 (applying the Trombetta and Youngblood standards to address a due processchallengepursuanttotheMaineConstitutionandreiteratingthat“[t]hisCourthasheldrepeatedlythatdueprocessundertheMaineConstitutionprovidesnogreaterprotectiontoindividualsthandoesdueprocessundertheUnitedStatesConstitution”);seealsoStatev.Cote,2015ME78,¶¶10-15,118A.3d805;Statev.Bilynsky,2007ME107,¶41,932A.2d1169;Statev.Berkley,567A.2d915,917-18(Me.1989).Chanpointsoutinafootnoteinhisbriefthatcourtsinotherjurisdictionshaveinterpretedtheir

stateconstitutionstograntdueprocessprotectioninthiscontextbeyondthatdefinedinTrombettaandYoungblood, and invitesustodolikewise,withoutexplainingwhat intheMaineConstitutionwould be the basis for doing so. See, e.g., State v. Morales, 657 A.2d 585, 590-95 (Conn.1995)(collectingcases);Statev.Delisle,648A.2d632,642-43(Vt.1994);Statev.Smagula,578A.2d1215,1217(N.H.1990);Commonwealthv.Olszewski,519N.E.2d587,590(Mass.1988). Wedeclinetheinvitation.See,e.g.,Statev.Lowe,2015ME124,¶23n.6,124A.3d156;Statev.Genotti,601A.2d1013,1021(Conn.1992)(decliningtoreachthispreciseissueabsent“aseparatestateconstitutionalanalysisallegingaviolationof . . . statedueprocessrights”);cf.Morales,657A.2dat589&n.10(reaching the state constitutional law issue because the appellant had “furnish[ed] a detailedanalysis”relatedspecificallytothestateconstitution).AstheConnecticutSupremeCourthasstated,“relianceonotherstateconstitutionalprecedentdoesnotsufficeasaproxyforindependentanalysisofourownconstitutionallanguage,history,traditionandpolicy.”Statev.Perez,591A.2d119,124(Conn.1991).We do not foreclose the reassessment that Chan suggests, and that the concurrence also

endorses,iftheopportunityarisesinafuturecaseinwhichtheissueisfullydeveloped.

12

before theevidencewasdestroyed.’” Cote, 2015ME78,¶15,118A.3d805

(quotingTrombetta,467U.S.at489).

[¶19] The trial court found that the evidence was not apparently

exculpatory when it was destroyed, and that finding was affirmatively

supported by the suppression record. Chan does not argue otherwise—he

referstotheunpreservedrecordingsonlyas“potentiallyexculpatory.”Infact,

therecordaffordsnoreasontodoubtthattheemployeewhoactuallyreviewed

thesurveillancevideonotedallactivitydepicted,noranyreasontodoubtthat

the manager provided everything of any import on the video during the

appropriateinterval.11Noevidenceadmittedduringthehearingindicatedor

even implied that the unpreserved portions of the recording had any

exculpatory value at all, let alone that that fact was or should have been

apparenttothepoliceortheState. Seeid.¶¶17-18;Cruthirds,2014ME86,

¶¶30-32,96A.3d80.

[¶20] Given the lack of apparently exculpatory evidence in the

unpreservedportionofthesurveillancevideorecording,Chanboretheburden

11WearenotpersuadedbyChan’sargumentthat“nobodyeverwatchedsomeof”therecording.

Basedonthetestimonythatthestoreemployeewatchedtherecordingof“theentireday”and“untilitgotdark,” thecourtcouldhaverationally foundthattheemployeestoppedwatchingwhentherecordingbecamedarkenoughthatshecouldnotseetheresidenceacrosstheroad.SeeStatev.Sasso,2016ME95,¶19,143A.3d124(notingthatabsentamotionforfurtherfindings,“weinferthatthecourtfoundallthefactsnecessarytosupportitsjudgmentifthoseinferredfindingsaresupportablebyevidenceintherecord”(quotationmarksomitted)).

13

ofdemonstratingthat“theState...actedinbadfaithinfailingtopreservethe

evidence.”Cote,2015ME78,¶15,118A.3d805;seeYoungblood,488U.S.at58.

The trial court found that he did notmeet that burden, andwe review that

findingforclearerror,Cote,2015ME78,¶19,118A.3d805.Thequestionof

badfaithisafact-specificinquiryfocusingonthereasonsbehindtheactionor

inaction leading to the claimed due process violation. See, e.g., Cruthirds,

2014ME86,¶32,96A.3d80(affirmingafindingofnobadfaithwherepolice

destroyedasexualassaultvictim’sclothing,giventhatthedefendanthadbeen

positively identifiedbyaneyewitness and “nothingbeyondbarespeculation

pointedtoanalternativesuspect”whentheclothingwasdestroyed). “[B]ad

faithrequiresmorethannegligence.”Cote,2015ME78,¶19n.5,118A.3d805;

seeSt.Louis,2008ME101,¶7,951A.2d80(affirmingafindingofnobadfaith

“despite the State’s serious oversight” in allowing an insurance company to

destroyavehicleinvolvedinanaccident).

[¶21]Oncethepolicebecameawarethatthesurveillancevideodepicted

activityattheresidenceduringthetimeinquestion,theycouldhaveobtained

therecordingfortheentireday,ratherthanonlythepartsofthevideothatthe

storeemployeehadpickedoutandthemanagerhadprovided.However,the

failuretodosowasnegligentatworst. Asthetrialcourtfound,noevidence

14

suggested that the State failed to preserve the remaining portions of the

recording in order to conceal exculpatory evidence or to avoid discovery

obligations.SeeCote,2015ME78,¶19,118A.3d805;Cruthirds,2014ME86,

¶¶32-33,96A.3d80;seealsoYoungblood,488U.S.at58.Thattheofficerdid

notpersonallywatchtheentirevideo,evenacceptingChan’sargumentthathe

should have, does not indicate reckless or intentional conduct.12 See Cote,

2015ME78,¶19&n.5,118A.3d805.Thetrialcourt’sfindingthattheState

didnotactinbadfaithwhenitfailedtopreservetheremainderoftherecording

didnotconstituteclearerror.

[¶22]Wethereforedeclinetodisturbthecourt’sfindingsandconclude

thatthecourtdidnoterrwhenitdeniedChan’smotiontosuppress.SeeDiana,

2014ME45,¶11,89A.3d132.

B. ProsecutorialMisconduct

[¶23] Chan argues that several of theprosecutor’s statements during

closingargumentsconstitutedmisconductbecausetheyimproperlysuggested

thathehadaburdentopresentevidenceinsupportofhistheoryofthecase.13

12WethereforedonotreachChan’scontentiononappealthatYoungblood’sbadfaithrequirement

couldbesatisfiedbyashowingofrecklessdisregardforthepotentiallyexculpatoryvalueofevidencethatcouldhavebeenobtained,preserved,anddisclosedtothedefense.13Healsoarguesthatanotherstatementmadebytheprosecutorwasanimproperappealtothe

jurors’sympathiesforthevictims.Wearenotpersuaded.Inthecontextoftheentiretwo-daytrial,theprosecutor’sreferencetothevictims’modest,hardworkinglives,evenviewedalongsideother

15

Because he did not object to the statements during the trial, we review for

obviouserror. SeeM.R.U.Crim.P. 52(b); State v. Sousa, 2019ME171,¶15,

222A.3d171.“Toshowobviouserror,theremustbe(1)anerror,(2)thatis

plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.”14 Sousa, 2019 ME 171, ¶15,

222A.3d171(quotationmarksomitted).“[I]fthesethreeconditionsaremet,

wewillsetasideajury’sverdictonlyifweconcludethat(4)theerrorseriously

affectsthefairnessandintegrityorpublicreputationofjudicialproceedings.”

Id.(alterationinoriginal)(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶24]Wefirstreviewinstancesofallegedprosecutorialmisconductto

determine whether misconduct occurred; if so, we then “review the State’s

commentsasawhole,examiningtheincidentsofmisconductbothaloneand

taken together.” Statev.Cheney,2012ME119,¶34,55A.3d473. “Whena

prosecutor’sstatementisnotsufficienttodrawanobjection,particularlywhen

viewedintheoverallcontextofthetrial,thatstatementwillrarelybefoundto

have created a reasonable probability that it affected the outcome of the

proceeding.”Statev.Dolloff,2012ME130,¶38,58A.3d1032.

allegedimproperstatements,didnotconstitutemisconductrequiringanewtrial.See,e.g.,Statev.Stanton,1998ME85,¶¶11-13,710A.2d240.14 “To establish that the error affected a defendant’s substantial rights, the defendant has a

significant burden of demonstrating a reasonable probability that the prosecutor’s statementaffected the outcome of the proceeding.” State v. Woodard, 2013 ME 36, ¶ 33, 68 A.3d 1250(alterationomitted)(quotationmarksomitted).

16

[¶25]“Shiftingtheburdenofprooftothedefendantorsuggestingthat

the defendantmust present evidence in a criminal trial is improper closing

argument.”Cheney,2012ME119,¶34,55A.3d473;seeDolloff,2012ME130,

¶42, 58 A.3d 1032 (citing United States v. Glover, 558 F.3d 71, 76-79

(1stCir.2009)). A prosecutor is, however, “permitted to comment on the

plausibility of the defendant’s theory.” Glover, 558 F.3d at 78. When the

prosecutor does so, the “focusmust be on the evidence itself andwhat the

evidenceshowsordoesnotshow,ratherthanonthedefendantandwhatheor

shehasshownorfailedtoshow.”Id.InCheney,forexample,theprosecutorin

closingargumentfirstsaidthatthedefendant“d[id]n’thaveanyevidence”to

supporthis theoryand then stated, “[T]heydesperatelywantyou tobelieve

that somebody else hit [the victim] . . . . Yet, they have no evidence of it.”

2012ME119,¶¶16-17,55A.3d473(thirdalteration inoriginal) (quotation

marksomitted).Wedecidedthattheargumentwasimproper,notingthat“itis

essentialthattheStateavoidmakinganystatementsuggestingthatacriminal

defendanthasanyburdentodisprovethechargesagainsthimorher.TheState

is free, however, to forcefully argue to the jury that the evidence does not

supportorisnotconsistentwiththedefendant’stheoryofthecase.”Id.¶35

(citationomitted).

17

[¶26] Chan alleges four instances of improper burden-shifting by the

prosecutor during the State’s closing arguments. First, referring to Chan’s

arrest,theprosecutorsaid:

[T]here is no evidence presented that his car was packed full ofmoneyorhadacomputer. Thereisjustnoevidenceonthat. Um,thereisnoevidence—there’sbeennotestimonyfromsomebodyfromRhodeIslandthatsaidthisiswhathappened.Youjusthavethefactthathewasarrested,andthere’skindofanabsenceofinformationotherthanthathewasarrestedinRhodeIsland....

(Emphasis added.) Second, the prosecutor referred to Chan’s

alternative-suspecttheoryandsaid:

The problemwith that is you have to decide this case based onevidence, not onmere possibility. And the idea that somebodycould have done this, well, where’s the evidence? Who is thisperson?Whocouldthesepeoplebe?...[T]here’snoevidenceaboutthisunknowninsider.

(Emphasisadded.)Third,theprosecutorasked,rhetorically:

[A]reyousaying[thatChan]hungoutupherefortwoweeksbeforehewentinandcommittedthiscrime?Thereisnoevidencethathewasuphereforthosetwoweeks.Thereisjustnoevidenceofthatatall.Andtosaythat,well,hecouldn’thavebeenuphere,hehadtohave stayed here for two weeks, there’s no just no evidence tosupportthat.

(Emphasis added.) Finally, responding to Chan’s theory that others at the

restaurant framed him because he was an “outsider” after leaving the

restaurant,theprosecutorsaid:

18

Buttherewasnoevidencethat...Chan...hadagiantfallingout,that he had a fight with his boss, that there had been a violentdisagreement,thathewasfired. Thereisnoevidence thatwouldgiverise to a feeling that thepeopleat therestaurant . . . totallyresentedthefactthat...heleft.

(Emphasisadded.)

[¶27] Viewed “in the overall context of the trial,” State v. Sholes,

2020ME35,¶20, ---A.3d --- (quotationmarksomitted), the first, third,and

fourth statementsdidnot rise to the level ofmisconductbecause theywere

focused on the evidence that had been admitted, not on Chan’s failure to

present evidence of his innocence, see Glover, 558 F.3d at 76-79; Sousa,

2019ME171,¶¶10-12,222A.3d171(concludingthatastatementthatthere

was “no evidence” that the defendant was experiencing delusions did not

suggestthatthedefendanthadaburdentopresentsuchevidence(quotation

marksomitted)).

[¶28] The prosecutor’s second statement—in which he stated,

“[T]heidea that somebody [else] could have done this, well, where’s the

evidence?”—wasmore problematic because it came closer to implying that

Channeededtopresentevidencetosupporthisdenialofculpability.SeeUnited

Statesv.Berroa,856F.3d141,161-62(1stCir.2017);seealsoGlover,558F.3d

at77;UnitedStates v.Wihbey, 75F.3d761,770 (1stCir. 1996) (referring to

19

“how-does-counsel-explainargument[s]”as“animpermissibleshiftofburden

ofproof”(quotationmarksomitted)).

[¶29] Regardless, the court’s failure to intervene immediatelydidnot

constituteobviouserror.SeeM.R.U.Crim.P.52(b);Sousa,2019ME171,¶15,

222A.3d171.Inthiscase,thecourthadamplyinstructedthejurythatChan

had no burden whatsoever, stating that “[t]he law never imposes upon a

defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling anywitnesses or

producinganyevidence”andthat“theburdenofproofinthiscaseisentirely

upontheState.Thedefendantdoesnothavetoproveanything.Thedefendant

doesnothavetoproduceanyevidence. . . .Theburdennevershiftsfromthe

Statetothedefendant.”Thecourtalsoinstructedthejurythatstatementsby

the attorneys were not evidence. These instructions more than sufficed to

clarifyanymisimpressionthattheprosecutor’scommentsmayhavecreated.

Theentryis:

Judgmentaffirmed.

20

CONNORS,J.,withwhomJABAR,J.,joins,concurring.

[¶30]IagreewiththeCourt’sconclusionthatChan’sconvictionshould

beaffirmed. Hisdueprocessrightswerenotviolated,andhereceivedafair

trial.Iwriteseparatelytoexpresstwobrief,butimportant,caveats.

[¶31]First,Ibelieveitisimportantforustoacknowledgethatthedue

process standards enunciated several decades ago by the United States

SupremeCourt inArizona v. Youngblood, 488U.S. 51 (1988)—and, to some

extent,inCaliforniav.Trombetta,467U.S.479(1984)—havebeenthesubject

of considerable criticism. Legal scholars have described these standards as

placingtoomuchemphasisondeterringofficialmisconductwhenevidenceis

lostordestroyedandnotenoughonensuringfairand“reliablefactfindingthat

protectstheinnocentfromwrongfulconviction.”NormanC.Bay,OldBlood,Bad

Blood,andYoungblood:DueProcess,LostEvidence,andtheLimitsofBadFaith,

86 Wash. U. L. Rev. 241, 303-11 (2008) (noting that the harm a criminal

defendant experiences from the loss of evidence is the same regardless of

whether officials acted in good or bad faith). Many have emphasized how

infrequentlycriminaldefendantsareactuallyabletoprovethattheStateacted

in bad faith. See, e.g., Teresa N. Chen, The Youngblood Success Stories:

Overcomingthe“BadFaith”DestructionofEvidenceStandard,109W.Va.L.Rev.

21

421,456-57(2007);CynthiaE.Jones,EvidenceDestroyed,InnocenceLost:The

Preservation of Biological Evidence Under Innocence Protection Statutes,

42Am.Crim.L.Rev.1239,1246-47(2005);ElizabethA.Bawden,HereToday,

Gone Tomorrow—Three CommonMistakes Courts MakeWhen Police Lose or

DestroyEvidencewithApparentExculpatoryValue,48Clev.St.L.Rev.335,350

(2000). Somehaveadvocatedfortheadoptionofamorenuancedbalancing

testthatwouldhavecourtsweighthegovernment’sconductagainstthedegree

ofprejudicetotheaccusedtobetteraccomplishthetandemgoalsofprotecting

adjudicative fairness and discouraging official misconduct, see, e.g., Bay at

270-74, 309, as many other state courts have done pursuant to their state

constitutions, see State v. Morales, 657 A.2d 585, 594-95 (Conn. 1995)

(collectingcases).15

[¶32] Second,Idonotbelieveweshouldforeclosethepossibilitythat

different due process protections might be warranted under our own

provisionsintheMaineConstitutionprotectingdueprocessrights,Me.Const.

art.1,§§6and6-A,byrepeatingoverandover that “dueprocessunder the

15InStatev.Morales,forexample,theConnecticutSupremeCourtrejectedthefederalapproach

infavorofabalancingtestthatrequirescourtstoweigh“thereasonsfortheunavailabilityoftheevidenceagainstthedegreeofprejudicetotheaccused”byconsideringseveralfactors,including“thematerialityofthemissingevidence,thelikelihoodofmistakeninterpretationofitbywitnessesorthejury,thereasonforitsnonavailabilitytothedefenseandtheprejudicetothedefendantcausedbytheunavailabilityoftheevidence.”657A.2d585,594-95(Conn.1995)(quotingStatev.Asherman,478A.2d227,246(Conn.1984)).

22

MaineConstitutionprovidesnogreaterprotectiontoindividualsthandoesdue

process under the United States Constitution.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 18 n.10

(quotingStatev.Anderson,1999ME18,¶9,724A.2d1231).Thisoft-quoted

phrase has become something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. See Tinkle,

TheMaineStateConstitution44(2ded.2013)(explainingthatthephrase“law

oftheland”inMe.Const.art.1,§6,“wasfirstinterpretedtosignifytheprocess

andprocedureestablishedunderthecommonlaw,”but“oncetheFourteenth

Amendment[ofthefederalconstitution]cameintobeing,thelawoftheland

clause has been repeatedly equated with the federal due process clause”);

seealsoid.at20(notingthatthisCourthasoftenconcludedthatprovisionsof

the Maine Constitution are “coterminous” with their federal counterparts

“withoutanyanalysis”).

[¶33] In fact, aswithotherprovisions in theMaineConstitutionwith

federalcounterparts,wehavedepartedfromfederalconceptsofdueprocess.

SeeState v. Collins, 297A.2d 620, 625-27 (Me. 1972); see also State v. Rees,

2000ME55,¶¶5-6,748A.2d976(reaffirmingCollinsandnotingthat“federal

decisionsdonotservetoestablishthecompletestatementofcontrollinglaw

butrathertodelineateaconstitutionalminimumoruniversalmandateforthe

federal control of every State” (quotation marks omitted)). And we have

23

emphasized that “[a]lthough we may look to the construction of federal

constitutional provisions in U.S. Supreme Court cases and apply the same

constructionasfaraspossible,wearenotconfinedtothatconstructionwhen

... a more protective standard is warranted under Maine law.” Rees,

2000ME55, ¶ 9, 748A.2d 976; see also Lego v. Twomey, 404U.S. 477, 489

(1972)(“Ofcourse,theStatesarefree,pursuanttotheirownlaw,toadopta

higher[dueprocess]standard.Theymayindeeddifferastotheappropriate

resolution of the values they find at stake.”); Minnesota v. Nat'l Tea Co.,

309U.S.551,557(1940)(“Itisfundamentalthatstatecourtsbeleftfreeand

unfetteredbyusininterpretingtheirstateconstitutions.”).

[¶34] More broadly, under the “primacy approach” that we have

explicitly adopted, see State v. Rowe, 480 A.2d 778, 781 (Me. 1984), when

properly raised and developed, we interpret the Maine Constitution first,

examining—independently of the United States Constitution—the

constitutional question pursuant to Maine values. See State v. Flick,

495A.2d339, 343-44 (Me. 1985); State v. Larrivee, 479 A.2d 347, 349

(Me.1984). “It is only when we conclude that [a] claim under the state

constitution fails” thatweexamine the claim fromthe“standpointof federal

constitutionallaw.”Statev.Cadman,476A.2d1148,1150(Me.1984).

24

[¶35] Accordingly, I seenoreason tocurtailour ability to look to the

Maine Constitution to independently effectuate the ultimate purpose of due

process, which is to ensure “governmental fair play.” State v. Sklar,

317A.2d160,166n.6(Me.1974)(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶36]Withthatsaid,IagreewiththeCourtthatChanwasnotdenieddue

process in the circumstances of this case and that his state constitutional

argument isnotdevelopedenough forus toaddress any further. Moreover,

Iwould reach the same conclusion even if we were to reject the federal

standards and adopt an alternative balancing test given that Chan suffered

little, if any, prejudice from the unavailability of the rest of the surveillance

footageandthattheState’sfailuretopreservetheadditionalfootagewas,at

most,negligent.

RoryA.McNamara,Esq.,DrakeLaw,LLC,Berwick,forappellantWaiChanTodd R. Collins, District Attorney, Prosecutorial District #8, Caribou, forappelleeStateofMaineAroostookCountyUnifiedCriminalDocketdocketnumberCR-2017-320FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY