state of india's environment, a citizens report: rich lands poor people, is...

RICH LANDSPOOR PEOPLE

IS ‘SUSTAINABLE’ MINING POSSIBLE?

RICH LANDS POOR PEOPLE

State of India’sENVIRONMENT

6A C I T I Z E N S ' R E P O R T

CENTRE FOR SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT


“We call Koera chora bhuian, the land oftheft and the miners, doko, meaning

dacoits. They come and take our forests,land, rivers and even our lives.

They take away everything”– TRIBAL FROM KOERA, KEONJHAR DISTRICT,

ORISSA

“Mining and mineral industry operations arebecoming increasingly environmentally

conscious. Yet there are many conflicts thatarise in all mineral development projects

due to differing perceptions of the owners,investors, consumers and other

stakeholders. While much remains to beaccomplished to ensure compatibility

between environment and mining, with thecurrent arsenal of new technology tools

available, clean mining is withinthe realms of possibility”

– DECLARATION, 19TH WORLD MINING

CONGRESS, 2003, NEW DELHI

“The miner eventually leaves the landand can recreate or even improve

upon the forest as it existed beforecommencement of operations”

– HODA COMMITTEE REPORT, PLANNING

COMMISSION, 2006, NEW DELHI

“My ministry has recently assessed the status of compliance of environmental

safeguards stipulated for various miningprojects. I regret to tell that the status of

compliance is poor, to say the least. If perceptible improvement in performance on

environmental matters is not to be seen,the government will be constrained to

take a hard view” – T R BAALU, FORMER MINISTER OF

ENVIRONMENT AND FORESTS, SPEAKING AT THE

34TH ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING OF THE

FEDERATION OF INDIAN MINERAL INDUSTRIES,2000, NEW DELHI

“Miners will never create jobs forthe tribal people. Compensation money will

finish in two years, and after that,we’ll be left with nothing”

– BAHA KISKO, COMMUNITY LEADER,PACHWARA, PAKUR DISTRICT, JHARKHAND

TO THE PEOPLE WHO HAVE LOST EVERYTHING TO MINING

1 9 4 7 - 2 0 0 2

Governments in India love to talk

about poverty but usually serve

the interests of contractors and

companies. The trouble is that

mineral exploitation can easily

destroy the natural resource base of

the poor – forests and biodiversity,

in particular – unless there is a

strong governance of these

resources which involves the local

people instead of alienating them

Anil AgarwalFounder Director, CSE

‘‘

‘‘

CSE’s PublicationsFor 30 years, Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) has researched and published, authoritativematerial on environment. It is an unparallel database with in-depth analysis on Climate, Forests,Biodiversity, Industry, Air Pollution, Water, Desertification, Health, Toxic Waste, Education,Sustainable Development…

Check out our Publication Packages! Visit the CSE Store at: http://csestore.cse.org.in

MANAGING WATER

Making Water Everybody’s Business: Practice & Policyof Water Harvesting Edited by: Anil Agarwal, Sunita Narain & Indira KhuranaThis report provides in-depth analysis of traditional practices, technologies, policy issues and the work ofgovernments and NGOs. (Pages 456) PB: Rs 490 / US $22

Poison vs NutritionA briefing paper on “Pesticide Contamination and FoodSafety” — The CSE studies on pesticides in water andsoft drinks, pesticide contamination and its healthimpacts, regulatory apparatus and processes, right toclean water and the industrial use of water. (Pages 74) PB: Rs 250 / US $20

Sewage Canal: How to clean the YamunaSeveral crore rupees have been sunk into plans to clean up the Yamuna. The authorities have been busychasing targets to fulfill these plans. But the riverremains dirty. Backed by hard facts and data this latestbook explores the various options available to clean theYamuna. (Pages 180) PB: Rs 350 / US $14

Nectar To PoisonA briefing paper on Arsenic Contamination of GroundWater — an exhaustive set of FAQs on key issues, it'scauses, spread and technology available to mitigate theeffects. Contains an exhaustive database of resourceperson and institution working in the area. Also available in Hindi.(Pages 58) PB: Rs 100 / US $8

A Wastewater Recycling Manual for Urban Areas withcase studies A comprehensive documentation of localised community-level approaches in urban wastewater management.(Pages 52) PB: Rs 250 / US $20

A Water Harvesters’ Manual for Urban AreasThis manual is built out of CSE’s experience in providingtechnical advice to implement rainwater harvesting in theurban context. Available in English, Hindi, Marathi, Tamiland Telugu. (Pages 35) PB: Rs 100 / US $8

DOWN TO EARTH BOOKS

Anil Agarwal Reader: a decade of incisive commentaryon environment-development issuesThe Anil Agarwal Reader collects in three volumes someof his writings on the environment. They range from the1990s to the early years of this decade. The volumesshowcase the intensity and acuity with which he engagedwith the dominant concerns of the times. They are anessential introduction to environmental questions, movingseamlessly between local, national and internationalperspectives. (Pages Vol-1: 348, Vol-2: 220, Vol-3: 268) PB: One Volume: Rs 300 / US $15, Three Volume set: Rs 750 / US $35

Agenda UnlimitedAcross India, people have taken their destinies into theirhands – Improving their future. A compendium of suchstories. Reported over 12 years. (Pages 288) PB: Rs 490 / US $29

Survival Primer – Down To Earth Special Issue Contains prominent articles collated from 200 issues ofscience and environment fortnightly, Down To Earth, from1992 onwards. (Pages 240) PB: Rs 290 / US $10

STATE OF INDIA’S ENVIRONMENT

First Citizens' Report (SOE-1) Edited by: Anil Agarwal, Ravi Chopra & Kalpana SharmaThis report analyses the little understood relationshipbetween development and environment, the impact ofenvironmental degradation on individual, social groups,tribals and nomads. (Pages 192) PB: Rs 190 / US $10

Second Citizens' Report (SOE-2)Edited by: Anil Agarwal, Sunita NarainThis report describes major environmental changes inIndia. It’s a balance sheet of India’s resources andfocuses attention on the effect of ecological degradationon the poor. (Pages 393) PB: Rs 290 / US $12

Third Citizens' Report (SOE-3): Floods, Flood Plains &Environmental MythsEdited by: Anil Agarwal, Sunita Narain This report remains one of the few chronicles of theecological change taking place in the Indo-Gangetic plains— India’s most densely populated area. (Pages 167) PB: Rs 190 / US $10

Fourth Citizens Report (SOE-4): Dying WisdomEdited by: Anil Agarwal, Sunita NarainThis report provides a comprehensive overview of India’s millennia-old traditions of rainwater harvesting.Triggered a nationwide interest in community-based watermanagement. Also available in Hindi. (Pages 404) PB: Rs 390/US $14, Hindi Rs 290/US $12

Fifth Citizens' Report (SOE-5)Edited by: Anil Agarwal, Sunita Narain and Srabani SenThis report documents the extraordinary initiatives in therural sector and the crisis the urban sector faces. (Pages:Part I-440; Part II-256) PB: Rs 590 / US $33

GREEN POLITICS

GEN-1: Green PoliticsEdited by: Anil Agarwal, Sunita Narain, Anju Sharma This book provides a close analysis of importantenvironment related conventions and institutions fromtheir origins, and demystifies the politics of ‘saving theenvironment’. (Pages 409) PB: Rs 590 / US $31

GEN-2: Poles Apart Edited by: Anil Agarwal, Sunita Narain, Anju Sharma & Achila ImchenThe second in the series this book includes updates on theissues dealt within the first report, Green Politics. Thisreport has also new chapters on five conventions andinstitutions, and updates on issues covered in the firstreport. (Pages 441) PB: Rs 690 / US $33

Global Warming in an Unequal World: A case of environmental colonialism.Edited by: Anil Agarwal, Sunita Narain (Pages 34) PB: Rs 100 / US $8

INDUSTRY AND ENVIRONMENT

Concrete Facts – The life cycle of the Indian cementindustryA state of the art compilation of facts on the Indian cementindustry. It assesses its environmental, economic andsocial performance by covering issues ranging from rawmaterial sourcing to technology and finally benchmarks theperformance of 38 Indian cement plants with the globalbest practises. (Pages 164) PB: Rs 3,000 / US $90

All About Paper – Green Rating of Pulp & Paper IndustryA comprehensive Life Cycle Analysis (LCA) approach forassessing the environmental performance of pulp andpaper industry in various phases of life cycle ranging fromraw material sourcing to pollution generation and control.(Pages 344) PB: Rs 5,000/US $125

Mileage – Green Rating of Indian Automobile IndustryIn-depth Life Cycle Analysis of the environmentalperformance of major players in the Indian automobilesector. Also analyses technological issues, comparativeanalysis of best practices with global players andrecommends future outlook. (Pages 238) PB: Rs 490 / US $18

Environmental Rating of Indian Caustic-Chlorine Industry An exhaustive life cycle analysis of players in the Indiancaustic chlorine sector and its impact on environment.(Pages 334) PB: Rs 2999/US $90

POLLUTION AND HEALTH

The LEAPFROG FACTOR – Clearing the air in Asian citiesCaptures 10 years of action, impacts and learning toaddress the complex air pollution challenge in Asia. Thisbook is a survival guide for Asian cities trying to steertheir way out of the pollution haze. (Pages 448) PB: Rs 590 / US $35

Body burden: Health and Environment in IndiaA degraded environment brings with it a set of healthproblems – some new and some, which have posed achallenge over the years. Presenting Body Burden, acompilation of reports from Down To Earth on the healthimpacts of environmental pollution in India. (Pages 344) PB: Rs 390 / US $31

Homicide by Pesticides Edited by: Anil AgarwalA series of articles discuss the effects of environmentalpollution on public health – a must have. (Pages 128) PB: Rs 75 / US $7

Slow Murder: The Deadly Story of Vehicular Pollution inIndia Edited by: Anil Agarwal, Anju Sharma & Anumita RoychaudhuryThis report discusses the issue of smog and smogmakers with shocking revelations on vehicular pollution.(Pages 148) HB: Rs 390 / US $18,

SCHOOLS AND ENVIRONMENT

Green Schools Programme ManualThis manual is designed as a self-learning and assessmenttool so that teachers can work with students to audit theiruse of natural resources and to experiment withenvironment friendly practices. (Pages 78)PB: Rs 125 / US $10

Note: HB – Hardback and PB – Paperback. Prices include postage and delivery charges.

Contact: Sales & Despatch Department

Centre for Science and Environment41, Tughlakabad Institutional Area,

New Delhi - 110 062 India

Tel: 91-11-2995 5124/6110/6394

Fax: 91-11-29955879

Email: [email protected] Website: www.cseindia.org

IFC IBC

i




RICH LANDS POOR PEOPLEIS ‘SUSTAINABLE’ MINING POSSIBLE?

ii

© 2008 Centre for Science and Environment

Material from this publication can be used, but with acknowledgement.

Published byCentre for Science and Environment41, Tughlakabad Institutional Area, New Delhi – 110 062Ph: 91-11-2995 6110, 2995 5124, 2995 6394, 2995 6399Fax: 91-11-2995 5879, 2995 0870Email: [email protected] Website: www.cseindia.org

Printed at Excellent Printing House, New Delhi

Writers: Chandra Bhushan and Monali Zeya Hazra

Editor: Souparno Banerjee

The following people have assisted and made contributions in this report:Radhika Krishnan, Nivit Kumar Yadav, Allyson Amster, Sujit Kumar Singh,Shachi Chaturvedi, Sugandh Juneja, Kanika Sethi, Sonia Henam, Ranjan Panda, Sarabjit Butalia, Ritu Dwivedi, Sumit Singh, R Shreedhar, Philip Neri deSouza, Amit Shanker and Anil Kumar

Cover design: Surya Sen

Cover photo: Agnimirh Basu

Design and layout: Kirpal Singh and Surender Singh

Sketches: Shyamal Banerjee

Maps: Kirpal Singh (Maps in this report are indicative and not to scale)

Production: R Arokia Raj and Gundhar Das

iii

Preface..............................................................................................................................iii

Foreword ..................................................................................................iv

CHAPTER 1 Rich lands, poor people ......................................................................1

CHAPTER 2 The industry and its economics....................................................23

CHAPTER 3 Bearing the brunt: people and the environment ................65

CHAPTER 4 Mining in the states ........................................................................109

AAnnddhhrraa PPrraaddeesshh ................................................................................111

CChhhhaattttiissggaarrhh ......................................................................................120

GGooaa ....................................................................................................141

TThhee HHiimmaallaayyaann ssttaatteess ........................................................................151

JJhhaarrkkhhaanndd aanndd WWeesstt BBeennggaall ..............................................................159

KKaarrnnaattaakkaa aanndd MMaahhaarraasshhttrraa..............................................................190

KKeerraallaa aanndd TTaammiill NNaadduu ......................................................................204

MMaaddhhyyaa PPrraaddeesshh ................................................................................210

TThhee nnoorrtthh--eeaasstt ..................................................................................220

OOrriissssaa..................................................................................................228

RRaajjaasstthhaann aanndd GGuujjaarraatt ......................................................................263

CHAPTER 5 The challenge of governance ......................................................275

CHAPTER 6 Rehabilitation: the regulatory roadblocks............................293

CHAPTER 7 The way ahead....................................................................................315

Annexure: Forest cover and Human Development Index:

major mineral districts of the country ..................................................321

Abbreviations ......................................................................................327

References ............................................................................................330

C O N T E N T S

iv

This ‘State of India’s Environment’ report began by chance. It alsobegan with a question.

In early 2004, we had visited Nimmalapadu in Andhra Pradeshwhere tribals had fought and won a significant battle againstmining by a big corporation. Nimmalapadu is a remote, idyllichamlet, with lush green rice fields surrounded by hills. Its tale wastruly heroic – for over 10 years, the people in this otherwise poorvillage had fought the might of one of the biggest industrial housesin the country. Their struggle had taken them all the way to theSupreme Court, where a historic judgement had ruled that miningwill not be allowed in India’s tribal districts unless the locals werethe owners (or majority stakeholders) of the mines.

But as we travelled back on the dust road to town, we had onebig question: how long would these people be able to hold outagainst the mining industry? The people were poor, but the landsthey lived on were rich and coveted. The minerals under theirhouses were the drivers of economy across the world. Shouldmining be banned in such places? Or would it be better to changethe terms of the mining contract, so that it benefits people and theirenvironment? What is sustainable mining? Is it at all possible?

In 2005, our research on the cement sector enlightened us aboutanother facet. We learnt how the booming Indian cement industry,which was more energy-efficient than its counterparts in the West,was callous and negligent about mining its raw material. The costit paid for its minerals was miniscule, but the imprint it left on theenvironment was debilitating. Clearly, our mining regulationswere either deficient or not being enforced.

It was also apparent that our policy to price mineral rawmaterials used to manufacture products like cement, was at avariance with new realities; moreover, it paid absolutely noattention to the need to compensate local people whose lands werebeing devastated. We realised that the cement industry was notunique or unusual in these traits, nor in the grinding poverty andeconomic backwardness which characterised the areas in which itsplants were based. Modern industrial growth needs the resourcesof the region: its minerals, water and energy. It does not need thepeople. Employment in the cement sector was dipping. It wasclear to us that inclusive growth would require ways to value localresources – be it water, minerals or energy – so that industry couldgive back more than it took.

This was also a time when I was working on a report for thePrime Minister on tiger conservation. We had assembled a map ofIndia which superimposed the districts which are classified as thepoorest in the country, on the forest areas, the watershed areas andthe areas of maximum tiger density. There was a complete match.My colleagues, however, pointed out that the map was incomplete

unless we added the mineral-rich regions and the areas whereNaxalite violence was at its most intense. We did, and a newgeography emerged. When I presented my report, I told the PrimeMinister that his tragedy was that he headed a country whosepoorest people lived on its richest lands. Obviously, somethingwas desperately wrong with the way we practised ‘development’.

But these issues were fragments, at best, of the bigger story –one that was still eluding us.

In 2006, we gave a fellowship to journalists to investigatemining and its impacts on environment and people. Mediaprofessionals from across the country traversed the miningdistricts to unfold the harsh realities – of mining mafia, pollution,deforestation and people’s anger. The reports were a revelation:we learnt how the fissures were widening between the miners andthe inhabitants of these lands.

This is when all the pieces in the puzzle fell together. It becameclear that after services and manufacturing, the mineral sector wason its way to becoming the next boom sector for the economy.India is sitting pretty on huge mineral reserves. The demand inChina is driving up prices to new heights. The government hasalready opened out the sector to private players – players who arebig. They are desperate for entry. The stakes are high.

The contest – an unequal one – is on. Ranged on the one sideare all the interests that define the ‘incredible’ India dream; on theother side are people whose land is up for grabs; whose survivaldepends on the forests which will be needed for mining; whoseanimals graze on the lands where mining rejects will be dumped;and whose water comes from the hills which will be blasted. Thelife of these people is in their environment. Its degradation is theirdevastation.

The question, then, is if there is a balance in this challenge. Thisis what my colleagues have tried to understand and present in thisreport. From this understanding, they want us to look for themeaning of ‘sustainable mining’ and to see if we can break thislogjam of wealth in the midst of destitution and degradation.

The first ‘State of India’s Environment’ report, published in1982, had built the foundations of India’s green concern. It hadprovided us with the insights to understand why a poor nation asours needed to care for its environment.

Almost 25 years later, the sixth ‘State of India’s Environment’report tells us that the old challenges – of poverty andenvironmental degradation – remain as urgent as ever for newIndia to resolve. We know that we need a new bargain. How weget it is the only question.

— Sunita Narain

FOREWORD

1

c m y k

The mineral map of India is one that will gladden any potential investor: vast tracts

of territory, overlying massive, rich – and some entirely untapped – deposits of

minerals like coal, iron, bauxite, manganese and chromite. For investors, these hold

promises of unimagined wealth; for the land’s lawmakers, these constitute the very pillars

of their idea of the ‘Modern State’. Prospecting and extraction, with each group helping the

other, could be a cakewalk. Almost.

What queers the picture is a small truth which has remained elusive, ignored or

misunderstood over the years: these minerals lie under the same lands which hold most of

India’s biologically-diverse forests and water systems. What’s more, the nation’s

poorest, most marginalised people inhabit these lands, its richest. The land and its

resources give these people their means of sustenance. The people, a large majority of

whom are tribals, have lived in this symbiotic bond for centuries.

Minerals, however, are essential for a nation which stands poised on the threshold of

a promising future, and must be extracted. Which means the land, its resources and its

people must make way for the miners. Enamoured by the mining industry’s promises of

progress, Indian planners and lawmakers have accomplished this with clinical and brutal

precision. Forests are razed, waterways polluted and clogged, farmlands transformed into

wasted tracts, and mining dust hangs heavy in the air. As for the people, they are summarily

evicted, with little promise or prospect of compensation or rehabilitation.

But are these immense costs commensurate with the ‘development’ gains that mining

promises, and which governments harp on? Statistics say they are not. Most mining areas

of the nation remain mired in grinding poverty and deprivation.

Decades of this lopsided view (and practice) of ‘development’ are bound to have their

fallouts – and a growing popular anger has been one of these. In places, this anger has

found an expression through spiraling violence, as in cases of regions plagued by

Naxalism. In others, peaceful but strident popular protests have been the order of the day.

All this points to one incontrovertible truth: that mining, essential as it is, is not a

simple ‘dig and sell’ proposition for a country like India. Its challenges are immense:

protection and preservation of environment and inclusive development of all sections of

society.

1 Rich lands, poor people

• Conventional wisdom and geological evidence suggest thatIndia is richly endowed with mineral resources. Explorationshave found over 20,000 known mineral deposits and recoverable reserves of more than 60 minerals.

• If India’s forests, mineral-bearing areas, regions of tribal habitation and watersheds are all mapped together, they willoverlay one another on almost the same areas. In other words,India’s major mineral reserves lie under its richest forests andin the watersheds of its key rivers – these lands are also thehomes of India’s poorest people, its tribals.

• The three tribal-dominated states of Orissa, Chhattisgarh andJharkhand are the most productive mineral-bearing states aswell. They together account for 70 per cent of India’s coalreserves, 80 per cent of its high-grade iron ore, 60 per cent ofits bauxite and almost all its chromite reserves. Also, the forestcover in these states is far higher than the national average.

• Of the top 50 mineral-producing districts in the country,almost half are tribal. The average forest cover in these districts is 28 per cent, much more than the national averageof 20.9 per cent.

• An estimated 1.64 lakh ha of forest land has been diverted formining in the country. The forests in districts like Jajpur inOrissa, Dhanbad in Jharkhand and Bardhman in West Bengalhave been decimated by mining.

• A large part of the country’s mineral-bearing areas is in thegrip of Naxalism: 40 per cent of the mineral-rich districts in the top six mineral-producing states are affected by themovement, which is opposing the lopsided development thatmining brings in.

m k

2

India is a mineral-rich country. It has a vast geological potentialof over 20,000 known mineral deposits, and is in the top ranksin production of some key minerals such as coal, iron ore,

chromite and bauxite. According to the Geological Survey of India(GSI), the national exploring agency, the country is yet to tap itscomplete potential: it has huge reserves of important mineralsawaiting exploration and exploitation.

Unfortunately for India, almost all its minerals are in the sameregions that hold its greenest forests and most abundant river sys-tems. These lands are also largely inhabited by India’s poorest andmost marginalised people – the scheduled tribes and scheduledcastes – who depend on the very same forests and watersheds fortheir survival.

Mining in India, therefore, is not a simple ‘dig and sell’proposition as it is made out to be by industry. It is, in fact, ahighly complex socio-economic and environmental challenge: atstake are natural resources as well as people – forests, wildlife,water, environmental quality and livelihoods.

■ THE RESERVES AND THEIR SPREAD

Within the country, the geographical distribution of fossil fuels(mainly coal) and metallic mineral reserves is highly uneven. Coaland metallic mineral reserves are spread across central andeastern India along the states of Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh,Jharkhand and Orissa, as well as some areas of Maharashtra (bordering Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh) and AndhraPradesh (bordering Chhattisgarh and Orissa). Coal is also foundin Assam and Meghalaya, while lignite occurs along the EasternGhats in Tamil Nadu.

India’s iron ore deposits are in Orissa, Chhattisgarh,Jharkhand, Karnataka and Goa. The deposits of copper, lead andzinc are mainly in Rajasthan, while the reserves of bauxite are concentrated in the states of Orissa, Chhattisgarh and AndhraPradesh. Unlike coal and metallic minerals, non-metallic mineralsshow an even geographical spread across India. For instance,limestone deposits are spread from Himachal Pradesh in thenorth to Andhra Pradesh in the south and from Gujarat in thewest to Meghalaya in the east.

With respect to concentration of mineral deposits, Jharkhand,Orissa and Chhattisgarh emerge as the three top mineral-bearingstates (see Box on pages 4-6: Minerals in India). About 70 per centof India’s coal, 80 per cent of its hematite iron ore (high-grade ore),60 per cent of bauxite, 40 per cent of manganese and almost all itschromite are found in these three states.1

If all kinds of minerals, including sand, stone and brick earthare taken into consideration, then almost every district in thecountry can be said to produce one or other kind of minerals.However, out of the 604 districts in India, mining for fuel, metallic and non-metallic industrial minerals (also referred to asmajor minerals) is undertaken in 274 districts (including 46 districts where coal and lignite are mined). Of these, 50 districtsare extensively mined and produce large quantities of majorminerals. These include seven districts in Chhattisgarh; six eachin Jharkhand, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh;three each in Rajasthan, Gujarat and Maharashtra; two each inGoa and Karnataka; and one district each in Tamil Nadu, UttarPradesh, Assam, Meghalaya, West Bengal and HimachalPradesh (see Annexure).

3

CHAPTER 1

Rich lands, poor people

India’s mineral reserves are largely concentrated in the states ofOrissa, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, which also have the highestnumbers of people living below the poverty line

DEB

AN

JAN

BA

ND

OPA

DH

YAY

m k

4

STATE OF INDIA’S ENVIRONMENT: MINING

c m y k

Minerals in IndiaThe deposits and their locations

Out of India’s total area of 3.29 million sq km, systematic geologicalmapping has been conducted over 3.15 million sq km.1 According to theIndian Bureau of Mines (IBM) which prepares an inventory of mineraldeposits for the country, India has recoverable reserves of 58 minerals,excluding fuel minerals.

CoalThe coal resources of India are available mainly in the sedimentary rocksof the older Gondwana formations of peninsular India; some coal is alsofound in the younger tertiary formations of north-eastern/northern hillyregions.2 Explorations by government agencies till January 2006 haveestablished coal reserves of 253 billion tonne. Of this, about 96 billiontonne are proven reserves. A majority of the reserves – 87 per cent – are ofnon-coking coal.3

In terms of distribution of coal reserves, Jharkhand leads with 29 percent of the total reserves in India (see Graph 1: Distribution of coalreserves). India produced about 407 million tonne (MT) of coal in 2005-06,about 70 per cent of which was accounted for by Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh,Orissa and Madhya Pradesh.4

Iron ore India has large reserves of high grade iron ore. Hematite (Fe2O3) andmagnetite (Fe3O4) are the main ores of iron. Hematite, which has higheriron content, constitutes 52 per cent of the country’s reserves, and is foundin the states of Orissa (which accounts for 33 per cent), Jharkhand andChhattisgarh. About 80 per cent of the magnetite ore deposits occur inthe southern states, especially Karnataka (see Graph 2: Distribution of ironore reserves).5

With total resources of 22 billion tonne, India is one of the leadingproducers as well as exporters of iron ore. The country accounts for threeper cent of the world’s iron ore reserves; Ukraine, with 21 per cent, has thelargest deposits.6

The production of iron ore, constituting of lumps, fines and concentrates, was 154 MT in 2005-06, of which about 40 per cent werelumps and 56 per cent, fines. These were produced by about 270 operational mines.7 The state-wise production data is not available for theyear 2005-06 but in 2004-05, Orissa was the major producer, accountingfor 28 per cent of the total production in the country. It was followed byKarnataka with 26 per cent, Chhattisgarh and Goa with 16 per cent each,and Jharkhand with 11 per cent.8

BauxiteThe total resources of bauxite in the country are placed at 2,926 MT; theseinclude 524 MT of reserves. About 27 per cent of the reserves are of metallurgical grade and 54 per cent of metallurgical mixed grade. Thereserves of refractory and chemical grades together account for 11 percent. The principal states with bauxite reserves include Orissa, whichalone accounts for 51 per cent of the total reserves (see Graph 3:Distribution of bauxite reserves).9

West Bengal11%

Others1%

Andhra Pradesh7%

Chhattisgarh16%

Jharkhand29%

Madhya Pradesh8%

Maharashtra4%

Orissa24%

Source: http://www.coal.nic.in/, as viewed on November 8, 2006

GRAPH 1: Distribution of coal reservesJharkhand and Orissa have more than 50 per cent

Andhra Pradesh7%

Chhattisgarh10%

Jharkhand14%

Karnataka41%

Orissa

17%

Others11%

Source: Anon, 2005, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,Nagpur, pp 47-2-47-33

GRAPH 2: Distribution of iron ore reservesMagnetite makes up 87 per cent of Karnataka’s reserves

A profligate sector

India prides itself for having one of the best quality of iron ores in theworld in terms of iron content. This has led to a situation where mostIndian iron and steel plants reject iron ore containing less than 62 percent iron. In contrast, the iron and steel industry across the world usesiron ore containing even 50 per cent iron.

5

RICH LANDS, POOR PEOPLE

c m y k

At the global level, Australia has the largest reserves of bauxite. India’sshare is just about four per cent, but it still ranks among the top countrieswith bauxite reserves.10

In 2005-06, India produced about 12 MT of bauxite from 191 mines;National Aluminium Company (NALCO), a public sector enterprise,alone produced about 40 per cent of this. Orissa accounted for themaximum production (41 per cent), followed by Gujarat (20 per cent),Jharkhand (13 per cent), Maharashtra (12 per cent), Chhattisgarh (nineper cent) and Tamil Nadu (two per cent).11

Manganese ore In India, manganese occurs mainly as bedded sedimentary depositsassociated with the Gondite series of Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra,Gujarat and Orissa.

Total manganese resources in the country amount to 295 MT, ofwhich 104 MT are reserves. Orissa has the largest manganese reserves –about 35 per cent of the country’s total (see Graph 4: Distribution ofmanganese reserves).12

At the global level, South Africa has the largest reserves of manganese(80 per cent of the world’s total); India’s contribution is only about oneper cent.13

In 2005-06, India produced about two MT of manganese ore; Orissadominated the production figures with 37 per cent, followed byMaharashtra (24 per cent), Madhya Pradesh (19 per cent) and Karnataka(16 per cent).14

Lead and zinc Lead and zinc are the most widely used non-ferrous metals in the world.The total resources of lead and zinc ore in India is 485 MT. Almost 90 percent of this is in Rajasthan (see Graph 5: Distribution of lead and zincreserves).15 At the global level, China holds the largest reserves,accounting for more than 21 per cent of the world’s total.16

In 2005-06, India produced about five MT of lead and zinc ore: thisincluded 97,572 tonne of lead concentrate and 8,93,287 tonne of zincconcentrate. Hindustan Zinc Limited, which has its own captive mines inRajasthan, is the major producer of primary lead and zinc metals inthe country.17

ChromiteIn India, almost 98 per cent of the chromite reserves are present in Orissa,mostly in the Sukinda valley of Jajpur district18 (see Graph 6 on page 6:Distribution of chromite resources). The country has total resources ofaround 179 MT, comprising of 47 MT of reserves.19

Andhra Pradesh 21%

Gujarat 6%

Orissa 51%

Uttar Pradesh 6%

Others 16%

Source: Anon, 2005, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,Nagpur, pp 17-1-17-2

GRAPH 3: Distribution of bauxite reservesMore than half of the reserves are in Orissa

Others 18%

Orissa 35%

Madhya Pradesh 10%

Karnataka 29%

Goa 8%

Source: Anon, 2005, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,Nagpur, pp 55-2

GRAPH 4: Distribution of manganese reservesOrissa leads in reserves as well as production

Other 5%

Andhra Pradesh 1% Bihar 2%

Rajasthan 90%

Maharashtra 2%


GRAPH 5: Distribution of lead and zinc reservesRajasthan dominates in reserves and production

6


At the global level, Kazakhstan holds the largest chromite reserves(26.1 per cent). India’s global share is a bare 0.32 per cent,20 yet thecountry was the second highest producer of chromite in 2003-04.

The production of chromite in 2005-06, by about 20 mines, wasmore than three MT. Tata Iron & Steel Company (TISCO), the OrissaMining Corporation and Balasore Alloys Ltd are the major names inthe sector, and Orissa (99 per cent) is the key producer.21

LimestoneLimestone, the principal raw material in cement manufacturing, is

found in Karnataka (which holds 29 per cent of the country’s totalreserves), Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and Rajasthan (see Graph 7:Distribution of limestone reserves).22

Total resources of limestone of all categories and grades is esti-mated at 1,70,459 MT; seven per cent of this is reserves. Cement-gradelimestone accounts for more than 80 per cent of the total reserves.23

The production of limestone in 2005-06 was 170 MT, produced by about 570 mines. About 96 per cent of this was cement-grade limestone.24

DiamondsDiamond fields in India are grouped into four regions – the southIndian tract of Andhra Pradesh; central Indian tract of MadhyaPradesh; Behradin-Kodwalli area in Raipur (Chhattisgarh) andTokapal-Dugapal area in Bastar (Jharkhand); and the eastern Indiantract in Orissa between the Mahanadi and Godavari valleys.25

India’s resources of diamonds are placed at around 45,80,336 caratsas per the United Nations Framework Classification. Of the totalresources, 17 per cent is gem-grade and 18 per cent industrial-grade.The remaining resources are unclassified.26

State-wise, 40 per cent of the reserves are held by Andhra Pradesh(see Graph 8: Distribution of diamond reserves). Congo has the largestreserves of diamonds in the world, accounting for 28 per cent of theglobal total.27

Though officially India produced about 44,170 carats in 2005-06,the unofficial production is estimated to be much higher. There areonly two legally operating mines, both in the public sector, located inPanna in Madhya Pradesh. Of the total official output, rough and uncutgem variety constituted 28 per cent, while the remaining 72 per centwas of industrial grade.28

Andhra Pradesh 40%

Chhattisgarh 28%

Madhya Pradesh 32%

Source: Anon, 2005, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau ofMines, Nagpur, pp 53-2

GRAPH 8: Distribution of diamond reservesMadhya Pradesh is the only producer in India

Andhra Pradesh 21%

Others 8%

Rajasthan 11%

Meghalaya 8%

Madhya Pradesh 3%

Karnataka 29%

Himachal Pradesh 3%

Gujarat 12%

Chhattisgarh 5%


GRAPH 7: Distribution of limestone reservesKarnataka and Andhra Pradesh account for the major share

Others 1% Karnataka 1%

Orissa 98%


GRAPH 6: Distribution of chromite reservesOrissa has 98 per cent of the total resources

m k

■ MINING, FORESTS AND TRIBALS

In general, India’s major mineral-producing districts are charac-terised by large forest covers, big tribal populations and a highincidence of poverty and backwardness (see Box: Fatal overlap andMap 1.1 on page 8: India – forests vs minerals). The average forest cover of the 50 major mineral-producing districts stands at28 per cent; the total forest cover in these districts is 11,890,400hectare (ha) – 18 per cent of the total forest cover in the country.

Six of these districts have forest cover more than 50 per centof their geographical areas. Of the 50 districts, about 62 per centhave a forest cover that is more than the national average of 20.6 per cent. The districts where forest cover is less than 10 percent are – usually – either those where mining has been going on for a long time or those that are located in arid andsemi-arid regions. Districts like Dhanbad in Jharkhand, Jajpur inOrissa and Burdwan in West Bengal fall in the first category: longyears of mining have devastated their forests. In the second category are districts like Kutchh, Jamnagar and Amreli (inGujarat) and Bhilwara (Rajasthan).

Barring Gujarat, the forest cover in the remaining top five mining states – Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand,and Madhya Pradesh – is above the national average. Chhattisgarhhas the highest forest cover: around 43 per cent. Jharkhand hasforests on 30 per cent of its land, while Orissa and Madhya Pradeshhave forest cover on 27 and 26 per cent of their lands, respectively.

Mining and quarrying has destroyed large tracts of forest landin these areas. One estimate by the government puts the total for-est land diverted for mining between 1980 and 2005 at 95,003 ha.2

Other sources point to a much higher figure. Based on

7


m k

Fatal overlap……of mineral deposits, forests and tribal areas is clear fromthe characteristics of some major mining districts

● Keonjhar, Orissa, produces the maximum amount of iron ore in thecountry. Officially, it has around 31,256 ha of land under mining (illegal mining is rampant).The district also has 39 per cent of its geo-graphical area under forests; 45 per cent of its population is tribal.

● Dantewada in Chhattisgarh is the top iron ore producer in the state,accounting for 69 per cent of the total output. The forest cover hereis as high as 62 per cent, while the tribal population is 79 per cent.

● West Singhbhum, a major iron ore producer in Jharkhand, has 39 per cent of its area under forests; 66 per cent of its population istribal. The district produces 16 MT of iron ore, accounting foralmost 100 per cent of iron ore production in the state.

● Goa, fast emerging as the hub of iron ore export after Bellary inKarnataka, has more than 100 mine leases in each of its two districts. Both districts also have a high forest cover: 65 per cent insouth Goa and 51 per cent in the north.

● Korba in Chhattisgarh, which produces the maximum amount ofcoal in the country, has about 51 per cent of its geographical areaunder forests.

● Angul, the biggest coal-producing district in Orissa, has forests on42 per cent of its area.

● Chatra in Jharkhand, the second highest coal producer in the state,has forest cover on 48 per cent of its area.

● Udaipur in Rajasthan has the maximum land under mining in the state. It is the second biggest producer of lead and zinc in India. It is also the most forested district in the state and has forestcover on 23 per cent of its area, much more than the national average. Udaipur is also a tribal district; tribals make up about 46 per cent of its population.

● Of the six major mining districts of Madhya Pradesh – Katni,Rewa, Satna, Shahdol, Sidhi and Chhindwara – five (Rewa is theexception) have more forest cover than the national average; forestcover in Sidhi and Chhindwara is 85 and 80 per cent more than thenational average, respectively.

● The coalfields of the north-eastern districts of Tinsukia in Assamand Jaintia Hills in Meghalaya have forest cover on 40 and 64 percent of their geographical areas, respectively. Both these are alsotribal districts.

● Khammam in Andhra Pradesh, one of the leading coal producersin the state, has forest cover on 45 per cent its geographic area andis also a tribal district.

Sparse and sparser: mining eats up forest land. Tribals, who dependon these forests for livelihoods, suffer

AG

NIM

IRH

BA

SU /

CSE

8


c m y k

HARYANA

MADHYA PRADESH

UTTAR PRADESHRAJASTHAN

JAMMU & KASHMIR

HIMACHALPRADESH

PUNJAB

UTTARAKHAND

DELHI

BIHAR

WESTBENGAL

MEGHALAYA

ASSAM

ARUNACHALPRADESH

NAGALAND

MANIPUR

MIZ

OR

AM

TRIP

UR

A

SIKKIM

CHHATTISGARH

GUJARAT

MAHARASHTRA

ANDHRA PRADESH

KARNATAKA

GOA

KER

ALA

TAMIL NADU

JHARKHAND

ORISSADAMANDADRA &NAGAR HAVELI

LAKSHADWEEP

AN

DA

MA

N &

NIC

OB

AR

ISLAN

DS

BAY OF BENGAL

ARABIAN SEA

INDIAN OCEAN

State boundary

Water bodies

Non-forest

Scrub

Open forest

Moderate forest

Very dense forest

Lead

Manganese

Petrolum and natural gas

Limestone

Silica sand

Coal/lignite

Chromite

Copper

Gold

Iron

Magnesite

Bauxite

Zinc

Uranium

Asbestos

Barytes

Diamond

Dolomite

Graphite

Gypsum

Kaolin

Kyanite

Mica

Sillimanite

Source: Anon, 2001, Environmental Atlas of India, Central Pollution Control Board, New Delhi

MAP 1.1: India – forests vs mineralsIndia’s mineral deposits are largely beneath its remaining forests

information available from various sources including the Unionministry of environment and forests (MoEF), the total forest land diverted for mining in India has been estimated to be as highas 1,64,610 ha.3

Even this figure would be higher if it took into account the forest land diverted before 1980 when many coal mines took overvast areas of land – mostly forests. Examples are Hazaribagh andDhanbad in Jharkhand and Burdwan in West Bengal.

What makes things especially complicated for India is its largetribal population – numbering 84.3 million – which is approxi-mately above eight per cent of its total population.4 Most of thesetribes inhabit lands that are mineral-rich: 90 per cent of India’scoal and 80 per cent of its other minerals are found in tribal areas.5

Of the 50 major mining districts of the country, almost half aretribal districts.6 The co-existence of tribals and minerals is widelyacknowledged within the government as well, but with a ‘twist’.For instance, the website of the Union ministry of mines says:“Mineral deposits generally occur in remote and backward areaswith poor infrastructural facilities. Mineral-bearing areas are alsooften inhabited by tribal population.”7 The implicit message in

this statement is that mining is essential to bring backward tribalareas into mainstream ‘developed’ India.

As most tribals also inhabit forest areas, their livelihoods and economy are closely intertwined with the fate of the forests andwater sources. According to the Forest Survey of India, Dehradun,the average forest cover in tribal districts of the country is 37 percent, which is 85 per cent more than the national average.8

Forest degradation due to mining and other developmentprojects has significantly depleted the ecosystem, rendering thetribal population more socially and economically vulnerable. Theimpact, naturally, has been disproportionately higher on thesealready poverty-stricken and marginalised people.

The problem is likely to get more acute as the governmentcontinues its industrialisation drive, pegged at exploiting its vastnatural resources – without investing much thought or action insafeguarding its people and environment. The crisis has notescaped the attention of some national leaders (such as the lateformer president K R Narayanan – see Box: Two presidents, twoIndias); but they have been few and far between, and the countryhas chosen to ignore their messages.

9


c m y k

Two presidents, two IndiasFormer presidents Abdul Kalam and K R Narayanan heldcompletely opposite views on the mineral industry

“Let it not be said by future generations that the Indian Republic has beenbuilt on the destruction of the green earth and innocent tribals who havebeen living there for centuries. Let it not be said of India that this greatRepublic, in a hurry to develop itself, is devastating the green mother earthand uprooting our tribal populations.”

– President Narayanan, 2001

“The facilitation for the project through provision of land, infrastructuraldevelopment, community development etc, can be done by the governmentagencies whereas the investment in the mine and the associatedtechnological inputs can come from the private sector… In addition, theprivate sector must have the freedom to run the mine in a cost-effectivemanner.”

– President Kalam, 2003

Six years ago, India had a president who spoke about developmentwith caution, cognisant of the fact that the current model of develop-ment sacrifices human rights and the environment in the pursuit ofinvestment and industry. In his 2001 address to the nation on the eve of Republic Day, the late president Narayanan referred to thisproblem as the “dilemmas of development”, and he asked that the country consider carefully how it chose to develop its mining industry.

President Narayanan was particularly concerned about mining’simpact on scheduled tribes: “…the developmental path we haveadopted is hurting them and threatening their very existence...”He waschallenging the country to confront the environmental and social costsof India’s growing domestic demand for minerals and, as an exporter,India’s willingness to accommodate foreign demand. He was not

against developing industry, but he did speak out against encouragingindustry if it was not in the best interest of all of India’s citizens.“Whilethe nation must benefit from the exploitation of these mineralresources, we will have also to take into consideration questions ofenvironmental protection and the rights of tribals,”he had said.

President Kalam was, on the contrary, more concerned about thewelfare of industry. On November 1, 2003, he gave the inauguralspeech for the 19th World Mining Congress and Expo in New Delhi, inwhich he spoke of the importance of increased exploration and miningand the need to increase mineral production to feed India’s growingappetite for minerals, without once mentioning the impacts this wouldhave on forests and tribals of the country.

The main themes of president Kalam’s speech revolved around theneed to attract more private investment and feed increased demand byrapidly increasing India’s production of major minerals, especially coal.Early on in his speech, the president had expressed concern over the lackof investment in the industry, which he blamed on many things includ-ing problems in land acquisition and community development demands.

While president Narayanan believed India needed to re-evaluateits practice of meeting increased demand with unchecked production,president Kalam declared that India must increase mineral productionas much as 10 times in the case of coal: “Indian mining industry shouldexpand the scope of its contribution to the GDP from the existingthree-five per cent to over 10 per cent. We should work for increasingthe productivity from 0.5 tonne per man-year to 5 tonne per man-yearin underground coal mines using long wall mining and from 15 tonneper man-year to 30 tonne per man-year in open-cast mines.”

Unfortunately, president Narayanan’s concerns have very fewtakers today in the government. While Narayanan spoke of the consti-tutional protection afforded to tribals and their lands (“We cannotignore the social commitments enshrined in our Constitution”), itseems the present government is more than willing to ignore this too.

■ RIVERS AND MINERALS: CLOSE BONDS

The role of mining in changing the hydrological profile of a regionis also being increasingly acknowledged and debated.

Hard rocks are the major sources of minerals. Out of the coun-try’s geographical area of 3.20 million sq km, as much as 1.82 mil-lion sq km is built up of hard rocks and is thus, potentially miner-al-bearing. But there is also a problem: hard rocks usually aboundin hilly terrains linked to forests, and both forests and hills are themajor sources of water for our rivers. Hard rock mining, therefore,not only affects land and forests, but also rivers and waterways.

Mining also impacts rivers in other ways: overburden isdumped into valleys, filling streams and rivers, and deforestationleads to increased run-off. The two, in combination, increasefloods. Whether it is iron ore in Goa or Karnataka, bauxite in thehills of Chhattisgarh or Orissa, coal in Madhya Pradesh, or lime-stone and magnetite in Uttarakhand, open-cast mining on catch-ment slopes has played havoc with nation’s water resources.9

An analysis of distribution of minerals vis-à-vis river basinsindicates that a significant portion of India’s mineral reserves arein areas which are either near the origins or in the catchments ofrivers (see Map 1.2: ‘Mined’ rivers).

Most of India’s iron reserves are found along the courses andwatersheds of rivers such as the Indravati in Chhattisgarh,Baitarani in Orissa, Tungabhadra in Karnataka and Mandovi in Goa.

Over 80 per cent of the coal in Jharkhand and a substantialportion of the Raniganj coalfields in West Bengal lie within theDamodar river basin. Coal is also found all around the Godavariand its tributaries in Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh and alongthe distributaries of the Son in eastern Madhya Pradesh and western Chhattisgarh. The Mahanadi-Brahmani basin holds allthe coal reserves of Orissa, while the coal in Nagpur region liesunder the Kanhan river.10

In Rajasthan, mica is distributed between and around therivers Sambhar, Luni and Chambal, while in Orissa, it is foundaround the Mahanadi. Chromite is found around the tributaries ofthe Cauvery, and along the Tungabhadra, Baitarani and Brahmanirivers in Orissa. Limestone occurs near the Chambal, while bauxite deposits exist near the Chenab, Mahi, the tributaries of theKrishna and Cauvery, Mahanadi, Tungabhadra, and near the riverSind (in Madhya Pradesh).

Unless they are carefully planned and thoughtfully carriedout, mining activities in these regions are bound to degrade thecatchments and alter the courses of the rivers. For example, thestate of Chhattisgarh also holds the catchments for at least fourmajor river systems – the Mahanadi, Godavari, Narmada andGanga. Large-scale mining in the state is degrading all the catch-ments, affecting the quality and quantity of water in the rivers.

Mining of sand, stone and gravels from riverbeds is anothercause for concern. With rapid urbanisation and growth in the housing and infrastructure sector, the demand for these mineralshas gone up significantly over the past few years – and most of thisdemand is being met by rampant mining of riverbeds, often ille-gally. This is changing the course of rivers and eroding their banks.

Besides this, mining also leads to increased sedimentation andpollution of a river: examples include the Bhadra river inKarnataka and Shankhini in Chhattisgarh. Overburden andwastes from mines run into a river, choking it. Mining also affectslocal availability of water as it consumes large volumes of waterand breaches the groundwater, thereby altering the hydrologicalregime. Forty per cent of the captive limestone mines of large-scale cement plants in India have breached the groundwater intheir regions.11

Consumption by mineral-based industries adds to the stress:due to the presence of minerals and water in the same area, mostsuch industries prefer to set shop along or near the rivers. These not only consume large quantities of water, but also discharge their effluents into the river. The rivers Brahmani and Damodar are examples of such rivers.

Mining near river basins, especially in underground coalmines, involves the additional risk of accidents due to inundation.In 1975, over 350 miners lost their lives in a gruesome accident inChasnala in Jharkhand when water gushed into the mines.

The impacts of mining and mineral-based industries on somekey watersheds of the country have been summarised in the following pages.

10


c m y k

Lost river: unless thoughtfully planned and carried out, mining willdestroy water sources, like this one in Goa

PHIL

IP N

ERI D

ESO

UZA

11


c m y k

NA

BAY OF BENGAL

ARABIAN SEA

LAKSHADWEEP ISLAND

ANDAMAN

AND

NICOBAR

ISLANDS

INDIAN OCEAN

DAMAN & DIU

GUJARAT

MANIPUR

NAGALAND

ARUNACHAL PRADESH

JAMMU & KASHMIR

HIMACHALPRADESH

PUNJAB

RAJASTHAN

DADRA &NAGAR HAVELI

MAHARASHTRA

KARNATAKA

GOA

TAMIL NADU

KERALA

ANDHRA PRADESH

PONDICHERRY

CHH

ATTI

SGA

RH

ORISSA

WEST BENGAL

JHARKHAND

SIKKIM

ASSAM

MEGHALAYA

TRIPURAMIZORAM

BIHAR

UTTAR PRADESH

MADHYA PRADESH

HARYANA

UTTARAKHAND

DELHI

Lead

Manganese


Limestone

Silica sand

Coal/lignite

Chromite

Copper

Gold

Iron

Magnesite

Bauxite

Zinc

Uranium

Asbestos

Barytes

Diamond

Dolomite

Graphite

Gypsum

Kaolin

Kyanite

Mica

Sillimanite

River

Source: Compiled by the Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, 2006

MAP 1.2: ‘Mined’ riversMost mineral reserves in India lie near the origin or in the catchments of rivers

12


c m y k

Mining in the watersheds leads to increased sedimentation and pollution of rivers; it also affects local availability of water

SUN

ITA

NA

RAIN

/ C

SE

● The DamodarFlowing through Jharkhand and West Bengal, the river’s water-shed covers almost 25,000 sq km.12 In its upper stretch, theDamodar twists through six coalfields (north and southKarnapura, east and west Bokaro, Ramgarh, Jharia and Raniganj)owned by Coal India Limited. The valley is one of India’s mostindustrialised regions:13 added to these coalfields are 28 iron oremines, 33 limestone mines, five copper ore mines and 84 micamines, which are along the river’s coastline. In addition, thenumerous coal washeries add considerable pollution load to theriver. The region produces 60 per cent of India’s medium-gradecoal.14 The river “drain[s] almost the entire coal mining areaunder the Central Coalfields Ltd (CCL), the Bharat Coking CoalLtd (BCCL) and the Eastern Coalfields Ltd (ECL) – all three sub-sidiaries of the public sector Coal India Limited (CIL).”15 This isalso evident in the amount of forest land that has been lost:according to Sacred Sites International, a US-based non-profitorganisation dedicated to the preservation of sacred sites and tra-ditional culture, the lower valley had a 65 per cent forest coveronce upon a time; today, it stands at a meagre 0.05 per cent.16

It is no wonder then, that the Damodar is one of India’s mostpolluted rivers. The source of much of this pollution is large-scale

sedimentation and non-point source pollution that has beenincreasing along with the clearing of land. About seven MT oferoded material is brought down from deforested lands anddeposited in reservoirs of the Damodar valley by the Damodarand Barakar rivers annually. About 66 per cent of the total land area of the upper Damodar valley has been affected by different forms of erosion. The rate of silting in Maithon reservoir is recorded at more than seven million cubic metre(mcm) annually, as against the designed rate of 0.84 mcm – thusexceeding the projected figure by nine times.17 The MoEF hasindicated that the growth of mining and loss of forest cover arereal threats to the Damodar river valley.18

● The Mahanadi The Mahanadi basin extends over an area of 1,41,000 sq km. Lying in the north-east of the Deccan plateau, the basin covers large areas in the states of Chhattisgarh and Orissa, andsome areas in Jharkhand and Maharashtra (see Map 1.3: TheMahanadi river basin). The river rises in a pool six km fromPharsiya village near Nagri town in Raipur district ofChhattisgarh, and falls into the Bay of Bengal, traversing a totaldistance of 851 km.19

13


c m y k

Andhiyarkore

Manendragarh

Rampur

Sundargarh

Kantamal

KurubhataGhatora

Kesinga

Tikarpaha

Sukma

Pathardhi

Kotni

Bilaspur

Paradeep

Tanduladam

Konark

Puri

Bhubaneshwar

Cuttack

BAY

OF

BENGAL

O R I S S A

C H H A T T I S G A R H

J H A R K H A N D

Chilikalake

Mahanadi

Mahanadi

Korba

Jharsuguda

Talcher

Ib Valley

BhilaiDurg Salebhata

Jondhra Basantpur

Bamnidhi

Pandigaon

Seon

ath

Seon

ath

Mah

anad

i

Ap

ra

Hasdo

Raigarh

Ib

Tel

Mahanadi

Bhargav

i

Raipur

Simga

Kurungdam

Bango dam

Hirakuddam

Sambalpur

KharamalRajim

Baronda

Rudri WeirNavishankar dam

State boundary

A N D H R A P R A D E S H

M A H A R A S H T R A

Thermal power plant

Cement plant

Sponge iron

Iron and steel plant

Aluminium smelter/refinery

Coal mine

Iron ore mine

River

Source: Compiled by the Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi

MAP 1.3: The Mahanadi river basinThe river hosts some major coalfields, iron ore mines and a number of mineral-based industries

The river hosts a number of mining complexes and mineral-based industries. On its upper stretches, there is the Bhilai SteelPlant and the Urla iron and steel complex in Durg district. Thereare also some cement plants at Durg and Raipur.

The other major industrial point on the upper stretch inChhattisgarh is Korba, which has also been identified by theCentral Pollution Control Board (CPCB) as a critically pollutedarea in this river basin. The major sources of pollution at thisstretch are Bharat Aluminium Company Limited (BALCO), KorbaSuper Thermal Power Station (KSTPS), Hasdeo Thermal PowerCorporation and the coal mining operations of South EasternCoalfields Limited (SECL).

The river, when it enters Orissa, supports several more miner-al-based industries. The basin has the misfortune of hosting two ofIndia’s largest coalfields: the Ib Valley and the Talcher coalfields inOrissa, which together produced about 70 MT of coal in 2005-06.20

The river also has bauxite on its banks: in Orissa, local communi-ties have fought against BALCO to protect the Gandhamardanhills, from where originate a number of the springs that feed thetributaries of the Mahanadi. Besides, the other industries along theriver and its tributaries include thermal power plants atChoudwar, cement plants at Bargarh, coal mining at Rampur, aluminium smelter at Hirakud, and several small-scale cement,refractory, steel and sponge iron plants at Jharsuguda.

● The Brahmani The Brahmani-Baitarani basin extends over an area of 51,822 sqkm and covers large areas in Orissa and Jharkhand and someparts of Madhya Pradesh.

The river, with a catchment area of around 39,000 sq km, originates as two major distributaries – the Sankh and the Koelfrom the Chhotanagpur plateau in Jharkhand – and joins at Veda Vyasa near Rourkela in Orissa to form the Brahmani. It flows through the Eastern Ghats in Sundergarh, Keonjhar,Dhenkanal, Cuttack and Jajpur districts of Orissa and empties intothe Bay of Bengal. The major portion of its catchment area lies inOrissa; and due to the vast mineral deposits in this area and theeasy availability of water, several industries have come up in andaround the river basin.

At its upper reach, the river is polluted by effluents from theRourkela Steel Plant, Rourkela Fertiliser Plant and the iron ore-mining industries of Bonai subdivision. The pollution levelincreases in the middle section due to drainage from the coal beltsand industrial wastes from the Angul-Talcher region, mainlyemptied into it by its tributary, the Nandira.

The NALCO smelter at Angul has also contributed to the poor quality of the surface and sub-surface water. The effluent discharged from plant has increased the fluoride level in the drinking water. Downstream, the Brahmani is polluted by mine discharges from the Sukinda belt and industrialactivities in Duburi.

● The GodavariThe Godavari originates near Triambak in Nasik district ofMaharashtra, and flows through the states of Chhattisgarh,

Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh. TheGodavari basin extends over an area of 3,12,812 sq km. Its four important tributaries are the Manjira, Pranhita, Indravati andthe Sabari.

The discharge of the river is not very impressive because of moderate annual average rainfall in the basin. Moreover, the river and its watershed are affected due to industrialisationand urbanisation, as the river passes through a number of mineral-rich districts – Nagpur, Wardha, Nashik, Chandrapur and Yavatmal in Maharashtra; Bastar and Jagdalpur inChhattisgarh; Chhindwara and Seoni in Madhya Pradesh;Warangal, Khammam, Kakinada and Adilabad in AndhraPradesh; Bidar in Karnataka; and Jeypur in Orissa. All these areasadd to the pollution load in the river and are also eating away intoits watershed.

The mines of Western Coalfields in Nagpur and Chandrapurbelt are along the Godavari basin. In addition, there is a superthermal power plant at Chandrapur, some coal washeries andseveral cement plants in the area which draw from the tributariesof the river and also discharge into it. A recent phenomenon hasbeen a mushrooming of sponge iron plants in the area. Mining ofsillimanite, corundum and pyrophyllite in Bhandara district alsoadds to the pollution.

The Indravati, a major tributary of the river passes through Bastar, where the National Mineral DevelopmentCorporation (NMDC), the biggest iron ore producer in the country, operates. The tributaries of the river receive thousands of tonne of iron ore fines from the mines of NMDC as they pass through Bastar. Several steel plants are also coming up in this area, which will add to the pollution loadof the river.

In Andhra Pradesh, several coal mines in the Warangal andAdilabad district are located within the watershed of the river.Besides, these two districts also add on to river pollution due toextensive limestone, iron ore and manganese mining in Adilabad.The coalfields of Singhareni Collieries Company Limited inKarimnagar also contribute to the pollution of the Godavari. InVisakhapatnam district of Andhra Pradesh, bauxite mining in theEastern Ghats is being opposed by local communities mainly overthe issue of water.

The stretch in Orissa is also not free of industrial pollution.Jeypore district houses industries as well as the Kolab andMachkund thermal power stations.

These cases are not unique: this is the fate which most rivers in the country are saddled with. Unfortunately, very little research has gone into the subject of how mining menaces India’s watersheds and rivers. Without a cumulative environmental impact assessment process, the real impact of mining on India’s watersheds will neither be assessed in full nor curtailed.

It is very important, therefore, to study and understand howmining will alter the hydrological regime of the country.Moreover, this should be reflected in legislation; there is no legislation at present on water and mining, and the mineral policy also ignores it.

14


m k

■ THE MIRAGE OF MINING AND GROWTH

Across the world, the mining industry has been hard-sellingdreams – of development, employment and growth. It has consis-tently tried to project a pro-people image by promoting the ideathat mining will unleash growth in backward areas and will pullthe indigenous communities into the ‘mainstream’, therebyimproving their lives and livelihoods. But has it really done so?

At the macro level, things appear to be different. States likeJharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Orissa, that have a high level ofdependence on mineral resources, demonstrate low per capitaincomes compared to states which do not depend completely ontheir mineral wealth (examples are Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra andGujarat) (see Table 1.1: Minerals and state economies). The mineral-dependent states also have higher levels of poverty, lower growthrates and higher levels of mortality, malnutrition and morbidity.

India is not the only country where mining is linked withpoverty and poor development outcomes. In most nations of theworld, a high level of mineral dependence is associated withretarded economic performance. This phenomenon is so widelyand commonly observed that it has been given a name – the‘resource curse’.

A study by the World Bank, Environmental and social challengesof mineral-based growth in Orissa, has attributed institutional weak-ness and political economy as some of the reasons behind theresource curse. The study found that resource-rich economiesexhibit weaker institutions compared to resource-poor countries.A recent global study by the Food and Agriculture Organizationfinds that mineral-rich states have weaker property rights andpoor enforcement of the law and that these, in turn, have led toretarded development outcomes. An analysis of the Indian statesalso reconfirmed that mineral dependence leads to poorer qualityinstitutions, which in turn results in impaired growth and devel-opment outcomes.21 Evidence shows that point resources –resources extracted from a narrow geographical base – weaken

institutions and accountability. In the case of a country with all ofits wealth concentrated in a few pockets, most of the political andadministrative power goes into promoting and facilitating extrac-tion of these resources instead of focusing on development of thearea. This has been found in case of Orissa, where policies so farhave focused on developing the mineral sector, rather than onbroad-based development.22

Resource curse, thus, is very much a reality in the mineral-richareas of India. Of the 50 major mining districts, 60 per cent figureamong the 150 most backward districts of the country (see Map1.4 on page 16: Poverty amidst plenty).23 Four of these mining districts – two from Orissa and one each from Jharkhand andChhattisgarh – are among the top 25 backward districts of the country; 13 of these districts figure in the top 50 backward districts of the country.

A closer look at a few districts gives a clearer picture of thephenomenon of resource curse:● Adilabad has the highest number of mines in Andhra

Pradesh and is ranked third in terms of total value of mineral

15


State Contribution of Per capita net state minerals in the state domestic product at

GDP (percentage) factor cost in Rs (2003-04)

Chhattisgarh 12 6,692

Orissa 6.6 5,265

Jharkhand 13.2 6,651

Gujarat 3 13,022

Tamil Nadu 0.72 12,348

Maharashtra 0.86 15,082

Sources: Directorates of Economics and Statistics of respective stategovernments; Indian Minerals Yearbook, 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,Nagpur

TABLE 1.1: Minerals and state economiesAn inverse relationship exists between dependence on mineral wealth and per capita income

Instead of integrating tribals into the mainstream, mining has marginalised them further

AG

NIM

IRH

BA

SU /

CSE

m k

16


c m y k

NA

BAY OF BENGAL

ARABIAN SEA

INDIAN OCEAN

Lead

Manganese


Limestone

Silica sand

Coal/lignite

Chromite

Copper

Gold

Iron

Magnesite

Bauxite

Zinc

Uranium

Asbestos

Barytes

Diamond

Dolomite

Graphite

Gypsum

Kaolin

Kyanite

Mica

Sillimanite

Backward district areas

LAKSHADWEEP ISLAND

ANDAMAN

AND

NICOBAR

ISLANDS

DAMAN & DIU

GUJARAT

MANIPUR

NAGALAND

ARUNACHAL PRADESH

JAMMU & KASHMIR

HIMACHALPRADESH

PUNJAB

RAJASTHAN

DADRA & NAGAR HAVELI

MAHARASHTRA

KARNATAKA

GOA

TAMIL NADU

KER

ALA

ANDHRA PRADESH

PONDICHERRY

CHHATT

ISGARH

ORISSA

WEST BENGAL

JHARKHAND

SIKKIM

ASSAM

MEGHALAYA

TRIPURAMIZORAM

BIHAR

UTTAR PRADESH

MADHYA PRADESH

HARYANA

UTTARAKHAND

DELHI

Source: Anon, 2003, ‘Identification of districts for wage and self-employment programmes’, Report of the Task Force, Planning Commission, New Delhi

MAP 1.4: Poverty amidst plentyMineral-bearing districts continue to be among the most backward districts of the country, in spite of the immense wealth theygenerate

production, but it is one of the least developed districts in thestate. According to the 2001 census, Andhra Pradesh had a percapita income of about Rs 10,000, while Adilabad’s was onlyRs 8,291. The district also lacks physical and social infrastruc-ture: only 55 per cent of the households have electricitycompared to the state average of 67 per cent. While the percentage of rural households with access to safe drinkingwater in the state is 77 per cent, it is 61 per cent in Adilabad.The district lags behind in education as well with a literacyrate of just over 50 per cent compared to the state’s average literacy rate of 65 per cent.24

● Keonjhar, the most mined district of Orissa and the centre ofits iron ore production, has quite a few dubious distinctions toits credit. Its infant mortality rate (number of deaths in firstyear of the birth per 1,000 live births) is 20 per cent higher thanthe state’s average. About 60 per cent of its population livesbelow the poverty line and its per capita district domesticproduct is one of the lowest in the state. According to the 2001census, the percentage of rural households with access to safe drinking water in Orissa was 63 per cent; in Keonjhar, thepercentage was a meagre 39 per cent.25

● Dantewada is fast emerging as the most favoured destination

in Chhattisgarh for steel companies due to the presence ofhigh-grade iron ore. It ranks seventh among the 150 mostbackward districts in the country. Only about 22 per cent ofthe households in Dantewada have power connections.Provisions for safe drinking water are available for only half ofthe households (53 per cent), much lower than the state average (71 per cent). Only one-third of the population is literate – once again, lower than the state average.26

● Gulbarga and Bellary are two key mining districts inKarnataka. While Bellary is the hub of iron ore mining,accounting for 84 per cent of the iron ore produced in the state,Gulbarga is the largest producer of limestone in the country.Both these districts fare poorly when it comes to human devel-opment. Gulbarga is ranked 19th and Bellary 17th out of the 20districts of Karnataka on the human development index (HDI).Although Bellary boasts of the largest number of private aircrafts in the country, more than 45 per cent of its populationlives below the poverty line. The district does not even havethe basic amenities – only about 41 per cent of its householdshave access to power. The infant mortality rate is much higherthan the state’s average and life expectancy is lower. Less than50 per cent of the population of Bellary is literate. The scenario

17


c m y k

India’s mineral-rich districts are marked by grinding poverty, low literacy and poor human development indicators

AG

NIM

IRH

BA

SU /

CSE

is similar in Gulbarga, where the rate of literacy is as low as 38per cent. Poverty is rampant with 45 per cent population belowthe poverty line (the state average is 33 per cent). Only 63 percent of the households in the district have access to safe drink-ing water, while 45 per cent have no power connection. Thereare only 68 hospital beds per lakh population compared to thestate’s average of 86 beds per lakh population.27

● Both the mining districts in Maharashtra – Yavatmal andChandrapur – not only figure among the 150 most backwarddistricts of the country, but are also ranked 34th and 26th,respectively, out of the 35 districts of Maharashtra, on the HDI.Chandrapur, the largest producer of coal and limestone in thestate, has only half of its villages linked by pucca roads, whileonly 43 per cent of households have access to safe drinkingwater. Health facilities are poor, with the infant mortality rate(number of deaths in first year of the birth per 1000 live birth)as high as 106 compared to the state average of 74. The percapita income of Chandrapur is more than 20 per cent lowerthan the state average; about 47 per cent of the families in thedistrict are below the poverty line. Yavatmal leads in coal production, but lags behind in all other aspects. Around 44 percent of families in the district are below the poverty line. Lessthan half the households have access to safe drinking water.The rate of infant mortality is 1.7 times more than the stateaverage, while per capita income is 1.8 times lower.28

● Rajasthan is one of the leading non-metallic mineral-produc-ing states of the country. Udaipur and Bhilwara are the keymining districts: the mining industry contributed 31 and 25per cent to Udaipur and Bhilwara’s GDP, respectively,between 1998-2001. But as is the case with the other states,both these districts have failed to benefit from their mineralwealth. The per capita income of Udaipur is lower than thestate average. Only 32 per cent of villages in the district have

access to power, while 64 per cent get safe drinking water.About one-third of the district’s population is below thepoverty line. Udaipur has been ranked 27th out of 29 districtsin the state in terms of HDI. Bhilwara fares poorly too – withonly 32 per cent of its villages with access to power and 60 percent with access to safe drinking water. Almost half the popu-lation in the district is below the poverty line, and literacy rateis only 50 per cent.29

● Cuddalore, in Tamil Nadu, produces three-fourths of India’slignite. Groundwater near the lignite mines here has beendepleted, leaving local agriculturists high and dry. More thanhalf of Cuddalore’s population lives below the poverty lineand it is ranked 16th out of the 30 districts of Tamil Naduin HDI.

● Sonbhadra is the most mined district of Uttar Pradesh. Itproduces more than 20 MT of coal every year, apart from thousands of tonne of limestone and dolomite. It is also one ofthe most backward districts of the state. About 55 per cent ofits population lives below the poverty line and its literacy rateis less than 50 per cent.There are several other similar examples that go on to prove

the theory of ‘resource curse’ (see Annexure). One of the more recent studies on mining-poverty linkages

has been done by the World Bank as part of a research on strength-ening the institutional capacity of the Orissa government to dealwith mining-led growth and development. The study focuseson the mineral-rich Keonjhar district. It has selected two blocks:Joda, with a high concentration of mines, and Keonjhar Sadar,which is likely to be mined intensively in the near future.

The study has found that households in Keonjhar Sadar aresignificantly better off in terms of average cash incomes and own-ership of productive assets, compared with those in Joda (see Table 1.2: Mining prosperity or poverty). Education levels too

18


Variable Joda Keonjhar Sadar

Mean SD Mean SD

Total cash income† 21,623 14,408 25,305 26,890 0.110*

Days ill† 37.7 35.6 25.5 26.2 -0.159*

Adult education† 20.0 28.7 33.1 33.0 0.193*

Better quality of life† 0.8 0.4 0.9 0.3 0.136*

Poor quality of house 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.4 -0.016

Livestock asset† 1.5 2.1 3.1 2.7 0.302*

Production asset† 1.9 0.8 2.9 1.2 0.431*

Consumption asset 4.6 3.4 4.4 3.0 -0.006

Land owned† 0.9 2.3 1.6 2.9 0.134*

Notes: † Test for equality of block means is significant at the 5 per cent level* Significant at the 5 per cent level; SD = standard deviation

Source: S Srivastava, 2006, Environmental and social challenges of mineral-based growth in Orissa, World Bank, New Delhi

TABLE 1.2: Mining prosperity or poverty: a case study of Orissa Joda, a more mined block, has poorer quality of life and income compared with the less mined area of Keonjhar Sadar

Correlation of weighted mean with distance to mines

m k

are higher for households in Keonjhar Sadar. Households in Jodahave reported higher incidences of family illnesses. Wage incomeis higher in the case of households in Joda, most likely because ofthe employment benefits of nearby mines. However, the differ-ence is not statistically significant. The study has also concludedthat the proximity to mines is detrimental in a number of ways:villages closest to mines bear a greater environmental andeconomic cost.

Similar studies across the country and elsewhere have showna co-relation between poverty and mining (see Box: Parej perishes).Despite the tall claims of industry as well as government, mining does not seem to usher in prosperity and development on the scales promised; in fact, under current the policies and practices of the government, mining districtsand townships have actually slipped deeper into povertyand destitution.

19


Parej perishesWorld Bank-supported project leads to poverty and dip inlocal incomes

The ghost of Parej continues to haunt the World Bank (WB) even aftera decade of its support to the Coal Sector Environmental SocialMitigation Project (CSESMP). It all began in 1997, when the Bank supported Coal India Limited (CIL) in expanding coal mines and production in the 25 mines in Hazaribagh’s Parej area, under the CoalSector Rehabilitation Project (CSRP) with an International Bank ofReconstruction and Development (IBRD) loan of over US $530 million.However, parallel to this, pathetic conditions at the mining site forcedthe WB to give a loan to CIL under the CSESMP – to mitigate the environmental and social impacts of this mining expansion. CSESMPwas approved in May 1996, with a loan of US $63 million from theInternational Development Association (IDA). It was envisaged thatafter being tested and revised as necessary during the five-year timeperiod financed by the Bank, CIL would apply its new environmentaland social mitigation policies in its 495 mines.

The debate over the Parej project’s impacts revolves around the netloss of local livelihoods due to the coal mines. Every Bank-supportedproject is approved with the condition that it must increase localincome and reduce poverty, but the Bank’s own monitoring team hadfound loss of income among local residents who were displaced by theParej coal mines.

A recent study by a Delhi-based advocacy group Environics Trustand Hyderabad’s Samata has refreshed the debate. These groups studied seven villages, including two resettlement sites of CIL, in Parejmines to assess the current socio-economic status of the people andthe impacts of coal mining on their lives.

The study found that displacement due to mining, irrespective ofcompensation, has greatly impacted annual incomes. Every acre ofland in Parej used to sustain the landowning family for six months,and landless families for three-four months. A family owning threeacres got a net income of Rs 2,600 a year after taking care of itsconsumption needs. It also made about Rs 5,000 from working as wage

labour in nearby areas for a minimum of 100 days. From the nearbyforests, a family earned Rs 2,000 a year. Thus, each family used to make Rs 9,600 a year – which placed it much above the poverty line for rural areas. Even the landless earned around Rs 7,400 a yearfrom these sources.

All this changed with the coming of CIL. For every three acres ofland that it took away, CIL compensated a family with a job. The studyfound that after a land-holding family shifted to resettlement coloniesor other places, its net cash inflow went down. The net annual loss incash inflow was Rs 9,260 for landed families and Rs 7,060 for landlessfamilies. “As net flow has gone down, the indebtedness of both thecommunities has increased manifold. Now, on an average, a landown-ing family has to take a loan of Rs 2,000-3,000 per month. Earlier, loansused to be not more than Rs 500 per month, and were taken and repaidwithin the community,”says the study.“Because of shifting, there hasnot been much impact on the incomes of both landless and landown-ing families. However, expenditures have increased, thus pushing theresidents into a debt trap,”points out R Sreedhar, the managing trusteeof Environics. Families now spend more money on buying foodgrains,which they were earlier growing on their own lands. The only employ-ment is in the coal mines, while forest access has been barred. As aresult, both landowning and landless households are spending thesame – about Rs 8,200 – per month.

The CSESMP has the distinction of being the only coal sector project in India to be critically scrutinised by the inspection panel of theBank for its bad impacts on overall development of the local people. But the Bank has tried to hush up the panel’s findings. Afterthis, the WB has not supported any other coal sector project, though itis said to be reconsidering its decision on that count.

Affected residents of Parej are planning to approach the WB. Therehave been a few sporadic meetings with Bank officials on introducingactivities to increase incomes of the project-affected people. While allthese parleys are underway, residents of Parej continue slipping intothe debt abyss.

– Richard Mahapatra, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi

False promises: mining does not really lead to prosperity

AG

NIM

IRH

BA

SU /

CSE

m k

■ THE RED SHADOW OVER MINING

Poverty and lack of development extract terrible prices – and one of them has been the rapid rise of Naxalism. In 2005, Naxaliteviolence in India claimed 669 lives: this marked an 18 per cent risein casualties compared to the previous year.30 The governmentscrambled to give an appropriate response. In his address to thenation on August 15, 2006, prime minister Manmohan Singhtermed Naxalism as a threat to India’s national security. Less than a month after this pronouncement, one of his predecessors –former prime minister V P Singh – came up with a completely different viewpoint: he saw no option but to embrace Naxalism in the present model of development, where forceful acquisitionof land and displacement of thousands by the State are the orderof the day.

Both the statements were made in their respective contexts;both are revealing. To begin with, they mark the rise and rise ofNaxalism as a movement that is giving sleepless nights to thenation. They mark the acknowledgement – among our leaders – ofthe strength and undisputed popularity of the movement. V PSingh’s statement, in particular, also marks a recognition of the

murderous track that official ‘development’ policies have takenover the years, pushing people into the arms of such movements.

Naxalism had begun as a peasant movement in 1967, in thetiny hamlet of Naxalbari in West Bengal. The fundamentaldemand was radical land reform – land to the tiller – and a violenttakeover of power was seen as the only means of achieving this.Governments then were completely unwilling (as they are evennow) to yield to these demands, and the movement was brutallycrushed.

The character of Naxalism changed with the changing times.Forced out of West Bengal, it has now regrouped outside the state– largely in heavily forested areas dominated by tribals in thestates of Orissa, Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra andAndhra Pradesh. Its focus has moved to attainment of tribal self-determination and control over local resources – issues for whichit has found ready sympathisers among local communities.

In tribal-dominated regions, ‘development’ has been largelysynonymous with the commercial exploitation of forest resources,primarily controlled by the forest department and other govern-ment agencies. This has almost obliterated traditional communitycontrol of forest resources. Government policies have made outthe very existence of tribals as detrimental to India’s biodiversity,and displaced them from their lands. Legislations like the ForestConservation Act, 1980 have made tribals encroachers on the landthey have inhabited for centuries. But this tribal alienation fromland has not just been a result of the country’s conservation policy. Tribals have also suffered for years due to ‘development’projects, including mining projects. Naxalism has emerged toexploit the often justified tribal angst against this oppression.

And with India’s major mineral resources lying under tribal-dominated forestlands, mining and related projects have – natu-rally – come into the crosshairs of the Naxals. Today, five of India’stop mineral-producing states – Orissa, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh,Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh – are fighting the rise of the redbrigades in most of their mineral-rich districts (see Map 1.5: Thered spread).

“It's not development. It is an express highway to speed upexploitation… What they have left for the local people is just airand water pollution,” says Communist Party of India (Maoist) –or CPI (M) – central committee member Kosa, while referring tothe mega mining projects in Bastar, Chhattisgarh.31 This Naxalopposition to mining is rapidly acquiring strident tones. OnDecember 20, 2005, the Bihar-Jharkhand special area committee ofthe CPI (M) sent out a press release opposing the proposed expan-sion of iron ore mining in West Singhbhum, Jharkhand.32

The militant opposition has unnerved the mining industry. Areport by the risk management consultancy, Hill and Associatesbased in Hong Kong terms Naxalism as a “grave operational riskaffecting investment climate in the core extractive sector”. Thereport also feels that Naxalism is likely to affect foreign directinvestment in the country.33 "The risk exposure would be greaterin pockets where Naxalites have joined the tribals in opposingproject-induced human displacement... Areas where industrialisa-tion is in the initial stages of development are more prone to stiffopposition by Naxalites,” it says.

20


c m y k

The Naxals have taken advantage of the alienation and poverty oftribal communities. This is evident from the success of the movementin tribal-dominated areas, which are also mineral-rich

OU

TLO

OK

21


c m y k

NA

BAY OF BENGAL

ARABIAN SEA

LAKSHADWEEP ISLAND

ANDAMAN

AND

NICOBAR

ISLANDS

INDIAN OCEAN

Severely affected districts (51)

Moderately and marginallyaffected districts (80)

DAMAN & DIU

GUJARAT

MANIPUR

NAGALAND

ARUNACHAL PRADESH

JAMMU & KASHMIR

HIMACHALPRADESH

PUNJAB

RAJASTHAN

DADRA & NAGAR HAVELI

MAHARASHTRA

KARNATAKA

GOA

TAMIL NADU

KER

ALA

ANDHRA PRADESH

PONDICHERRY

CHHA

TTIS

GARH

ORISSA

WEST BENGAL

JHARKHAND

SIKKIM

ASSAM

MEGHALAYA

TRIPURAMIZORAM

BIHAR

UTTAR PRADESH

MADHYA PRADESH

HARYANA

UTTARAKHAND

DELHI

Lead

Manganese


Limestone

Silica sand

Coal/lignite

Chromite

Copper

Gold

Iron

Magnesite

Bauxite

Zinc

Uranium

Asbestos

Barytes

Diamond

Dolomite

Graphite

Gypsum

Kaolin

Kyanite

Mica

Sillimanite

Source: http://www.cpcb.nic.in/pamsweb/technicalreport/report1/chapter-11.pdf, as viewed on May 15, 2007

MAP 1.5: The red spreadNaxalites are operational in most mining districts, targeting companies as exploiters of poor and tribal people

Traditionally, symbols of government machinery (policeforces, the forest department, politicians and railway networks)have been the targets of Naxal violence. Industrial establishmentsare likely to bear the brunt in the future, says the report. In fact, attheir ninth congress held in the beginning of 2007, Naxalites clearly expressed their intention of focusing on areas where mega development projects – including special economic zones,irrigation projects and mining enterprises – were coming up.34

The militants have used various tactics for opposing industrialinvestment. Threats and kidnapping of officials from companiesare often used. In Chhattisgarh, they have threatened to attack thefacilities of the Tatas and Essar; both the groups are planninghuge steel plants in the state. In some cases, they have carried outthe threats. There has been a spate of armed attacks inChhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa aimed at mining companies.Chhattisgarh has borne the brunt of these attacks – the strike onHindalco being a case in point (see section on Chhattisgarh inChapter 4). More recently, on May 31, 2007, Naxalites blastedthree high-tension power towers in the state, disrupting powersupply in large parts of Bastar and affecting iron ore production inthe mines run by the state-owned NMDC. According to NMDCofficials, the company suffered a daily loss of about Rs 9 crore.35

The rise of Naxalism can be directly linked to a certain crisis offaith: India’s marginalised populations, including its tribals, canno longer trust their lives and livelihoods in the hands of their

government. Development projects literally pushed down theirthroats by these governments have become synonymous withpoverty and insecurity. With their backs to the wall, these commu-nities believe they have found their way out in the violent ways ofthe Naxals. In a sense, the phenomenon of Naxalism is as much acrisis of political empowerment as it is of sheer economic back-wardness, as it is sadly one of the rare opportunities still availablefor the marginalised to express their aspirations.

The Indian government’s attitude to Naxalism, of course,remains as mulish as ever: as an “internal security threat”,Naxalism and its sympathisers deserve to be stamped out deci-sively by the State’s police and army. In his speech, ManmohanSingh claims “…the path of violence can never solve the problemsof the poor.” On the other hand, he strongly advocates violence tosuppress the movement and solve the problems of the govern-ment: “Our security forces will respond appropriately to the violenceunleashed by Naxalites,” he says.

It is precisely this myopic vision that is the real problem.Poverty, starvation, malnutrition, unemployment, lack of access tobasic necessities like health and education, forced eviction of peo-ple from their lands for ‘developmental projects’ – in official parl-ance, these do not qualify as threats to ‘internal security’. Reactionsto all of these, and resistance and protests against them, do.

Various experiences have proved that a vastly different strategy is required if governments are really keen to solve theproblem. The first step is an unambiguous acceptance that devel-opment policies have failed vast majorities in the country. The sec-ond is an understanding of the basic reasons behind the failure ofdevelopment policies. And the third, and most difficult, is thepolitical will to institutionalise alternative policies.

A prime reason for the spread of Naxalism has been the failureof the State to provide remote areas with facilities for health andeducation, and the prospect for dignified employment. People inthese areas have had to cope with an administration that is alwaysindifferent, often corrupt, and sometimes brutal. Meanwhile, economic development has been powered in good part by wood,water and minerals found on these lands, and for whose profitableexploitation they have often had to make way – most of the timeinvoluntarily. It is important to recognise the fact that in the cur-rent system, forced eviction of people from their land and liveli-hood for projects like mining creates poverty and not prosperity.

Governments need to be sensitive about these issues. They mustwork to make people in Naxal-infested areas true partners in thedevelopment process – by assuring them titles on lands cultivatedby them, by allowing them the right to manage forests sustainably,and by giving them a solid stake in industrial or mining projectsthat come up where they live and at the cost of their homes.

Even if land is necessary for mining, people need to be offered deals that are good enough for them to forgo their existinglivelihoods. Finally, and most importantly, governments mustrecognise and respect the right of a community to say ‘no’ to adevelopment project. Only then will it succeed in creating anatmosphere where progress, modernisation and industrialisationwill walk hand-in-hand with people’s aspirations – away from theshadow of guns.

22


To bring the people in mining regions out of the guns’ shadow, thegovernment must recognise and respect their right to say ‘no’

NIL

MA

DH

AV

PA

ND

A

m k

23

Worldwide, the mining industry is on an overdrive. Propelled by China’s

growing economy and its insistent craving for raw materials, mineral prices

are hitting the roof. And, understandably, countries like India are cashing in:

to feed the Chinese dragon, states like Goa and Karnataka are mining iron like there was

no tomorrow.

What aids this global demand-supply equation nicely is a strong national partiality

towards mining and miners. Mining means progress: so believe the Indian government

and industry. They argue that the country’s most backward regions, which hold its

poorest people and richest reserves of minerals, must mine more and more to clamber out

of their depths of poverty and destitution. Mining would bring jobs, and jobs would usher

in prosperity, they assure us.

But does it? To begin with, statistics indicate that there is no truth in the government’s

contention that the mining sector in India is slackening. India has been mining with a

vengeance for some time now – the 11 per cent growth rate of the sector is healthy enough.

The three top mineral-rich states of Orissa, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand are going all out

to rope in investors for tapping the wealth beneath their lands.

Despite this, mining’s contribution to the gross domestic product is nothing to

write home about: in 10 years, it has stagnated around a mere 2.2-2.5 per cent. Small-scale

and public sector mining, both mass employers, are on their way out. Privately-owned,

large-scale, mechanised mines are in, and this has meant a massive dip in employment:

mining offers lesser jobs now. The mining industry’s claims of contribution through

royalties and taxes do not hold either; in India, minerals are cheap, royalties low, and

what’s more, these royalties are rarely used for the benefit of the mined regions.

Thus, coupled with the devastation that mineral extraction wreaks on a region’s

forests, lands, water and people, the net result of increased mining has been increased

poverty. This, one would imagine, should be reason enough for our planners to rethink:

India must mine, but it must mine to ensure real and lasting prosperity, not the ephemeral

idea of progress that it has taken a fancy to.

2 The industry and its economics

m k

• The global mining industry is having a dream run. Between2002 and 2005, the index of world prices of minerals, ores andmetals has more than doubled. The real prices of most metalsare at 10-15 year highs. This has ushered in an era of frenziedmining and profiteering in countries like India, disregardingall environmental and social implications.

• The value of mineral production in India has more than tripledsince liberalisation of the mining sector in 1993. The valuegrew at an astounding rate of 10.7 per cent during 1993-2005.

• The growth of the Indian mining industry is likely to be muchhigher in the coming years. In between 2002-06, an area of 900 sq km was opened for mining for major minerals.Environmental clearance was granted to 540 mines during thisperiod and as on April 2007, there were 508 mining projectsawaiting environmental clearance.

• The Indian mining industry is characterised by a large numberof small mines and is dominated by the public sector. Withonly 25 per cent of India’s operational mines, the public sector accounts for 75 per cent of the total value of mineralproduction. Another characteristic of Indian mining is that most of the major minerals are produced for captive consumption. But these traits are likely to change soon.

• The thrust of the new mining policy being promulgated by thegovernment is to move Indian mining towards privatelyowned, large-scale, mechanised mines. To achieve this, thegovernment is rolling out the red carpet for foreign directinvestors and multinational mining companies.

• Mining is being promoted in the country for the wrong reason – employment. The formal mining industry in Indiaemploys just 5.6 lakh people and this number is coming down.Between 1991 and 2004, the number of people employed inmining came down by 30 per cent, but the value of mineralproduction went up four times.

24

c m y k

Mining activities in India can be traced back 6,000 years.In fact, remains of old mine workings have led to thediscovery of a number of mineral deposits which are

being worked today (for example, lead-zinc at Zawar, copper atKhetri and gold in Kolar).

Unfortunately, no detailed documentation of ancient mining policies and practices in the country exists; some records,however, have been found in Chanakya’s 4th century BC treatiseon governance, Arthashastra,1 which says that the owner of a piece of land is entitled to half of all minerals and treasures foundon it. Chanakya also writes that mines which required large outlays to work, were leased out for a fixed number of shares of the output (perhaps on a royalty basis) and for a fixed rent.Mines that could be worked without large outlays were exploitedby the State.

The first recorded reference to large–scale mining in Indiadates back to 1774, when an English firm was granted permission by the East India Company for mining coal inRaniganj. In 1880, M/s John Taylor & Sons Ltd started mining forgold in Kolar. And the country’s first oil well was drilled inDigboi in 1866 – just seven years after the world’s first oil wellcame up in Pennsylvania, USA.

During the British period, mineral rights belonged to thestates. In some states, these rights were vested in the landlords(zamindars) and were not subject to any regulations or restrictionsby the state; landlords were free to grant leases under their ownterms and conditions.

The Indian mining industry came of age only after independ-ence. On the eve of independence, the annual value of mineralproduction in the country was a mere Rs 58 crore.2 The country

25

c m y k

CHAPTER 2

The industry and its economics

Indian mining has a 6,000-year history. Remains of old mine workings have led to the discovery of deposits being worked today

largely depended on imports. The Mineral Policy Conference heldin January 1947 resulted in the enactment of the Mines andMinerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948, the first legalframework in independent India for the regulation and develop-ment of mines. The conference also resulted in the establishmentof the Indian Bureau of Mines (IBM) in March 1948 as the mainagency for the development of the mining industry in the country.

With the adoption of the Indian Constitution on January 26,1950, the legislative powers of the Centre and the state govern-ments were clearly defined. Entry 54 of List I in the SeventhSchedule of the Constitution empowered the Central governmentto regulate mining activities and the development of minerals.Entry 23 of List II in the Seventh Schedule empowered the stategovernments to frame rules and regulations for mining activitiesand mineral development, subject to the provisions of List I.

The Industrial Policy Resolution (IPR) of 1956 made the statethe sole exploiter of minerals by clearly delineating the role of thepublic and private sectors. It put major minerals such as coal, lig-nite, mineral oils, iron ore, copper, zinc and atomic minerals inSchedule A, which was reserved exclusively for the public sector,and minor minerals in Schedule B, in which the private sector wasalso allowed to participate (see Box: Mineral classification in India).

The IPR also envisioned an ambitious programme for develop-ing several mineral-based industries such as steel, non-ferrousmetals, cement, power and fertilisers. Coal received the maximumattention, as it was the basic fuel for a whole range of industries – aministry was created exclusively for coal, while all the other miner-als were clubbed under one common ministry. The 1956 resolutionalso led to the strengthening of the Geological Survey of India (GSI)to intensify the exploration of minerals (see Box: Mining operations).

In 1957, the Mines and Minerals (Regulation andDevelopment) Bill was enacted by the Parliament for the regula-tion of mines and development of minerals. This legislation stipulated that the state governments were the owners of the minerals located within the boundaries of the respective states,while the Central government was the owner of the minerals inthe ocean within India’s territorial waters or exclusive economic

zone. Two Rules were framed under the Act (referred to as MMDRAct) – the Mineral Concession Rules (MCR) and the MineralConservation and Development Rules (MCDR).

Under MCR, the Central government kept the powers withitself to grant prospecting licences and mining leases for all minerals other than atomic minerals and minor minerals. Stategovernments were given the powers to give licenses for onlyminor minerals. Accordingly, most states have framed their ownMinor Mineral Concession Rules. Thus, even though a state wasthe owner of the minerals within its territories, it had limitedpowers to grant or authorise mining in case of major minerals.

The period between late 1950s and early 1970s saw the emergence of a number of public sector companies in the miningand minerals sector: the National Coal Development Corporation(NCDC) came up in 1956, the National Mineral DevelopmentCorporation (NMDC) in 1958, Bharat Gold Mines Limited in 1972 and the Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) in 1973.

The MMDR Act, 1957 was first amended in 1972, enhancinggovernment control over mining through such measures as premature termination of mining leases (because of the large-scaleaccidents in the privately held coal mines), lowering of ceiling onindividual holdings, power to modify mining leases and for theCentral government to undertake prospecting and mining opera-tions in certain areas, removal of ceiling on royalty charged onminerals, inclusion of provision of dead rent as part of the act, andenhancement of penalties for non-compliance.

In 1986, the MMDR Act was amended again. First Scheduleminerals, for which prior approval of the Central government hadto be obtained under the act, were increased in number from

26


Mining operationsThe basics of mining processes

Mining is a three-stage operation, involving regional exploration,detailed exploration and extraction (or mining proper). The first two,taken together, are also covered under the generic term ‘prospecting’.In India, the term ‘reconnaissance’ is used to cover the regional explo-ration phase of prospecting. Mine development, which precedesextraction, is treated as a part of mining, as this work starts only afterthe mine lease is granted. Regional exploration is mainly a surveyactivity to identify areas bearing deposits through means such as geo-logical and theme (geophysical and geochemical) mapping, aerialphotography, satellite imagery, topographic and underground surveys,and some very limited geophysical exploration with sample drilling.

Unlike regional exploration, detailed exploration is invasive and involves close distance drilling, including slim hole drilling,large-scale mapping, and geophysical and geochemical testing toestablish economically recoverable ore bodies. Mining involves minedevelopment and extraction.

Currently in India, a miner has to take a Reconnaissance Permit(RP) to undertake regional exploration, Prospecting License (PL) toundertake detailed exploration and Mining Lease (ML) to undertakeactual mining.

Mineral classification in IndiaOf major, minor, atomic and fuel minerals

In India, minerals are broadly classified into fuel minerals (coal,lignite, oil and gas), major minerals, minor minerals and atomic minerals. Major minerals constitute metallic and non-metallic industrial minerals like iron ore, bauxite, chromite, lead, zinc,limestone, copper, manganese, etc and precious metals and stoneslike gold, silver, diamond, ruby etc. Minor minerals mainly constituteconstruction materials like building stone, sand, brick, earth, marble,gravel, murrum, quartzite/sandstone and kankar. In terms of value,brick earth constitutes the largest share of minor minerals in India:about 26 per cent. India currently produces about 90 minerals. Theseinclude four fuel, 10 metallic, 50 non-metallic, three atomic and 23 minor minerals.

m k

27 to 38; the Central government was authorised to reserve areasfor public sector undertakings (PSUs); and mining plan approvalwas made compulsory. In 1988, the MCDR was revised to enableIBM to monitor and regulate mining activity.

In March 1993, alongside economic liberalisation introducedby the government in 1991, a comprehensive National MineralPolicy (NMP) was announced. The policy is more known for whatit did not prescribe, than for what it did. This single policy hasbeen used as a tool to liberalise the Indian mining industry,though the policy per se doesn’t even talks about private sectorinvestment in exploration and mining (see Box on pages 28-29:Travesty of a policy). Thirteen major minerals – iron ore, manganeseore, chrome ore, sulphur, gold, diamond, copper, lead, zinc,molybdenum, tungsten, nickel and the platinum group of minerals – hitherto reserved exclusively for the public sector, wereopened up to the private sector. Induction of foreign technologyand foreign participation in exploration and mining was encouraged and foreign equity investment in joint ventures (JVs)in mining promoted by Indian companies was allowed. Whilegenerally there was a limit of 50 per cent on foreign equity, thegovernment announced its intention to consider relaxation of thislimit on a case-by-case basis (see Box: The FDI story).

Consequently, amendments were carried out in the MMDRAct in January 1994 and soon after, in the MCR and MCDR. Theseamendments sought to simplify the procedure for grant of mineral concessions. The objective was to attract investmentsthrough private sector participation, including FDI.

To encourage private sector investments, especially FDI, inexploration and prospecting, the concept of Large AreaProspecting License (LAPL) was introduced and guidelines wereissued in October 1996, whereby the area for a single ProspectingLicense (PL) for facilitating aerial prospecting was enhanced from 25 sq km to 5,000 sq km, with a proviso that the aggregatearea held by a single party would not exceed 10,000 sq km in thewhole country.

In another significant move, the government amended theCoal Nationalisation Act, 1973 in 1999, facilitating the entry of private entrepreneurs in coal and lignite production. Till then,coal had remained a monopoly of the state barring captive coalmines granted to the Tata Iron & Steel Company (TISCO).

Despite changes in the Act and the Rules to accelerate privatesector investment and FDI in the mining sector, prospecting andmining activity by the private sector did not pick up at the anticipated pace and in February 1997, the Union ministry ofmines constituted a committee to go into the reasons for this.

The committee submitted its report in January 1998, suggesting wide-ranging amendments in the MMDR Act. Basedon the recommendations, amendments were made in the MMDRAct, 1957 in 1999 as well as the MCR and MCDR in January 2000.

The key changes were:1. Introduction of the concept of reconnaissance operations as a

distinct stage prior to prospecting, and replacement of LAPLby the instrument of Reconnaissance Permit (RP)

2. RP holder to get priority in the grant of Prospecting License(PL) within reconnaissance areas subject to certain conditions

3. Minerals listed in the First Schedule requiring prior approvalof the Centre brought down from 11 to 10

4. Delegation of powers to state governments to renew lapsedMine Leases/Prospecting License, and grant RP/PL/ML forareas that were not compact or contiguous

5. Liberalisation of area restrictions of RP/PL/ML by makingsuch restrictions applicable state-wiseThus, after the first Mining Act was promulgated in 1957, the

act was amended four times – in 1972, 1986, 1994, and 1999. Aftereach amendment, corresponding changes were carried out in thetwo rules, MCR and MCDR. While the first two amendmentsincreased government control and excluded the private sector, thelast two did just the opposite. The last two amendments alsodevolved considerable authority from the Centre to the states.

After the amendment made in 1999 in the MMDR Act, which

27

THE INDUSTRY AND ITS ECONOMICS

The FDI storyThe mining sector, which enjoys 100 per cent FDI, has beendrawing big names like De Beers and Rio Tinto

Till the early 1990s, foreign direct investment (FDI) was not encouraged in the mining sector. Mineral concessions were restrictedto companies with less than 40 per cent foreign holding. The NationalMineral Policy, 1993, changed all that by allowing FDI up to 50 per centwith no limit on captive mines. It also allowed additional FDI on acase-by-case basis. However, all FDI proposals required clearance bythe Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB).

In 1997, FDI up to 50 per cent was taken out of the purview of theFIPB and put on an automatic approval route. In February 2000,FDI was allowed up to 74 per cent under the automatic route for exploration and mining of diamonds and precious stones. In February 2006, the mining sector was opened up to 100 per cent FDI.

Besides liberalising procedures, the Indian government has

divested its equity holdings in a number of public sector undertakingssuch as the Neyveli Lignite Corporation, National MineralDevelopment Corporation, Kudremukh Iron Ore Co Ltd, HindustanCopper Ltd, National Aluminium Company Ltd and HindustanZinc Ltd.

Since 1994, the government has approved 73 proposals of FDI inthe mining sector, envisaging an investment of about Rs 4,044 crore.It includes big names like De Beers Consolidated Ltd, Rio TintoMinerals Development Ltd and BHP World Exploration Inc. De Beers,the South African diamond giant, has acquired prospecting rights toseveral large tracts of land in Orissa (over 8,500 sq km), AndhraPradesh (679 sq km) and Chhattisgarh (9,000 sq km). Rio Tinto, amultinational corporation, has diamond and gold prospecting rightsin Madhya Pradesh (7,650 sq km) and diamond prospecting rights inChhattisgarh (6,000 sq km). Broken Hill Properties of Australia hasacquired nickel, gold and cobalt prospecting rights in Madhya Pradesh(2,293 sq km).

m k

28


c m y k

Travesty of a policyThe National Mineral Policy, 1993 has been covertlydistorted to usher in privatisation of mining in India,something which was not even enunciated in it

Every major legislative and regulatory change that has happened in thelast 14 years in India in the mining and minerals industry has been donein the name of the National Mineral Policy (NMP), 1993. The mining sector has been opened up for private investments, foreign direct invest-ment (FDI) has been allowed and regulations have been relaxed. So whatis this NMP all about? The preamble of the NMP reads as follows:1.1. “Minerals are valuable natural resources, being finite and non-

renewable. They constitute the vital raw materials for many basicindustries and are a major resource for development. Managementof mineral resources has, therefore, to be closely integrated with theoverall strategy of development; and exploitation of minerals is to be guided by long-term national goals and perspectives.”

1.2. “The country is not endowed with all the requisite mineralresources. It is, therefore, imperative to achieve the best use of available mineral resources through scientific methods of mining,beneficiation and economic utilisation. Simultaneously, it is essentialto keep in view the present and future needs of defence and devel-opment of the country and strive to ensure indigenous availability ofbasic and strategic minerals to avoid disruption of core industrialproduction in times of international strife.”

1.3. “These aspects constitute the essentials of National Mineral Policywhich has evolved over the years. The policy also emphasises certainnew aspects and elements like mineral exploration in the sea-bed,development of a proper inventory, proper linkage betweenexploitation of minerals and development of the mineral industry,preference to members of the Scheduled Tribes for development ofsmall deposits in Scheduled Areas, protection of forests, environ-ment and ecology from the adverse effects of mining, enforcementof a mining plan for adoption of proper mining methods and optimum utilisation of minerals, export of minerals in value-addedform and recycling of metallic scrap and mineral waste.”The preamble, in essence, had nothing to say about opening up of

the mining industry to private investments and FDI; instead, it hadeverything to say about national security, social and environmental fallouts, privileges of Scheduled Tribes, etc. The objectives of the NMPwere as follows:(a) “to explore for identification of mineral wealth in the land and in

off-shore areas;(b) to develop mineral resources taking into account national and

strategic considerations and to ensure their adequate supply and bestuse, keeping in view the present needs and future requirements;

(c) to promote necessary linkages for smooth and uninterrupted develop-ment of the mineral industry to meet the needs of the country;

(d) to promote research and development in minerals;(e) to ensure establishment of appropriate educational and training

facilities for human resources development to meet the manpowerrequirements of the mineral industry;

(f) to minimise adverse effects of mineral development on the

forest, environment and ecology through appropriate protective measures; and

(g) to ensure conduct of mining operations with due regard to safetyand health of all concerned.”The objectives of the policy, too, had nothing to say about private

investments and FDI; forests, environment, ecology, health and safety,however, were considered important considerations.

Significantly, the entire NMP does not allude to “encouragement ofprivate investment” anywhere. In fact, it only refers to the “private sector” twice: under the section on ‘survey and exploration’, it says that“the initiative and co-operation of the private sector will also be drawnupon as required”. Under ‘mineral policy and beneficiation’, it says “thereshall be co-operation between and co-ordination among all organisa-tions in public and private sector engaged in this task”.

The policy’s enumerations on FDI are restricted to the following:● “Induction of foreign technology and foreign participation in

exploration and mining for high value and scarce minerals shall bepursued. Foreign equity investment in joint ventures in mining promoted by Indian companies would be encouraged.”

● “In respect of joint venture mining projects of minerals and metalsin which the country is deficient or does not have exportable surplus,a stipulated share of production would have to be made available tomeet the needs of the domestic market before exports from suchprojects are allowed. In case of ores whose known reserves are notabundant, preference will be given to those who propose to take uptheir mining for captive use.”

In a nutshell, the NMP wanted FDI to meet India’s mineral needs, not toencourage mineral exports. Regarding environment and ecology, thepolicy had this to say:● “Extraction and development of minerals are closely interlinked with

other natural resources like land, water, air and forest. The areas inwhich minerals occur often have other resources presenting a choiceof utilisation of the resources. Some such areas are ecologically fragile and some are biologically rich. It is necessary to take compre-hensive view to facilitate the choice or order of land use keeping inview the needs of development as well as needs of protecting theforests, environment and ecology. Both aspects have to be properlycoordinated to facilitate and ensure a sustainable development ofmineral resources in harmony with environment.

Mining activity often leads to environmental problems like landdegradation particularly in open-cast mining, land subsidence inunderground mining, deforestation, atmospheric pollution, pollu-tion of rivers and streams, disposal of solid wastes, etc. affecting theecological balance of the area. Open-cast mining in areas with actual forest cover leads to deforestation. Prevention and mitigationof adverse environmental effects due to mining and processing ofminerals and repairing and revegetation of the affected forest areaand land covered by trees in accordance with the prescribed normsand established forestry practices shall form the integral part of minedevelopment strategy in every instance.”

● “Mining operations shall not ordinarily be taken up in identified ecologically fragile and biologically rich areas. Strip mining in forest areas should as far as possible be avoided and it should be

29


c m y k

permitted only when accompanied with comprehensive time-boundreclamation programme.”

● “No mining lease would be granted to any party, private or public,without a proper mining plan including the environmental manage-ment plan approved and enforced by statutory authorities. The environmental management plan should adequately provide for controlling the environmental damage, restoration of mined areasand for planting of trees according to the prescribed norms. As far aspossible, reclamation and afforestation will proceed concurrentlywith mineral extraction.”

● “Efforts would be made to convert old disused mining sites intoforests and other appropriate forms of land use.”

The policy’s recommendations on closure of mines and rehabilitation ofthe displaced population were:● “Mineral deposits being exhaustible, once the process of extraction of

a mine is complete, there is need for its closure. Especially where themining activities have been spread over a few decades, mining communities get established and closure of the mine means not onlyloss of jobs, but also disruption of community life. Whenever mineclosure becomes necessary, it should be orderly and systematic andso planned as to help the workers and the dependent communitiesrehabilitate themselves without undue hardships.”

● “Mining operations often involve acquisition of land held by individuals including those belonging to the weaker sections. While

compensation is generally paid to the owner for the acquisition of hisland, efforts shall be made to ensure suitable rehabilitation of affected persons, especially those belonging to the weaker sectionswho are likely to be deprived of their means of livelihood as a resultof such acquisition.”Going by these, the NMP emerges as the most comprehensive and

holistic policy that a nation can have to address and reduce the social andenvironmental fallouts of mining. It is farsighted enough to enunciate theprinciple of dematerialisation in the conservation of minerals: it statesthat one of the means to achieve conservation of minerals is by“reduction in the requirements of minerals per unit of material output”.

Despite all these proactive enunciations, the policy has been grosslymisinterpreted and misused. Using this policy as an entry point,large-scale mining has been ushered in the country, without giving dueconsideration to the social and environmental impacts. It has been publicly announced that the policy was made to encourage private sectorinvestment in exploration and mining. Consequently, amendments werecarried out in the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Actin January 1994 and soon after in the MCR and MCDR. These amend-ments sought to simplify the procedure for grant of mineral concessions,so as to attract large investments through private sector participation,including FDI. Of course, none of the clauses of the policy which relatedto forests, environment, Scheduled Areas, health or safety were givensimilar attention.

The National Mineral Policy advocates proactive processes like simultaneous reclamation of exhausted mines; but its exhortations have beenlargely ignored. The result: eyesores like the one above

CSE

introduced the concept of RPs, till March 31, 2005, 203 RPs cover-ing an area of over 2,78,618 sq km had been granted in 12 states.3

Following its liberalisation in 1993, the mining industry hasgrown significantly. Between 1993-94 and 2003-04, the value ofmineral production (other than atomic minerals) in the countryhas more than tripled: it has grown at a compound annual growthrate of 10.7 per cent since 1993-94.4

This apparent high, however, has only served to whet the government’s appetite; the dominant viewpoint in the corridorsof power is that India must mine more for exports and become amajor mineral-exporting country of the world. Keeping this inmind, another high-powered committee was set up by the government in September 2005 under the leadership of AnwarulHoda, member, Planning Commission, to review policies, acts,regulations and procedures for granting RPs, PLs and miningleases and suggest measures to expedite these processes forattracting private investment and FDI. This committee has comeout with a set of far more industry-friendly recommendationswhich, if adopted, will lead to massive changes in the relationshipbetween mining, people and environment (see Chapter 5).

■ THE MINING BOOM

Mine – let the good times roll: this is the title of a report that the glob-al consultancy firm PricewaterhouseCoopers published in June2006, reflecting the global trends in the mining industry. The min-ing industry is having a dream run because world prices of minerals, ores and metals have reached record levels. The pricesare in the midst of a multi-year upward trend, which started in2002 on the back of unprecedented demand from China. The year2006 saw prices skyrocketing further – up 48 per cent since thebeginning of the year.5 Between 2002 and 2005, the index of worldprices of minerals, ores and metals had doubled. During this period, the prices of iron ore increased by 118.5 per cent, copperprices shot up by 136 per cent, lead prices by 116 per cent, nickel

prices by 118 per cent and aluminium prices by 41 per cent.6 By2005, nickel was at its highest price in 15 years, copper and tinwere at their highest in 10 years, and aluminum was at a six-yearhigh.7 The real price of iron ore was at a 15-year high.8 Clearly, themining industry is going through a boom, and the “good times”are expected to last (see Graph 2.1: Monthly commodity priceindices).

The most important factor that has led to these price increaseshas been the demand from China. From 1990-2000, China’s metalsdemand grew at an average of 10 per cent annually; from 2000-2005, it skipped on at 17 per cent per year.9 Today, China isthe world’s number one miner of coal, lead, zinc and iron ore andthe top producer of steel, aluminium, refined zinc, tin and lead.10

But its domestic mining industry cannot meet the demands of itsmanufacturing sector. The result: China is importing everything,including bauxite, copper, iron ore, zinc, lead and nickel, to feedits metals industry.

Take the examples of iron ore and aluminium. China has beenthe largest steel producer for nearly a decade, producing aboutone-third of the world’s steel: this is more than three times theproduction of Japan and the US, the second and third largest producers.11 Between 1990 and 2000, China’s steel productionnearly doubled, growing at a rate of more than six per cent.12 Thedemand for iron ore during this period was largely met domesti-cally. But between 2000 and 2005, steel production nearly tripled,rising at an astounding average rate of more than 22 per cent.13 Tomeet the iron ore requirements of its steel industry, therefore,China moved to imports. Between 2000 and 2004, China importedtwo-thirds of the world’s traded iron ore, and its imports grew ata rate of more than 30 per cent annually.14 This demand led to skyrocketing of world iron ore prices, which increased by 118.5 per cent between 2002 and 2005.15

The influence of China on the metals market is also apparentin the case of aluminium prices, which have fallen as a result ofChina’s increased production. In 2005, China was both the largestproducer and consumer of aluminium.16 While prices are at a 10-year high (real dollars), aluminium surpluses are projectedthrough 2010 – a result of China’s increased production; this isexpected to drive prices down until they settle just above theprices in the previous 15-year peaks.17

The increase in minerals and metals prices have ushered in anera of frenzied mining and profiteering. Mines that were uneco-nomical and closed have been opened to meet the Chinese demand.There is a rush to open up new mines and metal manufacturingplants. Countries like India, which have large deposits of bauxiteand iron ore, have taken to mining extensively to feed the growingChinese demand, besides their own growing metals industries (see Box: The frenzy of mining iron).

Naturally, mining and metals companies never had it so good.During 2004 and 2005, the global mining industry’s performancehas exceeded that of the market as a whole by over 300 per cent.18

With net profits eight times that of 2002, 2005 had proved to be avery good year for mining companies, driven by the high prices ofcopper, gold, iron ore and coal.19 The top 40 global mining companies (which represent over 80 per cent of the world

30


Source: Anon, 2006, Trade and Development Report 2006, United NationsConference on Trade and Development, Geneva, p 19

GRAPH 2.1: Monthly commodity price indices Most mineral prices have gone up between 1995 and 2006

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

All commodities (in current dollars)Minerals, ores and metalsCrude petroleum, average of Dubai/Brent/Texas equally weighted

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

m k

industry by market capitalisation) reported a 59 per cent increasein aggregate net profits for 2005 – up from US $28 billion in 2004to US $45 billion. The aggregate profits of these companies were amere US $5 billion in 2002.20 For instance, in 2005, mining multinational BHP Billiton’s profits more than doubled for thefirst half of the year, largely due to China’s demand; Brazil’s RioTinto, one of the largest mining companies in the world, provided China with 25 per cent of its imported iron ore.21 Totalshareholder returns (TSR) in 2005 reflect the increasing commodityprices: the average TSR of the top 40 mining companies was 63 per cent. Eight of the companies had a TSR greater than 100 per cent.22 In total, the TSR in 2005 was around US $16 billion,almost double that in 2004.23

The metals and minerals commodities market has historicallybeen cyclical.24 Today, however, the market is looking towardsChina, India and the rest of the developing world to see if these

highs will be sustained because of continued growth and demandfrom those countries (which already account for almost half of theglobal demand).25,26 At the end of 2006, the World Bank had predicted that while the metals and minerals index will decline in2007 and 2008, it would still be high;27 however, even within theBank, there is a disagreement on how much countries like Indiaand other emerging economies will influence the market. There isa general sense of optimism that prices will remain high as coun-tries like India catch up with China. A PriceWaterhouseCooperssurvey of the global minerals and metals scenario reflects thissense of optimism: “India is on the path to a sustained high levelof growth. The rapidly growing private sector and massive invest-ments in building infrastructure across the huge country areexpected to trigger considerable demand for minerals in the fore-seeable future. This will provide great opportunities for increasedrevenues for the global mining industry.”28

31


The frenzy of mining ironChinese demand for iron ore is responsible for the surge iniron ore mining

Whether it is picturesque Goa, densely forested Koenjhar-Sundergarhin Orissa or hilly Bellary-Hospet in Karnataka, massive iron ore miningis leaving its indelible marks everywhere in the country. The frenzy hastaken India by surprise. Not long ago, this segment of the miningindustry was on the verge of collapse. Prices were low and domesticand global demands were moderate. Then came China and iron oreminers were a resurrected lot. In five years, the amount of iron ore produced in the country has almost doubled – from 77 MT in 2000-01to 154 MT in 2005-06 (see Table: Iron ore from India). The compoundannual growth rate of iron ore production in these years has been awhopping 15 per cent.

Most of the incremental production in iron ore is being exported. The share of exports to the total iron ore production in the country has steadily increased from about 26 per cent in 2000-01 to about 58 per cent in 2005-06. Today, India’s domestic requirement of iron ore is not even 40 per cent of the iron ore produced in the country.

The majority of the Indian iron ore is being bought by China.China’s share in India’s exports of iron has increased from about 30 percent in 2000-01 to 83 per cent in 2005-06. Today, China consumes farmore of Indian iron ore than the India’s own domestic industry. China,in fact, is buying everything from India – high grade ore, low grade ore,fines, lumps, concentrates and even the soil of areas like Goa,Joda-Barbil and Bellary-Hospet, which has about 40-50 per cent ironcontent. Vast tracts, as a result, are doomed to become veritable wastelands to satisfy China’s unquenchable appetite.

2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06

Production (in million tonne) 77.0 86.2 99.1 122.8 145.9 154.4

Total exports (in million tonne) 20.2 23.1 48.0 62.6 78.1 89.3

Exports as percentage of production (in percentage) 26.2 26.8 48.5 50.9 53.5 57.8

Exports to:

China (in million tonne) 6.1 10.7 25.2 42.1 59.4 74.1

China's share in total exports (in percentage) 30.2 46.3 52.4 67.2 76.0 83.0

Japan (in million tonne) 8.2 6.3 21.7 13.1 11.1 10.3

Japan's share in total exports (in percentage) 40.4 27.4 45.1 20.9 14.2 11.6

Others (in million tonne) 5.9 6.1 1.2 7.4 7.6 4.8

Share of others in total exports (in percentage) 29.4 26.3 2.5 11.8 9.8 5.4

Sources: Anon, Indian Minerals Yearbooks 2002-2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur; data from Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation, New Delhi; anon,2006, Lok Sabha Starred Question No 293, December 12

TABLE: Iron ore from IndiaProduction of iron ore has doubled in six years, and exports have surged too

m k

Indian mining industry has, so far, not disappointed the global consultancy firm. The value of mineral production in thecountry has tripled since the liberalisation of the mining sector in1993: from about Rs 25,000 crore in 1993-94 to more than Rs 84,000crore in 2005-06.29 The compound annual growth rate (CAGR) inthe value of mineral production in the country during 1993-2005has been an astounding 10.7 per cent.

Post-liberalisation, mineral production in the country hasbounded ahead on the back of increase in the production of coal,lignite, natural gas, bauxite, chromite, iron ore and limestone.During 1993-2005:● Iron ore production grew at a CAGR of 8.25 per cent. The total

production of iron ore increased from about 59 MT in 1993-94to 154 MT in 2005-06.

● Bauxite production grew at a CAGR of almost seven per cent:it increased from more than five MT in 1993-94 to about 12 MTin 2005-06.

● Total coal and lignite production grew at a CAGR of four percent, having jumped from 267 MT in 1993-94 to 437 MT in2005-06.

● The production of chromite grew at a CAGR of 10 per cent,from 1.06 MT in 1993-94 to three MT in 2005-06.

● Natural gas production grew at a CAGR of more than five percent. The production almost doubled from 16,340 millioncubic metre (mcm) in 1993-94 to 31,223 mcm in 2005-06.

● The production of limestone grew at a CAGR of six per cent,having more than doubled from 83 MT in 1993-94 to 170 MTin 2005-06.

● The only major mineral whose production stagnated wascrude petroleum, mainly because of the limited geologicalpotential.Despite such impressive figures over the last decade, the

government and the industry continue to believe that mining isnot contributing enough to the growth of the national economyand therefore, this sector has to do more to justify its position in aresurgent India. Most of the current official policies in the country,hence, seem to have been tailored to address this supposedmalaise. But most of these policies are silent on the environmental,economic and social fallouts of mining.

■ MINERAL PRODUCTION IN INDIA

India produced 90 minerals in 2005-06, valued at an estimated Rs 84,211 crore. The list was dominated by fuel minerals – coal,lignite, crude petroleum and natural gas – which constitutedabout 73 per cent of the total value of minerals produced in thecountry (see Graph 2.2: The top minerals in 2005-2006). The contri-bution of fuel minerals, however, has dipped over the years: in2001-02, it was as much as 81 per cent of the total value (see Table2.1: Growth and value between 2001 and 2005).

Within fuel minerals, solid fuels (coal and lignite) have overtaken liquid and gaseous fuels (crude petroleum and naturalgas) in terms of value. In 2001-02, solid fuels constituted about 47 per cent of the value of fuel minerals; in 2005-06, they made upabout 57 per cent of the value, while value from liquid andgaseous fuels decreased from 53 per cent to 43 per cent.

Metallic minerals are the next biggest contributors to the totalvalue of minerals. In 2005-06, they constituted about 13.6 per cent– a share which has increased in the last few years (in 2001-02, it

32


Petroluem21.3%

Lignite2.6%

Coal

38.4%

Others

2.2%

Minor minerals

10.0%

Limestone

2.3%

Iron ore

10.3%

Lead & zinc

1.0%

Chromite1.2%Natural gas

10.7%

Source: Data collected from publications of the Indian Bureau of Mines,Nagpur

GRAPH 2.2: The top minerals in 2005-2006Fuel minerals lead the pack in contribution to total value

The minerals sector in India has been growing at an impressive 11 per cent, contrary to the poor projections by the government

DEB

AN

JAN

BA

ND

OPA

AD

HYA

Y

c m y k

33


was just 6.5 per cent). In fact, metallic minerals are the fastestgrowing segment of the mineral industry in India. During 2001-05,the value of metallic minerals produced in the country has grownat a compound annual growth rate of 30 per cent, one of the highest in the world.

In metallic minerals, iron ore alone contributes three-fourth ofthe total value. Chromite, which is mainly exported, is the nextbiggest contributor (8.5 per cent).

Minor minerals, mainly sand, gravel, brick, earth and stone,are also important contributors. Though data for the last few yearsis not available, past trends indicate that they constitute as muchas 10 per cent of the value of minerals produced in the country.

Non-metallic minerals are minor players in the Indian minerals sector in terms of value, though they are big both interms of area under mining and volume of minerals produced.Their contribution to the value of total minerals produced in thecountry has remained at about 3.3-3.4 per cent in the last fewyears. In non-metallic minerals, limestone constitutes about two-thirds of the total value. Phosphorite is the next importantnon-metallic mineral produced in the country, constituting about10 per cent of the total value of these minerals.

● What the states producedIn the period 2002-05, mineral production was reported from 32states and union territories, other than offshore production ofpetroleum and natural gas. In terms of value of production, thetop 10 states along with the offshore production accounted forabout 87 per cent of the minerals produced in the country (see Graph 2.3 on page 34: State-wise contribution to mineral value).Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Jharkhand, Gujarat, Madhya Pradeshand Chhattisgarh are the major mineral producers of the country,

while states like Goa and Karnataka are the emerging giants.In the last few years, mineral production has increased at an

unprecedented rate in some states. Production in Karnataka hasalmost doubled – from Rs 1,133 crore in 2002-03 to Rs 2,117 crorein 2004-05. Goa has increased its value of production by 67 percent – from Rs 495 crore to Rs 829 crore in the same period.Madhya Pradesh has increased its value of mineral productionby 38 per cent during 2002-04. Orissa is not far behind: its valueof production has increased from Rs 3,443 crore in 2002-03 toRs 5,820 crore in 2004-05.30 All this mining frenzy has happenedon the back of the burgeoning iron ore demand from countries likeChina. In this period, Andhra Pradesh has made the maximumcontribution to the total mineral value generated in the country.The state is the dominant producer of non-metallic and minorminerals. It accounted for 26 per cent of the total revenue generated by minor minerals and 15 per cent of the revenue generated by non-metallic minerals in the country. It also rankedfifth in its contribution to fuel minerals.

Orissa, on the other hand, has substantial metallic mineralmining. It accounts for about one-third of the total value of metallicminerals, the highest in the country (see Graph 2.4 on page 34:State-wise contribution to metallic mineral value). Karnataka,Chhattisgarh and Goa are the other metallic mineral-rich states:along with Orissa, they accounted for 82 per cent of the total valueof metallic minerals produced in the country.

The states with significant contributions to fuel mineral valuewere coal-rich Orissa, Jharkhand, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh,Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh (see Graph 2.5 on page 34:State-wise contribution to fuel mineral value). Fuel minerals wereproduced in 19 states, other than offshore production (whichalone contributed about one-third of the value).

Sectors Value of mineral production Compound annual Sectoral contribution to the (in Rs crore) growth rate total value (in percentage)

(in percentage)

2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06

Total: all sectors 60,930.8 66,878.3 71,381.9 81,264.4* 84,210.8* 8.4

Fuels 49,324 53,042.9 55,480.7 60,511.6 61,484.8 5.7 81.0 79.3 77.7 74.5 73.0

(a) Solid fuels 23,343.1 25,930.1 27,926.1 32,625.1 34,506.4 10.3 38.3 38.8 39.1 40.1 41.0

(b) Liquid & gaseous fuels 25,980.9 27,112.8 27,554.6 27,886.5 26,978.4 0.9 42.6 40.5 38.6 34.3 32.0

Metallic minerals 3,978.1 4,679.2 6,395.9 9,940.4 11,486.1 30.4 6.5 7.0 9.0 12.2 13.6

Non-metallic minerals 2,048.1 2,248.8 2,371.1 2,686.1 2,828.9 8.4 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.4

Minor minerals 5,580.6 6,907.4 7,134.2 8,126.3* 8,411* 10.8 9.2 10.3 10.0 10.0 10.0

Notes: The table excludes minerals declared as prescribed substances under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962.*The data on value of minerals produced in the country for 2004-05 and 2005-06 excludes minor minerals. For estimating the total value of minerals produced, minor mineral value has been estimated based on the past trends, which indicate that minor minerals constitute about 10 per cent of the total value of minerals produced in the country. According to data released by the Indian Bureau of Mines, the value of minerals produced in the country, excluding minor minerals and atomic minerals, was Rs 73,136.4 crore and Rs 75,699.2 crore in 2004-05 and 2005-06, respectively. Sources: Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 1-5; value of mineral production for the years 2004-05 and 2005-06 takenfrom http://ibm.nic.in/frames.html as viewed on March 21, 2007

TABLE 2.1: Growth and value between 2001 and 2005Metallic minerals are the fastest growing segment of the minerals industry in India

m k

34


0.41.4

2.13.7

4.84.84.95.46.56.9

7.98.79.2

33.4

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Off

sho

re

Jhar

khan

d

Gu

jara

t

Mad

hya

Pra

des

h

An

dh

ra P

rad

esh

Ch

hat

tisg

arh

Ass

am

Mah

aras

htr

a

Ori

ssa

Utt

ar P

rad

esh

Tam

il N

adu

Utt

aran

chal

Meg

hal

aya

Oth

ers

Source: Analysis based on data from anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 11-4

GRAPH 2.5: State-wise contribution to fuel mineralvalue: 2004-05 (in percentage)Jharkhand generates the highest value in this sector

23.4

14.8

13.7

10.0

7.9 7.5

4.8 4.64.1

3.42.4

1.6 1.9

0

5

10

15

20

25

Raj

asth

an

An

dh

ra P

rad

esh

Mad

hya

Pra

des

h

Tam

il N

adu

Gu

jara

t

Ch

hat

tisg

arh

Kar

nat

aka

Ker

ala

Mah

aras

htr

a

Ori

ssa

Him

ach

al P

rad

esh

Jhar

khan

d

Oth

ers


GRAPH 2.6: State-wise contribution to non-metallicmineral value: 2004-05 (in percentage)Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh generatemore than 50 per cent

Orissa 35%

Karnataka 23%

Chhattisgarh 13%

Goa 10%

Others 1%

Maharashtra 2%Madhya Pradesh 3%

Jharkhand 6%

Rajasthan 7%


GRAPH 2.4: State-wise contribution to metallic mineralvalue: 2004-05 Orissa and Karnataka contribute more than 50 per cent

Andhra Pradesh

8.6%Assam

4.3%

Chhattisgarh

6.6%

Gujarat

7.5%

Jharkhand8.2%

Madhya Pradesh6.5%

Maharashtra4.5%

Orissa6.6%

Rajasthan 4.0%

West Bengal 3.7%

Offshore26.5%

Others13.1%


GRAPH 2.3: State-wise contribution to mineral value:2002-05 Top 10 states accounted for 87 per cent of the value

States States

m k

In non-metallic minerals, Rajasthan leads a pack of 22 states.The state’s rich reserves of gypsum and limestone have allowed itto corner 23 per cent of the total non-metallic mineral value (seeGraph 2.6: State-wise contribution to non-metallic mineral value).Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh are the other two states,which contributed significantly to non-metallic minerals.

Minor minerals were produced by 29 states, led by AndhraPradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The four states togeth-er accounted for almost 80 per cent of the total minor mineral value(see Graph 2.7: State-wise contribution to minor mineral value).

■ INDIA AND THE WORLD

India accounts for a significant portion of the world’s total production of a number of minerals. It is ranked second in outputof chromites, accounting for 17.7 per cent of what is producedglobally. It produces 11.5 per cent of the world’s barytes, andseven per cent of its coal and lignite (see Table 2.2: India’s share inglobal production).

India’s contribution to global coal production has remainedmore or less constant over the past few years: on an average,between 2000 and 2004, it contributed 7.6 per cent of the total

35


Rajasthan 23%Uttar Pradesh 18%

Bihar 12%

Gujarat 4%

Maharashtra 4%

Kerala 2%

Haryana 2%

Karnataka 2%

Madhya Pradesh 2% West Bengal 1%

Others 3%

Andhra Pradesh 27%


GRAPH 2.7: State-wise contribution to minor mineralvalue: 2004-05 Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan contribute half the value

Commodity Unit of quantity Production Contribution Rank in order % of quantum of

World India* production

Mineral fuels

Coal and lignite Million tonne 5,080 389 7.65 3rd

Petroleum Million tonne 3,596 334 0.93 26th

Metallic minerals

Bauxite ‘000 tonne 1,55,000 10,925 7.04 6th

Chromite ‘000 tonne 16,400 2,905 17.71 2nd

Iron ore ‘000 tonne 12,38,000 1,22,838 9.92 4th

Manganese ore ‘000 tonne 24,300 1,776 7.30 8th

Industrial minerals

Barytes ‘000 tonne 6,300 723 11.47 2nd

Kyanite, andalusite and silimanite ‘000 tonne 584 29 5.0 4th

Magnesite ‘000 tonne 20,800 324 1.55 9th

Apatite and rock phosphate ‘000 tonne 141,000 1,446 1.02 14th

Talc/steatite/pyrophylite ‘000 tonne 8,700 903 10.37 3rd

Mica Tonne 2,80,000 4,003 1.42 8th

Metals

Aluminium ‘000 tonne 27,900 810 2.90 8th

Copper (refined) ‘000 tonne 15,200 396 2.60 14th

Steel (crude) ‘000 tonne 9,67,000 31,779 3.29 8th

Lead (primary) ‘000 tonne 6,800 25 0.37 26th

Zinc (primary) ‘000 tonne 9,200 252 2.74 9th

Note: *Figure relates to 2003-04Source: Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 1-5

TABLE 2.2: India’s share in global production of minerals, 2003-04India contributes significantly to the world’s mineral production

m k

coal produced in the world.31 The major producers were Chinaand the US, who together accounted for more than 50 percent of the global production in 2004 (see Graph 2.8: Coal –country-wise production). In 2000, both these countries werecontributing almost equally (around 23 per cent) to the world’scoal production. However, China has taken over since and is nowputting in 35 per cent, while the US contribution has fallen to 18per cent.

In the case of iron ore, India accounted for 10.5 per cent of thetotal production in 2004 – up from 7.5 per cent in 2000 (see Graph2.9: Iron ore production (2001-04)). China is the largest iron ore-producing nation, accounting for 23 per cent of the global output in 2004. The nations which have shown significant increasein contribution to world production between 2000 and 2004 areChina, India and Australia.

Bauxite is another important mineral found in significantquantity in the country. India accounts for six-seven per cent ofthe total bauxite produced in the world. The biggest producers areAustralia and Guinea (see Graph 2.10: Bauxite – country-wise production). However, in the past five years, contribution of thesetwo countries has gradually gone down while countries like Indiaand China have increased their production by 32 and 34 per cent,respectively.32

India has limited reserves of petroleum and natural gas. In 2004, the country accounted for about 0.9 per cent of the total global production of petroleum products and 1.1 per cent of that of natural gas. Consumption of both these minerals is increasing within the country and is met mainly throughimports. Some other minerals in which India’s contribution to global production is low are silver (0.2 per cent), gold (0.12 per cent), diamonds (0.05 per cent), copper (0.2 per cent) andlead (1.7 per cent).

Industry experts feel that the current levels of mineral production in India are low, and that the contribution of India in global mineral production is bound to increase significantly in future. The populations of China and India are comparable in size and both economies have grown quickly in recent years. India’s economic growth has accelerated lately,and if liberalisation and economic reforms continue at the samepace, India could soon begin to match China in its contribution tothe sector.

India’s population is expected to grow more quickly andcould overtake China’s sometime after 2030. As the economyexpands and people become wealthier, the need for large-scalenew infrastructure will increase and the mineral demand forindustrial and consumer goods as well as services will grow. Therate of growth in demand could be very rapid. Today, it is Chinawhich is exercising an impact on international mineral markets;tomorrow, it could very well be India.

36


Russia5% South Africa

5%

USA18%

China35%

India7%

Australia7%

Others22% Canada

1%

Source: L E Taylor et al, 2006, World Mineral Production 2000-04, BritishGeological Survey, Nottingham, UK, pp 15-17

GRAPH 2.8: Coal – country-wise production (2004)China and the US account for more than half of the globalcoal production

7.5

8.28.9

9.910.5

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Perc

enta

ge

(%)

Source: L E Taylor et al, 2006, World Mineral Production 2000-04, BritishGeological Survey, Nottingham, UK, pp 32

GRAPH 2.9: Iron ore production (2001-04)India’s contribution to global outputs has been on the rise

Guinea12%

Jamaica8%

China7%

India7%

Australia35%

Others31%

Source: L E Taylor et al, 2006, World Mineral Production 2000-04, BritishGeological Survey, Nottingham, UK, pp 32

GRAPH 2.10: Bauxite – country-wise production (2004)Contribution of India and China is growing

m k

■ STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRY

The Indian mining industry is characterised by a large number ofsmall mines. The total number of mine leases, excluding fuel minerals, atomic minerals and minor minerals, stood at 9,131 in2004-05. The total number of operational mines (excluding atomic,minor and fuel minerals) was 2,606. However, if we add the numberof coal mines, for which the data for only operational mines is available, then the total number of mine leases in the country goesup to 9,693 and the number of operational mines to 3,168.33

A majority of the operational mines (63 per cent) produce non-metallic minerals (see Table 2.3: Operating mines in India), with limestone mines constituting about 30 per cent of total non-metallic mines. In the case of metallic minerals, about 44 per cent of the mines are iron ore mines.

In the mining industry, there is no clear-cut classification ofwhat is large, medium or small mining operation. As the total production of a mineral depends on its geological availability, whatis large, medium or small varies vastly in scale from one mineral toanother. In minerals like coal, iron ore and limestone, a mine

producing more than a million tonne of minerals per year might beconsidered a large mine; in the case of chromites, however, thisvalue might be just 100,000 tonne per annum. Nevertheless, estimates have been put out by various researchers and institutionson the share of mineral production from various segments of theindustry and the conclusions are more or less similar.

Minor minerals are dominated by small- and medium-scalemines – both in terms of numbers as well as production.

In major minerals, although a large number of mines areunder the small- and medium-scale sector, large-scale mines dominate in terms of production.

According to data published by the high-level committee(Hoda committee) constituted by the Planning Commission toreview the National Mineral Policy, other than diamonds, iron oreand bauxite, the contribution of small- and medium-scale minesto major mineral production is very small (see Table 2.4:Production from large-, medium- and small-scale mines).

Mining in India is largely concentrated in 11 states: Gujarat,Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand, Orissa,Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh and WestBengal. Together, they account for more than 90 per cent of thetotal number of reporting mines in the country34 (see Table 2.5 onpage 38: Reporting mines in India). Other than a few major miningstates, the number of mines in most of the states have shown fairlyconsistent trends over the last decade. The states which showed adip in the number of reporting mines between 1997-98 and 2004-05 are Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Kerala and Rajasthan. The numberof mines in Bihar and Madhya Pradesh went down in 1998-99 dueto the formation of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh respectively.Conversely, the number of operating mines increased inChhattisgarh (by 60 per cent) and Tamil Nadu (by 40 per cent).

The mining and minerals sector in India is dominated by thepublic sector. In 1993, the government revised the NationalMineral Policy, which allowed investments by the private sector

37


Sector 2003-04 2004-05

Solid fuel minerals (coal and lignite) 562 562

Metallic minerals 612 615

Non-metallic minerals 1,958 1,991

All minerals* 3,123 3,168

Note: *Excluding atomic minerals, petroleum (crude), natural gas (utilised) andminor mineralsSource: http://ibm.nic.in/frames.html, as viewed on November 15, 2006

TABLE 2.3: Operating mines in IndiaA total of 3,168 mines are operating in India

Mineral Total production Production by large-scale mines Production by small- and (2004-2005) medium-scale mines

Quantity Share Quantity Share (in percentage) (in percentage)

Iron ore (‘000 tonne) 1,42,711 85,040 60 57,671 40

Bauxite (‘000 tonne) 11,697 8,575 73 3,122 27

Limestone (‘000 tonne) 1,61,462 1,50,065 93 11,397 7

Copper concentrate (tonne) 1,45,664 1,45,664 100 Nil Nil

Zinc concentrate (tonne) 6,66,972 6,66,972 100 Nil Nil

Lead concentrate (tonne) 81,635 81,635 100 Nil Nil

Gold ore (tonne) 5,89,877 5,89,877 100 Nil Nil

Diamonds (carats) 78,315 Nil Nil 78,315 100

Source: Anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi

TABLE 2.4: Production from large-, medium- and small-scale minesExcept in the case of diamonds, the Indian mineral industry is dominated by big players

m k

(domestic as well as foreign) in most minerals. The objective of thenew policy is to propel growth in mineral industries to comple-ment the growth of national economy. For this, the governmentaims to withdraw from the non-strategic sectors and privatisesome public sector undertakings in a phased manner. Today, theprivate sector has been allowed in all segments of the miningindustry other than atomic minerals. In addition, industriesdependent on minerals are allowed captive mines.

Currently, the public sector – with only 25 per cent of thenation’s operational mines – accounts for about 75 per cent of thetotal value of mineral production in the country. Much of the fuelmineral capacity lies with this sector. Coal is still nationalised,though the private sector is allowed to hold captive mines as wellas sell coal (see Box: Rejuvenating the coal sector). Private participa-tion and investment in petroleum and natural gas is growing,

38


State 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 (p)

Andhra Pradesh 412 406 385 395 400 413 405 413

Assam 9 9 10 10 10 10 9 9

Bihar 335 20 13 10 9 6 8 10

Chhattisgarh - 86 66 116 123 125 142 138

Goa 74 76 71 74 75 80 79 72

Gujarat 461 443 454 430 424 417 421 430

Himachal Pradesh 39 38 33 33 32 32 30 28

Haryana 31 29 30 32 28 17 2 2

Jammu & Kashmir 5 6 7 7 9 9 8 8

Jharkhand - 311 343 338 299 292 299 303

Karnataka 207 202 184 177 192 216 227 235

Kerala 54 54 45 42 37 34 35 38

Meghalaya 2 2 2 2 2 4 5 5

Madhya Pradesh 514 425 436 374 371 325 318 335

Maharashtra 148 142 150 137 137 137 152 156

Orissa 238 219 229 235 232 243 243 240

Rajasthan 526 501 465 454 465 441 396 391

Sikkim 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

Tamil Nadu 124 130 134 156 172 171 183 183

Uttar Pradesh 43 21 21 29 38 29 27 28

Uttarakhand - 16 8 15 20 28 27 29

West Bengal 129 125 121 123 116 115 114 113

India* 3,354 3,283 3,209 3,191 3,193 3,146 3,132 3,168

Notes: P = Provisional*Excluding mines of atomic minerals, petroleum, gas and minor mineralsSource: Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 10-7

TABLE 2.5: Reporting mines in India A few states hold most of the mines in the country

Rejuvenating the coal sectorMoves are afoot to liberalise the sector

The Economic Survey 2005-06 has suggested liberalisation of coal mining in India, including bidding of captive blocks and permission tosell excess coal from captive mines, to arrest a slowdown in the mining and electricity sectors. The poor performance of these two sectors were responsible for dragging down industrial growth to 7.8 per cent during the first nine months in 2005-06, as against agrowth of 8.6 per cent in the same period of the previous fiscal. CoalIndia Ltd (CIL) recently proposed to allow captive players to producecoal even before commissioning of their main projects. Further, CILhas offered to buy coal from private players.

m k

where companies like Reliance are slowly gaining ground. Thecontribution of the public sector has gone down in production of natural gas, although it remains constant in petroleum at 87 per cent (see Table 2.6: How the public sector fares).

Some other metallic minerals such as copper, lead, zinc andgold are predominantly mined by the public sector, though allthese have now been opened for private investment. Currently,the private sector dominates iron ore, bauxite, chromite, lime-stone, silica and mica mining. A substantial chunk of limestone isalso under captive control of the cement industry. The public sector’s role is gradually declining in the mining of minerals likebauxite, iron ore, manganese, tin and dolomite. In the last fewyears, the share of the public sector in bauxite and iron ore mining

has gone down significantly.The structure of the mineral industry can also be determined

by the nature of consumption as captive and non-captive mines.For example, most large-scale cement plants have their own cap-tive mines for meeting their requirement of limestone. Similarly,most large-scale integrated iron and steel plants have captive ironore mines. The government has also allowed captive coal minesfor some industries, which include power, iron and cement.

In terms of number of mine leases, most of the mines in thecountry are non-captive in nature: other than fuel minerals, 83 percent of the total mines leased out are non-captive. Captive miningis only allowed for a few selected minerals: for instance, 34 percent of bauxite mines35 and 37 per cent of limestone mines havebeen set aside for captive consumption. In the case of iron ore,only eight per cent has been leased out as captive mines. Someother minerals for which captive mining is allowed includechromite (47 per cent), copper (67 per cent), gold (100 per cent)and lead (100 per cent).36

In terms of production, captive mines have a significant role insome major minerals. In the case of limestone, for instance, morethan 90 per cent of the production is from captive mines. Aboutthree-fourth of bauxite is produced from captive mines. Copper,zinc and lead are wholly produced in captive mines (see Table 2.7on page 40: Production from captive and non-captive mines).

The conclusions that can be drawn from the above about thestructure of the Indian mining industry, therefore, are:● Minor minerals are dominated by non-captive small- and

medium-scale mines.● Fuel minerals are dominated by public sector large-scale

mines.● In metallic minerals, private large-scale mines dominate.● In non-metallic minerals other than limestone, private sector

non-captive mines dominate (most are medium- and small-scale mines). Limestone has more of captive large-scalemines.

● Public sector companies are slowly losing ground to privatesector in most metallic and non-metallic minerals.

39


2002-03 2003-04 2004-05

Fuel minerals

Coal 95.36 94.65 96.12

Lignite 100 100.00 100.00

Natural gas (utilised) 82.29 79.27 78.37

Petroleum 87.63 87.07 87.49

Metallic minerals

Bauxite 52.89 50.31 42.57

Chromite 22.97 26.66 22.97

Copper ore 100 100.00 100.00

Gold 100 100.00 99.29

Gold ore 100 100.00 99.13

Iron ore (total) 50.16 46.84 40.06

Manganese ore 55.5 53.39 45.43

Tin 100 85.66 52.13

Non-metallic minerals

Diamond 100 100.00 100.00

Dolomite 66.94 57.34 57.50

Graphite 38.96 48.88 42.69

Gypsum 99.98 99.91 99.79

Lime shell 20.57 21.12 21.34

Limestone 6.48 6.14 6.53

Magnesite 56.44 65.89 69.61

Mica (crude) 9.12 1.38

Salt (rock) 100 100.00 100.00

Silica sand 3.69 7.43 5.93

Source: Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,Nagpur, pp 8-8 and 8-9

TABLE 2.6: How the public sector faresPublic sector is steadily losing ground to private sector inmetal mining (all figures in per cent)

Most cement plants have their own captive limestone mines

NIV

IT K

UM

AR

YAD

AV

/ C

SE

m k

■ SMALL-SCALE MINING

Small-scale mining has its supporters as well as detractors. For theformer, small-scale mining is important because it providesemployment, is highly productive and profitable, leaves behind amuch smaller specific environmental footprint, is a distributor ofwealth, and – to many – is the only way out of poverty. Its detrac-tors, on the other hand, claim that small-scale mines are highlypolluting, unsafe and disruptive.

The truth lies somewhere between these diametrically opposing views, and depends on factors like the types of mineralsbeing mined, the mining site, the processes and costs of mining,ownership patterns and the regulatory environment.

The first and biggest dilemma is to define a small-scale mine(SSM): there is no internationally accepted definition for it.Different countries have their own ideas of SSMs and use differ-ent basis for categorising them – mine area, production, level ofmechanisation, number of people employed or capital invest-ment. For example, in Pakistan and the US, SSMs are defined interms of employment, which is “mines with less than 50 workersin Pakistan and less than 20 in the US”. Capital investment isanother criterion for small-scale mining, varying from specifiedlimits such as US $2.5 million in Argentina and R 8.0 million inSouth Africa to Rs 300 million in Pakistan, US $1 million inThailand and US $30,000 in Zimbabwe.37

India too has struggled to fix a definition for SSM. There aretwo commonly used definitions, derived from a Committee onSmall Mines set up in 1986 by the Mining, Geological andMetallurgical Institute of India (MGMI). These are as follows: “Asmall mine is one in which the raw ore production does notexceed a certain limit depending on the mineral/ore.” This defini-tion does not prescribe the limit. The second definition is based oninvestment and says that “small-scale mines are those whereinvestment may not exceed Rs 6 million and if beneficiation orprocessing plants are installed, the investment may not exceed Rs 10 million.”38 However, the Kolkata-based National Institute of

Small Mines (NISM) has adopted a different definition for SSMs:all mines producing minerals upto 0.1 MT per annum for smalland 0.1-0.5 MT per annum for medium mines.39

There are also the regulatory definitions. Mines with a leasearea of less than five ha are considered small mines and are notcovered under the EIA process. However, according to the IBM,SSMs are manual open-cast mines not using explosives and wherethe average daily employment does not exceed 25.

Often, small-scale mining is confused with artisanal mines.However, these two are very different. Artisanal miners normallywork in small groups of family members or close relatives, without hired assistants. They may work on their own lands, inpublic places or on state-owned land with or without any license or formal permission. But in India, small-scale mining is(supposedly) organised mining carried on with acquired miningrights under some statutory control.

According to the International Labour Organization (ILO),small-scale mining falls into two broad categories. The first ofthese is mining and quarrying for industrial minerals and construction materials on a small scale, practised across the world.These mines are often regulated and taxed, but poor enforcementand monitoring often results in informal or illegal operations. Thesecond category is of mining of relatively high-value minerals,notably gold and precious stones. These are generally exported; in this case too, laws and regulations are impossible to enforce.

● The situation in IndiaIt is estimated that small-scale mining contributes as much as15-20 per cent of the global value of non-fuel mineral produc-tion.40 In India, SSMs extract almost all minor minerals, besidessome major minerals; over 40 different minerals are exploited bythis sector in the country.41 But India does not have any officialstatistics on the number of these mines. This is because a majorityof them do not fall under the purview of the government organi-sation responsible for monitoring mine management in India: theIBM. The bureau does not monitor minor minerals (such as sand,

40


Mineral Total production Production by captive mines Production by non-captive mines(2004-2005)

Quantity Share (in percentage) Quantity Share (in percentage)

Iron ore (‘000 tonne) 1,42,711 35,040 25 1,07,671 75

Bauxite (‘000 tonne) 11,697 8,575 73 3,122 27

Limestone (‘000 tonne) 1,61,462 1,50,065 93 11,397 7

Copper concentrate (tonne) 1,45,664 1,45,664 100 Nil Nil

Zinc concentrate (tonne) 6,66,972 6,66,972 100 Nil Nil

Lead concentrate (tonne) 81,635 81,635 100 Nil Nil

Gold ore (tonne) 5,89,877 5,89,877 100 Nil Nil

Diamond (carats) 78,315 Nil Nil 78,315 100

Source: Anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi

TABLE 2.7: Production from captive and non-captive minesIn case of some major minerals, production is dominated by captive mines

m k

stone or marble), which constitute a major chunk of the SSMinventory. Minor minerals fall under the jurisdiction of respectivestate governments, which usually have extremely poor trackrecords in maintaining statistics. In addition, there are a numberof SSMs which operate illegally and do not even exist in officialrecords. Estimations done by the Centre for Science andEnvironment indicate that there might be hundreds of thousandsof SSMs in the country. Consider Rajasthan: officially, it has 1,324 mining leases of major minerals, 10,851 leases of minor minerals and 19,251 stone quarries. In all, Rajasthan alone has31,426 mines and quarries, a majority of them small-scale.

In India, the private sector and non-fuel minerals dominatesmall-scale mining. The present size of mining operations (production-wise) can be estimated from aggregate production ofminerals and the number of operating mines. The average size ofmines of high-value minerals such as copper, lead, iron ore andchromite is much more than that of other minerals (see Table 2.8:Mining operations: average sizes – 2004-05). However, even in thecase of these minerals, there are mines which belong to the SSMcategory (as the iron ore mines in Keonjhar district of Orissa orlimestone mines in Rajasthan). A large number of SSMs target the smaller mineral deposits, whose extraction by large-scaleoperations is not feasible.

The IBM’s Statistical Profiles of Minerals, 2004-05 has categorisedall major minerals into two groups based on production. Mines inGroup A are bigger, producing more minerals compared to themines in Group B. The document puts the total number of minesin Category B (for minerals like slate, tin, quartz, ball clay etc) asonly 2,497. This, of course, is barely half the picture as it does notinclude minor minerals, which form the major part of SSM.42

Undoutedly, SSMs have their advantages, especially for acountry like India. To begin with, small mining operations have ahigh employment potential for workers of all types. What’s more,this employment is available in all seasons, and is a blessing forpeople who cannot cultivate their lands due to poor rains ordroughts. Worldwide, it is estimated that about 13 million peopleare directly engaged in small-scale mining, mainly in developingcountries, and the livelihoods of another 80-100 million are affectedby it.43 In the 1970s, 50 per cent of the Indian mining workforcewas engaged in small mines.44 A 2002 report by MMSD indicatesthat the total employment generated by SSMs in the country isabout 0.5 million.45 The ILO, in 1999, had however estimated thenumber of people employed in the sector to be much higher: 1.0-1.1 million people.46 Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt, a researcher at theCanberra-based Australian National University, estimates thenumber of people employed in Indian quarries as 12 million.47

Most of these quarries are small-scale operations. Besides their employment potential, SSMs are cost-effective

and also contribute to revenues. In 1998, 90 per cent of the revenues from minor minerals, 100 per cent from non-formalminor minerals and 25 per cent from metallic and non-metallicminerals came from SSMs: the total amounted to Rs 5,024 crore,48

which was 11 per cent of the total revenue generated by the mining sector in that year.49

Among the shortfalls of small-scale mining is its largely

41


Mineral Number Production Annual production of (in tonne) per mine

mines (tonne/mine)

Agate 1 15 15.0

Apatite 2 8,596 4,298.0

Asbestos 16 288.336 18.0

Barytes 15 2,04,55.019 1,363.7

Bauxite 197 11,697,000 59,375.6

Calcite 17 84,187 4,952.2

Chromite 20 3,640,000 1,82,000.0

Copper ore 5 3,073,000 6,14,600.0

Corundum 1 18.56 18.6

Dolomite 153 4,309,000 28,163.4

Felsite 5 793 158.6

Feldspar 101 3,73,212 3,695.2

Fireclay 100 5,59,000 5,590.0

Fluorite 6 11,450 1,908.3

Gold ore 3 5,90,000 1,96,666.7

Graphite 35 1,00,363 2,867.5

Gypsum 42 3,555,000 84,642.9

Iron ore 280 142,711,000 5,09,682.1

Jasper 8 1,210 151.3

Kaolin 122 9,05,000 7,418.0

Kyanite 8 7,710 963.8

Laterite 31 7,04,000 22,709.7

Lead & zinc concentrates 6 3,929,000 6,54,833.3

Limestone 571 161,462,000 2,82,770.6

Magnesite 17 3,81,000 22,411.8

Manganese ore 125 2,379,000 19,032.0

Mica 35 1,366 39.0

Ochre 50 8,08,000 16,160.0

Quartz 194 2,95,719 1,524.3

Quartzite 17 93,000 5,470.6

Sand (other) 7 1,387 198.1

Shale 13 2,386,000 1,83,538.5

Silica sand 157 1,905,000 12,133.8

Sillimanite 7 28,761 4,108.7

Slate 6 4,093 682.2

Talc/steatite/soapstone 180 7,50,000 4,166.7

Vermiculite 4 3,273 818.3

Source: Analysed from information from anon, 2006, Statistical Profiles ofMinerals, 2004-05, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur

TABLE 2.8: Mining operations: average sizes (2004-05)The average annual production of non-metallic mineral minesis low, indicating the large presence of small-scale mines

c m y k

unorganised, unregulated and unrecognised nature in the country,though it contributes a significant 10 per cent to the total mineralvalue.50 Working conditions in these mines are abysmal andexploitative. SSMs also exercise considerable impacts on the envi-ronment: they destroy forests and biodiversity, lead to siltation ofrivers, erosion of land, and overall pollution of land, water andair. This is largely because SSMs neither have enough resources toinvest in environment protection, nor the requisite knowledgeand consciousness of mineral conservation. A case in point is thatof small-scale mining of limestone in the Mussoorie hills ofUttarakhand, which resulted in widespread degradation of theHimalayan environment. Deforestation accelerated soil erosion,which affected the stability of hill slopes leading to frequent land-slides and debris flows, particularly during the rainy season.Disposal of waste materials from quarries and surface run-off ledto siltation of water courses. Besides, residents of the area had toface problems such as dust, noise and vibration. Mining stoppedonly after the intervention of the Supreme Court in 1986.

Most SSMs go scot-free even when they do not meet environ-mental standards, as monitoring is non-existent. State pollutioncontrol boards do not monitor small mines (less than five ha inarea) or illegal mines. Even the SSMs which fall under thepurview of the boards escape monitoring, as the boards lack thecapacity to deal with so many mines.

SSMs have exceedingly poor records with respect to safety.Problems related to occupational health are more serious and pervasive in this sector, and accident rates much higher. As mostof the mines are privately owned and in remote areas, accidentslargely go unreported. There are no provisions for insurance, compensation or health care. Most workers operate without basicsafety equipment, and there are no regular health checks to detectcases of occupational diseases (see Box: Battling feudalism andexploitation). According to the ILO, the number of accidentaldeaths in the country in SSMs ranges around 15-50 every year.51

Crushing and milling operations in SSMs are notoriously haz-ardous because of the unprotected machinery, noise and vibration.Workers who participate in wet processes such as sluicing and collecting concentrates, suffer from skin diseases and injuries as aresult of permanently wet hands and feet. Women who transportbasket-loads of minerals, stones and sand on their heads are proneto lower back injuries, which are aggravated by poor postures during mining in confined spaces, panning and amalgamating.Workers in SSMs are also exposed to hazardous chemicals such asmercury and cyanide which are used in processing.

Women, who play a significant role in small-scale and artisanal mining, are also some of its worst sufferers. Of the 13million or so miners engaged across the world in artisanal-scalemining (ASM), approximately 30 per cent are women.52 Aboutsix-seven per cent of artisanal miners in India are women.53

Another document by the MMSD puts the number of women in SSMs at around six to seven per cent – about 33,500 – of the people employed.54

Women miners get lower wages then men; their living andworking conditions are poor, they receive no benefits such as paidholidays or maternity leaves, and have no access to safety gear.Often, their role is limited to menial but more physically intensivejobs. They also become targets for exploitation by men.

Child labour is another major problem in the SSM sector (seeBox: The story of Shyam). Children, employed illegally, face thesame hazards as their adult counterparts, but the risks for themare much more severe. Children as young as six or seven years areemployed for breaking rocks with hammers, washing ore, sievingand transporting. They also work in underground mines, settingexplosives and fetching and carrying for adult workers.

All these drawbacks notwithstanding, it is a fact that small-scale mining generates employment; it is, therefore, necessary tobring it into the ambit of legal framework and monitoring. TheNMP, 1993 makes no reference to small-scale mines.

42


Battling feudalism and exploitationShankargarh’s silica mineworkers are in dire straits

Shankargarh in Uttar Pradesh is barely 48 km from Allahabad; but onecan be forgiven for assuming that this town is not a few kilometres, butdecades away. Shankargarh is feudal India at its worst – a sad reminderthat Indian society is far from having shed the baggage of exploitativestructures that have characterised it.

Shankargarh is famous for its silica mines. The erstwhile Raja ofShankargarh has mining rights for 99 years in the 46 villages coveringan area of 15,000 ha that make up this region. The Raja leases out plotsto contractors who, in turn, employ local villagers, the majority of themlandless and bonded labourers, at extremely exploitative rates. Sincethree-fourths of Shankargarh is rocky and unfit for cultivation, the localpopulation has no other source of income than mining.

The workers used to earn just Rs 15-20 a day until they rebelled;‘halla bol’, their rebellion, was supported by a non-governmental organ-isation called Sankalp. In 15 villages, mineworkers captured lands under

lease to the Raja, and started mining themselves because the contractorsrefused to give them work. After attempts at negotiation failed, theydecided to squat on the lands; their contention was that the lease in per-petuity to the Raja was illegal and was encouraging exploitation, bondedlabour and child labour. That was in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The situation hasn’t changed much after all these years. Mining cooperatives, controlled by the workers, have been set up, but workingconditions remain as terrible as before, and exploitation is rampant.

But what characterises Shankargarh is not the epic battle or itsaftermath, but the high prevalence of silicosis, locally known as‘Shankagarh-wali TB’ (Shankargarh’s tuberculosis). Workers earning alivelihood breaking stone are exposed to silica dust for long periods oftime. The average life span here is only 40 years. Treatment for a worker’s affliction costs Rs 130-150 a month, which he is ill able toafford on the paltry wages he receives. Compensation is unheard off.Since the workers are unorganised, very often, they are not even on theofficial muster rolls of the contractors. And where the workers havetaken over, there is no money to compensate.

m k

It is imperative to identify SSMs, monitor them and integratethem into the mainstream. This means recording the number ofsmall-scale mines and the number of people employed in themand addressing the issues that are so specific to this category. It is,therefore, important to frame a separate policy for SSMs, educatethe miners and monitor them more effectively.

There have been attempts to bring some semblance of orderinto this sector. One of these has been the practice of cluster mining, which involves creating a cluster of SSMs. This couldeither occur naturally through years of operation or through apre-planned effort. For example, Pakur stone mining in Bihar,Makrana marble mining in Rajasthan and Naini glass sand mining in Uttar Pradesh have evolved over the years. A pre-planned cluster approach was tried in Pachami-Hatgacha, WestBengal for stone mining. In this cluster mining, employmentincreased from about 200 to 10,000 in a period of two decades,providing minimum sustenance to a large number of people.55

The obvious disadvantage in the case of natural clusters is thatthey take a long time to develop. Moreover, as they are unplanned,infrastructure and environmental management facilities are usually poor. Planned cluster mining fares better on these counts.

However, the concept of cluster mining has not taken off inthe absence of official support. For instance, in Rajasthan, whichis a major producer of minor minerals, the government has contracted the process of revenue collection to private parties.Clearly, the state has no interest in monitoring its SSMs.

43


Unlike large mines, small-scale mining provides employment to thousands of people across the country

DEB

AN

JAN

BA

ND

OPA

DH

YAY

The story of ShyamA mineworker and a student

Shyam, now 12 years old, lost his father Kishnaram Bhil when hewas only six. He used to work in the mines in Gopalsagar, a small village near Ajmer, Rajasthan. Kishnaram was the only earningmember in the family. Shyam’s mother started working in the mines,getting a measly Rs 25-30 for a day’s hard labour. This hard-earnedmoney was not enough to fill the bellies of her five children.She began taking the children, including Shyam, his younger brother and little sister to the mines. The children had to sit in thesun the whole day. Soon, Shyam and his brother, Manohar startedworking in the mines. They used to remove debris, break downpieces of stone into pebbles and load them on the tractors. For thiswork, they got Rs 10-20 per day.

However, their life changed when a Special Child Labour Schoolopened in the neighbourhood. They enrolled, with encouragementfrom the school staff. According to Shyam: “The stipend that we getfrom school will help us continue our studies after completing ourprimary education from this school. If there had been no such school,it would never be possible for children like us to learn, and our futurewould have been nothing but the dark world of mining.”

– B Dutt, Mine Labour Protection Campaign, Jodhpur

m k

■ THE AREA UNDER MINING

An area of 6,20,372 ha was leased out for mining in the country tillMarch 2003. This included 9,131 mining leases for 62 metallic andnon-metallic minerals, including lignite.56 What this figure leavesout are the lands being mined for coal, atomic, liquid and gaseousfuels and minor minerals.

There is no data available on land under coal mining.However, we know that the public sector has acquired 0.13 million ha for mining coal since the nationalisation of the coalindustry57 (see Box: The private and the public in mining). As themajority (95 per cent) of coal production is accounted for by thepublic sector, the land held or acquired by it can be indicative ofthe land under coal mining (see Table 2.9: Land acquired by public sector coal mines).

Thus, the total land leased out for mining (for coal, metallicand non-metallic minerals) in the country stands at 7,54,861 ha.The land under mining would be much higher considering thefact that this data does not include minor minerals (as these areunder the purview of the states and it is difficult to get reliabledata on them), atomic minerals, petroleum and gas wells and landunder private coal mines.

An area of 0.75 million ha for mining may seem small compared to the overall size of the country (328.7 million ha). Butlooking at mine lease area alone gives a very distorted picture of

the actual amount of land diverted by the mining industry. Everymining enterprise includes the conversion of land to purposessuch as building roads, railways and ropeways for mineral trans-port, townships for housing miners and managers, land for stockyard and for preliminary processing operations and land forassociated economic activities. In effect, the total land affected bymining is many times larger than the simple lease area.

Among the states, in 2003-04, the maximum area of land wasleased out for mining in Rajasthan (22 per cent), followed byOrissa (15 per cent) and Andhra Pradesh (eight per cent) (see Table 2.10: Mine leases and lease area – the states). Gujarat, on theother hand, had the maximum number of mine leases, accounting

44


c m y k

An area of 0.75 million ha has been leased out for mining in the country. But the total land affected by mining extends on a much larger area– as it includes land for transportation, townships and processing plants

AN

UPA

MA

KU

MA

RI

The private and public in miningThe private sector holds less land, but more mines

Of total metallic and non-metallic mines, more than 90 per cent iswith the private sector. However, in terms of area under mining, theprivate sector accounts for only 63 per cent while the remaining iswith Central government undertakings (19 per cent) and state enter-prises (17.7 per cent). On an average, one private sector mine has anarea of only 46.2 ha. In contrast, a Central government undertakinghas an area of 562 ha and a state enterprise, 269 ha.

for 17 per cent followed by Andhra Pradesh with 16 per cent andRajasthan with 14 per cent. This variance means that the landholding per mine varies from state to state. Surprisingly, it is thesmaller states which have allotted more area per mine. For exam-ple, Manipur has the maximum land per mine in the country –around 305 ha. The mines in Orissa have higher lease area com-pared to those in Rajasthan or Chhattisgarh. In Andhra Pradesh,mines have the least mine area – only 32 ha per mine.

The mineral that has the maximum land under mining is lime-

stone, which accounts for 21 per cent of the total area under mining(see Graph 2.11: Area under different mineral mines). Iron ore has thenext highest area under mining (15 per cent), followed by man-ganese ore and lignite (six per cent each). Bauxite mines account forfive per cent, while low-value minerals like china clay, fire clay,gypsum, and silica sand all account for four per cent each of thetotal land under mining. If the area under coal mines is included, itbecomes clear that about 50 per cent of the total mine lease area inIndia is under three major minerals – limestone, coal and iron ore.58

45


Company Area acquired (hectare)

All rights* Mining rights** Total

ECL 12,471.09 74.88 12,545.97

BCCL 648 2,787.85 3,435.85

CCL 42,690.74 22,212.41 74,234.98

NCL 15,214 15,214

WCL 74.91 74.91

SECL 824.83 824.83

MCL 17,574.64 10,584.05 28,158.69

Total 89,498.21 35,659.19 1,34,489.23

Notes: *All rights are inclusive of mining rights; **mining rights are meant foronly mining purposes.Source: Anon, 2006, Annual Report 2005-2006, Union ministry of coal, NewDelhi, pp 50

TABLE 2.9: Land acquired by public sector coal minesAbout 18 per cent of land under mining is held by publicsector coal mines

Limestone21%

Iron15%

Others20%

Lignite6%

Gypsum4%

Fireclay4%

Dolomite3%

Bauxite5% China Clay

4%

Manganese ore6%

Mica3%

Silica sand4%

Steatite5%


GRAPH 2.11: Area under different mineral mines More than one-third of lease area is under limestone andiron ore mines

State No of Share Lease Share in Area leases in the area the per

total lease mine leases area lease

(%) (ha) (%) (ha/mine)

Andhra Pradesh 1,482 16 47,905 7.7 32

Assam 16 0.2 1,294 0.2 81

Bihar 51 0.6 5,422 0.9 106

Chhattisgarh 259 2.8 30,353 4.9 117

Delhi 4 0.0 486 0.1 122

Goa 396 4.3 30,325 4.9 77

Gujarat 1,589 17.4 37,457 6.0 24

Haryana 148 1.6 16,890 2.7 114

Himachal Pradesh 53 0.6 2,368 0.4 45

Jammu & Kashmir 25 0.3 1,312 0.2 53

Jharkhand 384 4.2 45,185 7.3 118

Karnataka 514 5.6 50,902 8.2 99

Kerala 96 1.1 2,193 0.4 23

Madhya Pradesh 1,154 12.6 33,465 5.4 29

Maharashtra 220 2.4 15,988 2.6 73

Manipur 2 0.0 610 0.1 305

Meghalaya 24 0.3 4,177 0.7 174

Orissa 629 6.9 95,532 15.4 152

Rajasthan 1,312 14.4 1,34,832 21.7 103

Sikkim 4 0.0 86 0.0 22

Tamil Nadu 536 5.9 41,667 6.7 78

Uttarakhand 56 0.6 2,757 0.4 49

Uttar Pradesh 99 1.1 6,741 1.1 68

West Bengal 78 0.9 12,424 2.0 159

Total 9,131 6,20,372 68


TABLE 2.10: Mine leases and lease area – the statesIn 2003-04, Orissa, Rajasthan, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh andJharkhand held more than half of the mine leases

m k

46


c m y k

A burden on the exchequer? Illegal mining is making huge dents in the national earnings from the sector

AG

NIM

IRH

BA

SU /

CSE

■ GDP AND MINING

In 2004-05, the mining and quarrying sector, excluding atomicminerals, accounted for about 2.2 per cent of the nation’s grossdomestic product (GDP)59 – up from from 1.8 per cent in 1970-71(see Graph 2.12: Mining’s contribution to GDP – trends). In the last10 years, the share of mining in GDP has remained constant ataround 2.2-2.5 per cent.

There is no established formula which provides for an optimalcontribution of the mining sector to a nation’s GDP. For instance,mining contributes just 1.7 per cent of the GDP in the US, whereas it constitutes five per cent of Australia’s GDP, 8.5 per centof Brazil’s GDP and 3.4 per cent of Canada’s GDP.60

It is important to note here that mining, with only 2.2 per centcontribution to India’s GDP, is already playing havoc with thenation’s environment and social fabric.

■ THE MINERAL TRADE – IMPORTS

Other than petroleum, the country is largely self-sufficient inmost minerals (see Table 2.11 on page 48: How self-sufficient arewe?). A majority of the demand for coal, iron ore, bauxite,chromites, limestone, manganese ore and many other minerals ismet by domestic production.

There are a few minerals which the country imports: theseinclude chrysotile asbestos, borax, kyanite, potash, rockphosphate, elemental sulphur, special grades of fluorspar, flakyand amorphous graphite of high fixed carbon, very low silicalimestone, dead burnt magnesite and seawater magnesia. Indiaalso imports uncut diamonds, emeralds and semi-preciousstones, which are cut and polished before being exported asvalue-added minerals.

47


c m y k

0.00

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

3.00

Perc

enta

ge

con

trib

uti

on

of

min

ing

to

GD

P

1974-75 1976-77 1978-79 1980-81 1982-83 1984-85 1986-87 1988-89 1990-91 1992-93 1994-95 1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 Re

1972-731970-71

At constant price

Source: Anon, 2006, Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy 2005, Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi

GRAPH 2.12: Mining’s contribution to GDP – trendsThe contribution has reduced during the last decade

SHYA

MA

L /

CSE

In the last five years, India has begun importing non-coking coal (see Box: Importing coal). The imports are still low – aboutfive per cent of the total demand – but there are fears that withan increasing energy demand, the gap between demand anddomestic availability might widen in future.

In 2003-04, India imported about Rs 1,30,060 crore worth ofores and minerals, and this accounted for about 36.2 per centvalue of all merchandise imported into India.61 The high importvalue was mainly due to imports of petroleum crude, whichaccounted for about two-thirds of the value of mineral imports,and uncut diamonds, which accounted for about one-fourth of thevalue (see Graph 2.13: Value of imports).

If imports of petroleum crude and diamonds are excluded,then imports of coal and coke account for the biggest chunk: about57 per cent of the value of total imports. Other minerals that figure prominently in the import list include asbestos, copper oreand concentrate, iron ore, limestone and zinc ore and concentrate.

India’s imports of ores and minerals have gone up fromRs 92,796 crore in 2001-02 to Rs 1,30,060 crore in 2003-04: ahike of almost 40 per cent. This was mainly propelled by anincrease in the imports of crude petroleum. Imports of uncutdiamonds also went up by about 50 per cent during this period.Imports of a few other minerals like asbestos (mining of which was banned in the country) and natural gas have alsoshown a significant hike.

In 2003-04, minerals were imported from more than 156 countries, although a majority of the imports was confined to 19countries. An interesting aspect of the imports is that two-thirdsare from ‘unspecified countries’, which is defined by IBM as “thecommodities for which country-wise details are not available”.Therefore, for a large chunk of minerals imported into India, thecountry of origin is unknown. Belgium, United Kingdom,Australia are some other important importers.

48


Petroleum (crude)66%Coal

4%

Diamond (cut)25%

Coke1%

Others3%

Copper ores and conc1%


GRAPH 2.13: Value of imports: 2003-04 India’s imports are dominated by petroleum products

Commodity Demand/ Supply/ Order domestic domestic of self-

consumption supply sufficiency ('000 tonne) ('000 tonne) (%)

Asbestos 86 1* 1

Barytes 135 723 100

Bauxite 7,718 10,925 100

Chromite 7621 2,905 100

Dolomite 3,829 4,051 100

Fireclay 499 657 100

Feldspar 202 332 100

Fluorspar 62 12 100

Gypsum 4,220 6,0932 100

Iron ore 41,276 1,22,838 100

Ilmenite 161 465 100

Kyanite 12 9 75

Limestone and other 1,37,0023 1,53,8844 100calcareous minerals

Magnesite 226 324 100

Manganese ore 815 1,776 100

Rock phosphate 2,693 1,446 54(including apatite)

Rutile 13 20 100

Sillimanite 6 20 100

Silica minerals 1,612 4,092 100

Sulphur 1,500 4255 28

Talc/steatite/pyrophyllite 271 903 100

Notes: Although almost the entire domestic demand is satisfied by domesticsupplies, some quantities of certain special quality/types of minerals and metals/ferro-alloys are imported to meet the requirement in certain specific end-uses.* Relates to chrysotiles asbestos1. Excluding consumption in small-scale; because of shortage of lumpy

grade chromite ore, it was imported.2. Includes all the three forms of gypsum – mineral gypsum, byproduct

marine gypsum and byproduct phospho-fluoro-boro gypsum3. Includes calcerous slag/sludge, flyash and flue dust4. Excludes production of limestone as a minor mineral5. Includes sulphur equivalent of mine production of pyrites/recovery of

byproduct sulphuric acid from copper and zinc smelters and recovery ofbyproduct sulphur from petroleum refineries


TABLE 2.11: How self-sufficient are we?A majority of the demand for most minerals is met by

domestic production

m k

49


Importing coalEven though production is sufficient, inland transportationcosts and poor quality have led to coal imports

In the last decade, India has started importing large quantities of coal.The country always depended on imports of metallurgical-grade coking coal to meet about 30-50 per cent its requirements. What is newis that India has started importing non-coking coal, which is mainlyused for power generation.

There are many reasons behind this, and one of the key ones is economics. In the coastal areas of the country, it is cheaper for thepower plants to import coal from countries like Indonesia and SouthAfrica than to transport it inland from the eastern parts of India wherethe majority of coal is produced.

There is also the quality factor. Indian coal is not very high in quality – it has a high ash content and low calorific value. Companies,therefore, have started blending high quality imported coal with low-grade indigenous coal. This is giving them better operational efficiencies, while keeping the costs competitive at the same time.

The third major factor is the capacity constraint in public sector coalcompanies to increase production.“In the last 10 years or so, we have notbeen allowed to hire technical and managerial level staff. The current situation is that there are not enough qualified officers to take the lead.We, therefore, are an organisation which is heavy at the bottom andempty at the top,”says a senior officer from Coal India Limited (CIL).

All the three factors together have led to imports of non-cokingcoal increasing from about three MT in 1995-96 to about 20 MT in2005-06. In terms of total coal consumption in the country, imports are still miniscule – about five per cent. But if demand increases at ahigher rate, India will have to import more coal.

“On an annual basis, we are still a coal-surplus country and imports hide this fact,” says the same officer from CIL. This becomes clear when one looks at the data on supply, demand and closing stocksof coal in the country (see Table: Production, demand, imports and closingstocks).

From the data, it is apparent that apart from metallurgical-grade coking coal, the production of all other types of coal exceeded thedemand.This is also clearly reflected in the amount of closing stock withthe coal companies, which has remained at around 20 MT in all years.

“No one is denying the fact that there are problems in public sector coal companies, but they are not something that cannot be managed. Our problem also stems from the fact that we produce poor grade coal and also that there are infrastructural bottlenecks totransport coal,”the officer adds.

2002-03 2003-04 2004-05

Demand (in MT)

Metallurgical coking coal 30.6 30.2 34.6

Non-coking coal* 332.7 350.4 380.2

Total 363.3 380.9 414.8

Production (in MT)


Non-coking coal* 348.9 370.9 394.8

Total 367.3 389.2 413.0

Imports (in MT)


Non-coking coal 10.3 8.7 12.0

Total 23.3 21.7 29.0

All India figure for closing stock (in MT)3

Coking coal 3.0 2.6 3.5

Non-coking coal** 16.4 18.7 20.5

Total 19.4 21.3 24.0

Notes: *Including lignite and non-metallurgical coking coal**Excluding Meghalaya coalSources: Anon, 2005, Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No 4497, May 5,2005; anon, 2007, Economic Survey 2006-07, Union Ministry of Finance,New Delhi and publications of the Union ministry of coal, New Delhi

TABLE: Production, demand, imports and closing stocks

Indian coal companies face capacity constraints, which is limitingan increase in production. This, along with poor quality of indigenous coal, has promoted coal imports

PATR

IK O

SKA

RSSO

N

m k

■ THE MINERAL TRADE – EXPORTS

In 2003-04, India exported minerals worth Rs 49,911 crore, whichwas 17 per cent of the total value merchandised out of India.62

India’s exports of ores and minerals went up by 42 per centbetween 2001-02 and 2003-04 – an increase mainly due to the rise in exports of cut diamonds and iron ore, the key mineralsexported from India.

In fact, cut diamonds account for 76 per cent of the value oftotal exports (see Graph 2.14: Value of exports: 2003-04). The secondbiggest contributor is iron ore, with about 10.5 per cent of thevalue. The quantity of iron ore exported from the country has more than doubled between 2001-02 and 2003-04 (see Box: Atug-of-war). China The other major minerals exported from thecountry are precious and semi-precious stones, chromites and coal(see Box: Net importer or exporter?).

Minerals were exported to 200 countries in 2003-04, however,91 per cent of exports were confined to only 11 countries. Otherthan US, some major destinations for India’s minerals were China,Hong Kong, Belgium and United Arab Emirates. Belgium figuresboth in import and export list as it supplies raw uncut diamondand later exports back value-added diamonds.

50


A tug-of-warTwo Indian associations slug it out over iron ore

A battle has been raging between two associations over exports of ironore.The Indian Steel Association (ISA) has called for a complete ban onexports, and is being opposed by the Federation of Indian MineralIndustries (FIMI), which wants a ban on captive iron ore mines.

The steel industry wants a ban on exports which, it fears, willexhaust the limited reserves of iron ore in India. It also argues that Indiashould export steel rather than iron ore because production of eachtonne of steel creates seven to 10 times more value-addition than ironore mining alone; steel production along with iron ore mining can create five times more direct and permanent employment than justmining. The steel industry has been supported in this by the government’s ‘Expert Group on Preferential Grant of Mining Leases forIron Ore, Chrome Ore and Manganese Ore’, also called the Dang committee. This committee has agreed with the steel industry and hasrecommended that the iron ore in the country should be preserved forsteel production and preference should be given to steel companieswhile allotting iron ore mine leases. It has asserted that “the country’snatural advantage of rich iron ore reserves must not be frittered awayby continued positioning as a raw material supplier to the developedworld and now, even to rapidly industrialising China”.

The FIMI, which represents the mining industry, has opposed therecommendations of the Dang committee and has taken its case to theAnwarul Hoda committee, set up to examine the mining policy. Theminers’stand has been clear: they want to sell the iron ore produced bythem at the best international prices. In their view, it is not necessary toban exports to ensure availability of iron ore to domestic industry. Ifdomestic steelmakers are willing to pay the price at which iron ore is

purchased across the world, there is no reason for not selling the ore tothem. FIMI also argued that iron ore is not in short supply, regardlessof how fast the demand for steel grows, because conversion ofresources into proven reserves is simply a function of exploration which will inevitably occur if demand rises. It also brought out theemployment card and pointed out the impact on employment the banwill have in Goa, Karnataka and Orissa.

The Hoda committee agreed with the mining industry. It believedthat there is no scarcity of iron ore in the country. It also believed thatany ban on exports would impact employment on a large scale and thatexports is a significant catalyst of socio-economic development inbackward and tribal belts. It also believed that any restriction on exportswould hamper FDI in mining, as foreign investors would view it negatively. It recommended that there is no need to impose any quantitative restrictions on exports currently but that the positionshould be revisited after 10 years. However, it also recommended thatcaptive mines of steel companies should not be allowed to export ironore. Exports should only be allowed for stand-alone miners.

The matter has now been sent to a Group of Ministers for resolution.The point in question here is not whether iron ore should beexported or preserved for domestic consumption; it is about what themining of iron is doing to the society as a whole. Miners as well as steelcompanies are paying peanuts in royalty to the state exchequer. Areaswhere iron ore is being mined have been ecologically devastated andare poverty-stricken. What is clear is that both the committees haveexpressed their learned opinions without considering the impacts ofiron ore mining on the environment, health and livelihoods of the people of states such as Goa, Karnataka and Orissa. The conflictbetween the FIMI and the ISA is not of national interest; it is a fightwhich reeks of greed.

Diamond 76.4%

Marble 0.5%

Precious &semipreciousstones 1.4%

Others 10.1%

Chromite 0.3%

Coal 0.6%Iron ore 10.4%

Bauxite 0.3%


GRAPH 2.14: Value of exports: 2003-04Diamonds alone account for three-fourths of exports

m k

■ CONTRIBUTION TO THE EXCHEQUER

The mining and minerals industry contributes to the Central andstate government revenues through payments of royalty, deadrent, cess, sales tax, excise duties and custom duties. The majorrevenue that the state governments, the owners of the minerals inthe country, get from the mining sector is by way of royalty onminerals. Royalty is paid on the amount of mineral removed orconsumed at the rates specified in the Second Schedule of theMMDR Act, 1957. Royalty rates on major minerals are fixed by theCentral government, while states are empowered to fix royaltyrates on minor minerals. The royalty rates on major minerals arerevised every three years.

Dead rent is a charge to be paid by the lessee for that areaincluded in the mine lease from which minerals are not extracted.The main purpose of levying dead rent is to discourage the lesseefrom keeping the mines idle. The existing rates of dead rent arebased on the area of the lease and the value of minerals.Accordingly, the dead rent applicable is higher for high-value min-erals. The MMDR Act has a provision that if there is a difference inthe amount of royalty payable on the minerals extracted from amine and the amount of dead rent payable for that area, the mineowner will be required to pay the higher of the two amounts. Thedead rent rates are specified in the Third Schedule of the Act.

In addition to royalty and dead rent, the states also get somemeagre revenues from application fees, annual fees from the RPsand prospecting licenses based on area held, surface rent, sales tax

or VAT, local area tax, and stamp duty. Some states like Orissa andWest Bengal have also imposed a cess as well as a surcharge onminerals for mining area development (in Orissa, it is termed as‘peripheral development’).

For most minerals (39 in all), the royalty is fixed on an ad-val-orem basis (percentage of sales price). For most of these 39 mine-rals, the ad-valorem rates are further based on the domestic salesprice. However, for base metals and precious metals (like copper,lead, tin, zinc and gold) the ad-valorem rates are applied on thebasis of the London Metal Exchange prices.

The interesting part of the royalty rate system in India is thatfor the major minerals produced in the country like coal, iron oreand limestone, the royalty is a fixed amount per tonne ofdespatch. In total, there are 22 minerals on which the royalty isbased on a fixed amount per unit of dispatch.

Internationally, the ad-valorem royalty system is predomi-nantly used; most mineral producers like Australia, Indonesia andChina use it. Over the years, India has also moved towards it,though some key minerals have been kept out of this list. One ofthe major advantages of the ad-valorem system is that it takes intoaccount the rises in price of minerals and, therefore, governmentsget the share of the rise in mineral prices – unlike the fixed ratesystem where the prices of minerals is not reflected.

The main problem with ad-valorem royalty is the determina-tion of ‘price’ or value on which the royalty rate is to be applied.In the case of metals which are traded at international commodityexchanges, the determination of value is not a problem; but for

51


Net importer or exporter?Unless India hits upon huge reserves of petroleum or gold, itsdreams of becoming a net exporter will remain distant

The Indian government believes that India has huge reserves of miner-als and, therefore, can become a major mineral exporting power – anassumption which the Hoda committee report supports when it rec-ommends changes in the mining policy to boost exports of minerals.

In India’s mineral basket, there is just one mineral, crude petro-leum, which actually decides the country’s trade balance in ores and minerals. If we remove crude petroleum from the basket, India turnsinto a net exporter of ores and minerals from a net importer (see Table:Trade balance in ores and minerals).

But the question is, can India still become a net exporter of ores andminerals if crude petroleum is included in the basket – considering thelack of geological potential in the country for producing crude andIndia’s increasing dependence on imports of this essential fuel? Quiteunlikely, unless India moves to non-petroleum fuels or finds hugereserves of gold and diamonds.

Globally, the value of minerals is primarily generated by petroleum,gold and diamonds. The rest of minerals produce less than 20 per centof the total value. India has large reserves of coal, which is low in quality, and metallic and non-metallic minerals, which are low in value.Even if we assume that India starts exporting large quantities of metal-lic minerals like iron ore and bauxite or non-metallic minerals like

limestone or coal, the quantity of these minerals that will need to beexported to balance the trade deficit will be huge.The prices of all theseminerals are between Rs 1,000-2,000 per tonne. India will have toexport approximately a billion tonne of these minerals to meet its current trade deficit. This is equivalent to the total amount of majormetallic, non-metallic and solid fuel minerals India currently produces.

TABLE: Trade balance in ores and minerals (Rs crore)

2001-02 2002-03 2003-04

Imports of ores and minerals 92,797 1,17,294 1,30,060

Exports of ores and minerals 35,136 46,618 49,911

Trade balance in ores and minerals -57,660 -70,676 -80,149(exports – imports)

Imports and exports excluding crude petroleum

Imports of ores and minerals 31,320 39,568 43,548

Exports of ores and minerals 35,136 46,618 49,799

Trade balance in ores and minerals 3,816 7,050 6,251

Source: Anon, 2005, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau ofMines, Nagpur

m k

others where no international benchmark is available, the determination is problematic, as there is a large scope for under-valuing of minerals by miners when reporting the prices to thegovernment (see Box: Evading royalties).

This problem of lower reported price of minerals is quitewidespread in India. Though the IBM publishes national- andstate-level monthly average values of different minerals for calcu-lation of ad-valorem royalty, the system is not foolproof. This isbecause the IBM merely picks up the figures from the returns filedby the miners and the values given there are invariably based onpit mouth sales reported by the miners themselves. These could

very well be under-reported. Further, in captive mines owned bythe processing industry, there could be a problem of transfer pricing and the price shown in the books of account cannot besaid to be the arm’s-length price.

There are no fixed formulae to set royalty rates; countries usevarious systems to fix them. In some, each mineral is taxed at a different rate, while in others minerals are grouped and each groupis uniformly taxed (typical groupings include industrial and con-struction materials, fertiliser minerals, precious metals, preciousstones, base metals and energy minerals). In many countries, thereis no differentiation and all minerals (metallic and non-metallic) arelevied the same royalty. For example, the royalty rate of all miner-als in Argentina is three per cent of the mine head value; in thePhilippines, the royalty rate is two per cent of the actual marketvalue, while in Mozambique, it ranges around three-five per cent ofthe free-on-board.63 In countries with different royalty rates for dif-ferent minerals, rates are generally assigned depending on thevalue of minerals, abundance of minerals in the country andwhether the minerals are for domestic consumption or for imports.

With increasing globalisation in the mining industry, there ispressure on countries to reduce royalty rates for attracting FDI.Other than the geological potential, one of the main factors thatmultinational mining companies take into account for theirinvestment decisions is the fiscal regime – in particular, the rate ofroyalty. There is, therefore, a clear scenario of a race to the bottom,especially in developing countries that are competing with eachother to get FDI. For example, base metals are often taxed at alower rate, reflecting the fact that investment in base metals is

52


Evading royaltiesUnder-reporting on quantity and quality is the easy wayout of paying royalties

There are many ways and means for evading royalties. One of thesimplest of these is to under-report the amount of minerals produced – as is widely practised in iron ore-rich Bellary-Hospet(Karnataka) and Joda-Barbil (Orissa). In these areas, the most conservative estimates put the illegal and legal production as equalfrom small- and medium-scale privately owned mines. The otherroute is to declare the ores as low in iron content. In Joda-Barbil,“plus-minus 62/65” is the term used to indicate this corruption.In this practice, mine inspectors are paid to declare the mines as inferior grade and royalties are evaded.

With increasing globalisation in the mining industry, there is pressure on countries to reduce royalty rates for attracting FDI

DEB

AN

JAN

BA

ND

OPA

DH

YAY

m k

highly dependent on foreign investors who have many countriesto choose from when making their investment decisions.

The royalty rates in India are a mixed bag when comparedwith the rates being charged by other c ountries. In the case ofsome minerals, Indian royalty rates are very low, while in othersthey are comparable and in some, they are high.

For instance, the royalty on iron ore in India is very low, vary-

ing from Rs 27 per tonne for iron ore lumps containing more than65 per cent iron (the best grade in the world) to a measly Rs 8 pertonne for iron ore fines containing less than 62 per cent iron (see Table 2.12: Royalty rates in different countries). The royalty ratesare insignificant when compared with the sales price of iron ore:currently, the domestic price for high-grade iron ore is about Rs 1,500 per tonne, whereas international prices are between

53


China India Papua Philippines Botswana Namibia Australia Brazil Argentina Canada USA New (Western (British (Arizona)Guinea Australia) Columbia)

Legislation National National National National National National Provincial law National Provincial Provincial Provincial law law law law law law or negotiated law law law law

agreement act

Royalty Two types: Ad-valorem Ad- Ad- Ad- Ad-valorem Mostly ad- Ad- Most Profit-based Ad-valoremtype 1. Royalty unit- or unit- valorem valorem valorem (sales valorem or unit- valorem provinces: (net revenue)

based plus; based revenue) based, and profit no royalty; and ad-2. Mineral resources based or hybrid others: valoremcompensation fee: for diamonds ad- (net ad-valorem based and V valorem proceeds)

Royalty 1. Various ranges 0.4-20% 2.0% 2.0% 3-10% 5-10% 2.5-7.5% ad- 0.2-3.0% 0-3% 13% (of net At least rate for each mineral, valorem revenue) or 2%,

expressed in yuan/ 2% (of net commissioner tonne ore, plus, proceeds) to determine 2. 1-4% depending rateon mineral

Iron ore 2% of sale value Rs 4-27 per 5-7.5% of realised tonne based value depending on grade on grade

Bauxite 2-4% of sale value 0.35% linked 7.5% of realised to LME prices price

Chromite NA 7.5% of sale 5% of sale pricevalue

Diamonds Industrial 2% of 10% of sale 7.5% of realised sale value; gems: price price4% of sale value

Copper 2% ad-valorem 3.2% ad- 2% NSR 2% ad- 3% ad- 5% ad- Concentrate 5% 2% ad-valorem Catamarca More than At least 2% plus 0.4-30.0 yuan/ valorem valorem valorem on valorem, of royalty value; on sales 3% ad- 13% of net of market tonne ore metal of on market adjusted on market metal: 2.5% value less valorem revenue less price

LME value value gross value of royalty value commercial on sales 2% of net of copper market taxes, value less proceeds, in ore value transportation allowable or 2% of

and insurance deductions net proceeds

Gold 4% ad-valorem 1.5% ad- 2% 2% ad- 5% ad- 5% ad- 2.5% of invoice 1% ad- Catamarca More than At least 2% plus 0.4-30.0 yuan/ valorem; realised valorem valorem valorem, value minus valorem on 3% ad- 13% of net of market tonne ore London FOB on market on adjusted on market deductions such sales value valorem on revenue less price

Bullion value gross value as transport less sales value 2% of net Market market value commercial less proceeds, or Association value taxes, allowable 2% of net price of transportation deductions proceedsgold in ore and insurance

Limestone 2% ad-valorem Rs 45-55 2% 2% ad- 3% 5% ad- AUD 0.30/t 2% ad-valorem Catamarca: > of 13% of At least 2% plus 0.5-20.0 yuan/ per tonne valorem on ad-valorem valorem, on sales value 3% ad- net revenue of markettonne or adjusted on on adjusted on net commercial less valorem less 2% of pricesyuan/m3 ore market gross market taxes, on sales net proceeds,

value market value transportation value less or 2% ofvalue and insurance allowable

deductions net proceeds

Coal 1% ad-valorem Rs 65-250 2% 10 pesos/t 5% ad- Up to 5% 7.5% of value if Yes – sales by Catamarca: More than At least 2% plus 0.3-5.0 per tonne valorem ad-valorem exported Garempeiros No 13% of net of market yuan/tonne on adjusted on market is exempt revenue less prices

gross market value 2% of net value proceeds,

or 2% of net proceeds

Notes: V = Valladium, LME = London Metal Exchange, NSR = Natural System Resources, FOB = Free on board, AUD = Australian dollar

Sources: Anon, 2006, Mineral Royalties, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 31-57; Sanjay Srivastav et al, 2006, Environmental and social challenges of mineral-based growth in Orissa: Building partnership for sustainable development, World Bank and the government of Orissa, June; anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy,Report of the High-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi

TABLE 2.12: Royalty rates in different countries There are no established trends in royalty in different countries

m k

54


Coal royaltiesThere is a movement towards ad-valorem rates

In India, the royalty rates for coal are fixed by the Central government.For this, the Union ministry of coal constitutes a study group, whichinteracts with all the stakeholders – the producing states, the consum-ing states and consumer sectors like power, iron and steel and cement.After taking into account the views of all, the group makes its recom-mendations to the ministry. The recommendations are considered bythe ministry, which then moves a proposal for a government decision.The decision is notified and the new rates of royalty come into effectfrom the date of such notification.

The last revision of the royalty rate was done in 2002. Coal royaltyrates are based on fixed amount per tonne of dispatch and not on anad-valorem basis. The rate was very low during the 1980s, when it wascharged at a rate of Rs 2.50-7 per tonne for different grades. Royaltieswere significantly enhanced in the 1990s; today, they stand at between Rs 65-115 per tonne for low-grade coal, and Rs 250 per tonnefor high-grade coal.

However, since the 1990s, though royalty rates have increased in terms of amount, they have dipped when these amounts are converted to ad-valorem basis. In 1991, the royalty rate on coal as percentage of sales prices was between 16-33 per cent for variousgrades.This reduced to 13-25 per cent by 2001. In 2005, the royalty rateon coal as a percentage of sales prices further reduced to 10-16 per centfor various grades.1 This has been a key concern for the coal-

producing states, many of which want the royalty rates on coal to moveto ad-valorem basis.2

The expert committee which was constituted in 2000 to considerrevision of rates of royalty on coal, did not recommend institution ofroyalty on an ad-valorem basis. It felt that the existing rate in the country was among the highest in the world and raising it furtherwould have a multiplying effect on coal prices, which would translateinto higher power costs. Moreover, as the country has to import coal tomeet its requirement, the government regulated the royalty in order tomaintain parity between the prices of domestic and imported coal (see Box: Woes of nationalised coal companies).

The government is doing a rethink. Today, there is a strong feelingwithin the government to move to coal royalty on an ad-valorem basis.A new committee has been constituted on June 2, 2005 to considerrevision of rates of royalty on coal and lignite. The committee hassought views and comments from the states and other stakeholders.

Woes of nationalised coal companies

While coal companies are paying royalty to state governments, thesecompanies are not being paid for the coal consumed by the state-owned electricity boards. In 2005, all the state-ownedpower utilities together owed Rs 3,326 crore as coal sale dues toCoal India Limited.

Effective tax rate on mining in IndiaIndia has a relatively low rate

Royalties are just one component of total taxes paid by mining com-panies. The mining sector also pays a variety of other taxes like salestax, corporate tax, excise duty and registration fees. Some of thesetaxes are collected by the Central government (corporate tax andexcise duty), while others are paid to the states (sales tax, royalties andregistration fees).

In a recent report titled Environmental and social challenges of mineral-based growth in Orissa: Building partnership for sustainabledevelopment, the World Bank has estimated the effective tax rate onmining industry in India and has benchmarked it with other countries. Effective tax rate is the amount of taxes collected by a government as a per cent of pre-tax cash flow generated by the project over its expected life. The effective tax rate on mining industryin India is about 44 per cent, which is lower than the tax rates in manyother major mineral-producing countries. For instance, Canada hasan effective tax rate of more than 60 per cent, Papua New Guineamore than 55 per cent, South Africa 45 per cent and Indonesia about50 per cent. The only major mineral-producing region which has alower effective tax rate than India is Western Australia (see Graph:Effective tax rate comparison).

Source: Sanjay Srivastav et al, 2006, Environmental and social challenges of mineral-based growth in Orissa: Building partnership for sustainable development, World Bank, New Delhi

GRAPH: Effective tax rate comparison Western Australia boasts of the lowest effective tax rates

Canada (Ontario)

Papua New Guinea

Ghana

Mexico

Indonesia

Tanzania

Kazakhstan

Philippines

South Africa

India/Orissa

Bolivia

Peru

China

Argentina

Chile

Western Australia

(in per cent)0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

m k

US $50-60 per tonne. This means that the ad-valorem royalty ratefor iron ore in India is less than 0.5 per cent. In comparison, the ad-valorem royalty rate for iron ore in Western Australia is 5-7.5 per cent of the realised value, while in Indonesia it is three percent of the sales value (see Boxes: Coal royalties and Effective tax rateon mining in India).

● States and the royaltyRoyalty is the key source of revenue from the mining sector forstates; other charges and taxes on the sector contribute little to thestate exchequer. Data on royalty is available only from 16 states.These states account for about 90 per cent of the total value ofmineral production in the country. If we extrapolate the royaltydata for the 16 states (see Table 2.13: State-wise royalty on minerals)in the same proportion as the value of mineral production, thetotal royalty collected from the mining industry (excluding oil andgas) in India would stand at Rs 6,814 crore in 2004-05.

Other than a few states, royalties on minerals are a very smallproportion of the total revenue receipts of the major mineral-pro-ducing states. In Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, mineral royaltiescontribute about 10-13 per cent of the total revenue receipts (see Table 2.14: Royalty and revenue receipts). In Orissa, mineral royalties contribute about five-six per cent of the total revenuereceipts. In Andhra Pradesh, which has the highest contribution tomineral value in the country, mineral royalties contribute aboutthree per cent to the total revenue receipt.

In Goa, a major centre of iron ore production, royalties contribute just one per cent to the total revenue receipt of the state.This raises questions about the ecological viability of havinglarge-scale iron ore mines in a fairly prosperous state, when minerals are not contributing much to either the state exchequeror to local development.

Data on mineral-wise royalty collection is unavailable, exceptfor a few states. According to data available on royalties paid bycoal and lignite mines, these minerals alone account for about halfthe royalties paid by the mining industry in India.64

55


Total royalty collection (in Rs crore)

2002-03 2003-04 2004-05

Chhattisgarh 552.4 637.2 694.6

Jharkhand 797.7 900.2 916.2

Karnataka 83.9 143.6 210.9

Madhya Pradesh 590.7 646.7 733.7

Orissa 440.6 547.2 663.6

Rajasthan 399.7 458.0 589.8

Maharashtra 400.7 475.9 568.2

Gujarat 172.6 217.9 239.0

Kerala 1.6 10.5 12.6

Goa 14.8 17.9 17.4

Tamil Nadu 297.3 324.5 324.8

Andhra Pradesh 769.9 766.6 864.5

Uttarakhand 22.6 30.7 35.6

Uttar Pradesh 262.4 254.2 291.9

Haryana 118.1 76.8 92.5

Assam 9.4 12.6 13.4

All India (estimated) 5,363 6,000 6,814

Source: Anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-levelCommittee, Planning Commission, New Delhi

TABLE 2.13: State-wise royalty on mineralsAlmost in all the states, royalty collected has increased

States 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05

Mineral Total Royalty as Mineral Total Royalty as Mineral Total Royalty as royalty revenue percentage royalty revenue percentage royalty revenue percentage

receipt of total of total of total revenue revenue revenue receipt receipt receipt

Chhattisgarh 552.4 5,417.3 10.2 637.2 5,959.32 10.7 694.6 7,248.87 9.6

Jharkhand 797.7 7,406.48 10.8 900.2 7,443.49 12.1 916.2 6,852.64 13.4

Orissa 440.6 8,438.77 5.2 547.2 9,440.24 5.8 663.6 11,850.19 5.6

Andhra Pradesh 769.9 23,002.92 3.3 766.6 26,868.5 2.9 864.5 28,749.51 3.0

Goa 14.8 1,833.0 0.8 17.9 1,623.13 1.1 17.4 1,820.02 1.0

Source: Revenue receipt data from the Reserve Bank of India and mineral royalty data from anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee,Planning Commission, New Delhi

TABLE 2.14: Royalty and revenue receipts (in Rs crore) In Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, mineral royalty contributes around 10 per cent to the state revenues

m k

■ THE PRICING OF MINERALS

Prices of minerals vary according to the grade and in some cases,depending on their usage (as with coal). One way of comparingtrends in prices is to look at the wholesale price index (WPI). WPIis an indicator designed to measure the changes in price levels ofcommodities that flow into the wholesale trade intermediaries.The most widely used price index in India, WPI is a vital guide ineconomic analysis and policy formulation, and as a basis for priceadjustments in business contracts and projects.

In the last decade, WPI for non-fuel minerals in India went upby three times from 105 in 1994-95 to 323 in 2004-05 (see Table 2.15:Index numbers of wholesale prices for minerals). All this increase in

prices has happened in the last two years, when the WPI jumpedfrom 122 in 2003-04 to 323 in 2005-06. In fact, before 2002-03, non-fuel mineral prices had remained highly subdued, not evenincreasing at the rate of general inflation in the Indian economy.The increase in the last two years is mainly due to the bullishincrease in prices of metallic minerals, especially iron ore. TheWPI of iron ore in India increased from 127 in 2003 to 699 in 2006(see Table 2.16: Trends in average wholesale price index of key minerals). Other than iron ore, prices of other metallic mineralshave remained stable and, in some cases, have even decreased.

In the case of non-metallic minerals, there has hardly beenany increase in prices in the last 10 years. In fact, prices of limestone, India’s key non-metallic mineral, have decreased.

56


Year Limestone Iron ore Coal Bauxite Chromite Magnesite

1994 100.0 136.9 104.7 141.7 100.0 146.3

1995 100.0 81.7 106.3 149.7 100.0 127.2

1996 103.7 89.0 113.0 153.3 100.0 109.5

1997 94.3 90.4 135.9 160.4 100.0 105.7

1998 82.7 110.2 143.0 130.9 100.0 123.4

1999 82.7 129.1 146.1 91.8 100.0 124.4

2000 83.0 116.6 156.2 106.7 100.0 136.0

2001 88.2 127.0 180.3 126.5 100.0 254.7

2002 89.4 127.0 181.1 118.6 100.0 252.7

2003 88.7 127.0 189.4 119.1 91.4 166.7

2004 90.8 377.2 214.9 119.6 74.8 142.0

2005 95.9 544.6 231.5 102.9 93.1 162.7

2006 95.8 698.6 231.6 95.2 75.5 185.6

Note: (Base 1993-94=100)Source: http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=375956&ptid=14874&level=5, as viewed on March 12, 2007

TABLE 2.16: Trends in average wholesale price index of key mineralsWholesale prices of iron ore and coal have increased significantly between 1994 and 2006

Group/sub-group (average of months/average of weeks ended Saturday) 1994-95 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06

All minerals 104.9 118.8 121.6 255.1 322.8

Metallic minerals 103.8 121.9 127.5 344.5 453.1

Other minerals 106.7 113.9 112.3 116.8 117.0

Fuel, power, light and lubricants 108.9 239.2 254.5 280.1 306.8

Coal mining 105.1 181.1 193.6 231.6 231.6

Minerals oils 106.1 254.7 274.3 315.8 359.8

Note: (Base 1993-94=100) Source: http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=375956&ptid=14874&level=5, as viewed on March 12, 2007

TABLE 2.15: Index numbers of wholesale prices for mineralsWholesale prices of minerals have increased significantly over the last decade

m k

Prices of fuel minerals, on the other hand, have increased inthe last 10 years. The WPI of coal has increased at a CAGR of 8.2 per cent between 1994-95 and 2005-06; that of mineral oil hasincreased at a CAGR of about 13 per cent over the same period.

Compared to the international prices, the prices of metallic andnon-metallic minerals in India is very low (see Table 2.17: Mineralprices – domestic and international markets). For instance, bauxite ispriced 16.5 times lower in the Indian market than the internation-al market. In the case of iron ore, international prices are 4.4 timeshigher. Similarly, international prices of graphite are 1.53 timeshigher, while feldspar and mica are both priced 10 times more.

● The case of coalCoal prices in the country were partially deregulated in 1997(grades A to D) and completely deregulated in January 2000(grades E to G). This, in theory, conferred the right to fix the priceof coal on the two public sector companies, CIL and SingareniCollieries Company Ltd (SCCL), which operate as exclusive pro-ducer-cum-traders of coal in India. However, the price fixed by thecompanies is, in reality, ‘guided’ by the Union ministry of coal(MoC). Though the principles of fixing the prices have not been setout explicitly, it is, in essence, determined on the basis of costsincurred in production from different mines plus a reasonableprofit margin. For example, on an average for SECL, the sales pricewas 86 per cent more than the royalty on coal in the year 2005.65

The prices of coal are also fixed keeping in mind the require-ments of the power sector. However, the present system of pricinghas proved unsatisfactory as the ‘demand’ for coal from non-powerusers at the price fixed, is far in excess of the available supply.

The industry is dominated by two fully government-ownedcompanies operating in two different geographical regions. Thesecompanies have never had to compete and as such, have had no

interest in creating a vibrant and competitive coal market. Theycompanies see their role as one of fulfilling the production targetsfixed by the government; they, therefore, take up plans and proj-ects to just meet these targets, with very little surplus to serve anyunanticipated or sudden increase in demand. New players in coalmining face huge entry barriers and thus, the supply responsetends to be slow. Demand-supply gaps persist: only minisculequantities of coal are available for trading freely.

Another peculiarity is that coal is priced in India based on itsgrades. Each grade of coal is identified by a very broad band of‘useful heat value’ (UHV), a concept unique to India. Apart fromthe fact that the UHV concept is a legacy of the past without anyscientific basis, it promotes a slab rate with increasing bandwidthand progressively lower grades of coal as opposed to a fully vari-able rate linked to the precise calorific value of the coal under con-sideration. This encourages companies to supply coal at the bot-tom of the grade bands by passing it off as the next higher band.

Between 2002-03 and 2004-05, sale prices of all grades of coalhave steadily gone up by about 10 per cent every year.66 The aver-age price of coking coal has increased from Rs 1,000 per tonne in2002-03 to Rs 1,200 per tonne in 2004-05. The average price of non-coking coal (long flame) has gone up from Rs 875 per tonne in2002-03 to Rs 1,050 per tonne in 2004-05. On an average, the prevailing price of delivered coal for powering India is around US $30 per tonne. Rest of the coal is sold at a market determinedprice which, today, stands at around US $50 per tonne.67

A comparison of coal prices of India and other nations shows● that the price of coal for thermal power plants is among the

lowest in India;68

● that the price of Indian coking coal is at the same range as inmost developing countries (China, Chile, etc), but is muchlower than that in developed economies (France, the US, etc).

57


Domestic price (US $/tonne) International price (US $/tonne)

2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03

Bauxite 6.2 5.8 5.5 99.3 97.5 100.8

Chromite lumps/fines and chips 63.4 57.9 57.9 91.9 86.6 87.5

Iron ore* 13.5 13.9 13.5 37.9 65.0 77.4

Feldspar 11.7 11.0 10.0 113.5 113.5 111.8

Fluorspar 99.3 99.3 99.3 123.3 113.8 129.6

Graphite 315.5 326.7 326.7 491.7 491.7 495.8

Deadburnt magnesite 164.4 176.4 169.4 116.7 120.0 103.3

Calcined magnesite 147.5 91.5 94.8 104.1 104.1 99.0

Mica 4.1 3.7 5.6 502.7 546.2 507.3

Silica sand 1.4 1.4 1.4 7.7 8.1 11.9

Note: *Iron ore prices are for the years 2003-04 to 2005-06.Sources: Domestic prices: Indian Bureau of Mines; http://www.indiastat.com/india/showtable.asp?secid=404795&ptid=23, as viewed on May 22, 2007Foreign prices: Union ministry of mines, Government of India; http://www.indiastat.com/india/showtable.asp?secid=404795&ptid=23, as viewed on May 22, 2007

TABLE 2.17: Mineral prices – domestic and international marketsAlmost all minerals cost much less in India in comparison to international markets

m k

In case of Russia and countries in transition, coking coal ispriced quite low;69 and

● that Indian captive coal prices are in the same range as in mostdeveloping countries, but lower than in developed nations.70

Indian coal is relatively low-priced, but after adding freightand handling costs, it reaches the same range as the cost ofimported coal near a coastal area. The weighted average free-on-rail price of domestic thermal coal sold to power plants is justunder US $5 per million kilocalories, inclusive of royalty and tax.Freight and handling adds US $7-11 for distances between 1,000 to2,000 km, making the delivered price of domestic coal US $12-16

per million kilocalories for distances of 1,000-2,000 km from themines. Imported coal can be delivered at a ‘cif’ (cost, insuranceand freight) price of about US $13 per million kilocalories, inclusive of a five per cent customs duty at a coastal location.71

Thus, imported coal is cost-competitive at coastal locationson the west coast and the southern shores of Tamil Nadu, especially if it requires minimal or no transportation on land toreach the consumption point (see Table 2.18: Landed costs atChennai). This is one of the main reasons why the expert commit-tee constituted by the government recommended regulatingprices for the power sector (see Box: Coal pricing: expertspeak).

58


c m y k

Imported coal ECL coal from Raniganj (ROM) (rail-cum-sea route)

At the port of entry (Chennai)

Australia China Indonesia S Africa A-Gr B-Gr C-Gr (6,685) (6,877) (6,019) (6,528) (6,454) (6,049-6,454) (5,597-6,049)

CIF price (Rs/MT) 1,589.50 1,483.25 1,294.98 1,443.72 Ex-colliery price 1,568.25 1,483.97 1,269.01

Duty and other incidental 451.06 430.12 392.85 422.30 Transport and other 859.50 859.50 859.50(Rs/MT) incidental (Rs/MT)

Landed cost 2,040.66 1,913.37 1,687.83 1,866.02 2,427.75 2,343.47 2,128.51

At the port of entry (Okha)

CIF price (Rs/MT) 1,589.50 1,483.25 1,294.98 1,443.72 Ex-colliery price 1,568.25 1,483.97 1,269.01

Duty and other incidentals (Rs/MT) 558.16 537.12 499.85 529.30 Transport and other 1,132.50 1,132.50 1,132.50incidental (Rs/MT)

Landed cost 2,147.66 2,020.37 1,794.83 1,973.02 2,700.75 2,616.47 2,401.51

Source: Anon, Pricing Policy & Credit Control, http://cag.nic.in/reports/commercial/2000_book7/chapter9.htm, as viewed on March 12, 2007

TABLE 2.18: Landed costsImported coal is cost-competitive on the southern shores of Tamil Nadu

Coal pricing: expertspeakExpert committee recommends market price for all exceptthe power industry

In December 2005, the Union ministry of coal’s Expert Committee onthe Roadmap for Coal Sector Reforms submitted its report, where itrecommended regulating only the price of coal for the power sector.“With the increase in share of coal-based power production, over time,the average cost of bulk power would depend on the price at whichcoal is sold to the power industry. In national interest, it is imperativetherefore that power costs are kept at the lowest so that Indian indus-trial production can be globally competitive and the poor amongdomestic consumers could be supplied electricity at affordable rates”, says the report submitted by the committee. The committeeconsidered it reasonable to have a special price-and-supply arrange-ment for the power sector, which it named a Class ‘A’ consumer; allother consumers of coal were to referred as Class ‘B’ consumers.

The committee also recommended that coal requirements ofClass ‘A’ consumers should be supplied at prices determined strictlyon a cost-to-produce basis, subject to certain efficiency norms andallowing a rate of return in keeping with other energy supply

industries. A tripartite agreement involving coal suppliers, consumersand transporters – called the Fuel Supply and Transport Agreement(FSTA) – should cover the supply arrangements for such consumers.The committee said the remaining coal produced in the countryshould be sold to Class ‘B’ consumers on the following basis: the larger among these consumers, including associations of consumerswith a minimum annual demand of one lakh tonne, can be given 60 per cent of their needs under the FSTA, but at a price indexed tothe e-auction price. The remaining quantity required by these companies and that needed by all other smaller consumers could beaccessed through traders, imports or e-auctions. For this method tosucceed, at least 10 per cent of the total domestic production must besold in the open market through e-auctions in the first year.Simultaneously, the power utility sector should be asked to set upcoastal generating stations along the western coast of India andsouth Tamil Nadu based on imported coal. This will lower thedependence of domestic power utilities on domestic coal, therebymaking it possible, over time, to raise the quantity of coal being soldin the open market through e-auctions. If during the transition, theallocation cannot meet the demand from Class ‘A’ consumers, theindustry should arrange to import the extra requirement.

■ MINING AND EMPLOYMENT

In 1991, the formal mining industry in India employed around 0.8 million people. By 1999, the employment had declined to 0.66 million,72 which further went down to 0.56 million by 2004-05 (see Graph 2.15: Trends in employment). Thus, between1991 and 2004, the total employment in the mining industry inIndia decreased by about 30 per cent – but the same period saw analmost four-fold jump in the value of mineral production.

In India, public sector mines provide the majority of employment in the industry. In 2004-05, the public sector accountedfor 85 per cent of the people employed in mining.

Coal is the major employment provider. Almost three-fourth

of the total people employed in mining are on the payroll of coalcompanies (mainly public sector). Employment provided by otherminerals is relatively small: for instance, iron ore, the major metal-lic mineral produced in the country, employed only six per cent ofthe total workforce involved in mining. Limestone, the major non-metallic mineral, employed only four per cent (see Graph 2.16:Mineral-wise employment status in India).

In terms of the geographical distribution of employment inmining, the coal-producing states of Jharkhand, West Bengal,Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh have the maximum miningemployment (see Graph 2.17: State-wise employment in mines).Jharkhand alone accounts for one-fourth of the total number ofpeople employed in mining in India.

Mining has been, and is still being, promoted in the countryfor a wrong reason: employment. A look at the mining industryworldwide tells us that modern large-scale mining doesn’t needpeople – a trend which Indian mines are following. It needs bigmachines and specialised operators to operate them. As theemphasis of mining industry shifts to modernisation and automa-tion, its employment generation potential is going down.Globally, mining is employing less people to produce more. Thegeneral trend towards a decrease in employment is most clearlyillustrated by the case of South Africa, a major mineral-producingcountry, where 360,000 mineworkers, or 46 per cent of the indus-try’s 1990 work force, lost their jobs between 1990 and 2000.Employment in the US mining industry decreased by 31 per centbetween 1985 and 2000; the coal industry, the biggest sectoralemployer, showed the largest drop – almost 60 per cent.73 InCanada, between 1994 and 2000, jobs in mining sector declined by12 per cent.74 In fact, the employment generated in Canada to produce US $1 billion worth of minerals has decreased by 43 per cent between 1998 and 2005.

The situation is no different in India. In 1994-95, to produceRs 1 crore worth of minerals, Indian mines employed about 25people. By 2003-04, to produce the same value of minerals, only

59


c m y k

Manganese 2%

Stone 1%

Coal 74%

Chromite 1%

Iron ore 6%

Limestone 4%

Other mines 12%

Source: Anon, Union ministry of statistics and programme implementation,Government of India, New Delhi, http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowDataSec.asp?secid=404513&ptid= 18528, as viewed on April 28, 2007

GRAPH 2.16: Mineral-wise employment status in IndiaCoal mining employs the highest number of people

Emp

loym

ent

(in

no

s)

7,16,183

7,04,537

6,85,673

6,58,901

6,38,741

5,99,301

5,62,778

5,56,647

0

100000

200000

300000

400000

500000

600000

700000

800000

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2004 2005

Source: Anon, Union ministry of labour and employment, New Delhi,http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowDataSec.asp?secid=287161&ptid=18528as viewed on April 28, 2007

GRAPH 2.15: Trends in employment Humanpower has decreased over the last decade

Andhra Pradesh 12%

Chhattisgarh 8%

MadhyaPradesh 10%

Maharashtra 6%

Orissa 8%Jharkhand 26%

West Bengal 13%

Others 17%

Source: Anon, Union ministry of statistics and programme implementation,Government of India, New Delhi, http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowDataSec.asp?secid=404513&ptid= 18528, as viewed on April 28, 2007

GRAPH 2.17: State-wise employment in mines (2003) Jharkhand has the highest numbers of mineworkers

60


0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

40.0

45.0

50.0

1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04

Year

Emp

loym

ent

po

ten

tial

(Em

plo

ymen

t p

er R

s o

ne

cro

re w

ort

h o

f m

iner

al p

rod

uct

ion

)

Non-metallic mineralsMetallic mineralsFuelsAll minerals

Source: Analysis based on data from the Union ministry of labour and employment and Union ministry of coal, New Delhi

GRAPH 2.18: Employment potential of Indian mines Employment potential has decreased considerably in metallic mineral mining

0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

40.00

45.00

50.00

1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Ave

rag

e d

aily

em

plo

ymen

t p

er 1

000

ton

nes

of

ou

tpu

t

Bauxite Copper Iron ore

Limestone Manganese ore Mica

Years

Source: Analysis based on data from the Union ministry of labour and employment and Union ministry of coal, New Delhi

GRAPH 2.19: Humanpower employment index in Indian mines (average daily employment per 1,000 tonne of output) Huge quantity of limestone, but humanpower employed is among the lowest

m k

eight people were required. Thus, in the space of nine years, theemployment potential (number of people employed to produceper unit worth of minerals) of Indian mines had reduced by about70 per cent.

This reduction has happened across the board. During 1994-2003, the employment potential of fuel minerals reduced by 63 percent. During the same period, employment potential in the metal-lic mineral segment reduced by 73 per cent and in the non-metal-lic mineral segment, by 83 per cent (see Graph 2.18: Employmentpotential of Indian mines). Take the case of bauxite. In 1951, 18 people were employed to produce 1,000 tonne of bauxite; by2002, only 0.5 people were required to produce the same amount.In the case of iron ore, the number of people required to extract1,000 tonne of ore reduced from 5.5 in 1951 to 0.3 in 2002 (see Graph 2.19: Humanpower employment index in Indian mines).

Today, for most major minerals, not even one person isrequired to produce 1,000 tonne of minerals. For instance, to produce 1,000 tonne of coal, CIL employed about 1.4 persons in2004-05; in 1996-97, the company had hired 2.5 persons to producethe same amount.75

Compared globally, the Indian mining industry is still consid-ered ‘inefficient’ vis-à-vis employment. Major mining countries ofthe world employ very few people in mining compared to India.The Canadian mining industry, for example, employs just 45,287persons to produce US $21 billion worth of minerals. TheAustralian mining industry employs 69,382 persons to produceUS $37 billion worth of minerals. In comparison, the Indian min-ing industry employed 5,56,647 persons to produce US $19 billion

worth of minerals. Only South Africa is close to India in terms ofnumber of people in mining – 4,57,371 persons. But the countryproduces minerals worth US $156 billion – about eight times high-er than India (see Graph 2.20: Employment potential – a comparison).The employment potential of Indian mining industry is, therefore,at least 10 times higher than those of other mining nations (barring China, for which no definitive data is available, but mostliterature indicate that the Chinese mining industry is heavilylabour-dependent and employs millions).

But the scenario is changing: employment potential of theIndian mining industry is definitely coming down, driven by adesire to take on global competition. Take the case of the captivelimestone mines of the large cement companies. To extract oneMT of limestone, these mines employ just about 40 people. Thereare companies which employ far less: the Alathiyur-basedMadras Cements Ltd employs just 14 people, while the Sirohi-based Binani Cement Ltd employs 25 people to mine oneMT limestone.76

The key question here is whether this is the right way for theIndian mining industry to develop. Mining displaces people notonly from their lands, but also from their livelihoods. Unless it isable to provide a reasonable number of jobs to the people reelingunder this double whammy, most communities will not acceptit. The Western paradigm of mining which requires only theland, forests and water – and not the local people – cannot workin India. Across the mining areas of the country, conflict betweenlocal communities and mining companies is reaching a crescendo – and the reasons are not hard to find: besides displacement, pollution and health impacts of mines, employ-ment is becoming a key issue. Deprived of their traditionallivelihoods, people need alternatives to survive (see Box:Employment: underground vs open-cast).

61


2,167 1,8902,941

29,930

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

Canada Australia South Africa India

Nu

mb

er o

f p

eop

le e

mp

loye

dp

er b

illio

n d

olla

rs r

even

ue

(US$

)

Sources: India: Anon 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau ofMines, NagpurCanada: Anon, 2006, Facts and Figures 2006, Mining Association of Canada,OttawaAustralia: Anon, 2006, Mineral Industry Survey Report 2006, Mineral Councilof Australia, Canberra

GRAPH 2.20: Employment potential – a comparisonIndia provides maximum jobs in mining, so far

Employment: underground vs open-castUnderground mines are labour-intensive but less productive

Underground mining is more labour-intensive than open-cast mining.The majority of India’s underground mines are in coal, whichis dominated by public sector companies. Labour productivity(amount of minerals produced per labour) in the underground coalmines of the country is about 10 times lower than that of open-castcoal mines. For instance, in 2005-06, coal output per man shift in theunderground mines of Coal India Limited (CIL) was 0.69 tonne,whereas in CIL’s open-cast mines it was 7.15 tonne. Similarly, in theSingareni Collieries Company Ltd, coal output per manshift inunderground mines was 0.85 tonne, compared to 8.49 tonne inopen-cast mines.

To reduce humanpower, most mining companies have started toshift production to open-cast mining. This has resulted in a steadydecline in the production of coal from underground mining in thelast 10 years. Underground coal mines produced about one-fourth of the total coal in the country in 1996-97; in 2005-06, their contribution fell to a bare 15 per cent.

m k

■ NEW GROWTH AREAS

The Indian mining industry is on the threshold of a quantumsurge. Some would contend that the boom has already begun – atleast in the cases of coal, iron ore, limestone, bauxite and chromite.But India is now reaching out for minerals which it had, till date,neither explored nor mined extensively: copper, lead, zinc, nickel,gold and diamond. From the environment and forest perspective,this is bad news: these ‘big money’ minerals also generate themaximum amount of waste and are characterised by large mines,huge tailings and desolate landscapes.

In the last five years (2002-03 to 2006-07), an area of 392 sq kmhas been leased out for new mines for the major minerals alone(excluding fuel and atomic minerals). Approvals have been granted to 348 new mine leases during this period. An overallincreasing trend is evident in the numbers of mine leases grantedover this period – in fact, the maximum numbers of mines havebeen approved in 2005-06 and 2006-07 (see Table 2.19: Leases,licences and permits).

The maximum number of leases has been approved for ironore, limestone and bauxite: about one-third of the total were foriron ore. In terms of lease area, iron ore mines accounted for about29 per cent of the total (see Table 2.20: Mineral-wise mine leases).

Though 13.5 per cent of the total mining leases approved werefor limestone, the lease area approved for limestone constituted28.5 per cent of total lease area. This means that limestone mineswere the biggest in size.

About 20 per cent of the total leases approved were for

bauxite; they covered about 16 per cent of the total lease area. If we consider the types of minerals for which mining leases

have been granted in the last five years, it becomes clear that themineral pattern of the Indian mining industry is not heading forany significant change in the near future. Minerals like iron ore, limestone, bauxite and manganese will continue to dominatemining in the country.

State-wise distribution of approved mining leases in the lastfive years does not show much variation either (see Table 2.21:State-wise mine leases). Rajasthan, which has the largest area undermining leases in the country, has also got approvals for the maxi-mum amount of lease area in the last five years: about 20 per centof the total in the country. The average size of the lease area

62


Year Mine Prospecting Reconnaissance leases licences permits

Numbers Area Numbers Area Numbers Area (in ha) (in ha) (in sq km)

2002-03 58 10,605 28 5,363 46 67,709

2003-04 44 2,430 21 19,699 46 2,34,043

2004-05 56 6,292 40 5,740 23 34.642

2005-06 100 8,961 14 2,679 14 24,526

2006-07 90 10,921 45 28,133 5 6,961

Total 348 39,210 148 61,614 134 3,67,882

Source: Analysis based on information given on http://mines.nic.in/, as viewedon January 15, 2007

TABLE 2.19: Leases, licences and permitsNumbers of new mine leases show an increasing trend

Name of the minerals Total mine leases (2002-03 to 2006-07)

Numbers Percentage Lease Percentagearea

Bauxite 69 19.8 6,104 15.6

Dolomite and associated 2 0.6 1,006 2.6minerals

Gold and associated 2 0.6 638 1.6minerals

Gypsum 19 5.5 4,557 11.6

Iron ore and associated 113 32.5 11,526 29.4minerals

Limestone 47 13.5 11,193 28.5

Manganese ore 47 13.5 984 2.5

Mineral sand 12 3.4 1,589 4.1

Uranium 1 0.3 535 1.4

Others 36 10.3 1,078 2.7

Total 348 39,210


TABLE 2.20: Mineral-wise mine leasesIron ore takes the lion’s share

States Total mine leases (2002-03 to 2006-07)


Andhra Pradesh 40 11.5 7,393 18.9

Chhattisgarh 31 8.9 4,199 10.7

Jharkhand 16 4.6 3,719 9.5

Karnataka 38 10.9 2,233 5.7

Madhya Pradesh 61 17.5 4,025 10.3

Maharashtra 44 12.6 3,139 8.0

Orissa 12 3.4 3,018 7.7

Rajasthan 24 6.9 8,226 21.0

Others 82 23.6 3,258 8.3

Total 348 39,210


TABLE 2.21: State-wise mine leasesRajasthan has the largest area under leases

m k

approved in Rajasthan is about 340 ha – mainly for gypsum.Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and Jharkhandare other states in which a significant amount of mining wasapproved in the last five years.

In the last five years, 148 prospecting licences (PLs) for majorminerals, covering an area of 616 sq km, were approved. There areno apparent trends in the granting of PLs, except for the fact thatthe maximum numbers were granted in 2006-07.

The industry is prospecting for iron ore, gold, diamonds andmineral sand in India. As much as one-third of the area under PLsgranted in the last five years have been for iron ore and associat-ed minerals (mainly manganese); about one-fourth for diamondsand associated minerals; and about 14-15 per cent each for goldand mineral sand (see Table 2.22: Mineral-wise prospecting licences).

Where is India prospecting? Andhra Pradesh andChhattisgarh are the key states: about 65 per cent of areas underprospecting were in these two states. Mining companies aresearching for diamonds in Andhra Pradesh; iron ore and gold inChhattisgarh; and mineral sands in Tamil Nadu (see Table 2.23 onpage 64: State-wise prospecting licences).

In the last five years, 134 reconnaissance permits (RPs) wereissued for major minerals, covering an area of 3,67,882 sq km. Of thelast five years, the maximum area under RPs was granted in 2003-04. Comparatively few RPs have been granted in the last two years.

Though the maximum numbers of RPs were granted for dia-monds and associated minerals (about 51 per cent of total RPs),the maximum area under RPs was for copper, lead, zinc and

63


Minerals Total prospecting licences (2002-03 to 2006-07)


Bauxite 14 9.5 974 1.6

Gold and associated minerals 5 3.4 8,781 14.3

Diamond and associated minerals 9 6.1 14,829 24.1

Iron ore and

associated minerals 89 60.1 20,520 33.3

Manganese ore 19 12.8 6,588 10.7

Mineral sand 6 4.1 9,418 15.3

Others 6 4.1 505 0.8

Total 148 61,614


TABLE 2.22: Mineral-wise prospecting licencesIron ore and associated minerals have been granted almostone-third of the area under prospecting licences

m k

SHYA

MA

L /

CSE

nickel and associated minerals, including gold (about 63 per centof the total area under RPs) – indicating a shift towards mining ofthese minerals (see Table 2.24: Mineral-wise reconnaissance permits).

In terms of state-wise distribution of RPs, Rajasthan tops thelist: it holds more than half the area under RPs. Miners are search-ing for gold, copper, lead, zinc and nickel in the state, while theylook for diamonds and gold in Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradeshand Orissa (see Table 2.25: State-wise reconnaissance permits).

The direction that Indian mining is moving towards is clear.During 2002-06, at least 900 sq km area was opened for the min-ing of coal and major minerals in the country (see Box: What’s newin coal?). Environmental clearances were granted to 540 odd minesduring this period. As on April 6, 2007, there were 508 miningprojects awaiting environmental clearance from the Union ministry of environment and forests. The industry is all set to fly.

In the short term, the emphasis will continue to remain on oldfavourites like iron ore, limestone and bauxite, while in the medium and long term, large-scale mining of gold, diamonds,copper, lead and zinc should be expected. Rajasthan, as per allindications, is all set to become a mining powerhouse.

64


What’s new in coal?Chhattisgarh and MP have the largest share of new mines

There is no systematic data on new coal mines in the country over the last five years. The Union ministry of environment and forests (MoEF) does bring out a list of mining projects to which it has granted environmental clearance, but this information isextremely sketchy. After an analysis of the available data, the followingpicture emerges:● Between 2002 and 2006, under the 1994 Environmental Impact

Assessment Notification, 129 coal mines were granted environ-mental clearance by the MoEF. These mines are either new coalmines or old coal mines that have acquired additional land formining.

● An area of 482.3 sq km was opened up for coal mining in the lastfive years.

● The maximum numbers of coal mines were in Chhattisgarh,Maharashtra, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh. Chhattisgarh andMadhya Pradesh alone accounted for about half of the area boughtunder coal mining in the last five years.

Minerals Total reconnaissance permits (2002-03 to 2006-07)

Numbers Percentage Lease Percentagearea*

Copper, lead, zinc, nickel and associatedminerals 42 32 2,27,766 63

Diamond and associated minerals 68 51 1,10,515 30

Gold and associated minerals 14 11 16,784 5

Others 10 6 12,816.73 2

Total 134 3,67,881.73

Note: *in square kilometreSource: Analysis based on information given on http://mines.nic.in/, as viewedon January 15, 2007

TABLE 2.24: Mineral-wise reconnaissance permitsThere is a shift towards mining of minerals like copper

Minerals Total reconnaissance permits (2002-03 to 2006-07)

Numbers Percentage Lease Percentagearea*

Andhra Pradesh 11 8.2 21,866 5.9

Chhattisgarh 24 17.9 38,279 10.4

Karnataka 15 11.2 17,856 4.9

Madhya Pradesh 23 17.2 37,890 10.3

Orissa 23 17.2 38,309 10.4

Rajasthan 22 16.4 1,89,260 51.4

Others 16 11.9 24,421 6.6

Total 134 3,67,882

Note: *in square kilometreSource: Analysis based on information given on http://mines.nic.in/, as viewedon January 15, 2007

TABLE 2.25: State-wise reconnaissance permitsRajasthan leads, again

Minerals Total prospecting licences (2002-03 to 2006-07)


Andhra Pradesh 15 10.1 18,854 30.6

Chhattisgarh 49 33.1 21,222 34.4

Madhya Pradesh 29 19.6 2,896 4.7

Maharashtra 15 10.1 4,196 6.8

Tamil Nadu 2 1.4 7,244 11.8

Others 38 25.7 7,203 11.7

Total 148 61,614


TABLE 2.23: State-wise prospecting licencesAndhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh are drawing prospectors

m k

c m y k

Large expanses of barren land and open, watery pits. Dust-laden, sooty air.

Grim-faced and grimy workers. Busy lines of trucks, bulldozers, excavators…

usually, the abiding image of mining is one of monochromatic aridity and industry

– indicative of what mining does to the landscape. But under this image and extending

from it lie hundreds of other stories of how mining affects us: stories of human tragedy,

environmental disaster and policy failures.

Mining requires land – mostly, land belonging to indigenous and marginalised people

– and land appropriation leads to displacement. Entire villages and communities are

uprooted, their livelihoods and lifestyles destroyed, leaving them economically “worse off

than before” and psychologically traumatised. Rehabilitation and compensation are

distant dreams at best, and leave out a vast population of landless and tribals who have no

legal claims to land.

The effects on environment are as severe. Miners enjoy almost unhindered access

everywhere: there is no moratorium on mining anywhere in the country. The results have

been catastrophic: thousands of hectares of forests – including protected areas – razed,

pristine water sources throttled and polluted, farmlands turned into barren stretches,

the air turned rank with mineral dust, and human health held hostage to a variety of

mining-induced disorders.

The havoc, of course, doesn’t stop with this. Post-mining, mountains of waste have

completely transformed landscapes and are slowly poisoning everything they come in

contact with. On the other hand, mineral-based industries like sponge iron are taking the

devastation further afield.

One would argue that mining’s impacts, severe as they are, are perhaps inevitable

and unavoidable. Especially so for a nation like India, which has consciously accepted

displacement and environmental damage as small prices to pay for the ‘greater good of the

country’. But this chosen one-track path to progress is leading the nation towards the edge

of a deadly precipice, beyond which lurks strife and civil war. Equally inevitable and

unavoidable if we don’t rethink our options.

3 Bearing the brunt: peopleand the environment

65

66

• Between 1950 and 1991, mining displaced about 26 lakh people – the second highest toll among all development projects. Of these, not even 25 per cent have been resettled.About 52 per cent of those displaced were tribals.

• For every one per cent that it contributes to GDP, mining displaces three-four times more people than all the development projects taken together.

• Forest land diversion for mining has been rising. During 1998-2005, 216 mining projects were granted forest clearanceannually, as against 19 per year during 1980-97.

• Mining and minerals-based industries consume as well as pollute water. Iron ore mining in India, for instance, used up 77 million tonne of water in 2005-06 – enough to meet thedaily water needs of more than three million people.

• An estimated 1.84 billion tonne of waste was generated frommining of major minerals in India in 2006. Among minerals,coal is the chief culprit: every tonne of coal extracted generates three-four tonne of wastes.

• All mining regions of India are air pollution hotspots. Townslike Korba, Bhilai, Satna and Dhanbad have been declared critical by the CPCB. Coal mining also generates methane, a greenhouse gas: it accounts for 10 per cent of all human-related methane emissions.

• India also has a huge problem of abandoned mines. Officially,there are 510 such mines in the country. But this is a gross underestimation, say experts. Mine rehabilitation is ignored:regulations are lax and implementation non-existent. Coalmines are not even required to undertake mine closure.

• Mining’s impacts extend beyond its immediate operations tomineral-based industries, especially steel and sponge iron:both highly polluting and resource-intensive. While the Indiansteel industry has registered a growth of 35 per cent in twoyears, the country is also seeing a mushrooming of sponge ironplants – from 23 in 2000 to over 400 in 2007.

m k

Mining is an environmentally destructive activity. The intensity ofthis destruction depends on what is being mined, where and how.Unless it is meticulously planned and carefully executed, miningcan devastate lands, pollute and deplete water, denude forests,wipe out wildlife, and defile the air.

The size and scale of a mining operation is a major determinant of its potential environmental impacts. Growingmechanisation of the mining industry has increased the capacityof mining companies to establish and operate large mines; this,consequently, has increased the environmental impacts of mining.

Mining is a high-risk trade-off, and nowhere more so than inareas with high population densities and high-value ecologicalresources: these are also the areas where most of India’s mineralsare found. Therefore, the impacts of mining, both on ecology aswell as the people, is magnified here. These impacts include displacement of people and loss of livelihood, loss of sites of cul-tural importance, changes in lifestyle, impacts on health, effectson women and children, influx of outsiders attracted by prospectsof employment, and illegal mining and its associated risks.

■ DISPLACEMENT: MINING’S WORST LEGACY

Involuntary displacement, which is forced upon people to makeway for development, has always been a major concern in India.Pushed by its first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Indiaembarked on a policy that accepts displacement for the greatergood of the country.1 This path has forced millions out of theirhomes and lands. Although there are no exact figures, one estimate puts the number of people displaced between 1951 and 1990 at over 21 million.2 N C Saxena, former secretary of the Department of Rural Development, acknowledges that thenumber could be as high as 50 million in the second half of the20th century alone.3

Displacement is too mild a term for this systemic impoverish-ment of people – all for the sake of gigantic development projects.It is now widely recognised that when people are displaced, they“are unable to recover and end up worse off than before”.4 To addto this, a global pattern is now emerging in displacement issues:largely, displaced persons are marginalised populations who have

67

CHAPTER 3

Bearing the brunt: people and the environment

Ground reality: the impacts of mining on densely populated, ecologically-rich areas are magnified, and lead to greater poverty

AG

NIM

IRH

BA

SU /

CSE

m k

little recourse to or possibility of redress. For these groups, theimpact of displacement is much more and severe than onlymoving residence: it reverberates through every facet of theirlives. In fact, loss of land accounts for just “10 to 20 per cent of the impoverishment risks known to be associated with involuntary displacement”.5

Involuntary displacement creates immense psychologicaltrauma due to disruption in the established lifestyles of the people displaced. Production systems are dismantled, close-knitkinship groups get scattered, long-established relationships aredisrupted, traditional sources of employment lost, market linksbroken, and customs related to food security and credit transfersget dissolved. The systems of social hierarchy and leadership losetheir credibility. Ancestral shrines, monuments and the entiresense of history and cultural identity of a community are irretriev-ably lost. Since the majority of the people displaced are tribals andother vulnerable sections of the society, they are not able to copewith the sudden and dramatic changes in their traditional ways of living. The obvious result of this is impoverishment, both economic and social.

Proponents of development projects contend that displace-ment is inevitable if the nation has to prosper – but many disagree.In his book Rehabilitation Policy and Law in India: A Right toLivelihood, Walter Fernanades writes that “many socio-economicsurveys and other studies clearly establish that it is invariablytribal and poor people who suffer, whereas the fruits of develop-ment are enjoyed by richer classes and urban populations. TheIndian development model has ensured that large projects resultin a transfer of resources from the weaker sections of the societyto the already privileged ones”.

● What the figures sayHow many people has mining displaced in India so far? Thereare no reliable official statistics. There are estimates available forthe period 1950 to 1991, which show that of all the developmen-tal projects, mining has displaced the second highest number ofpeople (see Box: High toll); dams have displaced the maximumnumbers. Mining projects have displaced around 25.5 lakh people during 1950-91.6 More importantly, not even 25 per cent of these displaced have been resettled (see Table 3.1: Displacementby mining projects). These figures are only for the people whowere moved out of their lands; they do not include the thousandswho were dependent on the land for their livelihoods, or those

whose lives were affected due to disruption of water tables,dumping of overburden on fertile agricultural lands and destruction of forests.

Mining affects tribal populations severely – sometimes, morethan other development projects. Of all the people displaced byvarious development projects, about 41 per cent have been tribals.In the case of mining, about 52 per cent of the people displacedwere tribals.7 Another estimate by Theodore E Downing in anMMSD (Mining, Minerals, and Sustainable Development) publi-cation puts the percentage of displaced tribals at 50 per cent of the1.6 million people displaced by 110 development projects in thecountry between 1990 and 1995.8

There are no statistics on the number of people displaced dueto mining after 1991. But looking at the data on number of miningprojects cleared after 1991 and the amount of forest land divertedfor mining, it is clear that large-scale displacement must have happened. In the last 10 years alone (1995-2005), as much as 74,000ha of forest land has been diverted for mining.

Displacement due to mining increased substantially since the1970s as India’s coal production shifted from underground toopen-cast mining. Operations Research Group (ORG), a consul-tant of Coal India Limited (CIL), reported that mining-induceddisplacement and resettlement (MIDR) was creating a pattern of“gross violation of human rights,” and “enormous trauma in thecountry”.9 In one of its environment impact assessment reportsfor its pending coal sector projects, CIL itself wrote that the vic-tims of resettlement “often end up as exploited contract labourers

68


c m y k

High tollDoes mining lead to disproportionately high levels ofdisplacement?

Macroeconomics suggests it does. Of the total displacement due todevelopmental projects, mining has accounted for around 12 percent. But the share of mining in the gross domestic product (GDP) of the country stands at around 2.2 per cent. If we exclude the con-tribution of agriculture to the GDP, then the contribution of miningto the rest of the GDP stands at around 3.5 per cent. This means thatfor every one per cent contribution of mining to the GDP, it displacesthree-four times more people than all other developmental projectstaken together.

Types of All DPs % of DPs % of Tribals % of all Tribals % of tribals projects (lakh) total DPs resettled (lakh) resettled DPs displaced (lakh) DPs resettled (lakh) resettled

Mines 25.5 12.0 6.30 24.7 13.30 52.20 3.30 24.81

All development projects 213 100 53.80 25.0 85.39 40.9 21.16 24.78

Note: DP = displaced personsSource: W Fernandes et al, 1997, ‘Hundred years of involuntary displacement in India’, Rehabilitation Policy and Law in India: A Right to Livelihood, Indian SocialInstitute, New Delhi, pp 17

TABLE 3.1: Displacement by mining projects (1951-90) Almost half the people affected by mining projects have been tribals; not even one-fourth of them have been resettled

69

BEARING THE BRUNT: PEOPLE AND THE ENVIRONMENT

c m y k

The exodus: for every one per cent that it contributes to the GDP, mining displaces three-four times more people than all other developmentprojects taken together

AG

NIM

IRH

BA

SU /

CSE

trapped in perpetual poverty or they simply leave the area, toreappear in the slums of the city or as squatters”.10

Worse, because of the large numbers of development projectsfrom dams to mines, there are now a number of cases where peo-ple have been displaced more than once (see Box: From one site tothe other). Theodore Downing (Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-Induced Displacement and Resettlement) describes this as “creating afloating population of development-induced poor”.11 Downingargues that the likelihood of displacement and resettlement from

mining increases as rich mineral deposits are found in areas withrelatively low land acquisition costs, high population density,poor land tenure definition, politically weak and powerless populations and indigenous communities.12

● The rehabilitation messThe Indian government’s mineral extraction policy mimics thatof countries such as Canada, the US and Australia. These threecountries have native populations that were displaced for mining, but their population densities are much lower than thatof India: 3.3, 32.95, and 0.79 persons per sq km, respectively. EvenChina has a population density which is less than half of India’s:137 people per sq km. Compare this with India’s population density of 329 persons per sq km, one of the highest in the world.Clearly, the Indian experience can never mirror that of other largemining countries.

India faces another unique problem. Tribals and scheduledcastes often have little legal claim to land, which pits them againstpolicies designed to compensate landowners – naturally, these poli-cies are wholly unfit to address the extant situation in rural India.

As a result of all this, in India, rehabilitation (which refers torestoring the incomes, livelihoods and social systems of the displacees toat least the level of their pre-project status) of displaced people hasbeen minimal and not very successful. One estimate by N CSaxena puts the percentage of people rehabilitated at only 29 percent of the total number of people displaced due to developmentprojects.13 There are no estimates available on the rehabilitation

70


From one site to the otherWith the large numbers of development projects, multipledisplacement is becoming a real problem today

In Uttar Pradesh, the Rihand dam oustees of the early 1960s weredisplaced again a decade later to make way for coal mines, a thirdtime for industries, and in the 1980s, for the Singrauli Super ThermalPlant. Displaced Soliga tribals of the Kabini dam in Karnataka arenow threatened with displacement a second time by the RajivGandhi National Park. In Orissa, Chitkapar village in Koraput districtwas displaced four times: first by the Hindustan AeronauticalLimited’s MIG factory at Sunabeda in the 1960s, the Upper Kolabdam in the 1980s, and a naval armament depot in the 1990s. The displaced people of Salandi dam in Orissa are expected to be shiftedonce again due to uranium mines.

SHYA

MA

L /

CSE

m k

performance of mining projects, but considering the fact that mining displaces larger proportions of tribals than any otherdevelopment projects, its rehabilitation performance is likely to beworse. The fact that tribals are poorly rehabilitated is supportedby many studies.

A survey carried out among tribal households in five villagesat Talcher, Orissa found an increase in unemployment from nineper cent to 43.6 per cent, accompanied by a large shift from primary to tertiary occupations. The survey also reported up to50-80 per cent reduction in the level of earning among tribes andscheduled castes.14 The other group that is most affected by displacement but hardly ever addressed in resettlement policies,is women (see Box: Raw deal).

Traditionally, the approaches to rehabilitate or reconstructlivelihoods have revolved around the following four options:

● Cash compensation: In this case, cash is paid to the displacedpeople in lieu of land and other properties acquired.Theoretically, cash compensation is seen as a preferableoption, as it gives a choice to the people to improve their economic status by investing the money. However, in practice,it often fails to benefit the affected – mainly because it completely ignores the needs of a large number of people(labourers, craftspeople, etc) who do not own land, but whostand to lose their livelihoods.

The going is not smooth either for those eligible to receivesuch compensation. To begin with, the packages offered underthe Land Acquisition Act are totally inadequate for restoringand enhancing standards of living. Delays in payment ofcompensation are the norm. Corruption and the role of middlemen ensure that most poor and ignorant oustees endup getting only a small part of the compensation money.Often, cash compensation is paid as a lump sum to oustees,without any advice or help on investing the money. Thereceivers, who have usually not seen so much money in theirlives, end up frittering it away.

● Land for land: This involves replacing the lost land with newland at some other location. For displaced people from ruralcommunities, this is one of the best and most preferredoptions as it allows them to continue with their occupation.But this form of compensation is rarely offered in India. Inmost cases where it is, the new land is usually of inferior quality (mainly wasteland), or not large enough, or is not suitably located. The biggest challenge for this form of compensation is the scarcity of land in India. In many cases,land-based compensation leads to ownership disputes.

● Employment: Effectiveness of this form of rehabilitation as aquick and reliable option has been documented. People whoget jobs are often able to re-establish themselves in lesser time.Besides a permanent job, they may also get free housing, medical care, education allowance for children, travel conces-sions, and pension on retirement. Naturally, there is always aclamour for jobs among the displaced.

Until recently, several public sector undertakings favouredthis form of rehabilitation: jobs were provided to at least onemember from each family to compensate for the loss of land.However, with the demands of globalisation and rightsizing,companies and governments are shying away from taking onmore numbers, especially of unskilled labour (see Box onpage 72: Shut out – officially). Even in the case of large opera-tions where an employment potential exists, most workersare not from local communities as companies want skilledlabour. Employment potential is even lower in private sectorcompanies.

● Self-employment: As land or jobs can no longer be guaran-teed, projects are attempting to promote self-employmentschemes to re-establish displaced people. But this is notworking. Most displaced people do not view this way of rehabilitation as a dependable source of livelihood. Forexample, when basket making as a source of livelihood was

71


Raw dealGender inequalities persist in mining-induced displacementand resettlement

The burden of development-induced displacement falls on the politi-cally weakest groups. Within these groups, women often suffer morethan men. This is for two reasons: women are often the victims of sexist resettlement and rehabilitation programmes that exclude themfrom compensation and the consultation process; their roles are oftenupset by displacement and they are forced into new societies wheretheir traditions place them at a disadvantage.1 Secondly, displacementleads to increased violence against women.

According to Layla Mehta of the UK-based Institute ofDevelopment Studies, one of the major obstacles is the view that reha-bilitation packages given to the man of a household are transferredequally to the women: this view fails to recognise different household

roles, societal constraints and issues of family unity.2 Displacement’simpact on family ties affects women differently, as security dissolves.The situation is worse for “landless women who were dependent onother people’s land (where they worked as agricultural labourers) or onforest resources.These women became further impoverished and oftendestitute.”3 One study found that joblessness among women rose from56 per cent before displacement to 84 per cent after.4

In India, investigations into the impact of displacement from coal mines have discovered an increase in domestic violence. Besides,children of these women do not receive regular education, perpetuat-ing a cycle of poverty.5 The role of women in their communities hasdeteriorated as their economic situation has worsened. Their inabilityto contribute to the household – either because they lack the skillsdemanded in the new location or because their culture restricts mobility and freedom to obtain employment – has created a situationwhere women continue to see their political power diminish.6

m k

suggested to the people displaced by the coal mines in Parej inHazaribagh district of Jharkhand, they accepted it – providedthey were guaranteed returns equal to a job in CIL, which ofcourse was not possible.15 Generally, displaced people are also reluctant to accept self-employment as it involves drastic changes in their lifestyles and occupations. Moreover,entrepreneur-centred small businesses supported by micro-credit tend to exclude the very poor, the people most in need.

Many of these income generation schemes have been formulated recently and still remain largely untried; therefore,they cannot guarantee an assured income. Experiences else-where are also not very encouraging. A study by the

International Labour Organization (ILO) points out that evenin industrial economies, less than five per cent of the unem-ployed opt for readily available self-employment assistance;moreover, in spite of increasingly sophisticated selection andscreening procedures, between 30-60 per cent of these failwithin the first few years. Developing countries, with largenumbers of unemployed and fewer options on offer, have amuch higher proportion of their citizens as self-employed, butthe failure rate is as high as in industrialised nations.16

One of the key reasons behind the recurrent failure of the rehabilitation process is financial – flawed compensation andunder-financing of reconstruction. Compensation has beenfound again and again to be financially insufficient and poorly conceived and implemented,17 as several micro-studies show.Studies reported by the Center of Mining Environment, IndianSchool of Mines, Dhanbad says that out of a dozen coal miningcomplexes, only two had a fair overall quality of life. The studies reported that the implementation of rehabilitation andresettlement (R&R) policies and packages in the mining areasdid not take into account the emotional, mental and physicalneeds of the project-affected families (PAFs). The PAFs were seldom consulted during development and implementation ofthe packages.

The studies also found that mining activities bring about anincrease in the cost of living: in most cases, local communities cannot cope with this because their incomes do not increase proportionately to meet the higher costs. More importantly, thestudies found that the social structures of the displaced werebeing disturbed. For instance, a large disparity in incomes wasintroduced, which not only led to frustration but also in the disintegration of families.18

While the problem of displacement and rehabilitation exists inall the states where mining has gained a foothold, it is more acutein the mineral-rich states of Orissa, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh(see Map 3.1: At war over mining). These three states also have ahigher percentage of tribal populations, and have witnessed themaximum number of public protests related to mining. Amongthe three, Orissa tops anti-mining protests with struggles reported in Jajpur, Rayagada, Keonjhar, Sundergarh, Kalahandiand Jharsuguda. In some cases, protests have been non-violentand successful in completely banning mining (as in the Doon valley in Uttarakhand, where people stopped limestone mining).In others, like Kalinganagar in Orissa, conflict has led to tragicloss of lives and property.

It is important to recognise these protests for what they are:people in the mineral-rich areas of the country are not willing togive up their land for mining. They do not believe that mining isgoing to improve their lot or add to the development of theirregions. A history of poor compensation and poorer R&R has created an atmosphere of acute distrust. People do not trust thegovernment and businesses, who they believe are hand-in-glove.And they are not far from the truth: the current paradigm of R&R is flawed and ensures nothing but impoverishment andsocial disruption.

72


c m y k

Shut out – officiallyNo jobs for displaced people, says ministry

The Union ministry of coal has issued a directive banning job fordisplaced people. This has put a number of public sector units inOrissa, such as Mahanadi Coalfields Limited (MCL), in a fix. Theban has resulted in agitations by displaced people and losses in production. It is expected to affect job prospects of 6,000 persons inthe Talcher coalfields and 2,000 people in the Ib Valley coalfields in Orissa. Local politicians have threatened a stir if the directive isnot overturned, as the order contradicts the rehabilitation policy ofthe Orissa government.

People rally against bauxite mining in Andhra Pradesh; such protestsare erupting all over the country now

THE

HIN

DU

73


Source: Compiled by Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science and Environment, 2006

1. Car Nicobar, Andaman & Nicobar, sand

2. Kakinada Yanam, East Godavari, Andhra Pradesh,

uranium

3. Vishakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh, bauxite

4. Nalgonda, Andhra Pradesh, uranium

5. Tumkar, Karnataka, sand

6. Amreli, Gujarat, limestone

7. Porbandar, Gujarat, limestone

8. Jaduguda, West Singhbhum, Jharkhand,

uranium

9. West Singhbhum, Jharkhand, iron ore and coal

10. Hazaribagh, Jharkhand, coal

11. Jharia, Bokaro, Jharkhand, coal

12. Kudremukh, Karnataka, iron ore

13. Madayipara, North Kannur, Kerala, lignite, china

clay and sand

14. West Khasi Hills, Meghalaya, uranium

15. Jharsuguda, Orissa, bauxite

16. Kalinganagar, Jajpur, Orissa, iron and steel

17. Kalahandi, Orissa, bauxite

18. Keonjhar, Orissa, iron ore and manganese

19. Kashipur, Rayagada, Orissa, bauxite

20. Karauli, Rajasthan, sandstone

21. Tehri Garhwal, Uttarakhand, stone, sand and

magnesite

22. Nagapattinam, Tamil Nadu, sand

23. Alappuzha, Kerala, sand

24. Bellary, Karnataka, iron ore

25. Sambalpur, Orissa, bauxite

26. Pakur, Jharkhand, coal

27. Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, stone

28. Chamba, Himachal Pradesh, slate

29. Solan, Himachal Pradesh, limestone

30. Paonta, Sirmaur, Himachal Pradesh, illegal mining

31. Tirunelveli, Tamil Nadu, sand

32. Dhanbad, Jharkhand, coal

33. Sukinda Valley, Jajpur, Orissa, chromite

34. Bardez, Goa, iron ore

35. Haldankarwada-Porascadem, Goa, iron

36. Nagarjunasagar, Andhra Pradesh, uranium

37. Bannerghatta National Park, Bangalore, sand

38. Tejaswininagar, Bangalore, Karnataka, sand/stone

39. Srirangapatna, Mandya, Karnataka, sand

40. Rampura, Karnataka, sand

41. Kollegal, Chamarajanagar, Karnataka, granite

42. Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, sand

43. Periyar, Kerala, sand

44. Thiruvallur, Tamil Nadu, sand

45. Ramanathapuram, Tamil Nadu, sand

46. Vellore, Tamil Nadu, sand

47. Jaisalmer, Rajasthan, granite

48. Powai Lake, Mumbai, Maharashtra, stone

49. Vastan, Surat, Gujarat, lignite

50. Vadodara, Gujarat, manganese

51. Salem Tabri, Ludhiana, Punjab, sand

52. Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh, illegal mining

53. Rampur, Haryana, quarrying

54. Morni, Haryana, quarrying

55. Sone River, Bihar, sand

56. Shankarpur, Ujjain, Madhya Pradesh, granite

57. Singrauli, Sidhi, Madhya Pradesh, coal

58. Bastar, Chhattisgarh, iron ore

59. Mathura, Uttar Pradesh, sandstone

60. Jhingola and Palla villages, Delhi, sand quarrying

61. Nimmalapadu, Andhra Pradesh, calcite

62. Bicholim, Goa, iron ore

63. Tiswadi, Goa, iron ore

64. Ponda, Goa, iron ore

65. Sattari, Goa, iron ore

66. Dantewada, Chhattisgarh, iron ore

67. Jagatsinghpur, Orissa, iron ore

68. Koraput, Orissa, bauxite

69. Angul, Orissa, coal

70. Sonbhadra, Uttar Pradesh, coal and dolomite

71. Solan, Himachal Pradesh, limestone

72. Udaipur, Rajasthan, marble

73. Rajasmand, Rajasthan, marble

74. Chandrapura, Maharashtra, coal

75. Nagpur, Maharashtra, coal

76. Karbi Anglong, Assam, coal

77. Golaghat, Assam, stone

78. Kutchh, Gujarat, limestone

NA

BAY OF BENGAL

ARABIAN SEA

INDIAN OCEAN

34,3562-65

24

31

48

49

3

25

15

33

10

58

75

74

11

1

1

23

42

2245

46 44384012

39 37

41

13

43

36

4

678

750 56

72

73

20

5960

47

545330 21

2771

51

2829

55

7057

52

6668

1719 69

1667

18

8 9

32

2614

7776

2

5

61

GUJARAT

MANIPUR

NAGALAND

ARUNACHALPRADESH

JAMMU & KASHMIR

HIMACHALPRADESH

PUNJAB

RAJASTHAN

MAHARASHTRA

KARNATAKA

TAMIL NADUKERALA

ANDHRA PRADESH

CHHATTISGARH

ORISSA

WESTBENGAL

JHARKHAND

SIKKIM

ASSAM

MEGHALAYA

TRIPURA

MIZORAM

BIHAR

UTTAR PRADESH

MADHYA PRADESH

HARYANA

UTTARAKHAND

DELHI

GOA

AN

DA

MA

N &

NIC

OB

AR

ISLAN

DS

LAKSHADWEEP

MAP 3.1: At war over miningPeople in India’s mineral-rich states are not willing to give up their lands for mining; the flashpoints…

m k

■ FORESTS NO MORE

Closely aligned to the issue of displacement is that of forests.Much of the country’s mineral reserves are in areas that are alsoforested and inhabited by marginalised populations. Mining andquarrying has already destroyed large tracts of forest land inmany parts. Diversion of forests is likely to become more acute asthe race for exploiting more minerals gathers pace.

Government estimates put the total forest land diverted formining across the country in the period 1980-2005 at 95,003 ha. Noestimates are available for forest land diverted for mining before1980. In terms of numbers, 1,198 mines were granted forestryclearances during 1980-2005 for operating in forest areas underthe provisions of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980.19

However, other sources point to a much higher figure.According to the figure quoted by the national consultation on theDraft Forest Bill, till 1994, 90,695 ha of forests had been leased tomining companies. Since the data available with the MoEFindicates that after 1995, 73,915 ha of forest land were divertedfor mining, the total forest land diverted for mining becomes1,64,610 ha.20

Whatever the statistics say, it is clear that mining in forest landhas increased significantly in the last decade. In the 17 yearsbefore 1998 (1980-97), forest clearances were granted for only 317mines with a total diversion of 34,527 ha. Between 1998-2005, theMoEF cleared 881 mining projects in forest areas diverting 60,476ha of forest area (see Table 3.2: Mine leases in forests). This means

that during 1998-2005, on an average, 216 mining projects weregranted forest clearance annually – as against 19 clearances annually during 1980-97. Similarly, the total forest area divertedannually for mining during 1998-2005 is four-fold higher thanwhat was diverted every year during 1980-97. This is an extremely worrying trend, since the mining industry has justbegun expanding: with the new mining policy on the anvil, whichis likely to give a significant boost to the industry, much more forest land is likely to be diverted for mining.

Forest diversion not only affects the ecological system of anarea, it also impacts livelihoods of people who depend on it forsustenance – especially tribals. In times of crisis, forest resourcesprovide a buffer against deprivation and hardship. Forest degradation due to mining and other development projects hassignificantly depleted the availability and productivity of theecosystem, rendering the tribal population more vulnerable tonatural disasters and adverse climatic shocks.

According to statistics presented to the parliament in 2005, the states which lead in production of minerals are also the oneswhere maximum forest land has been diverted for mining (seeTable 3.3: Forest land diversion: the states in the game). Orissa leads,with 15,387 ha forest land diverted for mining, which is more than16 per cent of the total forest land diverted for mining in the coun-try. It is closely followed by Chhattisgarh, which diverted about14,421 ha of forest land for mining – about 15 per cent of the totalin the country. The other states in this group include AndhraPradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and Jharkhand.

74


Waiting to be razed: with the new mining policy on the anvil, more forests are expected to make way for mining companies

AG

NIM

IRH

BA

SU /

CSE

m k

There are no sacred frontiers today as far as mining in forest areas is concerned. Across the country, mining is takingplace inside and outside reserve forests, protected forests, national parks and wildlife sanctuaries. Consider the followingexamples:● The Jamwa Ramgarh Wildlife Sanctuary in Rajasthan has been

extensively mined for marble and soapstone.● The Keladevi Wildlife Sanctuary, which is part of the

Ranthambore Tiger Reserve in Rajasthan, has been affected byred sandstone and limestone mining.

● The Bhagwan Mahaveer Wildlife Sanctuary, Goa, has at least100-150 mines in a 10-km radius of the protected area. In fact,mine leases are spread over more than 40 per cent of the forestarea in Goa.

● The Gangua Sanctuary in Madhya Pradesh is extensivelymined for diamond and white sandstone.

● Areas of Darlaghat Wildlife Sanctuary in Himachal Pradeshwere denotified to allow limestone mining.

● The Gir Wildlife Sanctuary and National Park in Gujarat, thelast home of the Asiatic lion, has 100 odd mines in a 10-kmradius of the protected area.

● The Gujarat government denotified the Narayan SarovarWildlife Sanctuary reducing its size from about 766 sq km toabout 444 sq km to allow limestone and lignite mining.Several iron ore mining projects have been allowed in

Sarai Kela Kharsawa Elephant Reserve, Jharkhand. Saranda,Kolhan and Porhat in West Singhbhum district of Jharkhand aremajor elephant habitats. This area is now being extensively minedfor iron ore. This has intensified human-elephant conflicts.

Coal and oil mining threatens wildlife areas in eastern Assam.Dilli Jeypore and Makum coalfields are in the fragile Patkai hills.Following protests by environmental, social and political groups,the MoEF ordered the Tikak colliery of the North EasternCoalfields to close down on environmental grounds, but this wasallowed to reopen in the 1990s.

The list can go on. In general, there is no moratorium per se onmining in any area of the country – be it an ecologically fragilearea, wildlife sanctuaries, reserve or protected forests, biospherereserves, national parks, critical water sources or areas inhabitedby indigenous communities. The only thing needed to open upany area for mining is permission from the government. Forexample, under the FCA, 1980 only a prior approval of the gov-ernment is required to bring about any change in the status ofreserve forests or protected forest land for non-forest uses.Regarding wildlife sanctuaries and national parks, the FCA saysthat states and union territories (UTs) should avoid recommend-ing use of these areas for other purposes. However, in case it isunavoidable, the state/UT government is advised to get the consent of the Indian Board of Wildlife (IBWL).

The Wildlife Protection (Amendment) Act, 2002 has no teetheither. While section 29 of the act prohibits mining in sanctuaries,and section 35(6) does the same for national parks; both have beenflagrantly violated.

75


1980-1997 1998-2005 Total (1980-2005)

Number of mine leases granted 317 881 1198in forest areas

Average number of mine 19 126 80leases granted every year

Forest land diverted for 34,527 60,476 95,003mining (in hectare)

Average amount of forest 2,031 8,639 6,334land diverted for mining every year (in hectare)

Source: ‘Mining projects in forest land’, Rajya Sabha, Unstarred question no552, Union ministry of mines, http://164.100.24.219/rsq/quest.asp?qref=106142, viewed on October 10, 2006

TABLE 3.2: Mine leases in forestsIn the last decade, mine leases granted in forest areas haveincreased significantly

State Forest land diverted Share of the for mining (ha) total (percentage)

Andhra Pradesh 13,532 14.2

Arunachal Pradesh 142 0.1

Assam 87 0.1

Bihar 414 0.4

Chhattisgarh 14,421 15.2

Goa 1,282 1.3

Gujarat 9,664 10.2

Himachal Pradesh 1,228 1.3

Jharkhand 9,059 9.5

Karnataka 7,558 8.0

Kerala 29 0.0

Madhya Pradesh 10,058 10.6

Maharashtra 4,057 4.3

Orissa 15,387 16.2

Rajasthan 4,996 5.3

Tamil Nadu 436 0.5

Uttarakhand 247 0.3

Uttar Pradesh 2,110 2.2

West Bengal 277 0.3

Andaman & Nicobar Islands 20 0.0

India 95,003 100

Source: A Behar, et al, 2005, Parliament Digest: Bridging the gap between parliament and people, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune, pp 57

TABLE 3.3: Forest land diversion: the states in the gameOrissa, Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh lead in the racefor diverting forest lands for mining

m k

76


Forests are the lifeline of tribal economies, and destruction of this lifeline is a real threat to tribal communities. They become more vulnerableto natural disasters and climatic shocks

AG

NIM

IRH

BA

SU /

CSE

m k

But across the world, there is increased recognition of the factthat critical ecosystems, biosphere reserves and other protectedareas need to be preserved for ecological continuity. This concern was translated into the ‘Amman Recommendations’ atthe World Conservation Congress in Amman, Jordan in October 2000 (see Box: The Amman recommendations). The recommendations “call on all IUCN’s state members to prohibitby law, all exploration and extraction of mineral resources in protected areas corresponding to IUCN protected area manage-ment categories I-IV”.

It is high time that India too decided: it should legislate its ‘no-go’ areas for mining and other development projects. These

special areas should be identified on the basis of an integratedassessment of ecological, environmental, economic and socialimpacts; in this, the economic cannot be allowed to dominate,which generally tends to happen if high-value minerals are found.In general, areas providing critical ecological goods and services,areas of high wilderness, cultural or social values or areas inhabited by primitive tribes should be declared as ‘no-go’ areas.

Other than forest land, mining in the country is increasinglytaking over agricultural land as well for exploiting mineralreserves (see Box: Limestone from farmlands). For an agrarian society like India, this is a serious concern: millions depend onfarming and allied activities for their sustenance.

77


c m y k

The Amman recommendationsGlobal efforts to limit mining in protected areas have metwith some resistance

Some governments equate a protected area with a place where mineral extraction and other development work should be banned;therefore, protected areas are ‘no-go’ areas for mining in these coun-tries. On the other hand, there are others that retain legal access tomineral rights and other development projects within protected areas.In India, for example, the government retains the legal right to allowmining in protected areas. Accordingly, some governments (and states)have changed or attempted to change the law to allow mining withinprotected areas, while others have failed to implement existing lawsand thus, turned a blind eye to illegal mining in protected areas.

In the late 1990s, the Australian government’s plan to permit limited uranium mining in an enclave within – but excluded from –Kakadu National Park and World Heritage Site caused a storm ofprotest among the international conservation community, whichalmost ended with the protected area being listed on the UNESCOWorld Heritage in Danger list. This controversy also opened the debateon protected areas as ‘no-go’ areas for mining. The debate ended up

demanding a globally agreed standard relating to protected areas andmining.

IUCN, the World Conservation Union, sought to tackle this issuethrough a recommendation at the World Conservation Congress inAmman, Jordan in October 2000, which suggested that mining shouldnot take place in IUCN Category I-IV protected areas, which include:● Category I: Strictly nature reserve/wilderness area – protected area

managed mainly for science or wilderness protection.● Category II: National park – protected area managed mainly for

ecosystem protection and recreation.● Category III: Natural monument – protected area managed

mainly for conservation of specific natural features.● Category IV: Habitat/species management area – protected area

managed mainly for conservation through management intervention.At present, this would eliminate around six per cent of global land

areas from mineral activity. The recommendation was passed by amajority of the members, including many governments, but there weresignificant exceptions: it was, for example, rejected by the US, whichnoted that mining policy is an internal matter for sovereign states andthat the “US government has acted strongly to limit mining where it isnot appropriate”. The mining industry was also opposed to it.

Limestone from farmlandsFertile croplands as well as grasslands have been diverted

Besides forests, many mineral reserves in India also lie in the rich fer-tile plains of the country and its grasslands and shrublands, used forgrazing. Limestone, for example, is found in the agricultural lands ofKarnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh andthe shrub/grassland regions of Rajasthan.

In India, the large-scale cement industry has leased out 0.15 million ha of land for captive limestone mines. Of this,almost 60 per cent is agricultural land, 20 per cent forest land and theremaining 20 per cent is ‘wasteland’, which in reality is common grazing land in states like Rajasthan. States where maximum agricultural land has been diverted for limestone mining includeKarnataka with more than 97 per cent and Andhra Pradesh with 88 per cent (see graph).

States

Pro

po

rtio

n o

f ag

ricu

ltu

ral l

and

ou

t o

f th

e to

tal l

ease

are

a

Chhat

tisga

rhM

adhy

aPr

ades

hKar

nata

kaAnd

hra

Prad

esh

Tam

il Nad

uM

ahar

asht

raRa

jasth

an

Gujara

t

Himac

hal

Prad

esh

57.9

74.183.7

97.588.1

32.6

76.1

11.9

33.4

0.0

20.0

40.0

60.0

80.0

100.0

120.0

GRAPH: Eating into farmland Cement plants have taken up prime agricultural land

Source: Chandra Bhushan et al, 2005, Concrete Facts: The life cycle of theIndian cement industry, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, pp 28

■ WATER: USED AND DEFILED

Mining does not only consume water; it also pollutes and depleteswater sources. Mining operations use up water for beneficiationand processing, wet drilling, cooling the machinery, dust suppres-sion (spraying on haul roads, conveyors, waste dumps and loading and unloading points), plantations and domestic con-sumption. Though ‘specific water consumption’ (water consumedto extract one tonne of mineral) of the mining industry may not bevery high, its total water consumption is large as the volume ofminerals mined is huge and increasing every year.

Take the case of limestone mining in India. On an average,about 20-30 litre of water is used to extract one tonne of lime-stone21 – a small amount compared to specific water consumptionin other industrial activities. However, considering the fact thatabout 170 MT of limestone is mined annually, the total water usedto extract limestone alone stands at about 4.25 MT. Most limestonemines are located in the water-scarce regions of the country, andwater use by them has left the already parched local communitiesin a worse state. Limestone miners, who are also the owners ofneighbouring cement plants, are now feeling the pinch them-selves. Growing tensions with the community over water are

forcing them to conserve the resource by recycling and reusing it.But limestone mines are some of the lowest water consumers

in the mining sector – limestone is used directly in cement-mak-ing without any beneficiation. This is not the case with metallicminerals like iron ore, bauxite, copper or gold, where mineral ben-eficiation and processing is required to extract minerals; waterconsumption, therefore, is high. There are no estimates about thetotal amount of water used up by metallic mineral mines in India.However, some conclusions can be derived from water consump-tion data of major mines. Average water consumption (excludingdomestic consumption) at the iron ore mines of Tata Steel (atNoamundi in Jharkhand and Joda East in Orissa) is about 600 litreper tonne of iron ore.22 Water consumption (excluding domesticconsumption) in the Dalli and Rajhara iron ore mines of the BhilaiSteel Plant is about 800 litre per tonne of iron ore.23 Even if weassume a lower value of 500 litre per tonne of iron ore (manysmall mines don’t have beneficiation processes) as a benchmark toestimate the water consumption by iron ore mines in India, theamount of water consumed to extract iron ore in India in 2005-06comes to a staggering 77 MT – enough to meet the daily waterrequirements of more than three million people.

Besides using up water, mines also deplete groundwater bybreaching the groundwater table and pumping the water out toextract minerals. In Goa, for instance, most iron ore mines workbelow the groundwater level. It is estimated that, for every tonneof iron ore that Goa produces, about 10 tonne of water has to bepumped out.24 This has severely depleted the groundwaterresources in areas surrounding the mines.

The breaching of the groundwater table creates a large cone ofdepression in the groundwater regime. The result is lowering ofgroundwater levels in surrounding areas. About 40 per cent of thelarge captive limestone mines of India have breached the ground-water table.25 The Talcher coalfields in Orissa, with their hugeopen-cast mines, have dried up local ponds and wells.

Continuous dewatering by underground mines also affectsgroundwater. These mines pump out millions of litres to drainmine galleries and release the water into nearby watercourses.This not only depletes the groundwater, it also causes flooding,siltation and pollution in the watercourses where it is discharged.The Neyveli lignite mines in Tamil Nadu pump out an estimated40 million litre of water every day.26

Large and deep open-cast mines exercise their own impact onthe hydrological regime of a region. Deforestation over mineleaseholds and changes in the watershed characteristics haveaffected water flows in streams in mining regions: flows havedwindled, perennial streams have turned seasonal, while othershave receded. This effect is most pronounced in the case of moun-tain-top mining. People in Orissa have been opposing bauxitemining on hills like Lanjigarh, Jagatsinghpur and Baphlimali asthey fear it will dry up the mountain streams.

Geological structures like hills and mountains have multipleand complex functions, and exert tremendous influence on localhydrological conditions. They induce precipitation: through theforest cover that often exists naturally, mountains convert season-al rainfall into perennial water sources. Mining on mountain-top

78


A picture of bliss? Hardly. Minerals are often found in watersheds,and their extraction impacts streams and rivers such as this one inGandhamardan, Orissa

PATR

IK O

SKA

RSSO

N

m k

79


increases surface run-off and decreases infiltration. The run-off,combined with the choking of water courses with overburden andfines, can cause floods and droughts in regions which otherwisehave stable and perennial supplies of water.

● Water use in mineral-based industriesMost mineral-based industries are located close to their maininputs – the minerals. Thus, the pressure on local water resourcescomes not only from mining, but also from related industries.Most mineral-based industries such as steel, aluminium and thermal power plants (TPP) are water-intensive. They not onlyconsume large quantities of water, but also discharge wastewaterpolluting the local environment. For example, TPPs use as muchas 35,157 MT of water per annum27: this amount is sufficient to meet the daily requirements of more than 1,751 million people in a year. A major chunk, around 88 per cent (27,000 MT)is discharged as wastewater (see Table 3.4: Water use – mineral-based industries).

Indian steel companies are not far behind. Every tonne ofsteel requires about 10-80 tonne of water; altogether, the sectorconsumes around 516 MT of water every year.28 Future availabil-ity of water has been recognised as a challenge by industryexperts. B Muthuraman, managing director of Tata Iron & SteelCompany Ltd (TISCO), stresses on good water management as along-term vision for the steel industry.29 “India is not managingits water well enough to be able to afford it to the steel industry,”he says. In Jamshedpur, where Tata Steel is based, groundwaterlevels have steadily dropped over the years, and the river

Subernarekha is drying up. The city is already drawing around700 MT from the river for irrigation, potable water supply andindustrial usage. Tata Steel is one of the biggest consumers, drawing 124 MT for its plant.30

To make matters worse, there are several pending requestswith the state water resources department from around 11 companies, most of them mineral-based, to draw an additional1,000 MT of water from the river for upcoming projects. Theseinclude various future projects of the Tata Group, which alone account for 25 per cent of the additional water demanded bythe industry.31

Compared to the steel or thermal power sectors, the cementindustry is not a very big consumer of water. The specific water

Industrial sector Annual Annual Specificwastewater consumption water

discharge (MT) consumed (MT)

Thermal power plants 27,000.9 35,157.4 80 t/MWh

Steel 396.8 516.6 10-80 t/t

Source: Chandra Bhushan 2004, Overused, Underrated, supplement to DownTo Earth, February 29, 2004, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi

TABLE 3.4: Water use – mineral-based industries The water thermal plants consume in India in a year isenough to meet the requirements of 950 million people

Frothy flow: mineral-based industries like thermal power plants and iron and steel plants are a major source of water pollution

PATR

IK O

SKA

RSSO

N

m k

consumption of large-scale cement plants is a low 0.50 MT pertonne of product. This, however, translates into a substantialquantity, as the sector is a large producer. In 2003-04, the industryused up around 39 MT of water.32 To make matters worse, mostcement plants tap groundwater to meet their requirements andare located in water-scarce areas. For example, the six cementplants in Rajasthan together source five MT of groundwater everyyear.33 This puts pressure on local resources, and creates conflictsand tension with communities. Most local villagers complain of water scarcity and are not satisfied with the initiatives under-taken by the companies to supply water.

The aluminium industry spins a similar tale. It consumesaround three-10 tonne of water to produce a tonne of product: thistranslates into more than six MT due to the sheer volume of pro-duction.34 What is a matter of concern is that many aluminiumplants are coming up in water-scarce regions. For example, theupcoming plant of Vedanta in Jharsuguda (Orissa) proposes touse water from the Hirakud reservoir at the rate of 2,060 tonne perhour. This, despite the fact that this reservoir was built to irrigateagricultural fields and the volume of water in the reservoirrecedes drastically during summers – under such circumstances,withdrawal of 18 MT per annum is bound to lead to acute scarcity. The EIA report of the plant itself has admitted that thewells in the area go dry during summer. Moreover, there are otherindustries within a 10-km radius of the proposed plant, whichdraw groundwater from a number of deep borewells.35

Naturally, water has been at the core of numerous protestmovements against mining and mineral-based industries, as inthe case of iron ore mining in Goa, bauxite in the hills of AndhraPradesh or Orissa, coal in Singrauli, limestone in the Doon Valleyor magnetite in Kumaon.

■ MINING, THE POLLUTER

Besides being a depleting agent, mining is also a major source ofpollution. With the induction of new technologies and mechanisa-tion in the minerals sector, the trend is towards bigger mines.Large mining operations require more land, large quantities ofwater, more excavation and removal machinery, expanded refin-ing facilities – and generate enormous amounts of waste: this isone of the principal causes of environmental pollution at a minesite. Large-scale waste disposal requires extensive land area andresults in increased erosion and sediment loads in nearby waterbodies and land. Dust creation at large open-pit mines can haveserious environmental impacts, including respiratory difficultiesin nearby communities and increased sediment loads in water-ways. Noise levels and visual impacts also increase with the sizeof an operation: the drilling, blasting and excavating of mineralores and the grinding and refining processes associated withmetal extraction have significant aesthetic, air and noise impacts.

The type of mining operation dictates its environmentalimpact. Surface mining has a much greater impact on the envi-ronment than underground mines because of the large amountsof vegetation, soil and rock that must be removed to expose themineral ore. The removal of the overburden physically alters thelandscape and disrupts ecosystem processes. Once removed,improperly contained or stabilised piles of stored waste rock areprone to erosion, threatening local soils and waterways. Largeopen-cast mines also significantly impact the hydrology of thelocal area, more so if the mining is undertaken beneath thegroundwater table.

While underground mines are generally less destructive interms of volumes of waste created and direct impacts on surfacevegetation and waterways, they can have other negative environ-mental impacts. Underground tunnels can be sources of ground-water contamination when groundwater enters the exposed areas.This type of contamination can occur for decades after mining hasceased and is very difficult to control. Subsidence – the droppingof the surface (land) due to underground tunnel collapse – isanother potential environmental impact related to undergroundmining. The risk of injury or death for mine workers is higher inan underground mine, where fires or overburden collapse are difficult to control and may trap miners below the surface.

The type of mineral being mined also has an important influ-ence on the potential extent of environmental degradation.Construction minerals such as stone, clay and sand are mostlyassociated with open pit mines and are extracted in extremely hightonnages. Typically, there is little or no processing involved in theextraction of these minerals. As few harsh chemicals are used intheir extraction and processing, the problem of release of toxic pollutants is limited. However, mining of these minerals does leadto air and water pollution and can affect the local water regime.

The mining of metals, on the other hand, can pose a more serious threat to the environment because of the waste generatedin removal and processing of the target metal. Because metals areoften scattered in small amounts throughout ore bodies, a largepercentage of the material excavated from a mine ends up as

80


c m y k

SHYA

MA

L /

CSE

waste. If not used and controlled with care, reagents used to separate metals from surrounding ore can generate serious long-term water and air contamination problems. The excavation ofmetal ores and waste rock in itself poses an environmental risk assome of the related metals may be toxic if they are soluble and bio-available. For example, mercury and lead, which are bothtoxic and bio-accumulative, can threaten humans and wildlife intheir natural states. Copper is non-toxic in its natural state anddoes not threaten humans if ingested; however, in different chemical forms and high doses, copper can be toxic to aquatic life.

The type of rock and ore surrounding the target metal is animportant indicator of potential environmental impacts. Whiledeposits can be found in a wide range of media from sands togranite rock, metals are typically surrounded by iron sulfide min-erals, which can produce sulfuric acid when oxidised by air andwater. Copper, for example, is most commonly found as a coppersulfide (cuprite, chalcopyrite) and is associated with pyrite, an ironsulfide mineral which breaks down easily and yields sulfuric acid.

The characteristics of the area are the most important determi-nants of the potential impact of a mining operation. Mining in for-est area can devastate the local biodiversity, water and soil andalso change the micro-climatic conditions. Mountain-top miningnot only changes the topography and aesthetics of the area, butalso impacts the local hydrology and water sources extensively:local streams become its first casualties.

The local climate of an area, including rainfall, wind and tem-perature, influences the type of soil and vegetation present at amine site and thus, the extent of a mine’s potential impact on the

local environment. The tropics have, on an average, higher rainfalland greater cloud cover than temperate settings. Rains in tropicalregions come in distinct wet and dry seasons, resulting in cyclicwetting and drying of rocks, soils and mining wastes. This rainoften comes in torrential storms. High rainfall intensifies theweathering of rock and can result in the leaching of metals and theproduction of acidic drainage. Heavy rains can also cause tremendous erosion and mobilisation of sediment and may causecatastrophic failures of structures such as tailings impoundments.

● Waste woesWastes in mining are generated during extraction, beneficiationand processing of minerals. In open-cast mining, the topsoil,earth, rock and other strata – called overburden – are completelyremoved to provide access to the ore seam. A good mining practice is to store the topsoil for reuse, but this is largely ignoredin India. The remaining overburden is of no use and becomes apart of the waste pool.

There is also that portion of the ore which is of no use becauseof its low grade or quality. These low-grade ores too become a partof the waste pool. The pool also includes tailings, materials leftover after the process of separating the valuable from the worth-less fraction of an ore. Tailings are generated during beneficiationand processing. In general, the amount of total waste generatedfrom mining depends on the type of mineral extracted, the char-acteristics of the deposit, as well as the size of the mine. Bigger themine, larger is the waste generation. Often, a cluster of smallmines too creates huge waste problems, mainly because small

81


c m y k

Waste land: these towering mountains are nothing but mining wastes, generated during extraction and processing of minerals

P M

AD

HA

VAN

mines generally do not follow good waste management practices.The total waste generated by mining is increasing every year;

as higher-grade mineral deposits are getting exhausted, the min-eral industry has taken recourse to mining lower grade reserveswhich generate more waste. In gold mining, it is estimated thatonly 0.00001 per cent (100,000th of one per cent) of the ore is actu-ally refined into gold – everything else is just waste. Gary Gardnerand Payal Sampat, in their 1998 publication Mind over Matter:Recasting the Role of Materials in Our Lives (Worldwatch Institute,Washington, DC), point out that in the US, copper ore mined atthe beginning of the 20th century consisted of about 2.5 per centusable metal by weight; today, that proportion has dropped to0.51 per cent.

Take the case of coal: Indian companies are digging deeper andopting for lower grades of coal as the demand for it is soaring up.According to the Directorate General of Mines Safety or DGMS(Waste and Overburden Management in Mega Open-cast Projects –Problems and Technical Options), the country is even planning forproduction from 300-m depth for lower grade coal (D and Fgrades), in which, for every tonne of coal, about 15 tonne of wasteswill be generated. H P D Boruah (Geochemical and BiochemicalProperties of Coalmine Tailings of North Eastern Collieries of Assam,Regional Research Laboratory, Jorhat, July 2006) points out that theopen-cast mines of North Eastern Coalfields have been producingwaste rock at a stripping ratio of 14:1 (the ratio of overburden andwastes excavated to the amount of mineral removed is called thestripping ratio). In 2003-04, the coal mines of Coal India Limitedremoved about 500 million cubic metre (cu m) of overburden toproduce 260 MT of coal, at an average stripping ratio of 1.92 cu mof waste per tonne of coal, reports B Sanyal in The Hindu BusinessLine (November 22, 2006).

In general, the process of extracting solid fuels and metals generates the maximum amount of wastes. In fact, in the case ofmetals such as copper, zinc, lead and gold, more than 99 per centof the ore goes as wastes. In comparison, lower quantities ofwastes are generated from iron ore and bauxite mining (see Table3.5: Ores and wastes – the global picture). Underground mines arebelieved to generate less waste than open-cast mines.

According to the US Environment Protection Agency (USEPA,2003, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Orientation Manual,Washington, DC), every year, mines in the US generate wasteequivalent in weight to nearly nine times the trash produced byall US cities and towns combined. The USEPA also says that thetotal amount of waste ore (excluding overburden) that has beengenerated till date by the US metals mining industry exceeds 90 billion tonne. No such data is available for India. However, a conservative estimation done by the authors of this book indicatesthat the total amount of wastes (excluding waste produced duringbeneficiation and processing) generated from the mining of majorminerals alone would be around 1.84 billion tonne in 2006.

While rocks and soil constitute most mining wastes, theindustry also generates waste that is toxic in nature. Some ofthese toxins – such as mercury, arsenic, lead, zinc, chromium andcadmium – are inherently present in the ore. They leach out ofstored waste piles, contaminating the local environment. Some

toxic chemicals are also found in the wastes as they are addedintentionally during extraction and processing. For example,gold is extracted through a technique called ‘heap leaching’,which uses cyanide. After use, the cyanide is stored in artificialponds for reuse. Each bout of leaching takes a few months, after which the heaps receive a layer of fresh ore. Given the scaleand duration of these operations (usually decades), contamina-tion of the surrounding environment with cyanide is almostinevitable. The effort of the industry has been to replace cyanidewith mercury, which incidentally, is equally toxic. Mine wastesalso contain salts and radioactive wastes.

Mining wastes in IndiaCompared to other minerals, coal mining produces the maximumamount of wastes in India (see Table 3.6: The burden of mining wastein India). For every tonne of coal produced, about three-four tonneof wastes are generated. Limestone and iron ore are the next twobiggest contributors to total mining wastes generated in India.According to the data of the IBM, the average stripping ratio forlimestone mines in India is 1.05:1. For iron ore mines, the stripping ratio varies widely and is about 1-3:1; this does notinclude the wastes generated during beneficiation and processing,which can be very high. Bauxite ores in India are harder and havea higher stripping ratio of around 1.2:1 compared to theirAustralian counterparts (0.13).36,37

How does India dispose off its waste rocks? Overburden management of Indian mines is extremely poor; in most cases, thewaste is just piled up in huge heaps on unlined surface, and minemanagements do not bother themselves with measures to preventrun-off or particulate emissions. The best use for waste rock is to

82


c m y k

Metal Ore mined Percentage of ore that (million tonne) becomes waste

(excluding overburden)

Iron 25,503 60.00

Copper 11,026 99.00

Gold 7,235 99.99

Zinc 1,267 99.95

Lead 1,077 97.50

Aluminium 856 70.00

Manganese 745 70.00

Nickel 387 97.50

Tin 195 99.00

Tungsten 125 99.75

Source: G Gardner et al, 1998, ‘Mind over matter: Recasting the role of materials in our lives’, Worldwatch Paper 144, Worldwatch Institute,Washington, p 18

TABLE 3.5: Ores and wastes – the global pictureMost precious metals have a very high waste generationratio

backfill the excavated land, but this is rarely done in practice ascompanies keep opening different faces of the mine without com-pletely exhausting any one of them (see Box on page 84: Managingwastes). The result is that Indian mines are characterised by largenumbers of pits surrounded by big dumps all around. Fines fromthese dumps are carried by rainwater into nearby watercourses orlands, polluting both. During dry summers, these dumps becomea key source of air pollution for surrounding areas.

Tailings are another major problem in India. They are generatedin the form of slurry during the process of concentration, whichinvolves grinding and milling; their storage is of great concern,specifically due to the presence of heavy metals in them. Mostsmall- and medium-scale mines in India (as well as several largemines) do not have proper systems in place to handle tailings.

In more than 100 years of operation of the Kolar gold mines,the total quantity of tailings generated was about 35 MT, reportsCurrent Science. Some of the tailings were used for filling underground voids and for sand stowing. The remaining 32 MTwas stored in 15 dumps spread out along an eight-km stretch inthe mine area. These tailings have been causing considerable environmental and health hazards for the people in adjoiningareas. During dry season, the finer particles get air-borne whileduring monsoons, the rainwater carries the tailings further downon to tank beds.

According to the National Mineral Development Corporation(NMDC) Limited, about six-seven MT of kimberlite tailings havebeen collected after recovery of diamonds from the mines at Panna,Madhya Pradesh. On an average, 0.9 MT of tailings is added to thetotal accumulated volume every year, says the NMDC.

In the case of iron ore, the quantity of tailings generated frommining depends on the quality of the ore. In some areas likeKudremukh, the ore is low grade and contains only about 35-38 per cent iron; the balance 62-65 per cent becomes tailings. Infact, the mines of the Kudremukh Iron Ore Company Limited(KIOCL) have generated a substantial quantity of tailings: approx-imately 14 MT per annum. These tailings were stored in an earthen dam called the Lakya dam; in 2005, the dam held around150 MT of tailings.38

Storage of tailings not only requires a significant amount ofland, but also has the potential of causing river and air pollution.Pollution of the Sankhini river by NMDC’s Bailadilla iron oremines is now a part of the local lore, and so is the pollution of riverDamodar by the coal washeries of Jharkhand and West Bengal.Hexavalent chromium pollution of river Brahmani by the Sukindachromite mines in Orissa lays bare the truth behind ‘waste management’ in Indian mines.

Another serious concern of tailings storage is the safety ofimpoundment structures. Failure of the impoundment can have a

83


c m y k

1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06

COAL

Production 300 310 323 337 356 377 407

Overburden and other wastes 1,100 1,135 1,183 1,235 1,304 1,383 1,493

BAUXITE

Production 7.1 7.99 8.59 9.87 10.92 11.96 12.34

Overburden and other wastes 4.3 4.84 5.20 6.0 6.6 7.2 7.5

LIMESTONE

Production 129 123.6 129.3 155.74 153.39 165.75 170.38

Overburden and other wastes 135 129.4 135.3 163.0 160.5 173.5 178.3

IRON ORE

Production 75 80.7 86.2 99.1 122.8 145.9 154.4


OTHERS

Production 7.5 5.02 4.91 7.82 8.32 9.24 9.44


Total overburden and other wastes from 1,324 1,355 1,414 1,512 1,602 1,719 1,841major minerals (excluding beneficiation and processing wastes)

Sources: Estimated by the Centre for Science and Environment based on the data from anon, 2001, Overview of Mining and Mineral Industry in India, The Energyand Resources Institute (TERI), New Delhi, pp 70 and anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 8-3

TABLE 3.6: The burden of mining waste in India Coal mining alone accounts for about 80 per cent of wastes generated from mining of major minerals in India

severe impact on people living in the immediate vicinity as well asthe environment. Accidents related to failure of tailings dams – inIndia as well as abroad – are not uncommon (see Box: In a tailspin).

Handling and management of tailings becomes particularlycritical when it contains radioactive material. Uranium mining,for instance, generates large volumes of tailings wastes. Thesecontain a number of radioactive materials, which are extremelyharmful to human beings and animals. The chief among these arethorium-230, radium-226, radon-222 and pulonium-210. If left onthe surface, this radioactive sand can blow in the wind and get deposited on vegetation miles away, entering the food chain;or it can wash into lakes and rivers and contaminate them. While the hazard per gram of mill tailings is low relative to mostother radioactive wastes, the large volumes and lack of regulations for containment have resulted in widespread environmental contamination.

Unless uranium tailings are perfectly contained in some kindof storage system (yet to be devised), humans and animals whocome close to the tailings cannot help ingesting or inhaling someof this radioactive material. This can lead to long-term damages,such as illnesses like cancers and leukaemia, and diseases andmalformations in foetuses.

The ways of disposal of radioactive wastes include retentionin repositories (concentrate and retain) or release into the environ-ment (dilute and disperse). Due to delays in developing radioactivewaste disposal facilities, the waste has to be stored for increa-singly longer periods. Some countries are also consideringextended storage as an alternative to disposal.

Mining of some minerals also generates specific wastes such asmarble slurry. In marble mining, the stone is cut into slabs usingdiamond gang saws: around 15-20 per cent of each block of marbleturns into powder in this process. To prevent the saw blades from

damage due to friction between stone and blade, water is continu-ously sprinkled on them. This water mixes with the marble powder,forming slurry. Thus, nearly 20 per cent of the total weight of themarble processed results into marble slurry. Rajasthan itself gener-ates five-six MT of marble slurry from its 4,000 marble mines everyyear. The state’s marble-cutting industries dump the slurry in anynearby pit or vacant spaces near their units – although notifiedareas have been marked for dumping – leading to severe pollution.

Marble slurry creates multidimensional pollution problems.When dumped on land, it adversely affects the productivity ofland due to decreased porosity, water absorption, water percolation, etc. Slurry-dumped areas cannot support any vegetation and remain degraded. When dried, the fine particlesbecome air-borne and cause severe air pollution. Apart from occupational health problems, it also affects machinery and instruments installed in industrial areas. During rainy season, theslurry is carried away to rivers, drains, roads and water bodiesaffecting quality of water, reducing storage capacities and damaging aquatic life. Due to long-term deposition on land, thefiner particles block flow regime of aquifers, thus seriously affecting underground water availability.

● Mining and water pollutionClosely related to the concerns that mining wastes raise is theissue of water pollution through mining. Mining primarily affectswater quality in four ways: through acid mine drainage, heavymetal pollution and leaching, pollution from processing chemicalsand through erosion and siltation.

● Acid mine drainage: When large quantities of rocks containingsulphide minerals are excavated, they react with water andoxygen to create sulphuric acid. The acid leaches from the

84


c m y k

Managing wastesSome internationally accepted best practices

Overburden management● Excavation from a new pit should begin only after an existing pit

has been exhausted. This would ensure that the overburden andinterburden generated is used for backfilling the exhausted pit,instead of being dumped elsewhere.

● Till a pit is exhausted, the overburden should be properly compactedand stacked in specified locations in low-lying non-mineralisedzones within the lease area.

● The height and slope of the overburden dumps should be maintained to prevent accidents.

● The stacks should be covered with plantations and ledges shouldbe created to prevent losses.

● Topsoil should be scraped out from the dump site in advance andpreserved in low-height dumps, covered with grass and vegetationto preserve its fertility. The dumps should be such that the completed outslopes should not exceed 20 degrees from the horizontal.

● Drainage should be constructed to handle heavy rainfall.● Sedimentation tanks should be constructed to treat run-offs.

Tailings management● Tailings must be managed to optimise human safety and

environmental protection.● On-land tailings impoundment systems must be designed and

constructed by taking into account the soil characteristics,hydrology, and seismic and precipitation conditions (to accommodate surface run-on). The designs should address the structural integrity of the tailings dams or deposits even post-closure.

● On-land disposal systems should be designed to isolate acidleachate-generating material from oxidation and percolatingwater. Marine and riverine discharges are not acceptable.

● The design of the tailings management system must address post-closure issues such as the long-term geotechnical stability ofthe impoundment, the chemical stability of the tailings, long-termsurface and groundwater management, including pollution control, and restoration.

rock as long as its source rock is exposed to air and water anduntil all the sulphides are leached out – a process that can last hundreds of years. This process is called acid minedrainage (AMD). This acid is carried off the mine site by rainwater or surface drainage and deposited into nearbystreams, rivers, lakes and groundwater. When the water reaches a certain level of acidity, a naturally occurring type ofbacteria called Thiobacillus ferroxidans may kick in, acceleratingthe oxidation and acidification processes, leaching even moretrace metals.

Environmental effects of AMD include contamination ofdrinking water, disrupted growth and reproduction of aquaticplants and animals, loss of aquatic life and corrosion of miningequipment and structures. Typically, AMD has very low pH,high levels of hardness and high iron and sulphate contents.Moreover, it may also have high levels of toxic trace/heavy

metals (if these are present in the mineral) as these are solublein acidic water. According to the public health engineeringdepartment of the government of Meghalaya, AMD is the mostpersistent pollution problem in the coal mines of North EasternCoalfields in this state. The problem has also been reportedfrom the Gorbi mines of Singrauli, located in the drainage areaof the Sone and Rihand rivers. Though the mine is closed now,the problem of AMD persists in the area. AMD has also beenreported from some lead and zinc mines.

The AMD problem is compounded by the fact that it also contains toxic metals like arsenic, cadmium, chromium,copper, mercury, lead, zinc, manganese, aluminium, iron and nickel. It can be minimised by limiting the exposure ofmine rocks to water or restricting the amount of time they are in contact with water (see Box on page 86: Preventing acidmine drainage).

85


c m y k

In a tailspinTailings disasters from across the world

The Jaduguda spill, India1: On December 24, 2006, thousands of litresof radioactive wastes spilled into a creek because of a pipe burst; thepipe had carried tailings from the nuclear processing facility to the tailings dam. Consequently, a thick layer of toxic sludge on the surfaceof the creek killed scores of fish, frogs and other riparian life.The wastefrom the leak also reached a creek that feeds into the Subarnarekhariver, contaminating the water resources of the communities. Notably,this was not the first such accident. In 1986, a tailings dam had burstopen and radioactive water had flowed directly into villages. TheUranium Corporation of India Ltd, which is mining in the area, has noalarm mechanism to alert the company in such cases of disasters.Instead, it was the villagers who had arrived at the scene of the accident who informed the company of the toxic spill.

Merriespruit tailings dam failure, South Africa2: On February 22, 1994,heavy rains triggered a flowslide from a part of the Merriespruit tailingsdam – 6,00,000 cubic metre (cu m) of tailings flowed out of theimpoundment, killing 17 people and destroying scores of houses beforeeventually stopping two km away. The disaster could have been avertedif a suitable operating manual and emergency plan had existed.

Omai tailings dam failure, Guyana3: The Omai gold mine, located in thehumid tropics of Guyana, began open-pit mining in 1993. Both the mineand the tailings dam are on the banks of the Omai river. On August 19,1995, a major breach in the tailings dam led to spillage of an estimatedthree million cu m of tailing pond water (which contained high concen-trations of cyanide) into the Omai. Production was suspended at themine. The spill was contained on August 24. The Omai case demons-trated that dams that do not have adequate seepage protection around conduits or adequate filters, cannot be expected to survive for long.

Bauxite mine tailings dam failure, Brazil4: The state government ofMinas Gerais in Brazil had to shut down the Mineracao Rio Pomba

bauxite mine after the failure of a tailings dam on January 22, 2007.Heavy rains caused the dam to break, releasing two million cu m ofmud into the Muriae river. Streets and houses in the towns of Miraiand Muriae were partially buried in mud. Plants and animals in thearea also suffered serious damages. The water supply of several townswas disrupted as the mudslide affected the rivers. However, state envi-ronmental regulators said the mud did not contain any toxic wastes.

San Marcelino tailings dam spill, Philippines5: Mine wastes from twodamaged tailings dams and spillways of the Dizon Copper SilverMines Inc (DCSMI) in San Marcelino, Zambales, spilled into theMapanuepe Lake and eventually into the Santo Tomas river on August30, 2002. Investigations by the environment protection authorityrevealed that heavy rains impounded water on the Bayarong andCamalca dams and spillways, eroding these and eventually causing themine wastes to leak to the lake below. Each dam’s catchment areaspans 50 ha. About 2,000 families live near the mine site, located about30 km east of San Marcelino town. The lake and the river are the fishing grounds and irrigation sources for five Zambales towns.

Inez coal tailings dam failure, USA6: On October 11, 2000, a coal tailings dam of Martin County Coal Corporation’s preparation plant near Inez, Kentucky, failed, releasing a slurry consisting of anestimated 250 million gallon (950,000 m3) of water and 155,000 cubicyard (118,500 m3) of coal wastes into local streams. About 75 miles (120km) of rivers and streams turned an iridescent black, causing a fish killalong the Tug Fork of the Big Sandy River and some of its tributaries. Towns along the Tug were forced to turn off their drinkingwater intakes. The spill contained measurable amounts of metals,including arsenic, mercury, lead, copper and chromium, but notenough to pose health problems in treated water, according to a federal official. The full extent of the environmental damage isn’t yet known, and estimates of the clean-up costs go as high as US $60million. The investigation of the spill shows that the protective barrierbetween an underground mine and the Martin County coal-wasteimpoundment was far thinner than regulators thought.

● Heavy metal pollution: This is caused when metals such asarsenic, cobalt, copper, cadmium, lead, silver and zinc con-tained in excavated rock or exposed in an underground minecome in contact with water. These metals leach out and getcarried downstream as water washes over the rock surface.Although metals can become mobile in neutral pH conditions,leaching is particularly accelerated in low pH conditions.Talcher, in Orissa, is a case in point. Here, mine dischargesfrom the Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd (MCL) contain severalheavy metals: arsenic, cadmium, chromium, lead, zinc andcopper, all of which are carcinogenic. Sukinda’s chromitemines are notorious for their hexavalent chromium pollution.

● Pollution from processing chemicals: This kind of pollutionoccurs when chemical agents (such as cyanide or sulphuricacid used by mining companies to separate the target mineralfrom the ore) spill, leak, or leach from the mine site into near-by water bodies. These chemicals can be highly toxic tohumans and animals. Cyanide contamination is an example.Most of the world’s large gold mining corporations usecyanide as the extraction reagent for gold. The Omai goldmine in Guyana, a project of the Canadian mining corporationCambior, is one of the largest open-pit mines in the world. Itstailings dam failed in 1995, releasing some three billion cubicmetre of cyanide-laden tailings into the Omai river, a tributaryof Guyana’s largest river, the Essequibo. Following the spill,the president of Guyana declared all 51 km of river drainagefrom the mine to the Atlantic Ocean, home to 23,000 people, anofficial ‘environmental disaster zone’. Initial governmentreports estimated the cyanide concentration in the Omai to be28 parts per million, which is 140 times the level that theUSEPA considers lethal.39

86


c m y k

Preventing acid mine drainageAcid main drainage or AMD is a major impact of coal mining

Waterways should be diverted from open pits, waste rock piles andtailings impoundments to prevent contact and acid production. Thiscan be done through use of impermeable caps and liners.

There are two basic options for preventing drainage of acidic materials in the long term – dry covers and wet covers. Covers can bedefined as natural or artificial medium (such as high density plastics)under which potentially acid-producing wastes are stored. If the coverprevents the entrance of either oxygen or water, acid will not beproduced.

Soil (dry) covers are usually made of clay or oxide wastes that areimpermeable to prevent oxygen access to the wastes. Wet covers (sub-aqueous disposal) that are emerging as one of the best technolo-gies to prevent acid rock drainage, involve the submersion of tailingsor other waste under water within an impoundment. Considering thehigh rainfall in tropical areas, this technique is more attractive thandry covers.

Certain naturally occurring bacteria are also known to catalyse or

increase the rate of acid production. One short-term solution, as wellas a partial AMD mitigation technique, is the use of bactericides toinhibit the bacteria. This practice is not a long-term solution, but hasthe potential to be a supplement to a more comprehensive AMD prevention programme.

In addition to taking precautions during operation, it is importantto rehabilitate the exhausted mine in such a manner that no acidicdrainage is formed. Besides, monitoring programmes should be imple-mented. Where feasible and using models of potential groundwaterflows and groundwater chemistry, an open-pit may be flooded toreduce the presence of oxygen and, therefore, prevent the formation ofacidic drainage from the pit walls.

For underground mining operations, holes should be sealed andtunnels should be lined properly to reduce or eliminate water infiltra-tion. Adits (horizontal tunnels) should be plugged with concrete slabsthat allow the underground tunnels to flood with entering ground-water, reducing the flow of oxygen and the potential for acid produc-tion. Waste piles or pools should be capped with clay or plastic covers,and soil and vegetation should be applied to all disturbed surfaces,including waste piles and tailings.

The colour of poison: acid mine drainage pollutes water sources withtoxic and heavy metals

ww

w.b

ette

rmin

es.o

rg/p

hoto

s.cf

m

87


c m y k

In 1992, leaks from the Summitville mine in southernColorado led to cyanide pollution killing all forms of life in a17-mile stretch of the Alamosa river. The state filed a suit overclean-up in 1999, which is expected to cost at least US $170million. Part of the settlement is to be used for restoration of the Alamosa river system. Robert M Friedland, whose company was blamed for the cyanide pollution, agreed to payUS $27.75 million to settle the state lawsuit.40

Fred Pearce, writing in The New Scientist (‘Tails of woe’,November 11, 2000), reported that in the coastal waters ofMarinduque island in the Philippines, the Marcopper copper mine pumped 200 MT of toxic waste rock over a periodof 16 years, carpeting 80 sq km of seabed, suffocating coral reefs,and poisoning reef fish. Children have tested dangerously highfor lead and cyanide in the island’s fishing communities.

In India, other than in Kolar, gold mining has not hap-pened on a large scale. But this situation can change very soon,as a number of global mining companies have started toprospect for gold in various parts of the country. Gold mininghas a very poor environmental track record and India willhave to set up stringent regulatory mechanisms to keep theindustry in check.

● Erosion and sedimentation: Mineral development disturbssoil and rock in the course of constructing and maintainingroads, opening pits, and waste impoundments. In the absenceof adequate prevention and control strategies, erosion of theexposed earth may carry substantial amounts of sedimentsand silt into streams, rivers and lakes. Excessive sediments canclog riverbeds and smother watershed vegetation, wildlifehabitat and aquatic organisms. Silt blankets at a stream’s bot-tom can cut off the food supply of fish, while floating solids onthe surface can adversely affect replenishment of dissolvedoxygen. Organic wastes, under the influence of bacterialaction, deplete dissolved oxygen by consuming it in biochem-ical oxidation reactions. This oxygen depletion is the mostimportant single aspect of pollution in natural streams.Replenishment of dissolved oxygen occurs naturally by re-aeration of the stream through its surface and by the photo-synthetic reactions of green aquatic plants. Re-aeration, how-ever, is retarded by oil films on the surface or by floating solidsthat decrease the amount of surface available for light penetra-tion into the water, thus retarding photosynthesis. An impor-tant case illustrative of this problem is that of the river Bhadrain Kudremukh (Karnataka). The impending disappearance ofthe Kushawati river in Goa is the most current example of howmining can destroy a river due to sedimentation.

Water use and contamination by a mine does not end with itsclosure. If overburden dumps and tailings are not contained prop-erly, then they become a major source of water pollution. Waterstored in the mine pits continues to affect the groundwater tablebecause of losses through evaporation. A 2006 study conducted byP L Younger for the Adelaide-based Australian Institute of Miningand Technology found that a mine in a humid subtropical area of

South America spread over 106 ha, had a water footprint whichexceeded the land by a factor of 27. Although the water footprintshould have declined by a factor of 10 immediately after closure,sustained evaporation from pit lakes and tailings dams meant thatthe final post-closure water footprint remained at 25 per cent ofthat encountered during the peak of mining.

Mining also impacts groundwater: a range of groundwaterpollution problems can be traced to mining activities. The natureof the pollution depends on the materials being excavated andextracted. Both surface and underground mines usually extendbelow the water table and often, dewatering is required to allowmining to proceed. The water pumped either directly from themine or from specially constructed boreholes can be highly mineralised: its usual characteristics would include low pH(down to pH 3) and high levels of iron, aluminium and sulphate.Disposal of this mine drainage effluent into surface water orgroundwater sources can impact water quality. Pollution ofgroundwater can also result from the leaching of mine tailingsand from settling ponds and can, therefore, be associated withboth present and past mining activity.

● What mining does to our air and climateMine areas often have a monochromatic appearance. Coal miningareas are black, bauxite and iron ore-rich regions are red whilelimestone provides a chalky white hue. The reason: dust emissions from mines, waste dumps and mineral transportation.

Fugitive dusts are generated from almost every mining operation: drilling, blasting, hauling, loading and unloading,transporting, crushing and other mineral beneficiation processes.Waste dumps and tailings too are major sources of fugitive dust.The intensity of dust generation is governed by factors such aslocation and wind speed at the site, hardness of the rock, miningtechnology, mode of transportation, level of mechanisation andthe steps taken by the mines to prevent dust emissions. Mining byblasting, for example, has much higher dust potential comparedto technologies like surface miners. Similarly, the dust potential ofconveyor transportation is lower than that of transportation bydumpers. Open-cast mines have much higher dust generationpotential than underground mines – on the other hand, underground coal mines produce methane emissions, which contribute to global warming.

Mechanisation has enabled miners to extract large quantitiesof minerals and therefore, mechanised mines generally have largewaste dumps, which become a major source of fugitive dust. Takethe case of an iron ore mine with a daily excavation capacity of3,000 tonne (or around one MT per annum), and generating anequal amount of waste. Assuming that 0.01 per cent of the wasteescapes into the atmosphere as fugitive dust (which is a grossunderestimation), the mine would release 100 tonne per annum ofdust into the surrounding environment. Naturally, all the majormining areas of India are also air pollution hotspots.

Korba, Bhilai, Satna and Dhanbad have been declared criticalby the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) with respect toannual average concentrations of both respirable suspended particulate matter (RSPM) and suspended particulate matter

(SPM).41 The Angul-Talcher coalfields in Orissa are critically air-polluted areas. The iron and manganese mines of Keonjharand Sundergarh are not only generating emissions from themines, but the transportation of minerals on the dilapidated roadshave become a major source of air pollution in the region. Dust,due to transportation of iron ore, is a problem in Bellary-Hospetin Karnataka and in Goa as well. During summers, the air isalmost unbreathable at some of these places. Air pollution in theold coal mining complexes of Jharia, Raniganj and Bokaro hasreached such levels that the CPCB had to set 40 per cent higherambient air quality standards for these mines compared to stan-dards applicable to new coal mines.

Mining-induced dust is known to cause diseases such aspneumoconiosis, silicosis, asbestosis, cataract, corneal ulcers,glaucoma and squint trachoma. In fact, the impact is pronouncedwhen the dust contains particles less than 10 microns in size, smallenough to be deposited in lungs. Affected populations includemine workers, people living in the vicinity and people alreadysuffering from one or more ailments. Before the Supreme Courtbanned stone quarrying on the Delhi-Haryana border, a thicklayer of silica dust used to coat the entire stretch of land betweenFaridabad and Badarpur. Twenty thousand workers and theirfamilies were affected; a survey by the University College of

Medical Sciences, New Delhi, had shown that 17 per cent of thelabourers at the Badarpur crushers were incurably diseased.42

Silicosis threatened the workers of Bhatti mines, barely 35 kmfrom Delhi, while tuberculosis, blood dysentery and seasonalfevers were quite common. The same fate awaits workers andpeople in areas like Chandikhol in Orissa and Makrana inRajasthan where stone quarrying is a cottage industry.

Another example is that of the Roro asbestos mines atChaibasa in Singhbhum district, Jharkhand. Hyderabad AsbestosCement Products Limited (now known as Hyderabad IndustriesLimited), a Birla Group company, used to mine asbestos here, tomanufacture asbestos cement products. Abandoned some timeback, these mines have left behind open waste dumps of asbestos,which are endangering the lives of the people living in the surrounding areas.

Dust generated by mining also reduces agricultural productiv-ity. A 2005 study titled Impact of Mining on Agricultural Productivityby Prajna Paramita Mishra of the Hyderabad-based Centre forEconomic and Social Studies (CESS) and Ayan Kumar Pujari ofNew Delhi’s Integrated Research and Action for Development,found that in the Ib valley coalfields of Orissa, agricultural produc-tivity has suffered in the cropfields which are closer to the mines.A rapid environmental impact assessment of iron ore mining in the

88


c m y k

Mining miasma: the air hangs heavy with fugitive dust at every mining site, as at this iron ore mine in Keonjhar, Orissa

AG

NIM

IRH

BA

SU /

CSE

Bellary-Hospet region by the National EnvironmentalEngineering Research Institute, Nagpur, revealed that dust gener-ated due to mining is impacting the agricultural productivity inthe area. Lead and zinc smelters, limestone quarries and cementfactories have reduced land productivity in areas like Udai Sagar,Khamli and Chittor in Rajasthan. One of the most persistent com-plaints that one hears from farmers living near limestone miningareas of the country is loss in agricultural productivity.

While there are no technical quick-fixes to solve dust emis-sions from mines, solutions do exist; but Indian mining compa-nies are usually found wanting as far as implementation is con-cerned. Water sprays and plantations are large-scale feasible solu-tions to control dust. But in semi-arid and arid areas, where wateris scarce, the effectiveness of these two solutions takes a nosedive.Moreover, not many mining companies in India make efforts todevelop full-fledged plantations across the mine perimeter andaround the mine pit head. One of the most effective ways toreduce emissions is to open mining areas in sequence and restrictexposed surfaces to a minimum. But miners like to open as big anarea as possible so that they can pick and choose best quality min-erals; they argue that economics demands this kind of an opera-tion. Provision for dust suction devices at crushing, loading andunloading points can also reduce dust generation, but most min-ing companies choose not to invest in these equipment.

The methane problemA large proportion of the world’s energy requirement is met fromcoal: 36 per cent of global electricity is generated from coal, and 70per cent of the world’s steel is produced using coal and coke.43

This dependence on coal is expected to continue, especially indeveloping countries – coal mining, therefore, will also increase.Burning of coal and other fossil fuels for power generation is oneof the major contributors to greenhouse gas (GHG) generation.

The direct impact of mining on climate change, however, is in the form of release of methane (CH4), a GHG: coal miningaccounts for 10 per cent of all human-related methane emissions.44 Climate change today is becoming a grave problemand mines are under pressure to stop methane formation andemissions (see Box: Say no to coal mining).

Coal seams contain pockets of methane. Methane moleculesalso become attached to the microscopic internal surfaces of coalitself. When miners break open the pockets in coal and coal-bear-ing rocks, methane is released. Underground coal mining releasesmore methane than surface or open-pit mining because of thehigher gas content of deeper seams. In general, lower quality coalssuch as ‘brown’ coal or lignite, have lower methane content.

On an average, the total methane emissions globally from coalmining ranged around 25-40 MT in 1990. China, the former SovietUnion and the US together accounted for two-thirds of theworld’s methane emissions from coal in the 1990s. In the case ofIndian coal mines, specific methane emissions were relatively lowand stood at 0.4 MT.45

Capping methane is important: methane’s contribution toglobal warming is second (18 per cent) only to that of carbon diox-ide (66 per cent). According to J K Pandey of the Dhanbad-based

89


c m y k

Say no to coal miningAustralian coal mine blocked over climate impact

An Australian environmental court has ruled against the country'slargest independent coal producer, saying that its assessment of theimpacts of a new mine should have included an assessment of itsimpact on climate change.The campaign group Greenpeace has calledthe ruling "historic". Greenpeace has been demonstrating against theproposal of the Centennial Coal Company to build a new mine in New South Wales. It is believed that the environmental assessment,previously approved by the government, was void; and that there is “asufficiently proximate link”between coal mining and GHG emissionsfor the latter to be considered in the mine's assessment.

Coal mine workers face the brunt of methane emissions

THE

HIN

DU

Central Mining Research Institute, methane has a global warmingpotential of 21 over a 100-year period, which means that on a kilo-gram-for-kilogram basis, methane is 21 times more potent thancarbon dioxide during the same time period.

Explosions due to methane gas continue to be one of the majorcauses of fatalities in India’s underground coalmines. Accordingto the DGMS, between 1901 and 2005, 57 per cent of the total fatal-ities in Indian coalmines were due to a combination of fire andexplosions. To ensure safety, the concentration of methane gas isconstantly monitored at workplaces and maintained below 1.25per cent by increasing fresh air ventilation. There is, however,another side to methane: it is a potential source of clean energy.One kg of methane produces 55,685 kiloJoule (kJ) of heat.46

Pre-mining degasification as a technology to neutralise thenegative impact of methane has attracted worldwide attention.The technology aims at producing coal-bed gas by drilling surfaceboreholes in virgin coal-bearing blocks and using the recoveredmethane as a fuel resource. The US coal industry has made substantial progress in recovering methane through drainage systems. Out of 142 billion cubic feet (Bcf) of coal mine methaneliberated from underground mines in 2000, about 42 Bcf was emitted through drainage systems – and about 86 per cent of thiswas successfully recovered.47

Ventilation air contains methane and till recently, it was notpossible to combust it as methane concentrations were not highenough. However, technologies now exist to oxidise and utilisethis methane. Reactors can combust the ventilation air at veryhigh temperatures to produce thermal energy. In fact, a successfulpilot project has already been conducted in Australia.48

In India too, there is a growing interest in recovering methanefrom coal-beds. Several explorations are being conducted byresearch organisations and companies aiming to identify potentialmethane resources in coal-beds. United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP) has given a grant of US $19.226 million to theUnion ministry of coal to promote coal-bed methane (CBM) in theWest Bengal-Bihar coalfields.49 The Union ministry of petroleumand natural gas (MoPNG) has awarded 16 CBM blocks to variouscompanies since 2001.50

● Abandoned: the problem of mine closureFinally, the Achilles’ heel of the mining industry: mine closure.

“The environmental and social costs of closing and rehabilitat-ing old and abandoned mines around the world are likely to be intrillions of dollars, and far beyond the capability of mining compa-nies alone to deal with:” this was what Robert Wilson, chairpersonof the London-based metals giant Rio Tinto Plc had said in 2002.51

A recent estimate puts rehabilitation costs just in the US,where regulation is stricter than in many other countries, at US$50-60 billion.52 The problem is much bigger in countries andregions like Russia, eastern Europe, South Africa, China and Indiawhere legislations are not comprehensive and implementation isweak. There are no estimates on how much it will cost to under-take proper mine closure for abandoned mines in India. But thecosts are likely to be very high, especially for rehabilitating themega coal mine complexes.

An abandoned open-cast mine leads to considerable pollution,is a threat to life and property, and an eyesore. In the case of anunderground mine, there remains the danger of subsidence.Often, companies abandon the mines once they have extracted allthe minerals. James Kuipers of the US-based Center for Science inPublic Participation estimates that 95 per cent of operating minesin the US have only vague plans for dealing with the environmen-tal consequences of shutting down, such as the pollution of localwater courses.53 There are several cases where the governmenthas had to use taxpayers’ money to pay for the mine closurebecause the companies declared themselves bankrupt. Since 1980,the US has had a ‘Superfund’ programme administered by theUSEPA to clean up the worst and most hazardous waste sites, anumber of which are the result of mining. In the Clark’s ForkRiver region of Montana, for example, where gold and silver min-ing started in the late 19th century and continued until the early1950s, rehabilitation costs have been roughly estimated at US $1billion. The Summitville mine in Colorado is likely to cost someUS $225 million to clean up, and the Yerington copper mine inNevada, around US $200 million. These are just the environmen-tal costs of abandoned mines. Mining in the US is also infamousfor ‘ghost towns’ left behind by the mining companies withoutany social or economic rehabilitation.

No systematic world-wide inventory of abandoned minesexists, but their numbers may run into millions if every shaft andalluvial working is considered.54 Some countries like Canada, theUS, Australia and the UK have attempted to produce abandonedmine inventories. For example, in Australia, the New South WalesDepartment of Mineral Resources has a database of about 500abandoned mines, but it is not a comprehensive list. In the state ofVictoria, there are records of around 2,000 old and historic mines.Canada has more than 10,139 abandoned mines in its files, butonly about 60 per cent have been physically assessed.55

There are a large number of abandoned mine sites all over theUS. According to the survey conducted by the US Bureau of LandManagement, there are about 9,200 abandoned mines on the 264 million acre of land that they manage. It is estimated that 25 per cent of these pose physical safety hazards and approxi-mately five per cent may be causing significant environmentaldamage, primarily in the form of water pollution. Due to a longhistory of mining, South Africa has many abandoned mines.These include 134 abandoned asbestos mines and 400 asbestosdumps that are still contributing to the constant flow of asbestos.56

India does not have a detailed inventory of its abandonedmines. According to the website of the IBM, there are 296 aban-doned mines (also called ‘orphaned’ mines) of major minerals inthe country.57 Most researchers and environmentalists believe thisto be a gross underestimation. This figure does not include thelarge number of abandoned coal mines in the country. In 2004, thethen minister of coal and mines had reported to the parliamentthat there were 214 abandoned coal mines of Coal India Limitedand Singareni Collieries Company Limited alone.58 Of these, amajority had exhausted their reserves and the rest were closeddue to techno-economic and safety reasons. If we add up theabandoned coal mines and major mineral mines, then the number

90


m k

91


Regulations on mine closure are too late, too little; most mine closure plans exist only on paper

MO

NA

LI Z

EYA

HA

ZRA

/ C

SE

m k

of officially recognised abandoned mines in the country reaches aminimum of 510.

The problem with the above data is that it does not accountfor hundreds of mines being closed every year. In three years,between 2002-03 to 2004-05, the total number of mines of majorminerals closed in the country was 1,227 (see Table 3.7: State-wisemine closure: 2002-2004). There are no consolidated data forclosed/abandoned mines of minor minerals. The number is likelyto be very high: in 2003-04 alone, 20,996 mining leases/quarrylicences were closed/cancelled in Rajasthan due to a SupremeCourt order. Out of these, only 15,047 have been reopened.59

According to the official statistics maintained by the IBM onabandoned mines (other than fuel and minor minerals), a majority of these are in the states of Madhya Pradesh andAndhra Pradesh (see Graph 3.1: State-wise distribution of aban-doned mines). The abandoned mines are of a varied range of minerals such as asbestos, bauxite, sand, feldspar, iron ore, etc.However, the largest number of abandoned mines is of limestone, followed by ochre (see Graph 3.2: Mineral-wise distribution of abandoned mines and Box on page 94: Closure chaos:the case of limestone). The reasons for abandonment of mines vary

too; the most common are of lease expiry (36 per cent) followedby exhaustion of minerals (12 per cent).

The information on mine rehabilitation in India is as sketchyas that on abandoned mines. According to the 2004 annual reportof the Union ministry of mines, five abandoned mines covering anarea of about six ha was reclaimed/rehabilitated in that year. Thistook the total number of mine leases so far reclaimed to 45 cover-ing an area of 645 ha. The ministry’s 2005 annual report says:“During the year (till September 2005), no abandoned mine hasbeen reclaimed/rehabilitated and the cumulative figure remains53 mines covering an area of 660 ha.” No information about thekind of reclamation/rehabilitation undertaken has been providedin these reports; nor is there any information on the whereaboutsof these ‘rehabilitated mines’.

The truth is that mine rehabilitation is a completely ignored areain India. It was only in 2003 that a mine closure plan was mademandatory for obtaining a mine lease – that too, only for major min-erals. Coal mines are still not required to have a mine closure plan.It is, therefore, not surprising to see the annual reports of the min-istry referring to mine rehabilitation only from 2004 onwards. Buteven the new regulation is turning out to be a mere formality. The

92


c m y k

Open secret: closure plans don’t usually go beyond huge pits partially filled with water

P M

AD

HA

VAN

mine closure plans that are being cleared today are nothing buthuge pits disguised as water bodies/water harvesting structuresand massive overburden dumps disguised as plantations (see Boxon page 95: International best practices for land reclamation).

The Green Rating Project of the Centre for Science andEnvironment (CSE), during an environmental rating of the large-scale cement industry, had found that nearly all the big companies (which had captive limestone mines) in the countrywere not following a proper programme on mine closure. They

did have mine closure plans, but more as a formality to meet regulatory requirements.

But mine closure is not only about physical and environmentalrehabilitation of the mining areas – it also about the socio-economic stability of the communities dependent on the mine.Social impacts of mine closure, although often neglected, are oftenas adverse as the environmental effects. Closure of a big mine represents a significant social and cultural upheaval in the commu-nities dependent on it. When a new mine is opened, traditional

93


State Number of mines closed in the year

2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005

Andhra Pradesh 39 5 1

Assam 0 0 0

Bihar 2 2 61

Chhattisgarh 1 1 62

Goa 1 9 198

Gujarat 27 48 6

Haryana 103 0 0

Himachal Pradesh 0 0 0

Jammu & Kashmir 0 0 0

Jharkhand 1 12 175

Karnataka 1 0 7

Kerala 0 0 2

Maharashtra 0 0 73

Manipur 0 0 0

Meghalaya 0 0 0

Madhya Pradesh 2 0 93

Orissa 0 0 0

Rajasthan 144 21 127

Tamil Nadu 0 0 1

Uttar Pradesh 0 0 0

Uttarakhand 2 0 0

West Bengal 0 0 0

India 323 98 806

Source: ‘State-wise number of mines closed in India (2002-03 to 2004-05)’,Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 579, November 25, 2005, http://www.indi-astat.com/india/ShowDataSec.asp?secid=397408&ptid=63, as viewed onFebruary 5, 2007

TABLE 3.7: State-wise mine closure: 2002-2004 In 2004-2005, officially, more than 800 mines were closed

AndhraPradesh 21%

Madhya Pradesh 48%

Tamil Nadu 8%

Jharkhand 8%

Others 15%

Source: Analysis based on data provided in website of Indian Bureau of Mines,http://ibm.nic.in/frames.html, as viewed on December 14, 2006

GRAPH 3.1: State-wise distribution of abandoned minesMadhya Pradesh accounts for almost half of the abandonedmines in the country

Limestone22%

Fire clay5%

Quartzite andfeldspar

11%

Ochre20%

Others42%

Source: Analysis based on data provided in website of Indian Bureau of Mines,http://ibm.nic.in/frames.html, as viewed on December 14, 2006

GRAPH 3.2: Mineral-wise distribution of abandonedminesLimestone has the largest number of ‘officially’ abandonedmines

m k

socio-economic systems and cultural values are greatly disturbed.Migration of skilled workforce, infusion of cash income and modern amenities change the existing social hierarchies, customsand values. A completely new way of life emerges in which traditional skills are lost and new skills are learnt. The local economy, which would have depended on traditional and dispersed livelihood opportunities, becomes totally dependent ona single economic mammoth.

When the mine closes, all the economic opportunities shutdown with it. Workers lose their jobs and most of the ancillaryeconomic activities dependent on the mine close down, demolishing the economic base of the communities. Across theworld, the economics of mining areas have been characterised bya sudden expansion, followed by a severe recession once the oreis depleted.

All this has prompted policymakers to rethink mine closure inan integrated socio-economic-environmental paradigm, ratherthan just landscaping and pollution containment. A notificationissued by the IBM on mine closure states that the mine closureplan should address “social issues, mainly related to employeeslaid off and socio-economic repercussions”. It, however, is silent

about the need to plan for the wider socio-economic ramificationson the community dependent on mines.

An integral part of mine closure processes, which is completelymissing in India, relates to public participation in designingappropriate mine closure plans. Today, it is widely recognisedacross the world that mine closure plans must have the approvalof local communities. In Papua New Guinea, for instance, publicconsultation has become a key element of the closure process.Mine closure committees with membership from all stakeholdersare set up with the primary task of developing and implementinga mine closure plan. The plan addresses both bio-physical andsocio-economic issues. Once all the stakeholders agree to it, theplan is sent to the government for approval.

In India, on the contrary, mine closure plans are the soleresponsibility of the IBM and the mining companies. Surprisingly,the issue is addressed only perfunctorily even by the environmentalimpact assessment process. While giving an environmental clearance to a mining project, the Union ministry of environmentand forests only requires a formal letter of approval of the mineclosure plan from IBM. The entire process of developing andapproving mine closure plans is completely non-transparent.

94


Closure chaos: the case of limestoneCement industry has largely chosen to ignore systematicmine closure

India is the second largest producer of cement in the world. Mostcement plants in the country have captive mines to meet their lime-stone needs. Limestone is extracted from big open-cast mines. About0.15 million ha of land has been leased out for extracting limestone.1

Most of this land lies in some of the poorest districts of MadhyaPradesh, Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh.

There are, broadly, two approaches to reclamation of an excavatedarea. One is to begin the reclamation programme after the entiredeposit is mined – essentially, a ‘repair work’. The obvious drawback ofthis is that at the end of the excavation, the company is faced with thedaunting task of reclaiming a vast area consisting of deep quarries created as a result of years of mining. The simplest option is to leavethe pits as they are, in the hope that they will serve as water reservoirs.

The second approach is to carry on the reclamation programmesimultaneously with the mining activity. This ensures that the majorportion of the reclamation is completed before the entire deposit isexhausted. It leaves a company with the flexibility to mould and shapethe lease area into useful sites. It, however, calls for careful planning.

Unfortunately, the Indian cement industry is mired in the ‘repairand forget’mindset. Around 60 per cent of the big cement plants ratedby CSE’s Green Rating Project had not even started reclamation,though most had exhausted some portion of their mines.

The companies rated by GRP had officially exhausted 1,100 ha ofland, of which they had reclaimed only 535 ha – a bare 48.5 per cent.Of this, 64 per cent had been reclaimed as so-called water reservoirs,while plantations had been done on 35 per cent (see Graph: Actualreclamation of exhausted pits). As per the future plans of these plants,

77 per cent of the exhausted land is to be reclaimed as water reservoirs. Plantations will be done on 22.6 per cent.2 Only one plantplans to reclaim land for agriculture or grazing.

While most units planned to reclaim land as reservoirs, they hadnot taken sufficient steps to ensure proper reclamation. In otherwords, what was being planned for was just deep pits filled with water – and not water reservoirs. Neither did the units have a community-based vision of how the water in the reservoirs was to beultimately used.

Water storage64.0%

Agriculture 0.5%

Plantations/forests 34.9%

Construction 0.7%

Source: Chandra Bhushan et al, Concrete Facts , The life cycle of the Indiancement industry, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, pp 38

GRAPH: Actual reclamation of exhausted pits Most pits are being used for storing water – an easyoption

m k

95


International best practices: land reclamationOpening mines with closure in mind is the mantra

Mine site reclamation, also called rehabilitation, refers to restorationof mined land to its pre-mining conditions, or alteration to make itavailable for another productive use. The objectives of mine reclamation are to prevent water contamination and sedimentation,restore the ecosystem, and improve the aesthetics of the landscape.Although it is not possible to fully restore the diversity level whichexisted before mining (such as in the case of a forest), the ultimategoal of reclamation should be to make the landscape as close as possible, physically and biologically, to its earlier state. The otheroption is to convert the land into a productive landuse like agriculture.A proper mine closure can only be achieved when it is detailed outeven before the mine has started operating. Therefore, opening with closure in mind is the key for a successful mine closure.Following measures are internationally adopted for reclamation:

Handling topsoil and biomassThe topsoil is the most valuable resource for re-vegetation after mining,as it contains the majority of the seeds, roots and microorganisms.Simultaneous replanting (which begins during mining operations) is very important because if topsoil is stockpiled for a long period oftime, its quality deteriorates. If topsoil is not available or is no longersuitable for re-vegetation (for example, if it contains weeds orpathogens which could kill plants), then subsoil, overburden or waste rock could be used.

Removal of biomass (vegetation) from the mine site affects the rateof rehabilitation of the site. A fully functional ecosystem cannot bedeveloped until the total pool of nutrients (nitrogen, phosphorus,potassium) and carbon in the system has reached the pre-mine levels.Therefore, the pre-mine biomass should be saved and used for thecontinuous rehabilitation of areas even during mining operation.These small pockets of forest can form centres of colonisation, as theyare a source of bacteria, fungi, seeds and plants and can promote thegeneration of the natural ecosystem.

Measures to reduce erosionThe main environmental concern while rehabilitating land is soil movement due to erosion or landslides, a problem especially pertinent to areas with high rainfall. Therefore, an adequate vegetationcover is necessary to control erosion. However, re-vegetation takestime, and during that process landforms are susceptible to wind and water erosion. In between the time of reshaping the land andplanting vegetation, wind erosion can be controlled by covering the soil with protective mulch for maintaining moisture in the soil,or erecting wind breaks to protect the landform from exposure to high winds.

Erosion is also a concern for waste piles that have not yet been re-vegetated with topsoil or native species. For examples, water erosioncontrols include the use of catchment areas that collect extra water, andthe slowing of water flow over the pile. Water flow over the soil surfacecan be slowed by encouraging the infiltration of water into the soil,

which can be accomplished by ripping the soil along the contour. It canalso be covered with mulch to reduce the impact of raindrops.

Re-vegetationThe selection of species for re-vegetation generally depends on future land use, soil conditions and climate of the area. As the objective of reclamation is to restore the native vegetation, in mostcases, the species to be planted are pre-determined. However, oneneeds to take into account the changes mining operations may bringabout in the soil and ensure that native species would thrive even ifthis were the case.

In restoring forest ecosystems, the goal is to develop an ecosystem that will move through the stages of succession and facilitate the accumulation of biomass. The diversity of plants andtheir physical requirements in a mature system are such that colonising plants should be used to condition the soil and provide amore appropriate habitat for the later stage plants. Colonisers can beidentified during the operation of the mine and then used in the initial rehabilitation of the land.

The timing of seeding is important for successful re-vegetation.Usually, seeding should take place immediately before rains begin orearly on in the rainy season. In tropical areas, seeding should take placeduring the wet season. Fertiliser is commonly used to speed up natu-ral processes by increasing species number, plant cover and density, and growth rates. Companies should be careful when usingfertilisers, however, to avoid the destruction of seedlings and thegrowth of unwanted vegetation.

Maintenance and success criteriaInvasion by animals, weeds and human activities can thwart rehabili-tation efforts. Maintenance of the reclaimed area is necessary to predict and address these problems. It is especially important to monitor the area for several years as it may take time for the system tobecome self-sustaining. Companies should be prepared to reworkareas that are not developing adequately.

Success criteria for performance should be defined and agreed onby consulting with all relevant parties. Components of such criteriainclude physical criteria such as stability, resistance to erosion, and re-establishment of drainage; biological criteria including species diver-sity, canopy cover, seed production, and weed control; water qualitystandards for drainage water; public safety; productivity of food crops;and the development of a sustainable forest management programme.

MonitoringMonitoring should be done from the start of an exploration programme to the construction and operation of the mine, and continue for years after closure and reclamation. Monitoring encom-passes a variety of long-term objectives to determine whether theenvironmental performance of the company is satisfactory.

Developing a monitoring programme involves setting goals andobjectives, identifying the standards to be followed, physically monitoring the processes during and after the mining operations,and internally and externally assessing the company ’s performance.

m k

■ HOW SAFE IS MINING?

In an interview to The Economist in 1983, the chief safety engineerof a South African mining corporation had pompously declared:“Production is more important than safety.”60 Such statements areunimaginable today. Growing awareness, public pressure andstringent standards have helped improve health and safety conditions in mining operations in most countries. Between 1994and 2004, the average annual death rate in South African mines fell from 0.79 per 1,000 workers to 0.61 per 1,000.61 In India,the average death rate in coal mines has dropped from 0.94 per 1,000 employees in 1901-10 to 0.25 in 2001-05; for non-coal mines, the number of deaths went down by 0.76 per 1,000employees to 0.35.62

Despite this, mining remains an unsafe occupation. Statisticsreveal that mine accidents claim over 15,000 lives every yearworldwide.63 According to the International Labour Organization(ILO), deaths within the mining sector as a whole account for fiveper cent of all worker deaths on the job, even though the sectoremploys less than one per cent of all workers worldwide.64 Theseare only the reported deaths; a substantial number of miningdeaths goes unrecorded. The data on injuries is even less reliable,

but it is likely that thousands of serious injuries are sustainedevery year. In 1996, South Africa’s minister for mineral and energy affairs estimated that in his country, each tonne of goldmined cost one life and 12 serious injuries.65

Most mining accidents occur due to fire, blasting, drilling,flooding, cave-in and land subsidence. Explosions and fires inunderground mines are especially risky as ventilation streams inthe mines can carry smoke and toxic combustion productsthroughout the mine, making escape through miles of confinedpassageways difficult. A fire in an underground coal mine is espe-cially hazardous due to the unlimited fuel supply and the pres-ence of flammable methane gas. Methane is non-toxic but it can beasphyxiating in high concentrations as it displaces the availableoxygen. In underground mines, most explosives-related fatalitiesare caused due to miners being too close to the site of a blast, fol-lowed by explosive fumes poisoning, misfires, and prematureblasts. Another cause is carbon monoxide (CO) poisoning. CO is atoxic gas that is produced from incomplete combustion or explo-sion of substances containing carbon. Large quantities of CO aregenerated during mine fires or explosions. The gas blocks the ability of the haemoglobin in the blood to carry oxygen from thelungs to muscles and other tissues in the body.

96


Bodies of mine accident victims being retrieved from a Dhanbad mine. Accidents in underground coal mines are common; Jharkhand accountsfor the most accidents due to coal mining

REU

TERS

m k

In India, mine safety, in terms of reported accidents, fatalitiesand injuries, has improved (see Table 3.8: Accidents, injuries and fatalities in Indian mines). The number of reported deaths inmine accidents has gone down from 293 in 1995 to 137 in 2005,while the number of reported accidents (both fatal and serious) has dipped from 1,228 in 1995 to 929 in 2005. During the same period, the number of injuries has gone down from 1,092 to 839.

Indian coal mines have always been more prone to accidentsthan mines in the non-coal sectors. In 2005, coal mines accountedfor 87 per cent of the accidents, 69 per cent of the deaths and 90 percent of the injuries of the total incidents in the Indian miningindustry. However, the numbers – in coal as well as non-coal mines– show a declining trend (see Box on page 98: Of coal and death).

The state-wise distribution of fatalities in the mining sector in2001 pointed towards Jharkhand as the leader, accounting for 26per cent (see Graph 3.3: State-wise distribution of fatalities). Thefatalities can largely be attributed to the state’s coal mines as wellas to the rampant illegal mining. West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh,Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh are the other states prone to mining accidents.

Among non-coal mines, gold mines have the highest rate offatal and serious accidents. The main reasons behind the fatalitiesin the non-coal sectors are transportation-related accidents, followed by falling roofs or walls. Casualties due to gas and firehave been minimal.

97


Year Coal Non-coal

Fatal accidents Serious accidents Fatal accidents Serious accidents

Accidents Killed Injured Accidents Injured Accidents Killed Injured Accidents Injured

1995 137 219 23 757 790 66 74 5 268 274

1996 131 146 20 677 703 72 83 14 263 269

1997 143 165 22 677 703 70 77 13 265 272

1998 128 146 18 523 542 56 65 15 254 258

1999 127 138 21 595 629 61 72 13 230 238

2000 117 144 28 661 679 51 55 2 187 192

2001 105 141 14 667 706 71 81 8 199 200

2002 81 97 15 629 650 52 64 3 205 206

2003 83 113 12 563 578 52 62 16 168 169

2004 88 97 14 958 972 59 66 10 187 193

2005 80 95 13 730 742 39 42 3 80 81

Source: Anon, 2006, ‘Occupational Safety and Health’, Annual Report 2005-06, Union ministry of labour and employment, Government of India, New Delhi

TABLE 3.8: Accidents, injuries and fatalities in Indian minesCoal mines have traditionally been more hazardous than non-coal mines, accounting for 80 per cent of accidents

Jharkhand26%

Andhra Pradesh17%

Madhya Pradesh8%

Maharashtra5%

West Bengal9%

Other22%

Orissa6%

Rajasthan7%

Source: Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No 3247, August 5, 2002,http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowDataSec.asp?secid=56886&ptid=17902,as viewed on February 17, 2007

GRAPH 3.3: State-wise distribution of fatalities (2001)Jharkhand, due to its numerous coal mines and illegal mining, had the maximum number of mine accidents

c m y k

● The mineral diseasesOther than accidents, a host of occupational health hazards areassociated with mining. Mine workers are prone to hearingimpairment, skin and eye diseases, metal and radiation poisoningand most commonly, respiratory problems. Vibration-induced dis-eases are also quite common (see Box: Impaired: what mining does tothe body). It is not surprising that in some countries, the lifespan ofminers is substantially lower than that of the general population.In Bolivia, for example, the average miner in the tin mines of Potosíwill live only 35-40 years, whereas the general population’s lifeexpectancy at birth is about 64 years.66

SilicosisSilicosis is caused by the inhalation of crystalline silica dust, a common air contaminant in hard rock mines; it can develop afterseveral months of exposure, and can lead to complete loss of lungfunctions. It also increases its victims’ susceptibility to other lungdiseases such as tuberculosis, bronchitis and lung cancer. Exposureto large amounts of free silica can pass unnoticed because silica isodourless, non-irritable and does not cause any immediate noticeable effect and hence, is confused with ordinary dust.Scientific evidence is increasingly demonstrating that exposureover a working lifetime to the commonly used standard of

98


Of coal and deathSafety in coal mines remains a serious problem in India

The only positive side to the grim story of deaths in Indian coal mines is that the rate of accidents has been dropping, especiallyafter the nationalisation of the coal sector in 1970s; the death rate hasdropped from 0.62 deaths per 1,000 employees in 1961-70 to 0.25 in2001-05.1 But even then, fatality rates in Indian coal mines remain higher than in Australian and European coal mines. However,the rates are almost comparable to the fatality rates in USA and Japan(see Graph: Fatality rates across the world).

However, the fatality rate in terms of productivity in Indian coalmines fares poorly compared to other countries. In 1999, the numberof deaths in Indian coal mines per million tonne of coal produced was24 times more than that in Australian mines and 16 times more thanin US.2 The rate was far better than Chinese coal mines, though; the number of deaths in India per million tonne of coal produced was

13 times lower than China’s.Open-cast mines are generally believed to be safer than under-

ground mines. For example, the number of fatalities in undergroundmines accounted for 54 per cent of the total fatalities in the country in2000, though the production from underground mines was three times lower.3 The yearly number of accidents per million tonne of coalproduction for underground, open-cast and surface happens to be1.236, 0.144 and 0.102, respectively (average data from April 1989 toMarch 1998). Thus, accidents are about 8.5 times more frequent inunderground mines than in open-cast mines.4

The single biggest cause of fatal accidents in Indian coal mines has been the fall of roof or the sides in underground mines. The sec-ond biggest killer have been transportation-related accidents. But overa period of three years, out of total fatal accidents, accidents due tofalling roof or side have gone down from 42 per cent in 2001 to 38 percent in 2004. At the same time, fatal accidents due to dumpers andtrucks have gone up significantly from 20 per cent to 27 per cent.5

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

Fata

lity

rate

per

1,0

00 e

mp

loye

es in

co

al m

ines

Australia France India Japan USA Germany

Source: Anon, 2001, ‘Safety and public grievance cell’, Annual Report of the Union ministry of coal 2000-01, www.coal.nic.in/chap120102.pdf, as viewed onDecember 2, 2006

GRAPH: Fatality rates across the world On an average, there were around 0.3 deaths in coal mines per 1,000 employees in India, US and Japan – compared tomuch lower rates in Germany or Australia

m k

0.1 milligram per cubic metre (mg/m3) of silica results in a signifi-cant burden of radiological silicosis and also deaths from silicosisand lung cancer.67 Chronic exposure to silica predisposes to tuber-culosis, which remains a major public health problem in countrieslike India.68 Recently, crystalline silica has been classified as ahuman carcinogen (Group I) by the International Agency forResearch on Cancer.69

Since the earth’s crust contains about 12 per cent free silicamostly in the form of quartz, mining and tunnelling have a highrisk of silica exposure. The sandstone industry, stone quarrying,granite industry, grinding of metals, sand blasting, iron and steelfoundries, silica milling, flint crushing and manufacture of abrasives are some occupations in which silica exposure can behigh. There are about three million workers in India at high potential risk of silica exposure. A majority of these – 56 per cent(17 lakh) – are employed in mining and quarries.70

The first cases of silicosis in India were described in the 1940samong the gold miners of Kolar.71 Very few epidemiological studies have been conducted on silicosis in the country. Some ofthe studies conducted indicate that cases of silicosis are found inall kinds of miners, though they are more prevalent in workersemployed in the slate pencil industry, agate mining, etc (see Table3.9: Silicosis in India).

99


Impaired: what mining does to the bodyA host of occupational health hazards are associated with mining activities. Unorganised labour is particularlysusceptible

Some of the occupational hazards associated with the mining industry are:● Hearing impairment: Approximately, 90 per cent of miners in the

US are hearing impaired by the age of 50.1

● Skin diseases: Skin diseases result from contact with allergens orirritant substances.

● Diseases of the eyes● Stress: Job stress often occurs in miners due to the conditions of

work and the dangerous environment.● Occupational hazards associated with vibrations: In 1977, the ILO

listed vibration as an occupational hazard and recommendedthat measures should to be taken to protect employees from it.Regular exposure to vibration causes both vascular and neuraldisorders such as hand-arm vibration syndrome (HAVS). InSouth Africa, the prevalence rate of HAVS is estimated at 15per cent of mine workers exposed to vibration in gold mines,2

while the prevalence in the US has been reported to be as highas 50 per cent.3 Prevalence of HAVS in India has not been doc-umented in detail. It is estimated that around 1.80-18 lakhmine workers are regularly exposed to vibration in Indianmines. Workers in unorganised and private mines are at anincreased risk due to extended shift duration.4

A study was conducted on 66 drillers and 35 blasters (as control subject) from limestone mines in India, and itreported a significantly high prevalence of HAVS amongdrillers as compared to blasters.5 Studies point towards strongepidemiological evidence that occupational exposure to wholebody vibration (WBV) is associated with an increased risk oflower back pain, sciatica pain and degenerative changes in thespinal system, including lumbar inter-vertebral disc disorders.6 Countries like the US, the UK, Canada andAustralia have enforced specific regulations for control ofworkplace vibration. The Bureau of Indian Standards has alsorecommended vibration standards that are identical to corresponding ISO standards. However, these standards are voluntary.

● There are various minerals such as uranium which are haz-ardous. Heavy metal poisoning – especially lead and chromium– and other forms of chemical poisoning are also common.

● Respiratory diseases: The relationship between mining and occupational lung diseases has been documented since the1500s, when Georgius Agricola described dust with corrosivequalities eating away the lungs.7 The prevalence and severity ofmining-related lung diseases depend on a number of factorsincluding type of mineral mined, exposure levels, the period of exposure and co-existing illnesses and environmental conditions. Common among these ailments are silicosis,asbestosis and pneumoconiosis.

Industry Prevalence (%)

Gold mines 8.84

Gold mines 13.9

Mica mines/mica processing industries of Bihar 34.0

Manganese mines 4.1

Lead and zinc mines 30.4

Stone cutters 20.0

Stone cutters 25.0

Stone cutters 35.2

Foundries 27.2

Ordnance factories 3.5

Agate workers 38.0

Glass bangle workers 7.3

Slate pencil workers 54.6

Mica mines/mica processing 5.2

Quartz crushing 12.0

Stone quarry 22.0

Sand grinding 27.8

Source: ‘Silicosis: an uncommonly diagnosed common occupational disease’,ICMR Bulletin Vol 29, No 9, Indian Council of Medical Research, New Delhi,http://icmr.nic.in/busep99.htm, as viewed on November 23, 2006

TABLE 3.9: Silicosis in India Industry-wise prevalence studies show slate pencil workersto be the highest risk group

m k

On their part, a number of state governments in India havepassed legislations to counter the problem. Silicosis was first noti-fied under the Factories Act on the basis of a coal mining report.Specific rules have been framed to establish the medical board, theprocedures for conducting medical examinations, etc. However,the implementation of these is extremely weak.

AsbestosisAsbestosis happens due to inhalation of asbestos and causes chestcongestions and organ malfunctions. Asbestos mining and millingactivities release fibre and dust in the atmosphere. When theseminute fibres are inhaled, they get accumulated in the lungs.Long-term exposure causes lung cancer, mesothelioma (cancer ofmesothelial linings of the lung and chest cavity), gastrointestinalcancer and asbestosis (scarring of lung tissues). There are twoschools of thought regarding the effects of asbestos on humanhealth: North American researchers postulate that use of asbestosin a controlled manner does not pose any harm, whereas theirEuropean counterparts claim that asbestos in minute quantities isalso lethal. Of the various types of asbestos, ‘blue asbestos’ or cro-cidolite is the most dangerous and is banned in most countries,including India.

A number of studies have been conducted in India to esti-mate the prevalence of asbestosis in this country. Some of these

have found that 23-70 per cent of people with direct exposure toasbestos for more than 20 years will develop asbestosis.72

Studies by the National Institute of Occupational Health (NIOH)in Ahmedabad found that 11 per cent of workers in asbestosmines had asbestosis.73 The 2004 report of the Union labour min-istry’s Saxena committee (set up following a Supreme Courtorder on the issue of medical benefits and compensation toworkers affected by handling of hazardous wastes) also men-tions the risk of lung cancer and mesothelioma caused byasbestos.

In India, asbestos is regulated under the Factories Act (1948),in which asbestosis is listed as a notifiable disease, as well as theAir and Water Act and the Hazardous Wastes (Handling andManagement) Rules, 1989 under the Environment Protection Act(1986). With increased awareness on the deleterious effects ofasbestos, the Central government forbade the state governmentsin 1986 from granting any new mining leases for asbestos. In June1993, it banned the renewal of existing mining leases of asbestos.The ban, however, does not include usage, manufacture, exportand import of asbestos.

The government is now considering the possibility of liftingthe ban on asbestos mining – a move which threatens to put livesof thousands of workers at stake (see Box: Supreme Court comes tothe rescue).

100


c m y k

Supreme Court comes to the rescueAnd speaks out for the workers of asbestos industry

Several judicial cases have been filed in India against the asbestosindustry with regard to the health of its workers. The most famous ofthese is one between Consumer Education and Research Centre(CERC), Ahmedabad, Gujarat and others and the Union of India, filedin 1993. The writ petition dealt with the danger to the life of workersemployed in the asbestos industry. The Court ruled: “Exposure toasbestos and the resultant long tragic chain of adverse medical, legaland societal consequences reminds the legal and social responsibilityof the employer or the producer not to endanger the workforce or the community or the society. He is not absolved of the inherentresponsibility to the exposed worker or the society at large.”

The Court ruled that the industrial units must maintain a healthrecord of every worker up to a minimum period of 40 years; insureworkers under the Employees State Insurance Act or Workmen’sCompensation Act; or give health coverage to every worker. In theparticular case, the appropriate inspector of factories in Gujarat wasdirected to send all workers for re-examination to the NationalInstitute of Occupational Health (NIOH). In case of the positivefinding that any of them were suffering from the occupational hazards, the person was entitled to a compensation of Rs 1 lakhwithin a period of three months from the date of certification by the NIOH.

Despite all this, there has not been much change at the groundlevel. Much of the problem comes from the fact that rules and regulations are poorly implemented.Dead man walking: workers in asbestos mines run the risk of cancers,

chest ailments and organ malfunction

P M

AD

HA

VAN

Coal workers’ pneumoconiosisCoal workers’ pneumoconiosis (CWP) is caused due to inhala-tion of coal dust from coal mines. The workers affected by thisdisease suffer from severe lung problems and are prone to lungcancer. There is no standard or limit in India for coal dust.Studies conducted by the NIOH have found that more than twoper cent of workers in underground coal mines develop CWP,while 45 per cent develop other respiratory morbidities. In caseof workers operating in open-cast coal mines, the percentage islower at two per cent for CWP and 42 per cent for other respira-tory morbidities.74

The statistics, of course, may be presenting only part of the picture; the number of diseases, accidents, injuries and fatalities in the entire mining sector is likely to be muchmore. Many cases, especially in small-scale and illegal mines, are neither recorded nor reported. Though mining accidents are on the decline, the Indian mining sector has a longway to go before it can be at par with some of the industrialisednations.

An important task for the industry is to increase awarenessamong workers about occupational hazards and risks. Though there are comprehensive laws in place, their implementa-tion is lax. Most of the safety inspections and audits remain onpaper. There is an urgent need in India to introduce a comprehen-sive occupational health and safety act in line with that of manyindustrialised countries. There is a need to develop capacity to identify and treat mine-related occupational diseases. Failing to address these issues can only lead to further losses forthe industry.

101


c m y k

Uranium kills The health hazards in uranium mining

Uranium has been mined for ages, but it is only in the last 30 years thatthe impact of occupational exposure to radiation in mines has beenrealised and discussed. Radiation-induced occupational cancersappear to be some of the most severe radiation injuries known to occuramong workers exposed to ionising radiation.

Uranium mining creates risks in two ways: through dust andthrough released radon, a radioactive gas of natural origin. Radon isfound everywhere in the earth's atmosphere, but has low reactivitywhen it occurs by itself. But in the process of mining, exposure to itleads to alpha irradiation of the bronchial epithelium.

A paper on the uranium mines in Erzgebirge, Saxony, in the formerGerman Democratic Republic (GDR) has tracked the long history ofoccupational injury from radiation in uranium mines. The studyreports: “The history of disease in these miners extends over five cen-turies. The discovery of the lung cancer component was made towardthe end of the 19th century, and the suspicion that a connection mightexist between this cancer type and exposure to ionising radiation wasvoiced at the beginning of the 20th century. In the first half of this cen-tury, further research was carried out on this disease in the Schneeberg

area of Erzgebirge. After World War II, American uranium mines in theColorado plateau used the German research results as a basis forworking out their own radiation protection standards. But the uraniummines under Soviet occupation in GDR paid no attention to theseresearch findings. For many years, no precautions were taken.The con-sequence: an estimated 9,000 fatal cases of lung cancer among theseunderground miners.”

Uranium miners also face many non-radiation-related hazards.Soluble uranium affects the kidneys if ingested or inhaled because ofits chemical toxicity as a heavy metal. The ore in which uranium isfound also contains non-radioactive toxic heavy metals. These varyfrom site to site but may include arsenic, lead, molybdenum, and manganese. Uranium mining is associated with lung damage throughsilicosis. Silica dust is created in the drilling process and can lead tocancer with an increased risk of tuberculosis, rheumatoid arthritis andkidney disease. Some measures can be taken to reduce toxic exposureto miners, such as proper ventilation, use of protective clothing andmasks, and monitoring of absorbed radioactivity doses.

In India, uranium mining is currently being done only in Jharkhand.The health impacts due to mining in East Singhbhum in this state havebeen devastating – ranging from respiratory diseases to reproductive disorders (see Chapter 4: Mining in the states – Jharkhand and West Bengal).

Dust standards exist, but only on paper. Workers exposed to coal dustare prone to lung cancer

AG

NIM

IRH

BA

SU /

CSE

■ BEYOND MINING: THE SAME STORY

The social-environmental downslide that mining triggers,endures much beyond a mine’s immediate boundaries or impacts– mineral-based industries carry forward the mayhem. Sectorssuch as iron and steel, thermal power plants (TPPs), aluminium,cement, lead and zinc figure among the ‘red category’ industriesin the country: they have an extremely high pollution potential.They are also resource-intensive and generate huge quantities ofwaste.

The global power sector is the biggest contributor to GHGemissions – in 2003, it contributed more than 40 per cent of thetotal CO2 emissions across the world.75 In India, TPPs account for65 per cent of industrial CO2 emissions from large point sources.76

Another problem associated with Indian TPPs is the huge quanti-ties of flyash they generate. The coal used by these TPPs is of infe-rior quality, and has an ash content of 35-40 per cent. On an aver-age, more than 100 MT of flyash is generated every year in India,of which more than 90 per cent ends up in waste dumps or in ashponds.77 Other environmental issues include dust emissions,wastewater generation, and mercury pollution.

Cement plants are not far behind TPPs in GHG emissions. Thesector accounts for five per cent of global CO2 emissions.78 In2000, the total CO2 emissions from the world cement industrywere around 829 MT,79 a major chunk of which was accounted forby the top three cement producers: China, India and the US. Indiacontributed 47 MT.80 The other major concern associated with thissector is that of dust emissions – fugitive as well as point source.

Metal smelters and refineries are equally damaging to theenvironment. Worldwide, smelting adds about 142 MT of sulphurdioxide to the atmosphere every year: that is 13 per cent of totalglobal emissions. Smelting releases a range of other pollutants aswell. Emissions of metals such as lead, arsenic, cadmium and zincare common and can pose serious health risks.81

Lately, two industries have been gaining particular notorietyin India in terms of their impact on environment: iron and steeland sponge iron. Both the sectors are witnessing significantchanges. While the steel industry, having received significantinvestments, is poised to grow, the sponge iron industry is alreadymushrooming all over the country at a rapid rate. Not surpri-singly, the two sectors have sparked off the maximum number of popular protests.

● Iron and steel: resource-guzzler and polluterThe Indian iron and steel industry is about eight decades old. In1957, the country had three integrated steel plants with a totalcapacity of about two MT.82 In 2007, the country’s total steel pro-duction stood at around 44 MT.83 According to the Belgium-basedInternational Iron and Steel Institute (IISI), China was the largestproducer in 2005, accounting for more than 30 per cent of globalsteel output. Japan (10 per cent) and the US (eight per cent) fol-lowed, while the contribution of India was about three per cent(see Graph 3.4: World production of steel – 2005).84

However, the Indian steel sector has recorded a phenomenalgrowth between 2004 and 2006. In 2004, India ranked ninth in

global steel production, with a total output of about 33 MT. By2006, it had improved its ranking to seventh, producing 44 MT –registering a growth of 35 per cent in two years. Today, there areeight major integrated iron and steel plants in the country, ofwhich five are under the Steel Authority of India Ltd (SAIL).

The country’s crude and finished steel production has showna continuous growth since independence (see Graph 3.5: Trends insteel production). Rapid industrialisation, motorisation and urban-isation have ensured a continuous demand. The IISI projectionshows that from 2010 to 2015, world steel demand will grow bymore than four per cent annually. Comparatively, the growth inIndia’s steel demand will be much higher at around eight per centper annum (more than China’s, which is expected to be around sixper cent per year).

While India’s exports of steel have remained more or less con-stant in recent years, its imports have gone up. In 2002-03, thecountry imported 1.5 MT of steel, which has almost tripled to 4.1MT in 2006-07 (see Table 3.10: The steel trade). This indicates thatalthough the production of steel has been continuously increas-ing, India’s steel plants are unable to cope with the burgeoningmarket demand.

The sector, however, is on the verge of a makeover. Because ofthe easy availability of high quality raw material and cheaplabour and the projected demand for steel, many domestic andinternational players have shown interest in investing in the sec-tor in the country. A total of 116 MoUs have been signed in vari-ous states till November 2006: these will add a capacity of around150 MT, with an investment of Rs 3,57,000 crore. These proposedprojects will take the total steel producing capacity of the countryto 180 MT by 2019-20.85

102


New EU (10)2.0%

CIS10%

NAFTA11.2%

China30.9%

Japan9.9%

Other Asia7.7%

Others7.8%

EU (15)14.6%

India3%

Other Europe2.9%

Source: Anon, 2006, World Steel, International Iron and Steel Institute,Belgium, pp no 3

GRAPH 3.4: World production of steel – 2005 With three per cent of the global production, India isranked 7th

m k

Even the existing players are beefing up capacities to meet thegrowing demand. India’s largest steel manufacturer SAIL is plan-ning to increase its annual production from 12 MT per annum to22.5 MT per annum by 2011-12, by investing about Rs 37,000crore.86 Tata Iron & Steel Company (TISCO), the other big player,is also planning to increase its steel-making capacity to 33-34 MTper annum by 2015. Besides increasing the capacity of itsJamshedpur plant from five MT per annum to 10, the company isalso planning to set up a 12-MT per annum greenfield project inJharkhand, a six-MT per annum plant in Orissa and a five-MT perannum capacity unit in Chhattisgarh.

The world’s largest steel producer, Arcelor Mittal, has alreadyannounced two projects – a 12-MT per annum greenfield steelproject each in Jharkhand and Orissa. Another global steel pro-ducer, Pohang Steel Company (POSCO) has invested in setting upa plant of 12 MT per annum at Jagatsinghpur in Orissa.

The states which lead with their steel industries are the onesthat hold abundant reserves of iron ore: Orissa, Jharkhand andChhattisgarh. The state of Orissa alone has signed around 45MoUs with steel investors for producing 60 MT within the nextfew years.87

Most of the integrated iron and steel plants in the country,including the plants of SAIL and Tata, are based on the blast fur-nace (BF) process. This method of steel making uses coking coaland iron ore as raw materials – coking coal is converted to cokeand then fed into a blast furnace along with treated iron ore. Theend product is the hot metal, which is sent to the oxygen furnacefor conversion into steel. The process is resource-intensive, con-sumes large quantities of water, and generates large volumes ofwastewater and toxic fumes.

For example, the five plants of SAIL consume – on an average – three tonne of raw materials (iron ore, dolomite andcoking coal) to produce a tonne of crude steel. The company alsouses up 6.5 tonne of water per tonne of crude steel and 31 gigaJoule (GJ) of energy per tonne of product. This means thatin a year, SAIL consumes around 38 MT of raw materials, 74 MT of water and 377 million GJ of energy.88 Similarly, TISCO consumes as much as 85 MT of water and more than 39 MTof raw materials.89

The major pollution concerns from the sector include variousforms of air pollutants such as particulate matter, sulphur dioxide,oxides of nitrogen, carbon monoxide, greenhouse gases (mainly

103


0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

4000019

4819

4919

5019

5119

5219

5319

5419

5519

5619

5719

5819

5919

60-6

119

61-6

219

62-6

319

63-6

419

64-6

519

65-6

619

66-6

719

67-6

819

68-6

919

69-7

019

70-7

119

71-7

219

72-7

319

73-7

419

74-7

519

75-7

619

76-7

719

77-7

819

78-7

919

79-8

019

80-8

119

81-8

219

82-8

319

83-8

419

84-8

519

85-8

619

86-8

719

87-8

819

88-8

919

89-9

019

90-9

119

91-9

219

92-9

319

93-9

419

94-9

519

95-9

619

96-9

719

97-9

819

98-9

919

99-0

020

00-0

120

01-0

220

02-0

320

03-0

4

Hot metal Crude/ingot steel Finished steel

Years

Pro

du

ctio

n (

in m

ilio

n t

on

ne)

Source: http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=13613&ptid=13591&level=5 as viewed on May 25, 2007

GRAPH 3.5: Trends in steel production Steel production has witnessed significant growth since 1998-99

Year Import Export(finished steel) (finished steel)

2002-2003 1.510 4.506

2003-2004 1.540 4.835

2004-2005 2.109 4.381

2005-2006 (Prov) 3.765 4.350

2006-07 (Apr-Mar, 2007) 4.100 4.750(prov estimated)

Source: ‘An overview of the steel sector’, http://steel.nic.in/over.htm, asviewed on May 1, 2007

TABLE 3.10: The steel trade Rising imports indicate the domestic steel industry’s shortfalls in meeting demand (figures in million tonne)

m k

CO2) and polyaromatic hydrocarbons including benz(a)pyerineand volatile organic carbons. Coke oven plants also release carcino-genic gases. The total dust load from a steel plant is significant, asis evident from SAIL’s steel plants, which emitted around 36,000tonne of particulates in a year90; the dust load from TISCO’sJamshedpur plant was 5,305 tonne per annum.91 The integratediron and steel sector is a big emitter of GHGs: on an average, formaking one tonne of crude steel, it generates about 2.5 tonne of CO2(excluding grid electricity).92

The industry is not only water-intensive, but also dischargeslarge quantities of effluents. The steel plants of SAIL dischargearound 53 MT of wastewater every year.93 The effluent contains awide range of pollutants ranging from organic-inorganic contam-inants to heavy metals such as chromium and toxins such ascyanide. For instance, in 2004-05, Tata Steel released around onetonne of cyanide through its wastewater.94 Integrated steel plantsalso generate significant quantities of hazardous and non-haz-ardous wastes. SAIL generated seven MT of wastes in 2004-05, ofwhich a major chunk (73 per cent) consisted of slag (BF air cooledand granulated slag).95

These factors, along with the iron and steel sector’s need forlarge chunks of land for the plant as well as for the mines, haveensured that its path for growth is not smooth. Across the country,communities are protesting against new iron and steel plants.They are protesting against the impending displacement, thedeterioration in environment and the destruction of the naturalresource base. The Tata group is facing stiff resistance against itssix-MT plant at Kalinganagar in Orissa. Another Tata Steel projectin Bastar, Chhattisgarh, is facing serious setbacks due to people’sprotests.96 There are reports of protests against Essar’s steel plantin Dhurli (Chhattisgarh) as well.

The South Korean steel giant, POSCO, is also facing a severetest in Orissa. Communities up against the project fear that over20,000 people from around 15 neighbouring villages will lose theirlivelihoods to the project. These people are dependant on betelleaf farming on government land, which the company proposes toacquire. The project is yet to take off.

India’s projected steel capacity for 2019-20 is 180 MT, and thesector would require huge resources to meet its requirement ofraw material – 310 MT of iron ore, 187 MT of coking coal and 1,103MT of water.97

Clearly, the steel industry must recognise its manifold challenges. These challenges include resource management (especially water), sound environmental management practicesand people-friendly policies. The industry cannot and will notgrow if it continues to antagonise local communities. Much is atstake: along with improving its bottom line, the industry alsoneeds to ensure an equitable development for people.

● Sponge iron: growing menaceSteel can also be manufactured by directly reducing iron ore (ironoxide) into iron. The product from this process is called directreduced iron (DRI), or sponge iron. DRI is manufactured usingeither coal or natural gas. Since natural gas reserves in India arelimited, the production of sponge iron is mostly through coal. Thepollution associated with sponge iron includes fugitive dust andparticulate emissions, gaseous emissions and solid waste.98

India has led the world in sponge iron production since 2001-02; today, it accounts for 20 per cent of the global output.Venezuela, Mexico and Iran are the other major producers.Together, these four countries account for around 60 per cent ofthe world’s production.99

The sector has largely gained at the expense of the BF and elec-tric arc furnace (EAF) methods, which require coking coal andsteel scrap, supplies of which are limited. Another reason for themushrooming of sponge iron plants across the country is the easewith which they can be set up with the help of local fabricatorsand suppliers. The capital investment is also low compared toother steel-making techniques. For instance, the cost of setting upa one-MT integrated steel plant with a BF works out to aboutRs 3,000 crore. The EAF process, on its part, consumes large quan-tities of power, and is only used, therefore, to make specialisedsteel products and alloys.100

Compared to this, setting up a 100-tonne per day sponge ironplant costs around Rs 7-12 crore, which can be recovered in just

104


c m y k

Steelmaking is a resource-intensive and polluting process. Communitiesaffected by upcoming steel plants are, therefore, on the warpath

105


NA

BAY OF BENGAL

ARABIAN SEA

INDIAN OCEAN

Gujarat (1)1 Essar Steel Limited, Surat

Karnataka (30)7 Hospet Ispat Limited, Koppal

Tamil Nadu (5)8 Sree Renagaraaj Ispat (P) Ltd, Perundurai

Goa (5)6 Goa Sponge & Power,Sanguem

Jharkhand (41)38 Bihar Sponge Iron Ltd, Kharsawa41 Balaji Industrial Products Limited, West Singbhum

West Bengal (35)34 Haldia Steels Limited, Burdwan35 Jai Balaji Sponge Limited, Burdwan36 Shri Ramrupai Balaji Steels Limited, Burdwan37 Shyam Sel Ltd, Burdwan

Chhattisgarh (70)10 HEG Limited, Durg13 Ind Agro Synergy, Raigarh14 Jindal Steel & Power Limited, Raigarh15 Nalwa Sponge Iron Limited, Raigarh16 Sidhi Vinayak Sponge Iron Pvt Ltd, Raigarh17 Singhal Enterprises (P) Ltd, Raigarh18 Nova Iron & Steel Ltd, Bilaspur19 Prakash Industries Limited, Champa20 Aarti Sponge and Power Ltd, Raipur21 Ispat Godavari Ltd, Raipur22 Khetan Sponge & Infrastructure Pvt Ltd, Raipur23 Monnet Ispat Limited, Raipur24 Raipur Alloys & Steel Ltd, Raipur25 Shri Bajrang Power & Ispat Ltd, Raipur26 Vandana Global Limited, Raipur

Andhra Pradesh (16)11 GSAL (India) Limited, Vizianagaram

Orissa (93)9 SPS Steel & Power Limited, Jharsuguda12 Scaw Industries Pvt Ltd, Dhenkanal27 Beekay Steels & Power Limited, Keonjhar28 Deepak Steel & Power Ltd, Keonjhar29 Grewal Associates (P) Ltd, Keonjhar30 Orissa Sponge Iron Limited, Keonjhar31 Rungta Mines Ltd, Keonjhar32 Shree Metaliks Ltd, Keonjhar33 Tata Sponge Iron Ltd, Keonjhar39 Neepaz Metaliks Ltd, Sundargarh40 OCL India Ltd, Sundargarh

Maharashtra (5)2 Sunflag Iron and Steel Co Ltd,

Bhandara3 Lloyds Metals & Engineers Ltd,

Chandrapur4 Ispat Industries Ltd, Raigad5 Vikram Ispat, Raigad 6

7

8

4-5

1

11

9

39-40

12

27-33

34-373818

19 13-17

10

20-2623

41

DAMAN & DIU

GUJARAT

MANIPUR

NAGALAND

ARUNACHALPRADESH

JAMMU & KASHMIR

HIMACHALPRADESH

PUNJAB

RAJASTHAN

DADRA &NAGAR HAVELI

MAHARASHTRA

KARNATAKA

TAMIL NADUKERA

LA

ANDHRA PRADESH

CHH

ATT

ISG

ARH

ORISSA

WEST BENGAL

JHARKHAND

SIKKIM

ASSAM

MEGHALAYA

TRIPURAMIZORAM

BIHAR

UTTAR PRADESH

MADHYA PRADESH

HARYANAUTTARAKHAND

DELHI

Sponge iron country

Plants with capacity morethan 66,000 tonne per annum(200 tonne per day)

MAP 3.2: The sponge iron spreadThe country is expected to have 431 plants by 2007, up from 23 in 2000

Note: The figures in brackets indicate the number of plants in each state.Source: Compiled by Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science and Environment, 2006

m k

12-18 months because of the massive profit margins.101 An unitcan make a profit of Rs 60 lakh a month if the production costs arekept low by cheap labour and by not operating the pollution control equipment.102

Naturally, the sector has witnessed a phenomenal growth. In2000-01, there were 23 plants in India with a total capacity ofseven MT. By 2006, the number had gone up to 206 with a totalcapacity of around 19 MT. According to the Joint Plant Committeeconstituted in 2005 by the Centre to survey the sponge iron indus-try, in addition to the existing 206 plants, 225 coal-based spongeiron plants are at various stages of commissioning and construc-tion. It is expected that by 2007, there would be 431 sponge ironplants in the country with a total production capacity of 44 MT.103

The country produced 16 MT of sponge iron in 2006-07 com-pared to 12 MT in the previous year, registering a growth of about38 per cent. The production is likely to touch the 20-MT mark bythe end of the current fiscal, which means a rate of growth ofabout 23 per cent over the previous year.104

Due to the surplus coal and iron ore in the central and easternparts of the country, there is an accumulation of sponge ironplants in the states of Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and WestBengal. Chhattisgarh ranks at the top in numbers and capacity,followed by Orissa: in 2004-05, Chhattisgarh produced 21 per centof the total sponge iron in the country. The state had 60 spongeiron plants in 2006; this is expected to go up to 100 very soon.Most of these plants are located in Raigarh, Bilaspur and Raipurdistricts, in ecologically sensitive areas. For instance, in Raigarh,six plants have come up in the Taraimal reserve forest which hasa high wildlife density.

The states of Orissa and Jharkhand are not far behind. As ofDecember 2005, there were around 61 sponge iron units operatingin Orissa and another 44 had been given the necessary permis-sions. In addition, many plants are operating illegally inSundergarh, Keonjhar and Jharsuguda, districts which are rich incoal, dolomite and iron ore. Jharkhand has about 42 functioningsponge iron plants, most them concentrated in the Giridih,Saraikela-Kharsawan, West Singhbhum and Hazaribagh areas. Inthe past two years, the state government has signed 44 MoUs forindustrial projects; of these, 42 are for sponge iron plants.105

The big players in this sector are Jindal Steel and Power Ltd(Chhattisgarh), Ispat Industries Ltd (Maharashtra), Tata SpongeIron Ltd (Orissa), Orissa Sponge Iron Ltd (Orissa) and Essar SteelLtd (Gujarat). Due to the boom, many companies are in theprocess of expansion. For instance, Tata Sponge Iron Ltd is plan-ning to expand its capacity in Keonjhar (Orissa) from 240,000tonne to 390,000 tonne.106 Jindal Steel and Power Ltd has receivedclearances in August 2004 for increasing its capacity from 600,000tonne per annum to 720,000 tonne in Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

The rapid growth in the sponge iron industry is a matter ofconcern. Most plants are located in areas rich in forests, andinhabited by tribals; moreover, almost all these areas are charac-terised by poor environmental governance. The key problem ofthe Indian sponge iron industry lies in its highly polluting, coal-based production process; other countries have adopted the rel-atively cleaner gas-based plants. A typical 100-tonne per day

sponge iron plant consumes 160-175 tonne of iron ore, 120-150tonne of coal, 3.5-5 tonne of dolomite and 120-160 tonne of waterevery day. In return, it emits 180-200 tonne of carbon dioxide, 1-2tonne of dust (if it is equipped with required pollution controlequipment; otherwise, dust emissions can be as high as 10 tonneper day), 25-30 tonne of char and 2.5-3.5 tonne of kiln accretionevery day. The total pollution load from the plant, therefore, canbe as high as 230-250 tonne per day (see Figure 3.1: Sponging offthe earth). In the past five to 10 years, the indiscriminate mush-rooming of these factories has ravaged the countryside, affected

106


Source: Radhika Krishnan et al, 2006, ‘Iron in the soul’, Down To Earth,September 15, 2006, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi,pp 25

FIGURE 3.1: Sponging off the earthSponge iron plants gobble up huge quantities of resourcesand spew equally large amounts as wastes

1.6-1.75 tonne of iron ore1.2-1.5 tonne of coal

0.035-0.05 tonne of dolomite1.5-2.0 tonne of water

1.8-2.0 tonne of carbon dioxide0.25 tonne of dust

0.29 tonne of coal char0.02 tonne of kiln accretions0.02 tonne of sulphur dioxide,water vapour and thermal pollution

Garbage factorPollution cost for a tonne of sponge iron

m k

groundwater supplies, polluted air and water bodies, and severelydamaged crops, forest cover, livestock, health and livelihoods.

The sector has many problems. Factory owners, interestedonly in their profit margins, circumvent basic safety and pollutioncontrol measures. Almost without exception, all small- and medi-um-scale plants shut their electro-static precipitators (ESPs) in theevenings to save electricity costs and speed up the productionprocess (it costs a plant about Rs 6 lakh a month to run an ESPcontinuously). The dust collected from the ESPs is dumped outside the plant in dry form, causing severe pollution.

There is no system for disposing off coal char. The toxic slag isdumped haphazardly along highways, in villages, forests andstreams. Coal char can contaminate the water table if it seepsunderground. Rampant deep boring for water, necessary for theplants’ cooling systems, has depleted groundwater tables and leftvillage wells dry; one plant can have six to 20 deep borewells.

Moreover, most sponge iron plants do not contribute much tothe local economy. Despite assurances of job security, very fewlocal villagers are hired, and mostly as unskilled labourers withno insurance or medical benefits. There are no provisions for in-house training and accidents are common.

Another common problem is that of land acquisition, whichtriggers conflicts. Industry often acquires land through sub-terfuge. Land in villages near Raipur, originally meant for herbalplantations, is being used today to set up sponge iron plants. InBemeta in Chhattisgarh, villagers claim that land bought at the

rate of approximately Rs 20,000 per ha by the state governmentwas sold to industrialists at roughly Rs 1.25 lakh per ha.

Industries are required to get a no-objection certificate fromgram panchayats, but even this procedure has been reduced to amere formality, or at times, ignored completely. Mostly, sarpanchsare bribed and documents manufactured. In Chourenga nearRaipur, though the gram sabha did not pass a resolution allowinga plant to come up, blank spaces left in the gram sabha’s registerwere used to fabricate the NOC.

Where subterfuge doesn’t work, muscle and money powerdo. Villagers of Tamnar and Patrapalli in Raigarh district allegethat when some of them refused to sell their land to Jindal Steeland Power Limited, musclemen threatened them, hot ash wasdumped on their land, and their villages were razed with bull-dozers. In Chourenga, a canal was filled up and converted intoa road by a sponge iron plant. The state government, whileadmitting that the canal was given on lease to the plant, refusesto admit that a road has been constructed. In Bemeta, a nurserywas converted into a road after uprooting 5,000 trees.

In Ratanpur near Sundergarh in Orissa, Mahavir Hi-techChemicals Pvt Ltd bought around 30 ha along the Ib river in 2004for a sponge iron plant, without even a gram sabha hearing. Theplant affects four villages in the vicinity. A gram sabha was calledafter protests engineered by Kiran Club, a Balijuri village youthclub run by a group of tribal girls and boys. But the meeting wasadjourned repeatedly on some pretext or another. Villagers and

107


Way to dusty death: fugitive emissions from sponge iron plants take a heavy toll of environmental and public health

CH

AN

DRA

BH

USH

AN

/ C

SE

m k

youth club members say the company sent its goons to disrupt thesabha proceedings. It took five attempts at holding a gram sabhameeting before a resolution could finally be passed in February2005. Nearly 4,000 people attended the meeting and amid policelathicharging, said “no” to the proposed plant. The factory hasbeen stopped for now, but rumours are afloat that it will make acomeback bid under a different name and in the guise of an “integrated steel plant”.

Ratanpur may have got a reprieve, but in places likeKuarmunda and Podajalanga in Sundergarh district of Orissa,plants have not only acquired land without gram sabha approval,they have even been built and continue to operate despite strongprotests by local residents.

But the protests are growing across India. In some cases,things have taken a serious enough turn for companies to closedown plants. In Nayagaon village in Chaibasa, Jharkhand, villagers simply couldn’t take it any more. So, armed with bows,arrows and sticks, about 1,000 tribal men, women and childrenstormed the gates of Sai Sponge India Ltd on April 7, 2006. Theyransacked the factory, damaged property and equipment worthRs 1 crore and brought production to a halt.

“We had had enough,” says villager Mangal Singh Tamsoy.“Ever since it started in 2004, there have been problems. We hadno idea what kind of factory was being built next to our fields. Wewere duped.” The land transactions took place without gram sabhaapproval. The Ho Samaj Mahasabha in Chandil has filed a case inthe Jharkhand High Court accusing the Sai Sponge managementof violating the Panchayats Extension of the Scheduled Areas Act,

which clearly states that land acquisition for industrial and development projects have to be first approved by the local gramsabha or panchayat.

Following the April violence, the plant had to be shut downfor 58 days. Work resumed on June 4, 2006 after it finally installedan ESP and after factory owners reached a compromise with thevillagers. According to the compromise formula, the plant promised to give the village Rs 1 lakh a year for “developmentalwork”; it also promised to send a doctor for free medical check-ups in the village once a week, and to give a college scholarship tothe most meritorious student in the village.

In December 2006, non-governmental organisations,autonomous peoples’ movements and environmental expertscame together in a meeting held in Nagpur to discuss and highlight the adverse social and environmental impacts of thegrowing sponge iron industry in the country. The groups havelaunched a national campaign – ‘Save livelihoods and environ-ment from the sponge iron industry’ – to address the issue.

But despite the public outcry and protests, governments ofstates like Chhattisgarh, Orissa and Jharkhand are aggressivelygoing ahead with their industrialisation plans. They believesponge iron is a core area of development for them, and are planning accordingly. In the light of what the sponge iron industry is doing to the land and its people, these beliefs andplans certainly need a drastic review. Environmental conservationmust go hand-in-hand with economic development becausedevelopment which destroys the environment, is bound to createmore poverty.

108


Dark zone: solid waste generated by sponge iron plants is often dumped near forested areas and sources of water

CH

AN

DRA

BH

USH

AN

/ C

SE

m k

109

c m y k

The stories of mining from India’s states might seem similar at first glance, but

they also have their points of difference. Almost all the backdrops include

lands teeming with resources – forests, wildlife, water… and minerals. The

protagonists, unfailingly, are rapacious industries and the State, and their opposition:

the ragtag groups conveniently placed under the acronym of ‘project-affected peo-

ple’. But there are some typical regional characteristics as well.

The drama is at its most intense in three states: Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and

Orissa. All three are blessed with immense mineral and natural resources. All three

have substantial tribal populations that have their homes on the very lands which

hold the minerals. A very large majority of these three states’ populations subsist

below the poverty line. And all three are vying to outdo each other in the game (and

name) of development.

The fallouts, naturally, are the same: disappearing forests, curdling water

sources, barren farmlands, rising displacement and poverty… and growing

discontent, which has found its most potent and rabid manifestation in the form of

Naxal violence. In fact, Chhattisgarh faces an incipient civil war-like situation, with

its state-sponsored militias ranged against the rampaging Red mobs.

Among the other states, Goa and Karnataka have embarked on a path of

no-holds barred prospecting and extraction of iron ore – all to feed the ravenous

Chinese steel sector. Everything that has iron in it – including the soil of the region –

is being stripped down for export. A similar spectacle can be seen on the riverine and

coastal beaches of Kerala and Tamil Nadu: sand is the casualty here. And in all these,

and in other states like Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, forests are being put

to the axe with terrifying regularity.

Protest movements have accompanied almost every new project; the anger, it is

clear, is growing. But so is these states’ determination to let nothing come in the way

of their ‘path to progress’.

4 Mining in the states

110

• Orissa, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand together accounted for 54 per cent of metallic mineral value and 45 per cent of fuelmineral value created in the country. More than 3 lakh hectareof land is currently under mining in these states – each boasting more than 25 per cent of land under forest, and withmore than 20 per cent tribal population.

• Even though mining contributes significantly to the economy(between 10-15 per cent) of the three states, the sector hasnot brought any prosperity: 86 per cent of districts inJharkhand, 90 per cent in Orissa, and 94 per cent inChhattisgarh figure among the 150 most backward districts ofthe country.

• On the back of Chinese demand, mining of iron ore has goneup exponentially in Goa and Karnataka. Contribution of ironore to Karnataka’s royalty has gone up by six times in three years (2002-03 to 2004-05). Iron ore exports from Goahave gone up by 53 per cent since 1999-00. Both states are alsodevastated by the mining.

• Madhya Pradesh is the sole producer of diamonds – holding32 per cent of the deposits, mostly concentrated in Panna district. Panna, ironically, is among the five poorest districts inthe state. Moreover, illegal mining thrives here – there areover 3,000 illegal mines; 90 per cent of the diamonds mined inthe area is sold illegally.

• Rajasthan is the leader in minor mineral production – it has7,765 leases for minor minerals covering 54,390 ha and 15,786quarry licenses. It also employs 2.5 million people, 95 per centof whom are dalits or tribals. Most mines remain unmonitoredand have deplorable working conditions – unfair wages, nobasic rights or social security and high accident rates.

m k

Andhra Pradesh holds reserves of more than 45 minerals,ranging from coal, limestone, manganese and bauxite to dia-

monds, dolomite, graphite, sand, coloured granites and silica. Thestate accounts for 96 per cent of India’s barytes, 40 per cent of itslimestone, 30 per cent of its bauxite and six per cent of its coal (seeTable 1: The reserves), and is heavily mined. About 16 per cent ofIndia’s mines (or 1,482 mines) are in Andhra Pradesh.1 These donot include the leases under coal or minor minerals.

In terms of area, 0.75 per cent of the state’s 27.5 million ha landis covered under mining leases.2 This may appear to be a smallpercentage, but given the large land area of the state it turns outto be a whopping 2,06,250 ha. The IBM’s Indian Minerals Yearbook

2005, however, differs in its estimation. According to it, the areaunder mining in the state – not considering minor minerals andfuel minerals (both of which, incidentally, are important forAndhra Pradesh) – is 47,905 ha.

There are no estimates of the total amount of forest landdiverted for mining in the state. Data is available for the period1980-2005, according to which about 13,532 ha of forest land wasdiverted for mining.3 This is the third highest diversion of forestland for mining during this period in the country, after Orissa andChhattisgarh (see Map on page 112: Minerals and forests). Moreforests are under threat in regions like Adilabad, Karimnagar andWarangal, which hold both forest and mineral resources.

Nellore and Kurnool districts account for almost 15 per centeach of the total mines in the state (see Graph 1: Distribution ofmines). In terms of area (excluding fuel and minor minerals), thetop five most mined districts in the state are Nellore (14 per cent),Nalgonda (11 per cent), Kurnool and Kadapa (10 per cent each)and Guntur (nine per cent) (see Graph 2 on page 113 : Districts: thearea under mining).

The minerals which account for the largest number of mines inthe state are pyrophylite with 24 per cent, followed by limestonewith 14 per cent, mica with eight per cent and barytes with sevenper cent.4 Pyrophylite mines are small in size: the numbers arelarge, but the area is not. On the other hand, limestone minesoccupy 46 per cent of the total area under mining, followed bymica with 10 per cent and quartz with nine per cent (see Graph 3on page 113: Area under different minerals).

111

Mineral Quantity Percentage of (in million tonne) country’s reserves

Barytes 67.05 95.58

Ball clay 7.5 54

Calcite 3.9 41

Limestone 30,400 40

Gold ore 6.84 39

Bauxite 750 30

Tungsten 12 30

Illmenite 21.69 24

Diamond 1,94,990 carats 16.3

Rutile 1 15.5

Garnet 5 12.7

Asbestos 0.25 11

Fuller’s earth 25 11

Feldspar 1.5 9.3

Kyanite 4.65 9

Corrundum 1,071 tonne 7

Coal 13,021.50 6

Steatite 5 6

Quartz and silica sand 50 5

Lead and zinc 7.5 4.2

Manganese 7 4

Source: http://www.aponline.gov.in/Quick%20links/apfactfile/naturaladvan-tages.html, as viewed on March 17, 2007

TABLE 1: The reservesThe state has more than 30 per cent of the country’sreserves of five minerals, including limestone

Kurnool16%

Nellore15%

Anantapur10%

Kadapa12%

Prakasan5%

Others42%

Source: Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licences 2003,Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 9-10

GRAPH 1: Distribution of minesThe top five districts account for 58 per cent of the mines

M I N I N G I N T H E S TAT E S

Andhra Pradesh

m k

112


c m y k

Adilabad

Nizamabad Karim Nagar

Medak Sangareddi

Rangareddi

Mahbubnagar

Kurnool

Anantapur

Chittoor

Kadapa

Ongole

Nellore

Guntur Krishna

Warangal

Khammam

WestGodavari

Vishakhapatnam

SrikakulamVizianagaram

Nalgonda

ANDHRA PRADESH

KA

RN

ATA

KA

CHHATTISGARH

ORISSA

TAMIL NADU

BAY

OF

BENGAL

East Godavari

MAHARASHTRA

Nadari

Palleru

Manneru

Nagarjuna Sagar

Penneru

Krishna

Godavari

Searnamukhi

Chey

yeruPa

pagn

i

Ch

arav

ati

Pen

ner

u

Kunder

Saglleru

Gundla Kamma

Akeru

Palleru

Munsi

Bhima

Maher

Pranhita

Ind

rava

ti

NizamSagar

Pulicat Lake

Banshadhara

KolleruLake

Nagavati

Slleru

Krishna Protests: Bauxite and uranium

mining are facing the

maximum resistance

Open forests

Dense forests

River

Limestone

Bauxite

Manganese

Graphite

Mica

Gypsum

Silica sand

Iron

Uranium

Asbestos

Coal/lignite


MAP: Minerals and forestsAndhra Pradesh has the third largest diversion of forests for mining in the country

Andhra Pradesh produced about Rs 6,200 crore worth ofminerals, accounting for about eight per cent of the total value ofminerals produced in the country, in 2004-05.5 If the offshore min-eral value is not considered, then the state’s contribution to thecountry’s mineral value becomes 11 per cent.6 The value of miner-als produced in the state has gone up two-fold between 1997-98and 2004-05. The growth was significant in the initial years – espe-cially between 1999-00 and 2001-02 – when it ranged between 28to 16 per cent per annum. The growth was only one per centbetween 2003-04 and 2004-05 (see Graph 4: Trends in mineral value).

The mineral with the lion’s share in the total mineral value

generated in the state is coal, accounting for 53 per cent (as on2004-05).7 Minor minerals contribute another 30 per cent, whilelimestone is a distant third with only four per cent (see Graph 5:Contribution of minerals to total value).

The state collected about Rs 864 crore as royalty from mineralsin 2004-05, which accounted for a meagre three per cent of totalrevenue receipts in the state (see Table 2 on page 114: Royalty frommining).8 Mining provides employment, directly and indirectly, toabout five lakh people in the state.9 One of the reasons for the highemployment is the important position held by minor minerals,which employ more numbers.

113

MINING IN THE STATES: ANDHRA PRADESH

c m y k

Coal53%

Minor minerals30%

Others10%

Petroleum2%

Barytes1%

Limestone4%

Source: Based on data from anon, 2006, ‘State Reviews’, Indian MineralsYearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur

GRAPH 5: Contribution of minerals to total value Coal accounts for more than 50 per cent of mineral value

10%

Guntur9%

Kurnool10%

Others25%

Anantapur7%

Adilabad7%

Rangareddi7%

Kadapa

Nalgonda11%

Nellore14%

Note: The data excludes fuel and minor mineralsSource: Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licences 2003,Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 9-10

GRAPH 2: Districts: the area under miningNellore is high in number of mines and area under mining

Limestone46%

Barytes4%

Quartz9%

Mica10%

Others31%

Note: The data excludes fuel and minor mineralsSource: Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licences 2003,Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 4

GRAPH 3: Area under different mineralsLimestone has the largest share of land under mining

6,237

2,9533,239

4,140

4,752

5,4745,911

6,144

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

1997-98

1998-99

1999-00

2000-01

2001-02

2002-03

2003-04

2004-05

Min

eral

val

ue

( in

Rs

cro

re)

Source: Analysis based on data from publications of the Indian Bureau ofMines, Nagpur

GRAPH 4: Trends in mineral value Between 1997 and 2005, the value went up two fold

Because of its rich deposits of limestone, bauxite and coal, thestate is home to a number of cement and power plants. APCement Works, UltraTech Cements Ltd, Madras Cements-Jayantipuram and Andhra Cements Ltd are some of the big namesin cement (see Box: Limestone and Andhra Pradesh). Aluminiumcompanies such as Jindal South-West Housing Ltd (JSWHL) havebeen eyeing the bauxite wealth of the state, while the UraniumCorporation of India Ltd (UCIL) is also in the race for mining –but both these moves have met with stiff resistance. UCIL’s foraysin Nalgonda district have put at stake the region’s water bodies,livelihoods, and even the Rajiv Gandhi Tiger Sanctuary. Similarly,the JSWHL plan threatens to uproot tribals from lands and forestswhich they have inhabited for centuries.

What Andhra Pradesh really requires is stricter implementa-tion of its mining regulations. And this is a need which is beingfelt more acutely as the state continues on its spiral of mining andindustrialisation. Andhra Pradesh must realise that progress can-not be at the expense of its people, their livelihoods and ecology.

114


c m y k

Mineral royalty Total revenue Royalty as percentage(in crore) receipt (in crore) of total revenue receipt

2002-03 769.9 23,002.92 3.3

2003-04 766.6 26,868.5 2.9

2004-05 864.5 28,749.51 3

Source: Revenue receipt data from the Reserve Bank of India; mineralroyalty data from Anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-levelCommittee, Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi

TABLE 2: Royalty from miningMining’s revenue share remains constant at three per cent Limestone and Andhra Pradesh

Though the sector has largely escaped the public furyassociated with uranium or bauxite mining, it has its shareof problems: impact on groundwater, air pollution anddamage due to blasting

Andhra Pradesh holds India’s biggest limestone reserves: more than30 per cent of the nation’s total lies within the state’s boundaries.Themineral is abundantly found in Nalgonda, Kurnool, Kadapa,Adilabad, Anantapur, Karimnagar, Krishna and Rangareddy districtsof the state. As a result, many leading cement manufacturers havemade these districts their base.

Though the mining of limestone has not received the same kind of unwelcome attention or protests as in the case of uranium orbauxite mining, there have been environmental and social implica-tions at the ground level. Most of these impacts are similar to theeffects exercised by open-cast mining operations.

One of the major complaints of local communities living near limestone mines is related to the alteration of the groundwaterprofile of the region. For example, communities near the limestone mines of UltraTech (in Anantapur), Zuari Cement (inKadapa), and India Cement and Andhra Cement (in Guntur) allege that deep mining operations in these regions have breached the groundwater.This has led to acute shortage of water forthe people.

Damage to structures due to blasting and fugitive dust are the other environmental problems associated with limestone mining, as highlighted by these communities. Mining by large-scalecement plants involves storage and transportation of vast quantities of limestone. Most often, limestone is stored in the open, leading to large amounts of fugitive dust and severe air pollution as a result.

Blasting during mining is also a key cause for disaffection: themedia has reported extensively of the damage to property due tooperations of the Zuari limestone mines in Kadapa. The newspaperEenadu (September 19, 2000) published an exclusive report on thedamage inflicted by the blasting operations of this company and howit has affected the lives of the people.

Local people had also lodged a complaint, which resulted in aninspection visit by a team of rural development officers and the localMLA. The team recovered and seized 600 kg of gelatine, and a case was filed against the unit in the local police station. In responseto another complaint by villagers of Tnumamapalli, the mandalexecutive magistrate issued a notice to the unit to improve its blasting operations. These measures have had an impact: the company’s mining processes have improved.

This is not an isolated case: blasting operations at the mines ofIndia Cement in Guntur have interfered with the social life of the local communities, who report that blasting is conducted randomly at any time without any prior intimation. Residents ofVadapalli village add that the unannounced blasts seem and feel like earthquakes and had caused extensive damages to structures inthe vicinity.Large-scale limestone mining in Nalgonda has had a huge impact on

the local water regime

NIV

IT K

UM

AR

YAD

AV

/ C

SE

The flashpoints

■ NIMMALAPADU: FROM WHERE IT ALL BEGAN

In the parlance of mining, Andhra Pradesh has become synony-mous with Samata. Calcite mining in Nimmalapadu villagewould have led to the displacement of a large tribal populationwith devastating consequences – had it not been for the Samatajudgement of 1997. The judgement, which has become the pri-mary bugbear for state governments intent on ‘industrialisation’,set the pace for securing forest land from marauding developers.

Nimmalapadu is one of the 2,400 fertile and resource-rich trib-al villages in the hilly region of Paderu panchayat. The residents ofNimmalapadu are agriculturists who harvest three crops a year,having managed to divert a small stream into the village.

In 1987, few men wielding chisels, hammers, tapes and mag-nifying glasses descended on the village and started to dig. Soon,revenue officials appeared on the scene and asked the villagers tovacate. They offered Rs 5,000 per family. The people realised that“development work” was in progress to mine the abundant min-eral deposits in the area. Birla Periclase, owned by the Aditya Birlagroup, wanted to mine calcite from this tribal village to manufac-ture magnesia at its factory located 110 km away inVisakhapatnam. Determined not to allow mining in their village,the people of Nimmalapadu began a struggle against the govern-

ment and one of India’s leading business houses. Samata, an NGO based in Hyderabad, helped the villagers in

organising the agitation. On the advice of Samata, the villagersfiled a case in the High Court, which they lost in 1995. But Samatatook up the cause and filed a case in the Supreme Court on behalfof the villagers.

In a landmark judgment in 1997, which has come to bereferred to as the Samata judgment, the Court ruled that the Statehad no right to grant leases – even on government-owned forestland – to private companies on areas governed by the FifthSchedule of the Constitution and that only cooperative societiessolely run by scheduled tribes could mine in such areas, subject tocompliance with the Forest Conservation Act and the ForestProtection Act. The Andhra Pradesh government was directed tostop all private mining within Scheduled Areas.

Birla Periclase had to abandon its Rs 250-crore investment inNimmalapadu. A spacious black-topped road, built by the compa-ny to transport calcite from the mines, remains a metaphor for thevillage’s ‘independence struggle’. Nobody walks on that road. Itis used for husking and drying paddy. “We don’t have to use it forwalking as we hardly go out. Our own resources are enough for asurplus economy,” says a resident.

The state authorities, of course, are out in force against theSamata judgement and Nimmalapadu (see Box on page 116:Retribution: Nimmalapadu today). But the people of Andhra Pradeshhave refused to be cowed down. Another example of their courageis held up by ‘Jaduguda in the making’ – Nalgonda.10

115


c m y k

The epic 10-year struggle of Nimmalapadu’s residents against mining led to the landmark Samata judgement

SUN

ITA

NA

RAIN

/ C

SE

■ NALGONDA: DEVASTATION FORETOLD

On April 10, 2006, inspite of all the oppositions and protests by thepeople, the Union ministry of environment and forests (MoEF)gave environmental clearance to the proposed uranium mine ofUCIL at Nalgonda’s Lambapur and Peddagattu villages and aprocessing plant at Seripally.

The mines have 11.02 MT of uranium ore, which will beextracted in about 20 years. The total leased mining area coversabout 527 ha and the processing plant at Seripally is spread over278 ha. UCIL will spend around Rs 400 crore on the project.

“There is radiation everywhere on earth. Mining in Nalgondawill not increase it”: this comment by S D Prasad, adviser toUCIL, typifies Indian authorities’ insouciant disregard for theimpact of uranium mining on human health and environment.The project has seen everything – initial rejection by the pollutioncontrol board, unsatisfactory public hearing, massive publicprotests and even an attack from the People’s War Group (PWG).It was opposed right from the beginning by peoples’ representa-tives, environmental groups and local tribal communities livingaround the proposed mines. The opposition to the project forcedthe state government to constitute a technical committee, which

studied the UCIL project at Jaduguda in Jharkhand. The commit-tee gave a clean chit to UCIL, and the state government agreed togo ahead with the project.

The project was then opposed by the Consent forEstablishment (CFE) committee of the Andhra Pradesh StatePollution Control Board (APPCB). The committee came to theconclusion that a processing plant at Mallapuram could not beallowed because of its proximity to Nagarjunasagar reservoir. Thereservoir already has uranium concentration in the range of two-three µg/l, which is below WHO standards, but the committeebelieved that mining in this area could increase the leaching intothe reservoir.11 For the proposed mine in Lambapur-Peddagattu,the technical committee of the state government had suggestedsafeguards for its operations. However, the CFE committee decid-ed not to consider UCIL’s request for consent at the proposed siteas the suggestions and recommendations of the technical commit-tee were “impracticable and go against the universally acceptedprecautionary principle”. To pacify the Board, UCIL decided toshift its processing plant from Mallapuram to Seripally, which is20 km from the reservoir.

The public hearing for the project was mired in controversy. Tohave a ‘smooth’ public hearing, the APPCB planned the hearing

116


c m y k

Retribution: Nimmalapadu todayThe government has blacklisted the village

The people of Nimmalapadu are not being allowed to remain in peace;despite the Court ruling, private companies are pressuring them to selltheir land to allow mining operations. And because of the agitation,government largesse has become scarce.The village is blacklisted as faras development activities are concerned. Says B Ramanna, a tribal vil-lager: "The result of the Samata judgement is that officials do notemploy us as contract labourers or implement development schemessuch as drinking water supply in our hamlet. We do not even get thingslike tiles for our houses."

The mining blasts which had been carried out during explorationhad shaken the foundations of houses in the village. They had led toerosion of topsoil and hampered the seepage of rainwater. Recallingthe 10-year struggle, Somanna, a tribal villager, says: "Even a samplemine exploration testing left us devastated. Several families, includinga whole hamlet, were displaced. Many houses were destroyed and landwas taken forcibly (meagre amounts were given as compensation) forbuilding the road. The exploration has left deep holes that make theland uncultivable."

The judgement today is the biggest thorn in the sides of those whohave a vested interest in inviting private and foreign mining companiesinto such areas. In fact, the state and Central governments are now try-ing to circumvent the Samata judgement. An amendment to the Minesand Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, which will changethe scenario to the advantage of these governments, is pending beforethe Parliament. Samata’s executive director, Ravi Rebbapragada, hopesthat the government at the Centre will be more sensitive to the miseryof the tribal people and ensure their well-being.

Despite being shunned by official agencies, the people ofNimmalapadu are far from despondent

THE

HIN

DU

for the project at remote Peddagattu village on August 19, 2003.Strong protests marked the meeting, where the officials failed tocome up with satisfactory answers to people’s queries on healthhazards. The Board was forced to arrange another hearing on thesame day at the relatively accessible Pedda Adiserapally (theblock development headquarters) after the state’s High Courtintervened. The second hearing saw the presence of a large policeforce – the people’s movement was monitored strictly.

Before the hearings, allurements such as employment oppor-tunities had been dangled to win over the residents. “The author-ities have told us that Mallapuram will be transformed into amallepuvvu (jasmine) and developed on a par with hi-techHyderabad,” said Satyanarayana, a carpenter who was planningto sell his 1.21 ha land to the company.

UCIL informed the gathering that only a fraction of the area tobe acquired would come under forest land. But the fact is thatabout 445 ha out of the total site area of 527 ha lies in theYellapuram reserve forest. The buffer zone of the notified RajivGandhi Tiger Sanctuary falls within this belt.

On January 16, 2004, the MoEF approved the denotification of1,000 ha of the Rajiv Gandhi Tiger Reserve and 1,000 ha of reserveforest in Chitral to allow UCIL to carry out exploratory drilling foruranium.12

Experts charged the company with remaining mum on thefallout from the possible contamination of water bodies located inthe area. They contended that the proposed mines are just one kmfrom human habitation, hardly 10 km from the Nagarjunasagardam and barely four km from Akkampalli reservoir –Hyderabad’s new source of drinking water. The MovementAgainst Uranium Project (MAUP), a state-level umbrella group of20 civil society organisations, emphasised that radioactive minewastes would enter these water bodies.

When pressed on the issue of radiation hazards, the compa-ny’s managing director said, “The people will not be adverselyaffected and there will be no threat to any water body.” He justi-fied his stand claiming that “there is no documented proof of anyuranium mine accident in India.” He also added that the uraniumcontent in the Nalgonda ore is only 0.02 per cent, while in coun-tries like Canada, it is much higher at 2-12 per cent. This translatesinto lower risk.13

Considering the ratio of uranium in the Nalgonda ore (0.02per cent), only 2,200 tonne of useful uranium will be extractedduring the entire life of the mines. Thus after mining for 20 years,the place will be left with 10.9 MT of waste, predominantlyradioactive in nature, with no regulatory mechanism to containthe tailings.14

The public hearing for the relocated processing plant atSeripally was organised by the Board on March 3, 2005. About1,500 villagers, concerned citizens and civil society groups attend-ed, under the shadow of heavy police presence. All through theproceedings, the villagers vociferously expressed their oppositionto the project. Many people in the hearing questioned the decisionto relocate the project – if the project was bad for Mallapuram,how could it be good for Seripally, they asked. The uranium orefrom Lambapur-Peddagattu will have to be transported over 50

km to the processing plant at Seripally, passing through a numberof villages and tribal hamlets. The decision of the public hearingwas not conveyed to those gathered. They were informed by thedistrict collectorate that the minutes of the meeting would be sub-mitted to the expert panel reviewing the clearance of the project.

The MAUP continued its agitation against UCIL and the proj-ect. A demonstration was held in Nalgonda in front of the office ofthe environment engineer, APPCB, on October 25, 2005. Theactivists also arranged a protest walk on January 3, 2006 tomobilise public support against the project. They reachedDevarakonda after covering about 40 villages and hamlets andaddressed many roadside meetings to educate students and villagers on the ill-effects of uranium. The issue was also raised bythe opposition on March 9, 2006 in the state assembly. The mainopposition Telugu Desam Party, Telangana Rashtra Samiti,Communist Party of India, Communist Party of India-Marxist,

117


c m y k

Kadapa: lessons not learntUranium beckons, again

In February 2006, Andhra Pradesh chief minister Y S RajasekharaReddy announced that the state might have another uranium minevery soon. In fact, the new mine in Kadapa district might even takeprecedence over the project in Nalgonda.

The Kadapa project, estimated to cost Rs 1,030 crore,involves the extraction of uranium from underground mines in 879ha spread over five villages – Mabbuchintalapalle, Thummalapalle,Rajukuntapalle, Bhoomayagaripalle and Kottala. UCIL expects toextract 3,000 tonne of ore per day. The lifespan of the project is stated to be 30 years and its employment potential is just under 1,000 people.

The project has been opposed by the Movement AgainstUranium Project (MAUP), which says that it is neither technicallyfeasible nor financially viable. The organisation alleged that the EIAreport for the project did not qualify to be a full report, as the baseline data measurement was limited only to winter as against allthree seasons required for such a report. Moreover, the average quality of the ore was very low – only 0.04 per cent. Mining and processing of the ore would invariably contaminate air, soil,underground and surface water.

The public hearing for the project was held at Thummalapalle onSeptember 10, 2006. More than 100 protestors were baton-chargedand driven away by the police when they tried to prevent the hearing.In a press release, members of the NGO Mines, Minerals and People(MM&P) said "a public hearing based on irrelevant pronouncementsis a mere formality and cannot be construed as obtaining the consentof people in a democratic manner". They also questioned the need fortaking up such mining in a densely populated area.

The MAUP wrote to the member secretary of the AndhraPradesh Pollution Control Board, calling the public hearing a “mockery”. It demanded that the hearing be treated as null and voidand a fresh one be conducted after giving adequate notice, in a freeand transparent manner under the supervision of an impartial body.

Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen and Bharatiya Janata Party said theproject would not only affect the people of Nalgonda, but will alsopose a threat to the state capital by polluting the source of itsdrinking water.

But all these protests and concerns did not deter the MoEFfrom clearing the project.

■ BAUXITE BRAWL IN THE EASTERN GHATS

Besides calcite and uranium, Andhra Pradesh is also up in flamesover bauxite. JSWHL wants to set up a smelter and refinery at aninvestment of about Rs 9,000 crore.15 Under the project, bauxiteore will be extracted by the Andhra Pradesh MineralDevelopment Corporation from the hill ranges betweenPapikonda in East Godavari to Sileru and Krishna Devipeta inVisakhapatnam district. However, the project is being opposed byenvironmentalists, NGOs and the Andhra Pradesh GirijanaSangham (APGS) on various environmental issue (see Box: Recipefor a water-starved future?). Bauxite mining in the area, say the agi-tationists, will cause environmental disaster and displace tribals,in addition to destroying forests. It also violates Regulation 1 of 70of the Andhra Tribal Land Transfer (Prevention) Act. JSWHL haspromised 0.5 per cent of the revenue earned from the project, esti-mated at around Rs 10 crore, for development of the region.

Amenities like schools, drinking water and housing have beenassured for about 100 villages. The company also promisesemployment to each displaced family (one member), though itdoes not mention the kind of job it will offer.

Some of the local tribals were taken on a trip to Damanjodi inOrissa by the Integrated Tribal Development Agency (ITDA) toshow them the progress made there after NALCO set up an alu-minium plant. However, the ‘brainwashing process’ did not seemto have delivered the expected results. Korra Nookamma, oneamong the 47 tribals who went to Damanjodi, says: “We are notbothered about the hospitality. We were perturbed when the trib-als in Koraput told us that the public sector NALCO did not pro-vide them jobs. Those who were displaced were not given suitablecompensation.”

A public hearing for the project held in November 2006 inVisakhapatnam turned stormy, and several agitating personswere forcibally removed. Farmers from Sabbavaram mandal weredenied entry into the venue of the meeting. Despite these gaggingmoves, the people did manage to express their reservations aboutthe project. JSWHL has now shifted the site of its operations fromVizianagaram to Srungavarapukota district, but the protests havenot died down. The tribals refuse to budge from their bauxite-richlands; they contend that they should have been consulted beforepermission to mine was granted.

118


c m y k

Rage: the UCIL’s uranium mining project in Visakhapatnam is facing the ire of the local people

S RA

MA

KRI

SHN

A

119


c m y k

Recipe for a water-starved future?Bauxite mining can dry up the Eastern Ghats’ water sources

Andhra Pradesh’s zest for bauxite can spell doom for the ‘life-giving’hills and their water bodies in the Eastern Ghats. Rivers likeVamsadhara, Nagavali, Gosthani and Yelaru originate from the Ghatsand are the main source of drinking water for thousands of people inthe cities, towns and villages of Andhra Pradesh.

According to the state government’s Forest Department (FD), min-ing will endanger the environment of Eastern Ghats and affect itsspecies diversity. The FD had submitted a report to the Union ministryof environment and forests stating that mining will drastically reducewater supply to the plain areas and also pollute water sources and bod-ies extensively. Another study by Kalpavriksh, a Pune-based NGO, in2003 had clearly indicated that bauxite mining in Visakhapatnam dis-trict would adversely affect the river systems of Gosthani, Machkand,Sileru and Sharada. Several experts in the fields of geology and miningas well as environmentalists have expressed their apprehensions thatbauxite mining would compound the problem of scarcity of water fordrinking purposes and agriculture.

The Andhra Pradesh government has set its sights on seven baux-ite deposits in this region: Galikonda (14.5 MT), Raktakonda (8.5 MT),Chittamgondi (28 MT), Sapparla (186 MT), Gudem (38 MT), Jerrela(246 MT) and Gurtedu (43 MT). In case the government’s proposedplan materialises, districts that would bear the brunt of mining and theresultant water drought will be East Godavari, Vizianagram,Visakhapatnam and Srikakulam. Around 19 rivers and 27 reservoirswould be affected in these districts.

Moreover, bauxite mining and its associated infrastructure – alumi-na refineries, aluminium smelters, etc – guzzle up a lot of water. In fact,the concretionary nature of bauxite itself makes it well suited for waterretention.

According to estimates by the Hyderabad-based NGO Samata,together, these would use up more than 14 lakh cubic metre (cu m) ofwater per year (see Table: The bauxite-water equations).

Add to this the 146 lakh cu m that just one alumina refinery willuse up, and more than 32 lakh cu m that an aluminum smelter willconsume, and you have a total water usage of about 193 lakh cu mevery year. According to Samata, this water would be adequate to meetthe requirements of more than 10 lakh people for one year.

– Ravi Rebbapragada, Samata, Hyderabad

Location Operations Water consumption Reserves Life of operation Water per year Water for life of per day (lt) (MT) (years) (in kilolitre) mine (in kilolitre)

Galikonda Mining 142 14.5 10 51,830 5,18,300

Rakthakonda Mining 106 8.5 10 38,690 3,86,900

Chitamgondi Mining 186 28 12 67,890 8,14,680

Sapparla Mining 1,300.00 186.25 25 4,74,500 11,862,500

Gudem Mining 255 38.41 15 93,075 1,396,125

Jerrela Mining 1,625.00 246.04 40 5,93,125 23,725,000

Gurtedu Mining 275.00 42.63 15 1,00,375 1,505,625

Source: Ravi Rebbapragada, 2007, presentation at the ‘First Anil Agarwal Media Briefing Workshop and Dialogue on Mining, Environment and People’, April 26-27, 2007, New Delhi

TABLE: The bauxite-water equations

Bauxite mountain: Galikonda, with its 14 MT of deposits, is one ofthe regions in the state government’s crosshairs

THE

HIN

DU

120

c m y k

Carved out of Madhya Pradesh in the year 2000, Chhattisgarhreceived most of the parent state’s wealth, including its

forests and mineral reserves. But as is the case with most mineral-rich states in India, most of this wealth co-exists with biodiversity-rich forests. Extraction of this wealth, naturally, hasbecome a contentious issue – more so because almost all ofChhattisgarh’s tribal population also lives in this same zone (see Map: Minerals and forests).

■ MINERS’ PARADISE

Chhattisgarh is one of the richest states in India in terms of mineral wealth, producing 28 major minerals.1 The key mineralsare coal and iron ore. Around 16 per cent of India’s coal is inChhattisgarh; it also holds 10 per cent of the country’s iron ore,five per cent of its limestone, five per cent of its bauxite and 88 percent of its tin.2 The state accounts for almost one-third of the dia-mond reserves of the country as well.3

The mineral reserves are distributed across the state; the richest districts, however, are Bastar, Surguja, Korba andDantewada – they, incidentally, are also tribal-dominated and themost forested. These are also the districts where most of the newmining and industrialisation projects are coming up.

Chhattisgarh is the fifth largest contributor to the value ofminerals produced in India. It ranks sixth in contribution to fuelmineral value, third in metallic mineral value and sixth in non-metallic mineral value. According to the IBM, in 2004-05,the state produced minerals valued at more than Rs 5,049 crore,which accounted for seven per cent of the total mineral value ofIndia (including offshore mineral value). The share of the statewould have been higher at around nine per cent if the offshorecontribution was not considered.

The state’s contribution to mineral value has been growing infits and spurts. It dipped in 2000-01, took a quantum jump the following year, slumped again in 2003-04, and recorded a growthof 14 per cent in 2004-05 (see Graph 1 on page 122: Trends in min-eral value). The years that witnessed major jumps are also the yearsin which higher production of iron ore and bauxite was recorded.

Coal and iron ore together account for 94 per cent of the totalmineral value produced by the state (see Graph 2 on page 122:Minerals and their value). Expectedly, coal, iron ore and limestoneare produced in large volumes. Production of coal from the state has steadily gone up between 2001-02 and 2004-05, and sohas the production of bauxite, iron ore, tin concentrate, dolomite, limestone and quartzite (see Table 1 on page 122: Trendsin production).

CHAPTER 3 THE STATES: ORISSA

Red carpet: Chhattisgarh has abundant mineral resources and is one of the emerging destinations for mining companies

PATR

ICK

OSK

ARS

SON


Chhattisgarh

121

MINING IN THE STATES: CHHATTISGARH

c m y k


MAP: Minerals and forestsMineral-rich districts of the state hold the densest forests

Surguja

Koriya

Korba

BilaspurRaigarh

Rajnan

dgaon

Kabirdham

Mahasamund

Janjgir

Bastar

Dhamtari

Kanker

Dantewada

Jashpur

Mah

anad

i

Seo

nat

h

GovindBallabh

Pant Sagar

Hirakud

Indravati

Khar

un

Has

od

Man

d

JHARKHAND

UTTARPRADESH

MADHYAPRADESH

MAHARASHTRA

ANDHRAPRADESH

O R I S S A

RaipurCHHATTISGARH

Durg

Protests: Mostly against ironore and coal mines

Open forests

Dense forests

River

Lead

Coal/lignite

Limestone

Dolomite

Iron

Gold

Bauxite

Diamond

Tin

Almost 90,000 ha of land in the state is under mining ofmajor minerals and coal.4 The top five most mined districts inthe state are Korba, Koriya, Surguja, Raigarh and Durg: thesetogether account for 90 per cent of the total land under mining(see Graph 3: Districts – land under mining). Districts likeDantewada, which have drawn most of the new investments, areyet to join this list.

There are 344 mining leases in the state: around 34 per cent ofthese are for limestone. According to the state’s Department ofMines and Geology, dolomite and coal also account for a signifi-cant number of mine leases: 24 and 16 per cent, respectively.

The mining and quarrying sector is very important for thestate’s economy. Its contribution to the state’s GDP in 2001-02 was

12 per cent5 (this is without taking into account the contributionof mineral-based industries). The state collected a revenue of Rs 694 crore from the sector in 2004-05. In terms of contribution tothe total revenue receipt of the state, mining’s share was between10-11 per cent (see Table 2: Revenues from mining); however, theshare shows an overall decreasing trend.

Major minerals are the mainstay of the state’s economy,accounting for, on an average, 99 per cent of the total royalty collected by the state. Coal is the key contributor with an averageof 74 per cent. Of the rest, iron ore contributes 20 per cent andbauxite, three per cent.6 Chhattisgarh loses revenue due to illegalmining, especially of diamonds (see Box: Lawless).

The state has recently seen a spate of mining and mineral-

122


Unit 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05

Coal ‘000 t 53,621 56,758 61,505 69,081

Bauxite t 5,56,450 6,10,777 8,88,326 11,08,297

Iron ore ‘000 t 18,660 19,781 23,361 23,118

Tin conc. Kg 13,887 10,630 15,576 23,502

Dolomite t 8,55,391 9,17,719 10,05,119 11,36,763

Kaolin t 168 1,535 2,167 2,970

Limestone ‘000 t 13,149 13,626 13,833 14,772

Quartzite t – 11,834 26,158 26,213

Steatite t 500 700 352 –

Source: Anon 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,Nagpur, pp 11-22; Anon, 2005, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2004, Indian Bureauof Mines, Nagpur, pp 206

TABLE 1: Trends in production Most minerals have recorded an increase

5,050

3,837

3,728 4,586

4,447

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05

Min

eral

val

ue

pro

du

ced

(in

Rs

cro

re)

Years


GRAPH 1: Trends in mineral valueMineral value has grown, but in spurts

Coal74.2%

Bauxite1.0%

Iron ore20.2%

Others0.6%

Limestone3.1%

Minor minerals0.9%

Source: Based on analysis from Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005,Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 11-22

GRAPH 2: Minerals and their valueCoal accounts for almost three-fourth of the mineral value

Raipur4%

Durg5%

Korba37%

Raigarh6%

Surguja16%

Koriya26%

Others3%

Dantewada3%

Source: Based on information from documents from the Department of Minesand Geology, government of Chhattisgarh, Raipur

GRAPH 3: Districts – land under miningDistricts with big coalfields lead the way

m k

based industrial projects. Its 2001 mineral policy has made provi-sions to attract both domestic and international private invest-ments by simplifying procedures. Chhattisgarh is promising aminimum lease area with secured land rights so that investors cansafely commit large resources to mining projects. Quick process-ing of lease applications has been given the top priority. For majorminerals under the MMDR Act, approvals are required from theCentre; the state government is helping with strong advocacy toget such approvals quickly.

Between 1996 and 2003, Chhattisgarh received over US $105million worth of FDI; the basic metals and mineral industry, suchas steel and aluminium, accounted for more than 85 per cent ofthis investment.7 Most of the industries with a presence in the

state (SAIL, BALCO) are planning to expand, while there also arethe new entrants like TISCO and Essar Steel. Besides, the state isalso witnessing the sprouting of numerous sponge iron plants.The Surguja, Raigarh and Bilaspur belts are already home to theSouth Eastern Coalfields (SECL), a subsidiary of Coal India Ltd. Inrecent years, Chhattisgarh has received much attention for its diamond reserves (see Box on page 125: India’s diamond bowl?).

For the newborn state, mining has definite economic benefits. But in its overdrive to tap the resources mining offers,the state government has been ignoring the disastrous impactsmining has on environment and people. The clamour over risingpollution levels has reached the corridors of power – in 2006,three Bharatiya Janata Party members of the state legislatureaccused their own party-led government of having failed to control industrial pollution in the tribal-dominated Bastarregion. “Sponge, crusher and other industries are polluting theatmosphere and the government is doing nothing to check that,”said Lachchuram Kashyap, one of the MLAs. He added thatcroplands were becoming barren because of the pollution bythese industries, and that this had driven the people of theregion to protest against the industries. An industry in Keshlur area of Bastar was closed for three days in January 2006following stiff opposition from villagers.8

The government, of course, claimed the contrary.Environment minister Ganesh Ram Bhagat says that there is nopollution in Bastar and that the government monitors pollutionlevels periodically.9

123


LawlessIllegal mining of diamonds is resulting in huge losses

Nearly 1,500 illegal mining cases were detected in Chhattisgarh in2001. Of these, 587 cases were of illegal mining and 834 of illegal trans-portation of minerals – Rs 13 lakh was recovered from the offenders.1

Chhattisgarh regularly loses crores due to the illegal mining of dia-monds and precious stones in the Deobhog and Mainpur regions. This,when the state is yet to begin mining diamonds itself. As soon as newsspread in the 1990s that the tribal state had rich deposits of diamonds,there was a mad rush from within and outside the state to get richquickly by frantic digging in the regions where diamondiferous kimber-lite rocks are known to exist. Kantibhai Patel, who came down fromGujarat to Mainpur along with his friends, was arrested on charges ofsmuggling of diamonds. Law enforcement agencies have also nabbed anumber of businessmen from Maharashtra and Orissa on the samecharges. Interestingly, diamonds that are in the possession of theChhattisgarh Mineral Development Corporation, are all confiscated.2

A member of the Kamar tribal community living near Deobhog,seemingly unaware about the prohibition on illegal mining, says: “Icannot read, I cannot write, I do mining in search of precious gemsincluding diamonds to feed my children and wife.”The deposits areeasily accessible: the shallow kimberlite can be mined simply by siftinggravel in riverbeds, plains or forest areas. The state government hasdispatched its Special Armed Forces personnel to track down the

illegal miners, but they continue to operate unchecked.Farooq Memon, a journalist who first reported the probable exis-

tence of diamonds in Mainpur in the early ‘90s, says that middlemenand dealers of precious stones have become rich at the cost of localtribals, who are encouraged to dig diamonds illegally in return forpaltry goods or money.

Men of the Special Armed Forces guard prospective mine sites

EJA

Z K

AIS

ER

2002-03 2003-04 2004-05

Mineral royalty 552.4 637.2 694.6

Total revenue receipt 5,417.3 5,959.3 7,248.9

Royalty as percentage of total 10.2 10.7 9.6revenue receipt

Source: Revenue receipt data from the Reserve Bank of India and mineralroyalty data from anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-levelCommittee, Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi

TABLE 2: Revenues from mining (Rs crore)10 per cent of the state’s income comes from mining

m k

124


c m y k

What large tracts of Chhattisgarh look like: extensive coal mining in Korba has defaced the landscape

PATR

ICK

OSK

ARS

SON

■ NATURAL RESOURCES – AT THREAT

The minister’s contentions notwithstanding, Chhattisgarh todayis facing environmental challenges such as destruction of forestsand pollution of rivers, and witnessing public protests due to dis-placement from mining and industrial projects. The problem isaggravated because Chhattisgarh’s mineral wealth co-exists withits forests.

The state forms a part of the extended river basin of four majorrivers – the Mahanadi, Godavari, Narmada and the Ganga. Thereare 12 rivers in the state with a combined length of 1,885 km. Mostof these rivers traverse through mineral-bearing districts. Forexample, the Indravati passes through iron-rich belts of Bastar andDantewada while the Mahanadi courses through Raigarh andRaipur. The Hasdeo river flows through the coal-rich belt of Korbaand Koriya while the Rihand and Kanhar flow through Surguja.

The existence of many of these rivers is today threatened bymining and mineral-based industries. Pollution of the tributaries

of the Indravati due to iron ore mining by the National MineralDevelopment Corporation (NMDC) has been well documented.According to the Koriya District Report, the groundwater in the dis-trict is contaminated due to mining activities.10 Digma village ofAmbikapur block in Surguja district also reports a decline in thewater table. The District Report mentions that earlier, the peopleused to dig to a depth of 25 to 30 feet to reach water, but now theyhave to dig up to 60 to 70 feet. There are similar reports, especial-ly from villages where industry and mining compete for limitedwater resources.11

According to the official website of Chhattisgarh, 44 per cent ofits land is under forests, which make up 12 per cent of the nation’sforest land. Most of the dense forests are concentrated in the north-ern districts of Surguja, Koriya, Jaspur and Korba and the southerndistricts of Bastar, Kanker and Dantewada – regions rich in miner-al resources (see Table 3: Districts, minerals and forests).

In fact, all the mineral districts in the state have high forestcover exceeding more than 30 per cent of their geographic areas.

125


India’s diamond bowl?Chhattisgarh’s diamonds will rule global markets, believesthe state’s chief minister

Chhattisgarh is all set to become the nation’s diamond bowl before thedecade is out, claims its chief minister Raman Singh. According to him:“Diamonds will earn annual revenues of Rs 25,000 crore (US $5.7billion) for the state in three years.” He adds that seven companies,including De Beers, would start mining in the state by 2008.

South Africa's De Beers and Diamond Prospecting Pvt Ltd are car-rying out surveys along the 3,975 sq km stretch in Kanker, Dhamtari,Durg and Rajnandgaon districts. Mining MNC Rio Tinto has obtainedan aerial survey license for parts of Jaspur, Mahasamund and Raipurdistricts. It says it has detected a kimberlite-rich belt in Raipur. GeoMysore Services India has been prospecting in Kanker, Rajnandgaon

and Jaspur regions, while Admas Prospecting Pvt Ltd has been eyeinga 3,000 sq km area in Raipur and Mahasamund. Jindal Steel and PowerLtd (JSPL), which has a major industrial complex in Raigarh district,has also submitted a proposal for a diamond survey in Jaspur.

"Let 2008 come, Chhattisgarh will dictate diamond prices in worldmarkets and India will be the real diamond king," Singh said in aninterview. But state officials are not too sure. According to ShailendraTrivedi, senior director in the Chhattisgarh Mining DevelopmentCorporation, if the only diamond mines in the country at Panna can-not yield more than Rs 4 crore annually as royalty for the MadhyaPradesh government, what Chhattisgarh would get is doubtful.Officials are unanimous that it would still take more than a decade toexploit diamonds commercially through mining activities.

– Ejaz Kaiser, CSE media fellow, Raipur

District Minerals Area under Percentage of state's Geographic area undermining (ha) forest in district forest cover in district (%)

Dantewada Tin ore, iron ore and corrandum 2,010.51 20.23 64.24

Raipur Limestone, dolomite, diamond, granite 3,161.34 9.74 33.12

Korba Coal and bauxite 27,006.49 6.00 50.89

Raigarh Coal, limestone and quartzite 4,484.01 4.55 35.93

Surguja Coal and bauxite 12,232.87 12.84 45.71

Koriya Coal and fireclay 19,565.01 1.72 62.63

Source: Anon, 2005, State of Forest Report 2006, Forest Survey of India, Dehradun, pp 51; and information from the Department of Mines and Geology,

government of Chhattisgarh, Raipur

TABLE 3: Districts, minerals and forestsMost mining districts have more than 30 per cent of their area under forests

m k

In the case of Dantewada, Korba and Koriya, the forest cover is asmuch as 64, 51 and 63 per cent respectively.

According to the chief conservator of forest (CCF) land man-agement’s office, around 12,598 ha of forest land was cleared formining projects between 1985 and 2005 in the state.12 Dantewada,which accounts for 20 per cent of the forest cover of the state, hasaround 2,010 ha of land under mining for iron ore, tin and corran-dum. The Dantewada District Report indicts the mining for thedestruction of the district’s forest wealth: one-third ofDantewada’s forests have been degraded – this, when 40 per centof livelihoods in the district are forest-based.13 In Koriya, theDistrict Reports say that coal dust from coal-handling plants blan-kets agricultural fields and affects the yields adversely. Accordingto the District Report of Durg, red water from the mines in Daundiblock has reduced the productivity of the land.14

Data given to the parliament on the diversion of forest land tomining projects in the state says that about 14,421 ha of forest landhas been diverted between 1980-2005.15 The state ranks second interms of total forest land diverted for mining projects in the coun-try – accounting for 15 per cent.16

This is not surprising: the state government views the ForestConservation Act (FCA), 1980 as a liability. The state’s perspec-tive is very clear. It does not wish to be a loser in the race for rev-enues and other benefits from mines and minerals. The govern-ment, however, couches its intentions by claiming that it is seek-ing an amendment not exclusively for mining, but for distribut-ing land pattas to tribals and for development. It claims to have

already earmarked 50,000 pattas for tribals in forest land, but isunable to give them due to the FCA.17 Chhattisgarh chief minister Raman Singh has said that the Act, besides deprivingtribals of land pattas, is also a snag for various development programmes. “We cannot go for electrification, build dams orconstruct roads,” Singh complained.

But Chhattisgarh’s culture, tradition and livelihoods are inex-tricably linked to its forests (see Box: “We exist because forestsexist”). This high dependence and reliance on forests is commonto almost all the forest-rich districts. In fact, nine per cent of ruralwage earners in the southern districts of the state depend on forest produce; the figure for northern districts is six per cent.

The state government, however, is not letting anything comein its way of getting projects in forest areas cleared. According torecords maintained by the office of CCF land management, with-in five years of the formation of the state, 26 mining projects havebeen cleared under the FCA. Eighty more projects are currentlypending with the MoEF for clearance.18

There are a number of cases where industries have triedbypassing the legislation and illegally exploiting forest land. TheBharat Aluminium Company Limited (BALCO), owned by theUK-based Vedanta, has come under the scanner for allegedlyencroaching on 405 ha of prime forest land and cutting downthousands of trees for its expansion project in 2005.19 “The compa-ny grabbed (this) government land and cut down 20,000 treeswithout taking permission from the agencies concerned,”Nankiram Kanwar, the then Chhattisgarh revenue minister, had

126


Predators: mining operations such as these, dotting Chhattisgarh’s hills, are almost waiting to nibble into the state’s remaining forests

m k

IAN

UM

EDA

said in May 2005. The day after Kanwar made these allegations,he was shifted to the agriculture ministry.

The Korba-based company has denied the charges andclaimed that the land had been allotted to it between 1968 and1975. The government has ordered a high-level inquiry and thecommissioner of land records has been asked to supervise theinvestigations. “After getting the report, the state government willtake the appropriate steps. The state government will not faltereven in razing the constructions done under the expansion plan,”Kanwar had said before he was shifted from the ministry.

Kanwar came to know about the company’s misdeeds follow-ing a complaint lodged by villagers. He set up an 11-member teamto verify the complaint. The report of the team clearly indicatedthat the company had encroached on land in complete violation ofthe FCA. The report also pointed out that construction of build-

ings, chimneys and other components of the plant had alreadybeen done.

Another case is that of Essar Steel Ltd, which had been permit-ted to cut trees in Bastar to create an 8.4 metre-wide corridor forlaying an underground pipeline to transport iron ore slurry toVizianagram in Andhra Pradesh. Instead, alleges Congress legis-lator Bhupesh Baghel, the company has created a 20 metre-widecorridor.20 Baghel also points out that the state forest departmentdid not do anything to prevent the destruction of the forest byEssar, except imposing a fine of Rs 95 lakh on it.

In October 2005, the Supreme Court (SC) issued a notice tothe Central and Chhattisgarh governments and others to file theirresponses to an application by Baghel against illegal mining andencroachment of forest land by BALCO, Essar Steel Ltd and others.21

There was another case where the SC had to step in and directthe public sector coal company, SECL, to compensate for miningin forest land. In 2006, the court directed the company to pay Rs 300 crore by October 2006 as compensation for using forestland in Chhattisgarh – this was in addition to the Rs 50 crorealready paid by the company to continue its operations in thestate.22 The counsel for the company had argued that since thecompany had one of the best records for protection of environ-ment and had also deposited Rs 50 crore as compensation, itshould be allowed coal-mining operations. The counsel for theMoEF countered by saying that the net present value and per-formance of compensatory afforestation cost for the forest land inconsideration was calculated to be in the range of Rs 600 crore.

The fact that mining is destroying the forests, even those beyondthe lease area, has been established scientifically in Chhattisgarh. Astudy undertaken in 2006 by the Indian Institute of Remote Sensing,Dehradun has conclusively documented the impact of mining activities on forest land and agricultural land in some of the miningdistricts of the state (see Box: Mining has a long reach).

127


“We exist because forests exist”People’s account of what forests mean to them – publishedin the District Report of Dakshin Bastar, Dantewada

“The forest is the very basis of our lives. We exist because the forestexists. Thus, we strive to protect the forest, at any cost. Our traditionsand rituals are closely linked to our forests and trees. We believe thatour forests are sacred because our gods and goddesses reside there.The saja, the saja mahua, the mahua semal, the mango, the semal karanji, the banyan, the banyan pipal, the pipal salfi trees are symbolsof good fortune and prosperity.The number of salfi trees in a house isan indicator of the wealth and prosperity of the household. The drinkthat is made from its fruit is an integral part of our culture. If thedrinks of salfi, chind and mahua are not offered in ceremonies of birth,death and marriage, the ceremonies are considered incomplete.People revere trees just as they revere their parents and their deities.”

Mining has a long reachMine lease area is a poor indicator of the impact of mining

A 2006 study by the Indian Institute of Remote Sensing, Dehradun eval-uated the impact of mining on the local landscape of Surguja,Manendragarh and Korba. It found that mining in Bishrampur inSurguja district, despite being limited in operations, has severely affect-ed the land pattern. Around 24 per cent of the forest cover of the areahas given way to barren (seven per cent) and degraded (12 per cent)land. A small area of the forest – four per cent – has been converted foragriculture. While assessing the impact of mining on agriculture, it wasfound that four per cent of agricultural land had been laid waste due tomining.

In Manendragarh district, though slightly more than one per centof the forest area was under active open cast mining in February 2003,the study found that around 18 per cent of the forest had been convert-ed into barren (highly affected) land, followed by around 44 per centinto degraded forest. The forest closest to the mines had been totally

converted into a non-forest area. When the water table is breachedwhile mining, small and scattered water bodies are formed. InManendragarh, around 0.06 per cent of the area had been convertedinto such water bodies.

Korba, the third district, has been identified as potentially the rich-est mining and industrial site in the region. Due to mining activity,around 78 per cent of the forest area had been highly affected.According to the study, six per cent of forest land had been complete-ly converted for industrial purposes; 55 per cent had changed into bar-ren and wasteland, and around 17 per cent had become highly degrad-ed forest. Around eight per cent of the agricultural land in Korba hadalso been converted into an industrial area.

This is one of the very few studies which actually proves the pointthat mine lease area is a poor indicator to ascertain the impact of min-ing on land and forests. For every one unit of land under lease area, theactual area affected is likely to be 10-20 units or even more.

– Mukesh Kumar, Indian Institute of Remote Sensing, Dehradun

m k

■ POVERTY AMIDST PLENTY

Despite the well documented impacts of mining and the furorethey have generated (including Naxal resistance), multinationalsand top corporates are making a beeline to the state:Chhattisgarh’s abundant mineral resources are the big draw. EssarSteel is in the process of acquiring 2,285 ha in Dantewada; theNMDC has acquired 3,308 ha for its steel plant in Nagarnar, whilethe Tatas are looking for 2,000 ha for their project in Bastar.According to Goldy M George, a social activist working on dalitand adivasi human rights issues, more than 29,137 ha of land hasbeen leased out to SECL in the coal belt of the state (Surguja,Raigarh and Bilaspur districts); this has affected hundreds of vil-lages.23 In all, the mineral industry has taken over 90,000 ha ofland in the state.24 This is without accounting for the land takenby mega mineral-based projects.

Land acquisition on such a large scale has, naturally, had itsfallouts: extreme discontent. Chhattisgarh is dominated by a num-ber of tribes. Over half the area of the state is a 'scheduled area' or'tribal majority area' and falls under the Fifth Schedule of theConstitution. On an average, 31 per cent of the total population inthe state belongs to scheduled tribes. Like in other parts of thecountry, the concentration of tribals is especially high in the min-eral-bearing areas. In case of Dantewada, tribals account for 79 percent of the population, while they constitute 55 and 44 per cent ofthe population respectively in the case of coal districts of Surgujaand Koriya (see Table 4: The poorest districts). And these are thepeople who have been most affected by the mining and industri-alisation process in the state. Only 36 per cent of the total land areain the state is under cultivation or private ownership; the rest ofthe land is, literally, up for grabs. In the state’s rural regions, peo-ple depend on both agriculture and minor forest produce for theirlivelihoods.

Most of these villagers are either marginal landowners orlandless farmers with no official records to prove their rights overthe land they have been living on for centuries. As a result, whenindustrial and mining projects displace them, they neither get anycompensation, nor any alternative employment.

The state’s increasingly marginalised tribal population is, infact, getting crushed between two evils: industrialisation on onehand, and the raging civil war-like conditions in Chhattisgarh,courtesy the conflict between Naxal insurgents and the SalwaJudum militia (a state-sponsored movement of tribal villagers tofight against Naxalism – see next section), on the other. Accordingto The Tribune, almost 40 per cent of the tribal population in thestate has been displaced due to mining and industrial projects.25

There is, however, no official figure on the number of peopledisplaced in the state. According to a study by G M George(Mining to Destruction and Hijacking their Rights to Submission),around 1.5 million have been displaced in the state due to indus-trial projects; of this, more than 500,00 people have been oustedfor just the Bhilai project.26

The plight of their brethren in Orissa, Andhra Pradesh andJharkhand has not been lost on the tribals of Chhattisgarh. Theirpast experience of shabby rehabilitation when their lands were apart of Madhya Pradesh is also warning them to be wary (see Box:Cruel tryst with diamonds): their distrust of industrial and miningprojects is acute and growing. Their unwillingness to part withtheir lands has, inevitably, led to conflagrations and conflicts.

These conflicts have been further fanned by Chhattisgarh’s dismal economic condition. In spite of mining industries operatingin Chhattisgarh for many decades now, the state has not seen muchdevelopment. About 40.5 per cent of the people of the state are living below the poverty line.27 Infrastructure is poor or almostnon-existent in the remote corners of the state. Metalled roads coveronly 40 per cent of the 19,720 villages in the state.28 Chhattisgarh

128


Tribal district Ranking HDI ranking Literacy Percentage Infant Percentage Per capita (percentage among 150 (out of 16 rate of households mortality of households income (Rs)

of tribal backward districts) with safe rate (per with power at current population) districts drinking 1,000 live price

water births)

Dantewada 78.83 7 9 30.2 53 58 22.19 12,060

Raipur 12.1 – 4 68.5 67 53 65.7 9,524

Korba 41.5 34 1 61.7 45 84 49.73 33,763

Raigarh 35.38 35 10 70.2 69 84 60.66 8,617

Surguja 54.6 40 11 54.8 27.24 56 28.36 7,573

Koriya 44.35 39 13 63.1 41 103 44.36 10,504

Chhattisgarh 31.80 15/16* – 64.7 70.5 73 – 10,363

Note: *15 out of 16 districts in the state figure among the 150 most backward districts in IndiaSource: Anon, 2005, Chhattisgarh Human Development Report 2005, United Nations Development Programme, New Delhi

TABLE 4: The poorest districtsMore than 40 per cent of Chhattisgarh lives below the poverty line in these districts. Korba’s high per capita income on onehand and poor human development indicators on the other show that mining’s profits are not equally distributed

m k

lags behind the national average in terms of percentage of house-holds with power connection and access to drinking water.29

The situation in the mining districts is no better. Out of theseven key mining districts in the state, six figure in the list of 150most backward districts in the country. The iron-bearing districtsof Dantewada and Bastar are among the top 10 most backwarddistricts in the country. Only 22 per cent of households inDantewada have access to electricity, though the district boasts of

the presence of Essar Steel. Similarly, in Korba, the coal belt of thestate, only 40 per cent of households have access to safe drinkingwater and only half the households are connected to power.Literacy rate in Dantewada is as low as 30 per cent.30 The coalmining districts of Surguja and Koriya are at the bottom of thepile. Both are the two most mined districts in the state after Korba.Surguja has less than 30 per cent of its households with water andpower, and its per capita income and literacy is lower than the

129


Cruel tryst with diamondsHow the state’s poorest people live on its richest lands

Faith played a cruel hand on him. Barnu, a tribal farmer who is credited with finding the first ever diamond on his agricultural land inChhattisgarh (then in Madhya Pradesh) in the early ‘90s, died unsungin 2006, blind and mired in deep poverty. He could not even live longenough to secure the compensation for his land taken away by thestate government. Barnu’s diamond find had heralded the discovery ofthis precious gem’s raw form in this tribal state.

Today, the villagers of Paily Kahan in Mainpur region of Raipur district wait impatiently for the earth to throw up diamonds, after thegovernment okayed mining in their area. Barnu’s find had led mininginspectors to explore the area and consequently, four kimberlite pipeswere detected. Barnu’s son Kunwar Singh, a farmer, narrated how on several occasions Barnu had knocked the doors of ministers, officials andeven the secretariat in Bhopal to seek the compensation promised to him.

Barnu’s neighbours say that he was not even given alternative land.According to the state government, Barnu partially occupied

government land, owing to which there were difficulties in allocatingcompensation for him. The mining department, of course, said that itwas the government’s responsibility and the department had nothingto do with compensation.

Barnu leaves behind three sons and three daughters. They are stillunable to fathom why their late father was denied compensation. It isironic that Barnu’s dependents continue to live in abject poverty overone of the richest lands in the country. The sarpanch, DhansinghNetam, says optimistically: “I hope that once the companies startprospecting for diamonds here, we will become rich. But right now, ourfolks do not have enough even to eat.”

Barnu’s agricultural land in Paily Kahan is now fenced by SpecialArmed Forces personnel to prevent smuggling or illegal mining fordiamonds.

– Ejaz Kaiser, CSE media fellow, Raipur

Barnu’s homestead: the farmer, who discovered diamonds in the state, lived and died in abject poverty

EJA

Z K

AIS

ER

m k

state's average. In Koriya, infant mortality rate is the highestamong all districts and more than 50 per cent households have noaccess to clean water and power.

People have also not gained in terms of employment. Forexample, in NMDC, out of the total number of employees in executive positions, less than five per cent are tribals. In the company’s Bailadila iron ore mines, only 31 per cent of theemployees in non-executive positions are local tribals.31

The only exception seems to be Korba, which ranked first inHDI, though it is at number 11 and 12 in education and health.Korba’s high-income rank is explained largely by its public sectorcoal mines and industries, which provide employment, enablingit to generate the highest per capita income (Rs 33,736) in the state– three times the state's average.32 Dantewada has a high per capita income too, but has the lowest literacy rate and around 50 per cent of its households are without access to clean water. Thedistrict’s high per capita income (the second highest in the state)is due to its iron ore mines.

The contradictory trend of high per capita income on one handand poor health, education and other human development indica-tors on the other in mineral districts like Korba and Dantewadagoes on to prove that mining and mineral-based industries aremaking some people rich, but most are getting nothing out of it.

■ RISE OF THE REDS

The social implications of all this have been severe. Public discon-tent has found many outlets, and one of these has been the grow-ing influence of Naxalism. Chhattisgarh, along with Jharkhand,Andhra Pradesh and Orissa (all mineral-rich regions faced withpeople’s ire over mining), is one of the key states on the emergingNaxal-Maoist horizon. In recent years, the state has witnessedseveral audacious terror strikes perpetrated by Red groups. OnMarch 16, 2007, for example, more than 300 armed Naxalitesstormed the Rani Bodli police camp in Dantewada district; 55policemen were killed and weapons were looted.

The Naxal-official machinery stand-off in Chhattisgarh datesback to the 1980s. In Chhattisgarh, Dantewada has been thehotbed of Naxal insurgency. Naxalites have declared the district a“liberated zone”, which means the administration of Naxals has,in theory, replaced that of the Indian State. This is somethingwhich has not happened even in Andhra Pradesh (home to themovement), where Naxalites have only proclaimed “guerrillazones” – areas where they are carrying out an armed struggle topush the State out.

Initially, the movement in India was spearheaded against for-est officers, but it also took on the management of a leading papermill over wages for bamboo-cutting. Over time, it took up thecause of tendu leaf growers against exploitation by contractors.“Jal, jungle, jamin kisko” (“Water, forests and land – who do theybelong to”) was the slogan the movement raised against what itcalled the exploitative classes, a functionary points out.

After fighting against the feudal system rampant among adi-vasis in the Dandakaranya region in central India, the CommunistParty of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) is now training its guns on

what it calls the “unmindful exploitation” of natural resources bymultinational companies in the mineral-rich regions, setting thestage for confrontation with states who are vying with each otherto secure investment. “We are not against development or mining,but mining lease should not be given to multinationals or bigindustrialists who have no stakes in the development of theregion. The industries which take up the mining lease, should alsowork for the social upliftment of the adivasis,” the spokespersonof the outfit said in an article published on May 4, 2006.33

The spokesperson gave the example of indiscriminate mining in the Bailadila region, where the world’s best iron ore is mined and exported entirely to Japan through theVisakhapatnam port. The area has hardly seen any development.“Mining has been going for over three decades, but the onlyindustry to flourish in the area is prostitution. Mining hasdestroyed the ecology of the area and the adivasis are left withdrinking highly contaminated water,” he said. The Naxals haveorganised mass rallies to rouse public opinion against thisexploitation of rich mineral resources.

The Naxalites have been particularly outraged by the activitiesof the Bhilai Steel Plant. According to them, “The Bhilai Steel Plant

130


c m y k

Backs to the wall: even tribal women are joining the Naxalites’ war inBastar against the “unmindful exploitation of natural resources” bymultinational companies

MA

HA

DEO

SEN

might have helped increase the industrial muscle of the country,but it has not brought about any change in the economic status ofthe tribals in the area.” This was the reason why tribals resistedthe plant authorities’ plans to start new iron ore mines at Rowghatand Chargaum villages.

The Naxalites unleashed a spate of attacks against miningand related interests between January 1 and July 31, 2006, acrossthe states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa. Out of these, 13were in Chhattisgarh alone. Naxalites have also resorted to occa-sionally taking hostages from among the miners.34 One particu-larly daring attack was launched on the mining unit of Hindalcoin Saridih, Chhattisgarh in May 2006. Around 200 Naxalsstormed and shut down the operations of the aluminium-miningunit, and razed several buildings in the complex, usingHindalco’s own bulldozers. They also set fire to several documents, and decamped with two trucks and a jeep after loading them with almirahs, computers and office furniture. Thisstalled mining in the attacked unit, which also incurred a loss ofaround Rs 1 crore.35

As the war of nerves between Naxal groups and the states inthe region over the pace of development peaked, the Chhattisgarhgovernment came up with a novel idea of floating a ‘people’smovement’ called Salwa Judum to take on the Left-wingers (see Box on pages 132-133: The way of the Salwa Judum). Leader of

the opposition, Mahendra Karma, is one of the leading lights of theSalwa Judum, which is intended to bring the “misguided adivasis”back into the mainstream and isolate the Naxals. Another majorintention of the movement is to bring down the spiralling scale ofviolence in the region.

Possibly, the Salwa Judum has gained some sympathisersamong the region’s population because of the Naxals’ anti-devel-opment policies and the Naxal-enforced ban on picking of tenduleaves; Naxalite ‘take-over’ of Dantewada has meant that mostgovernment departments and public work programmes (such asroad-building) in the district have become non-operational, with the Naxals opposing these because they believe these wouldonly benefit corporate interests or facilitate movement of paramilitary forces.

The fear of Naxalites is forcing people to refuse basic ameni-ties: around 3,059 villages in Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh,Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa have refused telephone con-nections because they fear that the facility would only arouserebels' suspicions about them being police informers.

However, Naxalites and critics of the movement say thatSalwa Judum is just a ploy of the government to drive tribalsaway from their land and hand it over to industries. The adivasishave been moved away from their hamlets and housed in campsrun by the state government, where they have been provided with

131


c m y k

Errabore, Dantewada: the trail of devastation after a Naxal attack mirrors the life of the villagers who have been forced into this camp

IAN

UM

EDA

132


The way of the Salwa JudumThe state-sponsored anti-Naxal movement has complicatedmatters – perhaps irretrievably

Ramesh carries a .303 rifle. He’s not sure of his age.“Maybe 16,”he saysdoubtfully, and adds that he hasn’t really shot anyone yet. The teenagerhas had only a week’s combat training at the police barracks within theErrabore relief camp, but is officially a special police officer (SPO) of theChhattisgarh government to fight the Naxalites for a monthly salary of Rs1,500. Legally, he can’t get married or vote, but the government thinks hecan handle a gun. If you thought it only happened in Liberia or Congo,welcome to India’s world of child warriors.

Ramesh is a part of the anti-Naxal movement sponsored by the stateand called the Salwa Judum. In Gondi, the local language, the term meanspurification hunt. Some say it started in Dantewada’s Kerkeli village onMay 6, 2005, when villagers stood up against Naxalites who had come totake away a young girl into their fold (The rebels have a policy of recruit-ing one cadre from every tribal family, if necessary, by force.). Taken bysurprise, the Naxalites backed off. This emboldened the villagers. Otherssay the movement dates to a series of meetings in which villagers, whohad suffered through a drought and had no rural employment schemes ordevelopment projects to see them through (since government projectstended to sweep around Naxalite-dominated areas), began questioningthe rebels’ enforced boycott of trade in tendu leaf. The Naxals had calledtendu leaf boycotts in the past to force prices up, but this time it didn’twork.

What is clear is that the movement took form only after word of thetribals’ anger reached Mahendra Karma, a Congress MLA, who promptly

cashed in. He held a massive rally in the area and urged the tribals to takeup arms against the Naxals. Many tribals followed his urging. Armed withbows and arrows they set out in groups to hunt out the rebels in the jun-gles. Karma had led an earlier peoples’initiative against the Naxals, calledthe Jan Jagran Abhiyan. This movement began with the same name butwas later re-christened Salwa Judum.

The Congress leader, a tribal himself, began going from village to vil-lage in Dantewada, holding rallies and exhorting people to join the move-ment. His initiative was publicly supported by chief minister RamanSingh and Salwa Judum became part of the state government’s counter-insurgency strategy. Paramilitary forces were brought in to protect itsmembers.

The Central government chipped in, offering help in the form of extraparamilitary battalions, vehicles, minesweeping equipment and technolo-gy to help locate rebel camps. Several thousand Salwa Judum activists,many of them barely 16 years of age, were appointed SPOs, given somerudimentary training and arms and promised preference for permanentpolice jobs.

If the movement was ever a spontaneous peace mission by the trib-als, as the state government and Karma describe it, it very soon stoppedbeing so. Most of the Salwa Judum leaders are either non-tribals or rela-tively wealthy tribals.

Several reports by human rights groups and independent observershave documented the state-sponsored human rights abuses of the SalwaJudum movement. An all-India fact-finding team, comprising membersfrom Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand chapters of People’s Union for CivilLiberties, People’s Union for Democratic Rights, Delhi, Association for theProtection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal, and Indian Association of

On the move: Dantewada’s tribal people have a peripatetic mode of life

IAN

UM

EDA

m k

133


People’s Lawyers, which visited Dantewada in November 2005, said itfound “a pattern”in the displacements.

“When Salwa Judum meetings are called, people from neighbouringvillages are asked to be present. Heavy security forces accompany themeetings. Villages that refuse to participate, face repeated attacks by thecombined forces of Salwa Judum, district forces and a paramilitary Nagabattalion, which is stationed in the area,” the team’s report states.“Oncein camps, people have no choice but to support the Salwa Judum. Someof them are forced to work as informers against members of their ownand neighbouring villages and participate in attacks against them, lead-ing to permanent divisions within villages. Families are sometimes beingsplit between Judum supporters and those who wish to remain in theirvillages.”

Another group which visited Dantewada reported that the civiladministration there was “on the point of collapse”and Salwa Judum hadturned into “an unaccountable, indisciplined and amorphous group” ledby “criminal elements” over whom the administration had little control.“There is an atmosphere of fear and a great deal of violence in which ordi-nary villagers, and tribals in particular, are the main sufferers,” says thegroup’s report titled, War in the Heart of India. The report said they “foundevidence of killings, the burning of homes, and attacks on women, includ-ing gang-rapes”from both sides, though “only the killings by Maoists arerecorded”.

Unfortunately, the local media is either too compromised or too

intimidated to report the truth. The administration and Salwa Judumactivists take exception to any critical reports. Kamlesh Painkra, a youngreporter from Bijapur, had to flee to Dantewada town with his family afterwriting about Judum cadres burning villagers’ homes. Several other localreporters admitted that they didn’t want to risk their lives by seeming‘pro-Naxal’. Afzal Khan, a Bhopalpatnam-based correspondent with theChhattisgarh daily HindSat, was assaulted as he was suspected of havinghelped local village heads to make a request to the Raman Singh govern-ment to prevent the state-backed militia from entering their villages. Thejournalist is now hiding at an undisclosed location in Jagdalpur in Bastarand says he fears for his life and the safety of his family.

Since it began, the Salwa Judum movement has cost over 350 livesand emptied about 700 tribal villages. Caught between the two forces, ter-rorised villagers either flee to, or are forced into, relief camps set up alongthe highways by the state government. Nearly 49,000 tribal people arenow living in temporary shelters in 17 roadside camps and 27 new ‘vil-lages’ that have sprouted across Dantewada, according to the districtadministration. Another 20,000 have migrated to Andhra Pradesh, Orissaand Madhya Pradesh. Unable to farm their lands, those living in campshave since lost two crops and their access to forests, precipitating a liveli-hood crisis. Homeless, jobless, landless, they survive on governmentrations and occasional stints as daily wagers, building and widening roadsand digging ponds under rural employment schemes. After spending Rs300 crore on these settlements, the state government is now thinking ofturning the camps into new villages or resettling villagers on nearbylands. But there aren’t enough livelihood options in terms of land and forest produce, which sustain 97 per cent of Dantewada’s people.

While no anti-insurgency effort can succeed without the cooperationfrom local people, however to deliberately involve civilians in a conflict,especially underage boys and girls, as the Chhattisgarh government hasdone is, as the Asian Centre for Human Rights has stated,“morally andlegally untenable”.

Though both Congress and BJP supported the movement, questionsare increasingly being raised and doubts expressed in the political circle.A senior BJP leader described Salwa Judum as “a bone stuck in the throat”that could neither be spat out nor swallowed. The state Congress leader-ship, too, is split on the issue. Former chief minister Ajit Jogi’s factionrecently visited the prime minister and declared the movement a failure.They accused the state government of “betraying”the tribals of Bastar.TheCongress high command is yet to make its position on Salwa Judum clear,though Union tribal affairs minister P R Kyndiah has called for a review ofthe movement, saying it was “turning into a fratricidal war”. Manyactivists have also alleged that the Salwa Judum is just an excuse of thegovernment to drive tribals out of their home and lands, which can bethen handed over to number of industries who have already expressedtheir keen interest to tap the rich mineral reserves of the state.

Inspite of apprehensions by human right organisation, activist, politi-cians and people, the Chhattisgarh government continues to back SalwaJudum as the answer to the Naxal problems in the state. So far it has onlyprecipitated a deeper crisis instead of solving the problems posed byextremist insurgency.

– Maureen Nandini Mitra, Down To Earth, Kolkata

A special police officer: these ill-equipped members of the SalwaJudum are often recruited by force

IAN

UM

EDA

m k

free food and shelter. While government figures say about 10,000tribals are relocated, Naxalites claim over 40,000 people have been taken away from their hamlets and housed near paramilitarybarracks. A number of tribals have lost their lives in the bloodybattle between Salwa Judum activists and Naxalites. A newspaperreport puts the number of lives lost in 2006 at 150, out of which127 were killed in Bastar alone.36

Former chief minister of Chhattisgarh, Ajit Jogi, has urgedthe state government to give up the Salwa Judum movement,saying that it has failed to provide security to the hapless adiva-sis. Jogi’s demand has caused a stir among political circles sincethe movement has the backing of the state Congress leader,Mahendra Karma. There have been similar demands from CPI aswell as the civil rights body, People’s Union of DemocraticRights (PUDR).

In the meantime, the violence continues unabated. Ultra-leftgroups have mounted fierce attacks on villages, killing anyonesuspected of aligning with the Salwa Judum, burning houses and destroying government property. On February 28, 2006, 29people were killed by a landmine explosion near Konta village inDantewada while they were returning from a Salwa Judumcamp. On April 29 the same year, the dismembered bodies of 15 villagers were discovered on the main highway and jungleroads in the district. On July 16, 2006, Naxals attacked theErrabore relief camp, killing 42. And in all this, it is the peoplewho are the most affected.

The flashpoints

■ BAILADILA: BATTERED

The Bailadila hill range, rich in dense deciduous and evergreenforests holding medicinal plants, is one of the ecological hotspotsof the state. It is also known for its high quality iron ore deposits.Since 1961, the National Mineral Development Corporation(NMDC) has been mining these deposits. To facilitate export ofthe ore to Japan, a railway line was laid, which attracted outsidersto the area. Mining and the consequent industrialisation havedevastated the region, especially in places like Kirandul, Bacheliand Bhansi.37 Forest cover has declined, says a 1997 remote sens-ing study (see Box: In the line of fire). Local water bodies – such asthe Shankhini and Dankini rivers – have been contaminated; theShankhini, in fact, is called the “lal pani” or red water. Yet, peoplefrom about 100 villages on the banks of the rivers use their watersfor most of their daily needs.

For over four decades now, the NMDC has been releasing theBailadila mines’ tailings directly into the Shankhini. Some of thisslush is held in a tailings dam in Kadampal village at the foot of themines. Built around 1985 following a National Human RightsCommission directive ordering NMDC to clean up the river, thedam is supposed to allow the tailings to settle to the bottom and let

134


c m y k

Cesspool: river Shankhini runs polluted due to iron ore mining by NMDC

IAN

UM

EDA

the cleared river water flow out. But it doesn’t quite work that way.38

According to Pratap Agarwal, local lawyer and activist whohas studied the pollution levels in these rivers, “The dams made by the company are nothing but sedimentation tanks.Moreover, as the iron slurry has such high concentration of fillings– almost 50 per cent is fillings – the sedimentation process is not

effective.”39 The volume of slurry produced is so high that thedam fills up in no time. It has to be dredged regularly to functioneffectively. However, this is not done often enough. So the darkchocolate coloured water flows out (the colour gradually turns alighter rusty red as the river moves on depositing its unhealthyresidues along the banks). The slurry from earlier dredges liespiled up in black plateau-shaped dumps along the dam that,according to a 1989-92 MoEF report, have altered the course ofseveral natural streams in the area. The report recommendedbuilding tailing dams in locations without direct links with majorwater bodies. But no action was taken.

There were some attempts to address the situation, but nonehave been followed through to the end. In 1990, the Union government’s science and technology cell reported that recklessexploitation of the mines and release of effluents into the rivershad damaged not just the rivers, but also 35,000 ha of agriculturaland forest land around Bailadila. Four years later, the state govern-ment declared that 65 villages along the Shankhini and Dankiniwere affected by the polluted waters and ordered NMDC to digsome 200 wells to provide safe drinking water for these villages.According to Agarwal, “The wells were dug but were too shallowand not one of them is functional today.”40

In 1997, a report by the Madhya Pradesh Science andTechnology Council had described the water pollution from theNMDC’s iron ore mines as serious, saying its effects were seeneven downstream. The discharge from the plant contained higheramounts of suspended solids, causing turbidity to the Kiranduland Bacheli streams. About 37 villages on the downstream area ofKirandul nala could not use its water for drinking purposes dueto high turbidity, the study said.41

The situation has not changed much today. The rivers are stillpolluted and continue to affect the lives of the people residing ontheir banks (see Box: Iron river).

135


c m y k

In the line of fireMining in Bailadila is having serious impacts, says study

A remote sensing study conducted by the Madhya Pradesh Councilfor Science and Technology in 1997 found the environmental impactof iron ore mining in Bailadila to be alarming: it had endangered therich flora and fauna due to depletion of forest cover.1 The study alsopointed towards pollution of water and air and overall degradationof land and soil.The impact of the Kirandul mines on land was espe-cially intense within a 2.5-km radius, badly affecting all agriculturalactivities. Similarly, the Bacheli mine had affected the forest cover,leading to a deterioration of forest growth in a five-km radius.

The study pointed towards irreversible denudation of the forestin the next 25 years if mining activities were allowed in the region.Moreover, it also mentioned that the soil would get eroded, makingthe land unsuitable even for afforestation programmes. Additionally,the influx of people with increased mining activities would causeheavy damage to the fragile ecosystem.

Another study sponsored by the Union ministry of environmentand forests between 1989-92 found that mining activity, along withshifting cultivation, had resulted in diminution of the closed forest inKirandul, while mining was mainly responsible for the disappearanceof the closed forest in Bacheli. The study also clearly pointed towardsincrease in density of trees as the distance from mining pits increased.2

Iron riverDown To Earth’s Maureen Nandini Mitra travels along theShankhini and Dankini. Excerpts from her report:

Near its source at Kirandul, the Shankhini introduced me to a wholenew definition of bad. The closest I can come to describing what itlooks like here is: part viscous bog and part a molten brown liquid thatresembles something straight out of Willy Wonka’s scrumptious choco-late factory, but is sure to taste quite the opposite. No, I didn’t attemptto taste.These waters, I wouldn’t recommend dipping a toe in, let alonetaking a drink from.

We drive down a narrow unpaved road and park by the edge of thetailing dam made by NMDC. The slurry here is at the bank-level andresembles a dry, black, clayey riverbed. Deceptive. It isn’t solid at all. Ihurl a few pebbles in. They sink with a soft, heavy sound. My guide,N R K Pillai, who now runs a convenience store in Dantewada and isa local pointsman of sorts, tells me three children, all siblings, playingon the edge of the dam, drowned there few years ago. One fell acci-dentally and was pulled under, the other two sank trying to rescue the

first. I stare at the flat surface and imagine being sucked in, my mouthand nostrils slowly filling with clammy, metallic-tasting sludge.

Further along the bank, we come across two villagers walkingacross the bridge over the dam’s sluice gates. Farmers returning fromthe local market.“For many years now, crops don’t grow properly onour land,”Soma Kumha, whose extended family owns 121 ha of farm-land, tells me. They have to depend on rainwater for irrigation. Finedust from the mines layers the crop, affecting production. There is nofish left in the river because of its high suspended solids content, whichdeprives fish of oxygen. Finding safe drinking water is hard and chil-dren, especially, routinely suffer from various stomach ailments. Everyyear during the monsoons, the river overflows and leaves slurrydeposits on farmlands.

I take one last look at the Shankhini before turning away. It does-n’t smell as bad as the Yamuna or the Hooghly. Iron residues don’t raisea stink, only leach a whole lot of unsafe stuff into the water, includingdangerous amounts of mercury. “We have another name for NMDChere,”A D Nag, president of the local labour union, tells me as we driveoff.“Never Mind Don’t Care”.

Despite all this devastation, SAIL’s Bhilai Steel Plant presented a proposal in 1998 to mine at Rowghat in Bailadila,even though this area covered pristine forests; the proposal wasgreeted with opposition even from the MoEF. The ministry rejected it on the ground that it would involve diversion ofaround 1,000 ha of dense forest and would be in violation of theFCA.42 There were also protests by environmentalists and thestate’s forest department, as the region holds one of the richest salforests in the country.43 Even though the project had receivedenvironmental clearance in 1996, the issue of forest clearance hasbeen pending since 1985.

The company needed the Rowghat mines desperately, as thereserves at its captive mines at Dalli-Rajhara are fast depleting. It,therefore, decided to submit a new plan, which would use a newtechnology – a dry beneficiation plant. According to R P Singh,managing director of Bhilai Steel Plant, due to the technologymakeover, the total area required for mining will reduce by near-ly 50 per cent. Earlier, SAIL had asked for 2,400 ha; its new pro-posal called for 750-800 ha.44

The state government gave its formal consent for the use ofRowghat by Bhilai Steel in January 2007. Earlier, in September2006, the MoEF had issued a gazette notification reserving about 2,029 ha in Rowghat for the company. The IBM too clearedthe new proposal in March 2007. With this, the Chhattisgarhgovernment is free to move the MoEF for the necessary forestry clearances.45

A biodiversity planning initiative has recommended that theBailadila hills be declared a biosphere reserve. The initiative also

felt that the NMDC should restore the biodiversity in the degrad-ed areas and protect the areas that still have biodiversity left.46

Afforestation measures have been taken as part of closure andrestoration of the mined area, but the company has planted non-native species such as gulmohar and eucalyptus.

■ NAGARNAR: CHRONICLE OF A STRUGGLE

In May 2001, the NMDC decided to set up a steel plant inChhattisgarh. For this, it identified 4,452 ha of land belonging tofour villages – Nagarnar, Kasturi, Amaguda and Maganpura inJagdalpur tehsil of Bastar district.

These villages are surrounded by some of the most fertile landsin Bastar, which are flanked on three sides by the forests of Bastarand on the fourth side by the Indravati river. The area, whichcomes under Schedule V of the constitution, is dominated by trib-als who make up approximately 80 per cent of its population. In apopulation of 50,000, about 90 per cent own land, while theremaining are landless labourers who work on the fields of thelandowners and eke out a living from the forest and in the town ofJagdalpur.47

As a part of the statutory obligation of consultation with theconcerned gram sabhas before starting the process of land acquisi-tion, the company sent a notice to the persons whose lands it pro-posed to acquire, inviting them to participate in the gram sabhaand give their opinion. It was, however, alleged by the local peo-ple that many of them did not get the notice. Nevertheless, consul-tation meetings of the gram sabhas were held, in which the people

136

STATE OF INDIA’S ENVIRONMENT: MININGSH

YAM

AL

/ C

SE

m k

unanimously rejected the project. But the district collector issueda press statement stating that the villagers were in favour of theplant. The NMDC, in collusion with state officials, went aboutacquiring the land in complete violation of constitutional mandates and provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. As therewas no response from the state to the petitions of the tribals, theyapproached the National Commission for Scheduled Castes andScheduled Tribes (NCSCST). In spite of all this and investigationsby the NCSCST, the process of land acquisition continued. Anotification was issued on August 8, 2001 and the final award waspassed on September 29, 2001.

Attempts were made by the district administration to terrorisethe people. On October 24, 2001, activists protesting against theproject were apprehended and shot at by the police; 45 people,mostly women, were injured. The administration denied theentire incident, but a fact-finding team of the Peoples Union ofCivil Liberties (PUCL) found the reports of excesses to be true.The PUCL also reported that about 250 people had been jailed;those who hadn’t been jailed, fled their homes. Most the affectedvillagers were forced to accept the compensation cheques.48

The NCSCST, on the basis of an inquiry conducted underArticle 338 (5) of the constitution, came to the conclusion that theacquisition process violated the constitutional mandate for sched-uled areas, and therefore was null and void. It further held thatsenior officials, including the collector and chief executive officer,were involved in a conspiracy and had indulged in criminaloffences such as destruction of public records and fabrication ofreports. Further, the national guidelines for establishment ofindustries in scheduled areas (1974) had not been followed. Thecommission advised the state government and NMDC to restart

the process and take action against the concerned officials.The advice of the commission was ignored. In March 2002, the

four concerned gram sabhas convened a joint assembly, whichstressed that the tribals were not opposed to the establishment ofthe steel plant. However, the assembly put down 10 demands forcomplete rehabilitation, including ‘land for land’. It was alsoresolved that the agreement must provide safeguards against pri-vatisation to avoid a scenario like the BALCO case (see Box:Privatisation pains). In a meeting with the villagers, local officialsconceded nine of the 10 demands put forth by the people.

The state government acquired about 289 ha of private landand along with 114 ha of government land, handed it to NMDC.49

According to the Annual Report of the Union ministry of steel, thecompany has promised to implement a suitable scheme for theprogress of the people residing in the zone of influence of 10 kmaround the plant. The company has given monetary compensa-tion to 302 affected villagers for their land; 98 persons whoselands were entirely acquired have been provided suitable employ-ment in the company’s existing projects. NMDC has also commit-ted to bear the cost of training of any person of an affected familywho gets admission in any ITI run by NMDC or recognised by thegovernment. Additionally, the company is according priority tolocal cooperative societies for supply of building materials.50

The Nagarnar steel plant, which was to become operationalwithin six months of land acquisition, has not even begun func-tioning; it has been four years now.51 According to PratapAgarwal, the plant was set up to use the iron filling waste dumpsin the Bailadila iron ore mines. However, the technology wasfound to be unfeasible and the company ditched its plans. It isnow planning to establish a sponge iron plant instead.52

In a recent move, the state government has cancelled the minelease of the company and handed it over to Essar Steel. The rea-son given was that the company had held the lease for the past 30years without mining it (see Box: NMDC’s loss is Essar’s gain).

137


Privatisation painsBALCO case clouds the Samata judgement

When Sterlite, the Indian company of the Vedanta group, took overBALCO’s shares from the government, the employees of the company(BALCO Employees’Union of India) approached the Supreme Courtto stop the privatisation. Their contention: this violated the Samatajudgement, as the land in a Schedule V area acquired by the govern-ment was being given on lease to BALCO.

However, the case was dismissed. The Court, in its judgementdated December 10, 2001, almost reversed the mechanism for pro-tection of tribal lands. Firstly, it said the judiciary would not trans-gress into the field of policy decisions. It said that it was not withinthe scope of judicial review to conduct an enquiry as to whether aparticular policy is wise or whether better public policy could beevolved. Thus, the right of the government to have a public policy ofits choice was upheld. Secondly, it was held that application of thelaw in Madhya Pradesh is not the same as in Andhra Pradesh. It wasthus interpreted that the Samata judgment is valid only for AndhraPradesh. Thirdly, it was held that the transfer of management by thedisinvestment process would not amount to change of ownership, astechnically the legal owner remained the same.

NMDC’s loss is Essar’s gainBailadila changes hands

India's leading steelmaker, Essar Steel, won the prospecting licence(PL) for Chhattisgarh's Bailadila deposits, which has one of theworld's finest quality iron ore stocks, in February 2007. This happened after the state-run National Mineral DevelopmentCorporation’s (NMDC) lease expired unutilised.

NMDC had got the mining lease right of an area of 3,308 ha inBailadila deposit No 3 on February 3, 1977 for a period of threedecades. Till February 2007, when its lease expired, the company didnot excavate even a single kilogram of iron ore. Under the Miningand Minerals Act, its mining lease automatically lapsed after 30 years. The state government proposed to the Central governmentto award the PL to Essar Steel for a 2,285-ha stretch in Dantewadadistrict. Essar Steel will use the ore to feed its Rs 700-crore greenfieldintegrated steel plant to be set up in two phases in Dantewada, witha capacity of about three MT per annum.

m k

■ LOHANDIGUDA: TATAS VS PEOPLE

The state, of course, has not learnt anything from Nagarnar.Another protest has boiled over in Lohandiguda region of Bastar– this time against a private company, Tata Iron & Steel Company(TISCO), which is planning a Rs 1,000-crore steel plant in thearea. The land in question, belonging to 10 villages inLohandiguda, is a Schedule V area and one of the few places inthe country where wild buffaloes and the tribal culture of theMaria Gond tribes still survive.

The company had signed an agreement with the Chhattisgarhgovernment in June 2005 to set up the plant.53 It sought around2,000 ha of land – of which 1,784 ha was private land and 279 hawas government land54 – and promised to provide a “dreampackage” as compensation. However, the project was receivedwith distrust: the people alleged that the local administration andthe company were forcing them to give up their lands.

In July 2006, the state industry minister claimed that in a gram sabha held to discuss the fate of the plant, eight out of the 10affected villages had agreed to drop the agitation and give up

their lands.55 However, villagers and local leaders inLohandiguda alleged that votes in the gram sabha were obtainedby coercion. “Why would I give up my agricultural land whichhas been the source of my livelihood for generations?” askedKeshu Markam, a tribal.

Local communist party leader Chitranjan Bakchhi summed upthe prevailing mood: “Now the villagers have decided they willgo to any extent to prevent the Tatas from setting up the plant ontheir fertile lands.”56 On February 27, 2007, when a police partyarrested tribal leaders to force the land acquisition, an agitatingmob attacked it, critically injuring at least 15 people.57 Activistswho came to support the tribals were hounded out of Bastar.Jagdalpur’s hotel owners were warned not to accept any guestswho may be opposing the Tatas. In March, the collector ofJagdalpur convened a meeting of political parties, journalists andbusiness leaders and reiterated the government’s resolve: opposi-tion to the Tata project will not be tolerated.58

The project has received flak even from legislators of theBharatiya Janata Party, which is in power. “We are not opposingdevelopment and Tata is also welcome. We are stressing from the

138


Locals going to cast their vote under ‘police protection’ in a gram sabha held to decide the fate of Tata Steel

IAN

UM

EDA

m k

very beginning that the administration should acquire barrenand unused land for the Tata unit and not the farmers’ land. Thisway, no one will protest and it will also lead to the developmentof the villagers,” said Lachchoo Kashyap, MLA from the Bastar region.59

Despite all this, the Chhattisgarh government is persistingwith the project. It has also sent a recommendation to the Indiangovernment for granting a PL to Tata Steel for carrying out a survey on 2,500 ha in the area.60

The Tata group, on its part, is planning to bring the familiesaffected by the project under the 'Tata Parivar' concept, a branded version of its rehabilitation policy. Under this, the com-pany will register all families to be affected by the land acquisitionprocess. They will then periodically monitor them for theirincome for a minimum period of five years and intervene if andwhen required.

The company has promised that apart from compensationand benefits to the project-affected families, their other needswould also be taken care of. This would include building residen-tial colonies with all amenities like drinking water, power, streetlights, sewerage, schools and dispensaries.

The company is also creating an umbrella organisation toserve displaced families from all Tata's project which will helplocate self-employment 'opportunities' which come up during theconstruction phase. It would be a customised programme for eachfamily, claims the company, including special programmes andopportunities for women.

In the meantime, people from Lohandiguda continue their protest. A second gram sabha conducted by the people has rejected the "conditional consent" given in first gram sabha.Locals from Lohandiguda and Dhurli have now initiated "aar-paarki ladaai" (a do-or-die struggle).

■ DHURLI: ENACTMENT OF A FARCE

In June 2005, steel major Essar Steel signed a memorandum ofunderstanding with the government of Chhattisgarh to bring ininvestment worth Rs 7,000 crore in Naxal-hit Dantewada district:the plan was to install a steel plant in two phases.

For this, the company sought 600 ha in two tribal villages –Dhurli and Bhansi – but the 86 families living in these villagesprotested. They even refused to accept the rehabilitation package. The region being a Schedule V area, permission wasneeded from the gram sabha for land acquisition and setting up ofthe plant. In the gram sabha convened on September 9, 2006 (anearlier one had failed – see Box on page 140: An insider’s account),villagers of Dhurli and Bansi reportedly agreed to give their landto Essar. “Eighty-six protesting families held a meeting and agreed to hand over 600 ha of land to Essar Steel,” said H S Sethi,Essar’s Chhattisgarh director. “The company will pay the villagers Rs 1,50,000 per acre (Rs 3,70,657 per ha) plus compensa-tion for the trees on the surrendered land.” Essar also promisedemployment to those who were displaced as per Chhattisgarh’sindustrial policy.61

This claim was met with disbelief and allegations that the

whole process had been a farce. People were coerced and forcedto sign on the papers, with the media having no access to thewhole proceedings. According to Daily Chhattisgarh, a Hindinewspaper, thousands participated in a rally in Dantewadaagainst the proposed plant in September soon after the gram sabhacleared the project. They gave the collector a note saying theywould not give Essar land in September. This is an extract fromthe report: “The villagers, under the leadership of the DantewadaAdivasi Mahasabha and Sangharsh Samiti, Dhurli, said that onSeptember 9, police had forced them to sign no-objection letters.Two constables were posted at each house. No outsider wasallowed at the meeting place. People were not allowed to leavetheir homes or talk to each other. According to the villagers, atnine am they were forced into vehicles and taken to the meeting.They were taken to a room in twos, and pistols were placed ontheir temples to make them sign. They were told not to step outof the village.”62

The company, however, received the go-ahead from the stategovernment and it is in the final stages of acquiring the land. Thestate government has assured them the 600 ha within June 2007 tobegin construction work as early as possible.63

But a new threat has begun looming on the horizon: Naxalinsurgents have begun opposing the handing over of the state’srich mineral resources to corporate interests. The rebels havethreatened to disrupt mining operations not only in the state, butalso in other states like Orissa, Jharkhand and Andhra Pradesh. Ina recent attack, over 40 Naxalites raided Bhansi village and killed two farmers for having handed over their land for the Essarplant. The extremists also warned the residents of Bhansi andneighbouring Dhurli against giving up their ancestral farmland toEssar Steel, or they would meet the same fate.64 So, people arenow crushed from both sides – administrative repression andNaxal threats.

There have been some efforts by Chhattisgarh-based activiststo fight the tribals’ cause against the big companies. Activist andlawyer Pratap Agarwal has filed public interest petitions againstthe proposed plants in the High Court, alleging procedural and environmental norm violations. But the Court dismissed thelitigation saying the Chhattisgarh government had only signedMoUs with the two companies, and no final agreement had been made.

On the other hand, when an activist requested the details ofthe MoUs from the Chhattisgarh government under the Right to Information Act, 2005, the request was declined. The state commerce and industry deputy secretary, Shankar Rao Brahmane,refused to disclose the contents of these MoUs citing provisions inthe MoUs which stipulated that no details could be disclosed toany ‘third party’ without the consent of the signatories.65 Thisobviously raises a lot of suspicions about the deal.

The people of the state and the tribals in particular haveapproached various organisations such as the NCSCST and theNational Human Rights Commission for intervention. The state isstill young and holds a lot of promise. But its avowed path oftrampling the rights of indigenous communities at the alter of‘development’ does not bode well for its future.

139


m k

140


An insider’s accountA public hearing in Dantewada – a journalist reports

Armed police in riot gear stood in clusters around the walled com-pound where the people of Dhurli village gathered for a gram sabhahearing on August 30, 2005. The single lane highway connecting thisvillage, lying halfway between Dantewada town and the Bailadila ironore mines, was lined with cars and jeeps of district administrators,Essar’s top brass, Mahendra Karma, a Congress MLA, and the publicengineering and health minister Kedar Kashyap, and their respectiveentourages. They were all inside the compound. This was the secondhearing called to discuss the issue. An earlier one, called on June 10,was cancelled because villagers refused to turn up.

Justifying the heavy presence of armed forces, police officialsattributed it to possibility of a Naxalite attack. Essar officials said “out-side elements”were provoking the villagers to reject the steel plant, sothey needed extra security. Pisda, Dantewada’s collector, said villagerswere “fighting among themselves”, there was “tension in the area”andthey wanted the people to speak peacefully.

Gram sabhas, as per law, can’t be attended by outsiders. Hence,gun-toting policemen kept media personnel – “outsiders”– beyond thewalls, while within the walls Essar officials – “insiders” in Dantewadaadministration’s lingo – hobnobbed with state leaders. Section 144 ofthe Criminal Procedure Code, banning the gathering of five or morepersons, had been imposed on Dhurli on August 26. Police had also

picked up eight villagers on charges that they had roughed up thesarpanch, Bhagat Kunjam.

Villagers started to trickle in around noon. The compound filled upby around 1.30 pm, however. But there’s was no meeting or any discus-sion. Villagers were taken in turns to a room where officials told themthey have to sign on a piece of paper indicating whether they are for oragainst the project. Confused, unable to read what is written on thepaper, about 30 gave thumb impressions. By then the rest of the villagersin the compound had begun to get restive. Why aren’t we being allowedto discuss the issue, they asked. Pisda told them to “either sign or getout”. Angry villagers left.The hearing was re-scheduled for September 9.

“They should have allowed us to talk, this wasn’t a gram sabha, thiswas like forced voting,”farmer Dashroo Gundru said.“We won’t sell ourland at any cost, let them do their development elsewhere,”added YuvrajTellam, another farmer. Other villagers crowded around in assent.

On September 9, the entire story was replayed. Section 144 wasreimposed. The area was sealed off this time. Roads were blocked byCentral Industrial Security Force personnel. All the administrators,Essar officials and MLAs were present, once again. Few villagersturned up for the gram sabha, but since this was the second meeting onthe subject, by law, no quorum was necessary. The outcome of themeeting was not made public. It was later published in a newspaperthat the gram sabha had agreed to hand over the land to the company.

– Maureen Nandini Mitra, Down To Earth, Kolkata

The public hearing was marked by an overbearing presence of khaki; local people were barely visible

IAN

UM

EDA

m k

Goa is India’s smallest state – spread over 3,70,200 ha, itaccounts for just 0.11 per cent of India’s geographical area.1

It is, however, one of India’s leading producers of iron and manganese: four per cent of India’s iron ore reserves and eight percent of its manganese ore reserves are in Goa (see Table 1: Goa’smineral wealth).2 In 2004-05, more than 15 per cent of the iron oreproduced in the country came from Goa.3

The state has about eight per cent of its total area under min-ing, the highest in the country (see Map on page 142: Minerals andforests).4 Some 400 mining leases have been granted in Goa till2002-03, covering approximately 30,325 ha – this works out toalmost five per cent of the total area leased out for mining majorminerals in the country.5 Of these, 222 mining leases have beengranted for extracting iron ore: this accounts for 56 per cent of thetotal area under mining (see Graph 1: Area under mine leases).6

The number of leases and the total area covered under themhave remained almost constant over the years – in 1995-96, thearea under mining leases was 30,802, while in 2002-03, it was30,325 (see Graph 2: Mining leases over the years). But the areaunder mining in Goa is all set to zoom in coming years.

As per government records sought under the Right ToInformation Act, there are as many as 825 mining lease applica-tions, covering an area of 67,822 ha, under various stages of processing. If these leases are granted, which most probably theywill be, more than one-fourth of Goa’s land area will come undermining – a recipe for ecological disaster.

Iron ore is Goa’s most significant mineral – accounting formore than 98 per cent of the total mineral production in the statein terms of value (see Table 2: Mineral production).7 Most of the ironore produced in Goa is exported and mining for export has a huge

141

Mineral 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 (p)

Iron ore (in '000 tonne) 17,889 20,246 22,309

Manganese (in tonne) 11,050 13,650 7,636

Bauxite (in tonne) 52,291 – –

Laterite (in tonne) 140 83,205 43,218


TABLE 2: Mineral production Production of iron ore has been increasing

Mineral Reserves Proportion of national (in ‘000 tonne) reserves (in per cent)

Iron ore-hematite 6,42,113 5.62

Iron ore-magnetite 2,15,557 2.02

Manganese 23,271 7.89

Bauxite 53,072 1.81

Quartz/silica sand 20,004 0.69

Source: Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,Nagpur, pp 11-23, 11-24

TABLE 1: Goa's mineral wealthIron and manganese are the key minerals

Manganese37.8%

Steatite0.5%

Bauxite5.6 %

Iron ore56.1 %

Source: Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licenses, 2003,Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 5

GRAPH 1: Area under mine leases Iron ore accounts for 56 per cent of the area leased out

401 402 402395 396 396

350

360

370

380

390

400

410

420

430

440

450

1995-96 1998-99 1999-2000 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03

Tota

l no

of

min

ing

leas

es g

ran

ted

in G

oa

Year

Source: Documents published by the Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur

GRAPH 2: Mining leases over the yearsNumber of leases in Goa, so far, has remained constant


Goa

m k

142

c m y k

MAP: Minerals and forestsSouth Goa accounts for a larger share of Goa’s mineral wealth and forest resources

ANDHRAPRADESH

NETRAYALIWILDLIFESANCTUARY

MAHADEIWILDLIFESANCTUARY

COTIGAO WILDLIFESANCTUARY

BHAGVAN MAHAVEERWILDLIFE SANCTUARY

South Goa

North Goa

River Chapora

River Tiracol


KA

RN

AT

AK

A

A R A B I A N S E A

G O A

River Mandovi

River ZuariRiver Sal

River Galgibaga

River Talpona

Protests: Resistance

movements have been

against iron ore mining

G O A

Forest area

River

Boundry ofsanctuary

Mining area

Source: Compiled by Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi based on information provided by Philip Neri DeSouza, local activist,Goa


impact on the state’s economy and ecology (see Box: Exporting ore,importing disaster).

Goa is a major producer of metallic minerals: the stateaccounts for 10 per cent of the total value of metallic minerals extracted in the country.8 At just 0.01 per cent, the state’s share in the country’s total non-metallic mineral value isnegligible.9

The value of mineral production in Goa, which has continuously increased since 2000-01 (see Graph 3: Mineral valuetrends in Goa), stood at Rs 829 crore in 2004-05; iron ore accountedfor 99 per cent of this value.10 The value of minor minerals produced in 2004-05 was estimated at Rs 55 crore.11 The state contributed one per cent of the value of minerals produced in the country.12

But the mineral royalty received by the state government wasa pittance – Rs 15 crore, Rs 18 crore and a little more than Rs 17crore respectively in 2002-03, 2003-04 and 2004-05.13 Revenuesfrom mining account for a minuscule portion of the state’s totalrevenues – between 0.8-1 per cent.14 While private miners aremaking windfall profits, the government and the people of thestate are seeing none of it.

The mining industry in Goa employs about 11,000 personsdirectly, and about 10,000 persons indirectly, during the mining season from October to May.15 The major mining and mineral-based companies operating in Goa are Sesa Goa,Chowgules, Dempo and Salgaocar, which together extract

143

MINING IN THE STATES: GOA

c m y k

357.6

401.1

385.7 294.4 396.3

495.9

675.3

829.1

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05

Year

Val

ue

(in

Rs

cro

re)

Source: http://www.indiastat.com/, as viewed on March 26, 2007

GRAPH 3: Mineral value trends in GoaValue shows a continuous increase since 2000-01

Exporting ore, importing disasterIron mining in Goa is being propelled by demand fromacross the shores

For Goa, exporting iron ore is a colonial legacy. The Portuguese begansupplying ore to post-World War II Japan, and now Goa’s industrialhouses, some of which had been granted mining concessions by thecolonial power, are meeting China’s huge appetite. Japan, however,still remains an important market for Goa’s iron ore.

Exports of iron ore from Goa have been continuously increasing –at the turn of the century, Goa exported 15 MT, and by 2004-05, thishad increased to 23 MT (see Graph: The Chinese factor).1 Exports havegrown by more than 53 per cent since 1999-00.

The price of Indian iron ore in the international market has beensoaring – it increased from US $17 a tonne in 2000-01 to US $55 a tonne in 2005-06, and it even reached an all-time high of US $83 a tonne briefly in 2004.2 Miners in Goa and Karnataka have been quick to tap the export market, with Goa jumping the supply line. In2003-04, Goa accounted for 43 per cent of India’s total iron ore exports– with China being the major market, accounting for more than 68 percent.3 In 2004-05, exports from Goa to China increased by a whopping18 per cent.4

Feeding the ever-growing Chinese appetite for iron ore has beenthe strongest driver for Goa’s mining industry for the past few years.Goa’s iron ore companies aren’t complaining. and with good reason:record profits. Sesa Goa, for instance, recorded a profit margin of 46 per

cent in 2005-06.5 It is another story that the government receivespeanuts from the massive profits that private miners are making.

Unlike Goa’s miners, its villagers are complaining, for all that it isworth. With the massive devastation of farms, forest land and waterresources, they are bound to.

Source: Anon, 2007, Economic Survey – 2005-06, Directorate of Planning,Statistics and Evaluation, government of Goa, Panjim, pp 99

GRAPH: The Chinese factorDemand from China is driving iron production and exports

25

20

15

10

5

0

15.1 16.116.7

19.0

Exp

ort

s o

f ir

on

ore

(in

mill

ion

to

nn

e p

er a

nn

um

)1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05

Year

22.123.3

about 67 per cent of Goa’s total iron ore, and account for 68 per cent of Goa’s ore exports.16

The key iron ore deposits are located in Bicholim, Sanguemand Satari taluks, while manganese deposits are confined to thesouthern and south-eastern parts of Sanguem. Around 1,282 ha offorest land has been diverted for mining activities, which is aboutfour per cent of the total area under mining in the state.17

There is reason to believe that the figures of forest land divert-ed for mining are much higher. For one, large areas of forests inthe state are not classified in government records. These are private forests or community lands, and so forest clearance is notnecessary here. Mining done on such forest land is unlikely to bedocumented.

Illegal encroachment is rampant. Even the state governmentadmits it – according to the Economic Survey 2005-06, an area of2,66,000 sq m of government land has been identified as being“illegally encroached” by mining companies.

Whatever the figures are, there is no doubt that mining hascompletely devastated Goa’s pristine forests. According to areport by the New Delhi-based The Energy and ResourcesInstitute, at least 18 per cent of Goa’s forests have been lostto mining.

■ HIT: WATER, FORESTS AND WILDLIFE

The history of mining in Goa is intrinsically linked with its colo-nial past. When the Second World War ravaged Japan, leaving itseconomy in shambles, the country needed iron and steel torebuild itself. Goa, with its huge reserves, was well suited to meetthis demand. Portugal realised that this market was a potentialgold mine, and decided to tap it. Portugal also realised that itneeded to involve some local Goans and people from otherPortugese colonies in its plans; like all colonisers, it hoped thatthese agents would support its regime in order to protect theirown economic interests. In fact, Chowgule and Dempo, who havehuge stakes in Goa’s mining industry today, were migrants whoworked for the erstwhile Portugese dynasty.

Following this strategy, Portugal awarded mining leases inperpetuity to some Goans – mainly small businesspeople. Eversince, large-scale mining of iron ore and its subsequent hugelyprofitable export has been an integral part of Goa’s economy –leaving an indelible impact on Goan society and environment.

It is also a colonial legacy that mining in Goa is still largely inprivate hands, even after the liberation of Goa and its integrationinto India. After the Indian Army took over Goa, the mine owners

144


The other face of Goa, thanks to iron ore mining: a far cry from the sea-and-sun-kissed beauty touted by the state’s tourism department

SUN

ITA

NA

RAIN

/ C

SE

m k

went to the International Court of Justice at The Hague, whichwas to decide whether Goa was ‘captured or liberated’. TheIndian government agreed to let it be termed as ‘liberation’, andthis gave rights to the mine owners to carry on with the miningconcessions granted by the Portugese. In 1986, the concessionswere abolished and converted into leases, which were deemedgranted. However, many mines are currently operating withoutlease deeds being signed, which means the government has nocontrol over the mine owners.

Unrestrained iron ore mining has devastated the lifeline ofGoan society – its farmlands, forests, rivers, air and groundwater— and Goa’s people are feeling the pinch (see Box: Mines thatundermine farming). Most mines in Goa work below the ground-water level. About 10 tonne of water has to be pumped out forevery tonne of ore mined. This leads to depletion of groundwaterin the surrounding areas.18 Surface water from the rivers alsoseeps and flows into the mining pits, leading to drying of therivers downstream.

The once blue waters of Goa’s rivers are often bloody red,sometimes resembling choked drains. Take the case of primarywater sources like the Kushawati, Kalay, Uguem, Khandepar,Advoi, Bicholim Zuari, and Mandovi rivers. The Selaulim reser-voir (Goa’s biggest water supply project) too has not been spared.On one hand, the Curpem and Vichundrem streams deposit min-ing silt into the reservoir, and on the other, the Tudov, Netrulimand Salaulim rivers which originate in the Netrulim Wildlife

Sanctuary, carry run-off from the mines and haphazardly dumpthe rejects into the reservoir. Mine run-off from Salginin flows intothe Kali river, that joins the sea at Karwar. The renowned Mayemlake has also met the same fate.

Goa reels under severe water crisis even when it receivesrecord amounts of rain. In 2005, according to the state govern-ment, a deluge of 130 inches washed hundreds of tonnes of siltfrom mining sites into local water bodies.19 Officials said the holding capacity of these water bodies was considerably reducedfollowing the unprecedented silting.

According to Brother Philip Neri de Souza, who is attached tothe Don Bosco farm at Sulcorna in Quepem taluka, mining wastesare being discharged right into the Selaulim reservoir. The siltfrom the mines is now weakening the structure of the Selaulimdam itself. A news report published in 2001 in a local dailyGomantak says, “A government official said that the life span of a project of such dimensions should be at least 100 years, butsiltation caused by mining in the upper reaches of the catchmentarea could drastically reduce its longevity. Though the IrrigationAct prevents mining and quarrying activities in the catchmentarea, the subject comes under the Central Act, and there is a gooddeal of confusion.”

According to environmentalist Claude Alvares, Goa’s mineowners flout even the most basic environment protection normslike constructing bunds to prevent inflow of mining wastes intowater bodies. “The state government’s Mines Department which

145


c m y k

Mines that undermine farmingGoa is slowly turning into a mammoth wasteland

Everything in Lamgaon village in Goa is coated with a fine layer of redearth – part of the environmental price paid by the community for thenearby iron ore mine. The emitted particles settle on plants and trees,stunting their growth. Earth dislodged by mining is dumped on hillslopes. From there, it is washed down by the monsoons into lakes,riverbeds and irrigation channels, choking them.

“Look at this muddy water flowing into my farm now,” says 48-year-old Shantabal Hoble, a member of the Lamgaon Citizen’sCommittee.“It disgorges so much silt that the level of my field has risenby about a third of a metre.The fertile land that once yielded more thantwo tonne of paddy is buried under the clay from the mine on the hilland now I get less than a tonne of paddy from the field.”The channelthat brings water to her two hectare field is chocked by silt.

Other mine debris has affected the fertility of the farms in the village, 30 km east of Panaji. But Lamgaon is not alone. Many villageshave been hit by the activities of the iron ore mines in the state.

All over Goa, pollution caused by the transportation of minedmaterial is causing havoc. The dust generated by the heavy trucks hasreduced agricultural productivity, apart from causing significant congestion problems. At least 7,000 trucks travel every day in Goa –through villages, forests, wildlife sanctuaries and farmlands. And theimpact on this small state, with a delicate ecosystem, is enormous. Dust from mining operations is destroying the fertility of farms

SUN

ITA

NA

RAIN

/ C

SE

146


c m y k

Iron ore mining has devastated Goa’s lifelines – its rivers. They are turning bloody red with the iron ore fines running into the water bodies

PHIL

IP N

ERI D

ESO

UZA

oversees the functioning of mines has just two engineers, one ofwhom is bogged down with court matters,” Alvares said.20

While Selaulim and Bicholim are choked with silt, the Zuariand Mandovi are threatened by arsenic. They are the major riversin Goa, flowing over an area of 2,50,000 ha through the state’smining belts.21 A large part of Goa’s iron ore, manganese and fer-romanganese ores comes from mines located in the basins andwatersheds of these two rivers. In fact, 90 per cent of Goa’s ironand ferromanganese ores are transported through them to theMarmugao harbour.22

The Mandovi carries discharges from a catchment area of1,15,000 ha, while the river basin has an area of around 38,000ha.23 The river carries drainage from 43,500 ha of forest land.24

There are 27 large mines that generate 1,500-6,000 tonne of rejectsper day per mine, a substantial portion of which ultimately endsup in the river.25 The Zuari carries discharges from a catchmentarea of 55,000 ha.26 Ten large mines are located in this basin, generating 1,000-4,000 tonne of rejects per day per mine.27

These mines are equally generous in offloading their wastes intothe passive Zuari.

A study was conducted to assess the presence and quantity ofarsenic in the rivers due to the mining activities in their basins. Six samples were collected from both the estuaries to assess thearsenic content. The iron ore of Mandovi-Zuari catchment areahas approximately 50 microgram per gram (µg/g) of arsenic, andthe study found that partial dissolution of the mining rejects couldenrich the dissolved arsenic in estuaries.28 During the pre- andpost-monsoon seasons, both estuaries had same arsenate levels(0.11-0.24 microgram per litre, or µg/l).29 The arsenate level waslow at marine and freshwater ends, while it was at its maximumin the mid-estuarine region.

During monsoons, arsenate levels showed a four-fold increase(0.3-0.78 µg/l) with higher concentrations in the surface layercompared to the bottom layer.30 Arsenate was at its peak duringthe period of maximum precipitation and river discharge, a telltale sign of mining waste laden with arsenic getting into therivers. The high levels of arsenate also indicate the possibility ofsome arsenic associated with iron (as FeAsS) leaching into therivers and of dissolution of river-borne sediments. Manganeseoxides significantly enhance arsenite oxidation and may bebehind the high arsenate at the marine end.

Among the other rivers in Goa, the Kushawati faces siltationand pollution from iron and manganese fines. The river is themajor source of agricultural and drinking water supply for peo-ple living in the villages of Rivona, Sulcorna, Pirla, Kevona,Colomba, Chandor, Zambaulim, Paroda and Quepem. Over thelast few years, large-scale extraction of minerals in this man-ganese-rich belt has resulted in contamination of the river fromrun-offs during monsoons and washing of manganese ore alongits banks. Wastes from the mining pits, which flow into theKushawati, cause siltation of the river and also affect its flow.Many of its tributaries have already dried up due to the miningactivities. The Kushawati Bachao Andolan (KBA), which hasbeen campaigning against the pollution of the river, believes thatif the situation is not controlled, the region’s paddy, coconut, sug-arcane and aeracanut plantations will be affected severely.

The situation in most of Goa, thus, is serious, particularly forvillagers from areas near mining centres: they have already begunselling off their properties. Most of the residents of Pisurlem vil-lage in Bicholim taluka which is surrounded by mines, have leftafter mining wastes destroyed all the 80 wells in the village.Residents of Bicholim say they had begun to order water tankers

147


c m y k

Blasted and stonedThe residents of Saleli are reeling – from rampant miningand stone crushing near their village

For more than 10 years now, residents of Saleli have been complainingto the authorities against the menace of stone crushing units in theirvillage. Located close to the Mahadei wildlife sanctuary, Saleli is anagricultural village with a population of around 1,200.

According to Rajendra Kerkar, an environmentalist from the adjacentvillage of Keri, Saleli has about 48 mines of meta basalt and meta granite,13 stone crushers and two hot mix plants. And these are the bane of thelocal agriculturists. Mining has put paid to 15 of the 25 perennial streamsin the village, while blasting at the mines is taking a heavy toll of the villagers’health. Radhike Ragobha, a 55-year old Saleli resident sitting ondharna outside the village temple along with other women of Saleli, says:“Blasting in the mines would begin early morning and carry on till late atnight. The noise pollution was driving us deaf.”Added another villagerwho lives about 150 metres from one of the 13 stone crushing units,“Stone dust has begun telling on our health; my 18-month daughter suffers from constant cough and cold. And we don’t even have a primaryhealth care centre here. The nearest hospitals are in Valpoi or

Sankhli, both about 15 km away.”There has been no study to ascertain theimpact of these 13 stone crushers on the health of Saleli’s residents.

The blasting has also destroyed the village’s drinking water andirrigation sources. Pointing towards one of the many blasting sites,Kishori Gawas, a Saleli resident, says, “This used to be a perennialsource of water, but stone crushing has put paid to it. Now, we have nooption but to use groundwater. We have been complaining against this indiscriminate blasting for more than 10 years and have written tovarious departments. But the authorities have turned a deaf ear to ourpleas.” Another villager added that “stones from the blasting site would often hit our cattle, injuring or even sometimes killing them. Butthe miners carried on with impunity.”

The first pollution-related complaint from Saleli was filed way back in 1994 to the Paryavaran Vahini of Goa – a scheme launched bythe Union ministry of environment and forests in 1992-93 to createenvironmental awareness through people’s participation. But, saysKerkar, a Paryavahan Vahini member, no action was taken on the complaint filed by Saleli’s residents. The Vahini was finally woundup in 1997.

– Vasudha Sawaiker, Down To Earth, Goa

even before the rains ended, as the groundwater has already beenruined by the mines. The poorer farmers lost their crops due towater stress caused by the mines that have been operating on theperiphery of the village.

Some farmers decided to take matter into their own hands.Villagers of Surla in Bicholim filed a writ petition against the min-ing companies in the Bombay High Court’s Panjim bench in 2004because of the heavy losses incurred due to silting of their fieldsfrom adjoining mining units since 1993.31

A committee was set up in April 2005 to evaluate the extent oflosses (in terms of fertility and water-retaining facility) and thecost of removal of silt. The committee reported that mines wereoperational on the north, east and south sides of the village allalong the hills. It found that approximately 1,090 ha of land (124ha under paddy, 603 ha under garden crops and 363 ha under drycrops) was affected due to silting. Several farmers had incurredtotal loss of their kharif as well as rabi crops, while yields of cashewcrop had fallen by 50 per cent. The committee suggested that thefarmers be paid compensation for the loss of yield.

Recently, the court, giving its ruling in the case, said that the

mining companies should pay Rs 3.6 crore by August 30, 2007 tocompensate for the losses incurred by the farmers from 1993 till2006. The compensation amount is to be disbursed to 761aggrieved farmers whose fields had been destroyed.

Mining companies such as Salgaocar Mining Industries,Chowgule & Co Pvt Ltd, Salgaokar & Brothers Pvt Ltd, and V SDempo & Co Pvt Ltd have been asked to pay Rs 8.5 lakh each,while Timblo Pvt Ltd and D B Bandodkar & Co Pvt Ltd are to payRs 3.6 lakh each. Payment of the compensation, however, discharges these companies from the responsibility of desiltingthe fields.

The court has appointed the deputy collector of Bicholim ascourt commissioner for disbursing the collected amount and hasmade provisions that farmers not listed among the beneficiariescan still approach the zonal agriculture officer with an applicationfor raising a claim.

The judges also directed the companies to undertake adequate protective measures such as providing catchment drains,protective walls and check dams for arresting silt and begin plan-tations on the waste dumps. They indicated that the compliance of

148


c m y k

OverburdenedGoa’s mining waste dumps are choking its streams, destroying forests and farmlands and killing people

For every tonne of iron ore mined in Goa, three tonne of waste material gets generated. Over a period of 55 years of mining in Goa, it isestimated that hundreds of millions of tonnes of waste and overburden,low-grade ore and tailings have accumulated around mining areas.

In most of the mines, overburden and tailings is not properlystored and managed. Forests in Goa have been hugely affected byoverburden – mountains of overburden can be seen all over forests,and even in protected areas. A case in point is the Netravati sanctuary.

Coupled with the fact that dense vegetation on the steep slopes ofthe Western Ghats has been destroyed by the decades of relentlessmining, the overburden gets washed away during monsoons, and findsits way into homes, farms and local water bodies. Mining wastes is oneof the reasons for the devastation of forests and farmlands in Goa. Adeluge in 2002 led to the collapse of mining reject dumps in six mines,which destroyed the Advoi river. Silt from the dumps covered residen-tial houses and around 100 hectares of agricultural land in Pissurlemand neighbouring villages.

The dumps are also an occupational hazard. Six workers were killedon December 9, 2006 when iron ore mining waste dumps collapsed inTollem mines in Goa.The nearly 100 metre (m) high overburden dumps– covering an area in a 200 m radius – gave way, burying the excavatingmachines as well as the operators beneath them. The landslide was sosudden that those trapped were unable to even react. Military personnelwere called in for rescue operations. A case of negligence was filedagainst the board of directors and managers of the mine.

The low priority given by mine operators to overburden manage-ment culminated in this tragedy. Cases like these abound; many arenot ever reported.

Huge mountains of mining waste like this one accidently slippedand killed six workers in Tollem, South Goa

SUN

ITA

NA

RAIN

/ C

SE

these protective measures would be monitored by the chief engi-neer (water resources), and the case would be again reviewed aftera year to decide if further compensation is required.

Mining is hammering away at Goa’s other resources too: in theNorth Goa forest division, immediately adjacent to or often insidethe Bhagwan Mahaveer wildlife sanctuary, several mining leasesencroach on the sanctuary or impact on its borders.

As Goa’s highly influential mining lobby pushes to increaseproduction of minerals, the state’s forests and wildlife sanctuarieshave suffered. According to a study done by Pune-based NGOKalpavriksha (Hoghe et al, 2002), the Bhagwan Mahaveerwildlife sanctuary and Molem national park cover a total area of240 sq km of moist deciduous, semi-evergreen and evergreenforests. The area boasts of a rich diversity of fauna, including thetiger. Occasionally, even black leopards are sighted. Parts of thisarea were denotified way back in 1985. Other protected areas affected by mining include the Bondla, Neturlim, Mollem andCotigao wildlife sanctuaries – the state government has plans todenotify large areas in these.

Apart from actual mining on forest land or protected land,transportation and storage of minerals have endangered thesefragile areas. Take, for instance, the Mollem national park. Thoughit was declared a protected area in 1967, its western and southernboundaries are dotted with mines. The Bellary-Hospet-Mormagoarail line passes through the Bhagwan Mahaveer wildlife sanctuary.Some iron ore is also being unloaded at Sanvordem, Kalay andCollem. Collem was a sanctuary until it was denotified in 1985. AtKalay, unloading and transportation of iron ore takes place withinthe sanctuary. Rather than protecting the forests and their wildlife,the government, pushed by the mining lobby, is all set to intensifyits spree of denotification of protected areas.

■ NO MINE MANAGEMENT

Given the nature of mineral resources in Goa, vast quantities ofoverburden and waste material is generated while mining. Deepquarries are formed which can be filled up by the overburden.However, most mines, helped by poor regulations, just don’t bother.

Reclamation has found very few takers in Goa. For Goa’s mineowners, mines are important only as long as something can beexploited from them – afterwards, they are just pits. Literally.About 14 mines have been abandoned without restoring the area.Some mines have been abandoned because erstwhile mineral concessions have not been renewed. In all, about 140 mines withbroken area of 1,500 ha have been left as pits for water storage.32

In Goa, the reclaimed area is just 9.5 per cent of the total brokenarea, and land used for waste disposal is about 11 per cent – indi-cating that reclamation is lagging way behind instead of happen-ing simultaneously.33 Back-filling has started in only 10 workingmechanised mines, out of a total of 42.34 Of the total area of about940 ha of these mines, just 12 ha is under reclamation, in whichabout 55 MT of overburden and wastes have been back-filled.35

There are rare good examples, though. Sesa Goa’s Sanquelimmines has established a football ground on reclaimed overburdendumps. It cost the company a capital investment of Rs 80 lakh andhas an annual budget of Rs 30 lakh (see Box: One good show).36

In 1977, Konkani writer Pundalik Naik wrote Acchev – the‘Upheaval’. It was a vivid and brutal portrayal of the impact oframpant iron ore mining on Goa’s self-sufficient agrariancommunities. Though it was written years back, echoes of Acchevcan still be heard all over Goa. In fact, as the mining juggernautgains speed, the upheaval is most certainly going to be evenmore devastating.

149


c m y k

One good showSesa Goa’s reclamation work is worth emulating

Spread over 200 ha in north Goa, the Sanquelim iron ore mines wereexhausted in 1988. The Sesa Goa group of companies had been operating these mines since 1960.Today, the reclaimed land has a foot-ball field on it.

Prior to reclamation of these mines, experiments were conductedto identify plant species suitable for the mine reclamation site. It wasfound out that local flora can grow on mine rejects in a water-deficientenvironment, if the soil is supplemented with organic matter. Thesefindings were used to design a plantation programme for introducinglocal flora and thus enhancing the biodiversity of the reclaimed area.More than five lakh saplings have been grown at the Sanquelim minesite so far, covering a total area of more than 300 ha.

Overburden dumps were initially stabilised by planting acaciasclosely; acacia acts as a nitrogen fixer and is generally not grazed bycattle. The dump soil finally becomes rich in humus due to thefoliage of acacia, which initiates microbial activity and helps in further plant growth. After stabilising and reclaiming the areathrough this agro-horticultural approach, crops like cashew, jack-fruit, coconut, banana and mango were introduced in the area.

Additionally, mine pits which held water were made available forpisciculture by treating the water with lime and organic and inorganic fertilisers.

– Kirti B Gupta, Federation of Indian Mineral Industries, Delhi

Reborn: landscaped and reclaimed iron ore mines

SUN

ITA

NA

RAIN

/ C

SE

150


c m y k

Tourist paradise? A visitor’s travelogue An editorial by Sunita Narain written for Down To Earth

We were standing between a massive mine and a stunning waterreservoir. Local activists were explaining to me how this iron ore minewas located in the catchment of the Salaulim water reservoir, the onlywater source for south Goa. Just as I clicked this depredation on mycamera, we were surrounded by a jeep-load of men. They said theywere from the mine management and wanted us off the property. Weexplained that we had come on a public path and that there were nosigns to indicate that we were trespassing. But clearly, they were not ina mood to listen. They snatched the keys of our jeep, picked up stonesto hit us and got abusive. Before things got totally out of hand, wedecided to leave.They followed us till they saw that we left the area andmost importantly, could not stop and take more photographs.

I was completely baffled at these developments. After all, this wasthe paradise of Goa, known for its sandy beaches, lush green moun-tains and most of all, for its peace and calm. This was also the placewhere industrialists – the families of Dempos, Salgoacars, and Timblos– with mineral interests, play key roles in education, in culture and inpromoting the ethics of good corporate governance. Why would theyallow mining to take place next to what is clearly the most importantwater source for the state? Why were there no signs of regulation –even signboards with names of owners, near or around the mine? Whywould state regulators allow this to happen? What was happening inthis paradise to unleash this violence and simmering tension? I got myanswers soon.

In the next village of Colomba, I was surrounded once again: notby the goons of a mining company, but by the women of the village.We were standing on top of the hill, overlooking the village nestledbetween coconut and cashewnut trees. But where we were, the bull-dozers, mechanised shovels and transporting trucks were hard atwork. They were breaking the hill, shovelling its mud, dumping therejects and then taking away the ore.This mine had just began, said theagitated women, but already their streams were drying up. The sight ofthe red rejects on the green lands below was painful.

They dragged me down into the village, where they showed me

their wasted fields.They then showed me how the mining rejects – andthere are tonnes of this red mud – were being dumped into theirstreams. They walked me to a home where the walls had deep gashes,they said because of the blasting done in the mines. The house owner,Devki Kanta Veli, told me that when she complained to the minersabout her house, the supervisor told her that they would break it alldown next time she opened her mouth.

Understandably, they had just one demand: close down the mines.I asked how permissions had been given without the consent of villagers, who were these companies and whose land were they mining. I learnt that in this literate state, a secrecy gravy trail sur-rounded their operations. It was assumed that conditional environ-mental clearance had been taken to operate the mine. It was mostlycommunidade land – under local community control, which can only beleased for agricultural purposes. But as the concessions had beengranted by the colonial Portuguese government and later convertedinto leases by the Indian government, these restrictions did not seemto apply. Or if they did, then clearly they did not matter.

The ownership was equally muddy, explained the villagers: oneHiralal Khodidas had the lease, but the mine was operated bySociedade Formento (one of Goa’s biggest mining companies),through its agent, Raisu Naik, who had in turn sub-contracted it toGurudas Naik, the ex-sarpanch of the village. This is why, I guess, themines did not have company signboards. It did not suit them to revealtheir identity or their permissions to the villagers.

In the next village, Quinamol, the scene was more or less the same.The miners were rowdy; the villagers angry. The only difference wasthat the mine was older – mined for ferro-manganese and now beingexcavated for iron ore. The mining rejects were bigger; they coveredopen fields of villagers and filled their water bodies. The tension waspalpable. The women told me that they had complained but nobodywas listening. I learnt later that the next day after my visit, people ofthe village stopped a truck loading the material and beat up the driver. A case has now been registered by the police against thewomen. But is it only their fault?

This was the scene in all the villages that we passed. Red mudoozed from the hills above. It was as if is these were tears of blood. Whatmade it particularly devastating is the fact that these villages are notdestitute, desperate for livelihoods and money. These are prosperousareas, where agricultural productivity is the basis of economic wealth. Itis this well-being that is being destroyed, bit by bit. I understood thenwhat the demand of ore from China, which had raised prices of themineral as never before, was doing to the greed of Indians.

It was in Vichundrem village that I saw the future. Here our vehicle could not proceed up to the hill. It was blocked by a massiveboulder. This was the simple but effective blockade by the village. Itwas their way to keep the miners out of the government forest land,which surrounded their fields and provided it spring water for irrigation. The fields were gleaming green in the sun.

The images burned in my mind. When I returned to town thatevening I saw on the news that violence had broken out in Nandigramin West Bengal over the government’s plan to acquire land. I had justseen a million Nandigrams taking birth. Where are we headed?The rock that protects Vichundrem from mining companies

SUN

ITA

NA

RAIN

/ C

SE

The Himalayan states of Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradeshare rich in minerals, but the ecological fragility of the region

has rendered mineral extraction here an extremely hazardous –and in some cases, impossible – venture.

Uttarakhand (erstwhile Uttaranchal) was carved out of UttarPradesh in the year 2000: it has an area of about six million ha.1

Nearly 44 per cent of this – more than two million ha2 – is underthick forest cover. Forest land diverted for mining stands ataround 247 ha.3

The state has significant reserves of limestone, magnesite, rockphosphate and soapstone (see Table 1: Minerals in Uttarakhand andMap: Minerals and forests – Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh onpages 152-153). Uttarakhand is the second largest producer ofmagnesite and steatite in the country, contributing 12 per cent and14 per cent, respectively, to the total output.4 Steatite accounts for53 per cent of the value of mineral production in the state, andmagnesite another 44 per cent.5 Although the state has sizeablereserves of limestone, mining of this mineral has been banned.

The value of mineral production in the state stood at aroundRs 90 crore, and the state received a royalty of more than Rs 35crore in 2003-04.6

Till 2003, leases covering a total area of 2,757 ha7 were grantedfor mining in the state. The largest number of leases had beengranted for extracting steatite (38), while with 1,413 ha, magnesiteled in terms of area under lease.8 Pithoragarh is the most mined district in Uttarakhand with an area of 1,444 ha under mineleases, followed by Bageshwar with 554 ha.9

Himachal Pradesh too has abundant limestone deposits,besides those of magnesite and steatite. The reserves are scatteredall over the state – limestone in Bilaspur, Sirmaur and Kangra; saltand slates in Mandi; gypsum in Rajban, Bharli Sirmour and Solan;and uranium in Kullu and Hamirpur (see Map on page 152).Forest land diverted for mining in the state is estimated at about1,228 ha.10

Limestone is the most important mineral for HimachalPradesh, accounting for 75 per cent of its value of mineral produc-tion.11 The state was the sole producer of rock salt in the countryin 2004-05. Minor minerals are also an major part of its mineralbase, contributing around 24 per cent to the value of minerals produced.12

Himachal Pradesh had about 53 mine leases, with the totalarea under them being 2,368 ha in 2003.13 A majority of the leases

151

c m y k

Large-scale limestone mining is being done in the two states’ protected areas, which are being denotified to allow mining

MO

NA

LI Z

EYA

HA

ZRA

/ C

SE


The Himalayan states

152


c m y k

PU

NJ

AB

H A R Y A N A

UT T A

R P R

AD

E S H N E P A L

C H I N A( T I B E T )

Protests: Limestone mining hasfaced maximum resistance

J A M M U A N D K A S H M I R

U T T A R A K H A N D

H I M A C H A L P R A D E S H

Chamba Lahul & Spiti

Kangra

Kullu

Kinnaur

Shimla

MandiHamirpurUna

Solan

Sirmaur

Uttarkashi

TehriGarhwalDehradun

Rudr

apra

yag

Chamoli

PauriHaridwar

Almora

Bageshwar

Pithoragarh

ChampawatNainital

Udham Singh Nagar

Bilaspur

Chenab

Za

ska

r

Pong reservoir

Ravi

Satluj

Spiti

Bh

agir

ath

i

Yamuna

Tons

Ganga

Ra

mg

an

ga

Kal

i

Gir i

Govind Sagar

Open forests

Dense forests

River

Iron

Gold

Copper

Coal/lignite

Limestone

Gypsum

Graphite

Dolomite

Soapstone

Magnesite

Alaknanda

Source: Compiled by Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi

MAP: Minerals and forests – Uttarakhand and Himachal PradeshBoth the states are blessed with vast forested tracts; mining in these regions is a recipe for disaster

(48) were for extracting limestone; the area under limestone was1,705 ha – accounting for 72 per cent of the total area under leasesin the state.14 Gypsum accounts for 26 per cent of the mined areawhile rock salt takes care of the rest.15 Solan has the maximumarea under mine leases, while the maximum number of leases isin Sirmaur (see Table 2: Districts and mine leases in HimachalPradesh). Solan is home to some huge cement plants which havecaptive leases for limestone. The key cement manufacturers in thestate include Gagal Cement Works owned by Associated CementCompanies Ltd, and the Darlaghat-based unit of Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. In Uttarakhand, on the other hand, the bigindustrial players include producers of steatite such as KatiyarMining and Industrial Corporation and Parwatiya Mines, andmagnesite miner Almora Magnesite Ltd.

The Himachal Pradesh government has been laying the red car-pet for cement manufacturers, aggressively promoting the state inthe name of development and employment generation. JaiprakashAssociates Ltd has undertaken a greenfield project for manufactur-ing three MT of cement in Baga Bhalag in Solan, and another two-MT cement plant is slated to come up in the Choupal region.

The flashpoints

■ THE STRUGGLE FOR THE DOON VALLEY

Both the Himalayan states have a history not just of mining, butalso of protests by local communities over ecological damage andresource alienation. Uttarakhand, for instance, used to be a limestone-mining hub – thanks to the abundant quantities ofhigh-grade limestone available in the Dehradun valley. Protestsled to the banning of limestone mining in the Doon valley, cour-tesy a landmark 1986 judgement by the Supreme Court (SC).

The Doon valley, in many ways, epitomises the state’s tryst with the mining industry. The valley is bordered by the lime-stone-rich Mussoorie hills to the north. For one interest group(including the operators of the limestone quarries and the scientificand technical agencies of the state government in charge of geology and mining), the most productive use of the limestonedeposits in the valley lies in their extraction. For the other andmuch larger interest group (consisting of the local communities,both rural and urban), the most productive use of the same limestone deposits lies in their in situ function – conserving thelarge volumes of rainwater that falls in the Mussoorie hills duringmonsoons every year.

In 1911, four quarries were being worked in the Doon valley,and by 1982 there were nearly 100 leaseholders holding about1,250 ha of area. The valley’s environment was severely damaged– characterised by loss of topsoil, lowering of the water table and deposition of dust on plant surfaces. The kilns led to the emission of carbon dioxide (CO2), carbon monoxide (CO) and sulphur dioxide (SO2), causing defoliation, chlorosis and necrosisin plants.

But the most severe impact of mining was on local waterresources. Blasting of limestone had resulted in landslides, which carried debris to the rivers and streams clogging these natural channels of drainage. Floods, therefore, became a common occurrence in the valley during monsoons. Mining in the Mussoorie hills even affected the water sources of the Doon valley – the limestone reserves coincided with the catchment areas of the streams that flowed into the valley. Therun-off from the mines changed the course of the rivers andincreased the height of the riverbed. Silt and debris affected the canal network, choking canals, necessitating dredging anddisrupting the water supply.

The resistance to the extraction of limestone from this vulner-able ecosystem was in three phases. In the first phase, local villageorganisations politically resisted the mining activities. The resist-ance was quickly interpreted as a block to national progress, andthe organisations of the villagers were subverted by convertingthem into cooperatives and providing them with small leases.Without the support of science or the state, the villagers lost theircampaign. The second phase was characterised as a conflictbetween the state and the lease holders. The Uttar Pradesh gov-ernment tried to withdraw the lease in 1977 on the grounds that it

153

MINING IN THE STATES: THE HIMALAYAN STATES

Mineral Quantity (in million tonne)

Limestone 430.5

Marble 6.4

Rock phosphate 25.0

Graphite 10.7

Dolomite (superior) 30

Magnesite 70.3

Copper 1.6

Soapstone 26.6

Source: http://www.smallindustryindia.com/policies/state/uttran/utran.htm, asviewed on March 29, 2007

TABLE 1: Minerals in UttarakhandThe state has considerable limestone reserves, but miningthese would lead to excessive environmental damage

District Number of leases Lease area (hectare)

Bilaspur 4 248.21

Kannaur 2 609.09

Mandi 3 53.86

Sirmaur 42 699.99

Solan 2 757.08

Source: Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licences, 2003,Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 12

TABLE 2: Districts and mine leases in Himachal PradeshSolan accounts for the maximum area under leases, becauseof its cement industry

m k

154


c m y k

Limestone: more flashpointsLimestone is the bone of contention in other regions as wellin these states

In Himachal Pradesh, limestone mining emerged as a profitable occu-pation two decades ago in Sirmaur district: reckless mining resulted inrapid destruction of forests and water pollution.1 In 1986, the govern-ment imposed a ban on granting new limestone mining leases.2 In1995, the government recognised the malpractices being followed inthe name of limestone mining in Shimla and ordered the closure of 10-12 mines in the region.3 The mines were accused of violating mining laws regarding the height of the mine and steps to be taken forprevention of water pollution.

Solan has been one of the worst-affected districts in HimachalPradesh. Unscientific mining has drastically reduced the green cover inthe neighbouring districts of Bilaspur and Sirmaur. In 1991, GujaratAmbuja began planning a cement plant in this region – inside awildlife sanctuary. There was immense pressure on the state govern-ment to lift the ban on mining to allow the plant to operate. As acounter to this, about 15 panchayats of the area came together to urgethe government not to lift the ban. But the government caved in: thecement plant was allowed to be built after denotifying the Darlaghatwildlife sanctuary.

The state continues to woo the cement plants despite facing facingopposition from the locals. An example is the proposed 1.2-MT perannum cement plant of Harish Cement, a subisidiary of Aditya BirlaGroup at Sundernagar in Mandli district.4 Residents of Khatrwari andadjoining villages took out protest rallies forcing the plant to be shifted elsewhere.5 Similar protests by environmentalists and localshave marked the proposed cement and power plant projects ofJaiprakash Industries in Solan district. Inspite of the protests, the workon the cement plant has already begun.

Kataldi: in limboIn 2002, a case of limestone mining similar in nature to that of theDoon valley came up in Hemwalghati in the Tehri-Garhwal region.6

Kataldi village, consisting of about 30 families, was at the centre of thecontroversy here. Limestone mining in this area had faced oppositionfrom the locals on previous occasions as well, the earliest being in1974-79, which had led to a stay on all mining operations.

However, in 1997, a six-year mining lease was obtained byParvatiya Mineral Industry, which was again met with resistance.Again, in 2001, the company obtained a fresh 30-year lease. The leasedarea had a perennial natural spring on which a number of surroundingvillages were dependent for water. Blasting and digging during themining operations was feared to restrict access to this water source.Another threat was to the region’s bio-diversity. Mining was thoughtto affect the fertility of the land, leading to loss of food security. Also,the leased area was next to a forest reserve, which served as the onlylink between forests and the people for purposes of fodder and fuel-wood. The lease area of 5.26 ha at Kataldi also fell in the category of‘mining projects with lease area above five ha’as per the EnvironmentImpact Assessment Notification, 1994 and also attracted provisions of

the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980. Thus, the project required environmental clearances from the Union ministry of environment and forests. However, whether such clearances were obtained or notwas not known.

A public interest litigation (PIL) was filed in the Nainital HighCourt by the Academy for Mountain Environics and other people’sorganisations, and some residents of Kataldi. The High Court’s judge-ment put the onus on the district collector who, it said, should notallow mining till forest clearance had been granted. According toKanchi Kohli of Kalpavriksha, a Pune-based organisation working onenvironmental issues, in response to a Right to Information (RTI)petition filed by Kalpavriksha, the ministry has replied that till now noforest clearance has been asked for. Even the preliminary formality offiling an application by the company to get forest clearances has notbeen done.

At present, no mining activity is going on in the village.“Till the 30-year mining lease is cancelled, the matter can be considered pending in spite of the High Court’s decision. It’s like a sword hangingover people’s heads,”adds Kohli.

While limestone mining has been banned in neighbouringUttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh continues to encourage cement plants

VEN

U M

AD

HA

V /

CSE

would affect the ‘natural beauty and ecology’ of the region. TheSC called on technical experts to inform its decisions. The expertsinformed the Court that quarrying in the lease areas “does notnecessarily affect the environmental and ecological balance inregard to water, soil and other related factors”. Without counter-arguments based on ecology as a public interest science, even thestate could not control mining in the Doon valley.

In the third phase, citizens’ groups in Dehradun andMussoorie headed by the Dehradun-based NGO Rural Litigationand Entitlement Kendra fought a similar case in the SC – this timeinformed by public interest science. The balance shifted, and thesame expert who in 1977 had stated that quarrying was ecologically safe, now opined of the same quarry that “the leasearea is situated right in the immediate catchment area of a nullahand is thus subjected to conspicuous denudation by flow of water.Rectification of the situation calls for a permanent closure of thismine”. The emergence of public interest science supporting

public interest litigation in the Doon valley created a new counterveiling force favouring public interest. Finally, on March 12, 1985, the SC passed an order closing permanently ortemporarily, 53 limestone quarries out of 60 within the geographical limits of the Doon valley or Dehradun tehsil. This was a landmark judgement: it was rare for the highest court of the country to put a blanket ban on mining activity in an entire region – that too on ecological grounds.

■ UTTARAKHAND’S OTHER WOES

In Uttarakhand, soapstone and magnesite quarries have alsodeprived people of large tracts of forest land, pastures and farms.Eastern Bageshwar is a hub of soapstone mining. There arearound 200 mines in the area, many of which are illegal, and anestimated 200-250 trucks ply daily in the region to supply thesoapstone. Environmental regulations, of course, fall by the

155


c m y k

Soapstone seals Bageshwar’s fate Mining for soapstone is devastating this hill region

Bageshwar district in Uttarakhand is known for soapstone mining,with Eastern Bageshwar as its hub. In Kapkot tehsil, “the number ofactive mines has grown from six in 1980 to over 40 in 2005, spread over2,734 ha of productive farmland,” says Naren Singh Bhandari, reader,department of chemistry, Kumaon University.

Most mining companies operating in the region are owned byindustrialists and entrepreneurs who do not belong to the state.“About200-250 trucks ply daily to transport soapstone,”says Mahesh ChandraJoshi, a local journalist. Five companies are mining in Kanda Parav village. “Nearly 1,000 tonne of soapstone is mined a day. Every farmwith soapstone can yield up to 5,000 kg,” says Sunder Singh Garia,gram pradhan.

Most of these mines have encroached upon agricultural land. Asfarmers began profiting from leasing out land, mining on agriculturalland got entrenched. According to Girish Gunwant, the subdivisionalmagistrate of Bageshwar in charge of mining, the Mineral ConcessionRules, 1960, say that one mining unit cannot exceed 200 metre length-wise. In reality, however, no restrictions are adhered to.“Mining of soap-stone continues to a depth of 30-40 feet since there is no limit on exca-vation,”says Keshav Bhatt, a Bageshwar-based journalist. Social activistssay there are 150-200 mines in Bageshwar. Of these, many are illegal.

Between 1957 and 1976, three major landslides occurred in the district’s Chaurashtal village.“Soapstone is soft and slippery. Whereverit gets exposed due to mining, large landslips are bound to occur,”Bhandari points out. Joshi agrees: “As a slope is destabilised, slumpingoccurs, triggering landslides. Since mined lands are not taken care ofafter being abandoned, large and devastating landslides can strike in afew years.”

“There are no specific mining policies for the state and miners aretaking advantage of the situation,” says G S Joshi, district magistrate,Bageshwar. “Trees are not planted and mining areas not filled up to avoid expenses. What we get after the mining are gaping craters

filled with water, which increases the threat of landslips, and dwindlingnatural springs and barren land,” says Diwan Singh, a farmer fromKirauli village.

– Bidisha Kumar, Down To Earth, New Delhi

White patches of mined-out soapstone are an eyesore inBageshwar

SAM

RAT

MU

KH

ERJE

E /

CSE

wayside. Soapstone, if exposed due to mining, can trigger offlarge landslips as it is very soft and slippery. Mining operationsare also affecting the flow of water through the aquifer zone, cre-ating large fissures through which water seeps out. This has led todrying up of springs. Land fertility has been drastically reduced,endangering food security of villages.

Clay mining in the state has had its share of controversies too:the early ‘80s had witnessed protests against it in Malla Danpur,Bageshwar district.16 The bone of contention was the governmentapproval granted to six different clay mining leases in five areasof Kaplot development area in Bageshwar (then Almora district).A social organisation, Grameen Utthan Samiti, began organisingthe people by creating awareness among them against mining. InApril 1984, the villagers sent a letter against the mining to the district collector. When they saw no results, a year later, theyorganised a strike which stopped the mining work for four days.A movement against mining was again launched in June 1985 inwhich about 150-200 men and women took part. The peopledemanded the annulment of all mine leases in the area, compen-sation for the losses, and reclamation of the mined-out lands.They organised a 54-km walk from Chaudasthal to the districtheadquarters in Bageshwar, laying siege to the administration.The local administration gave a report in favour of the people andfinally, in September 1995, the government ordered the miners tostop extracting clay.

Ten years down the line, history repeated itself: mining started in the area again, and the villagers rose up against it. InSeptember 1995, under the banner of Grameen Chetna Manch,protests and fastings were once again organised at the Kalika tem-ple in Chaudasthal. Women participated actively in the protests.In 1996, mining was banned once again – only to restart in 2002,followed by another round of protests and demonstrations, lead-ing to a ban a third time. Some of the mine owners transferredtheir leases to other contractors, triggering another agitation. InMarch 2005, the deputy district magistrate gave an undertaking in

writing to the protestors that no more notices will be given formining leases.

There have been areas where people have given up their landsto miners in the hope of development and employment genera-tion, but have been left high and dry. The people of Chandak,Mostamanu, Sikadani, Dhari, Dhunga, Tadigaon, Punedi, Silpata,Siloli, Mad, Maila, Manesera, Dhunauda and Bhunigaon villagesin Pithoragarh district gave their grazing lands, watersheds andvan panchayat lands to magnesite companies.17 After some years offunctioning, the companies went bankrupt, leaving behind fractured societies.

Chandak Magnesite Ltd is a case in point. It used to manufac-ture dead burnt magnesite (DBM). As India opened up to theglobal market and reduced import duties, the company lost itsmarket to its Chinese and Korean counterparts. There were nobuyers for the locally produced magnesite. When it becameimpossible to stay in competition, the factory owners locked thefactories, without paying the workers their dues or paying off theloans taken from the banks.

For the local community, it was a double blow. The fields,covered by dust from the factory, were unable to produce anycrops. Grazing grounds had turned into parched deserts. Dust-borne diseases were common. Natural water resources, whichhad been destroyed by explosions, were not in a position to berecharged.

Tadigaon has a similar story: in 1976, industrialist J P Khetanacquired a 20-year-old lease of 360 ha of land in the name ofHimalayan Magnesite Company, promising villagers employ-ment. Before the end of the lease period, the factory was lockedup, rendering 500 to 600 people unemployed.

These cases have served to alert the people of other villageslike Askot. When a Canadian multinational corporation, PebbleCreek, expressed its interest in mining ascot ore and promisedemployment to the villagers, the people protested (see Box: TheAskot project).

156


The Askot projectA thriving bio-habitat is all set to be sacrificed to mining

Askot, well known for its musk deer sanctuary, is situated in Pithoragrahdistrict of Uttarakhand. In 2000, the government granted prospectinglicense here on 793 ha to Pebble Creek Resources Limited, a Canadianmining firm, to explore zinc, copper, silver, lead and gold. In March 2005,the company applied for a 30-year mining lease on 386 ha.The lease wasapproved by the state government and forwarded for Central approval.The company has prepared a draft EIA and is now waiting for the public hearing process and grant of environmental clearances.

Exploration for minerals in Askot is not a new phenomenon; it was previously explored in the period between 1965-88 by different organisations, including the United Nations Development Programmeand Geological Survey of India. Pebble Creek estimates that the areahas a resource potential of 50 MT of multi-metal ores.

This eco-fragile region is already under serious threat from

soapstone mining and stone quarrying. Environmental groups andexperts have expressed their concerns about the threat to the regiondue to mining.“The Askot deposits can yield only a few grammes ofmetals per tonne of ores mined. Why destroy the precious environs forsuch a little gain?”asks R Shreedhar, regional convener of the activistbody Mines, Minerals & People. According to him, the geology of theHimalaya makes its imperative to avoid mining there.“Large quantitiesof water can seep into the mines, which will make the region moreprone to landslides,”he explains.

A due diligence assessment carried out by the UK-basedResource Engineering & Development Ltd (RED) on behalf of PebbleCreek highlights some of the major environmental concerns associ-ated with the Askot project. These include disposal of wastes (lumpmaterials, tailings and slurries/fines), discharge of process waters inthe vicinity of the Kali river, and the tendency for acid mine drainage.The report also states that mine is situated in an area susceptible tolandslides.

m k

157


c m y k

People of Uttarakhand feel that indiscriminate stone quarrying and soapstone mining has spoilt the delicate ecosystem of the state. Projects likeAskot, if allowed, will further degrade the environment and hence, are being strongly opposed

SAM

RAT

MU

KH

ERJE

E /

CSE

■ SAND MINING: GOING ILLEGAL

Sand mining is a key concern in Uttarakhand as well as HimachalPradesh. A number of rivers in Uttarakhand have been threateneddue to unsustainable lifting of gravel and sand from their beds –the Gaula, Sharda, lower Kosi and the Dabka, to name a few.Mining in these zones invites the risk of increased erosion, changing courses and heavier floods, posing a grave threat todownstream habitations. For instance, the width of the Gaulariver between Haldwani and Lalkuan was 50 feet (15.24 metre) in1963-64; now the river is more than two km across. It leaves itscourse frequently.18 The river lies in a tectonically sensitive zoneand is thus, highly prone to flash floods.

In Himachal Pradesh, the Kullu valley is one of the centres for sand mining. Severe damage has been done to the bed of theriver Beas, leading to devastating floods. The riverbed greenery hasbeen reduced drastically and its course has been diverted towardsthe National Highway and Kullu’s main business centre. The mining has affected various irrigation and water-supply schemes.19

Illegal quarrying in the Binwa river has posed a threat to an ancientShiva temple nearby.20 A portion of the temple has developed

cracks because of reckless and unscientific mining. The level ofwater in the river has gone down, affecting the stability of the temple compound.

In 1997, when the government of Himachal Pradesh with-drew the blanket ban allowing short-term permits, illegal miningfor sand and other minerals became common. The Kullu valleyhas borne the consequences:21 flash floods and land erosion. Anumber of villages like Chandpur, Kinnaur and Sundergarh havefallen prey to environmental disturbances caused by rampantillegal mining and quarrying. In Sundergarh, sand mining fromthe Suketi khud has lowered the water levels in the area.Indiscriminate sand mining has led to the silting of the Ponddam, reducing its lifespan and storage capacity. It has widenedthe riverbeds – the low-lying areas of Kangra, Palampur andDehra have lost cultivable land due to this. Landslides have become common. In addition to being an environmentalissue, the illegal mining and quarrying is also a huge loss to thestate exchequer.22

■ HIMACHAL PRADESH: UNCLEAN SLATE

Slate quarrying has been another bane for Himachal Pradesh.23

The Dhauladhar range has been shorn of its green cover becauseof it. Mining at the Khaniara slate quarries in Kangra district havestripped up to 60 per cent of the forest cover and caused innumer-able landslides.24 The hills in the Kangra mine area have acquireda barren look due to the excessive mining.25 In 1999, about 20 villages in the interiors of Chamba district, with a population of18,000, started sinking as a result of illegal slate quarrying.26

Slate mining has aggravated the problem of soil erosion.Surface run-offs have increased, and flash floods have become fre-quent in the region. The waters of the Manjhi and Manooni khudsin Kangra have turned grey with slate particles and debris frommines. Large-scale slate quarrying on the Rangdhar and Gehrahill slopes have damaged the Chamba-Bharmour highway, which gets blocked during heavy rains due to mine run-offs fromthe hillsides.27

Quarrying in the state has been carried out in violation of ahost of laws – including the Forest Conservation Act, theExplosives Act and the Mines Safety Act. Workers have beenforced to work under hazardous conditions; more than the sanc-tioned area is being used for mining. Mining was officiallystopped in Khaniyara in 1997, but the mining mafia had remainedoperative. In 2000, the government succumbed to pressures fromthe mining lobby and granted permission to restart mining in thearea, subject to certain conditions.28

The cases from these two states demonstrate the many facets –and one common impact – of mining in the Himalaya. The impactis on the region’s ecosystems and watersheds, the lifeline of itspeople, and almost all of it is devastating. For a region whosebiggest riches are its forests, streams and rivers, these Himalayanstates pose a tough question: is it possible for mining in such fragile ecosystems to be sustainable? If not, then what should bethe development paradigm to be followed in such regions?Certainly not mining.

158


c m y k

SHYA

MA

L /

CSE

159

CHAPTER 3 THE STATES: JHARKHAND

Besides being contiguous states, Jharkhand and West Bengalare bound by virtue of the primacy of coal in their mining

industries. In fact, the coal mining belt in these two states almostexists as one continuous, seamless whole, with issues and con-cerns very similar all across (see Box on pages 168-169 for miningin West Bengal). Mining for coal has, on one hand, played havocwith the two states’ land and water resources; on the other,underground fires and land subsidence – the result of unscienti-fic extraction – are threatening large areas with complete annihi-lation. Jharkhand faces additional traumas: the burden ofJaduguda and its radiation-ravaged population, and large-scaleiron ore mining.

■ JHARKHAND: RESOURCE-RICH

Jharkhand was carved out of Bihar in the year 2000. The state’sstruggle for separation was driven by the aspirations of its pre-dominantly tribal population: it was, essentially, a struggle toprotect identity and to gain control over land and resources. Thereason behind this battle for self-determination was clear.

Jharkhand is extremely rich in forests and mineral resources – butthe tribal inheritors of this vast wealth had seen none of it. Thehistory of Jharkhand, therefore, was one of exploitation ofresources as well as people, and of protests for community control over resources.

Jharkhand has vast reserves of coal, iron ore, fireclay, lime-stone, copper ore, mica, bauxite, graphite, kyanite and uranium,among other minerals (see Map 1 on page 160: Minerals and forests– Jharkhand). While many districts in Jharkhand are resource-rich,the districts of East and West Singhbhum are especially so.According to the IBM, the state accounts for 29 per cent of thecountry’s coal reserves, 14 per cent of its iron ore and three percent of its bauxite (see Table 1 on page 161: Jharkhand’s mineralwealth). Coal is the most important mineral – accounting for morethan 90 per cent of the state’s mineral production in terms ofvalue.1 Jharkhand is also the richest Indian state in terms of thequantity of coal reserves and the number of coal mines, account-ing for 21 per cent of the coal production in the country in2004-05.2 Jharkhand’s output of key minerals has been showing anincreasing trend (see Table 2 on page 161: Mineral production).

c m y k

Black gold: Jharkhand has the largest reserves and is the biggest producer of coal in India. Coal is the key mineral in West Bengal as well

AM

IT S

HA

NK

ER /

CSE


Jharkhand and West Bengal

160


c m y k

GumlaPashchimiSinghbhum

PurabSinghbhum

Ranchi

Lohardagga

Palamu

Chatra

Hazaribagh

Bokaro

Sahibganj

Godda

Pakur

Dhanbad

Deogarh

Giridih

Kodarma

Garhwa

Dumka

Bokaro Barrage

Burbablang

Subarnarekha

South Koel

Sankh

KonarReservoir

North Koel

Damodar

AjayBarakar

TilaiyaReservoir

MaithonReservoirPanchet

Reservoir

Badu

a

Ganga

Ganga

Dha

dharPunp

un

Phal

gu

Son

lb

Protests: Most of the protestshave been related to uranium,iron and coal mines

O R I S S A

W E S T B E N G A L

B I H A R

J H A R K H A N D

CH

HA

TT

IS

GA

RH

Open forests

Dense forests

River

Manganese

Lead

Copper

Mica

Graphite

Coal/lignite

Limestone

Dolomite

Granite

Silica sand

Iron

Gold

Bauxite

Chromite

Uranium


MAP 1: Minerals and forests – JharkhandIf coal is not taken into account, the districts of Purab and Pashchimi Singhbhum emerge as the most mined districts

Without considering coal, the most mined districts in the stateare West and East Singhbhum. West Singhbhum leads both interms of number of leases granted and the area under mining:over 45 per cent of the land under mining in the state is in this district (see Graph 1: The mining districts). Most of these leases arefor iron ore (74 per cent of leased land).3 Of the total number ofleases granted in the state for mining, 28 per cent is in this district.4 East Singhbhum follows closely, accounting for 20 percent of land under mining.5 The majority of land in this district, 87 per cent, was leased for copper mining.6 Today, most of thesemines are closed and abandoned.

Some of the districts in the state, such as Latehar andKodarma, account for a significant number of leases, 11 and 10 percent respectively.7 However, they do not figure prominently interms of area under mining. This is because both these districtshave several small mine leases of low value minerals such asquartz, feldspar, and mica.

With respect to coal, the key districts include Dhanbad,Hazaribagh, Chatra and Bokaro. Out of the total coal produced inthe state in 2004-05, 44 per cent was accounted for by Dhanbadalone.8 Hazaribagh, Chatra and Bokaro followed with 18, 17 and12 per cent, respectively.9

The value of minerals extracted in Jharkhand in 2004-05 wasRs 5,760 crore – approximately eight per cent of the total value ofmineral production in the country.10 The value has been decreas-ing slightly since 2002-03, though it has shown an overall increaseof 15 per cent from Rs 5,000 crore in 1998-99 (see Graph 2 on page162: Value of minerals).11

The state is a large producer of fuel minerals, and accounts for10 per cent of their total value in the country.12 At just six per centand 1.6 per cent respectively, the state’s share in India’s total

metallic and non-metallic mineral values is lower.13

In 2002-03, the mining industry contributed Rs 797 crore tothe state exchequer in the form of royalties.14 Revenue from mining accounts for a substantial portion of Jharkhand’s totalrevenue – between 11-13 per cent.15 Revenue collected has shownan increasing trend (see Table 3 on page 162: Mineral royalty inJharkhand), despite the decreasing value of minerals extracted inthe state; the increase was due to the revision of royalty rates ofcoal in 2002.

Coal contributes the most – 92-93 per cent – to the total rev-enues from mining received by the Jharkhand government; ironore accounts for another two-three per cent.16 Jharkhand receives

161

MINING IN THE STATES: JHARKHAND AND WEST BENGAL

Gumla7%

Dhanbad6%

Others20%

Singhbhum (East)20%

Singhbhum (West)47%

Note: Excluding fuel, atomic and minor mineralsSource: Anon, 2007, Distribution of Leases and Lease Area (byState/District/Minerals) as on March 31, 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur

GRAPH 1: The mining districts Resource-rich West and East Singhbhum are the most mined

Mineral Reserves Proportion of (in million tonne) national reserves

(in per cent)

Coal 72,204 29.1

Iron ore-hematite 11,425.8 13.7

Iron ore-magnetite 10,682.2 0.09

Copper ore 1,338.4 0.2

Manganese 295.1 2.6

Chromite 178.7 4.1

Bauxite 2,925.5 3.4

Granite 3,76,240.6 23.51

Graphite 1,59,267.2 5.78

Limestone 1,70,458.7 0.35

Fireclay 695 9.73


TABLE 1: Jharkhand’s mineral wealthThe state has nearly 30 per cent of India’s coal reserves

Mineral 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 (p)

Coal (in ‘000 tonne) 78,628 79,533 78,028

Iron ore (in '000 tonne) 13,702 14,682 16,087

Copper ore (in tonne) 89,486 – –

Manganese (in tonne) 5,120 7,388 5,706

Bauxite (in tonne) 1,184,102 1,464,393 1,509,057

Graphite (in tonne) 11,532 10,013 15,241

Dolomite (in tonne) 2,57,949 2,91,528 2,33,163

Limestone (in tonne) 891 745 822

Fireclay (in tonne) 6,087 11,592 8,463


TABLE 2: Mineral productionApproximately 80 million tonne of coal is extracted per year

m k

the maximum mining royalty among the coal-producing states ofIndia.17

Jharkhand’s riches have drawn some of the biggest names inIndian industry to the state. Subsidiaries of Coal India Limited(CIL) – Bharat Coking Coal Limited (BCCL) and CentralCoalfields Limited (CCL) – operate here. CIL has 69 collieries, fivecoal washeries, 30 mining projects and 20 non-mining projects inthe state. The Indian Iron and Steel Company (IISCO) is the onlypublic sector company operating captive coal mines in Jharkhand.Among private players, there is the Tata Iron and Steel Company(TISCO). The Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL), RungtaMines Private Limited, IISCO as well as TISCO operate iron oremines in Singhbhum.

Since its formation, the Jharkhand government has been laying the red carpet for industrial investment by offering sops. It

promises to clear applications for mining leases within threemonths. The erstwhile government had signed 45 MoUs withinvestors for proposals worth more than Rs 2,20,000 crore, mostlyin the minerals and power sectors.18 Although most of these pro-posals are under scrutiny after a change in government, the stateis well on its way to ‘industrialisation’.

Ispat Industries Limited has plans to set up a three-MT perannum steel plant in the state, whose capacity it proposes toexpand to five MT per annum in future. The Arcelor-Mittal groupwas considering setting up a massive 12-MT steel plant inJharkhand. The only deterring factor for this huge investment wasthat the company was demanding high-grade iron ore from theChiria mines in West Singhbhum, which Jharkhand has not beenable to guarantee since it is involved in a court case over control ofthe mines (see Box: Battle drawn over Chiria mines). The Tatas arealso planning to set up a 12-MT steel plant in Tontoposhi, Saraikeladistrict. SAIL, Essar, the Jindals as well as the Chinese steel giantSinosteel add to a long list of prospective investors in the state.

The Jharkhand government has granted 524 leases for miningvarious major minerals – 206 of which have been granted for coalalone.19 A total area of 2.2 lakh ha has been leased out for miningmajor minerals in the state – the highest in the country.20

In addition, 2,717 leases covering an area of 8,426 ha have been granted for extracting minor minerals in the state.21

According to the IBM, the number of mining leases for extractingmajor minerals (other than coal) shows an overall increasing trend(see Graph 3: Mining leases over the years). The area under miningis also increasing. Between 1999-00 and 2002-03, while the numberof leases increased by 67 per cent, the area under mining leasesmore than doubled from 18,280 ha to 45,190 ha.22

162


182.8

451.8 451.9

384384332

229

406.3

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03

Year

No. of leases Area in '00 hectares

Note: Excluding fuel, atomic and minor mineralsSource: Documents available with Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur

GRAPH 3: Mining leases over the yearsNumber of leases for extracting major minerals is rising, andso is the area under mining

5000.5

4730.8

4967.3

4611

5890.2

5876.2

5760.1

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 (P)

Years

Min

eral

val

ue

(in

Rs

cro

re)

Source: Data from http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowDataSec.asp?secid=5956&ptid=19252 as viewed on March 24, 2007 and anon, 2006,Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur

GRAPH 2: Value of mineralsShows an overall increasing trend

Year Mineral royalty Total revenue Royalty as (in Rs crore) receipts (in Rs crore) percentage of total

revenue receipts

2002-03 797.7 7,406.5 10.8

2003-04 900.2 7,443.5 12.1

2004-05 916.2 6,852.6 13.4

Sources: Anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-levelCommittee, Planning Commission, New Delhi; Anon, 2006, State Finances – AStudy of Budgets of 2006-07, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, November;Anon, 2005, State Finances – A Study of Budgets of 2005-06, Reserve Bank ofIndia, Mumbai, December

TABLE 3: Mineral royalty in JharkhandMineral royalty forms a substantial portion of revenues

m k

■■ PAUPERISED: LAND AND THE PEOPLE

The website of the Jharkhand government says that forests inJharkhand cover about 29 per cent of the state’s total geographi-cal area. The State of Forest Report 2003 of the Forest Survey ofIndia puts it at almost 30 per cent; of this, 82 per cent consists ofprotected forests, 17 per cent is reserved forests, and the remain-ing 3,349 ha are unclassified forests. Jharkhand accounts for nineper cent of the country’s forest cover,23 and its forests are richreserves of biodiversity.

Unfortunately for Jharkhand and its tribal population, much

of the state’s vast mineral wealth is located under these forests(see Map 1). For example, out of the total forests in the state, themaximum – 17 per cent – is in the district of West Singhbhum,which incidentally, produces 99 per cent of the iron ore in thestate.24 Out of the total geographic area in the district, almost 39 per cent is forested (see Table 4: Forest cover in mining districts).It is also one of the most mined districts in the state.

West Singhbhum is not an isolated case. Hazaribagh is the second highest producer of coal in the state. Around 35 per cent ofthe district's area is covered with forests.25

The cases of Gumla, Ranchi and East Singhbhum are similar.

163


Percentage of state's Percentage of area Major minerals producedforests in the district in district under

forest cover

Hazaribagh 9.19 34.81 Coal (second biggest producer in the state)

West Singhbhum 16.78 38.47 Iron ore and manganese (largest producer in the state)

Ranchi 8.25 24.36 Coal

Gumla 11.28 28.24 Bauxite

East Singhbhum 4.06 26.13 Copper

Chatra 7.87 47.91 Coal (third highest coal-producing district)

Dhanbad 0.92 6.94 Coal (Top coal-producing district)

Bokaro 2.56 30.12 Coal

Source: Anon, 2005, State of Forest Report 2003, Forest Survey of India, Dehradun, pp 66

TABLE 4: Forest cover in mining districts Most mining districts have significant forest cover, which are threatened; in others, like Dhanbad, mining has already decimated the forests

Battle drawn over Chiria minesJharkhand government caught in legal tangle

The Chiria mines in East Singhbhum district of Jharkhand have thesecond largest deposits of high-grade iron ore in the world after theUrals. The almost virgin mines of deposits worth about two billiontonne are valued at an astronomical US $250 billion (as per currentLondon Metal Exchange prices).

These mines were leased to Burnpur-based Indian Iron & Steel Company (IISCO) some 70 years ago, which were later transferred to SAIL when IISCO was merged with it. However, theJharkhand government has been trying to get back these lucrativemining leases, as it plans to use the mines as a carrot to lure in freshinvestments.

Towards this objective, the BJP-led Munda government took backtwo of the 10 leases in the Chiria mines in January 2006: it decidedagainst renewing the mine leases of Budhaburu-Ajitburu and Sukri-Luturburu in Manoharpur ore mines; the leases had reserves of408 MT.

The company, SAIL, went to court as it had made the renewal of

the Chiria mines a pre-requisite for IISCO’s merger. It filed three writpetitions against the notification for the takeover of the mines. Basedon these, the Jharkhand High Court ordered status quo until the hearing is completed and a verdict given.

Both Tata Steel and Archelor Mittal have expressed their interest inChiria and have agreed to set up steel plants in the area. Mittal Steel isinsisting on exporting a part of the iron ore deposits – a proposal whichthe Jharkhand government is not very keen about. The Tata Groupseems to be in a better position. However, SAIL is also making concentrated efforts in getting back the lease.

In recent months, the Centre, the state government and SAIL havebeen trying to thrash out differences to persuade Jharkhand to agree tolet SAIL keep its mining leases, without which the planned expansionof the company from a current 13.5 MT to 22.5 MT may well run intotrouble.

SAIL has drawn up plans to invest some Rs 6,000 crore in freshinvestments in the Bokaro steel plant in the state and another Rs 2,000crore in Chiria itself within the next three to five years.The move is partof an effort to arrive at a settlement with the Jharkhand governmentafter the issue was taken up by the prime minister’s office.

m k

The percentage of area under forest cover in all the mining districts, barring Dhanbad and Bokaro, is more than 20 per cent.26

In the case of Chatra, the third highest coal-producing district inthe state, almost 50 per cent of the area is under forest cover.27

Moreover, the presence of minerals and mining operations hasalready affected the forest cover in this district. The forest cover inDhanbad district is low because it has been under mining fordecades. The forest cover in the Damodar valley, once 65 per cent,stands at only 0.05 per cent today.28

Feeding minerals to meet the nation’s insatiable appetite hastaken its toll on the state – rampant mining for decades has turnedlarge tracts of forests into wastelands. Agriculture has been com-pletely ignored. In the 1950s, under the Five Year Plans, large areasof fertile farms and forest lands were used up for industrial pur-poses. Millions of hectares of forests have been taken over by thegovernment under the Indian Forest Acts of 1878 and 1927, and theBihar Private Forest Act, 1927, converting community forests intoa source of revenue: after all, forests accounted for seven per centof the money the state earned.29 During the ‘80s, coal companiesacquired thousands of hectares of forests in Jharkhand for miningoperations in the Damodar valley.30 In Singhbhum district, a simi-lar devastation of forest lands happened for extracting iron ore.

When Jharkhand was born, the task, therefore, was clear: stopthe depredation of forest lands. According to the Forest Survey ofIndia’s State of Forest Report, during an assessment published in

1997, Jharkhand had 2.6 million ha of forests.31 In 1999, it had 2.2million ha:32 a loss of 0.4 million ha of forest cover.33 The state hada tough challenge: ensuring that around a third of its geographicalarea remained forested, and curbing further deforestation.

But Jharkhand has chosen to continue on its course of indus-trialisation. In fact, it has increased its rate of mineral exploitationin a mutually disastrous competition with Chhattisgarh andOrissa to invite industrial investment. According to the MoEF,between 1985-2004, more than 9,000 ha of forest land had beendiverted for mining in Jharkhand – approximately 10 per cent ofthe total forest land diverted for mining in India.34 This does notinclude the thousands of hectares of forests diverted and devastat-ed by coal mines. Decrease in vital forest cover that once served asimportant wildlife corridors has resulted in human-animal con-flicts in the state (see Box: Destroying Saranda). According to astudy by the Wildlife Trust of India (WTI), a Delhi-based non-profit organisation working on wildlife conservation, 20 suchcases were reported in Patratu, south of Hazaribagh, in the monthof September 2005 alone.35

All this has resulted in the inevitable. Banduhurang,Turamdih, Jharia, Jaduguda… Jharkhand is resounding todaywith protest movements against what is clearly being seen asstate-sponsored environmental degradation, economic exploita-tion and displacement. While the government grapples with anestimated 45 such movements across its districts, more are likelyto erupt with increasing industrialisation. Yet, state officials dis-miss these flashpoints as the work of “unscrupulous elements”.

In branding any protest as anti-social and anti-development,the administration finds the perfect justification to unleash the fullrepressive power of the state in favour of corporate interests. Andthe stories are numerous – heavy presence of police and paramili-tary forces, intimidation of protestors by the district administra-tion, fake cases filed against them, demolition and razing of hous-es, flattening of fields, lathi charges and police firings. It’s a sadsequel to the euphoria that greeted the formation of Jharkhand.The very people for whom Jharkhand was ostensibly created arenow being sacrificed in the name of their own state’s development.

For most of these people, this ‘development’ has become syn-onymous with displacement and loss of livelihoods. Figures ondisplacement are rarely reliable, since there is usually a highdegree of discrepancy between what is officially recorded andground realities. Between 1950-95, displacement due to the coalindustry alone was estimated at 1,049,640 people, mostly tribals.36

Coal companies took over 4,64,563 ha of land (including mineleases), alienating around 2,09,928 families.37 No estimates areavailable for displacement due to non-coal mining activities.

The state has the fifth highest concentration of tribals inIndia.38 Scheduled tribes and scheduled castes account for 28 per cent and 12 per cent of the total population of the state,respectively.39 Estimates say that 55 per cent of the people displaced due to mining are tribals40 – and just 25 per cent of thesehave been resettled.41

A significant portion of Jharkhand’s population, 44 per cent, isbelow the poverty line and more than six per cent is still unable toget sufficient food.42 The poverty ratio in the state is much higher

164


Forest cover in the state, particularly in its mineral districts, is muchmore than the national average

SUD

EEP

MU

KH

IA

m k

than that of the country (26 per cent) as a whole.43 Compared tothe other mining states of the country, only Orissa has more num-bers of poor people. Jharkhand also has a high percentage ofhouseholds without food sufficiency – almost five times morethan the national average.44

Infrastructure and basic amenities are poor. More than half thepopulation in the state has no access to safe drinking water.45

Educational facilities are few; there are only 817 schools per mil-lion people, much lower than the national average or in states likeChhattisgarh or Orissa.46 Literary rate is low as well, with justabout half the population being literate.47

It is, therefore, not surprising that 86 per cent of the state’s districts feature in the list of 150 most backward districts of thenation.48 Other than Dhanbad and Ranchi, all the other mineralproducing districts in the state are in the list (see Table 5 on page167: Human development indicators – mining districts). The non-coal

producing districts of West Singhbhum and Gumla rank as highas 20th and 5th in the list of backward districts.49 In fact, the situation in non-coal districts is much worse compared to coal districts of the state. The coal-producing districts rank higher inHDI and with some exceptions, have better provisions for safedrinking water and a lower poverty ratio compared to the state'saverage. This is because the public sector coal mining companieshave employed more people, compared to iron ore mines.

West Singhbhum, besides having abundant reserves of ironore and forests, also has 66 per cent of its population from theindigenous communities.50 Mining has not brought about muchprogress in the lives of the people here. Almost half the population is below poverty line and a significant 19 per cent ofhouseholds are not food-sufficient.51

Gumla, the only district producing bauxite, has a similartale. Half its population is poor, and not even 30 per cent has

165


Destroying SarandaWest Singhbhum’s Saranda forests are seriously imperiled byiron ore mining

Saranda, once so dense that even the sun’s rays couldn’t penetrate it,has Asia’s largest sal (Shorea robusta) forests and is an important ele-phant habitat. Today, uncontrolled mining for iron ore, both legal andillegal, is destroying not just the forests, but also the wildlife, apart fromthe livelihoods of the local tribal communities.

The Chiria mines in Saranda are believed to hold the largestdeposits of iron ore in Asia. In the 85,000 ha of the Saranda division, 28leases for iron ore mining already exist in about 9,300 ha. The miningdepartment wants more.“What will be left of the forest then?”asks CP Khanduja, divisional forest officer (DFO), Saranda. The past fewyears have seen an increase in mining. Thousands of trucks jam theroads leading to the forest from Chaibasa past Noamundi, disturbingpeople and damaging ecology. The proposed scale of some projects isan indication of things to come. The Mittals require some 8,000 ha. Onthe anvil is a steel plant with a capacity of 12 MT and investment of Rs 40,000 crore. The Tatas want 4,800 ha. The Jindals are plugging for1,800 ha, with a 10-MT mill and Rs 11,500-crore investment.

The impact on the forests has been significant. According to thestate of forest reports (SFRs), between 1997 and 1999, about 3,200 haof forest was lost in the Singhbhum region. Between 2001 and 2003,some 7,900 ha of dense forests were lost in East and West Singhbhumdistricts. Saranda too has been affected, and further degradation willhave serious consequences for its considerable biodiversity. Accordingto the forest department: “The surplus labour force that was brought into set up the infrastructure for mining is now engaged in illegal fellingof trees for sheer survival.”This is apart from the large swathes of for-est land that have been cleared for mining.

The DFOs of Saranda, Kolhan and Porhat have identified 237 forestcompartments out of the total of 289, covering 64,000 ha, as being verycompact dense forest areas still untouched by mining. A survey by themshowed that a small patch of 40 by 40 metres had about 30 plant species.

Apart from elephants, the forests are home to the flying squirrel,

four-horned antelope, sloth bear, leopard and deer. K Z Bhutia, theKolhan DFO, reports having seen many Oriental white-backed vultures – listed by the World Conservation Union as a highly threatened species. “We want to save the forest from exploitation.Giving it the status of a virgin forest will protect the areas from beingused for commercial activities. This will, in turn, protect elephants andother wildlife,”says Bhutia.

In 2001, the district was declared an elephant reserve under theCentral government’s Project Elephant, but the number of elephantshas gone down from 424 in 2002 to 375 in 2005.“High iron ore contentin the rivers makes the water unfit for drinking and the noise of truckscarrying ore scares elephants away from Saranda, which is the corearea,” says Khanduja. According to R K Singh, who did doctoralresearch in Saranda between 1993 and 1998: “Mining, along withunmanaged tailing disposal into the river system, is the biggest threatto elephant conservation.”

The Manoharpur group of mines around Chiria transport their oreusing roads going through the forest, which is also the main elephantmigration route from Saranda to Kolhan. A narrow gauge railway trackalong this road, used to transport ore, will be converted to broad gauge.The railways have sanctioned a Rs 190-crore project to transport moreore from the Chiria mines. As their habitat is increasingly disturbed, elephants go further in search of food. Reports of human-elephant conflicts have increased in the Kolhan and Porhat divisions.Most funds received under Project Elephant are spent on paying compensation for destruction of crops by elephants.

The Koina and Karo rivers, which flow close to the mines, are fullof residues which are directly released into these water bodies whenore is washed. This leaves the water and the riverbank red. The result:Koina’s crocodile population has completely vanished and its otherwildlife species, too, face extinction. The villagers say that all their low-lying agricultural land in Karampada has been rendered unproductive by the red sludge.“Neither the land, not the water is ofany use,”laments the munda (head) of the village.

– Ruksan Bose, Down To Earth, New Delhi

m k

166


Jharkhand has the fifth highest concentration of tribals in India, and a huge majority of these people depend on forests for their livelihoods

KA

ZIM

UD

DIN

AH

MED

/ C

SE

m k

access to safe drinking water.52 Literacy rate is lower than thestate average.

Jharkhand has a history of resistance. It is then hardly surpris-ing that tribals are fighting back, and the state is headed towardsbecoming a conflict zone a second time in its recent history. Thetension is palpable all over Jharkhand, specially in areas wherelarge-scale industrial investment is proposed.

Taking a cue from the legendary Birsa Munda, mutinies arebrewing. The people are showing their anger, their disgust and

their unwillingness to take it any more. And sometimes, they alsoshow exactly what they think of the system by simply takingmatters in their hands – governing their resources on their own –and fulfiling their aspirations of a real Jharkhand (see Box: Thestory of Horomocho).

The message the tribals of Jharkhand are sending to the stategovernment is abundantly clear – they will do everything possi-ble to see that the original reason for the formation of Jharkhandis not lost in the quest for industrial development.

167


The story of HoromochoA small village in Hazaribagh shows the way

This 52 household – all Santhals – village holds a few surprises. Forone, it has a forest but no forest department officials. Also, it has acommunity coal mine on the bank of the Rohargada river, a smallrivulet of the Damodar.“It belongs to the village,”the villagers say. Buthow have they managed to do it, when all mineral deposits in Indiabelong to the government and its contractors?

The shadow of government has not touched Horomocho. Ten kmto the nearest bus stand, Horomocho has not seen many amenities. Butnobody complains.“We are rich,”says Dhaniram Tutu, the Majhi Haramor head of the village in the traditional Santhali system. The villagershave a coal mine, 200 ha of sal forest, perennial water sources and agri-cultural fields. A two-room dispensary and a three-room school com-plete the picture. In 1982, the village declared sovereignty over these.

The forests of the village were depleted due to massive felling bythe forest department as well as the neighbouring villages. “We feltthreatened. They (the government) tried to take everything from us

instead of giving us anything,”says Dhaniram.This was pre-1982 whensome like Dhaniram and Charku had seen schools and gained someconfidence. The village decided to act. They first took control over theforests, and next the coal pits. Situated on India’s rich coal belt,Horomocho could foresee its fate: one day the village would be buriedin coal pits. The only way to save the village forest, protected since lasttwo decades, was to keep the mines commercially unexploited. So thelogical step was to declare the mines as community property. “Everyyear, the villagers take out about 20 tractor-loads of coal for the village,”says Lambu, a resident.The coal, however, is distributed free ofcost and suffices the fuel requirements of the village for most of theyear. Remarkably, this has also decreased a lot of pressure on the forest for which the mine was taken over.

The villagers are sure of one thing: whatever it takes, they are notgoing to part with their jal, jangal and jameen. Fully aware of the con-frontations and the difficulties involved, they are also very confidentabout winning this war and keeping it that way.

– Richard Mahapatra, Down To Earth, New Delhi

Human Backward district Tribal district Literacy Household Population Percentage of development (ranking among (percentage rate access to safe below poverty households index (overall 150 backward of tribal (percentage) drinking water line without food

rank) districts)1 population)2 (percentage) (percentage) sufficiency

Hazaribagh 5/22 115 No (3.83) 57.74 41.46 31.79 2.29

Dhanbad 3/22 – No (8.8) 67 100 31.42 4.45

Bokaro 4/22 100 No (12.18) 62.1 100 49.37 19.11

West Singhbhum 6/22 20 Yes (66.4) 50.17 84.15 45.74 20.27

Ranchi 2/22 – Yes (43.5) 64.57 52.24 32.63 0.06

Gumla 12/22 5 Yes (69.7) 51.74 29.50 45.74 7.73

East Singhbhum 1/22 111 Yes (28.9) 68.79 84.69 37.33 22.36

Chatra 7/22 70 No (3.83) 43.24 41.46 31.79 20.68

Jharkhand – 86% of total districts* 26.3 54.13 42.60 44 12.5

India – – – 65.38 77.90 26.10 2.3

Note: *19 out of 22 districts are in the backward listSources: Anon, 2006, Jharkhand Development Report 2006, Prabhat Khabar, Ranchi; 1 Anon, 2003, Report of the Task Force; Identification of districts for wage andself-employment programme, Planning Commission, New Delhi, pp 16-17; 2 http://jharkhand.nic.in/about/districts.htm, as viewed on March 16, 2007

TABLE 5: Human development indicators – mining districtsWest Singhbhum, the key iron producing district, lags behind in terms of development

m k

168


Minerals and mining in West BengalThe state’s focus on industrialisation is leading to environmentalchaos

Mining in West Bengal occupies 11,579 ha of the state’s total area of8,687,540 ha:1 as per the IBM, this is about 0.13 per cent of the land area.Concentrated in Purulia, Bankura, Bardhaman, Birbhum, Darjeeling,Midnapore (West) and Jalpaiguri districts, the industry mainly mines coal,china clay (kaolin), fireclay, limestone, dolomite, lead and zinc ores,manganese, sulphur and apatite.2 Among minor minerals, stone is minedin Birbhum (see Map: Minerals in West Bengal).

These minerals are worth Rs 2,802 crore, about 3.7 per cent of the totalvalue of minerals in India. In fact, mining is the 10th highest contributor tothe net state domestic product: the sector contributes about Rs 1,869crore, or 0.99 per cent of the total state domestic product.3 There were 113reporting mines in the state in 2004-05, excluding those mining atomicand minor minerals.

According to the IBM, although the overall production of minerals interms of value increased in the state by almost 29.7 per cent between1997-1998 and 2000-2001, the number of people employed in the sectordecreased by 14.8 per cent between the 1991 and 2001 census.4 A

December 2003 state government report on the economy of West Bengalsays that the fall in employment was mainly because a number of minesunder Eastern Coalfields Limited (ECL) closed down. Currently, the sector employs 1,36,940 persons or 0.97 per cent of the total working population; 93 per cent of this workforce are men.5

Coal is the mainstay of mining in the state. Mainly mined from theRaniganj, Bankura, Purulia, Birbhum and Darjeeling coalfields, it is thehighest in terms of production at 23,634,000 tonne and also has the high-est value at Rs 2,724 crore, taking up almost 97 per cent of the value of allminerals in the state.6 Currently, West Bengal has 27,815,000 thousandtonne of coal reserves, which is 11 per cent of the country’s reserves of themineral (see Table: Reserves of minerals).7 Raniganj coalfields alone have acoal reserve of 8,553 MT in an area of 44,350 ha. Raniganj has the richestdeposits of good quality semi- and non-coking coal, accounting for aboutthree per cent of the total coal reserves.8

Production of coal increased by 32 per cent from 1990 to 2003-049, butthe average number of people employed daily in coal mines reduced by 33 per cent over the same period.10 This was mostly due to either closureor mechanisation of mines. According to the Economic Review of WestBengal, 2005-2006, during this time, the number of coal mines reducedfrom 199 in 1990 to 100 in 2003.

The state holds almost 99 per cent of India’s apatite reserves; the min-eral’s reserves are the second largest (after coal) in West Bengal. But theproduction of apatite (which is sourced from one mine in Beldih in Puruliadistrict) fell from 13,034 tonne in 2002-03 to 4,950 tonne in 2004-05, saysthe IBM’s Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005. The production of china clay alsofell from 83,275 tonne in 2002-03 to 67,099 tonne in 2004-05. Eventhough production increased in 2003-04 to 86,242 tonne, the value ofchina clay reduced by almost 18 per cent from the previous year.11

Production of fireclay increased by 86 per cent between 2002-03 and2004-05. Found in Purulia and Bardhaman districts, its mines, though,decreased in number from eight to five.12

Despite these, the index of production for the mining sector increasedto 140 in 2004-05 from 127 in 2003-04, thus registering a growth of almost10 per cent.13 The sector had an outstanding investment of Rs 2,629 crorein 2005. Economic reviews attribute this to the investor-friendly approachof the state government since 2002.14 The new mineral policy announcedby the West Bengal government in 2001 aims at higher investments in themineral sector. The policy recommends review of existing state policies onmineral exploration and selectively de-reserving mineral areas. The objec-tive is to allow public sector units to concentrate on specific areas, whilethe remaining could be opened to private and foreign entities.15

Huge investments have also been flowing into the state through theestablishment of mineral-based industries like iron and steel and cement.In 1991-2004, 234 new iron and steel plants were set up in the state,almost half of them established in the last three years. They have broughtin an investment of Rs 8,356 crore. The state had only two cement unitstill 2000 – between 2002-04, 11 units sprouted. Besides, about 17 spongeiron units were established in 2005 at an investment of Rs 203 crore.16

The state government is also investing in state-owned companies.The Indian Iron and Steel Company (IISCO) was merged into SteelAuthority of India Limited (SAIL) in 2006, and Rs 9,592 crore was spenton expansion and modernisation of its Burnpur plant.17

WEST BENGAL

JHARKHAND

SIKKIM

MEGHALAYA

BIHAR

ASSAM

Midnapore South 24Parganas

Kolkata

North 24Parganas

Nadia

Howrah

Hoogly

Bankura

Bardhaman

Birbhum

Purulia

Malda

West Dinajpur

Darjeeling

Jalpaiguri

Cooch Behar

Copper

Graphite

Coal/lignite

Limestone

Dolomite

Source: Compiled by the Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Scienceand Environment, New Delhi

MAP: Minerals in West Bengal Raniganj, in Bardhaman district, has the richest coal deposits

m k

169


c m y k

Environmental mayhemNaturally, the state government’s focussed efforts to increase industriali-sation have had their fallouts. The state’s mining policy does proclaimminimising the adverse effects of mining on forests and environment andexpresses due concerns about the safety and health aspects, but there isnothing concrete to it and the actions are contrary.

According to the state’s 2003 Economic Review, about 14,500 ha of land has been degraded because of mining in West Bengal.18 Most of this land is in the mining districts of Birbhum, Bankura, West Midnapore,Darjeeling and Bardhaman – mainly the coal-mining blocks.19 About 277ha of forest land was diverted for mining between 1980 and 2004 – 0.29

per cent of the total forest land diverted for mining in the country.20

Incidentally, the two districts that have the highest concentration of mining, Bankura and Purulia, also hold the biggest wastelands, 4,047 haand 5,038 ha, respectively.21

The Buxa tiger reserve, located in Jalpaiguri district, and spread on anarea of 76,000 ha had been the victim of dolomite mining till 1997. Onepublic and several private companies were involved in mining whichcaused soil erosion and deforestation. The deposits have now been leasedout to the state-owned North Bengal Dolomite Limited. According to areport by UK-based Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA)International, a non-profit organisation, the MoEF has been rejectingapplications for diversification of forest land for dolomite mining. But theseriousness of the state government in protecting natural resources isclear from the minutes of the meeting of the Mineral Advisory Council inSeptember 2002, in which the government has asked the Department ofMines to take up the issue of diverting 12 ha of land inside Buxa fordolomite mining.22

According to a study by Walter Fernandes on development-induceddisplacement in West Bengal, between 1947 and 2000, 70 lakh peoplewere adversely affected by projects of which about 55 per cent – 39 lakh –were physically displaced. Of these, only three lakh people were resettled;the remaining 92 per cent had to fend for themselves.23

With about eight special economic zones (SEZs) sanctioned and 40proposed in the state, displacement is likely to emerge as a major problem.The steel sector is setting up a large base in West Bengal. JSW steels of theJindal group signed a memorandum of understanding with the West Bengalgovernment in January 2007.The project will take up about 1,974 ha of landin Salboni in West Midnapore district, to set up a 10-MT steel plant. Thestate government claims only small part of the required land is farmland.It also claims that almost 90 per cent of the land is already with the government. The project is set to bring in Rs 35,000 crore of investment.24

Mineral Reserves Percentage of (in thousand tonne) national reserve

Apatite 13,987.886 99.13

Barytes 433 0.58

China clay (kaolin) 4,17,011 27.34

Copper Ore 113 0.02

Copper metal 2.09 0.04

Coal 27,815,000 10.98

Dolomite 2,38,029 4.19

Feldspar 4,501.25 9.38

Fireclay 13,714 2.52

Granite 33,426 thousand cubic metre 0.38

Kyanite 26.52 0.65

Lead and zinc ore 3,709 2.09

Lead metal 139 5.81

Zinc metal 143 1.47

Limestone 44,706 0.05

Manganese ore 200 0.1

Pyrite 2,500 2.47

Quartz/silica sand 6,364 0.26

Sillimanite 1,653 3.17

Ilmenite 2,087 0.75

Rutile 192 1.73

Tungsten ore 683.429 1.79

Tungsten with WO3 1.173 1.35

Vermiculite 5.566 0.69

Source: Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,Nagpur

TABLE: Reserves of minerals West Bengal holds about 11 per cent of India’s coal

Mining is ravaging West Bengal’s land and people. When will thestate government see the light?

THE

HIN

DU

■ DAMODAR: THE SORROW REVISITED

One of the key pollution hotspots in Jharkhand as well as WestBengal is the Damodar valley. In fact, the Damodar, the ‘sorrow ofBengal’, has now become a cause of sorrow for the entire nation.It is probably one of the most polluted rivers in the country today,thanks to mining operations and coal-based industries that havesprouted on its mineral-rich banks.

The 563-km long Damodar originates near Chandwa village inthe Chhotanagpur plateau in Jharkhand’s Palamau district. Itpasses through six districts of Jharkhand and four of West Bengal,before joining the Hooghly river. The basin it flows through – supported by its major tributaries, the Barakar and the Konar –covers 57 lakh ha, an area which has witnessed unprecedentedindustrial growth with the availability of raw materials and infrastructural facilities like power and water supply.

In a 1998 report, the CPCB classified the river in Dhanbad as‘D’, or heavily polluted. It means the water here can only supportsome hardy varieties of fish; it cannot be used for drinking orbathing. This classification is not unique to this stretch; it holds forthe water quality of the river till as far downstream as Asansoland Durgapur, both in West Bengal. Many stretches of theDamodar and its tributaries resemble large drains carrying black,highly turbid water. The total suspended solid (TSS) count at mostplaces along the upper and middle stretches of the river is 40-50times higher than the permissible limit. For most part, between

Rajrappa in Hazaribagh district of Jharkhand and Durgapur inWest Bengal, the river carries a film of oil and grease from industrial effluents. Yet it continues to be the main source of waterfor many industrial towns like Jharia.

The crux of the problem is the extensive mining in theDamodar’s watershed. The basin is a repository of approximately46 per cent of India’s coal reserves. More than 50 per cent of theindustries in the region comprise coal mining, coal washeries andcoke oven plants. Due to easy availability of coal and prime cok-ing coal, several thermal power plants, steel plants and ancillaryindustries have come up: there are six coalfields in the Damodar’supper stretch, along with 28 iron ore mines, 33 limestone mines,five copper ore mines and 84 mica mines (see Map 2: The Damodarwatershed). West Bengal has 30 industrial complexes inside thebasin.53 All these industries not only use the water from the river,they also discharge the effluent back into the river (see Table 6:Polluting industries along the river).

Minerals, mine rejects and toxic effluents are regularly washedinto the river and its tributaries, which receive large quantities ofsuspended solids, dissolved solids, sulphates and iron from thevarious mines. Mine rejects from open-cast mines find their wayinto the river and sometimes even choke the flow of water.Drainage from active and abandoned mines also increases the pollution load.

Conservative estimates put the daily outfall of pollutants and effluents at 60 tonne of biochemical oxygen demand load

170


c m y k

Barakar river

Gowai river Damodar river

Raniganj

Patratu

Tenughat

Sindri

Maithon

DugdhaBokaro

Santhaldih

Panchet

Dhanbad

AsansolBurnpur

Durgapur

Chandrapura

Damodar river

Gomia

Konar river

Coke oven Chemical industry

Distillery Thermal power stationCoal washery

Coal mine

Reservoir and dam Steel plant

J h a r k h a n d

W e s t B e n g a l

Source: Anil Agarwal et al 1999, State of India’s Environment: The Citizen’s Fifth Report, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi

MAP 3: The Damodar watershedThe entire stretch of the river is dotted with polluting coal mines, washeries and industries

(BOD load), two tonne of non-metallic toxins and 1.2 tonne oftoxic metallic substances. Industrial effluents generated carryhigh suspended solids in terms of fine coal particles and flyash.Trace elements like nickel, cobalt, copper, lead, zinc, manganese,chromium, barium, germanium, vanadium, boron and strontiumin the coal find their way into the river.

The coal washeries that dot the area add substantially to thepollution load of the river. Theoretically, in a coal washery, afterthe coal is washed, the water used – full of ash, stones, soil, finecoal particles etc – is released into sedimentation ponds as slurry.The heavy coal particles and impurities are allowed to settle inthese ponds, after which the clearer water is pumped back to bereused in the washery. But in practice, hardly any recycling hap-pens. When it rains, the slurry is washed straight into the neareststream and from there, into the river. Dry slurry, or coal fines, isdumped wherever it is convenient to do so. Gurdeep Singh, headof the Centre of Mining Environment at the Indian School ofMines, Dhanbad, says that very often, slurry is intentionallyreleased into the river.

The CPCB’s data on the river is contradictory: while it cate-gorises the river as ‘D’ throughout its length, the Board’s 2005data given in its website says the quality of the river in WestBengal is as good as class ‘A’: at none of the monitoring sites, thedissolved oxygen (DO) level is less than six milligramme per litre(mg/litre). At all locations except one, the level of total dissolvedsolids meets the criterion set by the Bureau of Indian Standardsfor drinking water: 500 mg/l.

171


c m y k

Where’s the river? Run-off from the coal mines, slurry from coal washeries and effluents from industries have been the bane of the Damodar

SURY

A S

EN /

CSE

Unit Quantity (kl/d)

Bokaro Thermal Plant 6,00,575

Indian Explosives Ltd 4,070,000

Sudamdih washery 18,720

Jamadoda washery 18,306,000

Chandrapura Thermal 11,600,000

Sindri Fertilisers 21,000

Sindri ACC 366,672

IlSCO cold rolling mill + coke plant 29,523,000,000

Hindustan Steel 4,730,000,000

Durgapur Project Ltd 14,000,000,000

Bokaro Steel Plant 24,000

Carew & Co 150,000,000

Philip Carbon Black 1,600,000,000

Others 18,865

Source: Anil Agarwal et al 1999, State of India’s Environment: The Citizen’sFifth Report, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, pp 74

TABLE 6: Polluting industries along the riverAlmost all the industries near the Damodar discharge hugeloads into the river

■ PAREJ: DISPLACEMENT IS THEIR FATE

For the Turi community which used to survive by making baskets,agriculture, and raising livestock, coal has become the bane. It allstarted in 1981 when Coal India Limited (CIL) decided to mine thecommunity’s land. This was the beginning of the Parej East OpenCast Project (PEOCP), located on the West Bokaro Coalfields inMandu block of Hazaribagh district. The community was forcedto give up its land. Its members were promised jobs; very few got them. The total land acquired by PEOCP was 237 ha, whichaffected 1,172 persons. Of these, 487 belonged to the Turi tribe.54

The community has faced multiple displacements since theproject started. Initially, the Turi used to live in Turi Tola, but theexpanding Tata West Bokaro Colliery displaced them once again in1998. They were then moved to Premnagar and then to the PindraRelocation Centre. But the Centre is built on a site where Turiancestors are buried. The community believes the place is haunted.

When they were being displaced for the first time, the Turiwere told that the baskets used for loading coal would be boughtfrom them. Initially, they did supply the baskets; they were givencane to make the baskets. But then they were told that their baskets were not strong enough. Some of the Turi men becamelabourers in the mines. Women could find nothing to do.

Before they were displaced, the women used to do subsistencefarming of mahua, maize, millets and paddy on their lands. Butnow, they have to buy these from the local markets. Their accessto forest resources has also been restricted. As a result, the economic condition as well as the health of the Turi women havetaken a beating.

The PEOCP is significant as it is sponsored by the World Bankunder its ambitious Environment and Social Mitigation Project

(ESMP). In mid-1990s, CIL approached the World Bank for loans tofund its worker retrenchment programme. Since the Bank does notfund retrenchment programmes, it instead offered to fund therehabilitation of the displaced communities due to expansion at 25 coal mines of the CIL. In September 1997, a US $530 million loanwas thus granted.

ESMP adds a new dimension to rehabilitation efforts, usheringin, theoretically, an extensive use of consultative processes withproject-affected people (PAPs) in the preparation of the variousaction plans. This would, as stated in the ESMP outline, makerehabilitation not only visible and sustainable but more impor-tantly, would address itself to people’s needs. But for the Turicommunity, ESMP remained another project on paper.

In June 2001, a small tribal group – the Chhotanagpur AdivasiSeva Samiti (CASS) – wrote a letter to the World Bank drawing itsattention to the violations of the Bank’s policies on social andenvironmental safeguards by PEOCP. In 2002, based on the CASSletter and visits by the Bank’s officials, a panel was instituted bythe Bank to investigate the East Parej Project. The panel releasedits report in November 2002, in which it listed over 30 violationsof the Bank’s policies on social and environmental safeguards.

The panel found that there had been clear violations of therights of the PAPs. The objective of the Bank that the displaced people must be assisted in improving their former living standards,income earning capacity and production levels, or at least in restor-ing them, had been not achieved and PAPs have been harmed andcontinued to suffer harm.

On compensation and relocation, the panel found:● Land-for-land compensation, which is part of the Bank’s

policy, was not even offered by the project. ● Many of the displaced have not been and are not being

compensated at full replacement cost. ● The system of compensation is known to provide inadequate

compensation: middlemen take a share and there is under-reporting of the previous sales price based on which compen-sation is given.

● Compensation is fixed on the date of notification, not the dateof payment – the difference between the two, some times, iseven 10 years.

● The process and basis of house compensation lacks trans-parency and is open to abuse

● No title for houses in the resettlement colony has been givenso far to the PAPs.

● The PAPs were not consulted in the selection of the resettle-ment site. They were simply guided to a pre-selected site andtold to move there, without even establishing whether potablewater was available at the site. PAPs from Borwa Tola wereinvoluntarily relocated some distance away to Pindra eventhough there was no provision for a school building or teachers there.The panel indicted the Parej project for poor compensation,

relocation and rehabilitation. The World Bank, on its part, accepted that the project has caused poverty, but did nothing toalleviate the poverty. The Turi community remained where it was:displaced and dispossessed.

172


c m y k

Displacement has converted many self-sufficient communities intowage labourers in mines

SURY

A S

EN /

CSE

■ JHARIA: THE LAND OF FUMES AND FIRES

Coal is the bane of Jharia as well: the town, located in Dhanbaddistrict of Jharkhand, has to make do with polluted water, thanksto the coalfields in Damodar valley. There are a total of 86 coalmines in the region; Jharia has one of the most important coal-fields in India because of its metallurgical grade coal reserves.According to the Indian School of Mines (ISM), emissions fromthese mines have deteriorated the air quality to such an extent thatthe CPCB has declared Dhanbad-Jharia to be one of the most polluted regions of the country. The State Pollution Control Board (SPCB) has declared the region as a ‘problem area’ andmonitors ambient air quality under the National Air MonitoringProgramme. Monitoring is done at three locations – the RegionalOffice-cum-Laboratory in Dhanbad, the Mineral AreaDevelopment Authority (MADA) in Jharia, and the Birla Instituteof Technology (BIT) in Sindri. Ambient air monitoring over 11years (1991-2002) in these areas clearly indicates that the annualaverage concentration of suspended particulate matter (SPM) inJharia is 50 per cent higher than in the residential area (RegionalOffice, Dhanbad). In many years, the SPM values in the industrialarea were twice the values in the residential area.55

In MADA, Jharia, the ambient air quality levels exceed theNational Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) safe limitsquite frequently. The CPCB has fixed very lenient standards forambient air quality (SPM = 500 microgram per cubic metre orµg/m3) in some of the old coalfields including Jharia, Bokaro andRaniganj.56 New mines have to meet more stringent standards(SPM = 360 µg/m3) – and if Jharia had to conform to them, thenthe annual average concentration of SPM here would exceed thestandards in 10 out of 11 years.57

The average ambient air SPM concentration for the 11 yearsfor MADA, Jharia is 425 µg/m3, which is below the standardspecifically set for this area, but much higher than the standard fornew mines.58 The maximum ambient air SPM concentration is ashigh as 958 µg/m3.59 This high concentration is due to miningactivities in Jharia coalfields and heavy traffic on the Jharia-Sindristate highway.

● Inferno Jharia is also notorious for its coal fires: underground fires havebeen raging here for several decades. More than 90 years ago,when the first major blaze was reported from Jharia, private entre-preneurs were mining in this area. Left unattended and stoked byrelentless mining activity, as many as 70 fires have erupted inJharia since then. Of these, 60 are widespread. The open-cast mining areas in Jharia were not backfilled – leading to large voidswherever mining was abandoned. The practice of extraction ofthick seams by caving at shallow depths damaged the ground surface in the form of subsidence and formation of pot-holes orcracks reaching up to the surface. This, in turn, increased thechances of spontaneous heating of coal seams leading to minefires. BCCL is now mining coal under the township.

The 21st report of the business advisory committee to the Parliament presented in 1992 had said that 37 MT of coal has

already been burnt in Jharia. The value of the damaged coal comesto Rs 1,000 crore.60 A BCCL report has said that some of the fireshad endangered production outlets, surface structures, railwaylines, roads and drainage channels.61 In 2000, resident of Jhariatown Rajesh Chauhan watched as the town’s temple snapped intotwo. The next moment, flames leapt out from underneath spew-ing noxious gases. In a move that had apathy written all over it,BCCL got a terse message painted on the damaged temple wall:‘Fire area prone to subsidence.’

Some 150,000 miners, truck drivers, loaders and other workersbrave this hazard to eke out a living in Jharia. The fires have consumed about 42 MT of India’s best coking coal, renderinganother 1,864 MT out of bounds. Residents, meanwhile, live inconstant fear of a major subsidence that can cause the entire townto collapse. Around 35,000 houses in the town are said to be under“immediate threat”.

A fierce debate rages among scientists, activists and politiciansover the ameliorative course that needs to be taken. M M Sharma,deputy director general (mine safety), DGMS, says: “Only thefringe areas of Jharia are in danger.” BCCL also claims that the firehas been controlled “substantially” and is limited to only about900 ha as against the earlier figure of 1,732 ha.62

But in 2002, the then chief minister Babulal Marandi reignitedthe dispute by declaring that “the town must be shifted”. Thismeant relocation of the nearly 0.3 million population of Jharia,approximately 0.1 million houses and other buildings and a prospering economy. Marandi was forced to do a rethink as localleaders opposed the move. “First, we need to have a proper rehabilitation plan in place,” he clarified.

173


Scorched earth: mines spewing hot gases and fire are common sightin Jharia

MA

HA

DEO

SEN

m k

The resettlement option spawned numerous unsuccessfulattempts to implement the other solution: putting out the fire.Several organisations and agencies – from the PlanningCommission to the World Bank – have disbursed substantial sumsfor this, but to little avail (see Box: Dousing plans: the variousresponses to Jharia).

“The fire cannot be extinguished,” says D D Mishra categori-cally. He is the former director of Dhanbad-based Central MiningResearch Institute (CMRI) and an expert on Jharia fires. “Thestumbling block is not lack of technology, but the incompetence ofBCCL,” points out Mishra. He feels that the problem can besnuffed out by employing simple techniques which have beenused effectively elsewhere.

According to an assessment tabled by the Union ministry ofcoal and mines in Parliament some years ago, Rs 115 crore hasbeen spent to put out the fires since 1976. BCCL claims that 22cases were taken up and 10 completely extinguished using all“possible” technologies. In addition to this, there are said to beongoing projects worth Rs 100 crore. Ground realities, however,suggest that these are tall claims.

Mishra alleges that even elementary solutions such as pumping of sand and water into mines have become a lucrativebusiness proposition for the concerned players. For instance, onpaper, BCCL has filled the mines with some 50 MT of sand. Butinsiders say that less than one-fourth of this amount may haveactually reached the pits.

“There appears to be no permanent solution in sight. The only

option seems to cut out trenches to disconnect fire seams (coal layers), which have been identified. But this would require a hugeinvestment,” avers Sharma. “If a blaze spreads across a small area,it can be extinguished through expeditious remedial action. Butthe extent to which it has flared up in Jharia makes dousing it anuphill task – particularly when all the prevailing conditions fur-ther fan the fire,” contends Nitish Priyadarshan, a Ranchi-basedgeologist who has conducted studies on Jharia mines.Priyadarshan is alluding to continuing mining activity despite theraging fire. Not only has there been no let-up in BCCL’S opera-tions, but even open-cast mining has been taken up in the area.Incidentally, one such pit is the site of a major fire.

The lack of authentic data has also impeded progress on thisfront. Immediately after the nationalisation of mining activities in1973-74, the government was left without even site maps as private operators simply vanished with their working plans.Consequently, though many mines in the Jharia coalfields areconsidered “accident-prone”, neither the Union coal ministry northe CIL possess a comprehensive list of such collieries. Accordingto a retired official of CIL, the DGMS had recommended the closure of 100 unsafe mines long ago. But even today, 20 per centof the total coal extracted originates from such danger zones, headds. The outcome: major accidents like the one that occurred onSeptember 10, 1995, when the walls of a mine collapsed afterbeing weakened by fires. Water from a nearby canal gushed in,flooding the pits and tunnels. More than 60 miners lost their livesin the mishap.

174


Dousing plans: the various responses to JhariaCommittees have studied the problem, and action planshave been suggested, even as the fires rage on

In 1992, the Central government had asserted that the Jharia firesshould be controlled so that resources could be exploited. P A Sangma,the then Union minister of state for coal, had said in Parliament: “Rs 750 crore worth of coking coal is imported every year, which is ahuge bill. We would like to go in for mining as far as possible by dousing the fires at Jharia.”1

In 2004, the ministry had a different take: it said in Parliament thatthere is no mine fire below Jharia town and therefore, there is no planto shift the town. But it added that Jharia town is surrounded by minefires like Kujama, Lodna, Simlabahal, Ena, and Rajapur and that some of these localities have been identified to be shifted for safety ofthe persons residing there. As per the Master Plan/Action Plan, thereis a plan for shifting 65,300 houses (BCCL houses 36,208, privatehouses 15,571, encroachers’ houses 12,719 and others 802) over a 20-year period.2

Over the years, the inferno underneath Jharia has led to a widerange of responses from various quarters, creation of a number of committees and formulation of numerous plans. Here are a few of themore significant ones:

1988: Central Mine Planning & Design Institute’s (CMPDI) Rs 115-crore plan

1989: Bharat Coking Coal Limited (BCCL) informs the ChariCommittee on ‘Reclamation of Abandoned Coal Mines’that 95 MT coalwas saved by fire projects which cost Rs 69 crore.The Committee quot-ed BCCL’s estimate of Rs 300 crore for liquidating the fires in Jharia. Itnoted the high cost of reclaiming the burning areas, compared to thatof overburden dumps (Rs 400,000 per cubic feet and Rs 20,000 per hafor overburden dumps). The emphasis has since shifted to vacatingpeople from unstable areas along with tackling fires.

1994-96: The World Bank’s project to diagnose and control the fires1997: A writ petition on the fires filed in the Supreme Court (SC)

by Haradhan Roy1999: The CMPDI prepares a Master Plan for dealing with fire,

subsidence and rehabilitation in the BCCL leasehold. This is approvedby the BCCL and Coal India Limited (CIL) boards. Master Plan isrevised/updated in 2003, 2005 and 2006. Following an SC order, thePlan is examined and approved by different bodies such as the ministryof commerce, Planning Commission, the committee formed by theDGMS, etc.

2006: The updated cost of the project in 2006 stands at Rs 8,637crore.The project aims to shift persons living in the unstable areas, anddeal with the fires by excavation; every body, including encroachers,will be rehabilitated and it will permit BCCL to plan for scientific mining of coal.

– S P Banerjee, mining expert, Kolkata

m k

It was as late as 1995 that BCCL obtained a map of the minesand fires using satellite imagery. It was discovered that rampantillegal mining had exposed the pits to oxygen, a catalyst for fire.BCCL is not very sure of the cause of the fires. According to it, 62 per cent of the fires are ignited by spontaneous combustionand 38 per cent due to accidental and other miscellaneous rea-sons. But a recent research by scientists of the Central FuelResearch Institute, Banaras Hindu University and BCCL itselfhas disproved this theory. It has found that no single reason canbe attributed to the fires.

With the fire-extinguishing alternative failing to take off andthe blaze threatening to sear Jharia, resettling the town’s residentsemerged as an option. Sources in BCCL disclose that the reloca-tion move was initiated way back in 1996 when a World Bank-funded expert group reported that Jharia had to be saved from thefire. Two US-based consultants (Gai-Metchem and NorthwestMine Services Limited) jointly executed the ‘Jharia Mine FireControl Technical Assistance Project’ during 1994-1996. They recommended that “Jharia and Kirkend towns and other built-upareas… require immediate isolation from fires”.

BCCL officials and coal ministry bureaucrats construed this asa green light to relocate local people. The Union government

constituted a high-powered committee, led by the then coal secre-tary, in December 1996. The panel submitted its report a year later.The recommendation of the committee was accepted by the government and accordingly, master plans for rehabilitation ofunstable and fire-affected areas were drawn.

Sources in the Union coal ministry as well as in BCCLmaintain that the relocation issue has been raked up to facilitateopen-cast mining in Jharia. The loss-making BCCL has been propagating this method of extracting coal to cut costs andattempt a turnaround. But an essential prerequisite is evacuationof the town’s residents, since the best coal is under it. The CMRI,however, says that underground mining is a better alternativebecause it can prove profitable without jeopardising the safety ofthe people. “I have been told by several coal ministry officials thatrelocation is not viable and it can’t justify the BCCL’s incompe-tence in curbing the fire,” says Shibu Soren, leader of JharkhandMukti Morcha. He has launched a major protest movementagainst the proposed evacuation (see Box on page 176: All clear?).

Though BCCL is finally ready with a blueprint to shift the resi-dents of Jharia, this has not convinced the local people who haveformed the Jharia Coalfield Bachao Committee. Says K D Singh, aleader of the group: “BCCL just wants to leave us in the lurch. But

175


m k

TasraGourigram

Sindri

Sitanala

Mahal

Parbatpur

IISCO&

TISCO

IISCO

Amlabad

Jarma

Moonidih

Singra

Aluara

Bhagaband

LoyabadPootkee

TISCO

BhutGoriaM

urul

idih

Bhatdih

Murlidih20/21 pits

PhulariTand

Lohapatti

Mad

huba

nd

Bhurangia

Kharkharee

Maheshpur

Muraidih

Jogidih

Kooridih

Govindpur

SouthGobindpurKessurgarhDamuda

Nudkhurkee

Keshalpur

Benidih

GasliTand

Ramkanali

Tetulmari

Salanpur

Akask

inari

E. KatrasKatras

KatrasChoitudih Kan

Kanee

SendraBansjora

EastBussuriya

Bansdeopur

Gondudih

Bhuli

Bussuriya

Dhanbad

BankMore

Bast

acol

la

Bera

Kujama

Dobari

KuyaGanoodih

Goluck-dih

BhawrahSouth

BurraGarh

Hurriladih

Sudamdih Shaft

SudamdihInc.

Pather Dih

Damodar river

Chatkar Jore

Sula

nga

Jore

Tisra Jore

Damodar River

Khudia Nala

Katri Nala

Ban

sjo

ra N

ala

Damodar River

Jam

un

ia R

iver

Khudia Nala

Kari

Jore

DharmabandBARORA AREA

BLOCK II PROJ. AREA

WESTERN JHARIA AREA

GOVINDPUR AREA

BARORA AREA

KATRAS AREA

KATRAS AREASIJUA AREA

WESTERN JHARIA AREA BASTACOLLAAREA

KUSUNDA AREA

KUSTOREAREA

POOTKEE BALIHARIPROJECT AREA

Indu

stry

Balihari

NT OCPNichitpur

Khas KusundaDhansar

Kusunda

WESTERN JHARIA AREA

Jharia

Mudidih DCChord

W Mudidih

Kustore

Area / colliery boundary

Surface fire

Township

River

Source: Prof S P Banerjee, 2007, Presentation in ‘First Anil Agarwal Media Briefing Workshop and Dialogue on Mining, Environment and People’, New Delhi, April 26-27,

MAP 3: The Jharia firesThere are as many as 66 fires in 44 mines in Jharia

without concrete scientific evidence of the threat to Jharia, we arenot moving.”

Eyebrows are also being raised over the economics of the exer-cise. Mishra estimates that a minimum of Rs 18,000 crore will beneeded to shift the entire population of Jharia. This excludes thehardship that the people will have to bear in terms of lost businessand livelihood opportunities. Compared to this the cost of extin-guishing the fire would be around Rs 8,000 crore, opines Mishra.Even the World Bank-funded project puts it at no more than Rs10,000 crore. And the figure arrived at by the coal ministry, basedon assessments made by different expert groups, is the lowest atRs 4,070 crore. The estimated net worth of coal that can be extra-cted from Jharia is a whopping Rs 30,000 crore. “The right dosesof available technology and political commitment can help putout the fire at the best cost bargain,” feels Mishra.

Given the massive cost of relocation and the precarious financialposition of BCCL, the only way out seems to be to douse the fire.

Today, the blaze engulfs Jharia from three sides. In a desperatemove to extinguish the fire some years ago, BCCL officials tried topump water and sand into the mines. The hole they drilled burstand now oozes black fumes. Not far from it, houses caught fire asthe people used the abundantly available coal to erect the walls ofthe structures. In 2000, a major gas eruption forced BCCL to aban-don two of its staff colonies and evacuate people temporarily. Manyresidents had to be admitted to hospitals. Residents of Jharia town-ship are virtually sitting on fire. As the people say, it could turn intoa mass grave any moment (see Box: Subsidence in Jharia).

176


All clear?With the formation of a rehabilitation authority, thehurdles to tapping Jharia fields have been cleared

The Jharkhand government has formed a rehabilitation and development authority, the Jharia Rehabilitation & DevelopmentAuthority (JRDA), with a plan to set up townships to where all residents of Jharia would be shifted.The JRDA has already begun theconstruction of houses. The Planning Commission has approved theRs 5,792-crore action plan and advised BCCL to implement it within 10 years.

The Jharia Action Plan (JAP), which aims at shifting 65,000houses from as many as 532 endangered mine sites, has paved theway for the BCCL to access about 4.6 billion tonne of untappedcoking coal reserves in this town. The JAP has components such as fire control in 34 projects in 40 mines and stabilisation of 121 fire-bearing mine sites. The entire money earmarked for JAP would be organised from the sale of coal. CIL has decided toincrease the stowing excise duty from Rs 5.5 to Rs 10 per tonne byall its production subsidiaries, while a levy of Rs 6 per tonne wouldbe charged on CIL’s profit-making companies. These two measureswill help generate Rs 350 crore per annum, which will be spent entirely on JAP. Senior executives feel that the JAP, onceimplemented, will provide scope for large-scale mining in theJharia coalfields.

Subsidence in JhariaCoal mining is taking its toll – the town is in serious trouble

One more tremor and the country’s coal capital, with a population of4,00,000, will subside and disappear.“What is more tragic is that theBCCL, instead of trying to shift the people to safer places, is busy dig-ging their graves,”says Ramraj Tiwary, grandson of Pandit BajrangbaliTiwary, the priest of the erstwhile Jharia estate, resignedly. The state-ment sums up the impending fate of Jharia, India’s oldest and largestcoking coal producing area. While doom knocks at the door of thosewho have lived there for generations, BCCL, crippled by financialcrises and mismanagement, pleads helplessness.

In fact the October 27, 1996, tremor came as a preface to theimpending tragedy. People had assembled at Sadhan Kutir near Jharia’sKatras More at 8 pm to give final touches to their preparation for Kalipuja. But before they could get down to it, a massive subterranean blastand subsequent explosions shook the entire area. Walls, roofs and floorscracked. Panic-stricken men, women and children rushed out of theirrattling houses. The panic run was abetted by the disappearance of afamily into a ghost crack that had formed beneath their house.

While the BCCL management showed no sympathy, a commit-tee of Bihar Legislative Council members headed by Gautam SagarRana visited Jharia for an on-the-spot evaluation. Rana said neitherthe state government should allow people to commit suicide norshould BCCL be allowed to turn its mines into a mass grave. The

committee summoned the Dhanbad deputy commissioner to provide details of contingency plans to rescue the people in case ofan emergency.

The Jharia Bachao Samiti accused BCCL of intentionallyindulging in underground blasting despite a ban imposed by DirectorGeneral Mines Safety (DGMS). The samiti convenor M B Pramaniksaid that on the night of the tremor, BCCL used heavy explosives ina bid to recover two site discharge loader (SDL) machines. The con-sequent tremor caused cracks in the mine roof that supports a largenumber of settlements. Similar explosions in future might devour theentire area. BCCL sources, while denying that the blast caused cracks,said soon after the cracks developed BCCL appointed an expert com-mittee headed by former DGMS head H B Ghosh which concludedthat cracks developed because of the movement in the old goavesand warned that similar damage in future could not be ruled out.“Under these circumstances, prevention of damages is not feasibleand, therefore, remedy lies only in evacuation of the buildings,”BCCLsources said.

On its part, the BCCL management has been claiming that mostof the residents are encroachers, especially after a criminal case wasfiled against it. BCCL claims that through nationalisation, it not only got the underground mining rights, but also the rights over thesurface; hence, all those living in the area were illegal settlers.

– N A Khan, Down To Earth, New Delhi

m k

177


c m y k

Disaster zone: Jharia and Raniganj (see next page) are not only plagued by fire, but also by land subsidence

AM

IT S

HA

NK

ER /

CSE

178


The death traps of RaniganjThe coalfields of West Bengal are also being held to ransomby the twin threats of underground fires and land subsidence

When coal is extracted from underground mines, pillars of the mineral are left to support the roof. Once the mine is exhausted, itshould ideally be filled with sand to prevent the roof from caving in.But in most cases, this is not done. The mines are abandoned withoutbeing stabilised.

Once the mining company abandons a mine, the powerful miningmafia takes over. The remaining mineral is illegally and unscientificallyremoved – even the pillars that support the roof are scraped away.Consequently, the roof weakens and gives way leading to loss of prop-erty and lives. Methane, a coal bed gas, can build up in abandonedmines, causing blasts that weaken the pillar and the roof and leadingto a collapse.

According to a report in The Telegraph, in 2002, about 146 villagesin Bardhaman district – inhabited by six lakh people – are threatenedby subsidence resulting from rampant illegal mining. In 2004, in a pub-lic interest litigation, former member of parliament from Asansol,Haradhan Roy, said that four lakh residents in 56 localities in Asansol’scoal belt are endangered due to subsidence caused by illegal miningand underground fires.1 A notification issued by the DGMS in 1997had put the towns of Raniganj, Andal, Asansol, Kulti and Sanctoria ina potentially dangerous subsidence zone.2

In November 2006, 150 miners were trapped in an abandonedmine while extracting coal illegally in Gangtikuli, near Asansol. Themine caved in and was flooded by the overflowing Damodar.Threatened by the coal mafia running the mine, none of the villagers

or the kin of the dead miners reported the deaths.3

In 2002, West Bengal’s coal mines accounted for 176 accidents,which claimed 10 lives; 170 were injured4. The Union ministry oflabour reports that for every 4,167 persons employed in coal mines,one person dies; for every 408 employed, one is injured. Moreover, oneperson dies for every 1,265,822 tonne of coal extracted, and for every124,688 tonne extracted, one is injured.5 Non-coal mines reported onlyone accident in 2002.6

This, however, is an incomplete picture: it does not include accidents that happened in the illegal mines of Raniganj and Asansol.A significant number of injuries and casualties in illegal mines are noteven reported and hence, not compensated for. In 2002, the CIL paid atotal compensation of Rs 16.28 lakh to only 10 persons.7

Subsidence and underground fires have also damaged and threat-ened roads and the main railway line of the Eastern Railways.8

In January 2007, land subsidence led to huge cracks on NationalHighway 2, which connects Kolkata to Delhi. Blasts reportedly weak-ened underground pillars in mines, leading to the subsidence.9

Accidents in mines can mainly be attributed to the negligence ofCIL subsidiaries, which own and operate most of the mines in WestBengal: they do not backfill the abandoned mines. This is despite thefact that in 2005-06, Rs 60 crore was sanctioned to CIL for undertakingsafety measures.10

The response of the government has been the usual: various expertcommittees have been set up, which have recommended measures thatare never implemented. An apex monitoring committee was set up bythe Union ministry of coal in 1990 to look into the problem of subsi-dence and underground mine fires. The ministry, in its 2005-06 annualreport, says the committee identified 49 unstable locations in June 1992and added 21 more locations in 1995. Recently, the DGMS indicated thatthere were 171 unstable locations in the Raniganj and Asansol coal belt.

Another high-level committee was set up by the ministry in 1996to look into land subsidence and fires in Jharia and Raniganj.The com-mittee asked the Coal Mines Planning and Designing India Limited(CMPDIL) to prepare a master plan for the Raniganj coalfields. TheCMPDIL report recommended that 59 locations needed to be stabilised, 80 were to be rehabilitated, seven railway lines were to bediverted and seven fire areas were to be bio-reclaimed.

In response to another action plan prepared by ECL for shiftingand rehabilitation of people from unsafe areas, dealing with fires andstabilising unstable areas, the CMPDIL identified 43 locations for sta-bilisation, 92 for rehabilitation, diversion of seven railway lines andbio-reclamation of eight fire areas. It also identified 121 locations forstabilisation, 532 for rehabilitation, 66 for fire control under the BCCL.

According to the annual report, the CMPDIL has prepared a planfor the rehabilitation of Samdih, Bangalpara, Kena and Harishpur villages which fall under the area mined by ECL.The plan is in progress– Rs 15.50 lakh of the earmarked total cost of Rs 32 crore has alreadybeen spent. The report also says that while eight sites in Raniganj coal-fields have been stabilised, stabilisation of six more sites is in progress.11

Rehabilitation in the state must pick up pace: compared to thepopulation of more than 16,71,972 under threat from mining activities,the rehabilitation work that stands completed is really insignificant.12Abandoned mines are not backfilled, leading to accidents

REU

TERS

m k

■ THE BUSINESS OF ILLEGAL MINING

West Singhbhum and Hazaribagh districts of Jharkhand are asmuggler’s paradise. Far away from the Jharia coalfields, illegalcoal mining and smuggling is a profession in itself here. Accordingto an article published in The Hindu Business Line in October 2001,illegal mines in Jharkhand produce and despatch 40 lakh tonne ofcoal every day.63 Controlled by the powerful coal mafia, and oper-ating with the connivance of officials of public sector mining com-panies and the local police, illegal mining and theft of coal fromcompany-operated mines has become almost impossible to control.

While the mafia provides the muscle power, it is Jharkhand’spoor who fuel the industry through their labour. A substantialproportion of the population lives below the poverty line, and understandably, grabs any opportunity to earn a living. The work is backbreaking – any visitor to Hazaribagh for instance,has seen hundreds of people carrying coal from the mines of CCLin the Rajrappa area, on bicycles, traversing some 70 km ontreacherous valley roads (see Box on page 180 : Black: three storieson illegal mining).

These ‘coal thieves’ buy coal from illegal contractors and sup-ply this to the mafia in return for a pittance that keeps their fam-ilies going. They earn between Rs 500 and Rs 600 a trip. Policeharassment is a part of their lives – the local administration finds

them easy prey.64 The contractors largely go scot-free as theybribe their way out of trouble: they offer kickbacks to the coalmanagements and the local administration to avoid penal action.

Working conditions in the illegal mines are a travesty oflabour laws. Minimum wages are not paid – workers earn a paltry Rs 50 a day. Labour laws governing safety and number of

179


Steal and toil: pilfered coal being borne on bicycles for supplying to the mafia

AM

IT S

HA

NK

ER /

CSE

A parallel economy Illegal rat hole mining is a money-spinner in West Bengal

Irrespective of its exploitative nature, illegal mining has become themainstay of local economies. According to a report published inThe Hindu in 2004, illegal rat hole mining powers an entire economy in West Bengal. There are at least 1,000 small wells, about40-45 feet deep, in the 20-km stretch in Jamuria coveringNandigram, Sankri Danga, Banamalipur and Baijayantipur. Thesemines reportedly employed about 25,000 people, mostly poor tribals from Jharkhand. They employed an even greater number asaccountants, managers, transporters, etc. The daily production ofcoal in the illegal mines in Jamuria, Barabani and Raniganj almostequalled the 30,000-40,000 tonne produced by the ECL mines, andgenerated over Rs 5 crore a day.

m k

180


c m y k

Black: three stories on illegal mining

The illegal miners of HazaribaghTravelling from Hazaribagh town towards Badakagaon block, one willsee hundreds of people carrying coal on their bicycles.These people arefrom nearby villages and are illegally mining coal in Chandoul village of Badakagaon. The region is a stronghold of the erstwhileMaoist Communist Centre (MCC) – now known as the CommunistParty of India (Maoist).

Locals say that earlier, officials used to visit the areas to check illegal mining, but now they don’t as they are scared of the MCC.For the past several years, these people have been mining more than500 bags of coal every day and selling them in local markets. One bagof coal sells for Rs 150 in Hazaribagh town.

Says Pancheswar Ram of Chandoul, who oversees the illegal operations in Chandoul: “We extract as much coal as we can. Peopleare so poor in this tribal belt that they do not get a full meal a day. Sowe have engaged all our misguided brothers in work to keep theirminds away from Naxalism. We are the real owners of this ‘property’.So there is no question of allowing the government authorities to takeaway our property.”

J L Srivastava, chief conservator of forests (wildlife), says: “The people are destroying natural resources because of the government’swrong approach. The government has emerged as the worst alienatorof the tribal people.”

Their day starts with coalAt the crack of every dawn, Lakshmi, Jyoti and Khushbu of Godhar,aged between five and eight, rush towards the mines with their baskets. Every day, they manage to get only one-two baskets of coal –for which, they cover eight km, the to-and-fro distance between theirhomes and the mines.

Dulari Devi, Munni Devi and Champa also rummage for coal; thiscoal is used to cook food in their homes. These women are all agedbetween 35-45 years. The men in their households leave this chore ofstealing coal to the women – in fact, 75 per cent of those stealing coalin the area are women. This is because if the women are caught, theCentral Industrial Security Force (CISF) personnel guarding the minesdo not beat them up, or jail them. However, the women do not escapeharassment: eveteasing and physical abuse is common.

Most women living in the villages in the area – as well as inGhansadih and Dhansar – are dependent on pilfered coal. Living stan-dards are appalling. Wages are inadequate. Residents use the waterpumped out from mines for their daily needs. Officials agree that waterfrom the washeries is not treated properly before being disposed off inthe Damodar and Khudia rivers. The entire area is covered in blackdust. People often suffer from diseases like tuberculosis, bronchitis,silicosis and asthma. Dhanbad-based heart and diabetes specialist Dr N K Singh says that medicines for TB sell the most in Dhanbad.

Public sector mines are no better. Women working in the BCCLmines in the Kusunda area of Dhanbad do not have access even tobasic amenities. Mine sites and workshops lack toilet facilities. Mostwomen working in these mines are either widows or have lost their

fathers to mine accidents.The management has granted them employ-ment – mostly as unskilled labour – as compensation. The women aredissatisfied, but cannot protest.

The other side of developmentEvening brings with it a different world in the villages of Belatand,Gandhinagar, Premnagar, Golbhatta and Roopnagar. Promised a lifeof prosperity, life is just the opposite for these villages. There is a pileof coal in front of every household and the smoke is so thick that onecan’t see beyond two houses. Only the black of coal is visible every-where. This black engulfs the life of the women of these villages.

These villages fall under the Central Coalfields Limited’s (CCL)Baniyadih project in Giridih district. Not a single household here isfree from the influence of alcohol or drugs. Some consume alcoholmade of mahua (bassia latifolia), some get drunk on locally madeliquor. Every morning, they are back to the mines to steal coal to earntheir daily meals. And every evening they go back to the same “high”.Life, it seems, is in agreement with sunrise and sunset. But then thereis nothing else to signify hope and happiness in their lives. Liquor andmusic provide them means to forget their pain. Maybe that’s whythere is a small TV or tape recorder in every household.

Every household is heavily indebted to the local moneylender.They will, perhaps, never be able to pay back, as the interest keeps onpiling and the capital remains as it is. Households that have girls haveeven more problems.They are indebted in the first place and also haveto get their daughters married off, which means spending money fordowry. That will mean borrowing more money.

– Anupama Kumari, CSE media fellow, Ranchi and

Manish Tiwary, Down To Earth, New Delhi

Safety gear? What’s that? Working conditions in most coal mines –legal and illegal – are pathetic

PRA

DIP

SA

HA

/ C

SE

working hours are flouted with impunity. It is, therefore, not sur-prising that Jharkhand accounts for the maximum number ofdeaths due to mining accidents.65 Organised resistance toexploitation through trade unions is suppressed by musclemen onthe coal mafia’s payrolls.

Working conditions in legal mines are hardly any better,though. In fact, they are especially abysmal in mines operated bycontractors; in spite of this, CIL has earmarked several blocks forhanding over to contractors. The extent of contracting is huge –more than 50 per cent of the coal extracted in the country comesfrom mines that are run on contract.

Apart from being responsible for abominable working condi-tions, illegal coal mining and coal smuggling is a big drain on thestate exchequer – trade union leaders have pointed out that about

Rs 1,000 crore worth of coal is pilfered from coal mines everyyear.66 On an average, only about 5,600 tonne of coal was recovered every year and 191 FIRs related to illegal mining werelodged by CIL between 2000-01 and 2002-03.67 On its part, thegovernment has taken minimal action to stop this.

A high-powered committee looking into illegal mining, andheaded by the Union minister of state for coal Dasari NarayanaRao, has recommended that the Indian School of Mines (ISM) andXLRI, Jamshedpur jointly conduct a study to assess the problemof illegal mining in West Bengal and Jharkhand. Coal India Ltdwould bear the cost of the study, which would assess the numberof illegal mines and total coal reserves and see whether it is possible to run them on a cooperative basis, reported The FinancialExpress in October 2006.

181


c m y k

The story of Nirjal BirhorA cycle-wallah’s journey from forests to illegally mined coal

Jharkhand’s business of illegal mining involves a wide network of people, in which each person’s role is clearly defined. There are the cutters who cut the coal from the face and are the highest paid amongthe workers. There are bojharis who carry the coal in head dishes fromthe surface and dump it in shallow square depressions called khudis.Then come the cycle-wallahs at the fag end of the chain, who bag thecoal, load it on cycles and deliver it to consumers. The entire operationis controlled by contractors and the mining mafia.

Ant-like processions of ragtag men pushing bicycles – the cycle-wallahs – laden with sacks of coal is a common sight in the state,especially in the region around Hazaribagh. This area used to be covered with thick tropical dry deciduous jungles and was home to anumber of indigenous tribes. One of these was the Birhors, literallymeaning ‘forest people’. Nirjal Birhor used to forage food in the forests way back in the early 1980s. By 2005, forced out of his tradi-tional home, he had become one of the 2,000 odd cycle-wallahs in the eastern Indian coal tracts.

Nirjal covers up to 20-22 km in a day, pushing up to 250 kg of coalon a bicycle. He sells the coal door to door, to domestic consumers,small industries such as brick kilns and local tea or food stalls. The coalhe carries is either scavenged from existing open cut or undergroundmines, or old abandoned mines that were not backfilled by sand by thestate-owned coal mining company. Nirjal also works in small villagedug-mines on individually owned land, or in rat holes sunk in the mining company’s leasehold land.

All these are illegal activities, but men like Nirjal did not havemany options once the forests disappeared. This subsistence ‘collec-tion’of coal earns Nirjal and his family only about Rs 42 (US $1) a day.It forms a tiny part of an underground coal mining economy that mightwell amount to 10 per cent or more of India’s annual coal productionof 330 MT from the state-owned coal mines. An informed guesstimateis that the entire black business of coal would be to the tune of at least70-80 MT annually.

To make an assessment of how much coal is carried only on cycles,I, with my colleague David Williams, decided to focus on eastern India.

We counted the number of cycle-wallahs entering individual townsthrough a particular access road over the day. For example, ifHazaribagh town can be accessed through four roads from four directions, we observed these four roads over four days from 6 am till6 pm. We did such physical surveys – counting the numbers – for asample of towns in eastern India. We took the amount on one cycleconservatively at 200 kg (or 150 kg of coke) to allow for variations instrength of the man, terrain and seasonality. This gave us the amountof coal coming into these sample towns. We then looked at the 2001census population of these towns to correlate the coal demand withthe size of the urban population. In the next step, we took the popula-tions of all sizeable towns of the entire region, and extrapolated theamount of coal that can be demanded by that population. We knewthis is a simple procedure, but often the most simple answers and taskscan be the most difficult to find or undertake. We allowed for noise inthe calculation in several ways: by leaving out the villages (many families in these villages are switching over to coal and kerosene frombiomass as the latter gets harder to collect) and smaller towns and con-sidered only the more nodal ones.

We arrived at a figure of around 12 million cycle loads per yeardelivering coal to domestic and small users such as tea shops, brick-kilns and sponge iron plants. Assuming each individual carts only onecycle load per day, this would mean around 33,000 bicycles per day ineastern India. Not only is this significant in terms of employment,together, the cycles annually supply 2.5 MT of coal only in easternIndia.This is the production of a medium-sized colliery, and taking intoconsideration that this is rather low quality coal from shallow dugmines, the amount of coal is valued in the world market at currentprices around US $75 million – though the cycle-wallahs probably sellit at a much lower rate.

All these cycle-wallahs’and Nirjal’s world of survival is illegal as allcoal resources belong to the state, and only the state or its chosenagents are allowed to mine it. But what will Nirjal and his ilk do in adispensation under which lands owned by adivasis or indigenouscommunities – supposed to be legally ‘non-transferable’ – are forciblytaken over by the government and industry?

– Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt, Australian National University, Canberra

The flashpoints

■ CHAIBASA’S ASBESTOS MOUNTAINS

Jharkhand is a state of hills. Some are natural, most often coveredwith thick forests and picturesque. Some are human-made:Hazaribagh has huge black hills of waste generated from coalmining, towering above the deep coal quarries.

But Chaibasa’s human-made hills have to be seen to bebelieved – massive piles of asbestos waste mixed with chromite,lying above the natural hills, and forming grotesque hilltops. Overthe years, this ‘indestructible’ waste has seeped into the water,soil, vegetation and bodies of people living around the abandonedmines, poisoning the local community and the environment.

The Roro hills, located 20 km west of Chaibasa, the districtheadquarters of West Singhbhum, have been extensively minedover seven decades. The hills have rich reserves of a host of min-erals. They were first mined for magnetite. The Tatas and theBirlas, besides other industrial houses, then started mining theasbestos and chromite reserves in the hills. TISCO stopped miningchromite by 1958, when it discovered better reserves elsewhere.After the Tatas and the Kesris stopped mining, the HyderabadAsbestos Cement Products Limited stepped in.

Asbestos mining was abandoned in 1982, and since then the

waste dumps have been lying, spread across 100 metres. Theyhave undergone years of disintegration, and have extended several metres down the hill slopes, spreading into the paddyfields on the foothills of the Roro. A 40-cm thick layer of siltywaste is spread over these fields now. The dumpsites can poten-tially contaminate the streams flowing down the hills, as well asthe ponds located in the villages.

Mines, Minerals, and People (MMP), a coalition of NGOs work-ing on mining issues, had instituted a fact-finding team to do ahealth survey of the ex-workers and villagers in the area. The resultsof the study are damning – 45 per cent of the respondents had symp-toms normally identified with long-term exposure to asbestos:lower back pain, dyspnea (shortness of breath and difficulty inbreathing), hemoptysis (blood in the sputum), and blindness.68

The team also examined three chest radiographs (takenbetween 1998 and 2000) of workers who complained of chest painand respiratory distress; the radiographs suggested some form ofinterstitial lung disease (pneumoconiosis, pulmonary tuberculosisas co-morbid conditions).

The devastation in the Roro hills is a classic example of howill-managed wastes from mines can harm human health. Thoughthe mines have been abandoned many years back, the dust fromthe piles of waste stored in the open pose a serious health risk tolocal communities, as studies done by the International LabourOrganisation (ILO) and the assistant director general of mines inNovember 1978 have shown.

182


Ghost mountain: asbestos dumps in the Roro hills

MA

DH

UM

ITA

DU

TTA

m k

■ JADUGUDA: WHERE DEATH STALKS

Jaduguda has been enshrined in the collective consciousness ofIndia: lying on indigenous Santhali and Ho tribal lands in EastSinghbhum district, its claim to fame is that it houses the singleuranium mine and processing plant that supplies uranium to allof India’s 10 pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWRs). The pro-cessing plant is a sprawling complex fed by three undergrounduranium mines and the by-product from three nearby coppermines. All these are owned by Uranium Corporation of IndiaLimited (UCIL), which is under the Department of Atomic Energy(DAE).

The three uranium mines of Narwapahar, Bhatin andJaduguda are situated in a heavily forested area of steep hills,which frame a fertile river valley. This is part of the catchment ofthe Subarnarekha river, which flows through the states ofJharkhand, Orissa and West Bengal.

Jaduguda is an underground uranium mine, which com-menced operations in 1967. The ore grade is around 0.06 per cent– so low it would not be considered worth recovering in other countries.69 The mine workforce (largely tribal contractors)

works 1,600-2,000 feet below the surface without any protective clothing.70

It takes more than 1,000 metric tonne of ore to get two metrictonne of uranium (to obtain a typical uranium concentration of 0.2 per cent).71 More than 998 tonne of waste is generated in theprocess.72 This waste, or mill tailings, contains 85 per cent of theradioactivity in the original ore along with heavy metals andchemical toxic materials.73 When discharged from the mill, thetailings are roughly 40 per cent solid and 60 per cent liquid.74 M VRamana, fellow, Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies inEnvironment and Development, estimates the amount of wasteproduced during mining and milling to be about four MT. 75

Jaduguda exports yellowcake (U3O8) to the Nuclear FuelComplex (NFC) in Hyderabad, more than a thousand kilometresaway in southern India, for fabrication into fuel rods. Waste fromthe NFC plant, as well as nuclear wastes from other parts of India,are then returned by road and rail to Jaduguda and thrown intotailings ponds along with mill tailings; these ponds are adjacent totribal villages.

There are three large tailings dams at Jaduguda, impoundingmillions of tonnes of radioactive wastes.76 They are unlined and

183


Santhals in turmoil Illegal quarries brew tribal unrest

Illegal stone quarries in Birbhum district have led to displacement ofthe people from their land and livelihood. The Santhal tribe ofMallarpur region of the district has been fighting against the stonequarry owners. Many Santhals have lost their farmlands and havebeen forced to work in the stone mines. The mines, excavated ontheir fields, have degraded their lands, killed their livestock andimperilled their health.

A 2001 report in The Times of India said that there were about 305stone quarries, mostly illegal, and 325 stone crushers in the area.

The National Institute of Small Mines conducted a survey onabout 1,000 Santhal women working in Pachami Hatgaccha andMallarpur in 2002. The study found that a number of them could notconceive and were suffering from bronchial problems due to dustpollution. A large number were also suffering from sexually trans-mitted diseases due to sexual exploitation in the mines.

A non-governmental organisation, Uthnau, based in Garia village,has been involved in organising the tribals against the stone quarries.It has, with their help, been able to close a few quarries. The quarrymafia has been threatening the organisation and the tribals.The leaderof Uthnau, Kunal Deb, was arrested in 2002 on false charges. The localadministration and the police are hand-in-glove.

Up in arms in PachwaraA small village rises against mining

The 1,000 families of Pachwara village in Pakur district have decided toblock mining: 15 boys and girls, armed with traditional bows andarrows, guard the barricaded village at all hours. Not even the districtmagistrate is allowed in.

Pachwara was one of the first places to be chosen in the Jharkhandstate for ‘development’, once the new national policy on coal mine liberalisation, allowing state electricity boards to own captive coalmines anywhere in the country, was adopted in 2001. The Punjab StateElectricity Board (PSEB) formed a joint venture company, PANEM CoalMines Limited, with Eastern Minerals Trading Agency to produce,supply, transport and deliver coal from the coal mines of PachwaraCentral Block to PSEB thermal power stations. The project envisages

44 years of opencast mining to extract 289 MT of coal. The governmenthopes to get a royalty of Rs 100 crore per annum from this area.

However, Pachwara Central Block also stands on more than 1,100ha of raiyati (sharecropped land), forests, homesteads and grazingland. Official estimates say 250 families will be displaced within 10-15years and “afterwards, possibly more”. The land was acquired withoutany prior consultation with Pachwara’s gram sabha, as stipulated in thePanchayati Raj Extension to Scheduled Areas Act, 1996.

PANEM has, belatedly, offered compensation; but the villagers arenot interested. The company is all set with petrol pumps, fleets ofdumpers and cranes on standby. To curb protests, state authorities have slapped arrest warrants against all but two villagers, but this hasnot fazed the villagers at all.


m k

uncovered; so while the solids are mostly contained, the liquids,gasses and fine dust particles are rapidly cycled into the environ-ment. During the dry season, the dams run dry and the windpicks up the loose tailings and blows them around; in the mon-soons, the dams overflow into the river. People have used thedams to graze livestock and play soccer, and regularly cross themon their way from one place to another.

The ore is brought to the Jaduguda mill in open trucks fromthe nearby Bhatin and Narwapahar mines. These trucks, some-times partly covered by tarpaulins and occasionally carryingworkers perched on top of the load, are a familiar sight on the narrow roads linking the mines. Every day, about 200 trucks passthrough the crowded town, loaded with uranium ore, and uncovered most of the time. Sometimes, only a thin polythenesheet separates the people from the deadly cargo.

Tailings have also been used as landfill and construction mate-rials. As the complex has gradually encroached across the land-scape, people have had their agricultural lands taken away butnot their living space; so that even today, people still live within30 metres of the tailings structures. Water from the main tailingspond travels five km before joining the Subernarekha. This is lifeas usual for 50,000 people in seven villages in East Singhbhum.77

In Chatikocha village, 500 people live below the embankmentof the area’s largest tailings pond. The massive embankment ofthe tailings pond is all that keeps the village from being sweptaway by millions of tonne of radioactive materials. As the windusually blows from above the embankment, solidified with milleduranium ores, it carries with it dust from the tailings pond.78

“Besides me, nobody is alive who joined the UCIL as a millworker in the 1960s,” says Saluka Himbram, the village head whoretired from UCIL after 34 years of employment. “Abnormalbirths have become common. Half of the village’s women haveproblems in delivery and miscarriages.” Some years ago, resi-dents were told not to drink water from the three tubewells. Lifebecomes hell in summer. His son, who is now working as a miner,has already made 39 visits to a doctor in the last six months.Complaints of defective births, rising tuberculosis, and lung andabdomen cancer from villagers living around the uranium miningfacilities is on the rise.79

In 1998, the Jharkhandi Organisation Against Radiation(JOAR) organised a health survey in conjunction with BIRSA, theBindrai Institute for Research, Study and Action, speaking to people in seven villages within one km of the tailings dams. Forty-seven per cent of the women reported disruptions to their

184


c m y k

Source: Google Earth, as viewed on August 25, 2007

MAP 4: Uranium in JharkhandUranium deposits are found near rivers, increasing the risk of radioactive contamination for local communities

NARWAPAHAR

JADUGODA

BHATIN

TAILING PONDS

RAKHA MINERAILWAYSTATION

Gura river

Subernarekha river

menstrual cycle, and 18 per cent said they had suffered miscar-riages or given birth to stillborn babies in the last five years; 30 percent reported some sort of fertility problem. Nearly all womencomplained of fatigue, weakness and depression. Overall, the survey found a high incidence of chronic skin diseases, cancers,TB, bone and brain damage, kidney damage, nervous system disorders, congenital deformities, nausea, blood disorders andother chronic diseases.80

Another study by the environment committee of the BiharLegislative Council in 1998 also confirmed that uranium wasleaching into the river, and that people were living too close to themine. The team expressed concern at the fact that the tailingsdams were unfenced, that wastewater was returning to the treat-ment plant in open drains, and that there were no warning signsaround the plant. The committee recommended a complete healthsurvey and relocation of people at a distance of five km from themines and tailings ponds.

A survey and scientific testing of samples from the soil andwater in and around the Jaduguda mines by Hiroaki Koide ofKyoto University’s Research Reactor Institute in July 2002, foundhigh radioactivity. The permissible limit for radiation exposure byany ‘artificial factor’ is one millisievert per year (mSv/y), or 0.11microSv/hour.81 In Jaduguda, there are places where the externalgamma dose by only the ‘natural factor’ exceeds this limit. The

most dangerous source of contamination lies in tailings ponds,and here the amount of air-gamma dose exceeds 10 mSv/y (1.1 microSv/h).82

The same study found high uranium contamination in theareas around the tailings pond and the stream that carries the tail-ings water to the Subernarekha. Similarly, roads on which truckscarry ore to the mill and the railway station at the Rakha Mineshad exceptionally high uranium contamination. Its findingsshowed:● The amount of air-gamma dose exceeds 1 mSv/y in the

villages, and reaches 10 mSv/y around the tailings ponds.● The perimeter of the tailings ponds is polluted with

uranium 10-100 times higher compared with areas withoutcontamination.

● Number One tailings pond is contaminated by cesium. As thearea’s uranium mines do not produce cesium, this shows thearea is used as a dumping ground for radioactive wastesbrought from other polluted sources.

● Uranium concentrations are high in samples taken from theriverbank and roads. This perhaps indicates that tailings areused as construction materials.

● At the Rakha Mines station, from where semi-processed urani-um is sent to Hyderabad for fuel fabrication, the soil is pollutedby only uranium. Its concentration is remarkably high.83

185


Unfinished lives: children have been the biggest sufferers in Jaduguda

P M

AD

HA

VAN

m k

Another survey of four villages, two in the vicinity of Jaduguda (where a similar plant has been in operation for manyyears) and two villages some distance away from the plant, conducted by the Gujarat-based Sampoorna Kranti VidyalayaVedchhi (SKVV), found that the number of infants born withgenetic disorders was six times higher than normal. Of the 70such cases reported, 60 were born with congenital deformities invillages close to the uranium plant, whereas 10 were born innon-affected areas. Moreover, 16 out of the 60 were mentallyretarded, compared to one in other areas. Cases of infants born with polydactyl (extra fingers or toes) and synductyl (fused or missing fingers and toes) are also common in theaffected areas.84

In September 2000, the Supreme Court admitted a petitionsubmitted by the JOAR, seeking direction to the Centre andUranium Corporation of India Limited to take stringent safetymeasures at Jaduguda. However, the petition was dismissed inApril 2004. In its judgment, the Court held that in view of an affidavit filed by the Atomic Energy Commission chairperson thatadequate steps have been taken to check and control radiationarising out of uranium waste, the Court did not see any merit inthe petition.

186


Death peddler: mines and the plant of UCIL at Jaduguda have been accused by locals of destroying their lives and health

MA

HA

DEO

SEN

Accident at JadugudaA tailings pond collapse and its impact points to a potential disaster zone

On December 24, 2006, one of the pipes carrying radioactive wastesfrom the uranium mill to a storage dam (tailings pond) burst,discharging highly toxic wastes into a nearby creek. The accidentoccurred in Dungridih, a small village near Jaduguda inhabitedlargely by displaced families whose lands were acquired to constructtwo of the ponds. UCIL did not have an alarm mechanism to alertthe company in cases of such disasters. It was the villagers whoarrived at the scene of the accident who informed the company ofthe toxic spill.

Even more reprehensible is the fact that the toxic sludgespewed into creek for nine hours before the flow of the radioactivewaste was shut off. Consequently, a thick layer of radioactivesludge along the surface of the creek killed scores of fish, frogs, andother riparian life. According to reports in local Hindi newspapers,UCIL has begun repairing the pipe and removing sludge from the creek.

m k

187


Banduhurang: another Jaduguda?Jharkhand’s dangerous tryst with uranium continues

Even after the horrors of Jaduguda, UCIL is determined to continuemining uranium. The people of Jharkhand have, however, learnt theirlesson from Jaduguda, even if UCIL hasn’t – UCIL faces stiff protestsevery time it proposes to set up shop again in the state. Whether it isBanduhurang, Turamdih or Muhaldih, peoples’ resistance marks anymention of uranium mining.

The Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board (SPCB) held a publichearing on February 25, 2004 in East Singhbhum district’sBanduhurang village to get environmental clearance for UCIL’s pro-posed mine. The public hearing was duly attended by a large selectionof security forces, including the Rapid Action Force, the CRPF and localpolice. Locals alleged that the company also got its goons to intimidatethe people. At the public hearing, the residents of three villages refusedto be displaced. The villages reminded UCIL that it still hadn’t giventhem compensations promised in 1985 when lands were taken awayfor a uranium mine near Thuramdih village. At the meeting, anti-nuclear activists reeled out stories of radiation-related health problemsin villages around uranium mines.

UCIL and the Board officials told the people not to worry. ButHarsingh Padeya, village head of Banduhurang, doesn’t believe them.Padeya lost his lands when UCIL started the Thuramdih mine. He is

still waiting for compensation, and there are at least 250 displaced people like him.

Roughly 5,000 people would be displaced by the proposedBanduhurang mine. So this time when the villages got a relocationnotice before the public hearing, Padeya and others decided: “No uranium without compensation.”

Villagers and environmental activists hounded the officials at thehearing. They demanded to know if the new mine would cause radia-tion like the ones in Jaduguda and what would they get in compensa-tion.“Poverty is more hazardous than radiation. What if we leave ourvillage and don’t get good compensation?”says Ashwini Sahoo, a res-ident of Kerwa village.“The hearing didn’t promise us a good compen-sation package and without it we will be destroyed,”says Arun Nayak,another resident. In April 2004, refusing to listen to the people, theSPCB gave a no-objection certificate (NOC) to the company to under-take open cast uranium mining at Banduhurang. According to UCIL,the project is likely to be completed by 2007.

Similar stories of protest emerge from other prospective uraniummining sites. “Don’t turn our village into Hiroshima Nagasaki; Wedon’t want the uranium mines; We will die but not give our land” –these sentiments expressed during a public hearing for a uranium project in Muhaldih village find echoes across Jharkhand.

– Anupama Kumari, CSE media fellow, Ranchi

People’s protest: a march by locals in Jaduguda against UCIL

J M

AD

RI

m k

188


In dire straits: India’s nuclear plans The country faces a uranium drought. And in a rush to end thisscarcity, the Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL) hasdone nothing to gain people’s confidence

India’s nuclear power generation is entirely dependent on natural uranium (see map: The uranium hotspots), which fuels 13 pressurisedheavy water reactors and all research projects. All this uranium comesfrom the 150-tonne-a-year Jaduguda mines. J L Bhasin, former chairper-son and managing director of UCIL, had said in the year 2000 that if thedemands of eight reactors currently under construction are considered,India would have enough uranium only till 2007.

The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), under the direct controlof the prime minister, has formulated a three-stage approach onnuclear energy. The approach envisages setting up of natural uranium-fuelled pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWRs) in the firststage, fast breeder reactors (FBR) utilising a uranium-plutonium fuelcycle in the second stage, and breeder reactors utilising thorium fuel inthe third stage.

However, the country’s nuclear power plan is running 15 years behindthe targets set for energy production. The DAE fears that the uraniumscarcity and protests can further delay the programme. While setting targets for nuclear power generation, the government in 1985 hadassumed that all identified uranium reserves would be explored. No newmines have come up till now and the government is panicking. Accordingto information based on questions asked in Parliament, India needs about450-500 tonne of uranium oxide (processed uranium ore) every year forthe current level of power generation and research (which sources put at25 per cent of the total uranium need).

The scarcity threatens to halt the second-generation FBR programmebased on plutonium, which is derived from uranium used in the presentthermal nuclear reactors. “Without uranium, we can’t run the nuclearestablishment and achieve the targeted 10,000 MW power in the firststage of nuclear power generation,”says P V Dubey, UCIL’s company sec-retary. The fast breeder reactors are supposed to produce another 10,000MW of power by 2020, but R K Sharma, head of Bhabha Atomic ResearchCentre’s (BARC) public awareness division, admits: “It will take about 10years before we can switch to FBRs.”India doesn’t have 50 per cent of theuranium it needs and the shortfall could become 70 per cent. The govern-ment had in 1983 estimated that by using 73,000 tonne of uraniumreserves, India could produce 10,000 MW of nuclear power till 2000. Till2005, the country could only produce 3,360 MW.1

Despite a major effort in uranium exploration, India has still not located, after 30 years, any reserves of good quality uranium. The esti-mated total quantity of uranium available (assured and probable)amounts to the energy equivalent of less than one per cent of India’s coalreserves. A really sizeable nuclear power programme could not be fuelledby the limited quantity of assured reserves.2

The ore at Jaduguda has just 0.06 per cent uranium content, buteven to get this bit mines have been dug 905 m below the surface. TheJaduguda mines, which were started in 1967, were supposed to last for15 years – but officials say they won’t abandon it for another 30 years.Spending Rs 200 crore, UCIL is extracting uranium from copper tailings

at four 100-year-old and closed copper mines at Surda and Rakha. Anestimated Rs 15,000 crore has been spent on all these mines. “It is definitely becoming extremely expensive as we dig deeper and deeperto extract less and less,” says P P Sharma, superintendent of geology,UCIL.

However, undeterred by these problems the government is deter-mined to generate 20,000 MW of nuclear power by 2020. “Aggressivelybuild capabilities and capacity in nuclear power to progressively raise itsshare in India’s fuel mix,” says the Tenth Five Year Plan that hawks formore nuclear energy. To achieve this, it suggests partial privatisation ofnuclear power generation and market financing for projects. And for thisit will extract uranium at any cost. As R Sreedhar, a former geologist withthe Atomic Mineral Division and now with Mines, Minerals and Peoplesays: “The government was never transparent in its acts and now it wantsto bypass the people for access to mines.”

India would need 5,00,000 MW of power by 2050. It has vast coalreserves, but there are doubts whether all of these can be mined. Thecountry’s hydrocarbon resources won’t last long and it will becomeeven more dependent on imports. India would have harnessed all its

Source: Richard Mahapatra et al 2004, ‘Red Alert’, Down To Earth, Societyfor Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 12, No 23, April 30

MAP: The uranium hotspotsCurrently, Jharkhand is India’s sole uranium supplier

Total reserves identified in India

Uranium: 90,000 tonne

Thorium: 3,60,000 tonne

Domiasiat, West Khasi Hills district, Meghalaya

ORE GRADE: 0.085 per centUJaduguda, East Singhbhum district, Jharkhand

ORE GRADE: 0.034-0.05 per centU

Bargarh district, Orissa

ORE GRADE: 0.067 per centU

Rajnandgaon district, Chhattisgarh

ORE GRADE: 0.04-0.1 per centU

Bastar district, Chhattisgarh

ORE GRADE: 0.067 per centU

Lambapur-Peddagattu, Nalgonda district, Andhra PradeshORE GRADE: 0.044 per cent

U

Gulbarga district, Karnataka

ORE GRADE: 0.010 per cent (mineralisation)UKottayam

Kollam

Kanyakumari

TiruneveliRamanathapuram

Visakhapatanam

Prakasam

Ganjam

m k

189


c m y k

hydroelectricity resources by 2050, and non-conventional energy isunlikely to be cost-effective. A mix of all these resources could help, butthe DAE feels that nuclear energy is the only solution which can fill thegap between demand and supply. The government agrees and hasdecided to cut the estimated 70 per cent contribution of coal-basedpower to 62 per cent by 2020 and compensate the shortfall throughnuclear stations.

The government wants that by 2050, nuclear reactors supply 25 per cent of India’s total power production. The DAE is sure that it can generate 10,000 MW of nuclear power by 2010 and 20,000 MW by 2020.Its confidence is based on an indigenous technology, which recycles spentfuel of thermal nuclear reactors to get plutonium for FBRs. The NuclearPower Corporation says it will generate 1,300 MW during the Tenth FiveYear Plan and 4,660 MW during the Eleventh Plan to make up for the first10,000 MW target within the next six years. But with no new mines, howis that possible?

Stage IIWhile the first stage of the nuclear programme is way behind scheduleand mired in controversies, the second stage seems to have more problems in store.

When the Union cabinet sat down on September 2, 2004 to approvethe construction of a 500 MW prototype fast breeder reactor inKalpakkam, the prime minister was warned that the country’s stockpileof plutonium was low. The nuclear programme’s second stage, which isto be powered by FBRs, will depend on the first stage reactors. But the trouble is that reactors of the first phase don’t produce enough plutonium.

The government planned that while producing 10,000 MW of elec-tricity, pressurised heavy-water (PHW) reactors of the first stage wouldalso yield about three tonne of plutonium each year. This plutoniumwould then enable the construction of FBRs of 1,000 MW capacities eachin the next decade. The cabinet has approved Rs 3,500 crore for the FBRprogramme, but the plan has a long way to go: the 500-MW Kalpakkamprototype reactor will only be commissioned in 2010 and plutonium forit has to be stocked from now. Within six months of the cabinet’sapproval for the prototype reactor, DAE secretary Anil Kakodkar proposed to build four more FBRs by 2020 to achieve the target of 20,000 MW nuclear energy.

FBRs would use less uranium more effectively, but the problem is thatthey are closely linked with the performance of conventional reactors.India’s 60,000 tonne of natural uranium deposits, which have a fissile uranium content of only 0.72 per cent, can at most generate 12,000 MWof power for 30 years. Moreover, anti-nuclear activists strongly opposefast breeder technology. They allege that FBRs are unsafe and have been discarded worldwide.

The prototype will be the world’s first to use a plutonium-uraniummixed carbide fuel. During the 1950s, sodium-cooled FBRs fascinatedthe West. These reactors were hyped as the ‘magical solution’ to theworld’s energy troubles. It didn’t turn out that way. More than US $20billion has been spent worldwide on building 11 plants. One of these,the Kalkar reactor in Germany, was completed in 1991 but never openedbecause of fears regarding accidents. Six of the other 10 reactors have

been shut. The Japanese Monju reactor, the latest, went critical in 1994but was shut down in 1995.

Crores spent, but power won’t be cheap. FBRs generally cost 50-100per cent more to build than PHW reactors and at least twice as much torun. Even if the DAE constructs the prototype reactor for Rs 3,000 crore,electricity would be expensive and cost between Rs 5 to Rs 10 per unit.Power sector experts say DAE’s capital cost estimate for the test reactor istoo low. The Russian BN-600 is the cheapest FBR since 1980, but the elec-tricity it produces costs about one-third more per megawatt than theDAE’s estimate for Kalpakkam. Compared to the latest US reactor of1980, the Kalpakkam FBR would cost Rs 22,000 crore. If the 1994 Japanesereactor Monju is used as the benchmark, the capital cost at Kalpakkamwould shoot up to Rs 46,000 crore.

Stage IIIUranium reserves almost over, with little plutonium, and chased away bypeople from digging new mines – India’s nuclear establishment is undertremendous pressure. By 2020, it has to prepare for the thorium-basedthird phase of the nuclear programme. If this doesn’t begin on time, theprogramme would turn out to be a colossal waste of national resources.Thorium, the government says, is a boon. Using its 3,00,000 tonne of thorium reserves, India can ensure energy for 400 years.

But the US, Germany, France, Japan, Russia, Canada and Brazil haveabandoned efforts to build thorium-based nuclear reactors after initialforays in the early 1960s. India, however, is not disheartened.The DAE hasbeen running an experimental reactor called Kamini at Kalpakkam sincethe mid-nineties and is now making plans for an advanced thorium-based reactor. A project report on setting up a 300-MW demonstrationplant, which will predominantly use thorium, is ready, says BBhattacharjee, director of BARC. The plant can be built in 10 years if theCentre approves the project, he says. BARC has also been developing anadvanced heavy water reactor for thorium fuel.

Starting from market funding of projects to external help in techno-logy, the government is now considering all options. Since the much-debated and high profile Indo-US joint statement on civilian nuclearcooperation, there has been a renewed interest in nuclear energy.From the perspective of Indian government, this would give new life to its nuclear programme that has been handicapped by limitations of technology and fuel.

“Public health can never be a violation of national interest.The loss ofcredibility in Jaduguda would keep on trailing the nuclear establishment,”says Sanghamitra Gadekar, a scientist who has studied the effects of theJharkhand mines on people.

“In the sixties, there was talk of nuclear plants producing up to 10,000MW of power by the eighties. But we have been able to reach just the3,000-MW mark. Let the government first account for the money it hasspent on atomic power projects over all these years,” says DhirendraSharma, who is an anti-nuclear activist and a former head of the sciencepolicy unit at Jawaharlal Nehru University in Delhi.

So, what’s the way out for India’s nuclear programme? Sorry, youcan’t suggest anything. It’s all secret.


190

c m y k

Karnataka’s mineral wealth is distributed more or less evenlyover its territory. The forest cover in the state comprises about

19 per cent of its total area: some of this area, such as the forests inthe Western Ghats and the Bellary-Hospet area, bear minerals –says the state government’s 2006 Karnataka Human DevelopmentReport (see Map 1: Karnataka – minerals and forests). Between 1980and 2005, around 7,558 ha of forest land in Karnataka wasdiverted for mining activities: this accounts for approximatelyeight per cent of the total forest land diverted for mining in India.1

Actually, the forest cover diversion would have been much higher as there are no records prior to 1980. According to the Stateof Environment Report 2003, prepared by the government ofKarnataka, a major chunk of the mine leases in some districts is in forest areas. For example, 38 per cent of mine leases inChitradurga, 66 per cent in Bellary and 96 per cent inChikamagualur districts are in forest areas.

According to the IBM, iron ore, gold, limestone and manganeseare the most important minerals produced in the state – in 2004-05,these minerals together accounted for 92 per cent of the mineralproduction in the state in terms of value.2 Karnataka has the largestiron ore reserves in India, 41 per cent, (see Table 1: Karnataka – mineral reserves) and accounted for 26 per cent of the iron ore production in the country in 2004-05.3

Karnataka is the sole producer of felsite in India, and a leadingproducer of gold, dunite and limeshell; in 2004-05, according to thestate’s official website, 99 per cent of the country’s gold, 43 per centof its dunite, and 65 per cent of its limeshell was mined here (see Table 2: Karnataka – mineral outputs).

The primary producers of iron ore in the state are based inBellary, the biggest being the National Mineral DevelopmentCorporation Limited (NMDC). Besides these, the Steel Authorityof India Limited (SAIL) has a base in Chikmagalur. Jindal SouthWest Steels Limited will come up in Toranagallu, Bellary district.

Gold in the state is extracted primarily by Bharat Gold MinesLimited (BGML), Hutti Gold Mines Limited (HGML) and DeccanGold Mines Limited (DGML). The biggest limestone producers inthe state are Associated Cement Companies Limited and GrasimCement, both of which are in Gulbarga district.

Rich uranium deposits have been found in Belgaum district bythe Department of Atomic Energy (DAE); currently, scientists ofthe Central Atomic Research Centre, Bhabha Atomic ResearchCentre and Tarapur Atomic Research Centre are exploring the site.

According to the IBM, the value of minerals extracted inKarnataka in 2004-05 was Rs 2,116 crore – which is approximatelythree per cent of the total value of mineral production in the coun-try.4 Of this, the value of minor minerals was around Rs 155 crore.5

The value of minerals in the state has increased by almost 50 percent in seven years: it was around Rs 1,012 crore in 1997-98.6

According to the IBM, Karnataka accounts for 23 per cent of the total value of metallic minerals extracted in the country.7

At just five per cent, the state’s share in the country’s total non-metallic mineral value is much lower.8

The royalty received by the Karnataka state government wasRs 84 crore, Rs 144 crore and Rs 211 crore respectively in 2002-03,2003-04 and 2004-05.9 In fact, revenues from mining accounted fora miniscule portion of the state’s total revenue – between 0.7-0.8per cent.10 Though this revenue has increased substantially overthe past few years, its contribution to the state’s total revenue hasconsistently remained low. Mining certainly has not contributed


Mineral Reserves Proportion of national (in million tonne) reserves (in per cent)

Iron ore-hematite 1,148.32 10.1

Iron ore-magnetite 7,883.85 73.8

Copper ore 34.40 2.57

Manganese 86.57 2.9

Chromite 1.87 10.5

Bauxite 44.98 1.5

Granite 9,571.93 2.5

Dolomite 5,352.39 7.6

Limestone 51,210.428 30.0

Gold ore 24.232577 13.1


TABLE 1: Karnataka – mineral reservesKarnataka has more than 40 per cent of India’s iron ore

Mineral 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 (p)

Iron ore (in '000 tonne) 24,797 31,635 37,176

Manganese (in tonne) 2,24,962 2,59,559 3,86,794

Chromite (in tonne) 19,194 12,425 11,638

Bauxite (in tonne) 28,835 48,403 68,323

Dolomite (in tonne) 1,72,778 2,22,550 2,80,256

Limestone (in '000 tonne) 12,144 13,047 12,897

Gold (in kg) 2,799 3,261 3,501


TABLE 2: Karnataka – mineral outputs Production of most minerals has been increasing


Karnataka and Maharashtra

191

MINING IN THE STATES: KARNATAKA AND MAHARASHTRA

c m y k

Protests: Sand, stone and iron ore have

been the cause of major protests

T A M I L N A D U

KE

RA

LA

G O A

AR

AB

IA

N

SE

A


AN

DH

RA

P

RA

DE

SH

K A R N A T A K A

Kabani

Kaveri FallsKaveri

NetravatiKrishnarajasagara

reservoir

Hemavati Shim

sha Arkav

ati

StanleyReservoir

BhavanisagarReservoir

Bhad

ra

Tunga Bhadrareservoir

Chik

i Hag

ari

Vara

da

Linganamakkireservoir

Jog falls

Kalinadi

Benj

i Hal

l

Malprabha

Ghatprabha

Tungabhadra

Krishna

Doni

Tungabhadrareservoir

Hag

ari

Bhima

Kagna

Bhima Bori

Bonithora

Nizam Sagar

Mullamari

TirnaManjra

Dudh Ganga

Panch Ganga

Papa

gni

Ch

arav

ati

Penn

eru

Limestone

Granite

Dolomite

Gold

Iron

Open forests

Dense forests

River

Manganese

Chromite

Bauxite

Building stone

Silica sand

Bangalorerural

Belgaum Bagalkot

Bijapur

Gulbarga

Raichur

Koppal

GadagDharwad

UttaraKannada Haveri

Bellary

Bidar

Davanagere

Chitradurga

Tumkur

UdupiChikmagalur

Tumkur

HassanDakshinaKannada

Kodagu

Mysore

Mandya

Bangalore

Kolar

Chamarajanagar

Shimoga

MAP 1: Karnataka – minerals and forests In the major mineral districts, the maximum number of mine leases have been granted in forest areas


significantly to the state’s growing economy; the informationtechnology sector has.

Iron ore and limestone contribute the most to the total royaltygenerated (see Table 3: Karnataka – mineral royalties). The contribu-tion of iron ore was low in 2002-03 (a little above six per cent), butit shot up to 32 per cent the next year, and increased further to 38per cent in 2004-05. But the contribution of limestone hasdecreased over the same period. Interestingly, though minor minerals contribute less than 10 per cent of the value of the mineral production, they accounted for more than 30 per cent ofthe royalties, indicating that the rate of royalties on minor mineral in Karnataka is far higher than the major minerals.

The IBM says that in 2004-05, 425 mine leases had been gran-ted in Karnataka for extracting major minerals.11 According to theState of Environment Report 2003 of the Karnataka government,

there were 5,650 quarry leases of minor minerals over an area of4,526 ha in December 2004. However, the total number of minesand the area under mining would be much higher, as the statedoes not account for leases in private land as per the Mysore LandRevenue Code 1888. Since 1998-99, there has been a fluctuatingtrend in the number of mining leases for major minerals in (see Graph 1: Karnataka – mining leases over the years).

According to the IBM, a total area of around 51,000 ha hadbeen leased out for mining till 2002-03, excluding fuel, atomic andminor minerals.12 In terms of area under mining, just four mine-rals – iron ore, limestone, gold and manganese – accounted formore than 75 per cent of the total area under mining in Karnataka(see Graph 2: Karnataka – area under mining). A large proportion of the mine leases are in the iron ore-rich Bellary district (see Graph 3: Karnataka – mining districts).

192


2002-03 2003-04 2004-05

Iron ore 6.4 32.2 37.8

Bauxite 0.2 0.1 0.1

Limestone 53.0 35.5 25.7

Dolomite 0.2 0.7 0.2

Manganese 0.1 0.3 0.6

Chromite 0.1 0.2 0.1

Gold 0.0 2.0 3.9

Others 0.9 1.0 1.1

Minor minerals 39.1 27.9 30.5

Source: Anon, 2006, ‘Annexure 7’, National Mineral Policy, Report of theHigh-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi

TABLE 3: Karnataka – mineral royaltiesA look at percentage contribution of minerals to the total royalty shows the resurgence of iron ore

Bagalkot7%

Bellary18%

Chikmagalur9%

Chitradurga10%

Gulbarga5%

Kolar11%

North Kanara11%

Tumkur5%

Others24%

Note: Excluding fuel, atomic and minor mineralsSource: Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases and Prospecting Licenses 2003,Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 13-15

GRAPH 3: Karnataka – mining districtsBellary is Karnataka’s most heavily mined district

Limestone 22.25Iron ore 27.15

Others 17.65

Copper 0.96

Chromite 1.94

China clay 1.74

Bauxite 0.17

Gold 12.33

Manganese 15.82

Note: Excluding fuel, atomic and minor mineralsSource: Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases and Prospecting Licenses 2003,Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 6

GRAPH 2: Karnataka – area under miningIron ore, limestone, manganese and gold account for morethan 75 per cent of the area under mining

513

514610

578

548

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03

Year

Tota

l no

. of

min

ing

leas

es g

ran

ted

Note: Excluding fuel, atomic and minor mineralsSource: Data collected from various publications of the Indian Bureau ofMines, Nagpur

GRAPH 1: Karnataka – mining leases over the yearsThe number shows some fluctuations

c m y k

193


The flashpoints

■ BELLARY: IRON COUNTRY

Bellary is the poster boy of the globalised Indian mining industry.It is an export hub – every day, thousands of tonne of manganeseand iron ore is exported from the district through Mangalore,Karwar, Goa and Chennai. It is rich in minerals: approximately 86per cent of Karnataka’s iron ore reserves are here, says the IBM.13

Much of these reserves are of high quality, with an iron contentranging from 62 to 68 per cent.14 For some years now, the Indianmining industry has been meeting the international iron oredemand – especially China’s seemingly insatiable appetite; Indiais China’s second largest supplier of iron ore and exported morethan 68 MT to that country in 2005-06.15

As the international demand for iron ore has increased, Bellaryhas risen handsomely to the challenge. And with good reason: theprofits have been enormous. A sudden rise in the global price ofIndian iron ore from US $17 a tonne in 2000-01 to US $55 a tonnein 2005-06 (it even reached an all-time high of US $83 a tonnebriefly in 2004)16 transformed the area into a mining giant respon-sible for nearly 20 per cent of the country’s iron ore production.17

Iron ore production in the district has gone up three-fold in thelast six years.18 For instance, the Vibuthiguda Mines increased pro-duction from 88,000 tonne in 2001-02 to 2,67,000 tonne in 2004-05.19

The district produces around 30 to 35 MT of ore annually, of whicharound 70 to 80 per cent is exported to China, Japan and Australia.20

Pakistan and Korea are also markets for Bellary’s mineral wealth.

Open-cast iron ore mining is spread over 18,000 ha in Bellary,Hospet and Sandur taluks of the district.21 Officially, the district hassome 99 mines, of which 58 are functioning.22 But the ground real-ity is different – more than 12,000 cases of illegal mining have beenreported since the year 2000.23 This phenomenon of a large numberof small mines privately owned by individuals is a legacy of theMysore Land Revenue Code 1888 (see Box: A code for landowners).

Illegal mining has been a huge drain on the state exchequer –estimates suggest that the Karnataka government lost Rs 3,000 croreto it between 2004 and 2006.24 In comparison, the government

c m y k

A code for landownersLeads to unregulated and unrestrained mining

The Mysore Land Revenue Code 1888 gave private landowners theinherent right to remove minor minerals and stones like granite fromtheir land without permission from the State. Therefore, in thesouthern part of Karnataka, any person who owns land can extractminor minerals. This Act is applicable only for privately-owned land– mining leases have to be obtained for government land. The government had challenged this Act in court, but it was upheld andthe Act remains in place.

The original purpose of this Act was to ensure that the land ismade more arable. However, this has led to completely unregulatedmining in parts of the state. Informal contracts exist betweenlandowners and mining companies: companies pay the landownersmoney in return for mining rights.

– B T Venkatesh, Mines, Minerals & People, Bangalore

In the red: rampant iron ore mining has completely destroyed the ecology of Bellary

M T

SH

IVK

UM

AR

earned a paltry Rs 80 crore as royalty from iron ore (at Rs 27 pertonne of iron ore) in 2005.25 This large-scale pilfering of Karnataka’smineral wealth has the patronage of the state administration, par-ticularly the forest department. Investigations of illegal mininghave exposed how officials of the forest department issue permitsillegally to transport mined ore from forest areas – by merely issu-ing ‘way permits’ which are meant for transporting forest producealready lifted from the forest area. The way permits are issued totransport material from dumping yards or any other place, wherethe miner stores the ore, after legally lifting them from the forest.

Reports on illegal mining have also found that officials allowthree to four days for transporting ore from Sandur-Hospet-Bellaryregion to Mangalore and Karwar ports, though the required periodfor transportation is only one day. This unduly long period is granted for facilitating more number of trips per permit. Also,many licensed mine owners have encroached upon the areasbeyond the boundaries of their mining area, and some also carryout mining activities at different locations – all of this in forest areas.

While large mining companies in Bellary-Hospet are expand-ing feverishly, smaller players are scrambling for all they can find.But unfortunately, amidst all this commotion, concerns aboutagriculture, ecology, human health and labour laws have taken aback seat (see Boxes: The little labourers of Bellary and Mines andmisery – the women miners of Bellary).

Private mining companies control almost 80 per cent of theland under lease for iron ore operations, with an average leasesize of 200 ha.26 The smallest of these private mines – four andfive-acre operations run by private landowners outside Hospet –are largely unregulated. Estimated to number 12,000, these ‘floatore’ mines – so called because workers dig by hand for smallquantities of iron ore that ‘float’ near the surface – are said to bethe region’s biggest thieves of iron ore. Small farmers ruined byyears of drought have cashed in on the boom by mining their agri-cultural farms themselves or contracting them out at Rs 62,500 to

Rs 75,000 a hectare.27 These mines have been the targets of theanti-mining lobby as they are responsible for some of the mostegregious violations of labour and environmental laws, includingchild labour and failure to manage waste or soil erosion.Practically none has mining permits or pays taxes.

Agriculture has been one of the worst sufferers of theunplanned mining expansion. “Over a period of time, the entirearea got covered in mine waste. Agricultural cultivation wasaffected. From banana, betel nut and paddy, there was a shift tojowar, millets and cotton. Now, even this is grinding to a halt,”says B T Venkatesh, an advocate who has studied unorganisedmining labour in the area. “Before 1990s, we used to get goodcrop. Now, with all this dust, we have to increase our use of fer-tilisers and still the yield is poor,” rues Jambumani Aryappa,tehsildar of Dhanapura, near Hospet.

Human health is, naturally, the casualty. Red Alert, a documen-tary made by non-governmental organisation (NGO) Sakhi basedin Hospet in Bellary district, records the health problems of mineworkers. “We always have stomach pain. With every gulp of tea,we take in dust,” laments a worker. The area has high incidence oflung infections, heart ailments and cancer. Complaints of air pollution are also common, but the Karnataka State PollutionControl Board (KSPCB) remains unmoved. “The only problem isdust during transportation, but there are no basic standards fixedand so we cannot take any action,” says KSPCB officer C M Satish.

Satish is right about the dust from transportation. Roughly7,500 trucks rumble along Bellary’s roads at any given time, most ofthem carrying far more than the 15-tonne load allowed by law.28

Years of such traffic has turned the area’s unpaved roads into crenu-lated strips of dirt so broken that Bellary’s wealthier residents –mostly mine owners – are purchasing helicopters to bypass them.

A 2002 study by the National Environmental EngineeringResearch Institute (NEERI), Nagpur, found suspended particulatematter at many locations in Sandur between 130 microgram per

194


c m y k

The little labourers of BellaryAt least 200,000 boys and girls work in the iron mines

Five-six year old Gangamma, Ishwaramma and Shekamma spendbetween six to eight hours a day hammering away through a pile of ironstock so that they can build up their pile of iron ore ‘lumps’. The pile atthe end of the day and the number of iron boxes they fill will determinehow much their families will earn. They are not the only ones.

Three-year-old Ramesh carries an iron box filled with iron orelumps on his head, this early induction into the world of mining andexploitation being part of his childhood. His load is not as heavy as the15 kg that all the other children carry up and down. Their backs andheads hurt, but as they tell themselves,“How can we complain?”

These are not ordinary jobs that these children do. Sitting hunchedover hot ferrous ore, chipping away steadily at heavy metal with a ham-mer is not exactly ‘child's play’. At its safest, it is painful for the shoul-ders, the back, the wrist joints and the arms while the little hands arecovered with bruises and blisters. At its most hazardous, it causes severe

injuries, maiming or death when heavy stones fall or the hammer inweary hands sometimes misses its aim.These children know no rest, noplay, no learning, nothing but the grim grind of a joyless existence.

Though illegal, child labour is common in Bellary’s ion ore mines

M T

SH

IVK

UM

AR

cubic metre (µg/m3) and 1,678 µg/m3.29 The maximum observedconcentration was 4,474 µg/m3, far above the ambient air qualitystandards.30 On its part, the KSPCB has neither found violations,nor issued any notice to any mine under the Air Act, 1981 or theWater Act, 1974.

Studies point at siltation in the Tungabhadra reservoir due tomining activities. “The total capacity of the reservoir was 133thousand million cubic metre (tmc), but now it is only 99 tmc. Therest has been destroyed by silt,” says Virupaksha Naik of JagrathaNayaka Balaga, an NGO based in Bellary.31 Another problem isthat the clamour for exports leaves a very small percentage of ironore for the domestic market. “Even Jindal, Kalyani and Kirloskarsteel plants are beginning to feel the pinch, because they are notgetting adequate raw material,” says S S Hiremath, deputy director, Department of Mines and Geology (DoMG).

Mining has also negatively impacted the Vysankere forest andthe Bellary reserve forest by fragmenting them. The dumping ofwaste material has caused a loss of topsoil in Bellary forest, butthe forest department is not too ruffled. “This is a dry zone forest.With god’s grace, we have lots of iron. We are compensated for theland and given money for afforestation,” says deputy forest conservator Manoj Kumar Shukla. But many in the area stillremember the mining belt as a forest area. Venkatesh points out

that while the district is dry, this area receives the highest rainfallof around 900 millimetre.32

Labourers work for as low as Rs 7 for a basket of brokenstones.33 “Despite their abject poverty, health status and workingconditions, their employment is touted as a sign of development,”points out A Bhagyalakshmi, member of a fact-finding committeeon child labour in the region, set up by Mines, Minerals andPeople, a coalition of NGOs working on mining issues.

Based on NEERI’s environmental impact assessment, theUnion ministry of environment and forests had directed the stategovernment to ensure that new mining leases are considered onlyif the area concerned is over five ha and a detailed report about itis available from the IBM.34 Small mines, less than five ha, damage the environment and do not come under the Mines andMinerals Development and Regulation Act, 1957.35 The state government was also asked to identify common dumping areasfor mine waste and carry out a detailed groundwater study.Neither of the instructions was followed. But the DoMG hascalled for a check on grant of leases in Hospet.

Aided by the iron ore money, many mine owners contested the2004 elections and became legislators. With mining interests andpolitical clout joining hands, it is now widely believed that onlylegislative changes can save the region from unbridled mining.

195


c m y k

Mines and misery: the women miners of BellaryWhile some in Bellary have prospered, its women minersremain in their pitiable state

The sun rarely peeps through the lingering dust clouds, as the womenwork for more than 10 hours a day for meagre wages. This is Bellary.

Mining in a district which had been suffering from a continuousdrought for three-four years, did help recover its economy. Lifestyleschanged, but the condition of women labourers working in the mineshas remained unchanged.

More than 20,000 women work in Bellary's unregulated mineswithout any safety measures. They are mainly engaged in activities likeunloading, stone crushing, and loading the ore on to tippers and goods wagons. Drought, poverty and illiteracy have pushed them into this dangerous occupation. They are forced to work beyond workhours even in advanced stages of pregnancy. They have no leave orcreche facilities and are always under threat of being thrown out. Insome of the quarries, women are forced to work at night and are oftensexually abused. Most of these women have health problems. Theirchildren suffer too as they are left at the quarrying sites while theirmothers are working. The wages are a pittance: while the men are paidRs 35-40, women are paid somewhere between Rs 25-30. Womenengaged in loading the ore are paid only Rs 18.

There have been several cases of people selling their propertybecause of the severe drought and poverty, and going to work in themines.“I sold my two acres of land for Rs 35,000 per acre. Now I amworking here. It is a very difficult job. My face starts itching and I feellike vomiting. I can’t have food,” says Malligavva of Karigallu village.One can find thousands of Malligavvas in the mines.

According to an official report, there are 5,432 permanent labourers and more than two lakh unorganised labourers working inthe mines. Nearly 35 per cent of this unorganised workforce consists of women. Karnataka is one of states that leads in hiring women inmining – accounting for 11 per cent of the total women employed in mining.

Right to education, food and employment or better infrastructureis only a dream for these women. Local labour unions, which only dothe bidding of politicians (many of whom are the mine owners), havenever paid attention to the pathetic conditions of the women workersin the mines.

– M T Shivkumar, CSE media fellow, Bangalore

More than 20,000 women toil in Bellary’s unorganised mines

M T

SH

IVK

UM

AR

196


c m y k

Red runs the Bhadra: iron mining and related activities have given an unearthly hue to the river waters

M T

SH

IVK

UM

AR

■ WESTERN GHATS: KUDREMUKH TANGLE

Chikmagalur is yet another district rich in iron ore. Located in the forested Western Ghats, the story of mining here is different from Bellary’s. For one, extensive mining in the district has a much longer history. The Kudremukh Iron OreCompany Limited (KIOCL) started mining in the area way backin 1979. Secondly, the sheer ecological fragility of the mining area is an issue: KIOCL is located in an extremely biodiversity-rich forest region, notified as a national park, and having a ‘protected’ status. But probably the most distinguishing featureof mining in Chikmagalur has been the way the livelihood-and-environment debate has played out (see Box: Livelihood versus environment).

One of the biggest casualties of iron ore mining in theWestern Ghats has been the river Bhadra. The KIOCL has beenmining on an area of 4,604 ha right in the middle of the catch-ment area of the river (see Map 2: Mining in the Bhadra catch-ment).36 The topographic and rainfall characteristics of theregion, combined with the open-cast mining activities, road-building and other land surface disturbances caused by KIOCL’s

operations have resulted in high sediment discharges in theBhadra river system.

As early as 1985, the state government had expressed con-cerns over the impacts of mining on water quality in the Bhadrariver. Several studies were commissioned to assess the impacts –among them were the 2001 assessment by the Centre forEcological Sciences of the Indian Institute of Science (IISc),Bangalore and a 2002 study jointly undertaken by the Bangalore-based Centre for Wildlife Studies (a non-profitable charitabletrust researching on wildlife conservation issues), and theAshoka Trust for Research in Ecology and the Environment(ATREE), an organisation working on biodiversity issues. Whilethe IISc study pointed out that large-scale deforestation hadresulted in an increased flow of silt and iron ore tailings into theBhadra reservoir, the 2002 study used both secondary as well asmonsoon data to confirm that the sediment load in the Bhadrahad dramatically increased as a result of mining (see Graph 4 onpage 198: Waste overload in the Bhadra). Moreover, it also provedthat less than six per cent of the entire Bhadra catchment (com-prising the KIOCL mining site) was by far the major contributorto sediment loads in the river.37 The contribution of this small

197


c m y k

Right BankCanal

Lakkavalli

Shimoga

Bhadra TigerReserve

Bhadra Dam

Gangamoda

Lakya Dam

KIOCL miningarea

KalasaKudremukhNational Park

Bha

drav

ati

Bhad

rariv

er

Left BankCanal

Streams

Catchmentarea bounary

Source: J Krishnaswamy et al, 2002, Impact of Iron Ore Mining in Kudremukh onBhadra River Ecosystem, Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology and theEnvironment (ATREE), Bangalore

MAP 2: Mining in the Bhadra catchment Run-offs from the mines fall directly into the river

Livelihood versus environment In India, environmental issues cannot possibly be seen inisolation from livelihoods: this is illustrated by battlezoneKudremukh

Environmental concerns have shrouded iron mining by KIOCL foryears. However, concerns over employment added another dimen-sion to the issue of mining in the ecologically-rich Kudremukh val-ley, competing with protests over environmental damage. As theprotests against ecological damage grew, and as demands for closureof mining activities gathered steam, the company's workers opposedthe impending retrenchment.

For a long time, the company’s management, confident that itwould be able to stave off any closure proposals, did nothing to lookfor alternative mining sites – instead, it spent all its energies lobby-ing for continuing mining. The alternatives included moving themining operations to Sandur (in Bellary district) or Ongole (AndhraPradesh), but the company claimed that these plans were not prac-tical, and too expensive.

The Kudremukh valley was also one of the battlefields betweenconservationists and sustainable livelihood groups. The issue wasdisplacement of the local inhabitants in the name of conservation.When mining was stopped by declaring the area as a national park,bodies such as the Kudremukh Rastriya Udayana Virodhi Vakoota(KRUVV) and a number of local groups which had been campaign-ing against iron ore mining in the region, stoutly resisted the forma-tion of the park since it will lead to the large-scale relocation of for-est dwellers. Leo F Saldanha, coordinator, Environmental SupportGroup, observed: “Disenchantment is high among forest dwellers.They first fought against the mining company and now they arebeing ousted from the habitation which is rightfully theirs.”

sub-catchment to the total load entering the reservoir in 1985 and1986 was estimated to be 53 and 67 per cent, respectively.Sediment loading since the beginning of mining in the early ‘80s(measured at Malleswara) increased successively from 1,197tonne in 1984 to 49,429 tonne in 1986.

Another the major problem created by KIOCL was the dispo-sal of waste tailings. The company had made a 100-metre dam

across the Lakya, a tributary of the Bhadra river, for disposal oftailings. A discharge or overflow from the dam would directlyenter into the river – as was the case when the Lakya wasbreached in 1992.

Opposition to KIOCL’s activities has built up over the years –from environmentalists who were concerned about the threat tothe region’s flora and fauna, to farmers who were affected by thepollution of the streams that originated in the mining area.Farmers complained of decline in agricultural productivitydownstream due to deposition of mine tailings,” P Sankaran,writing for the website of India Together quotes a fact-sheet puttogether by the Environment Support Group (ESG), a Bangalore-based non profit organisation involved in research and advocacyon environmental and social justice issues.38 Communities com-plained of increased sickness and disease due to pollution of theriver. Farmers said that paddy yield had declined from 50 quin-tals to 30 quintals a hectare because of the accumulation of siltand waste tailings in the fields. Sankaran also quotes a farmer ofNellibeedu: “Every monsoon, the water brings with it silt andtailings. These solidify and harden in summer. Nothing grows onthe field.”

Mining by KIOCL in the Kudremukh valley ended after anepic struggle by environmentalists and other civil society groups(see Box: Struggle saga). The area was declared a National Park.But the fact remains that an unprecedented effort by various agen-cies, including the media, was required to achieve this. TheKIOCL experience protecting environmental concerns will alwaysbe a long haul.

198


c m y k

60000

40000

20000

01984 1985 1986 2002

Malleswara Nellibeedu

Sed

ime

nt

loa

d (

ton

ne

s)

Source: J Krishnaswamy et al, 2002, Impact of Iron Ore Mining in Kudremukhon Bhadra River Ecosystem, Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology and theEnvironment, http://www.wcsindia.org/sedimentreport.pdf, as viewed on April25, 2007

GRAPH 4: Waste overload in the BhadraSediment load has increased by almost 58 times between1984 and 2002

Struggle sagaAn account of the battle to save Kudremukh

KIOCL started mining operations on an area of 4,604 ha.1 The inhab-itants around the Kudremukh National Park (KNP) witnessed years ofmindless mining and consequent loss of habitat – and then waged arelentless battle against the public sector undertaking, in what hasbecome one of India’s most poignant stories of ecological destructionand peoples’ protest.

The large-scale resistance followed the mining company’s refusalto relinquish its hold despite the expiry of its initial lease in 1999amidst a prior notification declaring Kudremukh as a national parkwith a total area of about 60,032 ha.2 When KIOCL asked for an exten-sion of lease for the next 20 years and demanded inclusion of freshland around the Gangamoola area for mining, prominent environmen-tal groups like the Karkala-based Kudremukh Wildlife Foundation,Bangalore’s Wildlife First!, Wildlife Conservation Society andEnvironment Support Group along with the Belthangady-basedNagarika Seva Trust and Parisarasaktara Okkuta took the contentiousissue to the Supreme Court (SC). The Delhi-based Legal Action forWildlife and Environment (LAW-E), and K M Chinappa, trustee ofWildlife First! filed an application in the Court in 2001 contending thatmining in the protected area was illegal.

Following this, the Court issued notices to the Union and state

governments and KIOCL to file an affidavit as to why mining was beingallowed inside a national park. This forced the state government in June2001 to issue a final notification of the park covering 53,600 ha area, thusprotecting the Gangdikal and Nellibeedu regions from mining.3 Themove was hailed as a great victory by most wildlife NGOs, but also camein for condemnation as in the same notification, 3,700 ha of forest landwas excluded from the national park to facilitate continuation of miningby KIOCL in the already broken area of Kudremukh.

The SC, in its ruling on October 30, 2002, ordered the company tostop all mining activities inside KNP by 2005-end. While giving thisorder, the three-member bench consisting of then Chief Justice B N Kirpal, Justice Y K Sabharwal and Justice Arijit Pasayat rapped theUnion and Karnataka governments.The bench pointed out that the twohad changed their stances in the case like a chameleon changes colour.The verdict criticised them for “not applying their mind”while adopting“an inconsistent stand”on the renewal of mining lease to the company.

Frantic attempts were made by the company as well as theKarnataka government to ensure that mining operations continue,including applying for fresh leases for slope stabilisation – and theretrenchment of KIOCL’s employees was one of the major argumentsput forward to convince everyone that mining should continue in theGhats. But the Court was firm, and mining finally ended.

– Binayak Das, Down To Earth, New Delhi

■ THE LURE OF STONE AND SAND

Stone quarrying and mining is big business in Karnataka. Next tothe capital city of Bangalore, illegal stone quarrying is happeningat as many as 30-40 sites within one kilometre of theBannerghatta National Park – much to the ire of local residentsand environmentalists.39 Quarrying began on a small scale wayback in 1983, and assumed large-scale proportions by the turn ofthe century. For the locals, apart from noise and vibrations fromthe periodic blasts, the dust generated from quarrying is the baneof their existence. Local vegetation is suffering. Livestock thatfeed on the vegetation fall ill with various diseases. Yields of food crops like ragi and maize have fallen drastically. There is amarked increase in reported cases of tuberculosis and skin diseases amongst the local residents.

Illegal quarrying is not restricted to Bannerghatta. It is rampant in other parts of the state too – Kanakapura,Ramanagar, Channapatna, Chamrajanagar, Yelandur, Kollegal,Gundalpet, Hungund, Bagalkot, Badami, Gouribidanur,Gudibanda, Chintamani, Bagepalli, Hospet, Kudligi, Sandur,Koppal, Yelburga, Kushtagi, Sadam, Chincholi, Chitapur, Tiptur,Turuvekere, Chikkanayakanahalli, Molakalmur, Challakere,Jagalur, Bailhongal, Gotak, Soudatti, Ramdurga and Kengeri areall hot spots of illegal quarrying.40

Another area that has witnessed heavy mining for stone (in this case, granite) is Kollegal. The Kollegal forests, immor-talised by the late brigand Veerappan, are not only famous forsandalwood, but also for their abundant black granite. The forestsare a treasure house of biological riches – valuable plant speciesand wildlife (including some of Asia’s largest elephant herds).

One hundred twenty-five quarries have come up in the taluk –and these are having a huge impact on the local biodiversity.Locals also claim that quarrying has depleted groundwatersources in the region.41

Kollegal is unfortunately not alone – quarrying has also devastated forests in the B R Hills in Yelandur as well as inBhadravati.42 Mining for laterite is rampant in several forest areasin Sirsi taluk.43

Illegal sand mining on river bed is also a big issue inKarnataka (see Box: The sands of Tungabhadra). Leader of theOpposition in the zilla panchayat Panchappa Kalburgi recentlyalleged that illegal sand mining was going on unabated in theBhima riverbed with the tacit blessings of officials. Even though,it was decided at least two times in the Karnataka DevelopmentProgramme meetings that height restriction frames will be fixedon bridge-cum-barrages across the Bhima to prevent illegallymined sands to be smuggled into Maharashtra. However, evenafter eight months, the frames had not been fixed.

199


c m y k

The sands of TungabhadraSand mining is destroying the river

Farming land as godowns for sand? This is the bank of theTungabhadra. The beleaguered river – a source of water for severalhuge paper mills and dumping ground for their effluents – is also thesite for rampant illegal sand mining, which has been prohibited, butcontinues unabated.1 Many farmers have stopped farming and taken to sand mining as an alternative livelihood to escape from recurrent droughts in the region. Roads, unable to cope with the extraload of trucks, have deteriorated. Groundwater sources have beenaffected, but the mining continues. According to the state government,on an average, almost nine lakh tonne of sand is mined every year in the state.2

According to a study by the Department of AgriculturalEconomics, Bangalore, which compared sand mining and non-sandmining areas in the Uttara Pinakini river basin in Karnataka, there isa high rate of failure of irrigation wells (46 per cent) in the case ofsand-mined areas compared to non-mined areas (29 per cent). Thesame pattern is observed in filter point wells; about 68 per cent werenot functioning in sand-mined areas.

In non-sand mining areas, the proportion of non-functioningfilter point wells was 23 per cent. Clearly, as the filter point wellsclose to sand mining areas are of shallow depth (30-35 ft), they aremost affected due to sand mining done at a depth of 25-30 ft. Thestudy found that as the distance from the river increased, the rate ofwell failure went down, although in each case, more failures wereobserved in case of sand mining areas (see Graph: Wells undone).

Due to the poor groundwater recharge, farmers’ incomes have suffered. The same study found that the net returns of farmers in thesand mining area was 28 per cent lower than that in the non-sandmining area.

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0

Pro

po

rtio

n o

f w

ell

fa

ilu

re

0-30 30-120 120-1500

Distance from stream

Sand mining area Non-sand mining area

Source: M G Chandrakanth et al, Whither Groundwater? Negative exter-nalities due to sand mining in India, Department of Agricultural Economics,GKVK, UAS, Bangalore

GRAPH: Wells undoneExcessive sand mining adversely affects groundwaterrecharging, which is reflected in increased number ofwell failures

■ GULBARGA: FARMLANDS, WASTELAND

Karnataka accounts for 30 per cent of the country’s limestonereserves, and 10 per cent of the total land leased out for mininglimestone.44 Gulbarga is the hub of these reserves. Unlike the ironore-rich districts of Chikmagalur and Bellary – also rich in forestsand wildlife – Gulbarga is predominantly agricultural. Apart from three massive limestone mines (operated by Wadi CementWorks, Rajashree Cement and Vasavadatta Cement), some smallones, as well as several small quarries and crushing units dot thelandscape.

Most limestone mines in the area propose to reclaim mined-out land as reservoirs. They have, however, not taken sufficientsteps to ensure proper reclamation. In other words, what is beingplanned for as the ultimate use of the quarried land is deep pitsfilled with water – not water reservoirs. Also, most mines do nothave a community-based vision of how the water in the reservoirwill be ultimately used, even if rainwater does get stored. Forinstance, some mines plan to develop the reservoirs as touristspots, complete with lakes and boating facilities.

Consider the situation in Gulbarga district few decades from now. The river Kagina, a tributary of the Bhima, flows in theregion, and is the main source of water for the predominantlyagrarian communities in the area. According to a study conductedby Green Rating Project of Centre for Science and Environment(CSE), all the three huge plants are going to create massive pitsextending over many hectares of land. Rajashree Cement, forinstance, has already created quarries over 80 ha of the land sinceit started mining in 1984. The pits are as deep as 60 m. All three

plants claim in their mine closure plans that the pits will ulti-mately be filled with rainwater. Rajashree Cement and WadiCement Works, between them, are planning to create reservoirsextending over 1,013 ha. Rajashree Cement and VasavadattaCement want to build tourist spots near the artificial lakes theyhope will be created, and Wadi Cement Works doesn’t have anyclear plans of how the water will be utilised.

Considering the fact that before mining began in the area, theland was being used in a variety of ways by local communities, sucha change in land use pattern is an extremely poor deal for the com-munities. That’s the future – in the present, noise and vibrationsfrom the blasting and a sense of disenchantment over unemploy-ment and the poor compensation packages is nearer to their minds.

Take for instance, Injepalli village: within the lease area ofVasavadatta Cement, it’s a good example of the battering thatblasting can bestow on the local community. The cracks caused inthe houses are so severe that they are no longer safe to live in.Many residents have shifted to nearby villages of Batgera (K) andBatgera (Gate), which, incidentally, are also suffering from thesame problem. Currently, around 300 people live in Injepalli. Theyare very poor, and the compensation amount offered by the man-agement is not sufficient to enable them to purchase houses else-where. Negotiations over the details of the relocation package aregoing on between the management and the villagers.

Large-scale limestone mines, together with the many stonequarries, have already had a huge impact on Gulbarga’s land-scape and landuse patterns, but the real impacts will probably beseen in the future, when the plants shut down, and the meagreemployment provided by the plants will disappear.

200


c m y k

Large-scale limestone mining in Gulbarga by cement plants has encroached upon agricultural land in a big way

RAM

YA V

ISH

WA

NA

THA

N /

CSE

201


c m y k

Mining in MaharashtraSeventh highest contributor to the total mineral value, thestate is a major coal producer

About 19 per cent of Maharashtra’s geographical area is potentiallymineral-bearing.1 The key regions are in and around Nagpur,Chandrapur, Bhandara, Kolhapur, Raigad, Sindhudurg and Thane, andthe major minerals are coal, limestone, bauxite, manganese ore, silicasand and laterite. The Ratnagiri coast contains sizeable deposits of illimenite. Undersea oil deposits were discovered near Mumbai in the1970s.

Most of the minerals in Maharashtra are found in areas which are rich in forests (see Map: Maharashtra – minerals and forests). Forinstance, the mineral-rich district of Chandrapur is home to denseforests. According to official estimates, about 4,057 ha of forest landhad been leased out for mining operations between 1980-2005.2 This

would mean that 25 per cent of mine leases in Maharashtra were onforest land.3 The state accounts for four per cent of the total forest land diverted for mining in the country.4 There is no data available,however, on how much area may have been destroyed through illegalmining, which is rampant.

In 2004-05, more than four per cent of the total value of minerals(excluding atomic minerals) produced in the country was contributedby Maharashtra, says the IBM.5 Barring a slump in 1999-00, the mineral industry has been growing consistently. The value of mineralproduction has gone up by 35 per cent in seven years – from Rs 2,715crore in 1997-98 to Rs 3,356 crore in 2004-05.6 The growth in the min-eral industry, however, has been gradual: there has been no majorinvestment and, therefore, no sudden surge in mineral value. The statehas not gone on a mining overdrive as in the case of Orissa, perhapsbecause it does not have extensive reserves of iron ore or bauxite, twominerals that have drawn major investments in recent years.

Daman

Protests: Coal and stone quarries are

facing most protests

G O A


CHHATTISGARH

AR

AB

IA

N

SE

A

Wain

gan

ga

BhimaDoni

Krishna

Bhima

Koyna reservoir

Tirna

Ghatprabha

Bonithora

Panch Ganga

Dudh Ganga

Ghod

Mula

Pravara

GodavariDudhana

PengangaPurna

Sina

Manjra

Manar

Aran

Bembla

Mu

n

Purna

Wardha

Wun

naWardha

Wain

gan

ga

Pen

ch

Kanhan

Girha

TapiKundi

Gal

Tapi

Panjhara

Narmada

Ukni reservoir

NizamSagar

PengangaIn

dra

vati

Ko

lri

Ban

dia

Bid

Nandurbar

DhuleJalgaon

Nashik

Thane

Mumbai(Suburban)

Mumbai

Raigarh

Pune

Ahmadnagar

Aurangabad

Jalna

Buldana Akola

Amravati

YavatmalWashim

Hingoli

Parbhani

Nanded

Osmanabad

Solapur

Latur

Satara

Sangli

Ratnagiri

Kolhapur

Sindhudurg

Gadchiroli

Chandrapur

GondiaBhandaraNagpur

Wardha

Dadra &Nagar Haveli

Daman& Diu

G U J A R A T

M A D H Y A P R A D E S H

ANDHRA PRADESH

K A R N A T A K A

Open forests

Dense forests

River

Bauxite

Copper

Iron

Magnesite

Coal/lignite

Dolomite

Limestone

Mica

Silica sand


MAP: Maharashtra – minerals and forests The state has 25 per cent of its mine leases on forest land

202


c m y k

According to the IBM’s data, coal is the key mineral for the state interms of value, contributing as much as 84 per cent of the total mineral value.7 The next highest contribution is from minor minerals –nine per cent – which are important for the state (see Graph: The top grossers). This matches the country’s, where minor minerals accountfor about 10 per cent of the nation’s total mineral value. The other contributors are manganese ore (3.5 per cent), bauxite (0.9 per cent) andlimestone (three per cent).8

Most major minerals such as limestone, bauxite, fireclay and coal inthe state showed an upward swing in production over 2003-04.Maharashtra is also a significant contributor to the country’s total produc-tion of manganese and shale, accounting for 24 and 21 per cent respec-tively.9 The state was the sole producer of corandum in 2004-05. Besides,the state also accounts for nine per cent of coal and 12 per cent of thebauxite produced in the country.10

Though Maharashtra is among the top 10 contributors to the totalmineral value of the country, the mining industry does not do much forthe economy of the state. The revenue collected by the Maharashtra government from the industry in the form of royalty accounts for only oneper cent of the total revenue receipt of the state.11 The mineral industrygenerated Rs 570 crore in 2004-05, which is an increase of 45 per centfrom 2002-03.12 At the same time, the contribution of the industry to thetotal revenue of the state went down marginally – this indicates that though the mining industry is growing, the other segments of theeconomy are growing better.

There were about 220 mining leases in the state, excluding minorminerals and coal, in 2002-03.13 If the number of coal mines is assumedto be the same as the number of mining leases, then there were 270 leasesin the state the same year.14 As per IBM data, mining industry occupied

an area of about 15,988 ha till 2002-03.15 Both the number of mine leases and area under mining increased over the period 1995-2001, butdropped suddenly in 2002-03. Mine sizes (area per mine lease) remainedmore or less constant in the initial years, but shot up in 2000-02 beforedipping gradually. This could probably be due to coming into operation oflarge mines in the particular year.

The average landholding per mine lease area is around 69 ha perlease.16 This indicates that the state has more numbers of medium- tosmall-sized mines. This is expected, since it is an important producer oflow-valued minerals such as shale, sand and quartz.

The IBM’s Bulletin of Mining Leases and Prospecting Licences 2003points out that besides coal, a major chunk of the mining leases has beengranted for limestone, followed by manganese ore and silica.

A district-wise analysis of the leases granted shows thatSindhudurg has the maximum number (53), followed by Nagpur (46).However, in terms of area occupied by these mine leases, Chandrapuris the most mined district, followed by Kolhapur. Chandrapur leads asit is home to a number of large captive limestone mines of the state’scement industry.

The IBM lists INDAL (Indian Aluminium Company Ltd), AssociatedCements Company Ltd, UltraTech Cement Ltd, Manganese Ore (India)Ltd, Esmo Minechem Industry, Kasarda Co-operative Mining Society Ltd,among others, as the key mining companies in Maharashtra. Apart fromthese, the Central Coalfields (subsidiary of Coal India Ltd) also operatesmines in the coal-bearing districts of the state.

Burden of miningLike all other regions of the country, the state is experiencing the ill effectsof mining – destruction of forests, poor air quality and illegal mining.

In recent years, the main issue facing Maharashtra has been manag-ing its unorganised mining sector, especially sand mining and stone quarries. Sand mining and stone quarrying – a lot of it illegal – have beenthe bane of Maharashtra. Sand mining along the Kihim beach and Panvelriver has led to noise and dust pollution. One of the earliest stone quarries was at the Uttan-Dongri area of Thane district, which is now suffering due to indiscriminate mining.17 The local people had leddemonstrations against the increasing number of stone quarries in thearea, which were leading to acute water shortage, environmental pollu-tion and crop failures. Several trees failed to flower and local wells driedup. The quarrying was carried out unscientifically in vertical strips ratherthan horizontal, increasing run-off, loosening root support for trees andchoking underground aquifers. Some of the hills were cut to almost halftheir size for extracting black stone.

Quarrying activities have also been going on in districts likeMatheran, Thane, Powai and Chandivali. In Matheran, illegal and secretmining of red laterite rock had created a stir in 1998.18 Mining had beengoing on in the area for almost a year before residents discovered it. Bythen, the quarry had stretched half-a-kilometre downhill from the KhojaSanatorium. Matheran residents believed that the stones from the quarrywere being used for the big hotels that had come up in the area. At Powai,quarrying has brought misery to the residents of the area by spoiling thelake and affecting the environment. Another worry here has been theproximity of the quarrying site to an Indian Air Force base.

Minor minerals 8.7%

Bauxite 0.9%

Limestone 2.7% Manganese ore 3.5%

Iron ore 0.10%

Coal 83.8%

Others 0.3%

Source: Based on data from anon, 2006, ‘State Review’, Indian MineralsYearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 11-56

GRAPH: The top grossersCoal accounts for 84 per cent of the total mineral value

203


c m y k

The stone quarrying industry employs about 40-50 lakh workers inMaharashtra. Being unorganised, it offers no special legal provisions toprotect the interests of workers, who live in dire conditions with no basicamenities like drinking water, electricity or health services. The industryalso employs a large number of women and children.

In 2002, the state government passed a resolution for setting up the‘Maharashtra Mining Development Fund’ (MMDF) for mining-affectedareas. The objective was to provide financial assistance for roads, drinkingwater, health services, electricity and environment. The most serious issuewas the ‘right to safe drinking water’. Stone quarry workers at Wagholi village in Pune had demanded drinking water under the MMDF, but thegovernment chose to ignore the demand under some pretext or the other.Instead, it decided to allot the entire money for the next five years fordeveloping roads. On top of that, the state government also waived off the10 per cent contribution to the fund from companies.

In April 2005, Santulan, an NGO working for the rights of these workers, filed a PIL in the Mumbai High Court. The demand: provision ofwater under MMDF. The judgement was in favour of the people and theNGO, and the state was forced to complete the public water scheme inNovember 2006. What is important to note here is that the workers hadto take a legal recourse for the provision of as basic an amenity as water.

The state government recently discovered that bauxite was being

mined illegally from a 3,000-ha area in Satara, which had been reservedfor windmills. The minister of state for mines, Dasharath Hande, who visited the site, found that considerable digging had already taken placeand high-quality mineral was being ferried away. The site is estimated tohave 40 MT of bauxite valued at Rs 1,150 crore. The land had beenrequested by the Maharashtra Energy Development Agency from themines department for a windmill project, with a written assurance that nobauxite would be mined from the site.19

The Chandrapur belt, which has rich deposits of coal, is also facingthe woes of industrialisation and development. The area has as many as29 coal mines – 15 open-cast mines and 14 underground mines. Fed upwith the air pollution from the operations of the coal mines, increasedvehicular traffic, and thermal power stations, the locals approached thestate and the Central governments. Their demand was to ban coal mining by Western Coalfields Limited in their area. People complainedof high incidence of respiratory diseases after the operation of the coalmines.

A petitions committee was formed by the Lok Sabha in 2003 to lookinto these complaints. The committee sought response from the Unionministry of environment and forests (MoEF) and commissioned studies toassess the health impacts. Studies were conducted by the GovernmentMedical College, Nagpur, Government Medical College Chandrapur andDistrict Health Officer (DHO). While the first two reports rubbished thecomplaints of the people, the district health officer’s study did reporttuberculosis, bronchitis, pneumonia and eye diseases. However, the DHOadded that these cases could not be only attributed to pollution from coalmines and the cause needs to be ascertained.

The Petitions Committee recommended carrying out a comprehen-sive health study in the Chandrapur district. It also recommended thatlocal people and NGOs should be involved in various schemes/programmes meant for pollution control in the area to ensure their betterimplementation.

The Chandrapur belt also houses a number of cement plants –Gujarat Ambuja’s Maratha Cement Works, UltraTech’’s Awarpur Unit andBirla Group’s Manikgarh Cements – all within a radius of five km. Thisregion faces extreme shortages of water, and the common complaint ofthe locals is that mining on such a large scale and the cement plant’s oper-ations have lowered the groundwater in the area. Villagers of NaokhariKhurd, which is two km from Manikagarh’s limestone mines, complainedthat the hand pumps were not working due to lowering of the water table.Villagers of Bibigaon, 3.2 km from UltraTech’s Awarpur unit, also com-plained of water shortage which is affecting their agriculture.The villagersmentioned that though the unit had constructed a number of borewells inthe region, most of them now do not yield any water. There were similarcomplaints from villagers of Sonapur, located just 1.5 km from GACL’sMaratha Unit. On their part, the companies have indicated that thedecline in groundwater is because of low rainfall and not because of theiroperations.

The state, thankfully, is not witnessing large-scale protests againstmining and mineral-based industries at the same scale as in the case ofOrissa or Chhattisgarh. However, if the current trend of environmentaldegradation continues, the people may initiate protest movements toblock mining and its related industries.

The Chandrapur belt is facing water crunch due to the presence ofcement companies and limestone mines

NIV

IT K

UM

AR

YAD

AV

/ C

SE

204

The mineral histories of Kerala and Tamil Nadu have theirdistinctive characteristics, but what binds the two south Indian

states is their common blight: sand mining. Ecology and liveli-hoods in both the states are severely threatened by inscrupulousminers who are turning the region’s riverbeds and coasts upsidedown (see Map: Kerala and Tamil Nadu – the mineral reserves).

Of the two states, Kerala is a relatively small player when itcomes to minerals: it contributed only 0.3 per cent of the total mineral value produced in the country in 2004-05, with its produce valued at only Rs 257 crore. Minor minerals represented55 per cent of this value (see Graph 1: Kerala – minerals and theirvalue). Nevertheless, thanks to sand mining, the state’s miningsector grew three-fold between 1997-98 and 2004-05.1

Kerala is the largest producer of kaolin in the country, account-ing for 34 per cent of the total output. It is also the second largestproducer of limeshell (28 per cent) and the third largest producerof sillimanite (25 per cent).2 Kerala also has 12 MT of fine sand3

and 35 MT of illimenite4 (the illimenite deposit at Chavara is theworld’s largest).5 The coastal districts of Kanyakumari,Tirunelveli, Thoothukkudi, Ramanathapuram and Nagapattinamhave reserves of high quality heavy mineral placers such as garnet (23 MT), illimenite (98 MT), rutile (five MT), monazite (twoMT) and zircon (eight MT). Recently, Karnataka’s Deccan GoldMines has announced discovery of new gold reserves in Attapadi(Palakkad district), a tribal area.6

The number of mining leases for major minerals in the state hasnot changed much over a five-year period (see Graph 2: Mine leasesin Kerala); the state had 96 mining leases in 2002-03, with a leasearea of 2,193 ha.7 Average land holding per lease was about 23 ha.It is clear, therefore, that small mines dominate the state’s mineralindustry. Loss of forest cover to mining in Kerala is a minor issue:just over 29 ha of forests have been diverted for mining.8

In May 2001, Kerala announced that the state would allow private companies into its mining sector. The new policy does not


Kerala and Tamil Nadu

ANDHRA PRADESHKARNATAKA

KERALA

PONDICHERRY

Kasaragod

Pahe

Ernakulam

Pathanamthitta

Karur

NamakkalTAMIL NADU

Copper

Magnesite

Kaolin

Protests: Sand mining

is the cause of most

protests

Open forests

Dense forests

River

Bauxite

Limestone

Glass sand

Granite

Mica

Graphite

Iron

Coal/lignite

Silica sand

Mineral sandKalloda

Achankovit

Periyar

Vembanad lake

Amra

vati

Noyil

Bay pore

Kabani

Kaveri falls

Kaveri

KrishnarajasagarareservoirNetravati

Gunaar

Valppur

Chittar

Valgal

Vollar

Kaveri Kollidam

Vellar

PonnaiyarStanleyreservoir

Cheyyar

PalarArkav

atiShim

sha

Bhavanisagarreservoir

Nadari

I N D I A N O C E A N

KottayamIdukki

Alappuzha

Kollam

Thiruvananthapuram

Kanniyakumari

Toothukudi

Tirunelveli

Virudhunagar

Ramanathapuram

SivagangaMaduraiTheni

DindigulTir

uchira

ppalli

Pudukkottai

Than

javu

r

Thiru

vaur

Karaikal

Perambalur

Ariya

lur

Kuddalore

Viluppuram

Nagapatttinam

Dharmapuri

Tiruv

anam

alai

Kanc

heep

uram

Chennai

Vellore

Thiruvallur

The NilgirisKozhikode

Malappuram

Palakkad

Erode

Thrissur

Salem

Coimbatore

Wayanad

Kannur


MAP: Kerala and Tamil Nadu – the mineral reservesCoasts and river basins are the worst affected by mining

c m y k

allow the private sector to be owners and operators, but permits itto create joint ventures with state-owned companies.

The major mineral-based companies in the state are the IndianRare Earths Ltd (IRE), V V Minerals, Beach Mineral Company,Transworld Garnet and Indian Ocean Garnet Sand. The Tata Iron and Steel Company (TISCO) has signed an MoU with thestate government for establishing a Rs 2,000-crore titanium dioxide plant.

Unlike Kerala, Tamil Nadu has large reserves of major minerals (see Graph 3 on page 206: Tamil Nadu – minerals). It is theleading producer of lignite in the country, with total reserves ofabout 30,275 MT.9 Neyveli Lignite Corporation (NLC) has led thedevelopment of a large industrial complex around Neyveli in Cuddalore district. Lignite deposits have also beenfound in and around Mannargudi, Jayamkondam andSrimushnam.

Some of the world’s best magnesite deposits are in the state –in Salem, Namakkal, Coimbatore and Erode districts. TamilNadu’s magnesite reserves amount to about 73 MT.10 The statealso ranks seventh in the country in terms of production of lime-stone.11 The key districts are Perambalur, Tirunelveli,Thoothukkudi, Virudhunagar, Salem, Karur, Namakkal,Dindigul, Coimbatore and Madurai. The total reserves are about1,473 MT, and there are 12 major cement plants.12 Tamil Nadualso has deposits of graphite (Sivagangai, Ramanathapuram,Madurai and Tirunelveli); quartz and feldspar (Tiruchirapalli,Salem, Coimbatore, Madurai, Tirunelveli, Erode and Dindigul);granite (Tindivanam, Dharmapuri, Pudukkottai and Madurai);magnetite (Salem, Namakkal and Tiruvannamalai); silica sands(coastal areas of Nagapattinam, Cuddalore, Kancheepuram andTiruvallur); bauxite (Kodaikanal, Palani, Yercaud and Kolli hillranges); and clay (Cuddalore, Pudukkottai, Tirunelveli,Tiruvallur, Kancheepuram and Tiruvannamalai).

205

MINING IN THE STATES: KERALA AND TAMIL NADU

m k

1998-1999

1999-2000

2000-2001

2001-2002

2002-2003

Years

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0

2,500

3,000

Min

ing

leas

e ar

ea (

hec

tare

s)

Source: Publications of the Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur

GRAPH 2: Mine leases in KeralaNumber of leases and area under them remain relativelyunchanged over five years

Minor minerals55.44%

Laterite0.07%

Sillimanite1.60%

Limestone6.31%

Limeshell1.29%

Silica sand0.22%

Kaolin34.97%

Bauxite0.10%

Source: Analysis based on anon, 2006, ‘State Reviews’, Indian MineralsYearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-46

GRAPH 1: Kerala – minerals and their value (2004-05)Minor minerals play an important role for the state

Mining-eroded beaches: a common sight in the two states

SASI

DH

ARA

N M

AN

GA

THIL

Mineral production in Tamil Nadu is mainly dominated bylignite, limestone, garnet, lime kankar and bauxite (see Table 1:Tamil Nadu – trends in production). Lignite accounts for a major chunk of the value generated from mineral production – 84 per cent (see Graph 4: Mineral value – Tamil Nadu). It is followedby limestone (nine per cent), minor minerals (three per cent) andmagnesite (two per cent).13

Mineral production has increased significantly in last fewyears. Revenue generation by the mining department hasincreased in the last decade: from Rs 74 crore in 1996-97 to Rs 446crore in 2004-05 (see Table 2: Tamil Nadu – revenue rise). The royaltycollected has also shown an overall increasing trend.14

206


m k

Year Amount in Rs crore

1996-97 73.851

1997-98 89.941

1998-99 110.371

1999-00 124.861

2000-01 163.121

2001-02 254.262

2002-03 317.22

2003-04 474.812

2004-05 445.952*

Note: *Till February 2005Sources: 1. http://www.tn.gov.in/spc/annualplan/chapter10-3.htm, as viewedon March 27, 2007; 2. http://www.tn.gov.in/spc/annualplan/default.htm, asviewed on March 27, 2007

TABLE 2: Tamil Nadu – revenue riseThe earnings from mining went up six-fold in nine years

Lignite84%

Limestone9%

Magnesite2%

Minor minerals3%

Others1%

Garnet (abrasive)1%

Source: Analysis based on anon, 2006, ‘State Reviews’, Indian MineralsYearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-80

GRAPH 4: Mineral value – Tamil NaduLignite and limestone are the two most important minerals,accounting for more than 90 per cent of the total value

42.59

66.67

38.10

87.09

27.78

17.59

25.00

28.16

7.31

33.33

8.97

2.60

5.00

0.85

0.87

0.04

0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00 70.00 80.00 90.00 100.00

Garnet

Vermiculite

Zircon

Lignite

Rutile

Magnesite

Monazite

Ilmenite

Gypsum

Graphite

Feldspar

Clay

Quartz/silica sand

Magnetite

Bauxite

Limestone

Percentage of national resources

Source: Analysis based on information from http://www.tnmine.tn.nic.in/TN-Mining.htm#Reserves, as viewed on March 26, 2007

GRAPH 3: Tamil Nadu – minerals (2002)A major chunk of India’s lignite is found in the state

Mineral Unit 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05

Lignite '000 t 18,624 20,556 21,567

Bauxite Tonne 2,64,126 2,79,616 2,98,822

Ball clay Tonne 3,982 2,075 –

Dunite Tonne 16,213 22,530 12,547

Feldspar Tonne 1,975 4,189 3,609

Fireclay Tonne 26,926 29,535 40,221

Garnet (abrasive) Tonne 4,31,787 4,90,728 5,69,505

Graphite (run of mines) Tonne 42,300 43,782 44,130

Gypsum Tonne – – 4,312

Limestone '000 t 13,575 14,098 14,636

Lime kanker Tonne 3,08,627 3,55,028 4,79,308

Magnesite Tonne 2,06,114 2,50,444 3,08,808

Quartz Tonne 16,997 15,035 10,591

Silica sand Tonne 1,900 21,712 9,267

Steatite Tonne 2,204 1,786 3,180

Sulphur Tonne 9,861 11,547 19,874

Vermiculite Tonne 1,765 1,458 1,855

Source: http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=16559&ptid=

12095&level=3, as viewed on March 26, 2007

TABLE 1: Tamil Nadu – trends in productionThe production of almost all minerals has increased

■■ A COMMON MISERY

As indicated earlier, sand mining has become the key challenge inKerala and Tamil Nadu. Almost 20 years ago, Kerala saw theemergence of its first environmental groups fighting to protect itsrivers from rampant sand mining. In 1987, one of these groupsbegan its agitation for the Periyar river, but by 1997 the river’sawesome economic value had thwarted the conservationists’efforts.15 By 1998, 45,000 tonne of sand was being mined everyday, causing the river to sink seven metre.16 The annual extractionof sand was almost two MT, while annual silt deposit was only33,000 tonne.17 The sinking riverbeds led to saltwater intrusion atplaces, which altered the river’s ecology and jeopardised thedrinking water sources in turn. 18

In August 1999, a report by the Centre for Earth ScienceStudies, Thiruvananthapuram, found that mining restrictionsintended to protect water resources and bridges had not beenenforced – this had contributed to 44 of Kerala’s rivers suffering“severe environmental strain” and serious risks to a number ofconcrete bridges.19 That same year, the Keezhumad Panchayathalted all sand mining from the Periyar in its area, citing thereduction of Parunthhuranchi Island from 16 to 10 ha and the risk

207


m k

Sentinels to chaos: rampant sand mining is eating into the coastlines, in spite of all efforts to stall the inevitable

SASI

DH

ARA

N M

AN

GA

THIL

CollapseSand mining in Tamil Nadu leads to collapse of check-dams

Farmers are at the receiving end of sand mining in Tamil Nadu.Rampant sand mining has led to the disintegration of a check-damat Mayilapudur, one of nine such dams constructed to redirect waterto 68 irrigation tanks from the Nambiyaru river.The tanks water over3,672 ha of agricultural land in the region.

Large-scale mining for sand, carried out with heavy equipmentat Rajakkalmangalam, Kannanallur and Mayilapudur, has weakenedthe foundations of the check-dams. As the river bed experiencedsudden floods, the already fragile Mayilapudur check-dam collapsed. Flow of water to seven irrigation tanks Aanaikulam,Veetrirunthaankulam, Karuppaakaalakulam, Ayyappaperikulam,Thangayamkulam, Vilvanamputhurkulam and Konarkulam –stopped completely, pushing farmers into a corner.

In fact, a member of the state legislature from Radhapuram,M Appavu, had tried to get a stay order from the Madras High Court on further sand mining on the dry river bed; but things spun out ofcontrol before the court could intervene.

to the Aluva water treatment plant’s pumping station and to theAluva railway bridge.20 By then, the Periyar was losing 4,000truckloads each day; the recommended amount was 53.21

The Pampa river in the state has been as severely hit as thePeriyar. In 1998-99, 511 trucks per day were hauling sand awayfrom the Pampa. The river lost 11 MT of sand in 1997 alone, whichcaused the riverbed to sink 2.5 metre below the sea level.22 By 2002,mining of the Pampa had taken its toll: a tributary, the Varattar,shrunk from 150 metre to 10 metre,23 its bed sank three metre, thewater table dropped and created a water crisis in the region.24

By 2002, there were reports of 30 illegal mining centres run bygangsters around the state – many of them in the Periyar.25 Illegalmining of the Walayar river in the stretch near Pulampara,Kongampara and Kanipiruvu was so intensive that by 2003,drinking and irrigation water was drying up and it posed a risk tothe Walayar dam. Illegal mining at the kadavus (banks of a river,lake or pond) in the Pampa meant five to six times more sand thanlegally allowed was being mined. The extensive mining was jeop-ardising a newly constructed bridge in Ranni as well as the waterauthority’s pump houses.26

Over the years, various court rulings, bans and state legislations have tried to curb mining, especially unauthorisedmining, in the state – but with little impact. In 1998, a six-monthban on sand mining was announced for the Meenachil river.27

Due to a drought in 2004, a three-month ban was implemented forthe Bharathapuzha river and its six tributaries in Palakkad,Thrissur, and Malappuram districts.28 The same year, 18 sandmining ghats had their licenses cancelled because they were within 500 metre of lift irrigation projects on the Periyar andMuvattupzuha rivers.29 Another notable success was notchedwhen residents from Torenoor village near Kushalnagar successfully got a stay on sand mining on the Cauvery river after they argued that the mining was polluting the environ-ment.30 But the Pampa continued to be at risk – it was discoveredthat a large-scale sand mining project at the Mukhannur kadavu was taking 20 truckloads of sand each day, when it wasauthorised to remove only eight.31

In February 2006, Kochi district halted all new sand miningghat licenses, while Kerala’s land revenue commissioner steppedup the state’s efforts to curb unauthorised sand removal.32 Theexpert committee on river sand mining, constituted by the landrevenue commissioner, Thiruvananthapuram, made a number of recommendations in March 2006 to monitor sand mining more effectively.33

Despite all this, sand mining is flourishing in the state – as it isin neighbouring Tamil Nadu, where the threat to livelihoods oflocal communities from this seems to be more real now.34 In fact,there has been a significant increase in sand mining in Tamil Nadusince the beginning of the 1990s, following a boom in the construc-tion industry. This activity intensified particularly in the southernand western regions of the state after restrictions were imposed onsand mining in Kerala in 1994.

The river basins which have been severely affected due tosand mining include the Palar and its tributaries (Cheyyar,Araniyar and Kosathalaiyar in Kanchipuram and Thiruvallur districts); the Cauvery (Karur); the Bhavani (Erode); the Vellar(Perambalur); the Vaigai (Madurai and Theni); and theThamiraparani (Tirunelveli). Also in the line of fire are the coastaldistricts of Nagapattinam, Tuticorin, Ramanathapuram andKanyakumari and the hill regions of Salem and Erode.

The Campaign for the Protection of Water Resources-TamilNadu has prepared a background note on the conditions in thePalar river basin. The Palar is the longest of the rivers in the districts bordering Chennai and has been a major source of drink-ing water for the state capital and its suburbs. The Palar and itstributaries also irrigate about three lakh ha of agricultural land inKanchipuram, Thiruvallur, Chennai and Vellore. Until a centuryago these were perennial rivers, but now the water flow is confined to the monsoon months. Because of this and also thethick layer of clay on the riverbed, the possibility of flooding hasbecome minimal. This has attracted sand miners to it.

According to the background note, the exposure of theriverbed to solar radiation following deep mining has resulted inits drying up. Water availability has dipped and even the avail-able water has turned saline in several places. Continued sandmining has led to obstruction in the free flow of water during themonsoon, and the volume of water that flows into the PulicatLake has dwindled as well. This has brought down the fish catchsubstantially, thus affecting the livelihoods of hundreds of fisher-folk. The sand mining has also hindered the flow of water into theheavily silted Red Hills and Cholavaram lakes, posing a seriousthreat to Chennai’s water supply system. Besides, the continuousflow of traffic, with trucks overloaded with sand, has badly damaged village roads in the region.

Because of its proximity to Chennai, the Palar basin mostlyserves the ever-increasing sand needs of builders in and aroundthe city and, therefore, is the most exploited of the river basins inthe state. Mining operations, both legal and illegal, have beennoticed in a number of places and the norm regarding the depthof the mine is often flouted.

There are other stories of the havoc sand mining is wreakingacross the state. Indiscriminate mining is taking a toll of

208


m k

Stopped in its tracksCourt halts sand mining in Tiruvallur lake

The Madras High Court has stayed mining of silt and sand in a lakein Thirukandalam in Tiruvallur district in Tamil Nadu. The interimorder was passed on a public interest litigation petition stating thatthe largest lake in the district was being desilted and mined beyondstipulated norms. Though the permission was to desilt only up toeight feet from the topsoil over an area of 150 square metre, the contractors had mined large tracts of sub-soil indiscriminately.

When villagers protested the violation and staged a dharna,33 of them were arrested on false charges, the petition said. Theindiscriminate mining would affect the water table in the lakeendangering drinking water as well as water for agriculture in theregion, it said.

agriculture in the Thamiraparani river basin, which has an ayacutof about 100,000 ha. In Kanyakumari district, 54 tanks that metdrinking water needs have been badly affected; most of themhave been closed down. The riverbed in many places has gonedown by 12 metre owing to continuous quarrying. Strong local opposition has begun against a government decision toallow silicon sand mining in and around Karumbakkam village inCheiyur taluk.35 In Nagapattinam district, extensive illegal miningfor silicon sand has resulted in depletion of groundwater andaffected agriculture. With drain canals blocked, agricultural landshave been flooded in several places and mangrove ecosystemshave been damaged.

There are visible impacts of mining of coastal sands inKanyakumari, Tuticorin and Ramanathapuram. Mining is done to a depth of up to six metre, within 10 metre from the high tide line. It has the potential to cause severe sea erosion, which can have an adverse impact on the fishing communities on the coast. Encroachment by miners has robbed fisherfolk of the space they have used traditionally to land their catch and stow their fishing equipment. In several places, seawater intrusion has resulted in salinisation of well water and depletionof groundwater resources. The disappearance of sand dunesowing to indiscriminate mining has made interior land vulnerableto storms and cyclones.

209


m k

Selling the coastCoastal mining in Kerala is a contentious affair

For years, villagers and environmentalists in northern Kerala havebeen trying to protect their coasts and the habitat they provide for a seaturtle, while in the south, people have been fighting the sale of miningrights to private business.

On a 20-km stretch of beach north of Calicut, the endangeredOlive Ridley turtles lay around 5,000 eggs every year. In the mid-1990s,efforts to collect and protect the eggs were successful, and led to a formal hatchery. However, by 2001, beach erosion from illegal sand mining had gotten so bad in some areas that the turtles were no

longer returning to nest.1

In 2003, it was announced that the Kerala Rare Earths andMinerals Limited (KREML) had been given mining leases on 17 km ofthe southern coast, but local environmentalists and social activistsquickly worked to prevent any more mining. The project was put onhold because of pubic pressure, but in 2005 it was learned that the gov-ernment had set up a commission to study the impacts and feasibilityof coastal mining along the 17-km stretch.2 Erosion and pollution fromsand mining along the coast can threaten local villages and the 30,000fisherfolk of the region.3 Mining and the subsequent erosion wouldlead to saltwater intrusion into the groundwater;4 seawater wouldenter the backwaters, threatening inland agriculture.5

Sand mining can lead to intrusion of saltwater into groundwater as well as into the backwaters, precipitating a water and agricultural crisis of mammoth proportions

SASI

DH

ARA

N M

AN

GA

THIL

210

Madhya Pradesh (MP) has about 335 operating mines ofmajor minerals (excluding coal) in an area of about 34,000

ha.1 The main minerals found in the state are limestone, bauxite,dolomite, ochre, diamond, coal, gold, copper ore and manganeseore. Important mineral-bearing districts are Katni, Betul, Shahdol,Sidhi, Satna, Balaghat, Jabalpur, Chhindwara, Panna andShivpuri.2 The state accounts for eight per cent of India’s coalreserves, four per cent of its bauxite, three per cent of limestone,10 per cent of manganese, and 28 per cent of its copper reserves(see Table 1: Mineral reserves). A 1999 study by the Forest Survey ofIndia (FSI), Dehradun, which examined the “forest cover in themetal-mining areas”, showed a high degree of overlap between

working mine leases and forest areas in the districts of Balaghat,Mandla and Shahdol (see Map 1: Minerals and forests).

The IBM says that 1,154 mine leases were given out by the state(excluding coal) in 2005.3 Limestone accounts for the maximumnumber of mine leases (503), followed by dolomite (131), ochre (97)and bauxite (67).4 Limestone also accounts for the maximum areaunder lease: 73 per cent of the total lease area in MP (see Graph 1:Mineral-wise mine lease area). The district of Satna leads with 308mine leases and 9,888 ha of area under leases, followed closely byKatni with a mine lease area of about 8,000 ha (see Graph 2 on page 212: District-wise distribution of mine leases). Both these districtsare the limestone belts of the state and house many big names inthe cement industry such as Associated Cement Company (ACC),Prism Cements and Birla’s Satna Cement Works.

The sector contributed about Rs 5,470 crore – or five per cent –to the gross state domestic product (GSDP) in 2005-06.5 In termsof value of mineral production, Rs 5,186 crore worth of mineralswere produced in the state in 2004-05 – a jump of nearly 38 percent from 2002-03.6 MP was among the top 10 states in terms ofvalue of minerals in 2004-05 and generated the third highest royalty from minerals in the country the same year.7

While the production of coal and manganese ore has increasedover the years, the production of bauxite and copper ore hasdecreased (see Table 2 on page 212: Mineral production). The strengthof the state is its fuel and non-metallic minerals. It stood fourth andthird in contribution to the total fuel mineral value and non-metal-lic mineral value, respectively, produced in the country in 2004-05.8

The total mineral value produced in the state increased duringthe period 1997-2000. There was a major dip in the mineral value

Mineral Reserves* Percentage of country’s

India Madhya Pradesh reserves

Bauxite 2,925,550,000 121,544,000 4.15

Calcite 15,997,763 1,108,245 6.93

Copper ore 1,338,387,000 375,722,000 28.07

Copper metal 10,485,000 3,457,000 32.97

Coal bed methane 1,434 bcm 144 bcm 10.04

Diamond 4,580,336 carat 1,453,381 carat 31.7

Pyrophyllite and 20,769,776 13,014,482 62.66diaspore

Dolomite 7,084,209,000 1,841,677,000 25.99

Fireclay 695,027,000 110,604,000 15.91

Gold ore 184,478,587 12,295,000 6.66

Gold metal 186.93 16 8.56

Granite 37,624,611,000 1,994,084,000 5.30cubic metre cubic metre

Iron ore 11,425,788,000 200,658,000 1.76

Lead-zinc ore 485,114,000 5,410,000 1.12

Limestone 170,458,657,000 5,883,784,000 3.45

Manganese ore 295,063,000 28,358,000 9.61

Molybdenum ore 16,296,732 8,000,000 49.09

Molybdenum 10,547 5,020 47.60containing MoS2

Coal 247,847,000,000 19,232,000,000 7.76

Ochre 58,279,801 9,561,573 16.41

Potash 21,815,000,000 1,206,000,000 5.53

Vermiculite 2,621,809 206,592 7.88

Note: *Quantity in tonne unless specified; bcm = billion cubic metreSource: Analysis based on data from anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 8-3, 8-4, 11-51

TABLE 1: Mineral reservesMP holds significant reserves of coal, copper and limestone

Limestone 72.94%

Bauxite 3.64%Others 12.84%

Manganese ore 4.85%

Ochre 3.67%

Dolomite 2.06%

Source: Analysis based on data from anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leasesand Prospecting Licences 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 6

GRAPH 1: Mineral-wise mine lease area Limestone tops in number of leases as well as their area


Madhya Pradesh

c m y k

by more than 50 per cent in 2000-2001.9 This was due to the for-mation of Chhattisgarh in 2000. A number of bauxite, coal andiron ore mines located in Raigarh, Bastar, Korba, Surguja, Bilaspur,and Kanker districts became part of Chhattisgarh. The productionof bauxite fell from 0.77 MT in 1998-99 to 0.28 MT in 2000-01.10

Surguja, Bastar and Bilaspur, which together contributed almost62 per cent of the bauxite in Madhya Pradesh in 1998-99, weretransferred to Chhattisgarh in 2000. Iron ore production wasalmost finished off in Madhya Pradesh after the formation ofChhattisgarh, as the Bastar and Dantewada mines shifted to thenew state. The production of iron ore in 1998-99 in MadhyaPradesh was 17.27 MT. This plummeted to 0.13 MT.11

The major chunk of limestone mines is based in Rewa andSatna districts of Madhya Pradesh; hence, production of limestonewasn’t impacted. But Raipur district, which became part ofChhattisgarh, contributed about 20 per cent of the limestone to thestate in 1998-99. The production dropped from 28.87 MT to 21.79MT during the same period.12

Madhya Pradesh is the sole producer of diamonds in India.Out of the 4,580,336 carats of deposits countrywide, about 31.7 percent are in MP.13 Found in Panna district, diamonds are minedmostly from shallow reserves. There are two diamond mineswhich are completely mechanised and are operated by the state-owned National Mineral Development Corporation (NMDC). Thetotal production is 78,315 carats, worth at about Rs 37 crore.14

Production in 2004-05 increased by almost 10 per cent from theprevious year.15 The diamond mines employed, on an average,354 people per day in 2004-05.16 However, a lot of diamond ismined illegally and smuggled out of the state.

Coal is another important mineral in the state, accounting foralmost 86 per cent of the total value of mineral production.17 MPranks fifth in the country with respect to coal reserves (19,232MT), which lie in Shahdol, Umaria, Betul, Chhindwara andNarsinghpur districts.18 The state comes fourth in terms of pro-duction after Jharkhand, Orissa and Chhattisgarh; the output isabout 52.68 MT of coal, worth Rs 4,496 crore.19

211

MINING IN THE STATES: MADHYA PRADESH

Protests: Mostly against

illegal mining

BhopalUjjain

Neemuch

Gwalior

CHHATTISGARH


U T T A R P R A D E S H

R A J A S T H A N


Ganga

Son

Betar

Betwa

Tons

G B Panth

Sagar

Son

Johilla

Mah

anad

i

Narmada

BanjarWain

gan

ga

Panch

Kanhan

Wardha

Tapi

Chhota Ta

wa

Narmada

Kundi

Gal

Mahi

TapiCham

bal

Gam

bh

irSipra

New

al

Parbati

Parwan

Betw

a

Sona

r

Bew

as

Bo

arm

a

Baghain

Dha

san

Sind

Kunwari

Ku

no

Chambal

HelatiReservoir

GandhiSagar

RanaPratapSagar

TawaReservoir

Anas

Sou

Anu

Gambhir Yahuna

Open forests

Dense forests

River

Lead

Manganese

Copper

Coal/lignite

Diamond

Dolomite

Kaolin

Mica

Limestone

Bauxite

Balaghat

SeoniChhindwara

Betul

East Nimar HardaWest Nimar

Barwani

Sidhi

Rewa

Tikamgarh

Chhatarpur

Panna

Satna

Shahdol

Dindori

Mandla

Katni

Jabalpur

Narsinghpur

Damoh

Sagar

RaisenSehore

Dewas

Vidisha

Guna

Shajapur

IndoreDharJhabua

Ratla

m

Mandsaur

Shivpuri

SheopurDatia

Bhind

Morena

Hoshangabad

Rajgarh

Umaria


MAP 1: Minerals and forests Several districts show a high degree of overlap

c m y k

MP is the third largest producer of limestone in the country,with a share of 15 per cent in country-wide outputs.20 In the state,limestone accounts for about five per cent of the value of mineralproduced.21 MP is also the leading producer of copper concen-trates, pyrophylite, diaspore and slate – accounting for about 56per cent, 73 per cent, 60 per cent and 90 per cent of the totalnational outputs, respectively.22 Copper concentrates are the thirdlargest contributor to the total value of mineral production in thestate: about two per cent.23

In terms of employment, the sector employs 1,53,150 people,constituting 2.4 per cent of the state’s workforce. Almost 87 percent of those employed are males.24 The numbers of women in themining workforce have been falling: according to the 1991 census,22,562 women were employed in mining and quarrying, and thenumber fell by more than 10 per cent in 2001. A background paperby the NGO, Mines, Minerals and People (MMP), presented at aseminar on women and mining in Delhi in 2003 says that women

have been pushed into contract labour, which completely lackswork safety and employment security. Most women mineworkersare found in small-scale and unorganised sector mines. Mostlarge-scale private mining industries are highly mechanised andtechnology-intensive, which exclude women’s participation.25

In terms of royalty from mining, the state earned Rs 734 crorein the year 2004-0526 – an increase of 24 per cent from Rs 591 crorein 2002-03. However, the industry’s contribution to the total revenue receipt of the state shows a marginal drop (see Table 3:Mineral royalty). On an average, the royalty generated from themineral industry contributed four per cent of the total revenuereceipt of the state.27 A major portion of the royalty is from coal (76 per cent), followed by limestone (17 per cent), diamonds (oneper cent) and minor minerals (three per cent) (see Graph 3:Mineral-wise contribution to royalty).

Industrialisation in Madhya Pradesh has been mostly mineral-based. Between April 2004 and June 2006, a billion dollars worth of

212


Balaghat7%

Jabalpur5%

Katni24%

Rewa5%

Satna30%

Others29%

Source: Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases and Prospecting Licences 2003,Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 15,16,17

GRAPH 2: District-wise distribution of mine leasesSatna, because of its limestone mines, is most mined

Mineral royalty Total revenue Royalty as percentage (in Rs crore) receipt of total revenue receipt

(in Rs crore)

2003-04 646.71 14,289 4.5

2004-05 733.72 19,743 3.7

Average 690.215 17,016 4.1

Sources: Anon, 2006, ‘Annexure 7’, National Mineral Policy, Report of theHigh-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi; anon, 2006, StateFinances – A Study of Budgets of 2006-07, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai,November; anon, 2005, State Finances – A Study of Budgets of 2005-06,Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai

TABLE 3: Mineral royalty Mineral industry contributes 4 per cent of the revenue

Mineral 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 (p)

Coal 45,736,000 49,826,000 52,683,000

Bauxite 249,264 194,401 186,459

Copper ore 2,273,531 2,321,026 2,053,711

Iron ore 128,000 94,000 201

Manganese 344,398 376,671 446,589

Diamond 84,407 71,260 78,315

Limestone 23,824,000 23,777,000 24,938,000

Note: Quantity in tonne except in minor minerals and diamondsSource: Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,Nagpur, pp 11-51

TABLE 2: Mineral productionMP is the sole producer of diamonds in the country

Suppressed Despite policy initiatives, power to panchayats remains apipe dream

Madhya Pradesh had, in 1995, formulated a new mineral policy.Under it, panchayats were associated with the selection process forgranting lease of all minor minerals except granite. The royaltyamount was also to go to the panchayats. However, this stipulationhas remained largely on paper.

An illustration of how ineffective it is can be seen in the case ofLimbi village of Badwani district. On September 19, 2003, 29 tribalsof the village were arrested for campaigning against illegal calcitemining in their village. False charges of extortion were pressed onthem because they wanted to use the gram sabha to deny the con-tractor a lease over their land. The Limbi gram sabha had alreadypassed two written resolutions, on January 26 and April 14, objectingto the mining operations.

m k

investment was proposed in the cement and minerals sectoralone.28 The state is home to a number of big industrial names.Hindustan Copper Limited (HCL), a company of the Aditya BirlaGroup, operates captive mines in Malanjkhand; these are the largestcopper mines in the country, mining about 50 per cent of the coun-try’s copper reserves. Jindutta Minerals Pvt Ltd, Associated CementCompany Ltd, Grasim Industries Ltd, Jaypee Rewa Cement Ltdand Khajuraho Minerals are other major industries in MP.

■■ LAND AND FORESTS: UNDER SIEGE

Naturally, large-scale environmental degradation and social dis-ruption has accompanied this industrialisation. Land degradationhas been particularly extensive in regions like Panna (diamondmines) and the Amarkantak forests (bauxite mines). MP also has achallenge in the form of abandoned mines: according to the IBM,the state has the highest number of abandoned mines in the coun-try – 145 (the figure, though, is unreliable as it does not accountfor mines of coal and minor minerals).29

The Wasteland Atlas of India of 2003 says that in MP, 12,148 haof land has turned into wasteland because of mining. Katni hasthe maximum area categorised as these wastelands: about 22 percent of the total mining wasteland in the state.30 Katni also has thesecond highest number of mine leases, 250, and occupies the second highest lease area.31

The state has a forest area of 7.6 million ha.32 Of this, about10,058 ha was diverted for mining between 1980 and 2004.33 Thisaccounts for 11 per cent of the total forest land diverted for min-ing countrywide.34 Illegal mining on forest land is also rampant.

In a bid to increase revenues from mining, the state govern-ment has been trying to denotify forest land. In 2004, the thenstate mining minister L K Sharma told journalists that since mostillegal mining was happening on plots allotted in forest areas, the

government planned to bring them under revenue limits35 – thuslegalising the illegal and allowing mining in forests. Back in 1997,the MP government wanted the Union government to makechanges in the MMDR Act of 1957 to facilitate a system underwhich mineral-bearing areas could be advertised and concessionsgranted irrespective of the extent of the area involved.36

How serious the government is about issues of mining in forestareas is evident from the discussions and decisions that took placeat the meetings of the state wildlife board in November 2005. Theboard made recommendations to denotify the central part of theSon Gharial Sanctuary in Sidhi district. It also cleared the proposalsfor the construction of the Bagad-Dhavaiya lift irrigation projectinside the sanctuary. Besides, the meeting approved renewal of dia-mond mine leases in proposed forest villages of Panna.37

In another decision, the board agreed to further alter theboundary of the Chambal sanctuary for “development needs”. Itrecommended that areas of sand mining and villages should beleft out of the sanctuary’s limits and approved laying of 765 kilo-volt power supply lines of the Power Grid Corporation within thesanctuary.38 This, when forest officials warned that the movewould further endanger the freshwater dolphins of Chambal,which are already on the verge of extinction: the power supply lines will interfere with their ability to communicate with other dolphins through sound waves.39 Member of theWildlife Board and principal investigator of the Panna TigerReserve, Raghunandan Singh Chundawat, said: “It appeared the

213


Coal

76%

Limestone

17%

Minor minerals

3%

Other

3%

Diamond

1%

Note: Average for three years from 2002-03 and 2004-05Source: Anon, 2006, ‘Annexure 7’, National Mineral Policy, Report of theHigh-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi

GRAPH 3: Mineral-wise contribution to royalty Coal contributes three-fourth of the total royalty

Hand-in-glove A national park is lain waste by political manoeuvres

In 1996, local politicians were granted mining leases for forest landinside the Madhav National Park in Shivpuri district: 40 ha of forestland granted in the lease was brought under the revenue depart-ment, which is under the control of the district collector. Khair treeswere cut overnight to show that the land was viable for mining; morewere destroyed later for making roads.

Interestingly, 20 stone quarries operated by the state miningdepartment had been closed down in the same area because of thedamage they were causing to the national park. These minesemployed about 40,000 workers. After their closure, a mining leasewas granted to one Saurabh Stone Polishing Pvt Ltd owned by aCongress Party leader. Locals believe that the state-owned mineswere shut down due to pressure from the mining mafia.

Currently, there is political pressure from local Congress leadersto open the mines, as about 30,000 people’s livelihood is at stake.Thenational park has been divided into three categories – areas locatedin more than five-km radius, in five-km radius and in less than five-km radius. There are 15 flagstone mines in Shivpuri, of which eightfall in the area greater than five-km radius. The Union government,in consultation with an empowered committee, has decided to giveno-objection certificates to the eight mines after the state govern-ment agreed to deposit the compensation and afforestation amount;the two governments are now squabbling over the amount.

m k

government is determined to carry on reckless mining and promote eco-tourism at any cost.” He also said that there wereefforts to denotify some more protected areas in the state.40

The powerful illegal mining mafia is the biggest threat toforests in the state. In fact, in 2002, the state had to take the help ofthe Special Armed Forces (SAF) to protect the forests in Ghatigaonand Son bird sanctuary from marauding illegal miners.41 Inanother case, the people of Bara village in Shankarpur area of thestate filed a petition in the Gwalior bench of the Madhya Pradesh

High Court to put a stop to illegal mining and crushing of granitein their village. The village was being polluted by the miningactivities. Asthma cases were increasing due to dust from thecrushers. Cracks had developed in houses in the village due toblasting.42 The court gave a stay order. In the same case in 2005,the High Court ordered shutting down of mining in another 262villages inside the district’s forest area.43

That the political brass is very much involved in denuding thestate’s forests is evident from the fact that a committee appointed

214


Amarkantak endangeredBauxite mining is devastating the hills and forests, and alsoimportant watersheds

The two mountain ranges, Vindhyas and Satpuras, meet atAmarkantak in Shahdol district. The Amarkantak mountains arethe source for three major rivers in the region – the Narmada,Johilla and Son. However, indiscriminate bauxite mining is destroying the forests and endangering the water resources. Thereare deposits of an estimated five MT of bauxite below theAmarkantak peak, being mined by the Hindustan AluminiumCompany (HINDALCO) and the Bharat Aluminium Company(BALCO). In 2003, about 2,00,000 tonne of bauxite was mined fromthe Amarkantak mines. The mining has also impacted the primatepopulation of the biodiverse forests in the area.

The official encroacher Coal company denudes forests despite court injunctions

Western Coalfield Limited (WCL), a subsidiary of Coal India Limited,has been encroaching on forest land, despite court orders in 1996 tothe state government to check violations of the Forest (Conservation)Act of 1980 (FCA). By June 1999, eight cases of violation of the Act hadbeen registered against WCL, which had encroached upon about1,349 ha in Pathakheda in Betul district. These encroachments werefor setting up poles for electrification for the projects, for running illegal mines, and for constructing offices and houses. But the districtforest officer was authorised only in 1999 to investigate and prosecutethe violators. Underground mining in Chhattarpur and Betul forests has been continuing since 1992 without approval. But caseswere registered against this only in 1998.

SHA

YAM

AL

/ C

SE

c m y k

by the Supreme Court (SC) concluded that the state rural indus-tries and animal husbandry minister in 2002, K P Singh, wasinvolved in illegal mining in the forests of Shivpuri. The commit-tee had been set up in 2001 after Santosh Bharti, an activist fromDamoh district, filed a case in the SC in 2000. In his petition, hehad alleged that the mines run by Singh were originally allottedto poor tribals and scheduled caste youths.44 These leases weretaken over by influential people like Singh against a power ofattorney.45 The committee had also found the local forest officialsresponsible for violations of the FCA.46 Illegal mining and quarry-ing was occupying an area of more than 3,000 ha inside thereserved and protected forests in the district at that time.47

In 1980, when the FCA came into being, numerous mines inShivpuri were closed down, rendering thousands jobless. Whenthe people protested, the Union ministry of environment andforests (MoEF) opened 15 out of the 20 mines that had been closeddown. A suggestion made at the time, that the sanctioned miningand quarrying be given to cooperative societies formed by poorersections of the society, was agreed upon conditionally. SaysBharti’s petition: “If conditions of MoEF clearance had been ful-filled, the entire benefit worth hundreds of crore would have goneto the state as well as thousands of poor mining labourers. But thestate government has deliberately failed to implement these con-ditions to protect the interests of the well organised illegal miningmafia operating in Shivpuri district.”

The petition also points out: “The extent of illegal mining canbe ascertained from the fact that Babulal Vanshkar, who has amining lease for 3.72 ha, paid a royalty of more than Rs 60 lakh.He is barely able to have two meals a day. Similarly, AcchelalAdivasi paid a royalty of more than Rs 35.55 lakh for an area of4.90 ha. He too can barely make his ends meet. In contrast, thestate mining corporation, which has a lease of over 73.50 ha, paidRs 12.32 lakh as royalty.”48

The flashpoints

■■ THE PARADOX OF PANNA

Panna district in MP ranks 41st out of the 45 districts in terms ofhuman development index calculated by the Madhya PradeshHuman Development Report of 2002. It is amongst the five poor-est districts in the state in terms of income. Ironically, Panna is alsothe lone diamond-producing district of the country. One doesn’thave to dig too deep to find diamonds here. Any piece of rockcould be bearing the precious stone.49

A significant portion of the mining is done in the unorganisedsector which is also the only source of livelihood for many peoplein the district. Despite that, labourers do not get more thanRs 15,000 for a stone worth Rs 2 lakh, says Arun Singh, a journal-ist in Panna, in a report in the news magazine The Week.50

What does thrive in Panna is illegal mining. Only 20 per centof the mining in Panna happens on revenue land. The rest is doneillegally in forest areas. The reason: revenue land is costlier and itis far easier to break the laws and mine inside the forests.51

While licenses were given for 1,339 shallow mines, over 3,000illegal mines flourish in the district, which mine about 16,000carats of diamond. Of this, only 335 carats were deposited at thegovernment diamond office in 2005. Local miners and traders saythat over 90 per cent of the diamonds mined in the area’s 24 vil-lages are sold illegally or smuggled out of Panna to polishingunits in Mumbai and Surat. A majority, 84,000 carats, is excavatedby the NMDC in its Majhgaon kimberlite pipe.52

The diamonds mined by individuals are supposed to bedeposited at the diamond office of the district. They are auctionedfour times a year. The amount, after deducting the royalty and the

215


Diamonds or the tiger?Diamond mining, legal and illegal, is impacting the PannaTiger Reserve

According to the Wildlife Protection Society of India, tailings from theNMDC-run diamond mine in Majhgaon are being dumped into thestream that joins the Ken river which in turn goes inside the Panna TigerReserve.The noise from the blasting operations disturbs the wildlife andthe solid waste is dumped outside the gates of the reserve. TheMajhgaon mines, located just outside the reserve, were closed in 2005 bythe pollution control board on directions from the Supreme Court. Afterrenewal of lease in 1995, the mines were operating without any environ-mental clearance. With the lease ending on July 14, 2005, and allegationsof encroachment inside the Gangau National Park, the mines wereclosed down.1 Illegal mining inside the Panna Tiger Reserve had turnedit into a fragmented island habitat. The tiger population had reduced toa vulnerable two-three tigers per 100 sq km.The NMDC has approachedthe court to reopen the mines and the final hearing is awaited.2

Though sandstone mining inside the reserve has also been

stopped, but till 2005 there were reports of sandstone being mined inthe buffer area of the reserve. Forests in Shikarpura, Magarpura,Nadarpura, Sigra, Jhanjhar and Devri have almost 200-250 functionalsandstone mines.

More threats to the reserve are emerging. The Union governmentplans to make a dam and two power stations across the Ken river anda railway line through the forests to link Khajuraho to Satna. Also, thedistrict planning committee is keen on denotifying a portion of the for-mer Gangau sanctuary to probably restart mining and agriculture.

Also, the Ken-Betwa river link proposes to divert surplus waters ofthe river Ken at Daudhan (2.5 km upstream of existing Gangau weir)through a Ken-Betwa link canal to river Betwa for meeting waterrequirements in the water-deficit Betwa basin.

Chief conservator of forests and field director of Panna TigerReserve, Shahbaz Ahmad, said in a news report published by TheHindu Business Line that the proposed ‘development’ projects wouldreduce forest cover and cut into the Panna Tiger Reserve. The govern-ment is expected to denotify parts of the national park to accommo-date the development projects.

c m y k

taxes, is given to the finder. But the process is so complicated andtime-consuming that no one wants to deposit the diamonds withthe diamond office. If one has deposited a diamond just after anauction, the finder has to wait for three months for the stone to besold and the proceeds to be given to him. To pay back the moneythe individual has borrowed to unearth the stone, he has to takeloans from moneylenders at high interest rates. To run a mine fora year, one needs to invest anything between Rs 25,000 to Rs 1lakh, whereas the average produce from a mine is two carats.Hence, people prefer selling the stone in the black market –though at throwaway prices.53 The state’s diamond departmentsays that lack of support and cooperation from the forest depart-ment and the police have led to the increase in illegal mining inthe district. It says that the department is not adequately staffed tomonitor all the leases given out in a year.

But the department itself is also to blame for the state of affairs.It is certain that a nexus does exist between administrators and dia-mond traders. In the past few years, a syndicate has been operatingat the auctions at the diamond office. For instance, if a 10-carat stoneis valued at Rs 10 lakh by the office, no trader bids more than Rs 6lakh for it. The stone remains unsold and the process is repeated atthe next auction three months later. After a wait of six months, thefinder allows the office to sell the diamond at Rs 6 lakh. Later, thetraders get together and bid for the same stone. If the same stone isbought for Rs 10.5 lakh, the difference is split amongst the bidders.54

As a consequence of all this, illegal mining has struck deep

216


Daku tax Dacoit gangs make a killing

In Panna district, daku (dacoit) tax plagues illegal diamond miners.Dacoits extort money from them for protecting them against othermiscreants as well as the police. The police doesn’t dare enter the forest when mining is going on. Gangs have also starting squabblingamongst themselves for the tax. If one gang asks for Rs 1 lakh, theother gang gives a discount of Rs 20,000.“It’s like a gang war,”saysKhurshid Khan, in-charge of Brijpur police station.

Nothing holy about thisThe ancient Bharat Mata temple is in trouble

The Bharat Mata temple at the Majhgaon village in Panna is the old-est temple in the region and is now threatened with the diamondmines of the National Mineral Development Corporation. Locatedabove the main quarry, the brick and concrete temple may bedestroyed due to extensive mining. Use of explosives has already disturbed its foundations. Meanwhile, project officials perceive thedevotees as a threat to the mining operations. There are two roadsthat lead to the temple, one of which goes through the mines.Visitors who take this route are frisked. The officials say that anypiece of rock could be a diamond and it is difficult to stop anyonefrom whisking one away.

Diamonds are forever: but Panna’s ecology might not be. The lure of diamonds has led to large-scale migration and rampant illegal mining

YU

SUF

BEG

m k

roots in the district and the state. It is evident at Khinna ghats,Harra Chauki, Khajri Kudaraiya and Ranibaj areas in Panna. Onentering the forests along the river in these areas, one can spot theillegal mines and labourers working in them. They dig the earth,sieve it and then pick out diamonds from it. In Brijpur, a numberof dacoit groups are also running illegal mines of diamond andsandstone. This has affected the ancient paintings found on rocksinside the forests. In Nachnegarh in Guner tehsil of the district, thepre-Gupta period Chaturmukh temple, the 500-year-old Rupnitemple, the Jain religious site of Shriyansgiri and other archaeo-logical sites are also threatened by the rampant mining.55

Kilkila river, the lifeline of Panna town, has also been affected.News reports allege that mining leases have been given out for theriverbed itself. A case regarding this was filed by environmentalistand resident Rajesh Dikshit in the Jabalpur High Court in 2005.56

■■ SAND MINING IN GHARIAL TERRITORY

Sand mining in MP thrives under official patronage. The state gov-ernment has been making efforts to seek permission from the SC toallow sand mining in parts of the 435-km stretch of the NationalChambal Sanctuary (NCS) (see Map 2: Sand for miners). The sanctu-ary is a breeding ground for gharials. The state wildlife board hadrecommended that a 10-km portion near the Piprai mines be keptout of sand mining as it was an ideal place for breeding.

In Piprai village, there is an official sanction to sand mining.During renotification of the sanctuary in 1983, Piprai village,though within the range, was left out. The revenue department of

the district promptly leased out about 108 ha for sand mining.Since 2001, a case filed by Madhya Pradesh’s forest department toinclude Piprai village in the protected area has been pendingbefore the Madhya Pradesh High Court’s Gwalior bench.

The district administration gives contracts for sand miningamounting to around Rs 8 crore every year. But operations havespread to 50 other villages, illegally. Forest officers in Morenaallege that the annual turnover from illicit sand mining is morethan Rs 20 crore and involves powerful mafias.

The operations begin in November/December and continuetill the monsoons start, usually till June/July next year. Gharials lay eggs in March/April and many of them are crushed underneath the miners’ tractors, which are estimated tonumber 500.

Experts and even wildlife officials reason that matters couldhave been different had Chambal been declared a protected areaafter giving due consideration to local people’s needs. They saythat the authorities could have done well to have adhered to theGuidelines for Wetland Management notified by the Union gov-ernment in 1992. The document offers a good roadmap for wet-land conservation, with the support of local people. Many alsoaccept that given the drought conditions, people have no optionbut to turn to sand mining. Officials in NCS are today examiningwhether sand mining can be done sustainably.

This is despite the fact that in 2006, forest minister HimmatKothari admitted in the legislative assembly that 63 cases of ille-gal sand mining had been registered and 56 trucks were seizedbetween March 2006 and July 2006.57

217


MAP 2: Sand for miners Sand mining hotspots in the National Chambal Sanctuary

Source: Kirtiman Awasthi 2006, ‘Croc cant go on’, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, November 30

Yamuna river

Sir Miutra

Baroli

Dholpur

Pinahat

Usedghat

Barhi

Ater

Bhareh

Chakarnagar

Etawah

Bhind

Panchnada

Morena

Tigri Rithora

Rajghat

Gwalior

Sand mining affected area

Batesura

SabalgarhRahu ka gaon

Rameshwar

Chamba l ri v

e r

m k

■■ SINGRAULI’S BURDEN

Another flashpoint of mining-induced environmental depreda-tion in MP is Singrauli. The country’s thickest coal seam, 135metres thick, lies in the Singrauli coalfields, in Sidhi district of MPand Sonbhadra district of Uttar Pradesh. Spread over an area of220,200 ha, most of the mines here are owned by NorthernCoalfields Limited (NCL).58

The Singrauli coal project started in the 1960s. It includeddevelopment of nine open-cast coal mines, six coal-fired thermalpower plants, ash dykes and transmission lines in MP. Today,there are 11 coal mines and six thermal power plants across boththe states.59

The project’s association with the World Bank started in 1977;the Bank invested US $120 million. The major beneficiaries werethe National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) and Coal IndiaLimited (CIL).60

This region was once known for its natural and forest wealth.It was home to the famous white tiger; the Kaimur mountainrange here was once known for its rich biodiversity. The districthas a sizeable number of tribals – about 30 per cent of the totalpopulation.61 The predominant tribes in the region are theKhairwar, Dhangar, Kol, Baiga, Gond, Dharkar, Panika, Agaria,Kevat and Baiswar.

There are about 400 villages just in and around Singrauli. Oneof the most critical issues surrounding the project, therefore, wasmass displacement. According to one report, more than 200,000

people were displaced due to the project.62 Reports by the Centrefor International Environmental Law based in the US puts thenumber of displacement much higher – 300,000 people.63 Thesepeople primarily lived on subsistence agriculture; cattle rearingwas an integral part of the local economy. The displacement andthe ensuing pollution reduced the cattle population and hence, amajor source of income.

In 1997, villagers in Singrauli backed by activist MadhuKohli filed complaints with the World Bank about inadequateresettlement and rehabilitation. Police and heavy equipmentwere sent in to forcibly evict the villagers near the Vindhyachalash dike. A World Bank inspection revealed that project authorities and police gave only one day’s time to the people tomove, that too in the middle of the rainy season. The agitation-ists were beaten up by the police when they refused to move.64

One elderly widow was physically restrained as her house wasbulldozed despite her objections. Villagers say that these abuseshave been routine for the last 35 years since the Rihand damcame up in the 1960s.

Under pressure from civil society, the World Bank assignedElectricite de France (EDF) to do an environmental impact assess-ment. The US $4.9 million study reported that two-thirds of theproject-affected people and half of those impacted by mining werestill jobless. Less than 20 per cent jobs had been given to the locals,who were in dire straits – having been removed from their lands,they had no livelihood opportunities left. The altered land use hadled to a food deficit in the region.65

218

STATE OF INDIA’S ENVIRONMENT: MININGA

GN

IMIR

H B

ASU

/ C

SE

Signs of the times: MP suffers from the depredations of illegal mining (of sand as above), as well as lawful mining (as in Singrauli)

m k

The study also concluded that the drinking water sources hadbeen contaminated. Groundwater and the water in the Rihandreservoir had been polluted with high levels of mercury, fluorine,chromium and other trace metals. The EDF report said thatSingrauli’s thermal power plants release about 720 kg of mercuryevery year.66 This, the CPCB says, is 17 per cent of the total mer-cury emissions in the country.67 A 2003 report by Delhi-basedNGO Toxics Link says that Singrauli accounts for 0.3 per cent ofthe total global and 10 per cent of the total Indian carbon dioxideemissions.68

The Indian Toxicology Research Centre, Lucknow, conductedclinical tests on 1,200 people in Singrauli area in 2003 for the pres-ence of mercury. Samples of blood, hair, food and water weretaken.69 The levels of mercury in blood were found to be signifi-cantly high. More than 66 per cent of the population had morethan five nanogram/ml of mercury in their blood. More than 47per cent had mercury more than one microgramme per mil-ligramme (μg/mg). Out of 100 vegetable samples, 23 per cent hadmercury levels higher than the permissible limit. Mercury levelswere significantly higher in food crops. Six out of 40 water sam-ples had high traces of mercury. In milk, more than 86 per centsamples had high mercury levels.70

With high dust pollution, 50 per cent of the population of the region suffers from lung diseases. Mercury – and its compounds such as methylmercury – are neurotoxins which leavechildren, in particular, very vulnerable. They can lead to memoryloss, impaired coordination and vision disturbance. There is also

a suggested link to cardiovascular problems. They can also affectthe thyroid gland, the digestive system, the liver and skin.71

The source of this mercury, flyash, is a significant problem inSingrauli. The coal-burning power plants release about six MT offlyash a year, making land unfit for cultivation. In parts ofSingrauli, the flyash lies in piles five feet thick. It consists of fineparticles (including calcium, sulphate, silicon and magnesium),along with toxic trace elements such as mercury, lead, arsenic,selenium, and cadmium. These heavy metals can leach intogroundwater and soil, cause acid rain, and affect human healththrough inhalation. The health effects range from permanent respiratory disorders, aggravation of ailments like asthma, bronchitis, and even lung cancer due to prolonged inhalation offlyash. Silica in flyash can cause silicosis.72 The coal mines, the thermal power plants and the associated industrial developments have ensured that Singrauli is one of the most polluted places in the country.

And it will remain so. The future does not bode well for MP’s mineral heavy districts. Despite the breaking away ofChhattisgarh, the significance of mining and minerals in the stateremains high – though the sector’s contribution to the state’s econ-omy is not much. The mineral industry is likely to grow as MP hasreceived a large number of proposals for coal mining. Prodded bythe political classes and aided by the illegal mining mafia, miningis sensitive and protected areas is all set to acquire gargantuan pro-portions – especially because the state and its official machineryshow no signs of waking up to the imminent devastation.

219

MINING IN THE STATES: MADHYA PRADESHPR

AD

EEP

SAH

A /

CSE

Rehabilitation has been a sore point for the people displaced to make way for the Singrauli project

m k

220

North-east India, comprising of the seven states of ArunachalPradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland

and Tripura, is characterised by rich biodiversity, heavyprecipitation and high seismicity. Ideally suited, on one hand, toproduce a whole range of plantation crops, spices, fruits and vegetables and flowers and herbs, the region also holds reservesof oil, natural gas, coal and limestone (see Table 1: Mineral wealthin the hills).

So far, the region’s production of minerals and generation ofwealth from mineral extraction has not been substantial (see Table2: Mineral production value). Together, the seven states contributejust above five per cent to the total value of minerals produced inIndia.1 Of this, the major share comes from Assam andMeghalaya, which contribute above four per cent and one percent, respectively.2

Assam contributes 4.1 per cent and Meghalaya 1.1 per cent tothe total value of fuel minerals extracted in India – both the states

have large coal reserves.3 The share of the north-east in the production of metallic as well as non-metallic minerals in thecountry is negligible. The region also accounts for a very smallportion of the total area under mining leases – for instance, Assamwith 1,294 ha under mining leases (for metallic and non-metallicminerals) accounts for just 0.21 per cent of the total area underleases in India.4 Meghalaya’s share, where 4,177 ha is under leases, is another 0.67 per cent.5

A variety of reasons make mineral exploitation in this region acomplex process, with very high environmental and socialimpacts. Given the topography of the region, any exploitation ofmineral wealth here will have a direct impact on the forestresources and local ecology (see Map: Minerals and forests). A casein point is the blasting of the Chandardinga hills in Assam’sDhubri district: though the mining involved just five ha, the sheerecological fragility of the region made the project highly controversial (see Box on page 222: A rocky issue). Another case isof limestone mining destroying Meghalaya’s famous Jurassic Agecave systems (see Box on page 222: Meghalaya’s lost treasure).

Even limited mining in these fragile areas have destroyed thetraditional social fabric of the region. Displacement, the key challenge, is an issue here (see Box on page 222: A story of three villages); so are the deplorable working conditions, lack of miningregulations and unscientific mine management practices.

State Important minerals

Arunachal Pradesh Petroleum (Ningru and Dam Duma), limestone (Lohit), dolomite (Kameng),graphite (Lohit, Subansiri), copper ore, goldand pyrites

Assam Coal (United Mikirs, North Cachar Hills,Sibsagar, Lakhimpur), petroleum and naturalgas (Digboi, Lakhimpur, Sibsagar), limestone(Lakhimpur, United Mikirs, North Cachar Hills,Karbi Anglong, Nagao and Sibsagar), magnetite, quartzite, kaolin, sillimanite

Manipur Asbestos, chromite, copper ore, coal, iron ore,lignite, limestone, nickel ore, and petroleum

Meghalaya Cement-grade limestone (East Khasi hills, West Garo hills, Jaintia hills), flux and chemical-grade limestone (Khasi and Jaintiahills), sillimanite (Sonapahar, West Khasi hills),coal (Mikir hills, Khasi hills, Garo hills andJaintia hills), uranium

Mizoram Lignite, sandstone and pyrites

Nagaland Coal (Nazira coalfield, Mon district), limestone(Phek), nickeliferous chromite (Tuensang)

Tripura Oil and natural gas, glass sand, plastic clay,shale and sand

Source: Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,Nagpur

TABLE 1: Mineral wealth in the hillsOil, natural gas, coal and limestone are the key minerals

Value of mineral Percentage production in 2004-05 contribution

(in Rs ‘000)

Arunachal Pradesh 4,08,133 0.0544

Assam 30,999,446 4.1323

Manipur 2,866 0.0004

Meghalaya 7,963,014 1.0615

Mizoram 8,847 0.0012

Nagaland 1,774 0.0002

Tripura 8,95,534 0.1194

India 750,181,419


TABLE 2: Mineral production valueBarring Assam and Meghalaya, the other states of theregion have limited mining


The north-east

m k

221

MINING IN THE STATES: THE NORTH-EAST

Kokrajhar

Dhubri

Goalpara

BarpetaBong

aiga

on

Wes

t Gar

o Hi

lls

SouthGaro Hills

East

Garo HillsWestKhasi Hills

EastKhasiHills

JaintiaHills

Ri Bhoi

Kamrup

Nalbari Darrang

Marigaon

Sonitpur

Nagaon

Karbi Anglong

Karbi Anglong

NorthCacharHills

Cachar

Kar

imga

n

Hai

laka

ndi

Kol

asib

Mam

it

Nor

th T

ripur

a

Dhalai

Wes

t Trip

ura

Sout

hTr

ipur

a

Saih

a

Law

ngtla

i

Lunglei

Serchhip

Aiz

wal

Cha

mph

ai

ChurachandpurChandel

Imphal East

Imphal West

Bishnupur

Thoubal

Ukhrul

Tam

engl

ong

SenapatiKohima

Dimapur Phek

Tuensang

Zunh

ebot

o

Wok

ha

Mok

okch

ung

Mon

Tirap

Changlang

Lohit

Tinsukia

Dibang Valley

WestSiang

Upper Subansiri

Lower Subansiri

EastKameng

Papum Pare

WestKameng

Tawang Dhemaji Dibrugarh

Sibsagar

Lakh

impu

r

Jorhat

Gol

agha

t

EastSiang

BANGLADESH

TIBET

MYANMAR

BHUTAN

Protests: Have been againsturanium, limestone, coal andstone quarries

Brahmaputra

Brahm

aputra

Lohit

Dib

ang

Suba

nsiri

Kameng

Man

as

Sank

osh

Amo

Kopil

Bara

k

Open forests

Dense forests

River

Limestone

Chromite

Copper

Gold

Coal/lignite

Dolomite

Graphite

Magnesite

Uranium

N A G A L A N D

A S S A M

M E G H A L AYA

T R I P U R A

A R U N A C H A L P R A D E S H

M I Z O R A M

MANIPUR

W E S TB E N G A L

State boundary


MAP: Minerals and forests The region’s topography ensures that no mining can happen without cutting forests

c m y k

222


Meghalaya’s lost treasureMining will devastate the state’s cave systems

Meghalaya is home to one of the longest cave systems in the sub-continent. The Meghalaya Adventure Association (MAA), whichmaps ancient and unique caves, has identified 970 caves in the state.The list includes Krem Kotsati-Umlawan in Lumshnong in theJaintia Hills district. At more than 21 km, this is the longest naturalcave system in India. The breathtaking caves also have a river and a11-metre high waterfall.

Rampant limestone quarrying has destroyed this natural treas-ure. Most of the caves are already obliterated; one cave system – theKrem Puja at Nongtrai village near Cherrapunji – has been destroyedby Lafarge, a French company mining limestone to feed its cementplant in Bangladesh.

Ironically, Kotsati-Umlawan was slated to be turned into a majortourism destination under the Union government’s plans for thedevelopment of the north-east region. The famous caves could haveattracted global tourism and helped local livelihoods, instead ofbeing sacrificed to feed the cement industry.

– Raymond R Kharmujai, Down To Earth, New Delhi

A rocky issueBiodiversity-rich Chandardinga hills is threatened by mining

In 1996, the Assam government allowed Rock Product Traders to blastin the Chandardinga hills to supply rocks to Bangladesh.Chandardinga hills is a reserve forest covering 284 ha, and blastingwas allowed in five ha. Situated on the northern banks of theBrahmaputra river in Dhubri district of Assam, the forest holds valuable trees and medicinal plants. Besides, wildlife including barking deer, leopard and porcupine are found in the area. The hillalso controls the hydrological regime of the Brahmaputra, one of themost erosive rivers in the world.

Environmental activists opposed the project – there was a fear thatthe blasting could change the course of the river causing environmen-tal degradation, besides monetary losses. The hill protects the hugelow-lying areas of Bilasipara sub-division of Dhubri from inundation.The blasting could cause siltation of the river, leading to serious floodproblems in nearby areas. Activists also felt that blasting couldadversely affect river dolphins living in the Brahmaputra.

Appropriate Technology Mission, an Assam-based NGO, filed apublic interest case against the blasting in the Guwahati High Court.Subsequently, the High Court stayed the licence to Rock ProductTraders for removal of rocks from Chandardinga. However, the Assamgovernment has decided to continue the controversial project.

KRE

M L

UBO

N /

YV

O W

EID

MA

N

India’s longest cave, wiped out by limestone quarrying

A story of three villagesCoal mining has transformed the land of the Tangsa Nagas.Waste dumps, land subsidence and displacement havebecome characteristic features of the place

For decades, the Tangsa Naga tribe had been living in the villages No1, No 2 and No 3 Mallowgaon in the forests of the Patkai range inUpper Assam. In the 1800s, coal deposits were discovered in the Tikokrange in Tinsukhia district of Assam, and mining was initiated in 1882by the Assam Railways & Trading Company. The coal mines, calledMakuna coalfields (consisting of five underground and three open castmines), were taken over by Coal India Limited (CIL) in 1975.

Decades of mining have transformed this area. Enormous andugly dome-like dumps of soil mixed with coal predominate the landscape. Two of the villages – No 1 and No 2 Mallowgaon – wereseverely affected by the excessive land subsidence due to the pressure of these dumps and the use of heavy machinery and explosives. Protests by the tribals forced CIL to relocate them on thebanks of the Namdung river.

CIL is now considering taking over the village No 3 Mallowgaon.The company has discovered coal deposits in the jhum fields of thevillage – and the threat of renewed mining is looming large. Privatecompanies have already started open cast mining in the area.

It is clear that rehabilitation and compensation are not theanswers. CIL’s rehabilitation efforts have been nothing but a whitewash. When it relocated the earlier villages, CIL had offered ameagre package of Rs 10,000 per family. Rehabilitation of tribals has to be handled very carefully. Most tribals do not own privateland; they practise jhum cultivation on common public land.This often creates barriers in ensuring that they receive proper compensation.

Neither is employment an option. CIL has not been hiring in theregion since the past 15 years. Moreover, the villagers are not qualified for the jobs offered by the sector. Till date, only three people out of the 35 families living on Tikok mountains have beenabsorbed as casual labourers at a rate of Rs 1,000-1,500 per month.

– Ratna Bharali Talukdar, CSE media fellow, Guwahati

c m y k

■ BLACK FUTURES: JAINTIA HILLS, MEGHALAYA

Mining in Meghalaya started with one Captain Lister, a Britishpolitical agent, who first worked out coal in the Khasi Hills in 1840.Coal mining took quick roots in the state: the proximity here of thecoal deposits to the ground makes extraction cost-effective andrewarding. The coal can be mined easily by the ‘rat-hole’ method,which requires neither modern technology nor trained personnel.All it involves is selecting a site and chopping the trees on it; a 20-50 metre pit is then dug till the coal seam is reached. The over-burden is removed from the pit and dumped on adjacent land.

There has been an alarming increase in air and water pollution due to unscientific coal mining in Meghalaya, onceknown for its natural beauty and pollution-free atmosphere. Astudy by the Meghalaya Pollution Control Board (MPCB) revealsthat private coal mining in Jaintia hills is gradually destroying the environment.6

Coal mining is changing the physical structure of the land,spoiling soil quality, threatening the biota and affecting humanlife. Since overburden is removed from the pits unscientifically,the most fertile humus layer gets dumped at the bottom and gravel and coal particles come up on the exposed surface. Themine spoil also becomes toxic with heavy metal ions, making thesurvival of any kind of life impossible.7 During monsoons, thewater that accumulates in the pits turns highly acidic and toxic.8

This, along with the run-off from mine spoils, poisons drinkingwater sources and enters agricultural fields, playing havoc with

crop yields. The environmental deterioration due to coal mining isdirectly proportional to the rate of extraction.

MPCB’s report says that due to an increase in air pollution levels, the weather has become unusually warm in the coal belt ofthe state.9 Coal is mined along a highway in Bapung, Lad-rymbaiand Klehriat in the Jaintia hills. It has been often noticed that commuters block their noses to avoid inhaling the dust andpolluted air.

Unscientific mining is gradually destroying the forests, andleading to soil erosion. An MPCB study on water supply in theregion concluded that both surface and groundwater in the coalbelt contained high proportions of sulphuric acid and other haz-ardous chemicals.10 The Jaintia hill coal deposits are known forhigh concentration of sulphide minerals.

The study by the state pollution control board also examinedthe air pollution levels. The report says that the average concentration of suspended particulate matter, sulphur dioxideand oxides of nitrogen in the coal belt locality are 200, 6.5 and 25.5 micro gram per cubic metre or µg/Nm3 respectively.11 Airpollution is also due to coal storages, which have affected not onlythe miners but also people living nearby. Doctors at the Bapungand Klehriat public health centres say that a majority of theirpatients suffer from asthma, severe cough and other respiratorytract ailments. The unorganised mines are also some of the mostunsafe in the country. Accidents and deaths among the workers,mostly daily wage labourers, are common; cases involving collapse of mine roofs go largely unreported.

223

MINING IN THE STATES: THE NORTH-EASTP

MA

DH

AVA

N

The landscape of Meghalaya is dotted with deep pits like this one. These are not monitored by regulatory authorities, and neither do they contribute to the state’s economy

c m y k

224

STATE OF INDIA’S ENVIRONMENT: MININGP

MA

DH

AVA

N

Working conditions in rat-hole coal mines in Meghalaya, which are under community control, are pathetic. Most accidents go unreported

c m y k

The state’s negligence towards regulating mining has alsoboosted extraction. Since most coal deposits are small, isolatedand worked by private operators, the government prefers tostand aside, deeming it uneconomical to invest in organised andscientific mining. As a result, landholders start coal mining as acottage industry, taking it for granted that mining is a customaryright independent of environmental obligations.

■ ASSAM’S TINSUKIA...

The breathtaking green cover that once existed throughout someof Assam’s hill ranges – including the Patkai, Tirap and Tikok hillsin Tinsukia district – has become a thing of the past. Mining forAssam’s ‘black gold’, coal, has taken a heavy toll. The Patkai hills,for instance, houses rich coal deposits and for decades, the NorthEastern Coalfields Limited (NECL) has been at work here. Today,running almost parallel to the natural hills, are hills created byyears of dumping of mining wastes. Open-cast mines run by theNECL over the past century have been producing waste rock at astripping ratio of 1:14 – which means that for every tonne of use-ful mineral extracted, 14 tonne of waste material is generated.12

The entire Patkai valley bears witness to the impact of coalmining. On one hand, the forest cover has been devastated; on theother, paddy fields around the Patkai ranges have been destroyedbecause groundwater sources have become polluted and acidicdischarges have found their way into the fields. A layer of coallines the paddy fields, and crop yields have fallen.

The Tirap and Tikok hills too are sites of large-scale mining forcoal. They are also home to several rivers, many of which are beingcontaminated increasingly due to mining. In Ledo, for instance, theKecha nadi receives water from the underground Lachit collieriesand also from the Tirap open cast mines through an artificial drainin the Itakhola area. Water from the Kecha finally traces its way tothe Brahmaputra. In Ledo, the river is not only a source of water –but also of pollution. Whenever the river water enters paddy fields,the crops start decaying; their leaves turn yellow and brown.

Acid mine drainage (AMD) from coal mining is one of the mostchallenging environmental problems in the north-east (the only

region in the country which produces high-sulphur coal). Trace met-als and other weatherable minerals are leached from the coal andassociated strata during mining operations in the form of AMD, andadversely affect the water quality of the region. The Indian School ofMines conducted a study in 1987 to assess this problem in the col-lieries of Makum and Jeypore coalfields run by the NECL.13 In thestudy, mine water samples were collected from various dumps ofLedo (Tirap), Bangolai, Jeypore and Tipong collieries.

It was found that rock formations in NECL mines are uncon-solidated and highly permeable, causing water leakage. Beforemining, rocks above the coal are saturated with rain and ground-water. As mining progresses, the overlying rock gets fracturedand groundwater starts to drain through it. The water dischargesare highly acidic, and ultimately find their way to nearby ravinesand rivers (see Table 3: Acid woes).

Chemical analysis of mine water samples shows that the waterfrom the coalfields are severally polluted. Considerable changeshappen in the pH from neutral to highly acidic as the water flowsover the mines. The pH survey in conjunction with acidity andsulphate data shows that severe acidic conditions exist at the Ledo(Tirap) and Jeypore colliery areas, while mild acidic conditionsprevail in the Baragolai and Tipong colliery areas.14

At low pH levels, the toxic heavy metals become more soluble;they enter into the solution as a result of secondary reactionsbetween iron sulphates, sulphuric acid and the compounds innearby clays, sandstones, limestones and sulphides as well as var-ious organic substances in mine drainages or streams. Thisexplains the existence of a host of toxic metals including calcium,chromium, mercury, lead, and arsenic in mine drainages and instreams in which they are discharged (see Table 4: Toxic woes). Thetrace metal levels exceed the drinking water standards stipulatedby various international organisations.

Mine management is supposed to treat the acidic wastewater –referred to as gas-paani by the locals – with lime, but people claimthis rarely happens; the water is released untreated into open drainsnearby. When it reaches the paddy fields in the vicinity, this highlyacidic water damages the fertility of the soil, sometimes beyondrepair. It has also harmed plankton and underwater fauna.

225

MINING IN THE STATES: THE NORTH-EAST

Mine Flow in rainy Flow in winter pHseason (in gpm) season (in gpm)

Ledo (Tirap) New Mine 800 200 2.7

M&P Dip 200 50-100 3.1

Baragolai 300-400 200 4.2

Tipong 200 50-100 4.0

Jeypore 400-500 100-200 2.4

Note: gpm = gallons per minuteSource: Gurdeep Singh, 1987, ‘Mine water quality deterioration due to acidmine discharge’, International Journal of Mine Water, Volume 6, No. 1, Hungary

TABLE 3: Acid woesWater discharges from the mines are highly acidic

Waterwater Stream water sampledischarge downstream

from Ledo mines of Ledo mines

pH 3.61 3.28

Cadmium (in ppb) 7.4 0.5

Chromium (in ppb) 455 73

Lead (in ppb) 4846 1098

Mercury (in ppb) 119 14.5

Arsenic (in ppb) 226 60.1

Source: Pollution Monitoring Lab, 2007, Centre for Science and Environment,New Delhi

TABLE 4: Toxic woesMine discharges contain very high levels of heavy metals

c m y k

■ ...AND THE STONE QUARRIES

The Kaziranga National Park (KNP), a prime habitat for specieslike the elephant, the Indian one-horned rhinoceros and the tiger,is threatened by stone quarrying. In January 2006, the Assam gov-ernment sanctioned stone quarrying at Mikir Chang, locatedsome nine km from the park. There was a furore over this move,since it came in the wake of protests over the adverse impacts ofstone quarrying in Behora in Golaghat district. The MoEF eventu-ally stepped in and stayed the sanction, saying that it went againstan earlier order passed by the ministry in 1996, declaring a 15-kmradius around the KNP as a ‘no-development’ zone.15

However, stone quarrying in the area is not an isolated incident. There are eight major and 12 small stone quarries locatedalong the foothills of Karbi Anglong and Golaghat districts – allalong strategic elephant corridors south of the KNP; this area is apart of the Kaziranga-Karbi Anglong Elephant Reserve.16 The pattern of elephant movement has been affected lately, and themaximum disturbance has been observed on the southern part ofthe Park where quarrying activities are presently taking place.

Earlier, most stone quarries were operated manually. Now,some of them have been leased out to big extraction companies,which use blasting devices and heavy machinery and flout all envi-ronmental norms. Moreover, quarrying at these sites is illegal asthey are located less than two km from the park.17 The quarryinghas also led to massive siltation in the streams coming down fromthe southern hills. Some of the streams have been clogged andmany have dried up, affecting the neighbouring agricultural fields.

Besides Kaziranga, Assam has to contend with rapaciousstone miners in other parts of the state as well. The lower Assamhill sector has huge deposits of granite, and is one of major pro-ducers of rocks in the country. Stone factories abound in Dhubri,Goalpara and Bongaigaon districts of the state. Silicon dust, whichhovers like a toxic mist on these quarries, results in slow andpainful death of workers, while leaving many more struggling tosurvive. Silicosis and tuberculosis are common – according tosome estimates, 85 per cent of the labour working for 7-13 yearshas tuberculosis or silicotuberculosis.18 Silicosis is found even incasual labourers. Government statistics are predictably at oddswith this estimate – not a single case of silicosis or any other occupational disease has ever been reported officially.

Labour laws are next to non-existent; working conditions areprimitive. Child labour is rampant. Flagrant violations of safetyregulations have led to accidents and deaths; many of the factorieshave not bothered to provide even the basic safety facilities totheir workers. Most of the work is done manually with the help ofheavy hammers, chisels, and other primitive tools. Heavy slabs ofstone often fall on workers, resulting in serious injuries.

The mines operate in very congested areas; laws have been reg-ularly distorted and exploited in granting leases for small mines.Illegal mining, sometimes coordinated by organised criminalgroups, is rampant. Since hardly any mine owner leaves 15 metresof open space between two mines – as directed by law – sometimesone mine lies just below the other.19 Stones from one mine can rolldown to another, causing serious injuries to workers.

■ DOMIASIAT: URANIUM BATTLEGROUND

Uranium reserves of nine MT have been discovered in Domiasiatvillage in the West Khasi Hills of Meghalaya, and the UraniumCorporation of India Limited (UCIL) is trying hard to access them.Local residents, politicians and activist groups, however, havebeen steadfastly resisting its attempts to execute a Rs 450-croreproject in the area. The pilot project was planned in 1992, but mas-sive public protests in 1996 forced UCIL to withdraw. The projecthas been strongly opposed by most NGOs of Meghalaya due tothe apprehension of radiation-related health hazards. Theseinclude the Khasi Students’ Union (KSU), the HynniewtrepEnvironment Status Preservation Organisation (HESPO) and theMeghalaya People’s Human Rights Council (MPHRC).

Almost a decade of lobbying with the state government and thelocal communities has not won the reserves for UCIL. “Every timewe turn up at Domiasiat, people chase us away calling us agents ofdeath,” says a senior officer of the company. UCIL has been explor-ing at West Khasi Hills for three decades, but has not done any studyon what impact uranium mines would have on the environment.

Meghalaya’s uranium deposits have now become crucial toIndia’s nuclear programme because the mines in Jharkhand’sJaduguda town – the sole source so far – are running out ofreserves. UCIL is, therefore, dangling major incentives to get a toehold in the area. But residents of Domiasiat and Wahkaliar villages have formed village action committees to resist the com-pany. Students, welfare organisations and opposition parties inthe state have joined hands to form the Khasi Jaintia EnvironmentProtection Council (KJEPC) to support them.

KJEPC convener P B M Basaiawmoit complains that theDepartment of Atomic Energy (DAE) is going ahead with explo-ration and mining of uranium in Meghalaya despite strong oppo-sition from the local people.20 Uranium mining in the state hasbeen given a clean chit by a high-level team led by Atomic EnergyCommission chairperson R Chidambaram.21 But the tribals aredetermined to stop further exploration and mining by the DAE.The protest is fast turning into a mammoth people’s movement.“The frightful consequences of uranium mining have alreadymanifested themselves in Domiasiat. About 21 families near theDomiasiat mining site are showing symptoms of radiation expo-sure,” claims Basaiawmoit. He admits, though, that medicalinvestigations have not yet been conducted.

The Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council (KHADC) – thenodal body that governs the district as provided for by theConstitution’s Sixth Schedule, and also owns the land in question– has decided to withdraw its temporary clearance to UCIL forsurvey and exploration of the area. But ironically, UCIL can over-ride local opinion if the Union government invokes the provisionsof the Atomic Energy Act, 1962. The sandstone type uraniumdeposit at Domiasiat will be cheaper to extract because it is closerto the surface. UCIL estimates that Domiasiat has about 10,000tonne of uranium ore, spread over 10 sq km.

In April-May 2003, UCIL had conducted a geophysical surveyin Domiasiat after it received permission from the district council.22

After over a decade, the company resumed investigations and

226


m k

drilling of uranium deposits in Meghalaya: this time, it negotiatedwith individual residents. But the protests have continued in vari-ous forms – rallies, strikes, etc. The three NGOs organised a protestmarch through the streets of Shillong on the occasion of ‘WorldAnti-Uranium Day’ on April 26, 2004.23 A strike supported by KSUwas held on October 5, 2004.24 On March 21, 2005, all the organisa-tions protesting against the uranium project have come together tolaunch the Coordination Committee against Uranium Mining(CCAUM).25 The organisation comprises of 11 groups including theKSU, MPHRC, Western Youth Welfare Organisation (WYWO),NADO, NAIDO, and Lai Lyngdoh Welfare Organisation (LYWO).

The CCAUM decided to launch the movement in the entireKhasi and Jaintia hills by organising a public rally at Nongstoinon April 6, 2005.26 On April 12, 2005, some of the organisationserected a gate at Domiasiat to check unauthorised entry into thearea.27 Landowner Spillity Lyngdoh Langrin said that the gatewas constructed as “a symbol of the people’s protest” against theproposed uranium mining project.

The project has its supporters too. On November 9, 2004, theLangrin War-San Lyngdoh Development Organisation (LWLDO)held a rally at Wahkaji village near Domiasiat to welcome the project.28 The rally was attended by Rangbah Shnongs and Sirdars (headmen) of villages.

UCIL’s Domiasiat proposal received a boost when the high-level team, which visited Jaduguda in Jharkhand, virtually gaveits seal of approval allaying fears of ill-effects. The KHADC chiefexecutive member Prestone Tynsong said the team did not witness any ill-effects of mining on human life, vegetations or animals there.29 In addition to this, another nod for the projectwas received from the results of the medical survey conducted in

Phangdilion village on December 13, 2005.30 The medical teamrefuted the claims made by NGOs that the health of the peoplewas getting affected due to the waste left after uranium explo-ration. At least 376 people, including 169 males and 207 females inthe age group of new borns to 80 years, underwent check-ups inthe health camp. The team checking them certified that there wasno apparent effect of radiation on the general health of the peopleresiding around the mining areas. The team checked patients fromPyndemsynia, Ryngkhiat, Nongmawmluh, Mawt-hemlang andRangblang, all adjacent to the uranium mining areas. The report,however, said that the medical team could not cover Domiasiatvillage on the same day as the area was not easily accessible.

Another report by Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC)ruled out any impact on health by radiation due to proposed min-ing.31 The BARC report indicated that “at the estimated dose of0.02 milli-sievert per year in public domain in the immediatevicinity attributable to the mining operation, no undesirablehealth impact is expected”. This was informed by the state’s min-ing and geology minister to the state assembly during questionhour on June 27, 2006.32

On April 11, 2006, the KHADC passed a recommendation infavour of the project to the Meghalaya chief minister.33 In fact, the KHADC even served a legal notice on the president of the Hill State People’s Democratic Party for its “misinformation propaganda and malicious campaign” against the project.

The struggle by anti-mining group and locals in the state con-tinues against UCIL. The public hearing of the project was recentlyheld on June 12, 2007, and was marked by protests. The fate of theproject now hangs in balance with most feeling that UCIL will getthe green signal even after 10 years of fierce battle by the locals.

227

MINING IN THE STATES: THE NORTH-EASTIA

N U

MED

A

Awaiting doomsday? UCIL’s plan to mine uranium in Domiasiat threatens the picturesque valley

m k

228

More than two-thirds of Orissa is made up of hilly forests: thestate accounts for seven per cent of India’s forests.1 It also

has a 480-km coastline and 11 per cent of India’s surface waterresources.2 It is a mineral hotspot as well – accounting for 24 percent of India’s reserves of coal, 17 per cent of its iron ore, 98 percent of chromite, 51 per cent of bauxite, and 35 per cent of man-ganese (see Map 1: Minerals and forests and Graph 1: The reserves).

Orissa also holds a key position as a mineral producer. It leadsthe country in the production of iron ore with a share of 28 percent.3 In 2004-05, the state also accounted for 41 per cent of India’stotal production of bauxite, 99 per cent of its chromite, 29 per centof dolomite, 46 per cent of pyroxenite, 37 per cent of manganeseand 41 per cent of quartzite (see Table 1: Mineral production).4

It is, therefore, not surprising that industries are flocking to setup base in the state. The Hindu Business Line (July 24, 2006) reportsthat the state has received private investment worth Rs 4,00,000crore in mineral-based industries.5 It boasts the presence of all thebig names in Indian industry – TISCO, SAIL, NALCO andHindalco, among others. Several multinationals and leaders in the mining sector (Pohang Iron & Steel Company, Arcelor Mittal,

Rio Tinto and ALCAN) have already acquired mining leases here or are in the process of doing so. According to the Federationof Indian Mineral Industries, the South African diamond giant, De Beers, has also acquired rights to explore over 8,500 sq km inthe state.6

What is this mining and industrialisation doing to Orissa? Thestate’s environment has already been severely compromised andthreatened by it; the real danger is that mining is likely to intensifyin the coming years. Biswajit Mohanty, secretary, Wildlife Societyof Orissa, and a keen observer of the way Orissa is opening itsdoors to mining, said in an interview to The Hindu Business Line(June 7, 2006): “The industrialisation boom will result in massiveenvironmental degradation since the local environment has a lim-ited ‘carrying capacity’ to absorb and assimilate effluents andwastes produced from such gigantic production facilities.”

A case in point is the steel industry. Aggressively promotinginvestments, Orissa has planned to hike its annual steel produc-tion to 56 MT, which shall require about 2,250 MT of iron ore overthe next 25 years; currently, the state produces only about two MTof steel.7 The additional steel-making capacity shall require at

17

24

51

98

35

32

95

77

12

0 20 40 60 80 100

Iron ore

Coal

Bauxite

Chromite

Manganese

Mineral sand

Nickel

Graphite

Dolomite

Percentage of national resource

GRAPH 1: The reservesBiodiversity-rich Orissa holds substantial mineral reserves

Sources: Based on analysis from anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005,Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur; Sanjay Khatua et al, 2006, ‘Ecological debt:A case study from Orissa, India’, Ecological Debt: The Peoples of the South arethe Creditors, World Council of Churches, Geneva, pp 130 (for mineral sand,nickel, graphite and dolomite)

TABLE 1: Mineral productionIron ore is the fastest growing mineral sector

Mineral Unit 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05

Coal ‘000 tonne 52,229 60,049 66,080

Bauxite Tonne 48,61,208 49,34,508 47,48,111

Chromite Tonne 30,49,410 28,92,379 36,28,207

Iron ore ‘000 tonne 22,077 31,288 40,567

Manganese ore Tonne 6,24,426 6,07,387 8,71,113

Dolomite Tonne 11,07,082 13,39,889 12,69,056

Fireclay Tonne 46,014 55,718 93,872

Graphite* Tonne 52,228 33,412 40,992

Kaolin Tonne 3,065 3,177 8,005

Sillimanite Tonne 7,640 11,341 13,129

Limestone ‘000 t 2,274 2,233 2,198

Pyrophyllite Tonne 27,129 41,178 39,235

Pyroxenite Tonne 2,17,233 1,98,375 2,09,224

Quartzite Tonne 10,332 19,409 37,801

Silica sand Tonne 19,000 18,000 19,000

Steatite Tonne 2,007 2,554 6,318

Note: *Run of mine: The mineral as it comes from the mine prior to screeningor any other treatment Source: Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,Nagpur, pp 11-64


Orissa

c m y k

229

MINING IN THE STATES: ORISSA

Protests: The resistance has been against

all types of mines, from iron ore to chromite

A N D H R A P R A D E S H

J H A R K H A N D WE S T B E N G A L

Ib

Has

do

Salandi

Battarani

Brahmani

mahanadi

Rushikulya

Chili

ka La

ke

Ban

shad

haraN

agavali

Tel

Indravati

JalaputReservoirBalimela

Reservoir

Sarada

Sabari

Sileru

Narangi

Baordhing

Indra

Son

du

r

Ong

Palr

i

Mah

anad

i

HirakundReservoir

SankhM

and

South KoelSubarnarekha

Burbablang

Koraput

Rayagada

GajapatiGanjam

PhulbaniKalahandi

Balangir

Nuapada

Bauda

Sonapur

Bargarh

Nayagarh

Puri

KhordaJagatsinghpur

Kendrapara

Cuttack

Dhenkanal

Jajpur Bhadrak

Baleshwar

Mayurbhanj

Keonjhargarh

Angul

Sambalpur

Deogarh

Jharsuguda

Sundargarh

Malkangiri

Nabarangapur B A Y O F B E N G A L

CH

HA

TT

IS

GA

RH

Open forests

Dense forests

River

Lead

Manganese

Iron

Coal/lignite

Dolomite

Graphite

Kaolin

Limestone

Mica

Granite

Bauxite

Chromite


MAP 1: Minerals and forestsBetween 1980 and 2005, about 15,386 ha of forest land was diverted for mining in Orissa

c m y k

least 527 million cubic metre of freshwater annually, which will bedrawn from major rivers such as the Mahanadi, Brahmani andBaitarani.8 The result: massive environmental loss and contamina-tion, most of which the state is already experiencing. Forests have been ravaged, and landscapes altered. Water sources are drying up or are severely polluted, and air pollution is rising.Large-scale displacement and losses in traditional livelihoodshave – inevitably – accompanied the environmental setbacks. Andas a result of all this, conflicts and tensions across the state are onthe boil. Local communities are up in arms over the state cosyingup to industrial interests in blatant disregard of their rights and welfare.

■ PLENTY...

Though Orissa does not have a separate mineral policy, it recog-nises the mineral industry as a potential thrust area within theindustrial policy. As indicated above, to promote the industry, thestate is offering sops like timely implementation of projects, singlewindow and fast track clearance, and special incentives for proj-ects with investment of over Rs 30 crore.9 The state’s policy alsotalks of ‘land bank’ schemes under which government land willbe identified by the Industrial Development Corporation ofOrissa (IDCO) and earmarked for industries. Any projects in dis-tricts like Kalahandi, Nuapada, Bolangir, Sonepur, Koraput,Rayagada, Gajapati and Deogarh will be given an interest subsidyof five per cent of the term loan as an incentive for backward areadevelopment.

Orissa is the second highest contributor to the total value gen-erated by the minerals sector in India: according to the IBM, it

accounted for 10 per cent (Rs 5,820 crore) of the total mineralvalue in 2004-05.10 The strength of the state has been its metallicminerals – in 2004-05, it was responsible for 36 per cent of the totalvalue of metallic minerals, the highest in the country.11

The state’s mineral industry has certainly come a long way.The sector registered a jump of almost three times from 1997-98,when the value of mineral resources generated was Rs 2,237crore.12 Analysis of the growth pattern of the industry shows thatgrowth was sluggish in the initial period, but picked up after2001-02. Between 1997-98 and 2001-02, the percentage of growthranged around six per cent. After 2002-03, the mineral industryboomed in the state and the value of mineral production grew by,on an average, 27 per cent per year (see Graph 2: Trends in value of mineral production).

Coal and iron ore are the two most important minerals for thestate in terms of value: in 2004-05, coal accounted for 46 per centof the total mineral value generated, while iron ore contributed 35per cent (see Graph 3: Value generation – the key minerals). The otherimportant minerals were chromite (12 per cent) and bauxite (twoper cent). According to the IBM, the state also produced minorminerals worth an estimated Rs 45 crore.

Despite this growing significance of minerals in Orissa’s econ-omy, the contribution of mining to the state’s GDP in 2003-04 wasonly 6.6 per cent – much lower than the 33 per cent contributed byagricultural and allied activities.13 This contribution hadincreased very marginally from six per cent in 2000-01, accordingto the Bhubaneshwar-based Directorate of Economics andStatistics – this, as the IBM points out, when the value of mineralproduction had increased almost two-fold in the same period.14

This can only mean that though the mineral industry in the state

230


Bauxite 2%

Others 1%

Chromite 12%

Manganese 2%

Iron ore 35%

Minorminerals 1%

Limestone 1%

Coal 46%

Source: Analysed from data published in anon, 2006, Indian MineralsYearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 11-64

GRAPH 3: Value generation – the key mineralsCoal and iron account for more than 80 per cent of value

22374

23794

23832

26897

28417

34432

47315

58204

0

10000

20000

30000

40000

50000

60000

70000

1997

-98

1998

-99

1999

-00

2000

-01

2001

-02

2002

-03

2003

-04

2004

-05

Vau

e o

f m

iner

al p

rod

uct

ion

(in

Rs

mill

ion

)

Years

Source: Based on data collected from Indian Minerals Yearbooks 1997 to2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur

GRAPH 2: Trends in value of mineral productionThe industry has boomed: after 2001-02, average growthrate was 27 per cent

m k

is growing, there are other sectors such as agriculture which aredoing better; in fact, the contribution of agriculture to the state’sGDP went up from 31 per cent in 2000-01 to 33 per cent in 2003-04, says the Directorate of Economics and Statistics.15

In 2004-05, the Orissa government collected Rs 664 crore asrevenue from mining. Compared to other mineral-rich states suchas Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh andChhattisgarh, Orissa – surprisingly – collects lower royalty,though the state generates the second highest mineral value in thecountry. One plausible explanation is that as coal has a higher roy-alty than other minerals. Therefore, the states, such as Jharkhandand Chhattisgarh, that lead in fuel mineral production are theones collecting higher royalties.

As with the trends in mineral value, the royalty collected bythe state has increased after 2001-02, points out the steel andmines department of the Orissa government. But mining’s contri-bution to the total revenue generated by the Orissa governmenthas been just about five-six per cent in the years between 2002-03

and 2004-05 (see Table 2: Mining’s share in revenues). The govern-ment has tried – in vain – to increase its revenue from the miner-als sector by bringing in new legislations to tax mineral produc-tion (see Box: A failed attempt).

The major minerals have been the mainstay of the state’s min-ing revenues, accounting for, on an average, 94 per cent of thetotal royalty collected by the state. Minor minerals contribute theremaining six per cent. Among the various major minerals, coal, isa key contributor to the royalty, accounting for, on an average, 69per cent (see Graph 4: Minerals and royalty). The other importantcontributions to the state exchequer came from iron ore (11 percent), bauxite and chromite (five per cent each).

231


Year Mineral royalty Total revenue receipt Royalty as (is Rs crore) (is Rs crore) percentage of

total revenue receipt

2002-03 440.6 8,438.77 5.2

2003-04 547.2 9,440.24 5.8

2004-05 663.6 11,850.19 5.6

Sources: Anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-levelCommittee, Planning Commission, New Delhi; anon, 2006, State Finances – AStudy of Budgets of 2006-07, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, November;anon, 2005, State Finances – A Study of Budgets of 2005-06, Reserve Bank ofIndia, Mumbai, December

TABLE 2: Mining’s share in revenuesAlmost unchanged, though the industry is booming

A failed attemptThe state’s efforts to bolster revenues from mining fall flat

In 2005, the Orissa government tried for the fourth time to levy a taxon mineral-bearing lands with reference to minerals extracted and soldin the state. But the move was struck down by the Orissa High Court(HC) on December 5, 2005. Companies like NALCO, MahanadiCoalfields, TISCO, Tata Refractories, Jindal Steel and Power andEastern Zone Mining Association were the petitioners.

The government had proposed to implement the Orissa RuralInfrastructure and Socio-economic Development Act (ORISED),2004 to mobilise Rs 1,500 crore through a cess on mining tax. Thegovernment proposed to use the tax for developing infrastructure inmining areas. However, the Court repealed the Act, indicating that itwas constitutionally invalid. In a state vs Centre conflict, the HC hadto take a decision on whether the state has the legislative compe-tence to levy tax on minerals, since the Central government already

levies a similar tax. The bench felt the tax was being levied on thevalue of the minerals extracted, and did not bear a direct relationshipwith land as a unit. Since it was not a tax on land according to thestate list, it was rejected.

Since May 25, 2005, the Orissa government had imposed a tax onthe value of mineral-bearing land. The tax varied from five per cent to20 per cent and was levied on minerals like coal, iron ore, chromite,manganese ore, bauxite, limestone, dolomite, fireclay, china clay,graphite and gemstone-bearing mines.The HC order provided relief tomine owners who had been paying the tax. The state government hasnow been ordered to return the amount to the mine owners. Otherlegislations in Orissa had tried to levy similar taxes, all of which wererepealed by the Supreme Court (SC). These include the Orissa MiningAreas Development Fund Act, 1952 and the Orissa Cess Act, 1962. Thestate would now appeal the HC order in the SC.

– Padmaparna Ghosh, Down To Earth, New Delhi

Limestone 2%

Coal/lignite 68%

Manganese 1%

Other majorminerals 1%

Minor minerals 6%

Iron ore 11%Bauxite 5%

Chromite 5%

Dolomite 1%

Note: This is an average of three years (2002-03 to 2004-05) of contributionof royalty from different mineralsSource: Anon, 2006, ‘Annexure 7’, National Mineral Policy, Report of theHigh-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi

GRAPH 4: Minerals and royaltyRoyalty from coal accounts for almost two-thirds of thetotal

m k

Mining of different minerals, including coal, is currently beingundertaken on 99,952 ha of land in the state.16 In 2005, there were605 mining leases in Orissa; however, 45 per cent of these leases were not operational.17 According to A Aruna Murthy’s2006 Status Paper on Mining Leases in Orissa, only 303 mine leases(55 per cent) covering an area of 72,077 ha and amounting to 72 per cent of the total area, were operational.

In the years between 1995 and 1998, the total area under min-ing in the state had followed the same trends as the total numberof mines. However, after 1997-98, while the area under mining hasprogressively gone down, the number of mining leases has goneup. The explanation for this could be that in recent years, moreleases are being granted to smaller mines (see Graph 5: Area undermining). Overall, according to the IBM, the area under mining(excluding coal and minor minerals) has actually reduced from0.105 million ha in 1995-96 to 95,531 ha in 2002-03.

In fact, three of the top seven mining districts of Orissa –Keonjhar, Sundergarh and Mayurbhanj – along with Jajpur, aredominated by smaller-sized mines. Almost one-third (32 per cent)of the land under mining is in Keonjhar, followed by Sundergarhwith 20 per cent (see Graph 6: The key districts). Average land sizesper mining lease in these four districts are 154 ha in Sundargarh,117 ha in Mayurbhanj, 216 ha in Jajpur, and 263 ha in Keonjhar.18

All the four districts also hold large deposits of iron ore. Clearly,to meet the growing demand of iron ore from China, the Orissagovernment has resorted to leasing out large numbers of smaller-sized mines: districts like Keonjhar, which are in a deplorable statetoday due to extensive mining by small players, have borne theimpact. Small mines are largely unregulated.

Of the remaining three top mining districts of Angul, Koraput and Jharsuguda, the first two have bigger-sized mines,with average land holdings of 601 ha per mine and 787 ha permine respectively.19 The reason: Angul has large coal mines

232


Sundergarh 20%

Angul 10%

Jharsuguda 9%

Koraput 6%Mayurbhanj 5%

Jajpur 5%

Others 13%

Keonjhar 32%

Source: A Aruna Murthy, 2006, Status Paper on Mining Leases in Orissa,Vasundhara, Bhubaneshwar (based on information obtained under the RTI Actfrom the Directorate of Mines, Orissa)

GRAPH 6: The key districtsSmall iron ore mines dominate in Keonjhar and Sundergarh

Small is big: the landscape of districts like Keonjhar and Sundergarh isdotted with small-sized iron ore mines

DEB

AN

JAN

BA

ND

OPA

DH

YAY

570

580

590

600

610

620

630

640

1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01

Nu

mb

er o

f m

ines

90

92

94

96

98

100

102

104

106

108

Area u

nd

er min

ing

(in '000 h

a)

Number of mines Area under mining

Note: This does not include land used for extracting minor mineralsSource: Indian Minerals Yearbooks and other publications of the Indian Bureauof Mines, Nagpur

GRAPH 5: Area under mining Area is going down, while number of mines is increasing –this shows that smaller mines are being phased in

c m y k

while Koraput is dominated by bauxite mines. Orissa’s bauxitereserves, in fact, are becoming a major bone of contention (see Box: Bauxite bonanza).

Out of the 605 mining leases, the maximum number has beengranted for graphite ore mines (114), followed by iron ore (75) andquartz (72).20 However, in terms of area, iron ore mines accountfor 22 per cent, coal for 18 per cent and iron and manganese for 15 per cent of the total mining area in the state (see Graph 7:Mining leases – the spread). Bauxite and coal mines have larger landholdings per mine compared to iron ore, which is dominated bymedium- and small-sized mines.

The biggest mining company in Orissa is the state-ownedOrissa Mining Corporation (OMC), which holds almost 20 per centof the total land under mining.21 The second biggest is the MiningCorporation Limited with leases covering 17 per cent of the landunder mining.22 According to the Status Paper on Mining Leases inOrissa, two steel companies, SAIL and TISCO, are the other impor-tant mining leaseholders, accounting for six per cent each.23

233


Bauxite bonanzaOrissa opens its bauxite wealth to the world... and impoverishes its land and people further

In Orissa, bauxite – the principal raw material for making aluminium –is becoming synonymous with big business. Widely used in construc-tion, as packaging material and for making automobile and aircraftbodies, global aluminium consumption has increased from 32 MT in2005 to 35 MT in 2006. It is expected to grow at similar levels in 2007,spurred largely on by Chinese demand. At the same time, environmentalregulations and a costly, power-intensive production process – haveled to scaling down to aluminium production in the West.

In India, however – and especially in Orissa – matters are different. Orissa holds more than half of India’s bauxite reserves, and israpidly becoming a hub for industries based on bauxite – all thanks to, besides its rich reserves, low operating costs and its proxim-ity to ports. Foreign investors like the Sterlite group, Biliton andALCAN are making a beeline to the state. According to an estimate by the Orissa government, the bauxite reserves in the state are worth“Rs 5 lakh crore.”

The key bauxite zones in the state include the districts of Koraput,Sundergarh, Kalahandi (Lanjigarh), Bolangir and Rayagada(Kashipur). The state already has top producers in the aluminium sector such as NALCO and INDAL. Both these companies are plan-ning to expand their operations: NALCO is increasing its capacity from2,88,000 tonne per annum (TPA) to 3,45,000 TPA while INDAL isexpanding from 65,000 to 100,000 TPA.

ALCAN, a Canadian company, had formed a consortium with theAditya Birla group for setting up a bauxite mine and refinery inKashipur block. This refinery is 100 per cent export-oriented with aproduction capacity of three MT per year. Vedanta Alumina Ltd of theSterlite group has commissioned a 1.4-MT alumina plant at Lanjigarhat a cost of nearly US $800 million. The company will be mining forbauxite over 680 ha of the pristine Niyamgiri forests.

The losers in this hunt for the bonanza have been the tribalsinhabiting these bauxite-rich lands. Since most of the resources arelocated in forest and tribal areas, the onslaught by the aluminium companies has impacted the forests and the tribal populations themost. The project-affected people of NALCO’s plant in Damanjodi arestill struggling for a proper resettlement package. The people ofKashipur have been fighting Utkal Alumina’s plans to mine bauxite inthe Baphlimali hills – the battle has been going on for more than 10years and the project is yet to receive an environmental clearance.Recently, ALCAN announced its withdrawal from this project.

Vedanta’s ambitions have hit a similar roadblock, with localsopposing its plans of mining in the Niyamgiri hills, considered sacredby the tribals. They fear that mining will destroy the fragile ecology ofKalahandi, dry up the water streams and ruin their livelihoods. But inspite of opposition by and criticism from experts and the civil society,the company has managed to get the final nod from the Union ministry of environment and forests.

Refineries are water-intensive. It is estimated that the UAIL project alone would require 19,000-26,000 cubic metre of water everyday, enough to meet the requirement of four lakh people.1 This canonly be met through the diversion of local streams and rivers, which isbound to affect water availability for local use and crop irrigation.The quality of rivers and streams are also likely to be affected by run-off from mines and wastewater discharges from the plants.Disposal of the red mud and flyash would require large tracts of land. Emissions of greenhouse gases, dust, SOx and NOx into the airare also an issue.

On top of this, more people would be displaced – and a majorityof these would be tribals with no clear land rights and therefore, no eligibility for rehabilitation and compensation. In most regions, it hasbeen found that the condition of tribals worsens after the initiation ofa project.

The Orissa government, of course, is unconcerned and is going allout to market its bauxite reserves.

Iron 22%Coal 18%

Iron &manganese 15%

Manganese 6%

Others 16%

Chromite 7%

Bauxite 6%

Limestone &dolomite 6%

Fireclay 4%

Source: A Aruna Murthy, 2006, Status Paper on Mining Leases in Orissa,Vasundhara, Bhubaneshwar (based on information obtained under the RTI Actfrom the Directorate of Mines, Orissa)

GRAPH 7: Mining leases – the spreadIron ore mines occupy the largest area

c m y k

■ ...AMIDST GROWING POVERTY

For all its mineral wealth, Orissa performs very poorly in terms ofhuman development indicators. The state has a human develop-ment index (HDI) of 0.404; in comparison, Kerala’s HDI stands at0.638.24 This is worse than other mineral-rich states of Tamil Nadu,Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal and Rajasthan. Takinginto account food availability, food access, and food absorption,Orissa has been put in the category of ‘severely food insecure’regions. Even the government agrees that the food insecurity is dueto “a vulnerable rural population with poor livelihood access”.

According to the state’s Human Development Report, the rela-tive per capita income of Orissa has declined vis-à-vis all otherlow-income states during the second half of the 1990s – preciselythe period when the state went on an industrial overdrive.According to this report, Orissa’s per capita income was three-fourths that of the all-India average, and became half by the endof the 1990s.

Except Jajpur and Angul, most of the heavily mined districts ofOrissa are tribal dominated – a trend which can be seen all over thecountry. In Sundergarh, Koraput and Mayurbhanj, tribals accountfor more then 50 per cent of the population, while in Keonjhar, morethan 44 per cent of the population is from the tribal community (seeTable 3: The mining districts – human development indicators). Influx ofoutsiders due to large-scale mining in Angul and Jajpur has madetheir tribals a minority in their own land.

According to the state’s Human Development Report, the pover-ty ratio (number of people below the poverty line divided by thetotal population) in the southern and northern regions in the state– which include mining districts like Koraput, Sundergarh,Keonjhar, Angul and Mayurbhanj – has increased between 1993-94and 1999-00. This is despite an overall decreasing trend in thepoverty ratio in the whole of Orissa. An estimated 75 per cent ofthe state’s poor live in these southern and northern regions.

In Keonjhar, the most mined district of the state, 62 per cent ofthe population lives below the poverty line. In Koraput, the bauxite capital of India, the figure is higher at 79 per cent.Sundergarh performs a little better with 37 per cent of its population under the poverty line. Tribals and dalit families facethe brunt of poverty – they constitute 44-82 per cent of the total number of below the poverty line families in the most mined districts.

However, the performance of some of these districts in HDIwithin the state is good. Jharsuguda ranks number two,Sundergarh is number four and Angul occupies the sixth positionin HDI. The reason for the high ranking of Angul and Jharsugudais because these are coal-rich districts. The coal mines in the stateare under the public sector which generates a far greater numberof employment opportunities compared to the private sector. Thisis the reason why the per capita income of these districts is high-er than in the rest of the state. On the other hand, Jajpur, Keonjharand Koraput are at the bottom of the pack, with HDI ranks of 22,24 and 27 respectively (out of the total of 30 districts in the state)– in all these districts mining is in the hands of the private sector.

All the mineral-rich districts are in the list of the 150 mostbackward districts of the country. It is obvious that mining’s‘wealth’ has not reached the people in these districts. Keonjharranks 30 in the list of the most backward districts. Others are evenworse – Sundergarh is at number 18, and Koraput at number 10.Among the mineral-rich districts, Jajpur does relatively betterwith a ranking of 136.

Koraput’s ranking among the backward districts is reflectedby the poor education levels: just over 36 per cent of the popula-tion in the district is literate. The literacy rate in Keonjhar isaround 60 per cent, while Sundergarh and Angul have rates of 65and 69 per cent, respectively.

The per capita income in the mineral-rich districts is the low-est in Jajpur – just Rs 4,468. The coal-rich districts show a better

234


District Tribal population Ranking among Human Literacy Per capita income Percentage Crude birth (as percentage 150 backward Development rate (Rs) 1997-98 of population rate1

of total) districts Index (in 1993-94 prices) below poverty line

Jajpur 7.4 136 22/30 72.19 4,468 NA 29.2

Keonjhar 44.52 30 24/30 59.75 5,286 61.92 32.3

Sundergarh 50.74 18 4/30 65.22 6,823 36.48 29.3

Angul 11.68 106 6/30 69.4 10,877 NA 31

Koraput 50.67 10 27/30 36.2 5,148 78.65 34.3

Jharsuguda 31.88 67 2/30 71.47 11,210 NA 27.90

Mayurbhanj 57.87 15 9/30 52.43 4,297 68.42 33.3

Orissa 23 90%* – 50.97 – 48.01 –

Note: 1Crude birth rate is the number of births per 1,000 population. * 27 out of 30 districts are in the backward listSource: Anon, 2004, ‘Some measures of human development – an inter-district analysis’, Human Development Report 2004, government of Orissa, Bhubaneshwar, p 194

TABLE 3: The mining districts – human development indicatorsA large majority of the state’s mineral districts count among the most backward districts in India

c m y k

performance: average per capita income in Angul is Rs 10,877,while it is Rs 11,210 in Jharsuguda. This is substantially higherthan the per capita income in other mining districts.

Overall, statistics indicate that the income from mineralextraction rarely benefits the regions from where these mineralscome – in fact, poverty is increasing in many of these districts.Some districts have gained probably because of higher employ-ment provided by coal mining, but even this has not resulted inoverall food security, livelihood access, or better health indicators.

■ LAND AND FORESTS: IN A MAKEOVER MODE

One of the most severe impacts of mining has been the changes ithas brought to Orissa’s land use patterns and concurrently, itslandscape. As in all other states, the land taken for mining inOrissa has either been forest land, agricultural fields or common(grazing) land. Forests have especially borne the brunt of mining.

While the mining and minerals industry occupies just 0.64 percent of the total geographical area in Orissa25, the devastation ithas wrought has been immense – largely because most of the min-eral deposits are in regions with forest cover. Nearly 39 per cent ofthe land area in Keonjhar is forested (see Table 4: Orissa – forestscoexist with minerals); the district is extremely rich in iron ore and

235


Life in the fast lane: industrialisation has failed to bring prosperity to the state’s population

AG

NIM

IRH

BA

SU /

CSE

Orissa Mineral Area under Percentage mining (ha) of area under

forest cover in the district (%)

Jajpur Chromite 4,543.2 9.04

Keonjhar Iron ore and manganese 31,255.5 38.97

Sundergarh Iron ore 20,017.2 41.44

Angul Coal 10,230.5 41.66

Koraput Bauxite 6,297.3 17.68

Jharsuguda Coal 8,865.5 13.89

Mayurbhanj Iron ore 5,391.6 38.44

Source: Data on area under mining and number of mines from A ArunaMurthy, 2006, Status Paper on Mining Leases in Orissa, Vasundhara,Bhubaneshwar (based on information obtained under the RTI Act from theDirectorate of Mines, Orissa); forest statistics from anon, 2005, State of ForestReport 2003, Forest Survey of India, Dehradun, pp 88

TABLE 4: Orissa – forests coexist with miningKeonjhar, the most-mined district, has 39 per cent of itsarea under forests

c m y k

236


Around 73 per cent of Orissa’s abandoned mines are ‘orphaned’ – the promoter has excavated the mineral and left behind piles of waste as highas this one

AG

NIM

IRH

BA

SU

c m y k

manganese. In Sundergarh and Angul, also heavily mined(Sundergarh is rich in iron ore, and Angul is a coal mining hub),the figures on forest cover are even higher: approximately 42 percent. In Mayurbhanj, 38 per cent of the district is forested, whilethe figures for Koraput and Jharsuguda are around 18 and 14 percent, respectively.

According to the estimates of the state’s department of forestsand environment, 31,780 ha of forest land was diverted in Orissafor different projects, including mining, between 1980 and 2005.Mining alone accounted for half of the forest land diverted in thestate – around 15,386 ha.26 The state also has the dubious distinc-tion of clearing the maximum amount of forest land for mining inthe entire country: of total forest land cleared for mining in India,Orissa accounts for 17 per cent.27

Between 2002 and 2005, the Union ministry of environmentand forests (MoEF) received 51 proposals for mining in forestareas in the state. Out of this, 35 were approved, four rejected, andeight returned to the state for want of complete information.28

Recent years have seen a spate of projects getting forest clearance. In fact, the impact of diversion of forest land for mining in

Keonjhar was documented in a study conducted by the WorldBank in 2005. It found that in the Joda and Keonjhar Sadar miningblocks of Keonjhar district, for instance, the area under wastelandand mining has gone up (see Table 5: Mining and land use). In bothcases, the biggest casualty has been forest land. In Joda, the areaunder forests has gone down by almost 50 per cent, while inSadar, it has reduced by 70 per cent. The land under agriculturealso shows a dip in both the cases. At the same time, the area

under wasteland has increased by 124 per cent in Joda, while inSadar block it has gone up by 50 per cent.

According to a paper presented by Ranjan Panda, seniorresearcher and in-charge of Manav Adhikar Samiti, Sambalpur, inan article published by the Society for Study of Peace and Conflict,a public research organisation based in Delhi, in its publicationOpinion/Analysis, agricultural land is shrinking in mining andindustrial districts like Rayagada and Jharsuguda. In Rayagada,unproductive land is nearly 174 per cent higher than cultivableland. Such lands amount to as high as two-thirds of Jharsuguda’stotal cultivable area.29

But the Orissa government does not seem to be bothered byland degradation. It is, in fact, working hard to fast track forestdiversion. One example of the fast-tracking of forest clearances(with generous help from the Centre) for a project is that ofPOSCO, the South Korean steel giant which wants to set up a steelplant in the state. Since its announcement in 2005, the project hashit several roadblocks – from villagers’ protests and confusion overland rights to the company’s inability to secure a mine lease. Butthe impasse is now being reviewed directly by the prime minister’soffice to expedite the 12-MT plant. Recently, the Central govern-ment asked the Orissa government to clear more forest land forsetting up the long-delayed steel plant. The state had asked to sub-mit a plan of action by April 30, 2007. However, Orissa chief secre-tary A K Tripathi points out that a ‘forest diversion clearance’ willhave to be first approved by the MoEF. To compensate for the raz-

237


SHYA

MA

L /

CSE

Land use changes in Joda block

Land use Area during 1989 (in ha) Area during 2004 (in ha)

Habitat 1,466.27 1,644.45

Agriculture 22,128.61 21,520.57

Forest 36,191.82 24,501.17

Wasteland 8,294.82 18,540.86

Mining 1,646.41 2,807.11

Land use changes in Keonjhar Sadar block

Habitat 2,822.02 3,642.86

Agriculture 36,282.00 35,452.14

Forest 12,837.99 7,576.63

Wasteland 4,177.00 6,280.43

Mining 755.54 77.76

Water body 1,089.64 1,054.10

Source: Sanjay Srivastav et al, 2006, Environment and social challenges of mineral-based growth in Orissa: Building partnership for sustainable development, World Bank, pp 48

TABLE 5: Mining and land useWithin 15 years of mining, forest land has reduced to halfits original size in Joda and Keonjhar Sadar blocks

m k

238


Saving a hillThe story of Gandhamardan

The biodiversity-rich Gandhamardan reserve forest, with an area of around 300 sq km, is situated on the borders of Sambalpur,Bolangir and Kalahandi districts. There are two ancient temples here – Nrusinghanath and Harishankar – situated near two perennial streams, the waters of which are believed to be sacred.Gandhamardan’s water resources, with over 800 small perennialsprings and many more rain-fed ones, supply water through 63 smallstreams to 17 large streams joining two rivers, the Ong and Suktel,tributaries of the Maa Nadi (or Mother River). A partial vegetation sur-vey of the slopes conducted by the Botanical Survey of India manyyears ago, recorded a diversity of 2,700 flowering plants, 125 medicinalplants and 220 species of other important plants. Local and forestdepartment sources claim that a rich variety of fauna also exists,including tiger, leopard, sloth bear, palm civet, jungle cat, wild dog,various primate species and bats.

The forest has no human habitation, but is surrounded by the vil-lages and towns of Jharbandh, Paikmal, Padmapur and Gaisilet blocksof Sambalpur in the north-east, Naupara block of Kalahandi in thewest, and Khaprakhole and Patnagarh blocks of Bolangir in the south.

More than 200 villages, with a population of around one lakh, aredirectly dependent on the forest.

In 1971, a government gazette notification revealed that a largeamount of easily exploitable quality bauxite was stored in theGandhamardan hill. The public sector Bharat Aluminium Company(BALCO) applied to the Orissa government for a mining lease over3,584 ha in the area in mid-1976. In 1981, the Orissa government notified that 36 sq km of the Gandhamardan reserve forest wasreserved for exploitation of bauxite for the public sector and a lease washurriedly sanctioned. In May 1983, when the foundation stone for themine was laid by the then chief minister, the people held a demonstra-tion and his vehicle was stoned. Until mid-1985, there was an appar-ent lull, during which BALCO went on erecting the infrastructurewhile activists collected information and organised the people.Villagers, who had initially welcomed BALCO, began to see the earlysigns of destruction with the building of roads, railways, ropeways anda water supply reservoir, and started asking questions. Some peoplefiled a public interest case in the Orissa High Court.

By August 1986, the Gandhamardan Surakshya Yuva Parishad(GSYP) had been formed with active participation of local youth. Invillage-level meetings and workshops, the GSYP discussed issues likedeforestation, microclimate variation, silting of streams, dust pollutionand the entry of frightened wild animals into villages because of blast-ing. The movement gathered momentum through rallies, slogans andsignature campaigns, which resulted in direct action like relay hungerpickets on the BALCO road to prevent vehicles going to the miningsites, and boycotts by labourers. People from 40 villages organised arelay protest: villagers, including women and children, from each vil-lage came and blocked the road every day. Administrative harassmentbegan; about 1,300 people, more than half of them women, were eitherarrested or dragged to court. BALCO authorities, of course, maintainedthat they would not harm the ecosystem and would be cutting very little forest. However, the protestors were not in a mood to listen.

In early 1986, a group of intellectuals from Orissa living in Delhiorganised the Gandhamardan Protection Committee and collectedsignatures to make an appeal to the then prime minister. Some actiongroups like the People’s Union for Democratic Rights and the Institutefor the Study of Society and Culture visited the area and reportedagainst the project.

The Union ministry of environment and forests stated in a pressrelease in September 1986 that permission for test mining and todeforest the hills would not be given under the Forest ConservationAct. On the other hand, the ministry of mines tried hard to push theproject by setting up an expert committee which stated that theimpacts of the mines would be manageable. The people, however,refused to relent: their slogan was “Beat us on our backs, but not on ourbellies”. The strong protest movement completely stalled the miningactivities of the company and the project was shelved (though BALCOclaimed to have invested Rs 30 crore in it). But Gandhamardan stillremains endangered: the Orissa Mining Corporation now owns themine lease and may enter into alliance with some mining companies.

– A B Mishra, The fight for survival, CSE, New Delhi

The sentinel of Gandhamardan: the temple of the hill’s presidingdeity would have been destroyed by mining – something whichthe people could not accept

PATR

IK O

SKA

RSSO

N

m k

ing of forests, the state government will have to provide alternativeland to the forest department and pay an equal amount of moneyfor its value and for reforestation, Tripathi says.

Destruction of forest land has a direct bearing on wildlife. Theelephant population in the state has seen a decline from 1,841 in2002 to a little over 1,600 in 2005.30 In Talcher (Angul district), elephants were displaced by the coal mining activities of CoalIndia in the early 1970s. In Sundergarh, mining and the develop-ment of the Rourkela Steel Town affected elephants and otherwildlife. Elephant habitats and corridors have also been severelyimpacted in both north and south Keonjhar. The situation inKeonjhar is particularly alarming, as elephant population hascome down drastically: according to reports, only about 150 elephants are left in the district and they have no outlet routetowards the Satkosia and Similipal ranges (see Box: No place for ele-phants). The proposed extraction of bauxite from the eco-fragileareas of Niyamgiri, Gandhamardan and Karlapat wildlife sanctuary is likely to exterminate wildlife further and ruin the richsources of water in the region (see Box: Saving a hill).

However, the government’s moves towards diversion of landfor mining have been strongly opposed by environmentalists andlocal people, especially tribals, who have spearheaded a movementto save their lands, livelihoods and water resources. For these tribals, forests are not only the sources of livelihood and home towildlife, but are also important sources of water. In fact, local inhab-itants also believe that many of the mineral-rich forested regions ofOrissa are sacred and the abodes of local and tribal deities.

The protests over the alumina refinery project and bauxitemining by the Vedanta group are probably the best indicators of what exactly is at stake. Vedanta requires about 721 ha for bauxite mining on top of the Niyamgiri hills in Kalahandi district.Much of this land is categorised as a reserved forest.31

The mining area consists of forest and grassland ecosystems ofextremely high value as wildlife habitat, for biodiversity, and fromthe perspective of water availability in this drought-prone area.The Central Empowered Committee (CEC) of the Supreme Court,

in its report on the project, says that the area is rich in wildlife, hasa dense forest cover, and has been proposed to be notified as awildlife sanctuary in the working plan of the area duly approvedby the MoEF under the Forest Conservation Act, 1980. The reportrecommends that “…the use of the forest land in an ecologicallysensitive area like the Niyamgiri Hills should not be permitted“.

Attempts have been made to quantify the impact of forestdiversion for the Vedanta project. According to guidelines speci-fied by the MoEF, as a thumb rule, the environmental value of oneha of fully-stocked forest (density 1.0) can be taken as Rs 126.74lakh, to accrue over a period of 50 years.32 Approximately, 660 haof forest land will be diverted for the mining project alone.Assuming an average density of 0.5, the net present value (NPV)or environmental value of forest diversion at this rate will approx-imately be equal to Rs 417 crore. Even the officially listed ‘non-for-est area’ (covering 49 ha) has good forest cover, and if this is alsocovered under the NPV formula, there will be an additional costof Rs 32 crore. This costing does not take into account the uniqueand infinitely valuable ensemble of rare species found in the proposed area. While numbers cannot convey the entire impact, they are an indicator of why forest diversion is under fire(see Flashpoints for more on the Vedanta project).

239


Vedanta’s mining project in Lanjigarh is being bitterly opposed bylocals and environmentalists as it would destroy vast tracks of richbio-diverse forest land in Niyamgiri

AG

NIM

IRH

BA

SU /

CSE

No place for elephantsA proposed elephant reserve meets with state apathy

The Orissa government's 'concern' for wildlife is evident: even afterthe Union ministry of environment and forests approved the creationof a new elephant reserve, the state government seems to have devel-oped cold feet in formally notifying the area. The reason: mines.

The proposed reserve – Baitarani Elephant Reserve – comprisesa huge chunk from both Keonjhar and Dhenkanal districts, both richin metallic minerals. Of the 10,560 sq km proposed for the reserve,Keonjhar alone accounts for 6,548 sq km, while Dhenkanal's contribution is 2,243 sq km. The state government finds this area alittle too big.

Once declared a reserve, the place will become classified as asensitive area – therefore, not suitable for mining – which seems tohave sent the state government on the back foot.

m k

240


Orphaned Miners in Orissa including public sector companies areafflicted by the ‘dig and run’ syndrome

One major environmental challenge for the state’s mining industry – inwhich it has failed miserably – has been to return the land in the sameform as it was taken. Unfortunately, the common practice has been tosimply abandon the mines without making any efforts at land reclama-tion. According to the IBM, around 73 per cent of the abandoned minesin Orissa are “orphaned”– the promoter has excavated the mineral andvacated the site without reclaiming the land. Talcher is a case in point:it is facing subsidence as the exhausted underground mines have notbeen filled up with sand as required.

A gigantic scam, in fact, is underway in Talcher. Crores of rupeesearmarked for sand filling in coal mines have been misappropriated,triggering a serious debate on the safety of life and property of peoplein mining areas. President of the Talcher-based Brahmani AnchalSuraksha Parishad (BASP), Bhibhudendra Pratap Das, points to the

case of Deoulabeda colliery: here, while coal extraction has been completed, no sand filling has been done.

No action has been taken on this under-utilisation of funds.Talcher lies on the earthquake zone, which makes it doubly importantfor its abandoned mines to be filled up. Way back in 1980, authoritieshad assured that no mining which might endanger the life and prop-erty of people, would be undertaken in the area. In October 2006,Mahanadi Coalfields Limited assured steps would be taken for sandfilling; in the absence of sand filling, landslides have occurred at leasteight times in the recent past.

A public interest litigation has been filed on the issue by PurnaChandra Sahu, a councillor of Talcher municipality. The petitioner hasstated that Talcher town was facing environmental threat caused byextensive coal extraction. After coal extraction, the pits are not filledwith sand as required, thereby pushing the town into danger, he hassaid. In response to this, the Orissa High Court has issued notices tothe secretary, Union coal ministry; the secretary, Steel and MinesDepartment, Orissa and Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd.

Dumped: most miners in the state extract the minerals and leave without reclaiming the area

RAN

JAN

PA

ND

A

m k

■ WATER: POLLUTED AND DWINDLING

Orissa is considered as a water-surplus state, and this view hasbecome the bane of its water resources. It is assessed that thoughOrissa occupies only four per cent of India's total geographic area,it has 11 per cent of the country’s total water resources. The state'sannual surface water flow has been assessed at 54,540 millioncubic metre (mcm).33 The stage of groundwater development inthe state has been assessed in 2001 at less than 15 per cent.34

The Orissa government considers this water and mineralabundance as 'competitive advantage'. “Orissa has 61 billiontonne of coal reserves, which can sustain power generation in theorder of 100,000 MW for a century. The state, which also has vastwater resources, can become the powerhouse of the nation,“ saidchief minister Naveen Patnaik while discussing a mega powerplant with Anil Ambani of Reliance Energy. Morgan Stanley's lat-est Global Economic Forum Report has stated that Orissa has thepotential to emerge as a centre for the metals business in India andcan attract investments up to US $30-40 billion over the next fiveyears – this, naturally, has further fuelled such perceptions.

● Industries consume waterBut the water-surplus picture of Orissa is already being severelymauled by its partiality for heavy water-consuming industries.

The Orissa government has signed about 50 MoUs with private companies to produce more than 70 MT of steel perannum. Other water-consuming thermal and aluminium industries are in the pipeline as well. MoUs have been signed orare being signed to generate more than 37,000 MW of coal-basedthermal energy.

The effects have begun to be felt. Watersheds and rivers areunder threat, and changes in hydrology are imminent. The hillyterrains of the state, with their natural springs, are the sources ofmany rivers. Mining in these terrains is threatening to completelydestroy the springs (see Box: Mines obliterating water sources). Oneof the villages affected is Junanimunda in the coal-bearing Ib val-ley region in western Orissa. Coal mining directly underneath thevillage and adjoining areas, which began in 1988, led to a dryingup of all the water sources of the village, including a big kata(water harvesting structure). Junanimunda now does not have asingle safe water source. The nearest drinking water source ismore than two km away.

Like many such villages, Junanimunda is not a 'project-affect-ed village': as it was an underground mine, the mining companywas not required to acquire the villagers’ holdings. MahanadiCoalfields Ltd, which is mining in the region, was 'compassionate'enough to dig three tubewells for the village, but all of themended up in the voids created by the underground mines.

241


Mines obliterating water sourcesWater sources are seriously imperilled in the state

Sara Dehuri of Upper Kadakala village under Bansapani block inKeonjhar district is unhappy with the government, and worried. Dehuriand her neighbours live near the world-famous Khandadhar waterfalls.The women are up in arms against the state’s decision of allowing ironore exploration around the falls. The government has issued prospectivelicenses to eight private parties to explore iron ore in the area.“Once min-ing begins, it will severely affect perennial streams like Ambila Pani,Jambiri Pani, Kriya Kudar, Pidi Pokhari, Gambhiri Nala, etc, which are thelifelines for nearby 20 villages,”says Kolu Dehuri, the head of Kadakala.

Sara, Sundari Nayak and Ahalya Dehuri are among the womenwho have come under the banner of Khandadhar Surakshya Samiti todraw the attention of the government to their plight. They want anassurance that the exploration will be stopped.

Mindless and indiscriminate mining activities have already led towater scarcity in Keonjhar – the name ‘Kendujhar’ comes from ‘kendu’(ebony trees) and ‘jhar’ (springs), but the place today can lay claim toneither.“Indiscrimate blasting has disturbed the water sources in thehills,” admits Bhaktabandhu Senapati, who is engaged in blasting inthe mines since 1998. The Central Ground Water Board (CGWB) haswarned the state government that there has been a fall of nearly fourmetres in the groundwater level in the district.“The water level may fallfurther due to mining activities and deforestation,” warns waterresources consultant Subrat Kumar Das.

Women like Sara are not worried without a reason. The state, in itsdrive towards rapid industrialisation, is diverting large areas of forest

land for mining and other industries – and obliterating the rivers andsprings in these regions in the process.The Vedanta alumina refinery inKalahandi, for instance, proposes to mine the Niyamgiri hill for baux-ite. The hill is a source of many perennial streams and a permanentsource of water to the entire area including Kalahandi and Rayagadadistricts. It is estimated that mining in Niyamgiri will destroy around22 water harvesting structures which are located in the foothills andprovide water throughout the year. It is also anticipated that the riversVamsdhara and Nagvalli, which originate from this hill, will get affect-ed. More than a lakh of people in Orissa and Andhra Pradesh dependon these rivers for drinking water and irrigation. The location of redmud and flyash disposal sites on the banks of the Vamsdhara will posean environmental risk in the case of flash floods and during rains.

The proposed Utkal alumina refinery in Kashipur area of Rayagadadistrict will mine the Baphlimali hill. This will affect around 56 streamswhich originate from the hill and feed the river Indravati. Red mud dis-posal sites will be located in the catchment area of Barha Nadi, thusexerting additional pollution stress on the river.

A similar threat looms with the proposed expansion projects ofRungta iron and bauxite mines in Sundergarh district. The project willalter around six perennial springs and permanently destroy the catch-ment area of the river Baitarini. The proposed coal mine of the OrissaMining Corporation – in D block, Talcher coalfields at Angul – is likelyto affect two streams: the Guendijeri nala and the Kathau Jhor whichflow through the lease area. Other streams that flow close to the minewill get heavily polluted and some of them may completely dry up.

– Braja Kishore Mishra, CSE media fellow, Bhubaneshwar

c m y k

Neither the company nor the district administration has both-ered to address the villagers’ problems. “We have realised thatjustice is not meant for people like us. It is reserved for the richpeople and companies,“ says Dukhi Singh, a village leader. Thevillagers now collect water from a pit below the kata, which isbeing used as a wastewater dump of the coal mine.

Junanimunda is not very far from the Hirakud reservoir. Infact, Junanimunda is one of many new settlements of Hirakudproject displaced families. The villagers of Junanimunda gaveaway their lands to the largest dam in the country, but are now leftto fend for themselves for a drop of drinking water.

About 300 km from Junanimunda, farmers are staring at a dryfuture; Sudam Majhi of Sirekeli is one among them who go for

vegetable cultivation in the Tel river bed. Vedanta, which is settingof an alumina refinery 100 km away, will draw water from verynear to Sudam’s fields. “Every time the company's pumps are trialrun for even few hours, our crops have died,“ says Sudam. Theforest from where the company intends to mine bauxite is hometo numerous streams that feed at least three major rivers.

The situation is not very different in the coalfields in Talcherand in other parts of Orissa. Earlier, river Brahmani – the secondlargest river of the state – used to provide plenty of water to theregion to sustain a predominantly agrarian economy. With thecoming of mining, industries started guzzling up more than 56 per cent of the river water. They also polluted the water by discharging their effluents into it.

Today, the Talcher-Angul region is considered a ‘living desert’.“The water sources here are deadlier than any sewage drain,“ ruesSisir Tripathy, coordinator of the District Action Group (DAG), afederation of 21 non-governmental organisations in Dhenkanaldistrict, which is protesting against the rampant coal mining.“Water availability has become the single most important casualty of mining,“ says Tapan Padhi, who surveyed the regionfor DAG.35

Groundwater is equally stressed. Ten billion litres of groundwater is pumped out every day in the coalfields of Talcherand Ib valley, drying up aquifers in an area of 1,000 sq km (seeBox: Women struggle for water).36 When villagers clamoured forcompensation and drinking water, Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd supplied them the water collected in its mines.

“The major problem with mining and consequent degradationof water resources is that victims and sufferers generally fail toraise a potent voice to make their plight heard,“ says octogenari-an activist Durga Prasad Nayak. They gradually loose their pos-sessions and livelihood, as in Darlipali, a village surrounded bythree open-cast coal mines. Not a single tubewell is running there,and all the old wells are dry. The villagers are entirely dependenton the coal mining company which supplies water twice a day during the summer months. “Mining companies are asked, by theenvironment ministry while granting permission, to record waterlevel four times a year. They seldom do that honestly,“ allegesenvironmentalist Biswajeet Mohanty.

“The whole perception that Orissa is a water-surplus state isabsolutely absurd,“ he adds. If all the new plants the state is plan-ning come up, they will be requiring about or in excess of 900mcm of water every year.37 The average annual flow in theMahanadi, the largest river of the state, is about 42,000 mcm andthat in the second largest river, Brahmani, is 10,884 mcm a year.38

But 80 per cent of these river flows are in the monsoon monthsalone and, therefore, of no additional use. “While water flow inthe two largest rivers will be only about 10,600 mcm in non-mon-soon months, industries alone will require about 700 mcm –approximately seven per cent of the total average flow in thosemonths,“ says senior journalist Barendra Krushna Dhala.39 Thingswill be far worse in the summer months considering that indus-tries need consistent supply. “In fact, conflicts over water alloca-tion for industries from the Hirakud reservoir is boiling towards ahuge social unrest in that region,“ says Nayak.

242


Women struggle for waterAuthorities forced to listen to the protestors

On May 15, 1997 the activists of Balugaon Khamar Mahila UnnayanSangha, in association with some villagers, stopped mining activityin the Lingaraj mines under Talcher coalfields. Their objective was toforce the MCL authorities to ensure regular and adequate supply ofdrinking water. Open-cast mining had dried up their ponds andwells, forcing them to take recourse to agitation.

The conveners of the Sangha blamed the mining authorities fornon-fulfilment of their promises of rehabilitation, compensation andemployment. They made it clear that unless the village was providedadequate water, mining activities will not be allowed. Faced withhuge production losses, the authorities had to accept their demands,and regular supply of water was promised.

SHYA

MA

L /

CSE

c m y k

Hirakud is representative of what lies ahead in Orissa. Thoughwater supply to industries was never envisaged during the plan-ning of the reservoir, industries soon came up in the late 1950safter Hirakud started functioning. In 1990, the state governmentearmarked 0.350 million acre feet (MAcF) of water for industrialuse.40 The reservoir has a live storage capacity of 3.91 MAcF: thegovernment, therefore, keeps proclaiming that it has enoughcapacity to meet the 1.3 MAcF required for irrigation.

But the farmers find it hard to buy that argument. “If the reser-voir has so much water, then why are we not getting water in ourcanals during the beginning of the kharif season?“ questionsShyamsundar Pradhan, a farmer. The situation has deterioratedafter two major industries started drawing water from the reser-voir, the farmers allege. This, when industries are drawing just0.031 MAcF from the earmarked 0.350 MAcF. “Imagine what willbe the situation when they draw all the 0.350 MAcF of water,“asks Dillip Padhi of Hirakhand Nagarik Parishad, which peti-tioned the president of India seeking a status report on water allo-cation from Hirakud reservoir to industries.

A large part of the state’s claim to 'water abundance' derivesfrom its confidence that the Hirakud reservoir has enough water.Since 1997, the state’s water allocation committee has given 1,590cubic metres per second (cusec) of water from various existingsources to 69 new or expanding industries and mining compa-

nies.41 Out of the total water allocation for industries made in thestate, 27 per cent has been made from Hirakud alone.42

“Permission for 426 cusecs has been granted in the post-1997 period alone,“ says D P Nayak.

The Brahmani river basin too is an industrial hot spot. Thestate government is now considering an idea to link Hirakud withthe Rengali reservoir. It plans to divert surplus water from theHirakud through a 150-km long canal. “This indicates that theBrahmani is a deficit basin and does not have sufficient water tomeet industrial requirements,“ argues Mohanty.

“It is absurd to state that Orissa has a lot of groundwater toexploit. The 2003 national habitation survey proved that depletinggroundwater level is a cause of concern,“ says Bimal Pandia ofWater Initiatives Orissa, a civil society organisation. About eightper cent of the state’s population comes under 'not covered' category mostly due to depletion in groundwater levels. Arabinda Behera, commissioner-cum-principal secretary at theministry of water resources admits that the situation needs “careful consideration“.

Fortunately, there still remain some communities which are ina position to resist this trend effectively. Farmers of the Hirakudcommand area recently forced stoppage of water procurement-related construction works inside the Hirakud reservoir area bytwo major industries – Bhushan Steel and Shyam DRI.

243


Mining in Orissa’s hilly terrain is threatening to completely obliterate the state’s natural springs, which are the sources of many rivers

DEB

AN

JAN

BA

ND

OPA

DH

YAY

c m y k

244


Koel

: Steel plant and captive power plant 1 and 2, Rourkela

: Fertiliser plant, Rourkela

: National Thermal Power Corp, Kaniha

: Talcher Thermal Power Station, Talcher

: Aluminium smelter and coal-based captivepower plant, NALCO, Angul

: Orissa Synthetic Ltd, Odapada block,Dhenkanal

: Iron ore mining area of Bana subdivision(Barasuan, Koida, Jamda, etc)

: Coal mining area, Talcher

: Chromite mining area, Sukinda valley

: Major affected area (water not forirrigation/human/livestockconsumption, mangroves in coastalcyclone-prone areas affected)

AN

DH R A

P R AD

E S H

JHARKHAND

WEST BENGAL

Mahanadi

Baitarani

Brahmani

Mahanadi

Baitarani

Salandi

Brahmani

Rushikulya

Chili

ka La

ke

Ban

shad

hara

Nag

avali

Tel

Indravati

JalaputReservoir

BalimelaReservoirSa

bari

Sileru

Narangi

Indra

OngPalri

Hirakudreservoir

SankhM

and

Ib South Koel

SubarnarekhaBurbablang

Koraput

Rayagada

Gajapati

Ganjam

Phulbani

Kalahandi

Balangir

Nuaparha

Bauda

Sonapur

Bargarh

Nayagarh

Puri

KhordaJagatsinghapur

Kendrapara

Cuttack

Dhenkanal

Jajpur

Bhadrak

Baleshwar

Mayurbhanj

Kendujhargarh

Angul

Sambalpur

Deogarh

Jharsuguda

Sundargarh

Malkangiri

Nabarangapur

CH

HA

TI

SG

AR

H

B A Y

O F

B E N G A L

Source: State of Environment Report, Orissa State Pollution Control Board, p 124

MAP 2: Polluted flows the BrahmaniThe river is one of the 10 most polluted rivers in the country – and mining is the culprit

Darlipali: raring to goPollution from mines is driving people out

At least 132 families in Darlipali village in the coal belt of Ib valley inOrissa do not want to stay in their village any more; they want to berelocated and leave the lands they have tilled for generations. What’sdriving them out is pollution – the village, in Jharsuguda district, isburied deep in coal mine territory. Darlipali is surrounded by theLakhanpur open-cast Mine, Belpahar open-cast mine and Lilari open-cast mine – all owned by Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd (MCL).

The area is littered with coal dumps and consequently, envelopedin a thick layer of coal dust throughout the year. The waterbodies arecontaminated by coal dust and oil, and there is a shortage of drinkingwater.“The mines have swallowed up the only source of drinking waterin the village, a three ha kata (a traditional water body),” says BhukliOram, a villager. Five tubewells have so far been installed in the village,but only one is functional. The villagers have to dig pits along the bankof the Lilari nullah for drinking water. A pond called the TISCO dhuda

(named after the nearby abandoned TISCO mines) – the only place tobathe other than Lilari nullah – is also polluted.

The Lilari nullah, a perennial stream that flows through Darlipali tojoin the Ib, a tributary of the Mahanadi, is also highly polluted. A studyby the state pollution control board says: “The Mahanadi basin, partic-ularly the Ib valley area, has a rich mining potential of coal. There are10 coalmines which discharge around 33,065 kilolitres per day ofwastewater (into) this river during the monsoon and pose a seriousthreat, for the effluent contains heavy metals and sulphur com-pounds.”However, A K Murthy, area environment officer, MCL, refutesthe report, arguing that coalmines do not pollute rivers. The water hasturned black and greasy because thousands of trucks are washed inthis nullah. “And we don’t have any control over these trucks,”he says.The villagers don’t buy this. “Pollution has afflicted our lives deeply;the little compensation we get is hardly of any help to us,” saysPrabhakara Pradhan, an unskilled labourer at MCL’s Budhijam mines.

– Ranjan Panda, Down To Earth, Sambalpur

c m y k

● Industries also pollute waterThe Orissa State of Environment Report, published by the OrissaState Pollution Control Board (OSPCB), has classified areas basedon their pollution potential. According to it, zone 1 includes dis-tricts like Keonjhar and Sundergarh, which are rich in iron andmanganese ore and face extensive pollution of rivers and rivulets.During the rainy season, the water in rivers turns red and the levelof total suspended solids goes up to 1,000 mg/l. Similarly, zone 2includes the Angul and Talcher coalfield area. The report alsostates that most coal mines do not have any effluent treatment sys-tem; effluents and wastewater go into the river (see Box: Darlipali:raring to go).

Take the example of the Brahmani, the second largest river ofOrissa. It is also one of the most polluted rivers in the state andone of the top 10 most polluted rivers in the country – due tolarge-scale mining operations on its banks.

The river, with a catchment area of around 39,000 sq km, orig-inates as two major distributaries – the Sankh and the Koel fromthe Chhotanagpur plateau in Jharkhand – and joins at Veda Vyasanear Rourkela in Orissa to form the Brahmani. It flows throughthe Eastern Ghats in Sundergarh, Keonjhar, Dhenkanal, Cuttackand Jajpur districts and empties into the Bay of Bengal. The majorportion of its catchment area lies in Orissa; and due to the vastmineral deposits in this area and the easy availability of water,several industries have come up in and around the river basin.

At its upper reach, the river is polluted by effluents from theRourkela Steel Plant, Rourkela Fertiliser Plant and the iron ore-mining industries of Bonai subdivision (see Map 2: Polluted flowsthe Brahmani). The pollution level increases in the middle section

due to drainage from the coal belts and industrial wastes from theAngul-Talcher region, mainly emptied into it by its tributary, theNandira.

The NALCO smelter at Angul has also contributed to the poorquality of the surface and sub-surface water. The effluent dis-charged from plant has increased the fluoride level in the drink-ing water. The water contains flouride more than 1.5 mg/l,43

which is considered toxic for animals. According to publishedreports, effluents discharged from the plant into the river haveresulted in deaths of cattle, crop loss and skin allergies.

Downstream, the Brahmani is polluted by mine dischargesfrom the Sukinda belt and industrial activities in Duburi. TheDamasala river, one of the major tributaries downstream, carriestoxic effluents from chromium mining (mainly hexavalentchromium) in the Sukinda valley into the Brahmani (see Box onpage 247: Poison river, chromite country).

A survey conducted in September 1998 by the Orissa StatePollution Control Board (OSPCB) said that “chromite mines in thearea discharge wastewater rich in hexavalent chromium“, aknown carcinogen. The 21 mines in the Talcher-Angul area dis-charge 29,434 kilolitres of heavy metal-laded water into the river.In 1989, a report by Bangkok-based Asian Institute of Technologyin collaboration with the OSPCB, observed: “The concentration ofsome heavy metals was higher than the standards in mine dis-charge.“ Despite recommendations by several studies, not a singlewater treatment plant has come up in the Talcher area.44 To makematters worse, flood waters have been reduced in the Brahmanifollowing the construction of the Rengali dam which caters to theneeds of the industrial belt.

245

MINING IN THE STATES: ORISSASH

YAM

AL

/ C

SE

c m y k

246


The water resources of Sukinda are contaminated with hexavalent chromium – people have no other option but to use them

P M

AD

HA

VAN

c m y k

247


Poison river, chromite country The Brahmani and the Sukinda valley

Orissa accounts for more than 95 per cent of India’s chromite wealth.According to the IBM, the state has total chromite resources of 175 MTof which 28 MT are proven resources.There are some 16 working minesof chromite in the state, located over 7,482 ha of lease area and 5,264 haof forest area. A majority of these are in the Sukinda valley region.

Almost all the mines in Sukinda are open-cast. Nine open-castmines are located upstream of the Damsala nala catchment area, whileone underground and two open-cast mines are located downstream. Itis a prevalent practice in the area to dump the overburden within themine lease area, through which the Damsala nala flows. Water seepagesfrom these dumps as well as the run-off from the quarries have poi-soned this nala, which ultimately meets the Brahmani river. Severalstudies have found very high levels of hexavalent chromium in the river.

The IBM, in association with BRGM, a French company, prepareda Regional Environmental Impact Assessment (REIA) report for the chromite belt of the Sukinda watershed (including a cluster of 12 mines). The REIA identified the ‘pollution of the waters, soils and

sediments by hexavalent chromium (CrVI)’ as the key problem. Thereport listed the main causes of the chromium contamination as minewater discharges, release of benefication-plant effluents and slurriesinto the environment, and the leaching of waste dumps and ore stockpiles. The mines of Sukinda generate almost seven tonne of overburden per tonne of chromite. Over the years, about 70 MT ofoverburden has been stocked in the area.

The monitoring results conducted by BRGM showed that mostwells and water courses in the central part of the watershed were con-taminated by CrVI (up to a value of 3.4 mg/l in surface water and 0.6 mg/l in groundwater), and in few places, by nickel (up to 0.6 mg/lin groundwater). The concentration of chromium exceeded the Indianguidelines for drinking water, surface water and soils used for agricul-ture. CrVI was also found in the food chain, specifically in fish, milk,paddy, fruits and grass. These too exceeded the toxicological standardsused in the risk assessment study (see Table: Waste tales from Sukinda).

A detailed survey and monitoring conducted by the CentralPollution Control Board in the Sukinda valley and the coal mines inTalcher found enormous volumes of water containing CrVI being discharged into adjacent water bodies. The overburden was beingdumped near the quarries, as a result of which soluble metals werepercolating into the groundwater.

Another study by the Department of Geology, University of Delhiin 2001 found the presence of CrVI in not only the mine discharges,but also in the water supplied for drinking. Mine discharge water contained hexavalent chromium much above permissible limit forhouseholds (0.1 mg/l): as high as 52 mg/l in some samples in Damsaladownstream of the discharge from TISCO mines. Seventy per cent ofthe water samples and 61 per cent of drinking water samples analysedpossessed CrVI concentration more than the safe level.

Media Main features

Nala sediment • Cr = 0.3-2.7 % CrVI = 30-104 mg/kg Ni =190-1,090 mg/kg

Paddy field sediment • CrVI = 6-90 mg/kg Hg = 0.04-14.4 mg/kg Ni = 40-580 mg/kg

Leaching tests • Leachate of river sediments: CrVI = 2-12 mg/l

• Leachate of paddy sediments: CrVI = 0.7 mg/l

Surface water • 23 out of the 31 monitoring stations exhibit CrVI above drinking water standards (up to 3.4 mg/l)

• No specific trend season wise

Groundwater • 32 out of the 33 monitored wells exhibit CrVI above drinking water standards (up to 0.6 mg/l)

• 6 wells exhibit Ni above drinking water standards (up to 0.6 mg/l)

Pit water seepage water • CrVI concentrations = 0.07-2.14 mg/l

Fauna and flora • Paddy: CrVI = <0.001-142 mg/kg• Fish: CrVI = 14-115 mg/kg• Fruits : CrVI = 5-28 mg/kg• Aquatic grass: CrVI = <0.001-29 mg/kg

Note: CrVI = hexavalent chromium; Ni = nickel; Cr = chromium; Hg = mercurySource: Anon, 2004, Mining-related chromate water pollution in the Sukindawatershed (Orissa, India), Environment Process Division, BRGM, France

TABLE: Waste tales from Sukinda

Open-cast chromite mining and overburden dumps are pollutingthe water resources

P M

AD

HA

VAN

c m y k

■ AIR: IN A HAZE

The OSPCB report, State of Environment in Orissa, has acknowl-edged air pollution as a major problem in almost all mines inKeonjhar. The report says that the levels are very high at crusher,loading and transfer points, with SPM levels goes as high as 1,000microgram per cubic metre (µg/m3), however, it often rangesaround 600 µg/m3, which is also more than the prescribed stan-dard.45 Similar is the case in other iron belts of the state such asSundergarh and Jajpur.

One of the biggest reasons for fugitive dust generation is thecondition of roads in mining areas. In most cases, proper roadssimply do not exist; where they do, they are in a sorry state, mademore so with the continuous movement of heavy traffic on them.The situation has forced people to look for innovative ways ofprotest. In tribal-dominated Keonjhar, the people participated in aday-long ‘sankirtan’ (singing religious hymns and prayers) pro-gramme, seeking divine intervention in solving their problems ofbad roads and pollution due to large-scale iron mining.46

Air pollution is particularly severe in the state’s coal belts.Besides fugitive dust, occasional fires in coal mines add to thewoes of the people. In the Lingaraj open-cast coal mines, firebroke out in a dump in November 2006, and has been generatingdense smoke ever since, besides destroying huge reserves of coal.

The Director General of Mines Safety (DGMS) has failed to solvethe problem.47

The Lingaraj coal mines are, in fact, a case in point. The mines’project officer was arrested in connection with a pollution case reg-istered in Talcher.48 The arrest came following allegations of heavydust emissions from the mines, situated close to the sub-divisionalheadquarters. Sources said the pollution was so acute that localresidents suffered from breathing problems and poor visibility inthe evening. Besides the residents, labourers working in the mineand passengers on National Highway-17 also face the brunt of thepollution. The situation was grave enough for the area DIG, ArunKumar Sarangi, to issue a warning to the mining authorities.49

The OSPCB monitors ambient air quality in some of the coalmines of the state. The maximum concentration of SPM in all themine areas of the state exceeds the prescribed regulatory standardof 360 µg/m3 for industrial areas (see Table 6: State of the air). Thequality of ambient air is especially problematic in the Balanda col-liery and the Lingaraj open-cast mines with respect to maximumconcentrations of SPM and RSPM. For instance, at the Balanda col-liery, the maximum RSPM recorded was 246 µg/m3, while themaximum value of SPM recorded was as high as 851 µg/m3. Theconcentration of SOx and NOx, though, are within regulatory stan-dards. Other problematic coal mines include Lakhanpur open-castmines, Lilari open-cast mines and Lajkura open-cast mines.

248


One of the biggest reasons for fugitive dust generation is the poor condition of roads in the mining areas

AG

NIM

IRH

BA

SU /

CSE

c m y k

■ EIA: PLAYING OUT A FARCE

In 1994, the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) notificationwas passed under the Environment Protection Act, 1986: it out-lined the procedure for granting environmental clearance toindustrial and development projects with the objective of main-taining a balance between the three pillars of development – envi-ronment, society and economy.

According to this procedure, projects classified on the basis ofscale and impacts are required to prepare an EIA report. The find-ings of the report are presented to the local community in a pub-lic hearing process during which the locals have an opportunity toexpress their opinion on the project. The summarised minutes ofthe public meeting and the EIA report are then presented to theclearance committee set up at the state or Central level, whichthen decides on the fate of the project.

On paper, this seems to be an excellent and foolproof methodto reduce the environmental and social implications of a project.But in practice, this rarely happens. The whole procedure stands completely diluted and has been reduced to being a mereformality. There are hardly any projects which are turned down orrejected by the clearance committee – even in cases where thepublic has expressed its opposition to one.

One of the biggest drawbacks in the current environmentalclearance process is the poor quality of the EIA reports. These are

prepared by consultants hired by the companies. There are a num-ber of cases where EIAs have been found to have glaring andintentional omissions and where the authenticity of the report isin doubt.

In Orissa, with the state government’s determination to tap itsmineral wealth, numerous projects have been cleared post-haste inthe last few years. Since January 2005, 36 mining projects havereceived the nod from the MoEF, in which around 4,978 ha of for-est area was diverted.50 Environment and the society, naturally,have been the casualties. Not surprisingly, Orissa has seen its shareof controversies related to the environment clearance process andquality of EIA reports (see Box on page 250: Ill assessed).

But in spite of these serious lapses, most of these projects arein advanced stages of clearance. Recent trends point to anothercause for concern: instead of living up to their role as protectors ofenvironment and of their peoples’ interests, the state and theCentral governments are often striving to outdo each other in act-ing almost like agents of the companies. For example, in spite ofstiff opposition by local people to POSCO, the state and Centralgovernments have given repeated assurances to the South Koreansteel giant that the project will be seen through.

The EIA and environment clearance process is designed to fail.Keeping in view the level of political interference and corruptionand the laxity of the regulatory mechanism, it is unlikely that theprocess can function as one would expect it to.

249


RSPM SPM SO2 NOX

Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min

Lingaraj open-cast mines 377 93 610 336 36.1 16.4 21.1 3.4

Bharatpur open-cast mines 216 91.3 486 63.6 34.6 16.6 16.8 1.86

Ananta open-cast mines 262 57.2 487 180 40.2 12.8 38 3.4

Balanda colliery 246 101 851 295.7 30.4 14.2 19.2 3.2

Kalinga open-cast mines 104.6 – 379.7 80.9 19.2 14.6 16.2 3.6

Jagannath colliery 210 81 600 225.6 38.1 10.2 42 3.1

Hingula open-cast mines 180.3 55.35 402 75.55 36 12.2 10.2 1.82

Belpahar open-cast mines 146.64 52.32 461.12 151.08 – – – –

Lajkura open-cast mines 198.22 65.77 611.54 12.96 – – – –

Lakhanpur open-cast mines 284 63.7 695.51 173 – – – –

Samalesari open-cast mines 273.2 50.4 588.0 180.82 – – – –

Lilari open-cast mines 170.8 70 695.6 142 – – – –

Basundhara open-cast mines – – 552 194 – – – –

Note: RSPM = Respirable Suspended Particulate Matter , SPM = Suspended Particulate Matter, SO2 = Sulphur Dioxide, NOx = Nitrogen oxidesSource: http://www.envis.nic.in/soer/soer-orissa/mines.HTM, as viewed on March 3, 2007

TABLE 6: State of the airAmbient air quality (in µg/m3) in mining areas of Orissa (2001-02) – concentration of SPM and RSPM is very high

m k

■ PEOPLE: FIGHTING TO THE FINISH

Along with all this, Orissa also has its tribals. With six million ofthem, the state has the highest proportion of tribal population inthe country. Nearly 85 per cent of the state’s population lives in itsrural areas and depends mostly on agriculture and naturalresources.51 Large-scale mining and industrial activities arethreatening to disrupt the livelihoods and social structures ofthese segments (see Table 7: The march of progress).

The figures tell the story: 1.5 million people were displaced inthe state by development projects between 1951 and 1995 – 42 percent of these were tribals.52 Mining alone has displaced some500,000 in the state.53 There are no recent statistics on the numberof people being displaced due to development projects, but every-one agrees that the number would be significant. The completeapathy of the government is apparent: it has not done any assess-ment of how many people have been affected by such projects andwhat is the status of their rehabilitation.

However, some independent estimates peg the displacementfigure at “at least another“ 100,000 people till now.54 According toKundan Kumar, an expert in tribal and land rights in Orissa, the

area acquired for various industrial and development projects inOrissa amounts to around 12 lakh ha, which has affected around2,170 villages.55 For mining projects, 101,947 ha have been acquired;however, there is no data on the number of villages affected.56

The problem of displacement is more severe in the state asmost of the development projects are in tribal/scheduled areassuch as Machkund, Salandi, Balimela, Upper Kolab, Indravati orMandira. Some major industrial projects taken up in scheduledareas include the Rourkela Steel Plant and NALCO’s aluminarefinery at Damanjodi. A large number of future mining projectsunder implementation or proposed – such as the alumina refiner-ies of Utkal Alumina in Kashipur and Vedanta at Lanjigarh – arealso in scheduled areas.

In four districts of Orissa – Dhenkanal, Ganjam, Koraput andPhulbani – over half of the tribal land has been lost to non-tribalsover a 25-30 year period. A study by Walter Fernandes, director ofNorth Eastern Social Research Centre, Guwahati, contends that inKoraput alone, over 100,000 tribals have been dispossessed oftheir land, which included 1.6 lakh ha of forests on which theydepended for their survival; more than six per cent of the districtpopulation, a majority of it tribal, has been displaced.57

250


Ill assessedEIA reports of some of the major projects in Orissa leave a lotto be desired

● The EIA report of the proposed Utkal Alumina plant at Kashipurclaims that mining will not affect a single village; this, even thoughthe project plans to adopt open-cast mining. Bhagaban Majhi, con-venor, Prakrutik Sampad Surakshya Parishad (PSSP), disagrees:according to him, around 42 villages of the Chandragiri, Maikanchand Kodipari panchayats will be directly affected by the mining.Further, the report mentions only two streams originating from theBaphlimali hills. Locals put the number of streams originating fromthese hills at an incredible 56, all of which feed the Indravati riverbasin.The EIA report also fails to present a correct picture of the pro-ject’s impact on biodiversity, society and culture of the area.

● Another case of poor EIA report is that of the bauxite mine inLanjigarh, Kalahandi, owned by the OMC, and operated by theVedanta group. The report claims that the mine area is unproduc-tive, tree-deficient and not useful for wildlife and forests. However,a Wildlife Institute of India (WII) report had contradicted this find-ing, saying that “these plateaus are very productive with highoccurrence of several herbivore and carnivore species. This kind ofhabitat is especially productive during the rainy season whenwater and grasses are available for several species. Elephants alsovisit these areas during rainy season... These areas are also breed-ing and fawning grounds for four-horned antelopes, barking deerand several other species”. The WII study has also claimed thatNiyamgiri hill (where the company proposes to mine) is an impor-tant source of water for the Vamsadhara and Nagaveli rivers;around 36 streams originate from the hill. The study notes thatremoval of the layer of bauxite will adversely affect the groundwater

in the region, and consequently, the quality of forested habitats.The EIA report, however, is silent on these impacts.

● The EIA report of the expansion project of Rungta iron and bauxitemines in Sundergarh district completely ignores the fact that the leasearea is an important watershed for river Baitarini and that there are sixperennial springs within the area.The report also fails to mention thatthe lease area is the genesis of rivers such as the Jalap Nadi .

● In January 2006, the OSPCB published the notice for a public hear-ing of expansion of the Putulipani iron ore mines in Keonjhar in onlyone daily – The New Indian Express. The EIA notification specifiesthat the notice should be published in at least in two newspapers,with one in a vernacular language. The mines are owned byGandhamardhan Sponge Industries (P) Ltd.The project’s EIA reportwas incomplete: it completely failed to identify the impacts of fugi-tive dust, or the effect on the region’s three perennial springs whichlie inside the proposed lease area. Moreover, the mines are locatedclose to the Gandhamardan Reserve Forest, home to wildlife such asbear, wild boar, fox, jungle cat and barking deer. Most of these ani-mals are in Schedules I or II (endangered species) of the WildlifeProtection Act, 1972. Strangely, the EIA report concludes that no“critically threatened species”exist within 10 km of the mining area.

● Yet another example of EIA violation is offered by the coal mines ofOMC at Utkal (D block, Talcher coalfields in Angul). The EIA wasconducted during the monsoons in violation of the guidelinesframed by the MoEF. The report mentioned that more than 50 percent of the area in the core and buffer zones was covered by reserveand protected forests and shrubs. At the same time, it claimed thatanimals like elephant, sambar, leopards, etc – covered in Schedule Iof the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972 were not present. Local peopleand forest officials have, on the other hand, reported the presence ofelephants, leopards, bear and wild boars in the same area.

m k

The state government justifies its industrialisation overdriveby saying that it will provide employment. But the OrissaEconomic Survey, 2002 shows that the employment potential of themining sector has actually reduced. In Dhenkanal, Jajpur andKeonjhar districts, chromite mines employed 8,886 people in1995-96 but only 6,679 in 1999-2000. At present, 20 lakh people inthe state are unemployed while another 20 lakh are underem-ployed.58 Samarendra Das, an Orissa-based activist and author ofa study on the political economy of mines, says: “A Rs 1 croreinvestment in mines results in only seven employment opportuni-ties. The same investment in medium and big industries creates40. In contrast, this investment in small and cottage industrywould generate 4,475 jobs.“59

The districts of Orissa that are the most mined – Jajpur, Keonjhar,Dhenkanal, Angul, Jharsuguda, Sundergarh, Mayurbhanj andKoraput – are also the poorest districts in the state. Manas Jena, con-venor of the Orissa Mines Area People Action Network, worries thatmines will create huge imbalances. He says, “Our study has foundhundreds of families displaced from forests are landing up in urbanslums.“ The percentage of scheduled tribes (ST) in Orissa livingaround forests has gone down from 95 per cent in 1981 to 80 per centin 1990.60 The state government’s move to allow transfer of land inFifth Schedule areas for mining and industrial operations is likely tofurther threaten the lives of tribals: the state has interpreted theSupreme Court’s (SC) landmark Samata judgement of 1997 to suititself (see Box: Subverting the Samata judgement).

251


Projects Area acquired or No of villagesaffected (ha) affected

Irrigation – dam projects 2,00,423 900(major) completed

Irrigation – dam projects 14,403 118(medium) completed

Irrigation – dam projects 12,160 92(medium) ongoing

Irrigation – dam projects 30,233 113 (major) proposed

Industries (all types) 45,358 176

Mines (all types of mine leases 1,01,947 NA given out)

Wildlife sanctuaries and 8,11,155 771 national parks

Total 1,215,679 2,170

Source: Kundan Kumar, 2006, ‘Disposed and displaced: A brief paper on tribal issues in Orissa’, http://www.freewebs.com/epgorissa/Orissa%20min-ing%20and%20industrialisation%20note.doc, as viewed on April 17, 2007

TABLE 7: The march of progress Development projects have affected more than 2,000 villages

Subverting the Samata judgementOrissa interprets the judgement to suit its designs

In 1997, the Supreme Court (SC) had ruled in the Samata versus stateof Andhra Pradesh (AP) case that tribal tracts and forest land in sched-uled areas were not to be leased out to non-tribals for mining andindustrial activity, as this would contravene the Fifth Schedule of theConstitution. According to the SC directive, such operations could onlybe permitted exceptionally – subject to the laws of the state concerned.The SC had stipulated that in instances where the law does not com-pletely ban mining in scheduled areas, a state-level cabinet sub-com-mittee should be constituted and a suitable decision taken thereafter.

In July 2003, a sub-committee – headed by Orissa chief ministerNaveen Patnaik – conveniently concluded that the judgment was notbinding on the state.The decision was premised on the claim that ampleprovision had been made in the state’s existing laws to protect tribalinterests; the rules cited in this regard were the Orissa Scheduled AreasTransfer of Immovable Property (Scheduled Tribes) Regulation(OSATIPR), 1956, and the Orissa Zilla Parishad (Amendment) Act, 1997.

“The state government has mentioned these two laws to give itsdubious agenda a veneer of legitimacy,” alleges Bibhu P Tripathi, anOrissa-based advocate. But the fact that certain clauses of OSATIPRitself forbid transfer of land from tribals to non-tribals, weakens theauthorities’case.“The Orissa government is not even conversant with itsown laws,” asserts Tripathi. Highlighting the ludicrousness of the sub-committee’s stand, he elaborates: “It goes against the grain of a recent

amendment to OSATIPR. The new clause, inserted in 2002, explicitlystates that no member of the scheduled tribes can transfer any land if the size of their holding gets reduced to less than 2 acres (0.8 ha) of irrigated land or 5 acres (2 ha) of non-irrigated tract in the process.”Tripathi observes: “The suggestion of the sub-panel will, in effect, violatethe regulation because tribal families would be left with no land at all.”

“Rather than regarding the Samata case as a point of reference andinsulating tribals, the Orissa government has paved the way for mining in scheduled areas by signing a memorandum of under-standing with private companies,”charges Tripathi.

For its part, the state government purports to have announced a“comprehensive” rehabilitation package to support the oustees.However, it has failed to fully comply with the SC order on this front aswell. The sub-panel has declared that companies would be required tospend five per cent of the net annual profit earned in each project ondevelopment activities such as healthcare, education, communication,irrigation and agriculture within a radius of 50 km of the affected area.

The SC had ruled that when states give out land in scheduledareas, at least 20 per cent of net profits should be set aside as a perma-nent fund for the development of local tribals. And this allocation didnot include the expenditure for reforestation and maintenance of ecol-ogy.“Orissa is legally bound to follow the stipulation. It is also consis-tent with the Constitution and the Directive Principles of State Policy,”stresses Rajiv Dhawan, the SC advocate who represented Samata.

– Kushal Yadav, Down To Earth, New Delhi

m k

Till recently, Orissa had more than 11 legislations for rehabil-itation and resettlement of project-affected people. In late 2006,the state adopted a comprehensive resettlement and rehabilita-tion policy, which is considered as one of the best in the country.However, the track record of the state in rehabilitating its dis-placed communities has been rather poor. Of the 650 families

displaced due to Nilachal Ispat Nigam in Kalinganagar, only 184have got jobs.61 At Rourkela, 33 villages – over 1,013,144 ha ofland – were acquired by the Orissa government in 1954 to set upSAIL’s steel plant. This project, along with the Mandira dam,uprooted 4,251 families.62 SAIL and the state government havenot been able to resettle and rehabilitate the evacuees of the last50 years. In January 2006, thousands of tribals armed with bowsand arrows blocked road and rail traffic near the steel plant. Thetribals were demanding that the land acquired from them shouldbe returned and each member of a family should be providedwith a job.63

There have been cases of multiple displacement as well –successive displacement of the same families from one place toanother following execution of various development projects inthose areas. For example, the displaced people of Hirakud dam,who were resettled in the mid-1950s in the upper catchment areasof the reservoir, faced displacement for the second time in the 1980s due to the Ib thermal power project and again in the1980-90s due to the Ib valley coal mining projects64 (see Box:Displaced AGAIN?).

Understandably, Orissa has been the hub of public – andsometimes violent – protests against mining and mineral-basedindustries. Cases in point are the 12-year struggle waged by thevillagers of Kashipur against Utkal’s alumina plant, protests bytribals against Tata’s iron and steel plant at Kalinganagar, andresistance to BALCO’s proposed exploration of Gandhamardanhills in western Orissa. The tragedy has assumed gargantuanproportions in the state because, ironically, of its backwardness:the people’s suffering is magnified in the mining regions as theydo not have enough infrastructural facilities to compensate forthe loss of land and quality of life. Roads, power, health facilities– the state has not been able to provide any of these adequately.Earnings have gone down because people no longer have their land, and most often, they end up as labourers in the mines.The consequence is immense discontent and an acute sense ofalienation. The future is likely to witness many more protests ifthe legitimate concerns of the people are not taken into accountby the state.

252


Displacement from mining is a major challenge for the state; peopledisplaced 40 years ago still have to be rehabilitated

AG

NIM

IRH

BA

SU /

CSE

Displaced AGAIN?Multiple displacement adds to their agony

In 1967, the people from Derjang village were displaced by the Derjangirrigation project to Dhobamalia Sahi village in Angul district. Thesame villagers are now again facing displacement because of the pro-posed Utkal-D coal mining project of the Orissa Mining Corporation.According to local activist Prasanna Behera: “People said no to theproject in the public hearing.”He adds that this project would requirediversion of forest land, as more than 50 per cent of the project areafalls in forests.1

A similar case is being repeated in Bamaloi grama panchayatof Jajpur district.2 There seems to be no end to the misery of the people who were earlier dispossessed of their land for Hirakud dam

project – and now they face the spectre of another displacement due toa proposed aluminium project. However, led by the Sambalpur ZillaDurniti Nibarana Mahila Mancha, people have been staging a protestagainst the displacement and sitting on a relay hunger-strike in frontof the Sambalpur collector’s office. Parikshit Kissan, a resident, said,“We are yet to recover from the displacement from our parentalhomes, which are now submerged under the Hirakud reservoir.Another one will ruin us.”

The villagers are not opposed to the project; they are onlydemanding the exclusion of Bamaloi from the project area. “Ourdemand is genuine since a second displacement is totally inhuman forthe people,” said Bhagabati Kissa and Gochandan Rohidas. The collector of Sambalpur, L N Nayak, however says that the people “areyet to make specific demands”.

m k

253


No sunny days: people in the state are a disappointed lot as the mining and industrial projects have failed to bring development which waspromised, and are increasingly protesting against new projects

AG

NIM

IRH

BA

SU /

CSE

c m y k

The flashpoints

■ ANGUL-KORAPUT: NALCO’S DEPREDATIONS

The National Aluminium Company Ltd (NALCO) set its sights onOrissa’s Koraput districts in 1981: to mine bauxite. The region’sbauxite reserves of 370 MT are expected to last 75 years at the cur-rent mining rate of about five MT per annum. The low silica con-tent of the bauxite makes it possible for NALCO to produce highquality aluminium at low cost.

Since the region was designated a Schedule V area, the compa-ny needed special permission for acquiring land here. The LandAcquisition Act helped: the company managed to obtain around4,070 ha through the Act to set up its mines and refineries inDamanjodi, Koraput. This was much more than what NALCOrequired (more than 60 per cent of the land has not been utilisedin the last 25 years). Of this land, 172 ha were for the mines, 1,068 ha for a township and 2,830 ha for the plants; 41 per cent ofthe acquired land was owned by the government, for which no compensation was paid, while another 41 per cent was agricultural land. The company later acquired 1606 ha of land inAngul district for its smelter plant. Majority of the land, 84 percent was privately owned.65

While no exact data exists, it is estimated that NALCO’s overall operations in Koraput as well as for its smelter plant andcoal mines in Angul have all together displaced 134 villages, com-prising of 6,263 households or 31,325 people.

There were several protests against the project in Damanjodiby the affected people. However, the company promised themjobs and a good relocation package, including money for theirland. The demands gradually veered towards the promisedreparations, and the project authorities were forced to act. Of the597 families that were initially ousted from Damanjodi, 441 wererelocated in Analabadi colony; for this, Analabadi villagers weredeprived of their land. About 352 families were offered one jobeach (mainly as drivers and diggers). Of these, 35 were dalits,149 tribals, and 168 other castes. Only eight of the employeeswere women. Overall, every family consisting of 5-15 membersreceived Rs 3,000 per acre, one house consisting of one-and-a-half rooms, but no farmland.

The company paid a compensation package of Rs 1.48 crorefor the patta land. No compensation was paid for communityproperty resources (CPR) or government and village lands, onwhich landless villagers depended for their subsistence.

Though the first notification for land take-over was issued in August 1981 and compensation was paid to displaced familiesin Champapadr and Koraguda villages in 1982, it took more than 20 years to finally shift these villages to the resettlementcolony in Damanjodi. By then, the number of people had swelledand there were a significant number of families who simply did not exist in enumeration papers and thus had no right to theresettlement colony.66

The woes of the displaced community did not end with their

shifting to the new area. The resettlement colony was poorly con-ceived and lacked basic facilities such as drinking water or educa-tional infrastructure. For example, before being displaced, thepeople had used the spring water available in their villages. Whenthey shifted, they lost this source; the company had provided onlythree wells for more than 500 families. In summers, the wellswould also dry up.

There was only one primary school in the colony. To pursuehigher education, students had to travel long distances to othertowns. Most of the displaced families living in the colony couldnot afford the costs involved in these travels.

To make matters worse, the resettlement area did not provide for the traditional tribal places of religious worship(sacred groves) or cremation/burial grounds; nor did it consider the needs of tribal councils which were disrupted during the relocation. During the entire displacement and rehabil-itation process, NALCO did not bother to consult the affectedpeople and communities, or involve them in the decision-making processes.

Several years have gone by; the displaced families continue toprotest under the banner of NALCO Kshatigrasta Praja Sangh.67

The promises made by the company to provide jobs to the affect-ed people have been forgotten. So far, the company has absorbed1,094 out of a total of 1,530 substantially affected persons (SAPs)as part of its rehabilitation programme. The people are demand-ing jobs for the remaining 436 SAPs. Uma Ballay Patnaik, director,NALCO clarifies that “it was not possible for the company to takein those persons who were not technically qualified“.

254


Koraput

Rayagada Gajapati

Ganjam

Kandhamal

Kalahandi

BalangirNuapada

Baudh

Sonapur

Bargarh

Nayagarh

Puri

KhurdhaJagatsinghapur

Kendrapara

Cuttack

DhenkanalJajpur

Bhadrak

Baleshwar

Mayurbhanj

Kendujhargarh

Angul

Sambalpur

Debagarh

Jharsuguda

Sundargarh

Malkangiri

Nabarangapur

• NALCO bauxite mining

• NALCO captive power-plant

• NALCO refinery, Damanjodi

• NALCO coal mine

• NALCO smelter and captive power plant

• NALCO ash andred mud ponds

NALCO OPERATIONS (atKoraput and Angul)• Villages displaced - 134• Families displaced - 6,263• Population displaced - 31,325• Land acquired - 14,534.52 acre• Private lands - 10,426.21 acre*• Govt. lands - 3,600.31 acre*• External debt - US $980 million

VishakhapatnamPort

ParadipPort

O R I S S A

B A Y

O F

B E N G A L

A N D H R AP R A D E S H

CH

HA

TT

IS

GA

RH

Source: Compiled by Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi

MAP 3: NALCO’s impactMore than 80,000 people displaced due to the projects

m k

■ BAPHLIMALI: UAIL GOES FOR BAUXITE

The Paroja Kondha tribe living in Kashipur block of Rayagada dis-trict is being asked to give up its land to make way for mining ofbauxite by Utkal Alumina International Limited (UAIL). The gov-ernment of Orissa entered into a contract with the company, a con-sortium of Alcan of Canada and Hindalco of India, in 1993. The ven-ture is 100 per cent export-oriented. UAIL plans to mine bauxitefrom the Baphlimali hills in the area using fully mechanised bauxite-mining techniques to recover 196 MT of the mineral.

There are contradictory reports on the number of inhabitantswho would be affected, directly or indirectly, by the project. Thecompany’s estimates are extremely low. According to Alcan, only147 families will be displaced. This number probably reflects thenumber of families who will be directly forced to relocate. But thisis just a tip of iceberg and does not take into account masses oftribals who depend on the land either as small-scale agricultural-ists or as landless peasants. UAIL states that there are 1,750 prop-erty-holding families in the area. This, again, does not include themajority who are working on land they do not own. In all, UAILcounts 1,900 affected families.

In contrast, estimates by local social groups such as thePrakrutika Sampada Suraksha Parishad (PSSP) and other NGOsshow that 9,000 people could be affected directly and indirectly.NORAD, the Norwegian international development agency, hasreleased a report indicating that 60,000 people could be affectedby the mega bauxite project.68

UAIL is promising employment for each affected property-owning family. However, this totally excludes the many landlessfamilies in the area. “In my eyes, it would be appropriate to talkabout ‘indirect displacement’ when we talk about these groups.They are forced out de facto, and the company takes no responsi-bility for their ‘displacement’, says Tarjei Leer-Salvesen, a veteranof the NorWatch campaign and a journalist who has been follow-ing the UAIL case. Alcan vice president of planning and strategy,Jeremy Lee Jonas, however assures that “landowners or not, theywill have compensation“.

The negative impacts of the project can go well beyond just thehuman toll. The local environment will be seriously affected.Agricultural land will no longer be cultivable. Hills will be flat-tened and increased rains will lead to higher siltation in the reser-voir that provides water for the region. Several streams that feedthe Indravati river would be destroyed and perennial sources ofwater would dry up. The most visible impact would be the efflu-ent discharge. Dumping discharge into the streams and riverswould raise pollution levels.

Facing resistance from local communities, the project has been stalled since inception. The tribals of the area have beenmobilised by the PSSP, and have been protesting against the project since 1993 (see Box on page 256: People’s protest againstUAIL). Alcan claims that the project has the support of elected rep-resentatives from 23 of the 24 “officially project-affected“ villages;however, the company has not produced any proof that couldsubstantiate this claim.

255


People of Kashipur have successfully mobilised a campaign against Utkal Alumina for more than 10 years

ASH

UTO

SH M

ISH

RA

m k

■ TALCHER’S BANE: MCL AND COAL

Coal mining in Talcher began with underground mines in 1921,and gathered momentum through massive investments in open-cast mining in the ‘60s. The increase in the number of open-castmines was accompanied by large-scale land acquisition and consequent displacement of people.

The Talcher coalfields of Mahanadi Coalfields Limited (MCL),a subsidiary of CIL, are located in Angul district. The coalfields –seven open-cast mines and three underground mines – are spreadover an area of 2,100 sq km.69

The company had acquired 2,575 ha of land by the year 2000.Of this, 1,175 ha were government-owned land, and most of therest was private land.70 Twenty-three villages were affected by theunderground mines, while 38 villages suffered due to the open-cast projects. One of the villages affected by open-cast mining hasalready been displaced; seven more villages are to be displaced.According to one estimate, over 35,000 people living in 27 villageshave already been affected in and around six open-cast mines.

One of the worst affected due to the displacement have beenthe women. According to an old tribal woman, Dukhi Naik of Hensmul village, “We used to earn enough by collecting and

selling forest produce from the nearby village. Even after thedeath of my husband, I was depending on the forest resources fora living.“ But Dukhi’s financial problems have been aggravatedwith the rapid clearing of the forests for open-cast mining. AsDukhi was landless, she did not receive any compensation orrehabilitation assistance either.

Sita Naik of Lacchmanpur village used to work with her husband in their fields and sometimes as daily wage labourers.The government acquired her land in 1988. Unlike Dukhi, herhusband received a compensation of Rs 15,000, which was spenton the daughter’s wedding and to pay the medical bills for herhusband’s cataract treatment. Sita says, “I have not got a job underthe rehabilitation package as the land record was under my husband’s name.“ Today, without her land and a job, she is aspenniless as Dukhi.

According to a survey conducted in 2000, over 80 per cent ofthe women in affected villages felt that the process of displace-ment led to disintegration of socio-cultural bases; 90 per centbelieved that their conditions have worsened. The women areclear: they did not benefit from the company’s resettlement andrehabilitation package, which was targeted only towards men.

In villages like Padmabadipur, land was acquired by the

256


People’s protest against UAILKashipur erupts against mining

In 1993, the people of the area met the then chief minister to demandthe cancellation of the UAIL project. They used road blockades, publicmeetings, padyatras (foot marches) and barricades as modes of protest.In Maikanch, on December 16, 2000, police fired on a crowd of 300protesters, killing three and injuring 30. The day before, Maikanch villagers had stopped political leaders from attending a ‘multi-stake-holder dialogue’, which UAIL had organised at Nuagon village. As aresult of all this UAIL, which was supposed to begin production in2002, was forced to reschedule the production deadline to 2005.

A fact-finding mission of the People’s Union for Civil Liberties(PUCL) reported that the tribals of Kashipur block were living under astate of siege. The district administration laid the foundation stone for apolice station at D-Karol village, the site of the alumina plant, inSeptember 2004. In December that year, about 1,000 people carried outa roadblock against the proposed station. Eight platoons surroundedthem. Amidst abuses hurled back and forth, the police lobbed tear-gasshells and lathi-charged the crowd. For a month afterwards, thereprisals continued.Villagers in the area haven’t been able to work theirfields, or trot off to market, for fear of being picked up by the police.

After years of silence, the company has again come into actionnow. It has put in an application to expand the capacity of its refineryplant from one MT per annum to three MT, and increase output fromits bauxite mines from three MT to eight MT – even though the proj-ect has barely taken off. The authorities organised a public hearing onOctober 17, 2006 in Tikri, one of the villages affected by the project.Thehearing was marked with protests and anger. Many villagers allegedthat the officials knew of the discontent and therefore had arranged

the hearing at Tikri, which is 10 km from the site instead ofKucheipadar or Bagrijhola, which were much closer. Many villagerswere also not allowed into the meeting. The PSSP, therefore, organiseda parallel meeting at Bagrijhola. Villagers from 10 of the 24 villagesgathered to rally against the company.

Even at the official hearing, anger at UAIL’s failed promises, at itsindifference to popular grievances and at the use of force to stifleprotest was in evidence. Speaker after speaker warned company offi-cials not to expect any cooperation from the local people unless UAILstopped using the police to harass and implicate them in false cases.

Even though the project had received the required clearances 11years ago, neither the refinery nor the mines are operational. In fact, till2000, no construction had started. The rules governing environmentclearances for projects are very clear: clearance granted to any projectis valid only for five years within which the construction or operationof the project should commence. Therefore, legally, the environmentalclearance for the original project itself has lapsed, and the companyneeds to get fresh clearances.

Instead of doing this, UAIL has started construction for the projectand also applied for environmental clearance for expansion. The EIAnotification clearly states that expansion is only applicable to an existing operational project and not to a non-operational project.

One of the demands made at the Bagrijhola meeting was that thestate’s chief minister, and industries and mines ministers must explainto the people how they were expected to survive after UAIL took awaytheir natural resources. But it doesn’t appear that will happen in ahurry. And if the track record is anything to go by, chances of redressfor the beleaguered villagers appear slim.

– Richard Mahapatra and Ashutosh Mishra, Down To Earth

c m y k

company in 1979; but compensations were doled out after a lapseof 26 years. Out of a total of 3,415 families identified for resettle-ment, 1,678 families are yet to be resettled. Sources say oustees invillages like Jilinda, Rackus, Gopalprasad and Soloda have beendemanding jobs in lieu of their land; MCL has not been able tomeet this demand. In fact, villagers of Jilinda want 309 jobs beforethe new mine, Bhubaneswari, opens. But MCL wants to take upthe employment issue only after the mine comes up.

A people’s struggle has been going on in the area: the objectiveis to get a proper rehabilitation and compensation package fromMCL. In 2006, protests by the local people broke out frequentlyand armed police was deployed to bring the situation under control.

The company has incurred losses of around Rs 51 crore due tothese stirs, while the state’s losses hover around Rs 64 crore. Themines which have been badly affected by the oustees’ stir areHingula, Bharatpur, Jagannath, Ananata and Kalinga, whichtogether produce more than a lakh tonne of coal daily. A high-level Rehabilitation Advisory Committee (RAC) was formedwhich suggested 6,026 names for job rehabilitation. However,even after regular intervention by the RAC, the MCL has failed toprovide the required number of jobs. The RAC has now been dis-solved, and a new committee has taken its place. But its slow paceof work has aggravated the situation.

■ JAGATSINGHPUR: THE POSCO STRUGGLE

The people of Jagatsinghpur district in coastal Orissa have beenengaged in a protest movement against Pohang Iron & SteelCompany (POSCO) since June 2005. POSCO-India PrivateLimited is a subsidiary of the Korean company POSCO, theworld’s fourth largest steel producer. POSCO signed a memoran-dum of understanding (MoU) with the government of Orissa toset up a 12-MT per annum steel plant in Jagatsinghpur, at an estimated investment of US $12 billion.71 The project will alsoinclude three mines in Keonjhar and Sundargarh districts, forwhich a separate MoU will be signed, even to the extent of permit-ting the company to export iron ore.

POSCO had initially requested 2,025 ha of land to build thesteel plant and a captive port, 10 km north of the port of Paradip.It subsequently settled for 1,620 ha to reduce potential displace-ment. Of this revised area, 1,439 ha is government land, while therest is private. Initially, state officials assumed that only 341 ha of the government’s portion were forest land; but they soon discovered that more hectares of forests would have to be razed to make way for the plant. This has led to a tussle between thestate revenue and forestry departments.

The proposed POSCO plant would displace nearly 22,000 peo-ple of 3,700 families residing in 11 villages of Dhinkia, Nuagaon

257

MINING IN THE STATES: ORISSAA

GN

IMIR

H B

ASU

/ C

SE

Spread over 2,10,000 ha, the Talcher coalfields have affected 61 villages – rehabilitation and resettlement have been given a short shrift

c m y k

and Gadakujang gram panchayats.72 Most of the people in this areaare opposed to the project because the government land promisedto the company is also used by 10,000 betel vine owners to growbetel; the crop fetches up to Rs 50 crore annually. The betel cropensures that no one is unemployed in the area; nobody dies ofstarvation. The people feel that the government has no right to sell the land and make so many people unemployed. The government, however, contends the project would affect only 500 families, and create thousands of jobs.73

The POSCO Pratirodh Sangram Samiti (PPSS), an organisationof local people, has been spearheading the movement against thecompany. The movement is witnessing voluntary participationfrom the old, women and children. There seems to be no requirement for a leader to lead it. “I would be the first to sacrificemy life if the government takes an inch of land for POSCO,“announces 86-year-old Jhaji Samal of Govindpuri village.

According to the people, the project would destroy thoseforests in the area which had protected the people during thecyclone of 1999. The PPSS has proposed two alternate sites for theproject – Ambiki village and Budha Garia – where no human habitation would be affected. But the government seems adamanton the original site, and claims to have formulated a policy tocompensate the betel vine owners.

POSCO says it would acquire additional land to compensatethe villagers. A spokesperson for POSCO’s Indian unit said this

move would cost the company about Rs 63 lakh (US $1,40,000),peanuts considering the scale of the project. The company alsoannounced a special scheme for betel farmers. Under it, cultivators will get alternative land for relocation of their vines.For those who wish to continue in the same area, land suitable forvine cultivation will be provided within or outside the projectarea. Besides, adequate assistance will be extended to them to restart cultivation. The scheme will be in addition to the rehabilitation and resettlement policy of the state government.

But a spell of uncertainty has been cast over the proposed project after the visit of the Union minister of commerce in July2006, and his reported statement that it is not desirable to grant amining lease to POSCO. The ministry is also opposed to the moveto allow POSCO to export iron ore.

The Orissa government, after much deliberation, hasapproved and forwarded POSCO’s application for a prospectinglicence (PL) of the Khandadhar iron ore mines in Sundergarh, tothe Union mining ministry. The company has, among others,applied for the remaining deposits at Khandadhar, spread over6,200 ha, which has an estimated iron ore reserve of about 200 MT.The company has applied for PL for two more mines – Thakuraniin Keonjhar and Malingtoli in Sundergarh. The state governmenthas also been asked by the Centre to fast-track the POSCO project.

Work on the project was originally scheduled to start in April,with the first phase to be completed by 2010. The company now

258


People say ‘no’: POSCO, the biggest foreign investment in the country, has been greeted with protests

REU

TERS

c m y k

hopes to start earthwork for the first phase from October 2007. The proposed mine lease of the company ran into further

controversy on account of two litigations filed by the public sector company, Kudremukh Iron Ore Company Ltd. (KIOCL).The company challenged the state’s decision to hand over themining lease at Khandadhar and Barsuan in Sundargarh district to the Korean giant. According to the officials of KIOCL,it had applied for prospective mining licence for the above sites prior to POSCO’s application and had also deposited Rs 1.1crore. The state government, without considering the applica-tion, had arbitrarily taken the decision to allot 6,500 ha of land in the mining area to POSCO. The company prayed for quashingof the lease. On the basis of this litigation, the Orissa High Courtdirected the state government to maintain status quo on grant of mining lease on February 27, 2007. It also issued notices to the state government and POSCO directing them to file countersby March 12.

The public hearing for the environmental clearance of the proj-ect, organised by the Orissa Pollution Control Board on April 15,2007, was a good indication of what the people thought. A vocalsection of the crowd wanted officials to answer a simple question:“What is the use of a public hearing when there is no peace in theproject area?“ The locals have, time and again, raised questions ofhow the loss of their livelihoods would be compensated, only toreceive unsatisfactory answers.

The locals are also employing less conventional methods ofresisting the project. In May 2007, three POSCO officials were kidnapped – people claimed that these officials were trying to persuade them to give up their land. But despite the protest andagitation against the company, it has received environmentalclearance in August 2007.

■ IRON ORE IRE: KALINGANAGAR, KEONJHAR

Kalinganagar, an industrial hub in Jajpur district, has been witnessing intense industrial activity, with 13 mega enterpriseshaving lined up to set shop here. These include Tata Steel, BhusanSteels, Jindal Steel, MESCO, Nilanchal Ispat Nigam Limited(under SAIL) and Maharashtra Seamless, among others.Thousands of hectares of land have been acquired by theIndustrial Infrastructure Development Corporation (IDCO) atrock-bottom prices from local tribals; these lands have been soldoff to the companies at higher rates.

The people, mainly Munda tribals, have been resisting theland acquisition process, compensation packages and the establishment of a Tata Steel plant in the area. Several rounds ofdialogues between the people, the company and the governmenthave failed. Events finally reached a flashpoint on January 2,2006: Tata Steel, with the help of 15 platoons of police, started levelling the land forcibly acquired by it in the villages ofGobarghati, Nuagaon and Chandia. Thousands of tribals peacefully protested this move and demanded that the authorities stop the acquisition. When their demands were notheeded, the tribals tried to force their way on to the land.According to the police, the mob became violent, pelted stones,attacked and axed a policeman to death. The police was forced toretaliate: 12 tribals, including three women and a school student,were shot down.

According to the people, the whole episode was planned.While the company and the government were fully prepared, thetribals had no inkling of the company’s plans to start work. Thepeople discount the police version which says that the tribals hadcome prepared for the violence; they contend that the peopleretaliated when the police began firing. All the persons killedwere shot either at their head, chest or waist at point blank range– which raises the question why the police did not shoot at thelegs to disperse the mob.

The incident has steeled the tribals’ resolve. If given an optionof choosing between a better compensation package or “no“ to thecompany, they are clear: they will chose the latter.

In Keonjhar, a proposed plant by Lakshmi Mittal is facing thesame steely resolve. Barely a few weeks after Arcelor Mittalsigned an MoU with the Orissa government in January 2007 to setup a 12-MT steel plant in the district, the project has run intorough weather.

Phulamani, a tribal who will be affected by the proposed project, says: “We will not allow Mittal steel to come up here. Wewill not give away our lands as they are our only source of livelihood. No matter what money the government or Mittal steelgives, we will fight against it till the end“.74 This is just one amongthe angry voices of thousands of villagers at Patna tehsil inKeonjhar. Instead of their land, the locals want the government togive barren land to the company.

These angry villagers from 17 villages demonstrated at aprotest rally to the Keonjhar district collector’s office, demandingthat their land should not be acquired for the plant. B BMohapatra, collector, said: “In the memorandum they gave us,

259


Betel farmers are likely to be adversely affected by the project as theyuse the government land, under proposal for acquisition by POSCO

AG

NIM

IRH

BA

SU /

CSE

c m y k

they demand that since it is a multi-crop fertile irrigated land, thisshould not be handed over for the project.“ Mr Mohapatra clari-fied that there was no communication from the state governmentas yet on acquisition or requirement of land.

■ VEDANTA: THE NEMESIS OF NIYAMGIRI

The Niyamgiri hill in Kalahandi district is a wildlife sanctuary and an elephant reserve. Seventy-five per cent of the area is covered with thick forests, with more than 300 species of vegeta-tion, including about 50 species of medicinal plants. Many of these species are listed as endangered by the International Union for Conservation of Nature. Niyamgiri also has a number ofperennial hill streams which serve the irrigation and drinkingwater needs of the tribals living in the foothills. The Vamsadharaand Nagvalli rivers emanate from this hill: lakhs of people insouth Orissa and Andhra Pradesh depend on these rivers.According to Kanchi Kohli of Kalpavriksh, an NGO working onenvironment and research advocacy, the hill is also consideredsacred by the Dongria Khond tribals, who call it Niyam Penu(god). Unfortunately, the area also has rich deposits – almost 195 MT – of bauxite.

In June 2002, villagers of Lanjigarh in this region were servedwith a land acquisition and gram sabha notice for a ‘proposed alu-mina refinery project’. It was said that the project would be set upby UK-based Sterlite Industries and its group company, Vedanta.Way back in 1997, Sterlite had signed an agreement with the

Orissa government for a mining project. The notice of the districtadministration proclaimed that when the project materialised, 12 villages would be razed, 60 families would be uprooted and302 would lose their farmlands.

Protests began almost immediately: a mass movement underthe banner of the tribal-dominated Niyamgiri Surakhya Samitibegan. The objective was to protect the forest, land and water ofthe area, and its slogan was a simple 'Vedanta hatao' (RemoveVedanta). In 2003, the administration evicted 64 tribal families ofJaganathpur in – say activists – complete violation of constitution-al provisions against alienation of tribal land. Villagers were givenno compensation because their fields were listed as governmentrevenue land.

In June 2003, the Orissa government signed a fresh MoU withSterlite for a three-MT per annum bauxite mine on the Niyamgirihill, along with an alumina refinery, a captive power plant and analumina smelter. According to the company, around 1,444 ha ofland was needed, including about 59 ha of forest land. Despitethis, and the opposition and doubts expressed by environmental-ists on the ecological feasibility of the project, the company wasgranted environmental clearance by the MoEF's technical commit-tee. However, the project ran into trouble with the SupremeCourt-appointed Central Empowered Committee (CEC) opposingit. The CEC listed the following adverse impacts of the project75:● Loss of biodiversity ● Destruction of water-recharging capacity of the hill and

desertification of perennial streams

260

STATE OF INDIA’S ENVIRONMENT: MININGM

ON

A D

AS

Killing fields: 12 tribals were shot to death in Kalinganagar on January 2, 2006 – a violent outcome of the protest against industrialisation

c m y k

● Damage to the Tel river: The project's proposed sourcing ofwater from this river will create hardships for the people, asthis river is an important source of water for Bolangir district.Moreover, the river has very little flow.

● Unsatisfactory compensation to the displaced: The rehabilita-tion colony was established close to the reserved forests ofNiyamgiri and no land was given to villagers for agriculture

● Forced evictions: Sixty-four households of Jaganathpur vil-lage, most of which were Kandha tribals, had been cultivatinga piece of revenue land – Khasra No 186 – for generations.Encroachment cases were filed against them and they wereevicted by force without any compensation and in violation ofthe special protection provided to scheduled tribes.On September 21, 2005, the CEC recommended the revocation

of environmental clearances given to Vedanta Alumina Ltd.76 Itwas very critical of the company which it felt had provided mis-leading information, and the MoEF for deliberately overlookingthem. Some of its observations were77:● Since the project involved the use of forest land, the environ-

mental clearance should have been granted by the MoEF onlyafter the project obtained a permit under the ForestConservation Act. But the company did not file its proposalunder the Act.

● Vedanta deliberately and consciously concealed the involve-ment of the forest land in the project. In the acquisition noticedated June 6, 2002 issued by the district collector, Kalahandi, itis clearly mentioned that 118 acre (47.75 ha) of forest land is

included in the project site. But in its application for environ-mental clearance and also during the examination of the proposal, Vedanta concealed this vital fact.

● In violation of the FCA 1980, the project has been split into alu-mina refinery project and bauxite mining project, even thoughbauxite mining is an integral part of the refinery project. TheMoEF accorded environmental clearance despite being fullyaware that forest land would be used for mining at Niyamgiriif the alumina refinery was to be established at Lanjigarh.

● The construction work for the refinery was started on the project site much before environmental clearance was accorded on September 22, 2004. A June 2006 study undertaken by the Wildlife Institute of

India, Dehradun, at the behest of the Forest Advisory Committee(FAC) of the MoEF warns that the threats posed by the proposedproject are serious and will lead to irreversible changes in the ecological characteristics of the area. The report titled Studies onimpact of proposed Lanjigarh bauxite mining on biodiversity, has pointed out various kinds of “environmental degradations“ suchas geomorphologic changes, landscape changes, loss of forestsand loss of flora and fauna.78

However, the institute tagged a supplementary report inOctober 2006, which included a Rs 42-crore plan for “mitigation of impacts on wildlife“. Based on these two reports, the FAC recommended diversion of forest land for mining in the region.The presence of wildlife in the area has also been questioned: theproject’s EIA report says that a primary survey has failed to

261


Bleak future: Supreme Court’s Central Empowered Committee has recommended revoking the environment clearance given to Vedanta, whichis now embroiled in a court case

AG

NIM

IRH

BA

SU /

CSE

c m y k

indicate the presence of all the mammalian species that the regionis said to hold. But even as this was being debated, Down To Earthsecured clinching evidence of the area’s wildlife – by photograph-ing a leopard in the wild.

The Vedanta case has also created an uproar in the assemblywith the opposition accusing the ruling party of selling out to amultinational company and harming the state. In December 2005,hundreds of tribals from Rayagada and Kalahandi districts stageda demonstration in front of the state assembly in Bhubaneshwarurging the government to shelve the project.79 Activists also trav-elled to London from Orissa to confront Vedanta chairperson AnilAgarwal on his company's human and environmental rightsrecord at its annual general meeting in August 2006. Agarwal andhis chief executive Kuldip Kaura faced a barrage of questionsfrom aggrieved shareholders and activists. Agarwal said the com-pany had followed all rules and regulations, and that it wouldaccept any decision reached by the court.80 Denying any wrong-doing at Lanjigarh, the company has said it has “neither alienatedtribal land nor caused any damage to forests“.81 But its statementsare suspect: it has been denying that construction work at the siteis in progress, while photographic evidence suggests that thecompany has almost completed construction work and has been planning to commence trial production by procuring rawmaterials from outside the state.82 Presently, the case relating tothe diversion of the forest in the Niyamgiri hill lies with theSupreme Court. And the protests of the people continue.

In most of the cases cited above, the root cause for the risingdiscontent against mining and mega industrial projects has beenthe failure of the government to satisfactorily rehabilitate andresettle the displaced people. The fact that a major proportion ofthe displaced are tribals depending on forests and land for theirsustenance, compounds the problem; resettling tribals and inte-grating them into the mainstream needs to be done with caution,and the government’s ham-handed efforts have been anythingbut. The result: despite boasting of the best R&R policy in thecountry, Orissa remains in the grip of numerous agitations, old aswell as new.

■ A QUESTION OF COMPLIANCE

One of the key reasons why the state faces so many environmen-tal issues and challenges is its poor institutional framework. Thereis no dearth of legislations; implementation is the problem. Withlimited resources at the disposal of the OSPCB as well as theregional arm of the IBM, monitoring of 300-plus mines has been an uphill task. Environmental compliance, as a result, isextremely poor. But according to the Board, compliance by themining sector is not a problem in the state. Its report on Orissastates that all the big mines monitored by the regional offices com-ply to sanctioned conditions of clearance and consent. No seriousviolations/impacts and pollution have been reported in the recentpast. Most importantly, the OSPCB talks of only monitoring 154mines, when there are more than 300 mines in the state.

The Board’s views notwithstanding, officially there have beencases of violation: of the 48 mines operating in Keonjhar, 10 wererefused consent to operate by the Board for violation of differentprovisions of the Air and Water Acts.83

Top officials of SAIL, TISCO, Hindustan Zinc, Orissa Mining Corporation, Indian Metal and Ferro Alloys Ltd, Orissa Cement Ltd, M L Rungta and others have faced prosecution for mining illegally in forest land without properapproval of the MoEF. About 50 mines were operating in Orissa’sforests in clear violation of the provisions of the ForestConservation Act, 1980.84

Under the current regulatory system, small or minor mineswith less than five ha area are not covered under the compliancemanagement system. In addition, it is estimated that over 1,000mines are operating illegally in the state and do not come underthe scanner of IBM or the OSPCB. From an environmental perspective, this means a very large percentage of mines areoperating without environmental safeguards and this representsa significant gap in the regulatory regime. It is also suspected thata large number of large, small and medium-sized enterprises inthe sector are operating without environmental supervision.85 Itis quite clear that mining in Orissa is a major socio-economic and environmental challenge. So far, the track record of the mining industry has been very poor, in all aspects, whether it isrehabilitation and resettlement or environmental performance.People do not trust either the companies or the government. TheOrissa government will have to reassess the role of mining andmineral-based industries in its future growth paradigm.

262


Out, damned spots? Vedanta’s EIA report did not record any wildlife inits primary survey, but a photographer’s camera captured a full-grownleopard in the area

AG

NIM

IRH

BA

SU /

CSE

c m y k

Rajasthan is the state with the maximum number of mine leases in India – 1,324 leases for major minerals,

10,851 for minor minerals and 19,251 quarry licenses for mining stones.1 Its most forested district, Udaipur, is also its most mined.

The state holds reserves of 44 major and 22 minor minerals.2

According to the IBM, the state has 11 per cent of India’s limestone, 83 per cent of its gypsum and 48 per cent of its copperore reserves.3 In addition, in 2004-05, Rajasthan was the only producer of garnet, jasper, selenite, wollastonite and zinc concentrates; the leading producer of calcite, lead concentrate, ball clay, fireclay, ochre, phosphorite, silver and steatite; and thesecond largest producer of asbestos, fluoride (graded), feldspar,copper concentrate and silica sand. Production of the state’s most important major and minor minerals has remained relatively constant between 2001-05.

Rajasthan is a major producer of non-metallic minerals –accounting for about 23 per cent of India’s total production.4 Atseven per cent, the state’s contribution to metallic minerals ismuch lower.5 The major non-metallic mines are in Rajasmand,Ajmer, Udaipur, Alwar and Dungarpur (see Map on page 264:Forests and minerals – Rajasthan).6

In 2004-05, the value of minerals produced in the state was Rs 2,919 crore – four per cent of India’s total mineral production,roughly the same contribution as in the previous two years.7

However, the value shows a continuously increasing trend in thestate – it was Rs 1,752 crore in 1997-98, and has grown by morethan 66 per cent since.8

Rajasthan is also the leading producer of minor minerals. In2004-05, of the total value of minerals produced in the state, asmuch as 57 per cent was generated by minor minerals (Rs 1,676crore) (see Graph 1 on page 265: Value of mineral production).

263

c m y k

Rajasthan is an important producer of minor minerals and accounts for a major chunk of the marble produced in the country

SUN

NY

SEB

AST

IAN


Rajasthan and Gujarat

According to the Planning Commission, the royalty receivedby the state government was around Rs 400 crore, Rs 458 croreand Rs 590 crore respectively in 2002-03, 2003-04 and 2004-05.9

Revenue from mining accounts for about three per cent of thestate’s total revenue.10 Lead, zinc and limestone contribute themost to the total royalty received (see Table 1: Royalty contribu-tion). Though minor minerals contribute more than 50 per cent interms of value of mineral production, their contribution to royal-ty is just five per cent.11

Rajasthan is one of the seven states in India that has districtscharacterised as “high potential” by the IBM: more than 100 mining

leases have been granted in these districts.12 These districts –Ajmer, Bhilwara and Udaipur – contribute 14 per cent of the mining leases and about 18 per cent of the total area under mining in Rajasthan (see Table 2: The mining districts).

In 2003, Rajasthan had 1,312 major mineral leases (excludingcoal), which was roughly 15 per cent of all of India’s major mineralmining leases.13 The area under major mineral mines was 1,34,831ha.14 Of the major minerals, maximum mine leases have beengranted for steatite (311 leases); these account for about 18 per centof the total area under mine leases for major minerals in the state.15

Gypsum has the next largest area under lease (16 per cent),

264


c m y k

Protests: Have been against stone quarries and

marble and limestone mines

Ch

amb

al

Sou

Dhebar Lake

RanaPratapSagar

GandhiSagar

Anu

Berach

Banas

Jawal

SukaiBandi

Bandi

Luni

Bana

s

Saraswati

Sabar

mat

i

Luni

Bandi

Bana

s

Khari

Gudha dam

Sambhar Lake Banganga

Dhund

Chambal

Yamuna

Gambhir

Sind

Bet

wa

Kal

i Sin

dh

Ghaghar

Markanda

G U J A R A T

P a k i s t a n

P U N J A B

H A R Y A N A


R A J A S T H A N

Open forests

Dense forests

River

Lead

Copper

Dolomite

Limestone

Mica

Kaolin

Asbestos

Gypsum

Silica sand

Marble

Granite

Dhaulpur

Parw

ar

Jhalawar

Banswara

Ganganagar

Bikaner

Churu

Hanumangarh

Jhunjhunu

Sikar

Jaipur

Alwar

Dausa

Bharatpur

Karauli

SawaiMadhopur

TonkAjmer

Nagaur

BhilwaraPali

Rajsamand

Bundi

KotaBaran

Chi

ttau

rgar

h

Dungarpur

Udaipur

Sirohi

Jalor

Barmer

Jodhpur

Jaisalmer

I n d i a


MAP: Forests and minerals – RajasthanUdaipur, the most mined district, is also the most forested

followed by limestone (15 per cent).16 The number of mining leasesgranted in Rajasthan, as well as the total area under these leases,shows an overall decreasing trend (see Graph 2: Mining leases).

But major minerals do not reflect the true picture of mining inRajasthan; minor minerals and stone quarries do. Rajasthan hasthousands of unorganised mines, which can be as small as one-twentieth of a hectare (see Box on page 266: Unaccounted).

The state has been attracting a number of public and private

mining companies, including the world’s largest multinationalmining giants BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto, who in 1998 conduct-ed aerial surveys for base metals in the state.17 Rajasthan’s zincproduction is a boon for Hindustan Zinc Ltd: its current annualproduction is four lakh tonne of zinc, 0.85 lakh tonne of lead,and 100 tonne of silver.18 Cairn Energy India Pvt Ltd, Oil andNatural Gas Corporation, Oil India Limited and Phoenix areactively mining for lignite in the state. These four companies are

265

MINING IN THE STATES: RAJASTHAN AND GUJARAT

c m y k

1,499

1,350 1,295 1,299 1,307 1312

1832

1578

1428 1412 1384 1348

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,800

2,000

1995-96 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03

No. of leases Area under leases (in '00 hectares)

Years

Source: Analysis based on data from various publications of the Indian Bureauof Mines, Nagpur

GRAPH 2: Mining leasesNumber and area under mine leases is decreasing

District No of % of total Area % of total leases leases (hectares) area under

lease

Ajmer 209 15.9 8,591 6.4

Bhilwara 151 11.5 8,486 6.3

Bikaner 94 7.2 13,415 9.9

Chittorgarh 54 4.1 7,003 5.2

Dungarpur 76 5.8 5,210 3.9

Ganganagar 13 1.0 8,788 6.5

Jaipur 90 6.9 8,043 6.0

Jaisalmer 22 1.7 5,465 4.1

Nagaur 19 1.4 9,980 7.4

Pali 44 3.4 4,157 3.1

Rajasmand 66 5.0 6,581 4.9

Udaipur 177 13.5 19,839 14.7

Source: Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases and Prospecting Licences2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 7, 18-20

TABLE 2: The mining districtsThree districts have more than 100 mining leases each

9%

Limestone

Phosphorite

7%Lead and zinc

16%

Others

10%

Minor minerals

58%


GRAPH 1: Value of mineral productionMinor minerals account for more than 50 per cent

2002-03 2003-04 2004-05

Iron ore 0.003 0.005 0.025

Copper 0.5 0.5 0.6

Limestone 23.4 20.8 19.8

Dolomite 0.2 0.1 0.1

Lignite 0.6 0.7 0.5

Rock phosphate 5.3 5.9 5.2

Lead and zinc 21.3 22.5 25.6

Others 43.6 43.9 42.2

Minor minerals 5.1 5.5 5.9

Source: Anon, 2006, ‘Annexure 7’, National Mineral Policy, Report of theHigh-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi

TABLE 1: Royalty contributionLead, zinc and limestone lead in terms of percentagecontribution to total royalty from mining

also exploring for oil in Barmer; 81 wells of depths up to four kmhave been drilled.19 Current reserves include 300 MT of crudeoil, 11,790 million cubic metre of gas, and more than 47 MT ofheavy oil.20 The state government believes the reserves couldprovide one lakh barrels of oil per day for 21 years.21

The state is also drawing sand miners. With the ban on sandmining in the neighbouring states of Haryana, Punjab and Delhi,demand for bajri sand is putting immense pressure on farmlandsin Kotputli tehsil, Jaipur district. In 2005-06, 16 sand mining oper-ations opened in Kotputli; the mines are using 13,000 litre of waterper hour, or 560 cubic metre per day, which has led to a substan-tial drop in water levels in local wells.22

■ WORKING CONDITIONS: DEPLORABLE

There are now over 2.5 million people working in Rajasthan’smining sector, many driven there by the state’s persistent droughtthat has wrought havoc on rural communities.23 In fact, mining inRajasthan relies heavily on exploiting marginalised communities:95 per cent of the workforce are dalits or tribals; 37 per cent arewomen, and another 15 per cent are children.24 With little politi-cal representation, the mining sector has succeeded in implement-ing a system that relies on unfair wages – Rs 50-70 per day formen; Rs 35-55 per day for women; and Rs 25-35 per day for chil-dren.25 Basic workers’ rights such as access to water and toiletfacilities, social security, safety equipment and compensation inthe case of injury or death do not exist.26

In 2002, the National Campaign on Labour Rights, organisedby the Delhi-based Centre for Education and Communication,

released a damning report on the mining industry in Rajasthan,after having visited mines in Makrana, Barmer and Jodhpur(see Box: Unorganised: Jodhpur’s sandstone mines). In Makrana,the best of the three, there was an average of one death a day;mineworkers did not receive pay slips, provident fund, pen-sions, gratuity or maternity benefits; safety regulations were notfollowed; blasting operations had not been updated; and there

266


Unorganised: Jodhpur’s sandstone minesMine owners prefer small mines to stay outside the law’sreach

Mine owners of Rajasthan have employed an ingenious system ofensuring their operations remain below the radar of any mining regulations: divide mines into small enough plots where industrialstandards do not apply. This is the case with the sandstone minesthat stretch for 25,000 ha in Jodhpur district. Here, sandstone quarries may be as small as 200 x 100 feet and employ as few as five to eight people who make Rs 30-50 per day (for men) or Rs 15-30 per day (for women).

Because these mines operate beyond the law, workers’ rights arenot recognised. Basic facilities such as toilets and water do not exist,nor do safety procedures or compensation for accidents. This lastviolation is especially cruel as the numbers of work-related accidentsand fatalities are high.

– Rekha Wazir, Mine Labour Protection Campaign, Jodhpur

UnaccountedThe minor minerals sector in Rajasthan is a grey area

Rajasthan is best known for its production of marble, sandstone andother stones, but a large proportion of the production of these miner-als does not feature in official records. The Indian Bureau of Mines(IBM) does not collect detailed information on minor minerals – andmost of Rajasthan’s mining falls under this category.

Individual state governments are supposed to maintain data aswell as regulate the production of these minerals. However, most gov-ernments, including Rajasthan, do not do so. Apart from inadequatedata, regulation of these mines is also an issue.The Rajasthan PollutionControl Board regulates only those mines that have a lease area ofmore than five ha.The numerous small mines, therefore, fall outside itspurview.

The Mine Labour Protection Campaign, an organisation workingamong workers in Rajasthan’s mines, says that in 2003-04, the statehad 7,765 minor mineral leases covering 54,390 ha and an additional15,786 quarry licences (see Table: Minor mineral leases and area).1

Rajasthan produces 10 per cent of the world’s and 70 per cent ofIndia’s output of sandstone.2 Officially, in 2003-04, there were 1,199leases for sandstone covering 20,713 ha. There are no accounts of thelarge number of illegal sandstone mines in the state.

Mineral Number of leases Area (in hectares)

Marble 2,232 3,075.71

Sandstone 1,199 20,713.44

Limestone 207 2,335.51

Masonry stone 2,661 9,049.51

Limestone (B) 352 14,244.04

Brick earth 20 580.25

Serpentine 362 386.63

Granite 402 620.92

Source: Anon, 2007, Database, Mine Labour Protection Campaign,http://www.minelabour.org/Database.PDF, as viewed on March 26, 2007

TABLE: Minor mineral leases and area Rajasthan has over 7,000 minor mineral leases coveringan area of more than 50,000 ha

m k

was no connection to workers’ organisations or unions.27

According to the Mines Labour Protection Campaign, thereare three deaths every day from work-related illnesses like silico-sis and tuberculosis.28 In the first six months of 1995, there were130 mining deaths.29 Most of these were resolved through unionleaders; mines do not usually involve the authorities, which hasled to families receiving work security promises and some meagrecompensations.30

The Gramin Vikas Vigyan Samiti (GRAVIS), a Jodhpur-basedNGO, in collaboration with the Society for Participatory Researchin Asia (PRIA), Delhi, carried out two independent surveysamong mineworkers in Rajasthan. The first study in 1994 foundabout 10 per cent of the mineworkers examined suffering from sil-icosis. A second study was conducted in 1996 at the sandstonemines in Jodhpur which included an elaborate medical examina-tion, lung function test and chest X-rays. Out of the 288 workersexamined, 14 per cent were found to be suffering from severe sil-icosis and 28 per cent were suffering from silicosis of less severity.If these numbers are indicative of mines throughout the state, thenan estimated 800,000 workers might be affected.31

In 1997, 25 per cent of open-cast mineworkers in Bijolia hadsilicosis, bronchitis, asthma or tuberculosis, while 50 per cent hadmalaria, a result of open-cast mining lending itself to easy breed-ing grounds.32 The noise levels, at 96-125 db, violated the 75 dblimit.33 In March 2004, the Central government ordered the stateto close 300 illegal marble mines in Makrana citing failure toimplement proper safety and security measures.

■ FORESTS: SYSTEMATIC DENUDATION

Mining has inflicted a body blow to Rajasthan’s forests and landresources as well. Legal mining operates in the state with littlegovernment oversight and illegal mining is rampant – land degra-dation and water and air pollution, therefore, plague the miningregions (see Box: All above the law). The 2006 State of the

Environment Report of the Rajasthan Pollution Control Board says:“Out of the leases of 2005, about 30 per cent (around 2,700) aremanually operated. In addition to it, there are about 15,000 man-ually operated quarries. All these mines and quarries and the ille-gal mines have no mechanism in place to implement environmentprotection measures.”34 In the report, the Board finds that landdegradation is the greatest environmental threat from non-metal-lic mining, and that the most “environmentally critical miningarea” is Ramganj Mandi and Jhalawar.

Rajasthan has 32,05,120 ha of forest land – which is over nineper cent of the state’s land area.35 The National Centre forAdvocacy Studies reports that about 4,996 ha of this forest landhas been converted for mining since 1980.36 In 1996, the SupremeCourt (SC) banned all non-forest activities on forest land; theorder covered 2,000 mines and quarries over 50,000 ha.37 Mining

267


Mining cooperatives – the way ahead?Rajasthan is experimenting with a cooperative system

A few years ago, the Mine Labour Protection Campaign set out toimprove the working conditions and the quality of life for residents ofSanfa village, Barmer. The village of 754 people and 138 households isin the south-west of Rajasthan, bordered by Jaisalmer, Jodhpur andPakistan – largely desert with little and erratic rainfall, low literacy rates(25 per cent), and no sewage or water system. The village’s primaryoccupation is agriculture, although this is only conducted four monthsof the year and yields are low.

Because Barmer has reserves of 10 major and minor minerals,mining provides the second largest industry for Sanfa residents. Thereare about 20 mines operating in the area, which employ about 300 people at Rs 80 per 100 khande. The mines are small – less than 15 persons per mine – unorganised, and therefore without any occu-pational standards, safety regulations, medical care or compensation.

After visiting the region and organising meetings with minework-ers, 21 people agreed in late 2002 to start a mining cooperative, and inNovember 2002 they registered the ‘Sanfa Khan Majdoor ThekaSamiti’. The cooperative applied for lease for mining masonry stonethree km from Sanfa, which was granted in May 2003 along with theclearances from the forest department and the district collector. Thecooperative has been turning a profit since it became operational in2003.

There are now 14 mining cooperatives in Rajasthan: six are profitably operational, and the remaining are waiting for leases. The wage of mineworkers in these cooperatives is about Rs 140 per day, and their jobs are secure for the life of the mining lease – 20 years.

Furthermore, cooperatives provide their workers with health facilities, and roles in the decision-making process; the profits are usedto provide services for women and children in the communities (suchas education), and no children work in these mines.

All above the lawIllegal mining is a major problem

The Rajasthan State Pollution Board has said in its State of theEnvironment Report 2006 that illegal mining of feldspar, quartz,sandstone, slate stone and masonry stone is on the rise in thestate.1 “Illegal mines”, it continues, “have no mechanism in placeto implement environmental protection measures”. 2

There are also cases where the government allows mines tooperate illegally. Mining for asbestos is banned in India,3 butRajasthan continued to produce asbestos in 2004-05.4 This is notthe only case: each time the state issues a mining lease for a forestarea, it violates the Central government’s directives. In 2005, inresponse to the proliferation of illegal mining and the state’s con-tinued policy of issuing licenses in violation of the Centre’s laws,the Supreme Court put a stay on all mining licenses issued inRajasthan after December 16, 2002.5

m k

268


c m y k

Playing with fire Rajasthan continues to dabble with asbestos despite worldwide bans on the mineral

“All types of asbestos cause cancer… Exposure to chrysotileincreases the risk of cancer”1

– World Health Organization (WHO)

“…a decision to ban asbestos is not simple. Whereas crocidoliteand amosite appear to be strongly linked to disease, chrysotile is not”2

– Indian Bureau of Mines (IBM)

With 40 countries having banned asbestos and the International LaborOrganization and WHO recommending an end to its use, it is surpris-ing that countries still argue that asbestos is safe.Yet, this is what India– and many others – continue to do. While a ban on mining asbestoswas imposed in India in 1986, it only applied to the renewal or granti-ng of new leases. India continues to use asbestos products, which can

seriously affect the health of users. And now it is considering lifting theban on chrysotile. Last year, the Union ministry of mines directed theIBM to work with the Central Pollution Control Board to determinewhat workplace safety safeguards must be implemented so that theban could be lifted.3

Around the world, 125 million people are exposed to asbestos inthe workplace, and around 100,000 people die each year fromasbestos-related diseases “resulting from occupational exposures.”4

Additionally, thousands of deaths from non-workplace exposureoccur each year.5 In India, domestic consumption of asbestosamounted to about 86,000 tonne in 2003-04, and it was used upalmost entirely for “asbestos-cement and asbestos-based productsmanufacturing”.6

Mining of asbestos occurs mostly in Rajasthan, which has 54 percent of India’s asbestos resources; the remaining reserves are inKarnataka (45 per cent) and Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand andUttarakhand (one per cent altogether).7 In 2004-05, almost the entireproduction (5,619 tonne) was of amphibole asbestos; the remaining 86per cent came from chrysotile.8 The number of mines is decreasing asa result of the 1986 ban, but Rajasthan still has five-six operationalmines. The biggest threat to workers, however, lies not in the mines,but in the mills.

The milling process accounts for two-thirds of the total produc-tion.9 Unfortunately, much of this is unorganised and lacks any healthsafeguards. According to Iqbal Ahmad, co-author of a new study onairborne asbestos in the unorganised sectors in India, the number ofunorganised asbestos mills is probably around 200, many employingonly five-15 people, mostly women who often have to bring theiryoung children to the workplace. Both workers and their children suf-fer high exposure to the dust in the mills.10

The IBM, however, persists in downplaying and misrepresentingthe risk asbestos poses. According to it: “The incidence of severeasbestosis has been declining for years and should continue to do sobecause of dust control in the workplace.”11 But, as Ahmad pointsout, the government has completely failed to control dust and expo-sure in the unorganised sector. While the IBM says that “minerals andchemicals containing 0.1 per cent or more silica are considered car-cinogenic”12, the WHO maintains that there is no threshold “for thecarcinogenic effects of asbestos” and that “the most efficient way toeliminate asbestos-related disease is to stop using all types ofasbestos.”13

There is also the question of a state’s responsibility towards othercountries. Canada, for instance, has come under fire for continuing tomine and export chrysotile. According to MiningWatch Canada,“Virtually all of Canada’s asbestos is exported to developing countrieslike India, Indonesia and Thailand.” But it is not only the West thatprofits from exporting carcinogenic materials. In its Indian MineralsYearbook 2005, the IBM says: “Results obtained so far (from research)suggest that chrysotile was less dangerous than amphibole asbestos.”Why, then, is India exporting amphibole? In 2003-04, India exported190 tonne of the mineral to China. India also exports chrysotile andother asbestos, and their primary buyers are other developing coun-tries, primarily China and Bangladesh.

In India, asbestos is mined mostly in Rajasthan, which has 54 percent of the country’s resources

P M

AD

HA

VAN

continues despite this on 53,000 ha of forests, the industry alleged-ly having footed the bill for compensatory afforestation.38

The state government, of course, is to blame. By 2002, it hadissued leases to hundreds of mines in the Sariska National Park,so that in November 2002, the SC had to order the state to closethem down.39 Despite this, marble miners in Jamwa Ramgarhsanctuary – just outside Jaipur and Sariska National Park – wereso confident that they would be allowed to resume mining thatowners of 69 closed mines had not even removed their machin-ery.40 While they were waiting for a final decision to be handeddown by a committee created by the then chief minister AshokGehlot, forest minister Bhagraj Chaudhary declared: “There is noharm in allowing the existing mines to reopen.” 41 Over 47,000 haof the land earmarked for this plan was on baarani land (landwhere irrigation is not possible), and most of lands were unfit forforests.42 In January 2007, five companies based in Udaipur,including Messers Wolkmen Ltd, received permission from theenvironment and forest ministry to temporarily resume miningon forest land.43

Rajasthan’s failure to ban mining in forest areas has led to theUK threatening to ban all stone imports from India in the face of

findings by the UK Environmental Investigation Agency, thatshowed stone mines were located in tiger habitats.44 In May2005, the SC was told that 145 mines were still operational within Sariska’s reserve area (despite the Court’s earlier order toban mining there); the SC requested a report on the issue fromthe MoEF.45 In 2006, it became known that illegal mining ofsandstone was still taking place in the Jawahar Sagar sanctuaryat Bundi.46 In the Bijola area, there were 23,800 ha of denseforests in 1971; by 1991, only 12,800 ha remained, and only 2,700 ha was dense. 47

■ THE FIGHT FOR THE ARAVALLIS

Mining in the Aravalli ranges – and the consequent deforestationand ecological devastation – is one of the most well-knownexamples of the impact on environment and people that miningactivity can exercise. The Aravalli ranges start from Delhi andextend across Haryana and Rajasthan all the way to Gujarat.They are an important division between the Thar desert and theCentral Highlands. They are also one of the main watershedsseparating the drainage of the Bay of Bengal from that of theArabian Sea.

Extensive mining of sandstone, marble and other minerals hasconverted the ranges into a rocky wasteland. Soil erosion is rampant, natural recharging of groundwater has been affected,and riverbeds have been flooded with coarse sand. Mining in thecatchments has also played its part in threatening the region’swater bodies (see Box on page 270: The changing hills).

In 1992, the Central government notified the Aravallis inGurgaon (Haryana) and Alwar (Rajasthan) under theEnvironment Protection Act as an ecologically sensitive area(ESA). An SC ruling in 1996 brought to light the fact that 50,000 haof forest land was being illegally mined in Rajasthan: a large partof this was in the Aravallis. The Delhi Ridge, another extension ofthe same ranges, was also reeling from the mining and quarryingthat went on inside it till the early 1990s, when the Asola-Bhattiarea was converted into a sanctuary (mining goes on even nowaround the borders of the sanctuary).

In 1999, the Centre transferred the power of allowing or disal-lowing mining to the state governments of Haryana andRajasthan. The states were also asked to develop a master plan foran environmental blueprint of the area, which would take intoaccount the land use of the area within the next couple of years.But due to the lax enforcement of regulations in ESAs – there wasa confusion among enforcing agencies about the extent of theirpowers in ESAs – mining went on unabated. Another factor wasthe lack of participation from local communities and local bodiesin efforts to protect the hill ranges.

In 2002, the SC intervened once again: an order was passedbanning all mining in the entire Aravallis. The Court later clarifiedthat only illegal mining had to stop. But in Gurgaon, illegal min-ing continued. In January 2005, the SC took note of this, and afterchastising the Haryana government and accusing it of complicitywith the miners, threatened that paramilitary officers would besent in to enforce its ban order.

269


c m y k

A campaign diesAn international campaign to stop mining in protectedareas whimpers out

In 2003, there was an international campaign to stop illegal miningin the Sariska Tiger Reserve, the Jamwa Ramgarh Wildlife Sanctuary,and the Kaila Devi Sanctuary. The media lapped it all up, and thecampaign received huge publicity. The Environmental InvestigationAgency (UK) even managed to convince the British marble industryto consider banning imports of marble from tiger habitats. But morethan a year after, the coverage has disappeared, and follow-ups havebeen rare. The campaign has met the fate of the animal that it hadset out to save – the tigers of Sariska.

Marble and sandstone mining in Sariska wildlife sanctuary is alsoresponsible for wiping out the tiger population

RUST

AM

VA

NIA

270


The changing hillsThe greens of the Aravallis give way to deep brown craters,courtesy mining

When Gurgaon resident Raghubir Singh was six years old, the portionof the Aravallis in the district was lush green, tall and majestic. Wildanimals inhabiting the hills kept the residents of nearby villages at bay.The scenario has changed today. Singh, now 35, stands witness to thegradual stripping of the verdant Aravallis. They hills are full of craters,some as deep as 125 feet – a result of intense mining and quarrying.The vegetation, whatever is left after deforestation and degradation,has also changed. “The ker and raunj trees are no longer there,” saysRaghubir Singh.

“We deliver about 10 trucks of stones a day,”says Virender Singh, amining contractor. According to him, each truck carries 300 cubic feet(cft) to 550 cft of stones, fetching the contractors anything between Rs300 to Rs 700. At an average, about 50 trucks carry stones from this area.This means roughly 21,250 cft of stones are extracted each day, makingthe yearly average a whopping 77,56,250 cft from just one quarry.

In the whole process of mining and minting money, what seems tobe ignored is the environmental fallout.“Mining is destroying the ecol-ogy of that area and we do not have any idea of the likely outcome,”

says V Rajamani, professor of geology at the School of EnvironmentalSciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. The geologicalcomposition of the area is primarily quartzite and pegmatite.According to Rajamani, although 95 per cent of the pegmatite of thearea consists of harmless minerals, there also are harmful and uselessminerals like fluorine and other trace elements. “Mining exposes therocks and the dust can mix with the soil of the nearby areas. If potas-sium, lead or mercury are present, it can be harmful,” says Rajamani.Apart from affecting whatever is on the surface, these trace elementsand harmful minerals can also contaminate water bodies. The dustfrom silica, for instance, which is created during mining can be veryhazardous to human health. The immediate sufferers are the peopleworking in the mines or quarries.

“Before beginning any quarrying activity in any area, HaryanaMinerals Limited (HML), a state government undertaking, has toundertake a report on environmental management and present it tothe pollution control board. This report, which includes aspects aboutthe ecology, air and water, is then passed on to the Central governmentfor approval,” says S N Sharma, mining engineer, HML. But whetherany environmental assessment is made or not, nobody knows.

– Kazimuddin Ahmed, Down To Earth, New Delhi

Gouged out: large-scale mining in the Aravallis for sandstone, limestone, marble and other minerals is changing the landscape in stateslike Rajasthan and Haryana

SUN

NY

SEB

AST

IAN

m k

The threat, however, had no effect. Mining continued inGurgaon. According to the Rajasthan Pollution Control Board’s2006 State of Environment Report, it continues in the RajasthanAravallis as well, but here it is restricted to areas fewer than 100metre from the ground level.

■ WATER: CRITICAL STATUS

The 2006 State of the Environment Report of the Rajasthan PollutionControl Board lists Agucha in Bhilwara district, Dariba-Bethumniin Rajsamand district and Zawar in Udaipur district as “environ-mentally critical [base metal] mining areas”, where “the release oflead content in air and groundwater are injurious to health.”48

Mining in Bijolia, in Bhilwara, has led to severe water prob-lems. By 1997, water levels in the area had dropped two-threemetre, and a stream had changed course – all a result of a nearbysandstone excavation.49 Groundwater also dropped by five metrebetween 1987 and 1989.50 The suspended particulate matter(SPM) level in Bijolia was 467 µg/m3, twice as much as non-min-ing areas.51

The limestone mines of Chittor offer another example. Chittoris located near the Chanderia Cement Works run by BirlaCorporation Ltd which has captive limestone mines. For the resi-dents of the area, the plant has primarily meant two things – mas-sive vibrations from the daily blasts that have caused cracks inbuildings, and acute water shortage. The mining activity by theplant has breached the region’s water table. The mines have beenoperational since 1987, and the unit has excavated pits as much as40 metres deep. In New Surjana village, located near the mines,there is acute water scarcity and recession in the groundwatertable. Residents claim that water could earlier be found at 25 feet,but now the water table has fallen to as low as 400-500 feet. Wellsand tubewells have dried up as a result. The vast quantities ofwater stored in the limestone quarries are supplied not to the villages near the plant, but to Chittorgarh town.

■ MARBLE: BANE OR BOON?

Rajasthan is famous for its marble – but quarrying for this beauti-ful stone has had a tremendous impact on the environment,thanks to poor management practices and inadequate regulations.

When marble, mined in huge blocks, is cut into sellable slabsusing diamond gangsaws, around 15-20 per cent of each blockturns into powder. To prevent the blades from being damaged bythe heat from friction between stone and blade, water is continuously sprinkled on them. This water mixes with the mar-ble powder, forming a slurry. The slurry has a water content ofnearly 35-45 per cent. Rajasthan generates marble slurry in therange of five-six MT from its 4,000 marble mines every year.52,53,54

The marble slurry imposes serious threats on the entireecosystem. When dumped on land, it adversely affects productiv-ity due to decreased porosity, water absorption and water perco-lation. Slurry dumped areas cannot support any vegetation andremain degraded. When dried, the fine particles become air-borneand cause severe air pollution. Apart from occupational health

problems, it also affects machinery and instruments installed inindustrial areas. During the rainy season, the slurry is carriedaway to rivers, drains and local water bodies, affecting the quali-ty of water, reducing storage capacities and damaging aquatic life.Due to long-term deposition on land, the finer particles block theflow regime of aquifers, thus seriously affecting groundwateravailability.

In Rajasthan, marble cutting industries dump the slurry in any nearby pits or vacant space available, although notified areashave been marked for dumping (see Box: The case of Chittorgarh).The lack of environmental management practices in the greenmarble and soapstone industries led to the closure of 226 greenmarble and 49 soapstone mines in September 2003. Green marbleexports were worth about Rs 400 crore in the three months beforethe closure.55

271


The case of ChittorgarhA part of the city is getting choked by marble slurry

On the outskirts of Chittorgarh city, in district Chittor, lies an aban-doned mine. Chhatriwali khaan is a huge crater right beside the high-way to Udaipur. Suddenly, disquietingly, the flat terrain gives way toa pool of rippling white fluid laced with pink, blue and brown – mar-ble slurry. When a researcher from Centre for Science andEnvironment visited this area, she found that the slurry was beingtransported here from Chanderia, about 15 km away on the otherside of the city.

Slurry first began to be dumped in Chhatriwali khaan in 2004. Itwas the third site around village Senti officials chose for this activity.When dumping first started in 2000, residents protested, for “this notonly means air pollution but also destruction of invaluable watersources,” says Chandra Mohan Saxena, one of the protesters. Fiveresidents were arrested on charges of obstructing official work; theirbail amount was set at Rs 1 lakh. “Thereafter, the mayor promisedChhatriwali khan will not be filled up. But officials duped the residents and procured a no-objection certificate,”reveals Saxena.

Today, the result of such deliberate dumping is apparent.The area’s groundwater is unfit for drinking and cooking; foodcooked in such water literally churns the stomach. Senti’sGovernment Higher Secondary School had the Public HealthEngineering Department laboratory test its groundwater. The level oftotal dissolved solids was found to be 5,040 milligram per litre (mg/l);the acceptable limit is 500-1,500 mg/l. Total hardness (calcium carbonate) was 2,550 mg/l (acceptable limit: 200-600 mg/l). Theschool has stopped using the water.

The amount of slurry Chittorgarh’s marble-cutting units gener-ate is quite minuscule, a mere 7,000-8,000 tonne a year. Dungarpur’sunits generate about 13,000 tonne per year; and Nagaur’s, 18,000tonne per year. In areas where marble-cutting is a firmly establishedactivity, the quantity jumps. In Sirohi, it is 59,000 tonne per year, inBanswara, 65,000 tonne a year and in Ajmer, 79,000 tonne per year.

– Ritu Gupta, Down To Earth, New Delhi

m k

■ A CASE OF OFFICIAL APATHY

There is an unnerving trend in the labour and environmentalproblems of the mining industry in Rajasthan: much of it occursbecause of the blatant disregard for laws of the Centre as well asthe state, or a failure to create strong environmental regulationsfor the industry. What’s more, unorganised mining operates out-side of the law, but considering its immense scale of operations, itis unlikely that the government is in the dark about it.

The number of cases where the state has failed in its responsi-bility to protect habitats and people from illegal mining is welldocumented. The government and the state pollution controlboard have not been able to control illegal mining even inBharatpur, which is within the Taj trapezium, and where mininghas been banned since 1996.56 Lack of oversight and monitoringhas meant that mines do not abide by some of the most basic safe-ty precautions. Few examples highlight this better than the minesoperating at Makrana. In 2003, it was discovered that mining oper-ations at Makrana had disregarded rules on mining distances fromrailway tracks. While the law required a minimum of 45 metre dis-tance to be maintained from railway tracks, some mines were oper-ating within eight metre of the Jodhpur-Delhi rail track, posing aserious risk to the track (see Box: At risk). Most disconcerting is thefact that these activities have been known since 1998.57

After the state had failed to properly implement an environ-mental clearance process (EC) as mandated by three RajasthanHigh Court orders (in March 2003 and January and April 2004),the High Court ordered the temporary closure of 20,000 minesand quarries until they received environmental clearance certifi-cates from the state pollution control board.58 Six months later, theCourt found that the board had issued approvals without properlyconsidering environmental management in the mines.59

272


c m y k

The conditions of workers in many of the small mines, which are predominant in the state, are deplorable

P M

AD

HA

VAN

At riskMarble mining leads to cave-ins and questions of safety

On January 7, 2007, two marble mines (No 44 and 45) in the ChakDungri range in Makrana collapsed, taking down with them a closedrailway line and a section of a marble cutting unit. Miraculously, no onewas hurt. The collapse was reportedly due to a blast.

There are 55 mines on the seven-km stretch, parallel to theMarana-Parbatsar railway line which was closed down a decade ago.Over the years, several mine owners have gone beyond their demar-cated boundary under the railway tracks and even beyond them. Mostmine owners have also cut through the support pillars of the mines,which have led to the land giving away. Laxmi Punia, senior engineer,North Western Railways, filed a complaint against the owners of themine that collapsed. He said that the Railways has filed several com-plaints with the mines department and the state government, but all invain. They have not been able to control these lease owners and thereare fears that the land will give away anytime.

Some NGOs have also approached the courts, which on severaloccasions have taken a written undertaking from the mine owners.

Punia said that in 1999, the High Court had ordered the mine ownersto deposit Rs 4 crore for relocating the railway lines, but they havefailed to do even that.

Officials from the Directorate General of Mines Safety (DGMS)accept that the mines are in danger of collapsing. According to DSengupta, DGMS, Ajmer region: “Mining beyond permissible limits doesnot fall under our purview, but we have issued notices to 450 mines andclearly stated that they are dangerous. We have, time and again,informed the state government that they need to be shut down.” D PGaur, mines engineer at Makrana says, “Over the past three months,several notices have been issued to mine owners and licenses of at leastthree mine owners were cancelled for mining beyond their lease areas.However, they managed to get a stay order and continue their work.”

The mine owners refute the charges. Manoj Rajaram, son of UparamRajora, who owns one of the mines which collapsed, said that the minecollapsed due to loose sand under it.“We are not doing any illegal min-ing and neither was there any blast,” he asserted. As the mine ownerscontinue to mine increasing the risk of subsidence, the authorities eitherfeign ignorance or helplessness to control this menace, putting the livesof workers and other people at risk.

273


Mining in GujaratThe state’s coastlines and wildlife preserves are seriouslythreatened

Gujarat is the fourth highest contributor in terms of value of mineralproduction in the country, accounting for more than seven per cent ofthe total value. In 2004-05, it produced Rs 5,472 crore worth of mine-rals.1 The major minerals in the state are crude oil, natural gas, ligniteand limestone. About 12 per cent of the limestone reserves of thecountry are in Gujarat.2

Gujarat is also the sole producer of agate, chalk, fluorite (conc) andperlite, and the leading producer of clay (others). It is also the secondlargest producer of silica sand, lignite, laterite, bauxite and fireclay inthe country.3 The state’s 1,600-km coastline is home to the largest salt-pans in the country, producing 65 per cent of India’s salt.4 The state’smineral-rich districts include Junagadh, Kutchh, Sabarkantha, Kheda,Amreli, Jamnagar,Valsad, Mehsana, Bharuch and Bhavnagar (see Table:Mineral reserves in Gujarat).

Mining provides employment to about 67,790 persons in Gujarat –only 0.73 per cent of the total workforce.5 Together with forestry, log-ging and fishery, it contributes 26 per cent to the state income.6

The impacts of mining in the state are clearly visible in the WildAss Sanctuary in the Rann of Kutchh, where illegal salt mining

threatens the endangered khur (the local name for the wild ass, Equushemionus khur) and other animals and birds. Twenty per cent of India’ssalt supply comes from illegal mining within the sanctuary alone,employing 50,000 people.7 The transportation of salt leads to noise andair pollution, disturbs the wildlife (the period of salt mining coincideswith the advanced stage of pregnancy in the khur) and damages thedelicate ecological balance.

A local NGO, the Dhrangadhra Prakrati Mandal, had approached theGujarat High Court in 1996 against illegal mining in the region. Its peti-tion said that besides illegal mining, the area under the salt-pan has beenincreasing. Between 1985 and 1990, this area increased from 2,479 ha to39,955 ha. Successive district collectors and the revenue department haveleased out sanctuary land for salt mining in complete violation of theForest Conservation Act and the Wildlife Protection Act (WPA). Writingin the magazine Seminar in 2000, conservationist Valmik Thapar pointedout that before the sanctuary was notified, there were only 203 licensedmines on 16,600 ha. After the entire area was notified as a sanctuary,another 1,448 mining licenses were given over 29,400 ha, and today nearly 1,700 mines operate on 46,000 ha inside the sanctuary. The newleases were given by the revenue department, flouting the WPA.8

Limestone, one of the state’s key products, is also responsible formajor depredations.The Narayan Sarovar Chinkara sanctuary in Kutchhis a case in point.9 In 1995, the Gujarat government had denotified thesanctuary, reducing its size from 76,579 ha to 44,423 ha,10 to allow themining of limestone, lignite, bauxite and other minerals. The denotifica-tion was challenged in the High Court, but mining operations began; thelocal population wavered between acceptance and protest. The Kutchh-based Sanghi Industries Limited was allowed to extract limestone with-in a 250-ha area on the condition that the limestone thus extractedwould not be sold. The company was asked to furnish a bank guaranteeof Rs 50 lakh to ensure the payment of compensation for any damagecaused in the area. Meanwhile, counsel for the Public Interest LegalSupport and Research Centre (PILSARC) raised the issue of the need toprotect an ecosystem in its entirety, thus broadening the scope of thecase filed by the Consumer Education and Research Centre (CERC) inthe Supreme Court. The SC ordered that permits must be restricted andexploitation of the mineral wealth must be controlled. The Court alsosaid that effects should be monitored for five years and a comprehensivestudy of the notified and denotified areas should be conducted.

The destruction caused by existing mines in the vicinity of thesanctuary is clearly visible today. Open-cast mining by the state-owned Gujarat Mineral Development Corporation (GMDC) atPanandro has devastated the land and endangered the wildlife.

Another protected area under threat is Saurashtra, which housesthe Gir Wildlife Sanctuary and Gir National Park. The region has richdeposits of limestone and many major cement plants have come up. Astudy done in 1998 showed that there were 100 mines in a 10-kmradius of the protected area. These mines were feeding seven cementfactories and one soda ash plant.11 On top of this, illegal mining thrivesin the coastal regions of the Gir National Park. Located in Junagadhdistrict and spread over an area of 1,80,000 ha, the park is the watercatchment for seven rivers. A number of hills on the Girnar range,which falls inside the park and is the only remaining home of the

Mineral Estimated Percentage Districtreserves of national in million reserve

tonne

Bauxite 105 4.15 Jamnagar, Kutchh, Kheda, Junagadh, Sabarkantha, Bhavnagar, Amreli, Valsad

Bentonite 105 27.6 Kutchh, Amreli, Jamnagar, Bharuchh, Bhavnagar, Sabarkantha

Crude oil 418 - Ahmedabad, Mehsana, Bharuch

Dolomite 720 12.67 Bhavnagar, Baroda

Lignite 1,072 - Kutchh, Bharuch, Surat,Bhavnagar

Limestone 11,500 15.2 Junagadh, Banaskantha, Amreli, Kutchh, Kheda, Baroda, Jamnagar, Banaskantha, Bharuch, Bhavnagar, Mehsana, Sabarkantha

Source: http://www.gujaratindustry.gov.in/resource.html#mineral andhttp://ibm.nic.in as viewed on May 23, 2007

TABLE: Mineral reserves in Gujarat Gujarat has large reserves of limestone, dolomite, clayand crude oil

m k

274


Asiatic lion, have been cleared in the last three decades for quarryinglimestone and manufacturing cement.

Besides these, there are numerous cases of unrestrained mining ofother minerals. In the Ambaji range in Banaskantha district, the MoEFhas approved diversion of 190 ha of forest land for marble mining. TheKadipani fluorspar mine has resulted in a loss of 619 ha of forests andsignificant faunal diversity. Lignite mining has been the bane of tribalsin the villages of Mangrol taluka in Surat.12 The quarry, owned byGujarat Industries Power Company Ltd (GIPCL), initially occupied 100ha; the company is now planning an expansion. The state governmenthad acquired land in nine villages of the taluka for lignite quarrying,and gave only cash as compensation – which was refused by some vil-lagers. No alternative site for re-settlement was allotted. Besides dis-placing the tribals, the quarry also poses a threat during rains for thehouses located on its edge. In fact, the Surat district administration wasforced to order villagers living within 100 metre of the quarry to vacatethe area, thereby adding to the numbers of displaced.

Mining of coral sands for the cement industry has resulted indestruction of corals on the Gujarat coast. When the lease of calcare-ous sands was terminated in 2003, about 0.5 MT of coral material wasmined every year since 1947. As the mining was not rigorously con-trolled, live corals were often the casualty of dredging. It is estimatedthat 50 per cent of the corals were destroyed in an area of 3,500 ha.13

Mining is threatening the state’s immensely rich historical-archeo-logical heritage as well.The Digvijay Cement Company in Jamnagar dis-trict has leased limestone mines in Gop, among other locations. Its oper-ations have degraded the nearby Gop hill and damaged the Gopnathtemple. They have also led to a rise in air pollution. Grazing land hasbeen encroached upon (see Box: Lawless prospectors). Similarly, illegalstone mining has damaged sites of historical, cultural and archaeologi-cal importance on a 100-km stretch of the Saurashtra coast fromPorbandar to Dwarka.14 Mining is also destroying the natural stone bar-riers that check water salinity and prevents seawater from invading near-by villages. For instance, in Baradia village of Okha, the sea hasencroached over a stretch of 25 km: this has led to a public outcry againstmining, and the villagers are engaged in a legal battle over the issue.

Three villages in Pavi Jatpur taluka in Vadodara district are alsoprotesting: in their case, against a manganese mine coming up at anabandoned mine site.Villagers, led by a member of the state legislativeassembly, have opposed the implementation of the project on theground that the site does not have a convincing environment manage-ment plan (EMP). The 100-ha project is close to two water bodies andalso includes a part of the villagers’ arable land.15

Clearly, the main casualties of mining in Gujarat have been itswildlife, forests and coastlines. In its eagerness to promote mining andmineral-based industries, the state government has adopted a policy ofdenotifying reserved forests and has turned a blind eye to illegal min-ing inside forests and wildlife sanctuaries. Popular protests againstmining have been few and far between in the state, largely becauseGujarat has the advantage of having a lower density of population inits mineral-rich areas like Kutchh. However, even in these areas, thestate has completely failed to address the needs of indigenous peopleand protect its natural wealth and wildlife.

Lawless prospectorsCompanies illegally siphon limestone worth crores of rupees

When Porbandar-based Saurashtra Chemicals, owned by detergentgiant Nirma, lodged a police complaint in the first week of October2006 alleging mineral theft from its captive mine in Adityana villagenear Porbandar, public knowledge about the size of the illegal miningracket in the coastal areas of Saurashtra was scanty.

Following the complaint, the state mining department started aspecial drive in Saurashtra to investigate illegal mining. In twomonths, it detected theft worth Rs 436 crore from 12 villages inPorbandar district.“In these villages, the mining mafia have almostdestroyed grazing lands by extracting minerals,” says HarineshPandya, secretary, Janpath, an Ahmedabad-based NGO that is campaigning against mining in coastal areas.

“Well-connected people operate leases through power of attorneys or simply in someone else’s name. When leases are givenfor one mine, these are used to mine on government wastelands.More than 1,380 MT of minerals was extracted,” said an officerinvolved in the raids. “The miners pay royalty, since royalty-paidmaterial is ‘legal’.”

This has led to a mushrooming of illegal limestone mines.“Whenwe matched the records of royalty-paid minerals supplied with exca-vation work in the approved mines, the disparities began showing. Itwas then that the scam was uncovered,” another official added.Authorities say they inspected records of 33 leaseholders and cameacross huge theft.

Corporate houses have allegedly participated in these illegaloperations. According to the mining department, this is the first timebig business houses have been suspected.The department has recov-ered penalties from Nirma, Digvijay Cement and DhrangadhraChemical Works for unlawful mining.

“Between April 2006 to January 2007, 190 cases of illegal miningwere registered in Porbandar but the authorities have recovered onlyRs 17.3 lakh,” says Himanshu Parekh, head of the special drive.According to one estimate, the authorities are yet to recover morethan Rs 400 crore.

Illegal mining is rampant in the state

ARV

IND

YA

DA

V /

CSE

m k

275

Indian lawmakers do reveal a grudging acceptance of the deleterious effects mining has

on environment: mining in India requires forest and environmental clearances from

the Central government.

But while the acceptance is evident, the intent is not. The laws are there, but the details

are either missing or fuzzy. The institutions exist, but so does complete confusion about

their responsibilities and concerns. In India, legislation that governs mining, right from

its prospecting to its closure stages, suffers from a strange langor. Take, for instance, the

Mineral Conservation and Development Rules of 1988. Tasked with ensuring scientific and

‘environment-friendly’ mining, the rules abound with half-hearted ambiguities and

loosely defined terminology, leaving ample scope for not following them. Not surprisingly,

the Indian Bureau of Mines, which monitors the industry in the country, says violation of

mining laws is rampant: 30-60 per cent of the mines it inspects are found to be operating

outside the bounds of laws.

Even progressive pieces of legislation like the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA)

notification have a penchant for leaving things half-baked. Prepared by consultants

appointed by project proponents themselves, biased and farcical EIA reports force projects

through. People, in the meanwhile, are effectively shut out of the entire assessment

process, and forced to watch the drama unfold – over their own lands – from a distance.

The focus in all this, obviously, is on making the most of India’s mineral resources. In

fact, to advertise their intent, our lawmakers even decided to modify the emphasis in the

nomenclature of the nation’s key mining legislation – the Mines and Minerals (Regulation

and Development) Act of 1957 was, thus, changed to Mines and Minerals (Development and

Regulation) Act.

Recently, all pretense of ‘environment-friendliness’ as far as mining is concerned have

been thrown to the winds: the government’s Anwarul Hoda committee, which

submitted its report in 2006, has upped the ante by recommending changes in laws to

assure prospectors that they will get forest clearance wherever they find minerals. In the

process, the committee has not bothered to even acknowledge the real challenge that India

faces today: to make mining more acceptable to society by ensuring that it is the genesis of

prosperity and not of poverty.

5 The challenge of governance

m k

276

• Laws related to mining’s social-environmental impacts havenot been codified clearly. A multiplicity of agencies and institutions managing these laws adds to the confusion. As aresult, implementation is lax and shoddy.

• Violation of the laws is rampant. The Indian Bureau of Minesfound laws were violated in 30-60 per cent of the mines itinspected between 1999 and 2005.

• The environmental impact assessment process, a progressivesystem when it was proposed, has been grossly abused. Its ‘re-engineering’ has failed to solve any of its fundamentalproblems.

• The forest clearance process is being construed not to preserveforests, but to derive compensation for diversion of forestlands. The problem is that even compensatory afforestationfor diverted forest land has been unsuccessful: during 1980-2001, 5.27 lakh hectare of forests were diverted in the country,while compensatory afforestation was taken up only on 3.80lakh hectare.

• India did not have mandatory mine closure regulations till2003. The law which has been enacted is also full of loopholes.For one, the financial surety asked for mine closure is too lowto be a deterrent for non-compliance.

• Despite all this, the Anwarul Hoda committee recommendsencouraging the flow of investment in mining and opening up more forests to mining. It believes that miners“can create or even improve upon the forest as it existedbefore the commencement of operations”.

• There is an urgent need to streamline regulatory institutionsand beef up regulations, including introducing credible deterrence for non-compliance, for the mining industry.

m k

Mining is a sector in which laws related to the environmen-tal and social externalities have not been codified indetail. The environmental law which has been especially

tailored for mining and which is under the Mineral Conservationand Development Rules, 1988, is two pages of benevolent state-ments which treats every mine as a special case and leaves amplescope for mine owners and regulators to do nothing. For instance,on mine restoration, it says: “...wherever possible, the waste rock,overburden etc shall be backfilled into the mine excavations with aview to restoring the land to its original use as far as possible”.

There is also an institutional confusion about who is responsi-ble for what. Both the Indian Bureau of Mines (IBM) and the statepollution control boards (SPCBs) are responsible for monitoringthe environmental aspects of mining. The IBM is supposed toclear mine plans and closure plans, but it is the Union ministry ofenvironment and forests (MoEF) which clears environmentalimpact assessments (EIAs). Both demand separate environment

management plans (EMPs) – one would not, in the normal course,accept the EMP submitted to the other. SPCBs can monitor the airand water pollution, but so does the IBM. The IBM looks afterreclamation and closure, and SPCBs have nothing to do with it.Strangely, neither the IBM nor the SPCBs have enough human-power to monitor even large-scale mines – let alone small- andmedium-scale and illegal mines.

Mining requires forest and environmental clearances from theCentral government. On paper, this is an excellent way of preserv-ing forests and safeguarding the environment. However, today,mining is happening in every ecologically sensitive area one canthink of – in and around reserved forests, wildlife sanctuaries andprotected areas, in the Himalaya and the Aravalli, and on thecoasts and shorelines. Wildlife sanctuaries and reserved forestshave been denotified to allow mining, while some have not beennotified at all because they hold prospective mining sites. Primeagricultural lands have been diverted for mining.

277

CHAPTER 5

The challenge of governance

Waste or wealth? The biggest challenge that mining faces is to make itself acceptable to society and local communities

PHIL

IP N

ERI D

ESO

UZA

m k

Environmental governance in mining – from the process ofgranting of lease till the ultimate closure of mines – has been effec-tively reduced to a long series of paperwork, with little impact onthe ground. Good, progressive legislations have become a part ofthis exercise in futility. As a result, the Forest Conservation Act(FCA) is being construed not so much as a tool for preservingforests, as one for deriving compensation for the diversion offorests. Similarly, the Environment Protection Act (EPA), insteadof focusing on its basic premise of environmental protection, ispreoccupied with environmental impact assessment studies priorto grant of environmental clearances.

But the fact remains that the modern urban-industrial economycannot do without mining. Mining generates great wealth (for afew) and contributes to the state exchequer. It provides someemployment as well. Till there exists a demand for minerals and tillthere are minerals which fulfill that demand, mining is here to stay.

The challenge of mining, therefore, is to make it more accept-able to society. The challenge lies in ensuring that mining does notdestroy the critical ecosystems of local areas. It lies in ensuringthat the pollution from mining is contained and mitigated, andthe health and well-being of communities are least affected. It liesin establishing and implementing a governance system that willensure proper monitoring and regulation of the mining industry.

■ MINING LEGISLATION

The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957(also referred to as the MMDR Act) and the Mines Act, 1952,together with the rules and regulations framed under them, con-stitute the basic laws governing the mining sector in India (seeChart 5.1: Mining legislation in India). The Mines Act governs thehealth and safety of workers, while the regulations on miningincluding grant of lease, royalty, prospecting and conservation aregoverned by the MMDR Act. Besides, all mining projects have toalso comply with the FCA 1980, the Environment Protection Actand Rules, 1986 and the Environmental Impact AssessmentNotification, 2006.

The MMDR Act, 1957 is the main regulation governing themines and mineral industry. Important rules in force under the actinclude the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, the MineralConservation and Development Rules, 1988 and the GraniteConservation and Development Rules, 1999.

The act provides for general restrictions on undertakingprospecting and mining operations without government permis-sion; procedure for obtaining prospecting licenses and miningleases; and conservation and systematic development of minerals.It also provides regulations relating to prospecting fees, royaltiesand dead rent in respect of the prospecting and mining leases forminerals other than minor minerals, payable to the state govern-ment. These provisions of the act can only be amended by theCentral government through a notification in the official gazette.

The royalty rates and the dead rent for minor minerals arefixed by respective state governments. There are also cess andother taxes on minerals levied in accordance with the Cess andOther Taxes on Minerals (Validation) Act, 1992, which is applica-ble in certain states like Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh,Maharashtra, Orissa, and Tamil Nadu.

● Mineral Concession Rules, 1960The Mineral Concession Rules (MCR) outline the procedures andconditions for obtaining a prospecting license and mining lease.These rules also stipulate that a ‘mining plan’ shall incorporate,among others, a plan of the area indicating water sources, limits offorest areas, density of tress, impact of mining activity on forest,land surface and environment including air and water pollution;scheme for restoration of the area by afforestation, adoption of pol-lution control devices and such measures as may be directed byconcerned Central and state government agencies. Environmentalmanagement plans, it follows, are part of the mining plans.

● Mineral Conservation and Development Rules, 1988 The Mineral Conservation and Development Rules (MCDR) laydown guidelines for ensuring mining on a scientific basis, whileconserving the environment at the same time. The MCDR also gov-ern the specifications in terms of submission and reporting in caseof reconnaissance operations, prospecting or applying for miningplan. These rules also specify the operation and working of open-cast and underground mines, procedures to follow in case of aban-donment or temporary closure of mines, and beneficiation studies.

278


Unregulated: mine management in India is abysmal, as governanceand monitoring mechanisms have been reduced to mere paperwork

DEB

AN

JAN

BA

ND

OPA

DH

YAY

m k

The rules have a chapter devoted to environment. There are 11 provisions in this chapter pertaining to storage and utilisation oftopsoil, storage of overburden, waste rock, reclamation and rehabilitation of land, measures against ground vibrations, controlof surface subsidence, measures against air and noise pollution,discharge of toxic liquids, and restoration of flora. All these provisions are in form of broad guidelines and end up treatingeach mine as a special case. There are some major lacunae in theserules with respect to environmental protection. To begin with,what the rules state – “Holder shall take all possible precautionsfor the protection of environment and control of pollution whileprospecting, mining, beneficiation or metallurgical operations” –is so broad-based that it is almost ambiguous.

In the section on storage of overburden and waste rock, therules say: “The dumps shall be properly secured to prevent escapeof material therefrom in harmful quantities which may cause degra-dation of environment and to prevent causation of floods.” It doesnot specify what the ‘harmful quantity’ is.

In the case of storage of overburden, waste rocks, tailings andslimes the rules also say that “as far as possible”, they should bestored on impervious ground. The rules do not make it mandatoryto store these either on impervious surface or lined surface or totake precautions to divert and treat run-off and prevent leachingof wastes in groundwater. In fact, the rules do not make any cate-gorical differentiation between highly polluting and toxic tailingwastes and slimes and less problematic waste rock and overbur-den; everything is accorded the same treatment.

There is no definitive rule for compulsory simultaneous recla-mation of land, which is the best practice. The MCDR just recom-mends phase-wise reclamation, which is again open to diverseinterpretations.

On mine restoration, they say that “wherever possible the waste

rock, overburden etc shall be backfilled into the mine excavationswith a view to restoring the land to its original use as far as possi-ble”. This leaves ample scope for mine owners and regulators totreat each mine as a special case and evade any responsibility. Infact, the rules give enough scope to mine owners not to backfillthe mines. They say: “Wherever back-filling of waste rock in thearea excavated during mining operations is not feasible, the wastedumps shall be suitably terraced and stablised through vegetationor otherwise.” In this, the term “not feasible” remains undefined.Across India, in mines with large quantities of overburden andwastes, backfilling is an exception.

On the discharge of toxic liquids, the rules say: “Every holder of prospecting licence or a mining lease shall take all possible precautions to prevent or reduce the discharge of toxicand objectionable liquid effluents from mine, workshop, beneficiation or metallurgical plants and tailing ponds into surface water bodies, groundwater aquifer and useable lands, to aminimum. These effluents shall be suitably treated, if required, to conform to the standards laid down in this regard.” This is bizarre, because it leaves everything to the discretion of the mine owner. It does not specify what is ‘minimum’. There are no regulations on the amount of wastewater a mine can discharge, nor are there any load-based pollution standards(see Box on pages 280-81: Pollution standards for mining). Theresult: very few mines in this country have wastewater treatment plants.

With respect to blasting, the rules are even more circumspect.They do not specify the distance from a habitation at which blasting can be conducted. They only say that the companyshould make provisions to minimise ground vibrations. The permissible limits for noise and ground vibrations are not fixed,and vary from mine-to-mine.

279

THE CHALLENGE OF GOVERNANCE

Source: Anon, 2005, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 11-4

CHART 5.1: Mining legislation in IndiaThere are three distinct legislations governing safety, environment and development of minerals

Mines Rules, 1955Mineral Concession

Rules, 1960

Mineral Conservationand Development

Rules, 1988

State Minor MineralConcession Rules

Granite Conservationand Development

Rules, 1999

Mines Act, 1952Mines and Mineral

(Regulation and Development)Act, 1957

Forest Conservation Act, 1980and Environment

Protection Act, 1986

MINING LEGISLATION IN INDIA

m k

280


Pollution standards for miningLax and minimal

Ambient air standards: An important environmental consequenceof mining is dust pollution. The ambient air quality standardapplicable to the mining industry is similar to the national ambient air quality standards (see Table 1: Standards – nationalambient air quality).

In the case of coal mines, different standards have been

formulated based on the age of the mine (see Table 2: Standards –air quality for coal mining). Older mines have been leniently dealtwith: the average annual standard fixed for them is 1.4 timeshigher than that for new mines. The justification for this is that“old mines such as Jharia, Bokaro and Raniganj already havehigh dust concentrations and therefore, would not be able tomeet the stringent standards set for the new mines”. The new‘stringent’ standard is nothing but a replica of the standard for alltypes of industries.

Pollutants Time-weighted Concentration in ambient airaverage

Industrial areas Residential, rural Sensitive and other areas areas

Sulphur dioxide (SO2) Annual average* 80 µg/m3 60 µg/m3 15 µg/m3

24 hours** 120 µg/m3 80 µg/m3 30 µg/m3

Oxides of nitrogen (NOx) Annual average* 80 µg/m3 60 µg/m3 15 µg/m3

24 hours** 120 µg/m3 80 µg/m3 30 µg/m3

Suspended particulate matter (SPM) Annual average* 360 µg/m3 140 µg/m3 70 µg/m3

24 hours** 500 µg/m3 200 µg/m3 100 µg/m3

Respirable particulate matter (RPM) (size less than 10 micron) Annual average* 120 µg/m3 60 µg/m3 50 µg/m3

24 hours** 150 µg/m3 100 µg/m3 75 µg/m3

Carbon monoxide (CO) 8 hours** 5.0 mg/m3 2.0 mg/m3 1.0 mg/ m3

1 hour 10.0 mg/m3 4.0 mg/m3 2.0 mg/m3

Notes: *Annual arithmetic mean of minimum 104 measurements in a year taken twice a week; 24 hourly at uniform intervals.**24 hourly/8 hourly values should be met 98 per cent of the time in a year. They may exceed 2 per cent of the time, but not on two consecutive days; µg/m3: microgram per cubic metre; mg/m3: milligram per cubic metre Source: http://www.cpcb.nic.in/as.htm, as viewed on April 4, 2007

TABLE 1: Standards – national ambient air quality

Concentration in ambient air

Pollutants Time-weighted averages New coal mines Existing Old coal mines(after December 1998) coalfields/mines (Jharia, Raniganj, Bokaro)

SPM Annual average* 360 µg/m3 430 µg/m3 500 µg/m3

24 hours** 500 µg/m3 600 µg/m3 700 µg/m3

RPM Annual average* 180 µg/m3 215 µg/m3 250 µg/m3

24 hours** 250 µg/m3 300 µg/m3 300 µg/m3

SO2 Annual average* 80 µg/m3 80 µg/m3 80 µg/m3

24 hours** 120 µg/m3 120 µg/m3 120 µg/m3

NOx Annual average* 80 µg/m3 80 µg/m3 80 µg/m3

24 hours** 120 µg/m3 120 µg/m3 120 µg/m3

Notes: *24 hourly at uniform intervals; **24 hourly/8 hourly values should be met 98 per cent of the time in a year. They may exceed 2 per cent of the time, butnot on two consecutive days; SO2: sulphur dioxide; NOx: oxides of nitrogen; SPM: suspended particulate matter; RPM: respirable particulate matter; µg/m3: microgram per cubic metre;Source: http://www.cpcb.nic.in, as viewed on March 4, 2007

TABLE 2: Standards – air quality for coal mining

m k

281


Standards for work environment dust levels: To ensure thatworkers are not affected by dust, the dust level at workplace hasbeen specified under the Metalliferous Mines Regulations (MMR),1961 and the Coal Mine Regulations, 1957. Respirable dust concentration in the workplace should not exceed five milligramper cubic metre for manganese; for all other types of mines, including coal, it should not exceed the value which is arrived atby dividing the figure of 15 with the percentage of free respirablesilica present in the sample. The MMR, 1961 has specifically

dealt with asbestos and states that respirable asbestos fibres should not exceed two fibres per mililitre of air sampled by anopen membrane filter.1

Effluent standards: In the case of effluents too, there is a separateset of standards for coal mines (see Table 3: Standards – effluentsfrom coal mines), while all other mines follow the general wastewater discharge standard for discharge in inland surfacewater and on land (see Table 4: Standards – wastewater discharge byindustry). However, the separate coal standards are not very specific and completely fail to address key parameters such asheavy metals. The effluent standards are concentration based andcompletely fails to take into account the large volume of run-offdischarge from mines duing rainy season. To preserve the waterquality, it is important to set load-based standards.

Standards for vibrations during blasting: The DirectorateGeneral of Mines Safety has specified standards for vibration lev-els during blasting (see Table 5: Standards – vibrations due to blast-ing). These standards take into account a number of parameters –type of structures in the vicinity of the mines (kuchcha or puccastructures will respond differently to blasting), and frequency ofblasting being the prominent amongst them.

Parameters Limit

pH 5.5 to 9.0

Total suspended solids 100 mg/l

200 mg/l*

Oil and grease 10 mg/l

Nitrogen as nitrates 10 mg/l

Notes: *: Standard for effluents discharged as irrigation water on land; mg/l:milligram per litreSource: Central Pollution Control Board, Union ministry of environment andforests, New Delhi

Parameters Inland surface Land for water irrigation

Suspended solids 100 200

pH 5.5 to 9.0 5.5 to 9.0

Oil and grease 10 10

Biochemical oxygen demand (3 days at 27ºC) 30 100

Chemical oxygen demand 250 -

Arsenic (as As) 0.2 0.2

Mercury (as Hg) 0.01 -

Lead (as Pb) 0.1 -

Cadmium (as Cd) 2.0 -

Hexavalent chromium (as Cr+6) 0.1 -

Copper (as Cu) 3.0 -

Zinc (as Zn) 5.0 -

Nickel (as Ni) 3.0 -

Cyanide (as CN) 0.2 0.2

Manganese 2 -

Iron (as Fe) 3 -

Note: All values, except pH, are in milligram per litre (mg/l)

Source: http://www.cpcb.nic.in/standard32.htm, as viewed on March 4, 2007

TABLE 4: Standards – wastewater discharge by industry

TABLE 3: Standards – effluents from coal mines

Type of structure Dominant excitation frequency (Hz)

<8 8-25 >25

I. Buildings/structures not belonging to the owner

a. Domestic houses/structures (kuchcha, brick, cement) 5 10 15

b. Industrial buildings (RCC and framed structures) 10 20 25

c. Objects of historical importance and sensitive structures 2 5 10

II. Buildings belonging to owner with limited span of life

a. Domestic houses/structures (kuchcha, brick, cement) 10 15 25

b. Industrial buildings (RCC and framed structures) 15 25 50

Notes: ‘The values under dominant excitation frequency (as in 5 for a dominant excitation frequency of <8 in the case of domestic houses/structures) denote peak particle velocity (ppv) in metre per second.Source: Directorate General of Mines Safety (Tech) (S&T) Circular No 7 of 1997Dhanbad, August 29, 1997

TABLE 5: Standards – vibrations due to blasting

c m y k

The rules say that trees cut down to make way for mining have tobe replaced by double their number. However, there is no mentionof the type of afforestation to be done. Thus, a very diverse forestarea could be cut and replaced by a monoculture of eucalyptustrees.

The provisions of MCR and MCDR are, however, not applica-ble to coal, atomic minerals and minor minerals. In the case ofcoal, mine operators have to comply with measures for scientificmining stipulated by the Coal Controller under the Coal Mines(Conservation and Development) Act, 1974. However, this issuch an antiquated regulation that it doesn’t even recognise

environmental protection as an integral part of mining coal. Infact, coal mines in India are not even required to submit closure plans. The state governments have, for this purpose, formulatedthe Minor Mineral Concession Rules, where environment is paid‘lip service’.

The focus of India’s mineral regulations, therefore, has been more on ‘development and promotion’ of the mineral industry – as the nomenclature of the MMDR Act suggests. Thereare some provisions for environmental protection, but they lacksubstance and enforceability (see Box: Indian Bureau of Mines: ineffective?).

282


Indian Bureau of Mines: ineffective?Monitoring by the Bureau has not controlled violations

The Indian Bureau of Mines (IBM), functioning under the Departmentof Mines, Union ministry of mines, is engaged in promotion of conser-vation and scientific development of mineral resources and protectionof environment in mines other than coal, petroleum and natural gas,atomic minerals and minor minerals. It might be the only regulatoryinstitution in the world which on one hand inspects and regulatesmines, and on the other provides technical consultancy services to themining industry.

IBM’s summary of its inspection activities in the Annual Reports ofthe ministry allows us to draw some inferences on how effective itspolicing has been (see Table: IBM’s inspection report).

To begin with, since the number of operating mines (mines whichsubmit data to the IBM annually) is about 3,100, we can safely assumethat IBM inspects about 80-90 per cent of the operating mines at least

once every year. Therefore, in general, the inspection frequency of IBMis about once every year for each mine.

The most disturbing part is that the Bureau has found violation ofthe law in 30-60 per cent of the mines it inspected. Out of the fouryears for which data is available, the violation percentage was morethan 50 per cent in three. This means that violation of mining laws andregulations are rampant in the country.

According to IBM’s statistics, every year, 50-60 per cent violationswere rectified by the mines; prosecution proceedings were launchedagainst about 10 per cent of the mines. IBM has an impressive recordwith prosecution – it wins a significant number of cases it files againsterring mines. But despite all this, more than 50 per cent mines werestill found in violation in subsequent years. This means that the deter-rence available with IBM is either not credible enough, or is not used.The Bureau has the power to close down mines if it finds violation ofthe law. Data shows that the IBM seldom uses this prerogative – it hasstopped the operations of less than one per cent of the violators.

1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-02* 2002-03* 2003-04* 2004-05*

Mines inspected 2,791 2,789 1,653 2,145 2,462 1,986

Number of mines in violation 1,404 835 986 NA 1,281 NA

Percentage of inspected mines found with violation 50.3 29.9 59.6 52.0

Violations fully rectified 759 508 613 1,535 1,895 919

Percentage of violations fully rectified 54.1 60.8 62.2 147.9

Prosecution launched 131 79 51 NA 134 NA

Percentage of violators against whom prosecution was launched 9.3 9.5 5.2 10.5

Cases in favour of IBM 28 51 33 NA 16 NA

Cases compounded 36 28 7 NA 24 NA

Percentage of cases in favour of IBM and cases compounded 48.9 100.0 78.4 29.9

Number of mines in which mining operation suspended 9 3

Percentage of violators whose mining operation suspended 0.9 0.2

Note: *Data only for April to December; NA: Data not given in the Annual ReportSource: Annual Reports of the Union ministry of mines, government of India

TABLE: IBM’s inspection reportAlmost 30-60 per cent of the inspected mines have been found to be violating the laws

m k

■ ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION

Environmental legislation has to cover many areas – these includecomprehensive environmental impact analysis to ensure that proj-ects that are ecologically destructive are not allowed, identifica-tion of ‘no-go’ areas, effective forest and wildlife acts to protectbiodiversity, and regulations governing mine closure and minerestoration. There are five main environmental acts that impactthe mining industry in India:● The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974

(amended in 1988)● The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981

(amended in 1988)● The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (with rules 1986 and

1987) (EPA)● The Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (amended in 1988)● The Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 (amended in 1991)

The EPA, 1986 is the umbrella legislation. It empowers the government of India to take all measures deemed necessary for protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, andpreventing, controlling and abating environmental pollution – thisincludes an authority to direct closure of any industry or operation.

The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 andthe Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, as thenames indicate, provide for the control of water and air pollution;consent under them is required before initiating mining

operations for discharge of effluents into a water body and emissions into air.

Today, environmental regulations and monitoring have takena back seat with regard to mining. The SPCBs are more interestedin giving quick consent to establish and operate mines. The reasonis that most SPCBs do not have the physical capacity to monitor alarge number of mines.

Take the case of Orissa: there are approximately 300 officiallyoperational mines in the state (there are hundreds of unofficialones), but only 172 of these have been covered under the consentmanagement system. The status of monitoring and regulation canbe assessed from the fact that many mines of the biggest miningcompany in the state, the state-owned Orissa MineralCorporation, operate without the necessary consent from theOrissa State Pollution Control Board (OSPCB). Conditions inJharkhand and Chhattisgarh are not any different.

A strong monitoring and enforcement system is fundamentalfor ensuring environmental sustainability. Without a seriousdeterrence for non-compliance, there will be little or no enforce-ment of the law. Unfortunately, this is exactly what is happeningin India. In Orissa, less than two-three per cent of industries andmines are subject to enforcement actions for persistently failing tocomply with OSPCB orders; and it takes an average of about 200-1,000 days between the show cause notice and subsequentenforcement action.1 Consequently, a credible deterrent is missingfor most willful defaulters and there is little incentive to comply

283


Freeze frame: there is an urgent need for a moratorium on mining in ecologically sensitive areas

DEB

AN

JAN

BA

ND

OPA

DH

YAY

m k

with environmental regulations. Perhaps imposing hefty financialpenalties for non-compliance could be one solution.

● Environmental impact assessment: a lame duck?In January 1994, the MoEF issued the Environmental ImpactAssessment (EIA) notification under the Environment(Protection) Act, 1986. The notification imposed restrictions onundertaking new development projects, or expansion or moderni-sation of existing ones, unless environmental clearance wasobtained from the ministry.

This was a progressive step. The idea was to evaluate thepotential impacts – environmental and social – of projects, toascertain the likely costs and whether the projected benefits justi-fied these costs. The entire exercise sought to minimise and miti-gate environmental and social damages. In 1997, an amendmentmandated a public hearing for a project (except in cases whereexempted) before the final clearance. In September 2006, a newEIA notification was brought into force after ‘re-engineering’ theexisting provisions.

The new notification has classified projects under two cate-gories – A and B. The projects which fall under category ‘A’(including expansion and modernisation of existing projects)

require clearance from the Central government, while category ‘B’projects can be cleared at the state level. Mining projects with a lease area of 50 ha or more fall under category ‘A’, whilethose smaller than 50 ha but more than five ha fall under category ‘B’. All forms of asbestos mining, irrespective of the area,require clearance from the Central government (see Box: Offbounds?). Prospecting for mining is exempted from getting environmental clearance if concession areas have got approvalsfor physical survey.

There are several drawbacks in the environmental clearanceprocess as envisaged by the new notification. The people have nosay in it right from its inception. The preparation of the EIA reportis also a controversial aspect: a consultant agency is commis-sioned by the project proponent to prepare the report. The agency,thus, becomes a service provider of the proponent – it is no longeran impartial body. In most cases, the consultancy, instead of identifying the actual impacts, ends up presenting the informa-tion in a manner favourable to the project proponent.

The public hearing process itself stands grossly abused. Apublic hearing is only a consultation forum; it has no legal authority to decide whether a project should be initiated or not.The result: even if everyone present in the public hearing

284


Lost in the haze: no legislations have been formulated to address fugitive dust from mineral transportation

AG

NIM

IRH

BA

SU /

CSE

c m y k

opposes the project, clearance is granted. In the case of miningprojects, where there is hardly any boundary between social, eco-nomic and environmental issues, the public hearing is treated asan exclusive ‘environmental public hearing’; social and economicconcerns are not entertained.

Today, the EIA process in the country has become largely inef-fectual. Very rarely are any projects rejected; mining projects, evenif they have huge environmental externalities, manage to clear thegrade. The ‘re-engineering’ of the EIA process has failed to solve

the fundamental problems in it – firstly, the conflict of interests inpreparation of the EIA report and, therefore, the need for an inde-pendent assessment and secondly, the need for consent of the peo-ple before clearing the project. In fact, the 2006 EIA notificationhas further marginalised the role of the people in the environmen-tal clearance process.

● The forest and wildlife actsThe Forest Conservation Act (FCA), 1980 provides for the protection of two classes of forests: reserve and protected. Priorapproval of the Central government is required for any change in the status of reserve forests or for non-forest use of protectedforest land. Reserve forests have the highest conservation statusand the area so classified cannot be used for any non-forest purposes, unless the government de-reserves it.

Surface and underground mining are deemed non-forestactivities and, therefore, Central government approval is requiredfor mineral concessions in any forest area. The FCA treats renew-al of a lease as grant of a new lease; lease renewal too, therefore,requires its clearance. A Forest Advisory Committee advises thegovernment on approvals and other related issues.

The FCA stipulates that even if a mining project has appliedfor environmental clearance, it needs to apply separately andsimultaneously for FCA clearance as well if the mine lease areacovers forest land. Further, it also mentions that proposals for

285


Off bounds?Mining in ecologically sensitive areas is, on paper, subjectto stricter rules

Any mining project, even if listed under category ‘B’, will be treatedas category ‘A’ if it is located wholly or in part within 10 km from theboundary of ● Protected areas notified under the Wildlife (Protection) Act,

1972 ● Critically polluted areas as notified by the Central Pollution

Control Board from time to time ● Notified eco-sensitive areas● Inter-state boundaries and international boundaries

SHYA

MA

L /

CSE

m k

286


Desolation: there are no sacred boundaries for mining, and forests are denotified to allow it. The Hoda committee proposes to encourage themayhem by opening up more forest areas to mining

AG

NIM

IRH

BA

SU /

CSE

m k

diversion of forest land should be accompanied by an endorse-ment from the gram panchayat or the local body.

The act also requires the developers to pay for purchase of anequivalent area of non-forest land as near as possible to the site ofdiversion, or twice the degraded forest area, for transfer to thestate forest department with sufficient funds for compensatoryafforestation, which is then declared as protected forest.

However, the compensatory afforestation scheme has beenwidely criticised by both the civil society and forestry and wildlifeexperts, who believe that compensatory afforestation cannot be asubstitute to a diverse natural forest. There is also a problem of thestates not being able to complete the quota of compensatoryafforestation. For instance, it is estimated that in Orissa, although10,000 ha of forest land has been diverted for mining purposes,only 3,000 ha has been covered by the compensatory afforestationscheme.2 The data on compensatory afforestation for the entirecountry shows that during 1980 to 2001, while 5,27,699 ha of for-est area was diverted for various projects, compensatory afforesta-tion was taken up on only 3,80,195 ha.3

Section 2.6 of the guidlines for the act also states that “whileconsidering proposals for dereservation or diversion of forestland for non-forest use, it is essential that ecological and environ-mental losses and socio-economic distress caused to the peoplewho are displaced are weighed against economic and socialgains”. However – instead of being made applicable to all projects– this analysis is required only for projects involving forest landmore than 20 ha in the plains and more than five ha in the hills.

Annexure XX of the guidlines says that states and Union terri-tories (UTs) should avoid recommending use of forest areas insidesanctuaries, national parks and Project Tiger reserves for non-for-est purposes. Wherever this is inescapable, the state/UT govern-ment has been advised to get the consent of the Indian Board ofWildlife (IBWL). After getting clearance from the board, the pro-posal can be submitted to the Centre for consideration under theFCA, 1980. In Writ Petition (Civil) No 337 of 1995 (Centre forEnvironmental Law, WWF-India vs Union of India and others),the Supreme Court ruled in 1997 that no denotification wouldtake place without seeking the opinion of the IBWL. In 2002, anamendment was brought in the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972,wherein the power to denotify/dereserve national parks andwildlife sanctuaries was vested in the National Board for Wildlife.However, the Supreme Court order dated November 13, 2000(Centre for Environmental Law, WWF-India vs Union of Indiacase) restrained all state governments from dereseving nationalparks, sanctuaries and forests without prior approval of the court.As things stand today, no national park or sanctuary can be der-served without the permission of the Supreme Court.

The Wildlife Protection (Amendment) Act, 2002 is a revision ofthe Wildlife (Protection) Act of 1972. It does not have much teethin terms of stopping the rampant ‘development’ inside or nearreserve forests. However, Section 29 of the Act prohibits mining insanctuaries, while Section 35(6) does the same for national parks;both have been flagrantly violated. A well-known example of thisviolation is the case of iron ore mining in Kudremukh NationalPark in Karnataka, which has recently been closed after directives

of the Supreme Court (see Chapter 4: Mining in the states –Karnataka).

The Wildlife Conservation Strategy, adopted by the IBWLin 2002, makes two important points which have relevance formining in forest areas:● No diversion of forest land for non-forest purposes from criti-

cal and ecologically fragile wildlife habitats shall be allowed.● Lands falling within 10 km of boundaries of national parks

and sanctuaries should be notified as eco-fragile zones underthe EPA. Despite the various safeguards provided within the law, as far

as mining is concerned, no frontier appears to be sacred anymore.The mining industry is ravenous. Its burgeoning demand hasfound support from none other than the Planning Commission’sHigh-level Committee on the National Mineral Policy, which rec-ommends opening up more forest areas for mining. “The essentialdifference between a mining intervention and other interventionsis that the miner eventually leaves the land and can recreate oreven improve upon the forest as it existed before commencementof operations,” reads the committee’s strange logic. Obviously, thecommittee has no clue about the difference between in value of anatural forest and a human-made one (see Box on pages 288-89:The Hoda report).

This is a suicidal course. Minerals are essential, but they arenot critical for human survival; ecological areas and functions are.There is an urgent need for a moratorium on mining in forestlands. With the rapidly increasing mineral demand in the country,if we do not enforce this moratorium now, it might very well betoo late.

■ PRICING FORESTS

In May 2002, following the alarm raised in India over decliningforest cover and a Supreme Court (SC) directive to formulate ascheme for compensatory afforestation, the MoEF constituted aCentral Empowered Committee (CEC). The committee submittedits recommendations in 2002, elaborating on the procedure forutilisation of funds for compensatory afforestation, activities per-missible under compensatory afforestation, compensation for lossof forest land through recovery of net present value (NPV), fundsfor catchment treatment plan and involvement of user agenciesfor compensatory afforestation.4

The major recommendation of the CEC was that a companyinvolved in diverting forest land for non-forestry purposes,should pay the NPV of the area diverted. This should be in addi-tion to the funds for compensatory afforestation. The committeefelt that the plantations raised under the CompensatoryAfforestation Scheme (CAS) could never adequately compensatefor the loss of natural forests, as they require more time to matureand even then, are a poor substitute to natural forests. The rate ofthe NPV was fixed at Rs 5.8-Rs 9.2 lakh per ha of forest landdepending on quality and density of the forest diverted. It isalready being charged by four states: Bihar, Chhattisgarh,Maharashtra and Haryana. More than Rs 300 crore collected so farunder it is lying with the courts.5

287


m k

288


The Hoda reportThe committee aims at diluting the environmental clearanceprocess to attract investment

In its mid-term appraisal of the 10th Five-Year Plan, the PlanningCommission realised that the National Mineral Policy (NMP), adopted in1993 “for encouraging the flow of private investment in exploration andmining”, had not lived up to its billing. The reason for believing the NMPhad failed was laid out thus: “[S]o far, the Central government hasapproved as many as 188 reconnaissance permits, involving an area of2,54,307.303 sq km… and the Foreign Investment Promotion Board hasgranted 73 approvals for FDI (foreign direct investment) in the mining sec-tor involving an investment of Rs 4,044 crore… there is no successful case ofa reconnaissance permit being converted into a mining lease so far (emphasisadded). …this is mainly due to procedural delays in various clearances atboth the Central and state government levels, especially in the case ofmandatory environmental clearance and inadequate infrastructure.”

A ‘high-level committee’ was, therefore, constituted in September2005 under Anwarul Hoda, member, Planning Commission. The committee’s terms of reference were: ● to review the NMP and the Mines and Minerals (Development and

Regulation) Act, 1957 and suggest the changes needed for encourag-ing investment

● to review existing procedures for granting Reconnaissance Permits(RPs), Prospecting Licences (PLs), and Mining Leases (MLs) and suggest ways for their streamlining and simplification

● to review the procedures for according clearance to mineral exploration and mining projects under the Forest (Conservation) Act,1980 and Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, and suggest ways forspeeding them up

● to prioritise critical infrastructure needs of the Indian mining sectorand make recommendations on ways to facilitate investment to meetthese needs

● to examine the implications of the policy of mineral-rich states tomake value addition within the state a condition for grant of mineralconcession and make appropriate recommendations in this regard

● to examine ways of augmenting state revenues from the mineral sector, and

● to examine any other issue relevant for stimulating investment flowsand inducting stateof-the-art technology into the sector.

The committee submitted its report in June 2006.

Blinkered visionBetween 1993-94 and 2005-06, the mineral sector had been growing at arate of 10.7 per cent, but had also caused massive environmental damage, economic marginalisation and social unrest. The NMP, whichhad emphasised on meeting the environmental and social challengesposed by mining rather than fast-tracking private investment, failed todeliver on these fronts, a fact ignored while finalising the terms of reference for the Hoda committee. The committee’s terms concentratedalmost exclusively on streamlining procedures to facilitate private invest-ment without recognising the serious environmental and social issues.

This was reflected in the composition of the committee, which

consisted solely of government and business representatives. L P Sonkar,adviser (minerals), Planning Commission, and convener of the Hodacommittee, put things in perspective with a rhetorical question to Down ToEarth: “Do you expect us to call tribals to the committee?”

Apart from this built-in bias, there was a flawed presumption: thecommittee said that between conservation and exploitation of forestresources, the government always favoured conservation, with the judiciary’s intervention making mining clearance more difficult. But sta-tistics say otherwise: the speed and scale of clearances for mining has, infact, been increasing over the years. Under the Forest Conservation Act(FCA), 1980, forestry clearance was required from the Union ministry ofenvironment and forests (MoEF). In the 17 years (1980-1997) since FCA came into force, forest clearances were granted on an average toroughly 20 mining projects, diverting 2,030 ha annually. Between 1998and 2005, MoEF cleared about 125 mining projects diverting 8,650 ha offorest land annually.

Private unlimitedTo solve the social-environmental problems, the committee pinned its

faith on two mechanisms – the sustainable development framework andGlobal Reporting Initiative (GRI), a multi-stakeholder group based inAmsterdam which develops reporting guidelines for corporates. Underfire for their poor environmental, social and human rights records in thedeveloping world (see Box: Mine sharks), the world’s leading multination-al mining companies had decided in 2000 to initiate a project to examinethe role of the sector in contributing to sustainable development. Nine ofthese companies contracted the International Institute for Environmentand Development to undertake the Mining, Minerals and SustainableDevelopment Project (MMSD), which came out with a wish list of sustainable development principles.

Meanwhile, in 2001, these mining companies also promoted theInternational Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) to improve their image. The MMSD’s sustainable development principles were thenconverted into a framework by ICMM, to be implemented by all its members. It mandated an annual report on social and environment performance to be verified by private auditors under GRI.

The problem with the framework was that it was no different fromexisting voluntary certification systems. Its principles were so broad andvague – for example, contributing to social, economic and institutionaldevelopment of communities – that companies could claim they adheredto them without doing much. The reporting and verification process wasalso farcical: companies could write what they wanted because verifierswere paid by them. In India, mining companies are supposed to submitannual environmental audit reports and half-yearly progress reports onenvironment management plans. Given that this mandatory system has failed, it is unlikely that a voluntary one will help make mining sustainable. Not surprisingly, the committee believes if the framework isimplemented, more forest land can be opened to mining.

Through the thicketAt the core of the Hoda committee’s recommendations on forest clearance are proposals to change laws to assure prospectors they will getforest clearance if they find minerals.

m k

289


Under existing FCA guidelines, permission to survey, explore orprospect for minerals in forest areas does not imply leases will be granted. Before granting leases, detailed impact assessment has beenenvisaged to protect ecologically sensitive areas.

According to the Hoda committee, however, “such a stipulation militates against the seamless transfer dispensation that the committeewould like to promote to attract investment into mining”. It wants the gov-ernment to spell out in advance the conditions to be met during mining sothat forest clearance can be granted without a hitch. This recommendationis based on the belief that “the miner eventually leaves the land and canrecreate or even improve upon the forest as it existed before commence-ment of operations”. But the 500-odd officially declared abandoned mines(there are thousands of unofficial ones) belie this claim. International experience with mining rehabilitation hasn’t been great either.

Cosmetic changeThe core of the committee’s recommendations for speeding up the forestclearance process is outsourcing the responsibility of divisional forest offi-cers (DFOs) and attenuating the MoEF’s role. It has also proposed a coor-dination-cum-empowered committee (CCEC) at the Centre and in statesto act as a single-window clearance outpost. It has recommended thatmine lease, forestry and environmental clearance should be parallel ratherthan sequential processes. No major change has, however, been proposed

at the Central level; the committee has recommended that MoEF’s inter-nal processes remain unchanged – its decisions will be binding on theCCEC. The problem is that the committee has taken a blinkered view ofrestructuring systems to minimise delays in granting of leases. Take thecase of renewing leases.The Hoda committee wants the clearance processfor renewals to be a mere formality, unless there are serious adverseeffects on the forest and wildlife or environment in an area or violationsof stipulated conditions. But it has not specified a mechanism throughwhich ‘serious adverse effects’ can be identified and monitored.

The need for renewals arises to assess damage from actual miningoperations and to then decide on a future course of action. Industry cannot complain as cases of large mines being denied renewals on ecological or environmental grounds are almost non-existent. Mines likethe Sukinda chromite mines in Jajpur, Orissa, should not have been grant-ed renewals because of the extensive damage they caused; they still gotthe green signal because regulators often reasoned that since the damagehad already been done, mining should continue!

So, while the Hoda committee’s proposals on renewals might notmaterially change the situation, what should be put in place is a system inwhich ecological and environmental performance of mines are periodicallyassessed and renewals granted on the basis of ground reports.

Public limitedThe Hoda committee wants public hearings to be dispensed with for mining leases for areas less than 50 ha and for renewals of any leases. Italso wants them to be limited to issues arising out of environmentalimpact assessment (EIA) reports and to people, legislators or NGOs ofareas concerned – complete outsiders should not participate. Though thelast suggestion is part of the new EIA clearance process, the implicationsof the first two are disastrous. To say that 50-ha mining does not needpublic hearings is to imply it has no environmental impacts. However, thenumber of people a 50-ha mine can affect and the environmental degradation it can cause has been witnessed across the land. The recom-mendation of the committee to dump public hearings for renewals doesnot take into account the fact that these are the only forums in whichaffected communities can express their opinions.

Another damaging recommendation, which, if accepted, could multi-ply environmental and social problems many times relates to size. TheHoda committee wants the upper limit for a single mine lease to go upfrom the existing 10 sq km (there are a few exceptions in the public sector) to 50-100 sq km to develop “world-class ore bodies”. What it doesnot tell is how to deal with massive displacement, especially given that thegovernment can’t even deal with the current levels of displacement.

Clearly, for mining to remain a viable economic activity, a ‘sociallicence to operate’ must be enshrined in future legislation. People will voluntarily accept change if they perceive an overall benefit. But if impoverishment is the anticipated consequence of mining, people willresist. If people do not want mining, then it can only happen with the helpof the coercive power of the State, which will be accompanied by large-scale human rights violations and social and economic dislocation.Hoda’s report comes to the aid of this process of coercion.

Down To Earth, April 30, 2007

Mine sharksHoda committee lays the red carpet for MNCs

In 2006, each of the world’s top four mining companies posted net profits of over US $5 billion – the largest, Australia’s BHP Billiton, earned US $10 billion. When operating in developing countries, these companies are not above exploiting states with laxlaws to circumvent environmental and social safety nets.

BHP Billiton operated the OK Tedi mine from 1984-2002 in PapuaNew Guinea. It had to be hauled up before the International WaterTribunal at The Hague in 19961 to force it to stop dumping 80,000-1,20,000 tonne of waste rock each day into local waters, drowningover 170 sq km of forest, destroying the river’s ecology and displacingalmost 50,000 people.2 Three years after reaching an estimated US $500 million settlement that required BHP to reform its waste disposal practices and compensate local communities, it announcedthat no waste disposal method could sufficiently mitigate the environmental impacts of the mine.3

US-based Newmont Mining Company is being held accountableby the Indonesian government for the pollution of Buyat Bay.Between 1996 and 2004, the Newmont Minahasa Raya gold minedisposed off its tailings into the bay.4 The tailings had mercury andarsenic levels much higher than the government standards.5

Newmont reached an out-of-court case settlement of US $30 millionwith the Indonesian government in February 2002.6 The company continues to dump 1,20,000 tonne of waste every day into theSenunu Bay from another Indonesian mine.7

c m y k

Based on the recommendations of the CEC, the SC ruled thatNPV should be obtained from the project proponent. However,the court was not satisfied with the quoted figure as it felt it didnot take into account the social and economic costs of diversion.The court felt that the basis for calculation of NPV should be theeconomic value spread over a period of 50 years, after taking intoaccount intangible benefits from the forest.

The SC set up an expert committee on September 26, 2005 toidentify the parameters for evaluating forests and the projects eligible for exemption from NPV payment. The committee, head-ed by Kanchan Chopra, director of the Delhi-based Institute ofEconomic Growth, submitted its recommendations in May 2006.

This committee has gone a step beyond its terms of reference:it has recommended a management system for NPV funds andgiven protected areas (PAs) an inviolable status. “Price cannot beput on the inviolable nature of PAs and biodiversity-rich areas likesacred groves and mangroves,” says Chopra. “PAs should not bediverted for any non-forestry use at any cost.” For areas otherthan PAs, the committee has set a methodology that includes thegoods and services provided by forest ecosystems: timber, non-timber forest produce, firewood, fodder, grazing land, tourism,carbon sequestration, flood control, biodiversity and nutrientcycling, and many more.

Though it does not put a price tag on every forest patch, thecommittee takes Himachal Pradesh as an illustration and sets theminimum NPV at Rs 1.57 lakh per ha for Nahan Circle (a mono-culture forest) and the maximum at Rs 8.57 lakh per ha forBilaspur Circle (a dense forest).“The maximum NPV charge isactually infinite, as the PAs haven’t been priced,” says Chopra.Charges will be site-specific and evaluated at the forest-rangelevel, says the report.

The committee has further suggested that the full compensa-tion for diversion of forest land should also include the groundrent for the land, which goes into the state coffers, subject to aminimum of Rs 10,000 per ha.

The committee took six months and sat through 113 presenta-tions from prospective forest land users, mostly hydroelectric powercompanies, to prepare the report. It suggests a 30 per cent NPVexemption for major hydroelectric projects. According to Chopra,“Projects with more than 50 per cent of additional capital cost bur-den should be given some consideration and so the exemption forhydroelectric projects.” Besides, the committee has identified sevenprinciples under which it has given complete exemption to somepublic works, welfare projects and tribal rehabilitation projects. Ithas also acknowledged traditional practices like jhum cultivation asan agro-forestry activity and recommended it for exemption.

The committee has, however, expressed concern that noCompensatory Afforestation Management and PlanningAuthority (CAMPA) collections were distributed betweenJanuary 2001 and April 2004, even though 5,73,164 ha of forestland was diverted for non-forestry use. It suggests a three-tier sys-tem of Central, state and local bodies to ensure proper distributionof funds. “In no case should the compensation collected underNPV be treated either as part of the consolidated fund of theUnion or the relevant state,” says its report.

■ MINE CLOSURE

Mining is a temporary economic activity that leaves long-termsocial, economic and environmental footprints. Closing of a mineis all about ‘what kind of footprint will be left behind’. It was onlyin 2003 that India actually put mine closure as a regulatoryrequirement for operating mines in India. Before this, mine leasesused to be granted without any planning on the mine closure. Therule, which has been incorporated under the MCDR 1988, makesthe holder of the mining lease responsible for ensuring the imple-mentation of the closure plan. The rule makes it compulsory forall the mines to submit a conceptual mine closure plan at the freshgrant or renewal of the license; a progressive mine closure planevery five years; and a final mine closure plan a year before theactual closure.

A financial assurance has to be furnished at the rate of Rs25,000 per ha for ‘A’ category mines (generally large mines) andRs 15,000 per ha for ‘B’ category mines (generally small mines),with the minimum amount pegged at Rs 2 lakh for category ‘A’and Rs 1 lakh for category ‘B’. The financial assurance can be sub-mitted in different forms – letter of credit, performance or suretybonds, trust funds or any other guarantees acceptable to theauthorities. This money might be forfeited if the clause of mineclosure plan is not met. According to the guidelines issued formine closure, the closure plan should address (i) the environmen-tal issues and proposed remediation measures, and (ii) the socialissues, mainly related to employees laid off and socio-economicrepercussions and the proposed remedial measures.6

Internationally, mine closure is one of the most discussedissues before a mine is allowed to operate. This is because experi-ence with mine closure has been poor and mining companies haveleft behind ‘ugly footprints’ – ghost towns, waste-choked water-ways, tailing dumps and overburden hills – for governments andlocal communities to deal with. Because India has had no bindingclosure regulations, mining in this country has left behind a trulyfractured land – officially, 500 odd orphaned mines, and unoffi-cially, thousands of abandoned holes in the ground and hillocksnext to them. Most abandoned mines in India are today so-called‘water bodies’, but in reality they are large pits in the ground thatare contaminated, many by acid rock drainage.

The situation is not expected to change: the 2003 regulationsdid not do much to alter the status of mine closure in the country.One of the biggest drawbacks of closure legislation in India is thatit has not learnt anything from international experience. Hence, ithas not included safeguards to ensure sustainable closure ofmines. One of the key roadblocks before sustainable closure is theavailability of funds at the end of the life of the mine. Financialsurety is required by almost all governments, but how much isasked for ultimately decides how a mine is closed. If too little isasked for, then there is a temptation to forfeit the surety and leavethe abandoned mine to the government to deal with. There havebeen cases across the world where mining companies filed forbankruptcy at the end of the life of the mine and left the mineswithout proper closure (see Box: Escaping liability).

Despite these international experiences, the financial

290


c m y k

assurance required by Indian regulations is a pittance. A 10-sq kmmine lease area has to pay a financial surety of just Rs 2 crore formine closure, though the annual turnover of such a large minewould be in thousands of crore. This amount is not sufficient toeven put the overburden into the pits. The provision of forfeitingof the financial assurance is, therefore, not a deterrent to the erringcompanies. The problem is that there is also no additional provi-sion to force companies to undertake proper rehabilitation. Thereare no rules to blacklist the company, nor any other penal provi-sions for non-compliance.

One drawback of closure regulations in the country is the qual-ity of mine closure plans that are being approved and implement-ed. Mine closure has become a ‘formality’ – one of the many paper-works that need to be done over with to get the clearance. Mine clo-sure plans that are being approved today in the country are allabout water bodies, stabilised overburden dumps and plantations;very little is being said about alternate land uses. Take the case ofthe Gondegaon open-cast coal mine in Nagpur (Maharashtra).Once this nine-sq km mine closes, it will leave about three sq km ofoverburden dumps (almost a small hill), about two sq km of voidin the ground, and more than two sq km of vacant land with plan-

tation. Only about one sq km would be backfilled area, while therest will hold the existing infrastructure. The case of the limestonemines of Rajashree Cement in Gulbarga, Karnataka is even moreeccentric: the mines will create a six sq km water body and provideboating facility for tourists. Most mining proposals today are beingcleared on the basis of similar closure plans.

None of these closure plans discusses pollution control orremediation – the assumption, almost, is that there is no likeli-hood of pollution once the mines are closed. Acid mine drainageand contamination of water in the left-out voids are not even dis-cussed. Stabilisation and plantation on tailings are discussed, butthere is no acknowledgement of the fact that more often than not,tailings are a source of heavy metal pollution; these metals arelikely to be carried by run-offs into nearby water bodies.

The closure plans fare worse on the socio-economic front.Most do not even consider the issue worth discussing, thoughunder a notification by the IBM on mine closure, “social issues,mainly related to employees laid off and socio-economic repercus-sions” have been made an integral part of mine closure plans.Mine closure is a non-issue as far as regulatory paradigm in thecountry is concerned.

291


Escaping liabilityIn the US, citizens pay for the crimes of mining companies

The US Bankruptcy Code was instituted to protect business ownersfrom a lifetime of debt and to provide a level of insurance for lenders.1

But the code had a loophole: bankruptcy ensures that a company willnot be fully liable for debts. So, when a company files for bankruptcy,it might escape being held responsible for cleaning up any pollutionthat it may have caused. Cleaning up the mess, therefore, couldbecome the state’s responsibility.

An attempt to close this loophole was made through the use offinancial assurances – most usually, bonding; the federal SurfaceMining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) and many states’hardrock mining laws require such assurances. Unfortunately, thesefinancial assurances have grossly underestimated the cost of environ-mental remediation, especially in the case of hardrock mining –because of which they have failed to force mining companies to inter-nalise the cost of pollution. According to Jim Kuipers (MPC Issue PaperNo 4), financial assurance is 50 to 10,000 per cent below the actual costof reclamation. According to him, the unbonded clean-up liability attoday’s mines ranges from US $1 billion to $12 billion.2

This loophole has been used by mining companies, especially thesmall- and medium-sized hardrock mining firms, which have declaredbankruptcy and left behind billions of dollars of clean-up costs.3 This isa practice intentionally adopted to skirt environmental liability. Notonly are companies looking to bankruptcy laws to shelter them fromtheir failure to comply with environmental management practices, butcompanies are looking to the future potential of bankruptcy to allowthem to operate in environmentally reckless ways so that they maykeep costs down. Frequently, this is done by creating a subsidiary thatis capital-poor.4 The subsidiary can claim bankruptcy – even point to its

environmental clean-up costs as a factor in its bankruptcy – and theparent company – large, and certainly solvent – is not held liable forthe actions of its subsidiary.

When ASARCO declared bankruptcy in 2005, there were over 100civil environmental cases pending, and its environmental liability wasestimated to be between US $500 million and US $1 billion.5 Ofcourse, bankruptcy could make all of that go away. By the time ASAR-CO declared bankruptcy, it had already sold most of its valuable assetsto a shell company owned by Grupo Mexico.6 By selling off its assets,creditors stood little chance of receiving payment from the bankruptcyhearing. Unless the government decides to hold Grupo Mexico liable,the money simply isn’t there.

The Indonesian government may have been able to forceNewmont Gold to pay for the pollution of Buyat Bay in Indonesia, butthe US government will have a difficult time convincing NewmontGold to pay for the pollution created by its subsidiary, Dawn MiningCo, whose Midnite Uranium Mine’s radiation, heavy metals and acidmine drainage created a Superfund site. With Dawn Mining unable topay for the clean-up and Newmont most likely to escape liability, thisis a clean-up that citizens will have to pay for.7

It is Pegasus Gold, however, which really figured out how to playthe system. By the time the mine, the Zortman-Landusky gold mine,closed after the 1998 bankruptcy, it had already achieved quite a bit ofnotoriety for its cyanide pollution and acid mine drainage; one spillreleased 50,000 gallons of cyanide solution that contaminated local drinking water.8 When Pegasus declared bankruptcy, Montanadiscovered that more than 85 per cent of the site was without any surface reclamation.9 And while bankruptcy allowed Pegasus to avoid paying for reclamation, it still managed to pay its membersover US $5 million in bonuses, which they then used to create a new company.10

c m y k

But it cannot remain so: if we don’t want ghost towns, contaminated hills and pools and gaping holes on our lands, wewill have to redefine the regulations on mine closure and set upan institutional mechanism that will ensure its implementation.

Mine closure is not about planting trees and stabilising over-burden; it is about creating a sustainable ecosystem in which thecommunity affected by mining can live after the miners and theirequipment are gone. Therefore, mine closure is a combination ofenvironmental, social, economic and development issues thatmust be clearly defined, understood and planned for – before amine is allowed to operate. This means that mine closure plansneed to be discussed and prepared in consultation with the com-munity. For this to happen, major changes need to be effected inthe law. Firstly, the law related to land must change. The currentpractice of giving the land back to the government (mainly theforest and revenue departments) suits the industry perfectly,because by doing so, it just shifts the post-mining responsibilityon to the government’s shoulders. The land, instead, should betransferred to the commons: entities that will ensure that liveli-hoods are created out of that land. Secondly, detailed communityconsultations and approval must become an integral part ofdeveloping the mine closure plan.

There is also the issue of livelihoods when a mine closes. Amine inflicts a double whammy on local communities: it disrupts

their socio-economic fabric twice – once when it begins, and againwhen it closes down. Mining operations must be designed in amanner so that the transitions do not create undue hardships. Thiswill require preparation of a socio-economic closure plan whichshould have provisions for alternate economic activities andlivelihoods, development of infrastructure in a way that it can beutilised after the mine is closed, utilisation of the mine land foreconomic and social uses, and compensation for workers.Environmental closure of mines must include decontaminationand containment of pollution as a core issue.

For all of this, adequate financial provisions and robust regulatory mechanisms are necessary – both of which are currently missing. The existing financial surety, which is completely insufficient for undertaking any kind of mine closure,must be revised realistically. Footprints left by mines differ; therefore, the financial surety must be designed accordingly foreach mine and should be fixed after taking into account theground realities. In Canada, the financial assurance ranges from afew million dollars for a small mine to over US $100 million for alarge mine.7

There is no denying that mine closure is one the biggest challenges for the Indian mineral industry. Unless, the right environment is created through legislations and financial surety,corporates are unlikely to take this issue seriously.

292


Cratered land: most mines are abandoned after use, and laws have been completely ineffective in preventing this practice

P M

AD

HA

VAN

c m y k

293

c m y k

Legislative laxity in mining is not restricted to environmental regulations; laws

targeted at setting right mining’s social impacts are as hazy. Land, of course,

and the right over it, is at the center of these impacts. The State believes that

since it is the owner of all minerals under its territorial jurisdiction, it has the right to

explore and extract them at will – and that whoever lives on lands where minerals are

located can be summarily evicted to aid the purposes of exploration and extraction.

The State prefers to rationalise this act of displacement and land acquisition as ‘all for

public purpose’. The laws of the land, naturally, follow what the State believes.

The Land Acquisition Act, a law dating back to India’s colonial past, is one such

piece of legislation. It gives the State the power to grab land, and cannily excuses it

from the obligation of resettling or rehabilitating those it dispossesses. In 2004 came

the national rehabilitation policy, or the NPRR. Dubbed “highly unsatisfactory” by

most, the policy chooses to ignore the right of the displaced to rehabilitation.

The costs of this legislative insensitivity have been immense: lakhs displaced,

with most left several notches poorer. Development – and mining as part of it – need

not entail such high costs. Contrary to what these laws and policies presume,

displacement need not be an inevitable consequence of development.

What is, perhaps, needed is a recognition of the place ‘people’ hold in the scheme

of things, and a respect for their position. What follows is providing these people with

what is rightfully theirs – the benefits that arise out of mining, and the right to say ‘no’

to a project. The world has acknowledged the importance of this people-centric

approach, and India would do well to join the ranks.

6 Rehabilitation: theregulatory roadblocks

294

• Contrary to claims and expectations, mining has not brought prosperity and growth to India’s mining regions. States likeJharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Orissa that have a high level ofdependence on mineral resources, have low per capitaincomes, higher levels of poverty, lower growth rates andhigher levels of mortality, malnutrition and morbidity.

• Most conflicts over mining begin in the struggle for land, andland is becoming scarcer. The average landholding in ruralIndia in 2003 was just 0.725 ha – 27 per cent lower than thecorresponding figure in 1992.

• Tribals have been hit the hardest. The Planning Commissionsays over a 25-30 year period, 56 per cent of the total triballand in the districts of Dhenkanal, Ganjam, Koraput andPhulbani in Orissa was lost.

• The National Policy on Rehabilitation and Resettlement 2003 isin form of broad guidelines, applicable only to projects thatdisplace 500 families or more en masse in the plains and 250families en masse in hills. It has other drawbacks as well.

• Under-financing of rehabilitation and resettlement (R&R) is one of the key causes of the failure of resettlement programmes in India.

• Orissa has introduced one of the better R&R policies in the country, which also includes a comprehensive institutional mechanism to implement it. But it has not been legislated yet,and its provisions are not binding.

• None of the existing R&R policies in India recognise the principleof free, informed and prior consent, nor do they envisage sharing of benefits of the project with project-affected people.

• Globally, the practice of free, informed and prior consent and sharing the benefits of mining with local communities is catching on. Countries like Ghana and Namibia have a mineral development fund to return part of the income fromroyalties to communities affected by mining.

c m y k

With the second largest population in the world, Indiaalso faces critical issues of displacement and rehabilita-tion (besides environmental impacts) when it comes to

mining and mineral-based industrialisation. Most of its miningareas are located in remote and least developed regions, inhabitedlargely by scheduled tribes and other economically weak and dis-advantaged sections of society. Mineral exploration, thus, results inlarge-scale uprooting and further impoverishment of communi-ties. The track record of the major mineral-bearing states in landacquisition and displacement is abysmal. People displaced fromtheir land 50 years ago due to mining have not been compensatedyet. Some have been displaced multiple times. People who havelived on their land and worked it for generations, have been evict-ed forcibly without any compensation or alternate livelihood justbecause they do not hold any legally enforceable claims to theirland. Compensations offered have been meager; numerous casestudies suggest that the majority who have been displaced, now

find themselves worse off than before. What’s more, it is not onlymining that tribals are losing their land to; compensatory afforesta-tion to ‘atone’ for mines on forest lands is also taking its toll.

Built into Indian laws are two deeply entrenched attitudes(Canadian and US laws reflect a similar thinking): one, that theState has the right to sell minerals to the highest bidder and two,that whoever lives on the lands where minerals are located hasfew or no rights to restrict exploration and extraction. Accordingto the Indian constitution, the state government is the owner ofthe minerals within its territorial jurisdiction. In offshore areas,the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, the rightsover minerals are vested with the Central government. Since allthe minerals are owned by the State, it appropriates the power todeny the people (on whose lands minerals are found), any rightsover these resources. It also assumes that the responsibility ofdeveloping the mineral resources gives it the power to summarilyseize lands and evict the people living on them.

295

c m y k

CHAPTER 6

Rehabilitation: the regulatory roadblocks

Living on the edge: people displaced from their lands 50 years ago due to mining have not been compensated yet. They are, in most cases,worse off than before

CH

AN

DRA

BH

USH

AN

/ C

SE

The main point of contention here is that while the surfacerights to land are under private and customary ownership, themineral rights are solely owned by the government. The govern-ment grants those rights through prospecting licenses or mineleases to mining companies that meet the criteria specified by law.During the prospecting phase, consultation with local communi-ties is not required and they have no right to intervene. During themine lease phase, the Land Acquisition Act (LAA) is invoked toacquire land. The owners of land or the traditional/customaryland users have no right to deny land acquisition; they can fileobjections and go to the courts for redressal. The holder of themine lease, however, has the right to take as much of the surfaceas is needed to gain access to the minerals (though there arerestrictions on the upper limit, which the government has theright to increase on a case-by-case basis), regardless of the prefer-ences of the surface owner.

A consequence of this approach is that while the interests ofone group are nurtured, that of the other are completely ignored,and even considered to be dispensable. Displaced communitiesare now asking – can the traditional axiom of sacrifice for the goodof the country truly be interpreted to mean unlimited sacrifice? Isit ethical for one group to shoulder the ills of development whilethe benefits go to others? Environmental degradation and the dis-placement caused by mining accentuates poverty. ‘Resourcecurse’ is now a well established phenomenon not only in India butin several other countries. Mineral-rich states like Jharkhand,

Chhattisgarh and Orissa, in spite of their mineral wealth, arestruggling with poverty, illiteracy, and low growth rates.

Why mining is creating poverty instead of prosperity hasmuch to do with the governance systems in place. Indian legisla-tions and policies related to rehabilitation and resettlement (R&R),view rehabilitation in simplistic terms. They vary widely fromstate to state, from project to project, and from authority to authority. Moreover, the limited policies provide no link with theLAA, which has governed forcible usurpation of land by the Statewithout any clause for rehabilitation.

The presumption that displacement is an inevitable consequence of all development projects needs to be reassessed,especially in view of the enormous cost of human suffering. Thereis a need to avoid such large-scale displacement, particularly oftribals. In cases where it is inevitable, care has to be taken for comprehensive resettlement and rehabilitation.

■ LAND IS THE KEY

Development projects need land; mining is particularly land-intensive. In mineral-rich areas like Bastar in Chhattisgarh, forinstance, thousands of hectares of land, sometimes entire villages,are diverted for mining.

This is most often the reason that sets local communities offon a collision course with project developers – because the sameland serves multiple purposes in the local economy in areas wherethese projects are scheduled. Especially in a predominantly agricultural economy like India’s, the importance of land cannotbe overemphasised. It is often the only source of food andlivelihoods in these areas. Even so-called ‘wastelands’ play a central role in sustaining rural economies (see Box: How useless isa wasteland?).

And this land is increasingly becoming scarce. The NationalSample Survey Organisation’s (NSSO) report on HouseholdOwnership Holdings in India, 2003 says that the average area ofland owned by a household in rural India in 2003 was 0.725 ha –which was 27 per cent lower than the corresponding figure in1992. Not surprising, therefore, that land and its acquisition havebeen at the centre of almost all protests against projects fromKalinganagar to Dadri and beyond (see Box on pages 298-99: Thestruggle for land).

● How is land ‘acquired’?In most cases, the first time people living in an area where a project is to be sited get to hear of it is when the land acquisitionprocess starts. There are two ways of acquiring land: representa-tives of companies can approach landowners directly and negotiate the sale, or the government can acquire the land andlater sell it to project developers.

When companies acquire land directly from the people, it is aclear process. No other agency is involved. Theoretically, peoplehave a right to decide whether or not they want to sell their land.The market decides compensation. However, the price and negotiating with individual land owners act as a dampener onacquisition plans – and companies then bank on the government

296


c m y k

Victimised: mining displaces labourers and agricultural workersdependent on land for their livelihoods

RAJN

IKA

NT

YAD

AV

to acquire land for them. The government, in a tearing hurry toinvite investments, is more than happy to comply.

Of course, the government is well-equipped for this task – theCoal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957allows it to acquire land in coal-rich areas, and the acquired landis automatically leased out to Coal India Ltd. The Atomic EnergyAct, 1962 gives the government huge and almost autocratic powers over land containing atomic minerals. By far the mostpowerful piece of legislation available with the government to

acquire land, at least in terms of the sheer scope it provides formass acquisition, is the Land Acquisition Act of 1894.

All these legislations operate under the same premise: the prin-ciples of ‘eminent domain’ (which gives the State overarchingrights over all the land) and that of ‘public purpose’ (the rationaleis that the State being the protector and controller of public interest,should have unlimited power to act in this interest). But the govern-ment grossly misuses the powers granted to it, and the LAA in particular has come in for strong criticism from many quarters.

297

REHABILITATION: THE REGULATORY ROADBLOCKS

How useless is a wasteland?Governments plan to ‘use’ and divert wastelands productively,but aren’t local communities already using them?

Recent protests over land acquisition for special economic zones(SEZs) have largely centred around the diversion of farmland – it isbeing argued as a result that this diversion should be avoided as far aspossible. The former chairperson of the National Advisory Council,Sonia Gandhi, is believed to have said that not more than 10 per centof the land acquired should be prime farmland.

Consequently, wastelands have gained the high ground now andare being sold as the panacea for all ills. Wastelands, governmentsargue, can and in fact should be diverted for making them more productive. Just about everyone is eyeing wastelands – the PlanningCommission says 11 million ha should be set aside for jatropha plantations. The paper industry wants another 36 million ha for plantations; SEZs are the latest entrants in the race.

But in India, there are no wastelands in the true sense of the term. Every bit of land in India is used – and the officially designated‘wastelands’ are often the backbone of local economies, supporting the most marginalised. Wastelands consist of fallow land, land used for shifting agriculture, grazing land and pastures. In fact,61 per cent of the area under wastelands in India are ‘common property resources’ (CPRs).

CPRs play an important role in rural economies. According to an NSSO survey, 12 per cent of rural income comes from CPRs. Theyprovide food and fodder for a large proportion of the poor. And theyare scarce. According to the same survey, the average CPR area available to a rural household is just 0.31 ha. This low value means ahigh dependence on these resources. All this goes to say that no land acquisition is benign from a social, environmental and economicpoint of view.

– Padmaparna Ghosh, Down To Earth, November 15, 2006

SHA

YAM

AL

/ C

SE

SAVE

OUR ...

WE WANT...

NO ... SAVE ...

m k

298


The struggle for landCases from across the nation all point to the same angst

Dadri, Uttar PradeshNot very far from Delhi, about 1,011 ha of land has been acquired in eightvillages in western Uttar Pradesh, for Reliance Energy Generation Ltd’s(REGL) “world’s largest gas-based power plant”; over 6,000 families havebeen displaced with meagre compensation. Fears of more displacementare growing with a planned new SEZ adjacent to the power plant.Farmers of the region are up in arms: they are not against the power plant,but are unhappy with the compensation, the way the land has beenacquired and the rehabilitation package.

REGL had sought the Uttar Pradesh government’s help to acquire theland in 2004. Villagers allege that the government took away their landalmost by fraud, without their consent and at throw-away prices. Manyhaven’t received any compensation at all. Manoj Bharadwaj, a farmer, says:“I haven’t taken a penny for my land, but REGL has already taken posses-sion and had my land barbed.”The then chief minister Mulayam Singh hadannounced compensation at the rate of Rs 37 lakh per ha, but the finalcompensation was pegged at a low Rs 17.9 lakh per ha.

There is some confusion regarding this, which the then district collector of Ghaziabad, Santosh Yadav, explains: “When negotiations were

going on, some representatives from Greater Noida were asking for a hikein compensation. The chief minister promised them compensation at therate of Rs 37 lakh per ha. It was not meant for the people who would bedisplaced on account of the power plant in Ghaziabad. The Ghaziabadfarmers have misunderstood the matter.”

Farmers claim that they did not want to part with their “fertile landthat produced three crops a year and sometimes, even four”. Says ManguSingh Rana, president of Maharana Sangram Singh Kishan SangharshSamiti (MSSKSS), a union of farmers created to convey dissent againstthe project: “The administration has played with our sentiments. It firstthreatened some farmers that their leases would be cancelled if they didn’t surrender and then they would be compensated at the circle rate ofRs 40 per square yard.”

Yadav trashes the farmers’ claims.“If you look at the sale deeds, youwill find rates ranging from Rs 2.99-7.18 lakh per ha. Besides, the allegation that farmers were scared of their leases getting cancelled is nottrue because there are only 200 farmers who farm leased lands. Why did2,800 landowning farmers sign the deed?”he asks. But farmers insist thatthey were coerced into leaving their lands.

Yadav’s denials notwithstanding, it seems evident that the farmershave been taken for a ride. The rates of land at a high-tech city project atDasna, 10 km away, is Rs 53.8 lakh per ha. A kilometre away from Dasna

In opposition: across India, farmers, like this man in Uttar Pradesh, are protesting against land acquisition for development projects

SHA

ILES

H K

UM

AR

/ C

SE

m k

299


is Bamheta where builders are paying farmers Rs 2.99 crore per ha.Further ahead, farmers of Nai Basti, Bir Akbarpur and other villages areselling their land for Rs 5.98 crore per ha. Local property dealers believethat the compensation for farmers displaced by the REGL project is verylow and that the appropriate rate could be close to Rs 53.8 lakh per ha.

The farmers have approached former Samajwadi Party leader RajBabbar who, along with former prime minister V P Singh, has formed theJan Morcha to fight their cause.“We did a survey and were startled to learnthat at least 1,21,406 ha of prime land near highways and fertile agricul-tural land was given to industrialists across the state,”says Babbar.

Farmers feel that such projects should be allowed to come up only onbarren land. A common question being raised is why did the governmentact as a middleman between the farmers and REGL.“Why didn’t REGLbuy land from the farmers directly?” asks Rana, “The farmers are notagainst the project. They also need electricity. Land was acquired in thename of public purpose for the UP Power Corporation. Why then was itgiven to REGL?”

According to Babbar, this is a monumental land scam amounting tothousands of crores of rupees.

Nandigram, West BengalOn March 14, 2006, about 3,000 police personnel forced their way intoWest Bengal’s Nandigram block; officially, 14 villagers lost their lives, andmany more were injured. Villages in the block, in East Midnapur district, had been resisting the state government’s plan to set up an SEZon their lands.

Villagers say over 100 people were killed in the bloodbath and several hundred were injured. They say the police, reportedly backed byCommunist Party of India-Marxist cadres called the ‘Lakshman Vahini’after their leader Lakshman Seth, Member of Parliament from EastMidnapur, shot to kill. They raped and killed women, and did not spareeven the children. They dumped bodies in the Haldi river, buried some inditches and carted the rest away in trucks.

Nandigram had been virtually cut off since January, when villagers,fearing their lands would be taken to set up the SEZ, dug up roads andblocked all entry points to ensure the area remained inaccessible. It iswidely believed that the state sent forces to Nandigram to regain controlof the block.

Three days after the incident, following public outrage, pressure fromLeft Front allies and a veiled censure from the governor, West Bengal chiefminister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee finally claimed responsibility, callingthe incident an “error in assessment”. He said the government would notacquire land in Nandigram. The Calcutta High Court called the stateaction “wholly unconstitutional”and taking suo moto cognisance, orderedan investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation. The agency hassubmitted its report, but the details were unavailable at the time of goingto press.

Amritsar, Punjab“I don’t know anything except farming,” says Preetam Singh. Singh andhis family’s livelihood comes from vegetable and dairy farming on his twoha of land.

Preetam Singh is one of the 1,500 landholders of seven villages in

Amritsar district who were served a notification for land acquisition for anSEZ on August 17, 2006. The land across the seven villages is very fertile.“This is the vegetable belt of Punjab and we get up to three cropsin a year,” says a farmer. Growing mostly potatoes and peas on the irrigated land, the farmers manage to earn up to Rs 1 lakh from each acreannually and most farmers have holdings between one and five acres.“Our crop is sold not only in Punjab but also goes up to Srinagar andHimachal Pradesh,” says Karaj Singh Jeete, a farmer. The suburbs of nearby Amritsar town are dotted with cold storages where these vegetables are housed on their way to diverse destinations.

But cultivation is not the only reason the locals depend on the land.Every farmer here has about 10 cows or buffaloes. Earnings from agricul-ture are supplemented by dairy farming.“For every Rs 30 we spend on acow, we earn Rs 100. We easily earn Rs 3,000-4,000 from each cow everymonth,” says Jeete. The fodder and feed for these cows and buffaloescomes from the same land. But the role of dairy farming in this area is notlimited only to the landholders. About 40 per cent of the population inthese villages comprises landless labourers, each of whom have a coupleof cows.“The farm workers are paid Rs 100-150 per day. But more thanhalf their earning comes from selling milk. And they buy the fodder forthe animals from us,”says a farmer.

“It is not just this project.The state has forcibly acquired 152 ha for theTrident Group. Even though a hundred farmers have not yet received com-pensation, the perimeter wall has been built and construction started,” says Sukhdev Singh Kokri Kalan, general secretary, BharatiyaKisan Union.

“What happened to the industrial township in Goindwal Sahib set upin 1986? About 890 ha of agricultural land was taken and now it’s vacant.Why can’t that be given for the SEZ?” asks Harjeet Singh Hundal, afarmer in Cheete Kalan village in Amritsar. All Preetam Singh can say,however, is: “I can’t watch the fields I have tilled with my hands for so longget bulldozed.”

Kalinganagar, OrissaBefore the bloodbath at Nandigram, the most violent land acquisition inrecent times happened in Kalinganagar. On January 6, 2006, 12 tribalsprotesting land acquisition were gunned down by battalions of the Orissapolice. Land for a steel plant had been acquired here by the governmentmany years ago, and was finally given to the Tatas in 2005.

What set off the protests was the Orissa government’s move to sellthe land to the Tatas at 10 times the price that it had paid to the tribals.On January 6, Tata officials accompanied by Orissa police personnelarrived at the project site to begin construction of a boundary wall for theplant. When the villagers came to know of this, they came armed withtheir bows and arrows to protest. They started retreating when theyheard bombs exploding; they were shot at as they retreated. Twelve tribals were killed, most of them shot in the back as they were runningaway. There were also allegations that the police mutilated the bodies ofthe dead tribals while conducting post-mortems.

The incident only served to steel the resolve of the tribals, and theprotests have intensified.

Down To Earth

m k

The reason for this criticism is easily understandable: thegovernment uses the LAA to acquire land, ostensibly for ‘publicpurpose’, and then promptly sells this land to companies (whichare often privately-owned), sometimes at much higher rates thanwhat it paid to acquire the land. The land acquisition process inKalinganagar, Orissa, is a case in point: here, the state governmentacquired land from tribals at the so called market rate, and thensold it to the Tatas for building a steel plant at 10 times this price.

It is this self-imposed role of the State that is raising questions.Should the government involve itself in facilitating private landacquistion? What are the criteria that decide what is in public interest, and what is in the interests of business and industry?

● The Land Acquisition Act, 1894Why is the LAA in the eye of the storm? The controversial act is a19th century piece of legislation (see Box: A colonial legacy). Its aimis to allow the government to acquire land for ‘public purpose’.The main issue with the LAA is its complete rejection of a democratic decision-making process – the government does nothave to take any permission from the owner of the land for acquiring it, and reserves with itself the right to decide what is‘public purpose’.

There are other serious concerns – the State has the power toacquire land, but is not duty-bound to resettle and rehabilitatethose displaced by the acquisition. While the government has tocompensate the landowners, the LAA does not require it to ensureresettlement and rehabilitation. What constitutes adequate compensation is also in question. Legally entitled landownersreceive monetary compensation for the land that is acquired, usually at prevailing market rates. But they are not compensatedfor other losses, like that of livelihood, shelter, habitat, culturalresources, access to natural resources or basic amenities.

The law does not take into account the rights of people whoare not legal owners of land: like the landless, nomads, fisherfolkand tribals who do not have ownership pattas for land. The actalso has an ‘emergency’ clause, which gives a district collectorextraordinary powers without adequate checks and balances,leaving it open to widespread misuse.

Many changes have been proposed in the LAA. The NationalAdvisory Council (NAC), set up by the Central government, hassuggested (in its Draft National Development, Displacement andRehabilitation Policy) the following important changes in the act:● It should have a strong, legally enforceable rehabilitation

clause within it.● It should guarantee the right to sustain life, including

livelihoods, shelter and habitat. ● The ‘eminent domain’ principle should be subject to the State

satisfying these fundamental and legal rights of those whoare likely to be displaced.

● The LAA should be prevented from overriding the Panchayat(Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act which is applicable inSchedule V and VI areas.

● Compensation should be provided not just for loss of land,but also for loss of livelihood, habitat, cultural resources andof access to natural resources.

● Monetary compensation should be based not on the marketvalue, but on the replacement costs.

● The government has to define the ‘public purpose’ to beserved by the project. Information on the social, environmentaland economic costs should be made readily available, andshould be transparently discussed.

● Project-affected people (PAPs) should have the legal right tochallenge the ‘public purpose’.

● ‘Public purpose’ should be replaced with ‘public good’,including the good of those to be displaced.

● ‘Public good’ can never include acquiring land for privatecompanies, or even for public sector units that are not producing public goods.

● The ‘emergency clause’ should be invoked only in the rarestof the rare cases.The NAC has also detailed out the nature of the rehabilitation

package and the institutional changes required to ensure implementation and fix accountability. However, the main thrust of the demands for either revoking the LAA or radically amendingit, has been to challenge the eminent domain of the State, and toredefine ‘public purpose’.

300


A colonial legacyThe genesis of a draconian law

In 1824, the British government enacted the Bengal Regulation I.This law empowered the Crown to acquire immovable property for the construction of roads, canals or other public ‘purposes’. For the first time, the State was allowed to acquire large tracts of land for‘public interest’ as government property. The notion of ‘property’

and ‘rights’as described in modern law did not exist in India before theadvent of the British.

The 1824 regulation was modified and amended many times. Asthe power of the Crown spread over the country, the regulation wasextended to Bombay and Madras, and later, to the entire country. TheBritish needed to develop an extensive railway network throughout

India. A comprehensive law giving the government huge powers ofland acquisition was, therefore, necessary. The all-powerful LandAcquisition Act, 1894 emerged, based on the principle of ‘eminentdomain’ and the State as the sole controller of land.

While the LAA was used by the British to consolidate their holdover the entire country, it was the tribals who bore the brunt. Using theprinciple of ‘eminent domain’, large tracts of land inhabitated by tribalswere converted into public lands owned by the State, and rights ofaccess were granted as ‘privileges’ by the State. This principle laterinspired the Forest Act of 1927 and the Wildlife (Protection) Act of 1972.

The British have gone, but the LAA remains: now used by theIndian government to do exactly what the British did in the past –forcibly acquire land from people in a completely undemocratic way inthe name of ‘public interest’.

m k

● Public purpose, public good or public interest? Defining ‘public purpose’ has never been simple. India has a ‘dualsociety’ – on one hand, there is a rich and influential minority with an ever-increasing appetite for energy-intensive lifestylesand luxury goods; on the other is a huge majority whose demandsrarely go beyond a subsistence existence. There is no homogenous‘public’, and so there can be no one definition of public purposethat meets everyone’s demands.

If past experiences are an indicator, ‘public purpose’ hasmeant anything that people want and that people can use, at leasttheoretically – for instance, projects providing power, irrigation,steel, aluminum, and even cars have been classified as satisfyinga public purpose. As a result, projects that primarily cater to avery limited proportion of India’s population and which lead to agreater accumulation of private wealth, are justified as serving a‘public purpose’.

Various social and political movements, civil society groupsand even the NAC have recommended a change in the definitionof public purpose. The universal belief is that firstly, private sector investment can never constitute public purpose and secondly, only certain public sector projects, providing basic infrastructure like roads, power and irrigation, should come within the ambit of public purpose.

The NAC has further recommended that a distinction bemade between ‘public purpose’ and ‘public interest’. While public purpose can be taken to mean anything that is open forpublic consumption, this might not necessarily be in ‘public interest’. According to the NAC, ‘public interest’ can be decidedonly after the social, economic and environmental costs are

balanced against the benefits. Further, who benefits and to whatextent should also be taken into consideration. Studies shouldcomprehensively prove that the proposed project serves ‘publicinterest’ more than the current land use patterns. The most significant recommendation is that decisions on ‘public interest’should be made in a transparent and participatory fashion, ratherthan being left at the sole discretion of the government.

● Tribal rights and land acquisitionTribals have always borne the brunt of land acquisition. They,unfortunately, inhabit areas rich in forests as well as mineralresources, and have repeatedly been told to make way for the use of these resources in ‘public interest’. India’s first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru famously told those displaced by the Hirakud dam: “if you are to suffer, you should suffer in theinterests of the country.”

Some legislations have attempted to safeguard tribal rights –the recently passed Scheduled Tribes (Recognition of ForestRights) Bill, 2005 (see Box: Legalising the ‘encroachers’?), and thePanchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (referred to asPESA in future) are examples. While the first tries to legalise tribal rights over the lands inhabited by them, the second hasattempted to involve them in the decision-making process andgive them greater control over local resources.

But despite these, land alienation of tribals persists; in fact, it isendemic in large areas of the country. Official figures show that every year, the number of landless in the country increases by two million. A study by the Steering Group on Rural Poverty Alleviation, Watershed Development, Decentralised

301


Legalising the ‘encroachers’?Despite its positive intent, the Tribal Rights Bill has run intorough weather

The government passed the Scheduled Tribes and Other TraditionalForest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act in 2006. The ForestConservation Act, 1980 had converted tribals into encroachers on theland that had been inhabited by their ancestors for generations. Thisillegitimate status meant that tribals were not eligible for compensa-tion (however meager) for displacement due to land acquisition. TheTribal Bill was meant to address both forest rights and occupancy rightsof people who had been using forest lands for generations, without anyformal recognition.

The bill, an important milestone for the tribal rights movement inIndia, was passed after much deliberations; a Joint ParliamentaryCommittee (JPC) was set up to review the recommendations of theoriginal bill tabled in December 2005.The bill accepted the cut-off datefor consideration of land rights as December 2005 rather than 1980(the year the Forest Conservation Act was enacted). Under it, all thoseresiding in forests for 25 years or more or for three generations prior to2005 would be eligible to claim land – and the ceiling has been set atfour ha for each settler family. Also, non-tribal forest dwellers werebrought under the ambit of the bill.

However, the bill has continued to be shrouded by controversy,since tribals rights groups feel that there has been significant dilutionof the recommendations of the JPC. The bill has defined forest-dwelling scheduled tribes and other traditional forest dwellers as those who “primarily reside in the forest”. Tribal groupspointed out that most “forest dwellers”do not strictly dwell inside theforests, living on forest land: they live on the fringes of forests, but are heavily dependent on the forest land and resources for their livelihood. The bill excludes them – some estimate that 90 per cent of forest dwellers are likely to be kept from availing the benefits of the bill. The bill has also excluded large numbers of non-tribal forest dwellers through constrictive definition. Also, it no longer mandates gram sabha approval for forest land diversion and land acquisition.

Tribal rights groups have also pointed out that the bill is suscep-tible to interference by the judiciary and other authorities. Section 15of the bill states that this act “shall be in addition to and not in deroga-tion of any other law in force”. In other words, this provision may leadto a bizarre situation – though forest dwellers will be provided landrights, they might still not be able to exercise these rights over theirland, since these rights would be subject to the provisions of the IndianForest Act. Also, the judiciary has the power to withdraw the rightsprovided by the bill.

m k

Planning and Panchayati Raj Institutions for the Tenth Five Year Plan, points out that in four districts of Orissa – Dhenkanal,Ganjam, Koraput and Phulbani – about 56 per cent of the total tribal land was lost to non-tribals over a 25-30 year period.1 Other estimates claim that 84 per cent of the land area inscheduled districts today either belongs to the government or to non-tribals.2

Tribal anger, as a result is brewing; resistance movements to protect tribal lands are gaining popularity. Several such movements are currently going on in the states of Orissa,Jharkhand and Andhra Pradesh, emboldened by the success inthe late 1980s of the Nimmalapadu case. Tribals of Nimmalapaduin Andhra Pradesh had gone to court to thwart an attempt by the Birla group to take their land (see Mining in the states: Andhra Pradesh). The case led to the landmark Samatajudgement which stipulated that land in Scheduled Areas cannot be transferred to private companies for mining (see Box: Alandmark judgement).

• PESA: reduced to a paper tigerPESA plays a central role in the land acquisition process, as it isapplicable over a significant proportion of tribal lands rich in min-erals. Nine mineral-rich states fall under the PESA legislation:Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh,Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Himachal Pradesh and Maharashtra. Theact was first passed by the Central government, and since land is astate subject, these states were asked to pass similar legislationsthat would be enforceable within their respective areas.

PESA is essentially an experiment in decentralisation – it pro-poses extensive powers not to the state government or the grampanchayat, but to the gram sabha, a collective consisting of all adultsin the village. The law is unambiguous and clear on land acquisi-tion. It gives the gram sabha control over prospecting of minorminerals; the sabha is empowered to take appropriate action torestore any unlawfully alienated land of scheduled tribes, and hasto give permission for any development project to come up inSchedule V (tribal-dominated) areas. The gram sabha has the right

302


m k

A landmark judgementThe Samata ruling gives tribals overriding powers on theirlands, but efforts to undermine it are on

In 1997, the Supreme Court had ruled that mining in Schedule V areas,classified on the basis of their tribal populations, should not be allowedwithout the participation of their people. In other words, mining leases tothe private sector would not be allowed in these areas. This judgement,known as the Samata judgement (named after the tribal activist groupthat had represented the matter to the Court), has become a major thornin the side of mining ventures. But the opportunity provided by the judgement, in the form of a protective and enabling envelope to managemining in the lands of poor people, remains unexplored.

What the judges notedThe judges said that the primary question was whether the governmentcould grant lease of lands situated in Scheduled Areas to non-tribals: this,when tribals were dependent on forests and would be exploited if theirlands were alienated. The judges also noted that it was this concern thathad led the government to demarcate regions inhabited by tribals asScheduled Areas, which “prohibited the transfer of immovable propertyby a member of the scheduled tribes to a non-scheduled tribe”.

The issue before the judges was if the state government was, in fact,above the law and therefore, allowed to allot land to a non-tribal; andwhether the land in the Scheduled Areas, which belongs to the govern-ment, could be handed over to non-tribals. The divisional bench of theAndhra Pradesh High Court, where the matter was first heard, had ruledthat the regulation did not apply to lands owned by the state government,as the state government was not a “natural person”.

But the Supreme Court judges, after minutely examining the legalinterpretation of the “state”, decreed that the “state” was indeed a “per-son”, directed “to fulfill the socio-economic goals set down in theConstitution to establish the egalitarian social order in which socio-eco-

nomic justice is secured to the poor and weaker sections of the society”.The judges then, in a majority decision, ruled that the “state govern-

ment is directed to ensure that all concerned industrialists stop forthwithmining operations within the Scheduled Areas, except where the leasehas been granted to the state undertaking”. In other words, only stategovernments would be allowed to mine in the areas classified asScheduled and that too, after due regard to the various environment andforest acts.

But the judges did not prohibit mining completely in these areas. Itwas possible to mine, but only after safeguards were taken to ensure thatthe needs of economic growth would not impinge on the lives of poorpeople and the environment. The judges directed that mining could bepermitted based on the decision of the state’s governor, whom theConstitution has empowered to sanction transfer of land. But as the exec-utive “is enjoined to protect social, economic and educational interests ofthe tribals”, it has to transmit its duties and obligations to the agencywhich has been given the charge to exploit resources.Therefore, the privatecompany has to ensure that the duties of the state are maintained.

The judges have laid out these duties (see Box: Samata: para 113).“Atleast 20 per cent of the net profits,”the judgement also says,“should be setapart as a permanent fund as a part of the industrial/business activity forestablishment and maintenance of water resources, schools, hospitals,sanitation and transport facilities.” In addition, the private agency wouldhave to invest in “reforestation and maintenance of ecology”.

The second approach was that the state governments could organisecooperative societies solely comprising scheduled tribes to exploit miningoperations within these areas, again after review and scrutiny under thevarious forest and environment acts.

Recognising also that the issues were complex, the apex court askedthe government, after deliberations, to take a policy decision based on the guidelines laid down in the judgement, so that there would be a consistent scheme throughout the country “in respect of tribal lands underwhich national wealth in the form of minerals is located”.

to reject a project – and this is what makes PESA so powerful. However, the versions of the original PESA that different states

enacted, have significantly diluted this power. Almost all powershave been made subject to rules and further orders “as may be pre-scribed by the state governments” – thus making implementationof PESA subject to other legislations. Also, rules enabling PESAhave not been passed even many years after the Central law waspassed. Says Sanjay Upadhyay, director of the Enviro-LegalDefence Forum, a Delhi-based NGO: “A few rules and prescriptionsbegan to surface in early 2000 primarily through revocable officialcirculars; these again have been totally inoperative because of theambiguity and lack of clarity of these provisions.”

The most significant dilution has been in the powers of thegram sabha. PESA originally required the sabha to give its consent for land acquisition. This consent has been reduced to‘consultation’ – and the recommendations of these ‘consultations’are obviously not legally enforceable. Also, different states,instead of keeping decision-making powers at the gram sabha

level, have given them to the different tiers under Panchayati Raj – gram panchayat, panchayat samiti and the zila parishad. The potentially radical law, therefore, has been reduced to a paper tiger.

Thus, though there have been attempts to empower tribalsand local communities in the process of land acquisition, thesehave been very few and far between. In most cases, the govern-ment has found ways to circumvent the people and their role. Inany case, legislations such as the LAA have given such sweepingpowers to the government that people have hardly had any saywhen the government has proceeded to acquire their land. More importantly, rehabilitation, which should have been a natural outcome of any land acquisition process, has not been featured into the act.

The country did not, in fact, feel the need for a legislation onrehabilitation till 2003; and even then, instead of legislation whichwould have made it a binding obligation, a nationalpolicy was drafted, which is supposed to act only as a guideline.

303


m k

Government wants to disposeIn the last few years, as private mining has grown by leaps and bounds, gov-ernments have worked overtime, not to develop a position on people andmining but to find ways of diluting the provisions of the Samata judgement.The Union and state governments had filed an application asking for amodification; the application was dismissed by the Supreme Court in early2000. Then in May 2000, the Andhra Pradesh government asked the state’sTribes Advisory Council for an amendment; protests made the chief minis-ter drop the idea. In late 2000, tribal activists released to the media a secretnote purportedly written by a joint secretary in the Union ministry of mines

to the Union government’s committee of secretaries: it proposed anamendment of the Schedule V to bypass the Samata judgement and sofacilitate the leasing of land in tribal areas.This secret note was published innewspapers and led to widespread protests.

In 2001, the disinvestment process of BALCO, a public sector unitoperating in the tribal areas of Chhattisgarh, raised the issue once again.However, this time, the Supreme Court ruled the decision of the “state”could not be questioned. After all, it was a mere three-judge bench thathad delivered the Samata judgement. To hold fire, it ought to have been afive-judge bench.

But the matter refused to fade away. The press reported that manyministers of the government were asking for a review of the judgement.The question was raised repeatedly in the Parliament as well. In March2001, replying to a direct question on the matter, the government statedthat it had no intentions of amending Schedule V to overcome the Samatajudgement. But speculations and surmises still flew thick and fast. It wassaid that the government was planning to amend the Mines and Minerals(Regulation and Development) Act for this purpose. In August 2004,again, replying to a question in the Lok Sabha, the minister stated that thegovernment is not considering any amendment to the act.

But Orissa has gone ahead. In July 2003, a state sub-committeechaired by the chief minister concluded that the Samata judgement was not binding on the state, a false inference because the ruling wasapplicable to all states. The committee’s premise was that there wereample legislations at the state level to protect tribals and Orissa couldremain outside the ruling’s ambit.

It is thus clear that the central problem in allowing large-scale miningis not mining per se, but its irresponsible embrace by corrupt regulators. Inthe current scenario, as projects get inaugurated all over the country, sowill another cycle of internecine conflicts. And who’s to know howviolent it will get?

Down To Earth, April 15, 2005

Samata: para 113On what the private sector must do

● Reforestation and maintenance of ecology in Scheduled Areas● Maintenance of roads and communication facilities in the

Scheduled Areas where operations of the industry has an impact ● Supply of potable water to tribals ● Establishment of schools for imparting free education at primary

and secondary level and providing vocational training to tribalsto enable them to be qualified, competent and confident in pur-suit of employment

● Providing employment to tribals according to their qualificationsin their establishment/factory

● Establishment of hospitals and camps for providing free medical-aid and treatment to tribals in the Scheduled Areas

● Maintenance of sanitation● Construction of houses for tribals in the Scheduled Areas as

enclosures; the expenditure for the above projects should be partof the annual budget of the industry establishment or business avocation/venture

■ THE NON-POLICY OF 2003

India did not have a single uniform national R&R policy till 2004.Different states had instituted and followed their own policies,which were rarely linked to the Land Acquisition Act. The Unionministry of rural development finally awoke to this unfortunatestate of affairs in 1994, and a draft National Policy on Resettlementand Rehabilitation was prepared.

This draft policy, however, chose to ignore rehabilitation as aright of the displaced. Following extensive discussions amongvoluntary organisations, an alternative citizens’ draft was prepared in 1994-95, which attempted to correct the imbalance bypushing for displaced people’s right to be rehabilitated. In 1997, acommittee of secretaries of the Union government came up with anew draft, which overrode the principal of ‘prior informed consent’. With the then government ousted from power in 1999,this draft was relegated to remain “under consideration” till 2004,when the new government finally promulgated a national rehabilitation policy.

The National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation ofProject-affected Families (NPRR-2003) is in the form of broadguidelines applicable only to projects that displace 500 families or more en masse in plains areas and 250 families en masse in hilly areas; the guidelines also cover Desert DevelopmentProgramme blocks and areas mentioned in Schedules V and VI ofthe Constitution.

The NPRR-2003’s simplistic assumptions – the policy hasfailed to incorporate any of the progressive clauses recommendedby the civil society during consultations in the earlier drafts – havedrawn criticism from all quarters. N C Saxena, former secretary ofthe Planning Commission and a member of the NAC, described itas “highly unsatisfactory” in an interview to the national daily, TheHindu. According to him, the policy “did not provide for trans-parency or any consultative process”.

Among the key drawbacks of the NPRR-2003 are its barriersof exclusion that effectively keep a large section of displaced peo-ple from the rehabilitation process. The first barrier of exclusion isthe clause which says that only those losing 100 per cent of theirlands will be eligible for compensation. Another exclusion is the

clause that only if 500 families in plains villages or 250 families inhilly or scheduled areas are affected en masse by the project, willthe area be declared an affected zone. The policy also makes allot-ment of land ‘conditional to availability’, thus putting no burdenon the government to find land. If in a rare case land is available,“only those who have lost their entire land would be entitled”.

Though the NPRR-2003 lays down that its objective is “to pro-vide better standards of living to project-affected families (PAFs)”,the compensation package it offers is more likely to transform aprosperous farmer into a landless poor. The policy also does notput any onus on the government to give public information aboutthe project and publicly justify the displacement. It doesn’t providea forum to even debate the requirement of the project.

Some of the other key concerns which the NPRR-2003 hasfailed to address are discussed below.

● Of alternatives and double-speakClause 2.1 of the NPRR-2003 states that its objective is to minimisedisplacement of persons and identify non-displacing or least dis-placing alternatives. But this has been nullified by Clause 4.5, whichstates that such an identification will be done by the ‘rehabilitationadministrator’ in consultation with the ‘requiring body’, which isthe company for whom land is being acquired by the government!It is unfortunate that instead of the affected people, the requiring bodywhich has no stake in the minimisation of displacement is consulted.

● Compensation: cash is betterThe predominant method of compensation advocated by the pol-icy is cash, not rehabilitation or livelihood support. But cash com-pensation is hardly ever adequate in making up for displacementlosses (see Box: The question of compensation). Surprisingly, the pol-icy itself recognises the limitations of this form of compensationand states that the system of extending cash compensation doesnot by itself, in most cases, enable the affected families to obtaincultivable agricultural land, homestead and other resources.

The NPRR-2003 makes allotment of land conditional to availabil-ity, thus putting no burden on the government to find land. If in a rarecase land is available, only those who have lost their entire land are enti-tled. Further, it offers to replace the agricultural land of the oustees

304


The question of compensation Market-driven monetary compensation has a flip side

Land acquisition goes hand-in-hand with compensation. But how is‘adequate compensation’defined? As per prevailing practice, compen-sation has largely been confined to monetary compensation at current‘market’ rates. There are a few exceptions, though: those displaced bythe Sardar Sarovar project, for instance, are entitled to land-for-land.

Fair market?While many groups have recommended that losses of other kinds –livelihoods, cultural resources, habitats and access to natural resources– also be compensated, the notion that market is a fair arbitrator of

compensation has also raised many questions. Firstly, it is well knownthat land prices increase exponentially when an industry or a majorinfrastructure project is set up. The original landowner is compensatedat current rates, preventing the displaced from benefiting from theboom in market prices.

A second and related point is that market prices are heavily distorted, as the land market is not sufficiently developed. Agriculturalland is, typically, not tradable for non-agricultural use. As such, the market price takes into account the restrictions in use. Land prices (ofagricultural land) do not include the probability of industrial or non-agricultural use at much higher prices (given higher productivity of landin industrial use). In land acquisition, therefore, the true prices wouldhave been substantially higher had land been a tradable commodity.

m k

with wasteland, wherever agricultural land is not available. Evenfor tribals, the policy does not go beyond stating that each sched-uled tribe PAF shall be given preference in allotment of land.

The policy lays down that its objective is “to provide betterstandards of living to PAFs”. But it does not elaborate on this; nei-ther does it specify the mechanism to achieve this. In comparison,the draft of the policy was more forthright in claiming “to ensurethat the resettled people (are) able to rise above the poverty lineand enjoy a better standard of living than before displacement.Secondly, benefits to the displaced people must be comparablewith the people benefiting from that specific project or with thepeople who have been beneficiaries of the development process ingeneral.” These objectives would have forced the authorities toview R&R as a poverty-reduction strategy, and thus there wouldhave been an incentive for them to seek options that result in theleast displacement.

Paragraph 6.18 of the NPRR-2003 says: “The PAFs shall be provided necessary training facilities for development ofentrepreneurship to take up self-employment projects at theresettlement zone as part of R&R benefits.” However, it is silentabout the responsibilities of the requiring body to provide wageemployment, when it is clearly established that the poorest ofthe poor cannot be trained to produce for the market and theirpreference is for wage employment. The policy does not even

suggest that all unskilled new jobs created in the project wouldgo to the PAPs.

Contrary to the draft policy’s reference to 26 basic amenitiesincluding roads, safe drinking water, education and irrigation, theNPRR-2003 states that the government would decide what ameni-ties are to be provided. The policy’s paragraph 6.22 says: “ThePAFs shall be provided the basic amenities and infrastructuralfacilities at the resettlement site as per norms specified by theappropriate government; it is desirable that provision of drinkingwater, electricity, schools, dispensaries and access to the resettle-ment sites amongst others be included.”

● Who says it was your land?The NPRR-2003 is designed to keep the majority of oustees out ofrehabilitation process, even if they are losing a large part of theirlands. One of its clauses says that only those losing 100 per cent oftheir lands will be eligible for compensation, while another saysthat only if 500 families in plains villages or 250 families in hilly orscheduled areas are affected en masse by the project, will the areabe declared an affected zone.

The new policy restricts the provision of housing sites only tothose who owned houses at the old site. Paragraphs 6.2 and 6.3 ofthe policy state: “Any PAF owning a house and whose house hasbeen acquired may be allotted free of cost house site to the extent

305


c m y k

Uncertain futures: one of the key limitations of the National Policy on Rehabilitation and Resettlement is that it keeps a large section of displaced people out of the rehabilitation process that it proposes

AG

NIM

IRH

BA

SU /

CSE

of actual loss of area of the acquired house, but not more than 150sq m of land in rural areas and 75 sq m of land in urban areas. EachPAF of below poverty line (BPL) category shall get a one-timefinancial assistance of Rs 25,000 for house construction. Non-BPLfamilies shall not be entitled to receive this assistance.” This woulddeprive many families of housing sites: these would include people whohave been living in ancestral houses that continue to be in the name oftheir forefathers, and the poor who live in huts on common lands.

● No transparency, no consultations The NPRR-2003 does not put any onus on the rehabilitationadministrator to give public information about the project or pub-licly justify the displacement. The administrator is also notrequired to hold any public hearings to debate the requirement ofthe project – a provision which the draft had contained. There is nomechanism in place that can even question the extent of displacement, letalone ensure its actual minimisation.

Clause 4.5 of the policy requires the administrator to holdconsultations with PAFs while preparing an R&R scheme or plan,but it does not envision consultations with the civil society; nordoes it specifically state that all PAPs and other concerned citizensand people’s organisations would enjoy the right to informationabout all aspects of the project which are of public interest includ-ing the detailed project report, the financial plans, economic orfinancial viability studies, social impact benchmarks and other

studies, environment impact assessment, environment rehabilita-tion plans and the detailed R&R plan, as was earlier suggested.

● Women get a raw deal, as usualThe definition of the family in most resettlement policies – andechoed in the NPRR-2003 – is based on the assumption thatwomen are totally dependent on men. In the Maharashtra Act of1989, family has been defined as including spouse, minor sons,unmarried daughters or dependent brothers or sisters. Thus, amajor unmarried daughter has no rights, while a major unmarriedson would be treated as a separate unit. Even in the case of thosedisplaced by the Narmada project, every son above the age of 18is to be treated as a separate ‘family’, but widows or desertedwives have no such rights.

The NPRR-2003 definition of ‘family’ includes the followingmembers: the head of the family, spouse, minor sons or unmarrieddaughters, minor brothers or unmarried sisters, father, mother andother members residing with him and dependent on him for theirlivelihood. Thus, married women, widows or deserted womenhave absolutely no rights to compensation.

● Another draft, but with a difference Expectedly, a clamour for amending the NPRR-2003 had begunbuilding up soon after it was announced. The NAC took it uponitself to amend the policy, and presented a new draft in December

306


c m y k

Silent sufferers: most rehabilitation packages totally ignore the rights of women to R&R benefits

P M

AD

HA

VAN

2005.3 This draft was certainly more progressive in character, con-tent and intent. But in May 2006, the prime minister’s office (PMO),which hosted a secretaries’ meet to discuss the draft, categoricallyrejected most of the proactive clauses contained in it. To obfuscatematters further, the government created several committees of sec-retaries and a Group of Ministers to review the draft policy.4

The NAC has suggested that the new law should be imple-mented with a retrospective effect of the last 10 years. It also asksfor the cost of rehabilitation to be incorporated within the totalcost of a development project before assessing its economic feasi-bility – a move which is essential for successful rehabilitation.Besides, the framers of the draft policy want that the zone of influ-ence of a project should not only include people identified as‘project-affected’, but also those on the periphery who have suf-fered indirect loss of livelihoods. Naturally, industry and elementsin the government are stridently opposing this draft. The Unionministry of rural development’s report on it is now awaited.

In modern times, the existing rehabilitation policies in combination with a colonial-era land acquisition act that we havewould do little to address issues related with development-induced displacement. There is a need to have a more practicalapproach in terms of a legally viable policy with stricter and moretransparent provisions.

■ REBUILDING LIVES

Naturally, ‘dismal’ would be the word that exemplifies the trackrecord of Indian mining authorities on R&R. No current estimatesare available about the number of people displaced by mining;however, available data for the period 1950-91 indicates that about2.55 million people – more than half of them tribals – had beeninvoluntarily displaced by mining during that period. What’sworse, only about 25 per cent of the displaced population hadbeen resettled (not rehabilitated).5

Mining, thus, has been taking a heavy toll of especially mar-ginal populations: people who are dependent on forests for liveli-hood and have a lower adaptive capacity for economic and socialchanges. In fact, there are now cases of people being displacedmultiple times, creating what Theodore Downing describes in hisreport, Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-induced Displacement andResettlement (MMSD, April 2002), as “a floating population ofdevelopment-induced poor”.6

Contrary to this abysmal state of affairs on ground, the sub-ject of displacement and rehabilitation seems to have receivedample attention from planners and thinkers, at least in theory.Principles that make up an effective R&R policy have been enu-merated and are widely accepted. Studies have isolated a set of

307


c m y k

Lost worlds: rehabilitation of project-affected people from mining projects has been largely unsuccessful and completely inadequate

AG

NIM

IRH

BA

SU /

CSE

impoverishment risks and rights usurpation issues that existacross all displacement-causing development projects. MichaelCernea, a US-based sociologist who has worked extensively withthe World Bank, has developed a list of nine impoverishment risksassociated with involuntary displacement: landlessness, jobless-ness, homelessness, marginalisation, food insecurity, increasedmorbidity and mortality, loss of access to common property andservices, social disarticulation and education loss.7

Prevention of these risks would necessitate undertakingextensive R&R projects that view displacement as much more thanthe loss of property. To counter landlessness, governments mustensure that oustees are given lands similar or better in quality totheir original holdings. This may mean creating productive landsthrough human-made restoration techniques. This should also beviewed as an opportunity to counter potential joblessness. Whereagricultural land is lost, new lands must provide sustainable liveli-hoods.8 The solution of offering jobs to oustees in the mining proj-ect is most often a false promise; short mine life and the growingtendency towards mechanisation means that employment oppor-tunities in mining are limited and in fact, decreasing.9

Checking homelessness would require adequate compensa-tion and consideration for improving the quality of life.10 TheInter-America Development Bank (IDB) has found that it is alsoimportant to consider income when providing housing, as hous-ing that requires maintenance and either new or increased utilityfees may lead to impoverishment or homelessness.11 Similarly,issues of food insecurity and health will depend greatly on theeconomic well-being of the communities. In the short-term,investment in health facilities and measures to mitigate food disruptions can offer immediate relief from potentially life-threat-

ening, but preventable, problems. Special consideration must begiven to vulnerable members of the society such as pregnantwomen, children and the elderly.12

Issues of loss of identity and social disarticulation are muchmore difficult to address. These demand open dialogue with PAPsand the communities that will receive the displaced persons.Projects must be sensitive to the difficulties of shifting communitystructures to another location, especially when cultural identitiesand ways of life are tied to lands and landscapes. Additional consideration must be given to how a new location will impact onthe roles of men and women, especially if mobility is affected.According to Downing, as a general rule, vulnerable groups relyheavily on their surrounding environment and alterations to thesurrounding ecology are likely to overwhelm individual and community adaptive responses and result in displacement.13

Finally, an assessment of the costs of resettlement and rehabilitation is essential for successfully preventing impoverish-ment. The costs of R&R must be included in the project cost. It is imperative that the costs are properly determined, as underfinancing of R&R has proven to be one of the greatest con-tributors to the failure of R&R programmes (see Box: Under-financing and R&R).14

Assessment of the cost of a resettlement programme has adual purpose: the World Bank has found that when resettlementcosts are too high, the profitability of a project can be jeopardised.If the resettlement costs of a project were no more than 10 per centof its total costs, a 50 per cent overrun could jeopardise the ratesof return on 30 per cent of the projects. If resettlement costs wereunder 10 per cent of the total project costs, overruns were not likely to threaten the internal rate of return.15

308


c m y k

Under-financing and R&R Poor resource allocation is one of the biggest causes of failure of resettlement programmes

A 1986 study carried out by the World Bank on resource allocation forresettlement found a strong correlation between the level of resettle-ment financing and implementation performance. It also identifiedcountry trends regarding higher or lower financing of resettlement.Thestudy included 31 projects with substantial resettlement components,under implementation in 15 countries. For each project, the study cal-culated the ratio between the per capita average cost allocated forresettlement in each project component and the per capita GNP in therespective country, and then ranked the projects according to theirratio. Independently, the research then examined the projects’ imple-mentation files, extracting the rankings given to each project’s imple-mentation performance in resettlement, and compared them with theratios of resource allocation to the resettlement components.

The study’s main finding was that “none of the projects with aratio of 3.5 or higher reported major resettlement difficulties. In con-trast, virtually all of the projects with a ratio lower than 2.0 were expe-riencing serious implementation difficulties.”

By country, the analysis found that the projects ranked among the

first 10 had a resource allocation ratio between 4.1-10.5. Of these 10projects, eight were in China. None of these were on the Bank’s list ofprojects with implementation problems. At the bottom of the list, the10 projects ranked last had very low resource allocation ratios, rangingonly between 0.5 and 1.9. Six out of these 10 projects were in India,and one each in Madagascar, Nigeria, Brazil and Argentina. The 10 lastprojects, with low financing ratios were all beset with serious implementation problems.

The study’s conclusion was: “Throwing money at resettlement willnot solve all resettlement problems. But starving resettlement ofresources is clearly the first step towards resettlement failure.”

That same study was sharply critical of the World Bank’s own hesi-tant and insufficient financial support for resettlement components in itsprojects. It found that “fewer than 15 per cent of the 192 projects withresettlement reviewed included Bank funding for the resettlement com-ponent.”In 85 per cent of the projects, the funding of resettlement com-ponents was left only in the charge of national resources. To change this,the study recommended that “constrained (country) budgets and unreli-able financial provisioning can be overcome by increasing the WorldBank’s share in resettlement finance…”(p 147). The Bank’s Board adopt-ed the study’s recommendations, and the World Bank significantlyincreased its financing share in the total cost of resettlement components.

It is important to keep in mind that while most discussionsabout involuntary displacement revolve around the loss of land, itonly represents 10-20 per cent of the risks.16 By de-emphasisingcash compensation and focusing on land-for-land, an R&R policydoes manage to provide a security net for oustees in an equitablemanner. The question of equity and ethics, however, demandsthinking beyond mitigation; it requires a policy of prevention.

Governments and project developers must begin by believingthat displacement is not a foregone conclusion in case of develop-ment projects. They should seriously consider alternatives to proj-ects that will lead to displacement, and summarily reject thoseprojects which can have severe impacts on local communities.Most funding agencies and international financial institutionshave certain criteria for R&R, which they consider as prerequisitesfor funding projects (see Box on page 310: What’s in a policy?).However, a serious consideration of alternatives to projects israrely undertaken.

Therefore, while the established set of impoverishment risksis important for development of a sound R&R policy, strongerstandards should be adopted to evaluate whether or not a projectshould be allowed to proceed. A recent study from YorkUniversity in Canada offers one method: assuming there are

certain ethical norms that cannot be violated no matter how great the development benefits, a system of evaluating a project’sethical violations should be made an integral part of the projectfeasibility. In the study titled ‘The Ethics of Development-InducedDisplacement’, the researchers of Centre for Refugee Studies havedeveloped a project evaluation based on eight criteria: systemdesign, equity, comparative voluntariness including democraticself-determination, indigenous peoples’ consent, other humanrights, environmental protection, heritage sites, and transparencyand compliance. The project has developed a two-part evaluationfor a resettlement plan: the first part offers specific limits which if violated result in the project’s rejection. If a project doesnot violate the limits, then it must meet a set of standards delineated by the study. This method offers a transparent process by which communities may hold development projects accountable.

It is important to understand that the option not to develop iscritical in any discussion about R&R policies. The notion that displacement is an inevitable – and acceptable – consequence ofdevelopment must be replaced with a genuine policy of rights allocation and equitable distribution of the costs and benefits ofdevelopment projects.

309


c m y k

Battleground: tension is writ large on the faces of these participants at the public hearing of POSCO in Orissa. The anger against such projectsis growing, but is the State listening?

ASH

UTO

SH M

ISH

RA

310


c m y k

What’s in a policy? Of multilateral lending agencies, their R&R policies, and whythese don’t work

International financial institutions and multilateral banks exercise atremendous amount of influence on large-scale development projectsand the governments that plan them. Whether it be through directingfunding or their control over development policy and technology, theseinstitutions determine countries’ attitudes towards displacement andenvironmental degradation. Banks, such as the World Bank (WB) andthe Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), have been in the spot-light for past and current abuses against local communities. Twoimportant criticisms of these institutions have been the lack of trans-parency in their project development and the lack of oversight duringconstruction of projects.

Over the past few decades, these lenders – led by the WB – havedeveloped internal policies for involuntary resettlement. We havenoted that while some of the policies are strong, displacement is stillhappening on too large a scale. Here, we compare the Bank’s and IDB’sinvoluntary resettlement policies, and question why even when astrong policy exists (as is the case with IDB), projects that impact localcommunities are allowed to continue.

World Bank: weak-kneed approachThe World Bank has two involuntary resettlement policies, one for theInternational Financial Corporation (IFC) and another that applies to its other divisions: both are equally ineffective. The policies are brief and lack any instructions, guidelines or standards, and their language is ambiguous. The Bank’s ‘Operational Policy 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement’ was recently updated, but is unavailable; we hope that the updates will reflect some of the WB’s own findings on impacts of displacement. The operational policy 4.30, which was replaced by OP 4.12, talked of replacing landwith land wherever possible and aimed at maintaining a quality of lifesimilar, if not better, than before. However, nowhere does it considera ‘no project’ scenario.

The IFC’s policy, ‘Performance Standard 5 Land Acquisition andInvoluntary Resettlement (2006)’, is a part of its social and environ-mental management plan, which also addresses the organisation’spolicy on indigenous rights. Performance Standard 5 does not find itnecessary to discuss gender, which is a major concern given the evi-dence on how worse off women are after displacement. The priority ofthe IFC is apparent in its ‘General Requirement for Project Design’:“The client will consider feasible alternative project designs to avoid orat least minimise physical or economic displacement, while balancingenvironmental, social, and financial costs and benefits.”This kind oflanguage actually permits large-scale displacement to occur if alterna-tives are deemed too costly.

IDB: worth emulating? As the largest lender to Latin America and the Caribbean, the IDB hastremendous influence and impact on local communities and environ-ment in this region. The ‘Involuntary Resettlement in IDB Projects:

Principles and Guidelines (1999)’ offers a comprehensive policy thatattempts to address the weaknesses of past large-scale developmentprojects and resettlement policies. It also clearly lays out for projectoperators what is necessary to complete a resettlement plan – it offersflexibility, while still providing an easy-to-follow structure.

In contrast to the IFC policy, which is only seven years older, IDBhas extensive sections on weak populations, with a focus on genderissues – one of the greatest weaknesses in resettlement plans. Thepolicy instructs project developers to consider the impact of resettle-ment on existing communities; where many people are to be reset-tled, it recommends an EIA. Additionally, it requires that indirectimpacts be considered and mitigated, something often outside thescope of resettlement policies. Another strength of the policy is thatit goes beyond physical, tangible losses and states that issues of identity and culture must be considered. Throughout the policy, theIDB reminds operators that cash compensation is rarely the bestanswer, and should therefore not be considered a satisfactory resettlement plan.

Beyond the involuntary resettlement policy is the IDB’s 2006 policy on indigenous rights, which prohibits involuntary resettlementwithout consent (although the policy does state cases whereby consentmay be circumvented). The question remains: do IDB projects have abetter track record?

On the ground, the IDB seems to have had an unfortunate history of inducing displacement: dams it has funded in the past werelinked to state-sponsored terror, as in the case with the Chixoy Dam,Guatemala. The IDB still funds dams and massive development plansthat have displacement and environmental implications; this, and itslack of transparency, cast a shadow over its activities – though it doesappear that more recently, the IDB has been responsive to concerns oflocal people.

Is a ‘good policy’ enough?While the World Bank has contributed substantially to the current lit-erature on displacement and involuntary resettlement and has givenquite a bit of lip service to the issue, its failure to incorporate the com-plexities of involuntary displacement in its own policies places a ques-tion mark on its commitment to the subject. The IDB, on the otherhand, despite having a strong policy, cannot boast of a clean slateeither.The question, therefore, is: should some projects be rejected andnot allowed to proceed?

Both the WB and IDB’s policies state that they must consider thepossibility of rejecting a project. The IDB’s language is much strongerin this regard compared to that of the IFC: “Resettlement should beavoided wherever possible... The alternative of not carrying out theproject should be seriously examined....” But given the numbers ofpeople displaced each year due to development projects, it is clear thatfew take this aspect of the policies terribly seriously. Have states andlenders become so arrogant that they believe they can entirely mitigatethe social and environmental costs of massive development projects?Or is it that they continue to believe that the benefits of these projectsare so great for the country, that the impacts on a specific communityare an acceptable collateral damage?

● Way to go for our R&R policiesIn fact, a close examination of all existing R&R policies in India –including that of the states (see Box: States and their R&R: the caseof Orissa) – exposes their common underpinnings. Not one ofthese policies recognises the right of the people to say ‘no’ to aproject. The only considerations are providing jobs, compensationfor land and homestead, financial assistance for buying shops orplots and some funds for making houses. Neither do these poli-cies recognise the land-for-land principle, and nor do they stresson sharing the benefits of the project with the PAPs. Their com-pensation packages are fixed arbitrarily, and there is little empha-sis given to restoration of incomes and income-earning opportu-nities for the affected people.

For instance, most tribals own few productive assets otherthan their human capital; even the land on which they work is notlegally recognised as theirs. Their livelihood is dependent on thecommons and their human capital. As a result, when they are

displaced, they never get adequate one-time compensation. For arehabilitation effort to succeed in such circumstances, it shouldaccount for land-for-land compensation for the loss of access tonatural assets and common goods, proper consideration for vulnerable members of the community, and the impacts of moving to a new location.

Emerging global best practices with respect to R&R for mining are a combination of people’s right to say ‘no’ and a participatory and negotiated R&R and benefit sharing package, all with legal and regulatory back-up (see Boxes on pages 312-13: The benefits of sharing and power to the communities).These practices have been developed keeping in view some basic principles.

Firstly, for a development project to succeed and to benefitaffected populations, there is a need to legally empower the peo-ple with adequate and transparent rights and safeguards. Unlessthis happens, communities will continue to exist at the fringes of

311


c m y k

States and their R&R: the case of OrissaStates have been more proactive on this front than the Centre

Even before the Centre formulated its R&R policy, some states, such asMadhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Karnataka enacted legislation forR&R while others, notably Gujarat and Orissa, had put their own R&Rpolicies in place. A few public sector enterprises, such as Coal IndiaLtd, have also adopted R&R policies. Of these, Orissa’s R&R policy hasbeen hailed as the most progressive in the country.

Orissa had 11 different legislations that included R&R considera-tions before it enacted a specific policy in May 2006. The objective ofthe policy is to avoid or minimise displacement, facilitate the process ofrehabilitation and develop an institutional mechanism for monitoringand grievance redressal.

For those affected by mining projects, the R&R package includesemployment to one family member in the project or cash assistanceranging from Rs 1 lakh to Rs 5 lakh with an option for 50 per cent ofcash assistance in the form of convertible preference shares; trainingfor self-employment; homestead land subject to availability or Rs 50,000 for relocation elsewhere; a house or housing assistance up to Rs 150,000; and shops or service units to those who opt for self-employment with preference to handicapped persons, scheduledtribes and scheduled castes. In addition to assistance specific to mining projects, certain types of assistance common to PAPs of allprojects have also been listed.These include maintenance allowance ofRs 2,000 per month per family for one year; assistance of Rs 10,000 fora temporary shed; and a transportation allowance of Rs 2,000 in lieu offree transport to habitation site. For tribal PAPs, this would also includepreferential allotment of land and resettlement as close as possible totheir original lands.

The policy has several progressive features compared to the otherpolicies existing in the country. To begin with, it has taken into accountthe plight of women. Thus, its definition of ‘family’ includes unmarriedwomen, widows and women divorcees. This makes them eligible forthe benefits under the policy.

In addition to the prevailing practice of socio-economic surveys,this policy proposes a comprehensive socio-cultural, resource mappingand infrastructural survey to be conducted by an independent agencyidentified by the government to ensure proper benchmarking.

The policy also requires that the resettlement plan should beframed in consultation with the displaced communities as well as gramsabhas and panchayats. This is to be then placed before theRehabilitation and Periphery Displacement Advisory Committee(RPDAC) for approval.The policy also specifies that the displaced com-munities should have a say in the selection of the resettlement areaand no displacement should take place unless the settlement plan hasbeen approved. All this seems to be an improvement over the previouspolicies as there is more engagement of displaced communities. Theonly drawback is that the policy narrows down the beneficiaries byspecifying that only “displaced communities” should be consultedinstead of PAPs. Moreover, even if a resettlement plan is made in consultation with the community, it is subject to approval from thegovernment body.

The policy establishes an institutional framework to ensure monitoring and implementation of R&R. Some of these institutionsinclude the Compensation Advisory Committee (CAC), the RPDAC,the State-level Resettlement and Rehabilitation Council (SLRRC) andthe State-level Unified Directorate of R&R. The responsibility of theCAC, which should have representation of women and indigenouscommunities wherever possible, is to negotiate the price. The RPDACoversees the implementation of the R&R package and monitorsperiphery development. It should also have representation from affected communities and NGOs. The SLRCC is constituted under thechief minister to monitor the implementation of the policy.

The policy is a great improvement over other R&R policies of thecountry as far as compensation package is concerned. It also envisages a much more comprehensive institutional mechanism toimplement it. However, the biggest drawback of the policy is that ithas not yet been translated into a legislation, which would make itsprovisions binding.

312


c m y k

The benefits of sharingWorldwide, wealth from the mineral industry is being channelised into local development

It is now well recognised across the world that the wealth generated bythe mining sector comes at a substantial development cost, along withenvironmental damages and economic exclusion of the marginalised.This has led to new thinking about ways in which mineral wealth can beconverted into sustainable development benefits for local communities.

Most new approaches that are being constructed and debated arebuilt on a comprehensive framework in which compensation, benefitsharing and community development plans are integrated and theroles of local communities, governments and mining companies are clearly delineated. The challenge, so far, has been to convert theseconcepts into practice.

Most countries offer compensation for land acquisition and relocation. However, it is the benefit sharing which varies from country to country. Typically, royalties fund the provision of benefits,whether they are in the form of infrastructure development, socialamenities or direct payments. The methods of revenue distribution and beneficiaries of mineral royalties vary widely. For example, inCanada’s North-West Territories, there is a legal provision to share royalty with the local community. Tanzania has a similar, provision but instead of being directly paid to the community, it is routed via the government.

In Mozambique, the mining law provides for a percentage of royalties to be paid directly to the lower levels of the government(Mining Code, Law No 14/2002 of June 26, 2002). Ghana has created amineral development fund to return part of the income from royaltiesto communities directly affected by mining. Of the total royalties col-lected, 20 per cent is paid into the fund. Proceeds are then sharedamong the local government authority, landowners and communitiesthat are adversely affected by mining.

Namibia has also created a Mineral Development Fund (MDF),but its expenditure is more broadly targeted than in Ghana. TheNamibian MDF is aimed at:● promoting and supporting all aspects of mining● broadening the contribution of the mining sector to the national

economy through diversification and by stimulating economiclinkages

● providing funds for the development of training and educationfacilities and programmesSouth Africa has introduced an alternative revenue distribution

system with its newly promulgated Mineral and Petroleum ResourcesDevelopment Act (MPRDA). Although there is no provision for lowerlevels of government to benefit through mineral royalties, local communities do have the potential to benefit substantially.

They are given the option to obtain a “preferent right” over landand minerals registered in their name, which effectively gives themnegotiation powers equal to those of the owners of the mineral rightsand fosters community development and social upliftment. To receivea preferential right, the community must submit a development plan tothe Department of Minerals and Energy, which can be easily renewed

for five-year periods. A preferential right permits the holder to eitherprospect or mine for the benefit of the community or, alternatively, tolease such rights to a mining company for a fixed considerationpayable directly to the community.

The charter of the MPRDA gives preferential treatment, in accordance with black economic empowerment, in mine ownership,procurement, employment and community inclusion into mine decision-making structures.

China levies two different royalty taxes, one of which is depositedsolely with the national treasury. The second one, called the mineralresources compensation fee (Regulations for the Collection andAdministration of the Mineral Resources Compensation Fee, N 150,1994), is collected by the appropriate county, provincial or city govern-ment, with 50 per cent of the amount collected remitted to the Centralgovernment and the rest retained by the provinces or cities. Inautonomous regions, the split is 40 per cent to the Centre and 60 per cent to the region.

In the Philippines, by statute, local government units receive a 40per cent share of the gross collection from excise taxes on mineralproducts (royalties) from the mines in their territorial jurisdiction (the National Internal Revenue Code of the Philippines). This amountis distributed as follows: 20 per cent to the province, 45 per cent to the component city and municipality, and 35 per cent to the Barangay(village or district).

In Brazil, the taxation authority has been set out in the country’sconstitution. It states that with regard to mineral resources, the states,federal districts and municipalities, as well as the federal government,are assured a “share in the results”of mineral resource exploitation intheir respective territories. In accordance with the constitution,statutory law provides that certain proportions of royalty are to be paidto lower levels of the government and to other parties.The distributionis defined as follows: 23 per cent to the states and federal districts,65 per cent to the municipalities, two per cent to the national fund forscientific and technological development, and 10 per cent to the mining and energy ministry, which shall give two per cent of its shareto environmental protection of the mining regions.

In Peru, provincial and local community discontent with perceived non-participation in the benefits of mining led to politicalpressure that culminated in a royalty tax being imposed in 2004 (Lawof Mining Royalty). The royalty is to be paid to the Central governmentand then distributed as follows: 20 per cent to the district municipali-ties where the exploitation takes place (50 per cent of that goes to thecommunities where the mine is located); 20 per cent to the provincialmunicipalities where the exploitation takes place; 40 per cent to thedistrict and provincial municipalities; 15 per cent to the regional government; and five per cent to the national universities of the regionwhere the mine is located.

In India, the mechanism of benefit sharing is completely underdeveloped, as the State collects all the royalties and taxes andthere is no provision to ensure that the revenues collected from mining percolate down to the local level. This is an area which needsgreater attention in coming years because it will ultimately decide the‘social license to operate’ for the mining companies.

society (as most mining experiences show) because industrialinterests align with government interests. The first step in thisprocess is to give an effective legal voice to communities to decidewhether they want the project or not, or how they want the proj-ect to come up and operate. Papua New Guinea’s mining success(at least from a socio-economic perspective, if not an environmen-tal one) is built upon the veto power that communities can exer-cise over mining development (see Box on page 314: The PapuaNew Guinea model).

There is an urgent need to introduce this practice in India aswell. It would be much more beneficial for the country to replaceinvoluntary displacement with negotiated, participatoryapproach and voluntary displacement. Resistance to displace-ment happens when communities perceive impoverishmentinstead of prosperity as the anticipated consequence of develop-ment. In case the community feels that the project will not lead to

social and economic prosperity or that the price it is being askedto pay is too high or that the compensation package it is receivingis too low, then it must have the legally enforceable right to say‘no’. For this to happen, the Land Acquisition Act must bereplaced or suitably modified to include the wish of the commu-nity as the paramount criteria in the land acquisition process. Toensure that this does not hamper the strategic or legitimate projects of national importance, ‘public purpose’ must be suitablyredefined in the act.

The second principle is that instead of a prescriptive one-size-fits-all R&R scheme, it is better to negotiate the R&R packageswith the communities themselves. The government can specifyminimum acceptable R&R packages from where negotiation canbegin. In direct negotiations, companies would never agree to apackage that would make their investments uncompetitive, andaffected communities would not agree to one that left them worse

313


Power to the communitiesA new concept which empowers right of people over theirown land

In most development projects such as mines or special economic zones,the local communities usually end up as mere bystanders or at best, asfringe participants; they stand to lose the most – their cumulative envi-ronmental, social and economic losses are immense.The concept of ‘free,prior and informed consent’, or FPIC, has been designed as a solution tothis state of affairs.

FPIC recognises indigenous peoples’ inherent and prior rights totheir lands and resources and respects their legitimate authority torequire that third parties enter into an equal and respectful relationshipwith them, based on the principle of informed consent.Therefore, FPICis about giving local people a formal role – and some form of vetopower – in the consultations and decisions on development projects. Itis intended to secure the rights of communities to control access totheir land and natural resources, and to share in the benefits whenthese are utilised by others. In the case of mining, with the bargainingpower that FPIC provisions bring them, communities can demanddirect compensation for damages or a continuing share of the profitsfrom mineral extraction. In this respect, the FPIC is a tool for greaterequity because it gives local communities a co-management role inlarge development projects.

Countries like the Philippines (Congress of the Philippines 1997)and Australia (Commonwealth of Australia 1976: Sections 66-78)have enacted laws requiring that FPIC be obtained by the governmentfor projects within the ancestral domains of indigenous peoples.Internationally, the World Commission on Dams (WCD 2000:xxxiv-xxxv, 98-112), the Forest Stewardship Council, the IDB’s operationalpolicy on resettlement and the Extractive Industries Review (WorldBank Group 2003 Executive Summary: 2-3, Volume 2:29-33, 47-50;MacKay 2004) of the World Bank have all recommended the adoptionof FPIC in making decisions about dams, forestry, oil and gas, andmining projects. In addition, FPIC as a principle has been acknowl-edged in the Convention on Biological Diversity, with regard to access

to and benefit-sharing of genetic resources (Perrault 2004: 22; Casas2004:2728); it is also enshrined in the International LabourOrganization’s Convention 169.

The global debate on FPIC is highly polarised. Some countries,including India, see FPIC as a possible threat to their ability to directcommercial exploitation of natural resources toward national develop-ment goals. On the other hand, there are others that have alreadydevolved and acknowledged certain levels of self-governance overresources to indigenous peoples. The FPIC has become the crux of adebate that juxtaposes concepts of sovereignty that empower govern-ments with the right and the duty to manage concerns within theirborders, with those concepts that limit the powers of national govern-ments to benefit some of their population to the detriment of others.Those arguing for full government control often assume that theaffected communities will reject development projects – though globalexperience shows that this has not always been the case when com-munities have had some degree of decision-making powers and wereable to get a better deal from a project.

There are also problems in operationalising the concept. There arequestions that need to be answered before FPIC can be put into practice:● What does ‘free’ mean in practice? How far ahead does ‘prior’

mean? What are the formal terms of ‘informed consent’?● In a diverse community, how is consent given and by whom? Is a

majority enough or is full consensus required? ● How is FPIC verified? Does the government verify it or is over-

sight by an independent party necessary?The right to prior informed consent is effective only if it is

defined and applied in a manner that guarantees sustainable devel-opment of local communities. Half-hearted measures like publicconsultation for discussing environmental impacts and consent of agram sabha – currently in vogue in India – are of little value. For FPICto become effective, there is a need to legally establish the followingrights: the right to be informed and consulted, the right of communi-ty to veto developmental projects, the right to negotiate the termsand conditions, including benefit sharing, and the right to participatein monitoring and enforcement.

m k

off. Hence, a voluntary settlement would be reached only if theagreement is mutually beneficial. In this process, the role of thegovernment becomes very important, not as a bargainer, but as awatchdog and a regulator. The government will have to ensurethat all interests are fairly represented, that the negotiations arefair and that the agreement reached is duly implemented. Thisprocess will need to have legal foundations to ensure that thecommunity gets what is promised.

The third principle is that minerals not only belong to the

government, they also belong to the people by virtue of lyingbeneath their lands. Therefore, people must have some share in the benefits from mining. In many countries, royalties receivedfrom minerals are shared by the government with the affectedcommunities. There are different models of benefit sharing –direct payment of cash, local area development fund, trust funds, etc. The key point here is that the communities are empowered –often legally – to decide how these benefits are to be shared and utilised.

314


Self-rule: people should have the right to say ‘no’ to mining companies

AG

NIM

IRH

BA

SU /

CSE

The Papua New Guinea modelA tiny island shows the way in benefit sharing

The Development Forum introduced in Papua New Guinea (PNG) iscited as a good model to implement benefit sharing with the community. This is a participatory model involving the government,the company, and representatives from the local community.

The forum has two principal functions.The first is as a venue wherethe developer and the State share information about the project (on thenature, scope and impacts of the project) with the landowners. The sec-ond is to establish how the various stakeholders will share the benefitsderived from the project; this is recorded in a series of project agree-ments. These agreements establish the roles and responsibilities of allinvolved parties (government, mining company and community) andinclude services and benefits that will be provided in the project’s affected

area. These include the provision of community infrastructure and thesharing of project’s financial benefits. The PNG mining act dictates thatowners of private land will receive 20 per cent of the total royalty paid formining leases on the land. In practice, the amount payable to landown-ers can exceed 20 per cent, such as in the case of the OK Tedi and Lihirmines, which pay 50 per cent. Mining companies pay the landownersdirectly and pay the balance to the State; the State, of course, monitorsand endorses the landowners’share for correctness.

Finally, the Development Forum in PNG has a firm legal basis.Thecontracts between the various stakeholders are legally enforceable.Consequently, the forum creates a base for trust and confidence, whichis essential to rebuild communities and enhance economic activity.

The PNG model is in stark contrast to the prescriptive policyapproach in India where the form and level of compensation is predetermined by the government.

m k

The term ‘sustainable mining’, being bandied about by the mining industry, is at best anoxymoron. Mining cannot be sustainable, simply because all ore bodies are finite and non-renewable. Similarly, terms like environment-friendly mining or ‘green’ mining are

misnomers. Even the best-managed mines will have environmental impacts – they will disturb theecology, destroy biodiversity, devastate the land and leave it unusable, in most cases, forperpetuity. In addition, large-scale displacement and loss of livelihood of locals are also foregoneconclusions. These are inevitabilities that we have to reconcile with when we talk about mining.

But mining entails another equally inescapable truth that must also be reconciled with: that ofthe significance of minerals and ores in our lives. Human beings have used minerals almost eversince they existed. The ages of human development have coincided with the use of minerals (suchas the bronze or the iron age). It will be naive to imagine that the modern urban-industrialeconomy can survive without minerals and metals: we cannot wish away mining.

The issue, thus, is not whether mining should be undertaken or not. Rather, it is about how itshould be undertaken. It is about the policies, norms, procedures and institutions that must beestablished to ensure that mining is conducted – as far aspossible – in an environmentally andsocially acceptable manner. It is about writing and implementing new ‘environmental and socialcontracts’ to ensure that mining not only does the least damage to ecology and environment, butalso contributes to the social and economic development of the areas where it is undertaken. Thisis the challenge that mining poses; it is a challenge that needs to be met forthwith, resolutely.

315

m k

A F T E R W O R D

The way ahead

■ THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT

To begin with, it is important to recognise and accept the fact that local communities – especiallytribals – have got a raw deal from the government as well as the mining and minerals industry.They have been displaced, dispossessed, marginalised, persecuted and pushed deeper intopoverty, all in the name of ‘public interest’ and ‘national development’. Today, most majormining districts in the country are suffering from the phenomenon of ‘resource curse’. The wealthgenerated by mining has largely bypassed local communities and is filling the coffers of rankoutsiders.

This has primarily happened because policies, laws, regulations and institutions are eithernon-existent or completely inadequate. It has also happened because of the crass insensitivity ofthe nation and its lawmakers towards the plight of the people from mining areas: one glaringinstance of this is the total absence of any updated information or statistics on the numbersdisplaced due to mining over the years.

All this must change. We must rewrite the contract between communities and the miningestablishment so that people get what is rightfully theirs – a share in the wealth generated frommining, and the secured right to a clean environment.

■ LET THE PEOPLE DECIDE

The very first item of the new social contract should be the ‘social licence to operate’. Miningshould not take place without the consent of the people affected by it. Community consent,therefore, must be the bedrock of mining policy in the country.

Under the current legislative framework, provisions do exist which require communityconsent before a project is given a go-ahead. For instance, under the environmental clearanceprocess, the practice of public hearing is a form of consultative deliberations where the people areheard. In Scheduled Areas – classified on the basis of their tribal population – clearance for landacquisition has to be given by the gram sabha. But increasingly, these safeguards are beingcompromised and weakened. The industry does not see reason in taking peole’s consent. As aresult, with the assistance of govenment it is working to either circumvent or disable theseprocesses. Public hearings have turned into exercises in futility and the gram sabha’s consent istaken for granted. This must change.

It is important to recognise that the ‘social licence to operate’ also makes eminently goodbusiness sense. In today’s world, where the market capitalisation of companies is largely made upof intangibles – primarily a company’s brand and reputation – the risks created by not obtainingcommunity consent are significant. Conflict with the community not only delays the project andleads to cost overruns, it also mars the reputation of the company.

Examples from across the world show that communities accept and support a projectwhenever they have some degree of decision-making power over it and are able to get a better dealfrom it. For a start, this requires the outdated Land Acquisition Act under which the state can takeland for a wide range of public purposes must be repealed or suitably modified. Simultaneously,the laws on consultation must be strengthened.

■ SHARE THE BENEFITS

It is now well recognised across the world that the wealth generated by the mining sector comesat a substantial development cost, along with environmental damages and economic exclusion ofthe marginalised. This has led to increasing attention being paid to ways in which mineral wealthcan be converted into sustainable development benefits for local communities.

One of the key components of this new approach is benefit sharing. A number of countrieshave introduced legal provisions to facilitate the sharing of wealth generated from mining withlocal communities. Typically, royalties fund the provision of benefits, whether they are in theform of infrastructure development, social amenities or direct payments to landowners.

So far, in India, the mechanism of benefit sharing has not been institutionalised. But thereis an urgent need to do so if we want mining areas to escape the ‘resource curse’. Benefit

316


m k

Mining should not take place

without the consent of the

people. Recognising the

people’s right to say ‘no’ makes

for eminent business sense too,

as it helps avoid conflicts with

communities, prevents cost

overruns and keeps the

companies’ reputations

relatively clean

sharing is also important because it will ultimately decide the ‘social license to operate’ for themining companies. It is also clear that India will have to innovate with this contract of sharingbenefits.

■ THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACT

India is one of the leading mining nations of the world, but its laws, regulations and institutionsfor controlling environmental fallouts of mining are possibly some of the world’s worst. Putsimply, India has not invested in managing the environmental impacts of mining. Mining remainsone of the most unregulated sectors in the country.

The problem starts from the very beginning: the process of granting permission to mine isgrossly abused. Ineffective regulations and lax implementation ensure that the problem persistsduring the operation of the mines. And it remains unsolved even after mining is stopped, becauseof the abysmal mine closure regulations and their implementation.

■ TIGHTEN ENVIRONMENTAL CLEARANCES

The very first concern with the environmental clearance process in India is the quality of theEnvironment Impact Assessment (EIA) report itself. This report is supposed to be the basis for alldecisions. According to current practices, the project proponent commissions a consultant oragency to prepare the report. The agency, thus, becomes a service provider of the proponent – it isno longer an impartial body. In most cases, the agency or consultancy, instead of identifying theactual impacts, ends up presenting the information in a manner favourable to the projectproponent. There is an urgent need to change this practice.

EIA reports must be prepared by an impartial party with no vested interests in the project.Instead of the project proponent hiring a consultant to prepare the report, the consultant should behired and paid by an independent agency of the government. The cost of preparing the EIA reportshould be charged by this independent agency to the project proponent. This can ensure an arms-length distance between the EIA consultant and the project proponent. It is important also to putin place a credible, transparent system for mandatory certification of EIA consultants, with a publiccomplaint handling mechanism built into it. Consultants accused of preparing poor EIA reportsshould be duly investigated and penalised, if found guilty.

Another very important component of the environmental clearance process is the publichearing, a mechanism that gives space to the local community for putting forth its concerns. Thegovernment’s Hoda committee recommends diluting the public hearing process to expedite mininginvestments. It wants to dispense with public hearing for mining leases for areas less than 50 ha andfor the renewal of mine leases. This recommendation, if accepted, would certainly spell disasterboth for environment as well as the mining industry itself. To assume that mining can happen inisolation, without addressing the concerns of the affected communities, is a fallacy. This assumption(largely on the part of governments and mining companies) is the precise reason why across thecountry, people have risen up against mining. Thus, not involving people in the decision-makingprocess is unhealthy even for the mining industry itself, leave alone the environment.

In fact, to ensure a better future for the mining industry, the existing public hearing processneeds to be adequately strengthened. The currently practised public hearing process (which hasbeen renamed as the ‘public consultation process’ to reflect its basic function in view of thegovernment) is limited to being only a forum for consultation, rather than being a platform tocollect the concerted views of the community to decide the fate of the project. Today, a project iscleared by the government even if all the people present at the hearing reject it on environmentalgrounds. This nullifies the very purpose of holding a public hearing. If everyone rejects a project,then the project can only come up by using the coercive power of the State, which is completelyundemocratic. This must change if we want people to be partners in the developmental process.The power to decide the fate of the project will have to be divested in the public. This will servetwo puposes: firstly, it will ensure that project proponents work hard on the environmentmanagement plan and adopt suitable technologies to convince people that the least damage willbe done to the environment. Secondly, it will also ensure that project proponents are discouraged

317

AFTERWORD: THE WAY AHEAD

m k

Independent, impartial

preparation of Environment

Impact Assessment reports, a

stronger public hearing process,

and stringent implementation

of Environment Management

Plans might go a long way in

ameliorating the present state

of affairs

from applying for mining rights in critical ecosystems; people’s opposition to such proposals andprojects might act as a powerful deterrent.

Many mining projects are captive projects – they are integrated with the manufacturing plants.Instead of doing separate EIAs for such projects, cumulative EIAs should be done which will bringout the total impact of the project on the environment.

To ensure that affected people are able to make the correct decisions, the process of deliveringinformation about the project would need to be strengthened as well. People must be made awareabout the project from its outset. At every step, complete information in local languages anddialects must be made available, and this should include the final EIA report.

The implementation of environmental management plans, or EMPs, is extremely slipshod inIndian mines simply because there is no mechanism to monitor them. In fact, every effort is madeto keep the public completely in the dark about the status of the implementation of the EMP orwhether the project proponent is actually living up to its promises. It is, therefore, absolutelyimperative to strengthen regulatory capacities to regularly inspect the status of EMPimplementation and penalise non-compliance. Additionally, reports on the status must be madepublic in a transparent manner, and local communities must be kept informed. Experience andexamples prove that these communities are in the best position to judge the authenticity ofimplementation and, therefore, can also apply pressure on the project proponent and regulators.

■ MANAGE FOREST TRADEOFF BETTER

The forest clearance process in India, governed by the Forest Conservation Act, 1980, is now beingconstrued not so much as a tool for preserving forests, but as a facilitator for derivingcompensation for the diversion of forests. While doing nothing substantial to discouragediversion, the process has in fact been concentrating more on the amounts of compensation theforest department can wring out for the diversion. This, certainly, cannot be allowed.

First and foremost, it is very important to recognise that there are critical ecosystems that areinvaluable and cannot be sacrificed for short-term economic gains. Today, in India, there is nomoratorium per se on mining in any part of the country – ecologically fragile areas, reserve orprotected forests, biosphere reserves, critical water sources and areas inhabited by indigenouscommunities are all equally at threat from marauding miners. The only safeguard put in placeby the Supreme Court is to debar the diversion of protected areas – sanctuaries and nationalparks -- for developmental projects. This direction is being used by many to stop the mining ofthese areas. But still there is nothing like a legislation which provides protection to areas, whichare important for ecological, water or livelihood security.

Across the world, there is increased recognition that critical ecosystems need to be protected atall costs. This has lead countries to enact legislation on ‘no-go’ areas for mining and otherdevelopment projects. It is high time we did the same. Clearly, this will require carefulconsideration. We know that we have to protect our national parks and sancturies. In addition, weneed to ensure water security, which will require new classification to protect existing forests fortheir water values. Then there is the concern of people for cultural and social values. All theserequire to be carefully evaluated so that the balance can be maintained. But ignoring the problemwont make it go away.

The Planning Commission’s Hoda committee on mining policy went out of it way to provideassurances to prospectors – that laws can be modified to allow them access to the forests wherethey find minerals. This approach does not bode well for Indian forests. The committee hasrecommended that the government should outline, in advance, the conditions to be met duringmining so that forest clearance can be granted irrespective of the region’s ecological importance.This recommendation stands in direct contradiction to global best practices, under which forestsare not allowed to be diverted without undertaking detailed EIA, and they are not allowed to bediverted for development activities. It is important that India adopts some of these best practicesrather than following a ‘race towards the bottom’ policy to attract foreign investments. No forestshould be diverted for mining without considering its wider ramifications on the environment andecology. Mining should not be allowed if the ecological and environmental costs are higher thanthe economic gains.

318


m k

Mining must not be allowed in

forests if its environmental,

ecological and social costs

outweigh its economic gains.

As the rest of the world is

doing, India can, and must,

demarcate ‘no-go’ areas

for development projects –

regions whose ecosystems

need to be preserved for

ecological continuity

■ REGULATE NOW AND REGULATE TOUGH

Existing regulations to control and mitigate environmental fallouts of mining are inadequate. Thereis, thus, an urgent need to codify detailed environmental management regulations for mining.

Best practices like simultaneous reclamation, collection and treatment of surface run-off,fugitive dust control from mining and transportation, tailings management and effective treatmentof tailings discharge, storage of tailings, waste rock and slimes on impervious ground/linedsurface etc should be codified and made mandatory.

Existing pollution standards for mining are concentration-based; these should be reconstitutedon the basis of loads. Concentration-based standards do not give correct representation of theextent or level of pollution. For example, a very large quantity of effluents may well meet theconcentration-based standards. However, due to the sheer volume of the effluents, these may adda significant pollution load to the receiving medium, which – on its part – may not have thenecessary assimilating capacity. Load-based standards, therefore, are a must.

Currently, no regulatory standards exist for containing the impact of mining on water – bothgroundwater as well as surface water. This, when mining across the country is being seen as amajor reason behind groundwater depletion, watershed disturbances, reduction in surface wateravailability and water pollution. The problem is compounded by the fact that the mitigationmeasures to reduce the impact on groundwater and watersheds are seldom incorporated in theEMPs. Mines are blatantly allowed to breach the groundwater table; no specific measures arerequired to protect the watershed. There is a need, therefore, to enact laws to protect groundwaterand water catchments from mining.

■ REFRAME RULES FOR CLOSURE OF MINES

Regulations on closure of mines are equally lax and ineffective. To begin with, they are applicableonly to the major minerals; coal mines are not even required to submit closure plans. Secondly,closure plans have become a formality, with overburden hills and water-filled craters being toutedas indicators of effective closure. The plans fare worse on the socio-economic front: most mineclosure plans do not address the impacts of closure on the workers or the communities dependenton the mine activities for their sustenance. They rarely pay attention to the rehabilitation of theseworkers and communities. And thirdly, the financial surety for mine closure, asked for by Indianregulations, is a pittance. The amount is so small that companies prefer forfeiting it. There is anurgent need, therefore, to reframe closure regulations.

It is important to recognise at the very outset that mine closure is not about planting trees andstabilising overburden; it is about creating a sustainable ecosystem in which the communityaffected by mining can live after the miners and their equipment are gone. Therefore, mine closureis a combination of environmental, social, economic and development issues that must be clearlydefined, understood and planned for – before a mine is allowed to operate. Mine closure plans, itfollows, need to be discussed and prepared in consultation with the community before a minecomes into operation.

For this to happen, some key changes need to be effected in the law. Firstly, the law related toland must be amended. The current practice of giving the land back to the government (mainly theforest and revenue departments) after mining suits the industry perfectly, because by doing so, itshifts the post-mining responsibility on to the government’s shoulders. The land, instead, shouldbe transferred to the commons: entities that will ensure that livelihoods are created out of it.Secondly, detailed community consultations and approvals must become an integral part ofdeveloping the mine closure plan.

On the socio-economic front, mining operations must be designed in a manner that thetransitions do not create undue hardships. This will require preparation of a socio-economicclosure plan which should have provisions for alternate economic activities and livelihoods,development of infrastructure in a way that it can be utilised after the mine is closed, utilisation ofthe mine land for economic and social uses, and compensation for workers. Environmental closureof mines must include decontamination and containment of pollution as core issues.

319

AFTERWORD: THE WAY AHEAD

m k

Mine closure is not only about

planting trees, stabilising

overburden or creating gigantic

water bodies. It is about

creating a sustainable

ecosystem in which the

community affected by the

mining can live after the miners

and their equipment are gone.

Mine closure has to be defined,

understood and planned for

For all this, adequate financial provisions and robust regulatory mechanisms are necessary. Theexisting financial surety, which is completely insufficient for undertaking any kind of mine closure,must be revised realistically. Footprints left by mines differ; therefore, the financial surety must becustomised for each mine and should be fixed after taking into account the ground realities.

■ DONT JUST MAKE REGULATIONS, ENSURE COMPLIANCE

There are four regulatory institutions that govern the environment, health and safety aspects ofmines. The Union ministry of environment and forests (MoEF) is responsible for givingenvironmental and forest clearances, the Indian Bureau of Mines (IBM) clears mining plans andEMPs (the MoEF can also clear EMPs), and the State Pollution Control Boards (SPCBs) areresponsible for giving consent to establish and operate mines under the Water and Air Acts. Withrespect to compliance monitoring, the MoEF is responsible for monitoring the implementation ofEMPs (IBM is also supposed to do this). On the other hand, the IBM and SPCBs are expected tomonitor the air and water pollution from mines. IBM is specifically responsible for mine closure;the SPCBs have nothing to do with it.

The Directorate-General of Mines Safety (DGMS) is the fourth institution in this regulatoryjigsaw, and is responsible for monitoring the health and safety of workers. However, its workoverlaps that of other institutions in some cases. For instance, in an open-cast mining project, thereis almost no difference between dust levels in the work environment and ambient air quality inand around the mines. Despite this, the DGMS is supposed to take care of the work environmentdust levels, while the IBM and the SPCBs are accountable for monitoring the ambient air quality.Caught amidst all this multiplicity of agencies and overlapping of responsibilities, mining,naturally, has remained one of the most unregulated industrial sectors in the country.

If there is one key change that is required to improve the environmental performance of Indianmines, then the restructuring and revamping of regulatory institutions must get the priority.

A strong monitoring and enforcement system is fundamental for ensuring a degree ofenvironmental sustainability. Without a serious deterrence for non-compliance, there will be littleor no enforcement of the law. Unfortunately, this is exactly what is happening in India. The currentlegal route followed for penalising non-compliance is not working simply because it takes a verylong time to initiate enforcement actions through the courts. Consequently, a credible deterrent ismissing for most willful defaulters as there islittle incentive to comply with environmentalregulations. There is a need to change theexisting paradigm of enforcement actions.Powers must be given to the regulatory agencies– with proper checks and balances – to imposehefty financial penalties for non-compliance.

320


m k

321

m k

ANNEXURE

Forest cover and Human Development Index:major mineral districts of India

District Minerals produced Major Major Area Tribal Human Development Index Back- Naxal-(Data for 2004-05)# mineral mineral under districts ward affected

leases* lease forest (Y/N) Rank Literacy Household Population districts area(Nos) area* (% of rate access to below (Y/N) (Y/N)

(Ha) total (%) safe povertyarea) drinking line (%)

water (%)

JHARKHAND

Singhbhum (West) Iron ore: 16.085 MT 92 17,198.74 38.47 Yes 6/221 50.17 84.15 45.74 Yes Yes(accounted for 99.9% of state’sproduction);Manganese: 5,706 t (only producer in thestate)

Hazaribagh Coal: 16.2 MT 19 957.02 34.81 No 5/22 57.74 41.46 31.79 Yes Yes(2nd highest producer with 21%share)

Dhanbad Coal: 24.9 MT 21 2,082.44 6.94 No 3/22 67 100 31.42 Yes2 Yes (biggest producer in state, accounting for 32%)

Chatra Coal: 11.85 MT – – 47.91 No 7/22 43.24 41.46 31.79 Yes Yes(ranks third, accounting for 15%)

Godda Coal: 9.7 MT 1 18.82 22.51 No 19/22 43.13 22.66 55.34 Yes No(4th place, with a12% share)

Singhbhum (East) Copper (only 29 7,549.71 26.13 Yes 1/22 68.79 84.69 37.33 Yes Noproducer in state)

ORISSA

Jajpur Chromite: 3.5 MT 15 5,710.92 9.04 No 22/30 72.19 NA NA Yes No(top producer not only in state but alsoin the country, with 96% share)

Keonjhar Iron ore: 33.248 MT 101 33,715.57 38.97 Yes 24/30 59.75 NA 61.92 Yes No(biggest iron ore producer, with 82% share);Manganese: 0.7 MT (top producerwith 81%)

Sundergarh Iron ore: 6.985 MT 91 14,810.71 41.44 Yes 4/30 65.22 NA 36.48 Yes No (second highest, with 17% share)

Conti…

322


m k

Angul Coal: 45 MT (biggest 4 326.46 41.66 No 6/30 69.4 NA NA Yes Noproducer in state, accounting for 68%)

Koraput Bauxite: 4.7 MT (top 11 7,396.27 17.68 Yes 27/30 36.2 NA 78.65 Yes Yes producer, accounting for 99% of state production)

Jharsuguda Coal: 19 MT 7 579.33 13.89 No 2/30 71.47 NA NA Yes No (2nd highest producer, with 29% share)

CHHATTISGARH

Dantewada Iron ore: 15.973 11 2,973.44 64.24 Yes 9/16 30.2 53 NA Yes YesMT (top producer, accounting for 69% of state production)

Durg Iron ore: 7 MT (2nd 98 3,519.65 9.01 Yes 2/16 75.6 72 NA Yes No highest contributor, with a share of 30%); Limestone: 1.49 MT (third biggest producer, with 10%)

Raipur Limestone: 42 3,132.31 33.12 No 4/16 68.5 67 NA No No11.195 MT (top producer, accounting for 76% share)

Korba Coal: 54.5 MT 1 0.46 50.89 No 1/16 61.7 45 NA Yes No(biggest coal producer in state, with a share of 80%)

Raigarh Coal: 3.5 MT 15 88.36 35.93 Yes 10/16 70.2 69 NA Yes No(4th biggest producer, with a share of 5%)

Surguja Coal: 5.9 MT 10 5,062.09 45.71 Yes 11/16 54.8 27.24 NA Yes Yes(2nd highest producer with a share of 7%); Bauxite: 1.1 MT (top producer in state with a 97%share)

Koriya Coal: 4.3 MT – – 62.63 No 13/16 63.1 41 NA Yes No(a share of 6%; the 3rd biggest producer)




water (%)

Conti…

Contd…

323

ANNEXURE: FOREST COVER AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX: MAJOR MINERAL DISTRICTS OF INDIA

m k

WEST BENGAL

Bardhaman Coal: 21 MT (top 8 9,884.58 3.2 Yes 5/17 71 96.43 Rural No Nocoal producer with poverty:98% share) 18.99

Urbanpoverty: 17

KARNATAKA

Gulbarga Limestone: 11.8 MT 14 3,606.18 10.59 N0 19/204 38.5 63.0 45.54 Yes No(largest producer with a share of 91%)

Bellary Iron ore: 28.2 MT 84 5,801.23 2.03 No 7/205 45.9 84.2 44.50 No No(biggest iron ore producer, accounting for 76%)

MAHARASHTRA

Chandrapur Limestone: 9 MT 36 4,341.42 35.33 No 26/35 73.07 43.35 46.92 Yes Yes(largest producer in state, accounting for 88%);Coal: 15.8 MT (topproducer with 48% share)

Nagpur Manganese: 51 1,046.38 22.21 No 5/35 84.18 65.34 34.32 No No0.18 MT (2nd

biggest producer with 32%); Coal: 7.6 MT(third major coal- producing district)

Yavatmal Coal: 9.7 MT (2nd 36 2,470.99 19.35 No 34/35 74.06 46.06 43.62 Yes Nocoal-producing district, accounting for 29%)

GOA 906 4.47

North Goa Iron ore: 12.9 MT 100 7,235.33 51.15 No – 72.02 – – No No(accounts for 58% share)

South Goa Iron ore: 9.4 MT 150 10,930.66 64.50 No – 79.98 – – No No(accounts for 32% share)

GUJARAT

Kutchh Lignite: 5.9 MT 75 1,581.32 5.00 No 17/25 60.4 27.1 – No No (biggest lignite producer with 75% share)




water (%)

Conti…

Contd…

324


m k

Jamnagar Bauxite: 2.1 MT 182 5,428.87 2.61 No 8/25 67.2 23.6 No No(largest producerwith 91% share)

Amreli Limestone: 6.3 MT 10 2,116.96 3.22 N0 15/25 67.7 13.94 No No(top producer with 35% share)

RAJASTHAN

Chittorgarh Limestone: 8.9 MT 45 5,985.49 15.43 Yes 21/29 34.3 72.3 43.9 No No(largest producer with a share of 35%)

Bhilwara Lead & zinc: 0.55 MT 114 5,505.4 2.10 No 25/29 31.7 60.3 51.6 No No(largest producer accounting for an 82% share)

Udaipur Lead & zinc: 0.062 109 12,985.69 23.03 Yes 27/29 34.9 64.2 31.8 Yes NoMT (second biggest producer); steatite& phosphorite

TAMIL NADU

Cuddalore Lignite: 20.84 MT 3 43.4 11.68 No 16/29 71.85 73.23 50.29 Yes No

UTTAR PRADESH

Sonbhadra Coal: 21.33 MT 6 5,307.67 36.4 No – 49.96 – 54.66 Yes Yes

ANDHRA PRADESH

Nalgonda Limestone: 103.22 MT 55 5,085 1.08 No – 57.84 – – No Yes(Top producer, with36.1% sharein the state)

Kadapa Iron ore: 0.134 MT 202 5,533 21.97 No – 64.02 – – No No(2nd largest producer accounting for 5% of production); Limestone: 4.05 MT(2nd largest producer)

Kurnool Iron ore: 0.036 MT 229 5,773 12.15 No – 54.43 – – No No(share of 1.3% of thestate’s production) Limestone: 3.6 MT(3rd largest producer with 12.6%)

Adilabad Limestone: 2.81 MT 37 3,207 37.93 Yes – 53.51 – – Yes Yes(4th largest producer with 9.8%); Coal: 5.83 MT (3rd largest producer with 6.9% share); Manganeseore: 0.117 MT (11% of state production)




water (%)

Conti…

Contd…

325

ANNEXURE: FOREST COVER AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX: MAJOR MINERAL DISTRICTS OF INDIA

m k

Karimnagar Limestone: 1.123 MT 14 2,482 13.95 No – 56 – – No Yes(with 3.9% share); Coal: 14.7 MT (Top producer with 42.5% share)

Khammam Coal: 12.99 MT 47 1,715 44.79 Yes – 57.72 – – Yes Yes(2nd largest producer with 37.6% share)

MADHYA PRADESH

Katni Limestone: 4.27 MT 146 1,943.78 24.06 No 29/45 64.7 100 42.22 Yes No(4th largest producer, (including share of 17.1%); Jabalpur)Bauxite: 90,386 t(2nd largest producer with a share of26%)

Rewa Limestone: 5.692 MT 31 1,713.99 11.21 No 39/45 62.3 48.11 29.4 No No(2nd largest producer with a share of 22.82%);Bauxite: 48,392 t (4th largest producer)

Satna Limestone: 8.68 MT 181 5,926.27 22.37 No 38/45 65.1 53.34 28.8 Yes No (top producer with a share of 34.79%) Bauxite: 90,387 t (top producer with a share of 48.5%)

Shahdol Bauxite: 41,580 t 7 553.53 24.95 Yes 31/45 57.8 46.91 33.4 Yes No(3rd largest producer); Coal: 10.66 MT (3rd largest producer)

Sidhi Bauxite: 2,280 t 4 497.77 38.12 Yes 25/45 52.8 51.33 36.4 Yes No (5th largest producer); Coal: 27.22 MT (biggest producerwith 49% share)

Chhindwara Coal: 12.72 MT 8 117.32 37.32 Yes 13/45 66.0 99.36 31.2 Yes No (2nd largest producer in state with23% share)

MEGHALAYA

Jantia Hills Coal 2 15.28 64.34 Yes – 53 13.94 – No No



(Ha) total (%) safe povertyarea) drinking line

water (%)

Conti…

Contd…

326


m k

ASSAM

Tinsukia Coal: 6,99,529 t 5 mines – 40.4 Yes 10/23 63.28 73.96 – No No(biggest producer in the state)

HIMACHALPRADESH

Solan Limestone: 3.136 MT 2 757.08 42.3 Yes – 77.6 81 29.32 No No(biggest producerwith 44% share)

Notes: *Mine lease and mine leasing area is only for metallic and non-metallic minerals (does not include fuel, atomic and minor minerals). MT = million tonne; t = tonnes; NA = not available; #data for coal production is for the year 20041. The Indicus has ranked all the districts in terms of performance in various indicators such as education, health and civic attainment, poverty, demography and

economy.2. The Planning Commission does not list it as a backward district, but it is indicated in red (extremist-affected) in other Planning Commission documents. 3. Percentage of rural households supplied water4. Although there are 27 districts in the state since 1997-98, analysis for HDI ranking was done for 20 districts only (the report was published in 1999).5. Although there are 27 districts in the state since 1997-98, analysis for HDI ranking was done for 20 districts only (the report was published in 1999).6. Only the state average is available.7. Only the state average is available.

Sources: Anon 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, NagpurAnon, 2005, State of Forest Report, 2003, Forest Survey of India, DehradunAnon, 2003, Identification of Districts for Wage and Self-employment Programmes, Report of the Task Force, Planning Commission, New DelhiHuman Development Reports of different states and The Encyclopedic District Gazetteers of India, Census of India 2001, New Delhi




water (%)

Contd…

ACC Associated Cement CompanyAMD Acid mine drainage AP Andhra PradeshAPGS Andhra Pradesh Girijana SanghamAPPCB Andhra Pradesh Pollution Control BoardASM Artisanal-scale miningATREE Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology and the

EnvironmentBC Before ChristBALCO Bharat Aluminium CompanyBARC Bhabha Atomic Research CentreBASP Brahmani Anchal Suraksha ParishadBCCL Bharat Coking Coal LimitedBF Blast furnaceBGML Bharat Goldmines LimitedBIT Birla Institute of TechnologyBUPC Bhumi Uchchhed Pratirodh CommitteeCAC Compensation Advisory CommitteeCAGR Compound annual growth rateCASS Chhotanagpur Adivasi Seva SamitiCBM Coal bed methaneCCAUM Coordination Committee against Uranium MiningCCEC Coordination-cum-Empowered CommitteeCCF Chief Conservator of ForestsCCL Central Coalfields LimitedCEC Central Empowered CommitteeCERC Consumer Education and Research CentreCESS Centre for Economic and Social StudiesCFE Consent for establishmentcft Cubic feetCIL Coal India LimitedCISF Central Industrial Security ForceCMPDI Central Mine Planning & Design InstituteCMRI Central Mining Research InstituteCO Carbon monoxideCO2 Carbon dioxideCPCB Central Pollution Control BoardCPI (M) Communist Party of India (Maoist)CPR Community property resourceCRPF Central Reserve Police ForceCrVI Hexavalent chromium CSE Centre for Science and EnvironmentCSESMP Coal Sector Environmental Social Mitigation ProjectCSRP Coal Sector Rehabilitation ProjectCu m Cubic metrecusecs Cubic metre per second

CWP Coal Workers’ PneumoconiosisDAE Department of Atomic EnergyDAG District action groupDBM Dead burnt magnesiteDCSM Dizon Copper Silver MinesDFO Divisional Forest OfficerDGML Deccan Gold Mines LimitedDGMS Director General of Mines SafetyDHO District Health OfficerDIG Deputy Inspector GeneralDoMG Department of Mines & GeologyDRI Direct reduced ironEAF Electric arc furnaceEC Environmental clearanceECL Eastern Coalfields LimitedEDF Electricite de FranceEIA Environment Impact AssessmentEMP Environment Management PlanEPA Environment Protection ActESA Ecologically sensitive areaESG Environment Support GroupFAC Forest advisory committeeFAO Food and Agriculture OrganizationFBR Fast breeder reactorFCA Forest Conservation ActFD Forest departmentFDI Foreign direct investmentFIMI Federation of Indian Mineral IndustriesFIPB Foreign Investment Promotion BoardFIRs First information reportFPIC Free prior informed consentFSTA Fuel Supply & Transport AgreementGACL Gujarat Ambuja Cement LimitedGDP Gross domestic productGDR German Democratic RepublicGHG Greenhouse gasesGIPCL Gujarat Industries Power Company LimitedGJ Giga jouleGMDC Gujarat Mineral Development CorporationGNP Gross national productGRAVIS Gramin Vikas Vigyan SamitiGRP Green Rating ProjectGSDP Gross state domestic productGSYP Gandhamardan Surakshya Yuva Parishadha HectareHAL Hindustan Aeronautical Limited

327

m k

Abbreviations

HAVS Hand-arm vibration syndromeHC High CourtHCL Hindustan Copper LimitedHDI Human Development IndexHESPO Hynniewtrp Environment Status Preservation

OrganisationHGML Hutti Gold Mines LimitedHINDALCO Hindustan Aluminium CompanyHML Haryana Mineral LimitedIBM Indian Bureau of MinesIBRD International Bank of Reconstruction and DevelopmentIBWL Indian Board of WildlifeICMM International Council on Mining and MineralsIDB Inter-America Development BankIDCO Industrial Development Corporation of OrissaIFC International Finance CorporationIISc Indian Institute of ScienceIISCO Indian Iron and Steel CompanyIISI International Iron and Steel InstituteILO International Labour OrganizationINDAL Indian Aluminium CompanyIPR Industrial policy resolutionIRE Indian Rare Earths LimitedISA Indian Steel AssociationISM Indian School of MinesISO International Organization for StandardizationITDA Integrated Tribal Development AgencyIUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature and

Natural Resources JAP Jharia Action PlanJOAR Jharkhandi Organisation against RadiationJPC Joint parliamentary committeeJRDA Jharia Rehabilitation & Development AuthorityJSWHL Jindal South-West Housing LimitedKBA Kushawati Bachao AndolanKHADC Khasi Hills Autonomous CouncilKIOCL Kudremukh Iron Ore Company LimitedKJEPC Khasi Jaintia Environment Protection CouncilKNP Kaziranga National ParkKNP Kudremukh National ParkKREML Kerala Rare Earths and Minerals LimitedKRUV Kudremukh Rastriya Udayana Virodhi VakootaKSPCB Karnataka State Pollution Control BoardKSTPS Korba Super Thermal Power StationKSU Khasi Student’s UnionLAA Land Acquisition ActLAPL Large area prospecting licenseLAW-E Legal Action for Wildlife and EnvironmentLWLDO Langrin War-san Lyngdoh Development OrganisationLYWO Lai Lyngdon Welfare Associationm MetreMAA Meghalaya Adventure AssociationMAcF Million acre feetMADA Mineral Area Development AuthorityMAUP Movement Against Uranium Project

MCC Maoist Communist CentreMCDR Mineral Conservation and Development RulesMCL Mahanadi Coalfields Limitedmcm Million cubic metreMCR Mineral Concession RulesMDF Mineral Development Fundmg Milligrammg/kg Milligram per kilogrammg/l Milligram per litremicroSv/hour Microsievert per hourMIDR Mining induced displacement and resettlementMLAs Member of Legislative AssemblyMLPC Mine Labour Protection CampaignMMDF Maharashtra Mining Development FundMMDR Act Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development)

ActMMP Mines, Minerals and PeopleMMSD Mining, Minerals & Sustainable DevelopmentMoEF Ministry of Environment & ForestsMoPNG Ministry of Petroleum and Natural GasMOU Memorandum of understandingMP Madhya PradeshMPCB Meghalaya Pollution Control BoardMPHRC Meghalaya People’s Human Rights CouncilMPRDA Mineral Petroleum Resources Development ActMSSKSS Maharana Sangram Singh Kishan Sangharsh SamitimSv/y Millisievert per yearMT Million tonneMW MegawattNAAQS National Ambient Air Quality StandardsNAC National Advisory CouncilNALCO National Aluminium CompanyNCAS National Centre for Advocacy StudiesNCDC National Coal Development CorporationNCL Northern Coalfields LimitedNCS National Chambal SanctuaryNCSTSC National Commission for Scheduled Castes and

Scheduled TribesNECL North Eastern CoalfieldsNEERI National Environmental Engineering Research InstituteNFC Nuclear fuel complexNGO Non-governmental organisationNIOH National Institute of Occupational HealthNISM National Institute of Small MinesNLC Neyveli Lignite CorporationNm3 Normal cubic metreNMDC National Mineral Development CorporationNMP National Mineral PolicyNOC No objection certificateNOX Nitrogen oxidesNPRR National Policy on Resettlement and RehabilitationNPV Net present valueNSSO National Sample Survey OrganisationNTPC National Thermal Power CorporationOMC Orissa Mining Corporation Limited

328


m k

ORG Operations Research GroupORISED Orissa Rural Infrastructure and Socio-economic

DevelopmentOSATIPR Orissa Scheduled Areas Transfer of Immovable Property

(Scheduled Tribes) RegulationOSPCB Orissa State Pollution Control BoardPAF Project-affected familiesPAH Polyaromatic hydrocarbonsPAP Project-affected peoplePAs Protected areasPCB Pollution Control BoardPEOCP Parej East Open Cast ProjectPHWRs Pressurised heavy water reactorsPIL Public interest litigationPILSARC Public Interest Legal Support and Research CentrePL Prospecting licensePNG Papua New GuineaPOSCO Pohang Steel CompanyPPSS POSCO Pratirodh Sangram SamitiPRIA Participatory Research In AsiaPSEB Punjab State Electricity BoardPSSP Prakrutik Sampad Surakshya ParishadPSU Public sector undertakingPUDR People’s Union of Democratic RightsR&R Resettlement and Rehabilitation PolicyRAC Rehabilitation advisory committeeRED Resource Engineering & Development LtdREGL Reliance Energy Generation LimitedREIA Regional Environmental Impact AssessmentRP Reconnaissance permitRPDAC Rehabilitation and Periphery Displacement Advisory

CommitteeRSPM Respirable Suspended Particulate MatterSAF Special Armed ForceSAIL Steel Authority of India LimitedSAPs Substantially affected peopleSC Supreme Court

SCCL Singareni Collieries Company LimitedSD Standard deviationSDL Site discharge loaderSECL South Eastern Coalfields LimitedSEZ Special economic zonesSFRs State forest reportsSKVV Sampoorna Kranti Vidyalaya VedchhiSLRRC State-level Resettlement and Rehabilitation CouncilSO2 Sulphur dioxideSPM Suspended particulate matterSPO Special police officerSSM Small-scale minet TonneTISCO Tata Steel & Company Limitedtmc Thousand million cubic metreTPP Thermal power plantTSR Total shareholder returnsTSS Total suspended solidsUAIL Utkal Alumina International LimitedUCIL Uranium Corporation of India Limitedug/m3 Microgram per cubic metreUK United KingdomUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural

OrganizationUSA United States of AmericaUSEPA US Environment Protection AgencyUT Union TerritoriesVAT Value-added taxVOCs Volatile organic compoundWB World BankWBV Whole body vibrationWCL Western Coalfields LimitedWII Wildlife Institute of IndiaWPA Wildlife Protection ActWPI Wholesale price IndexWYWO Western Youth Welfare Association

329

ABBREVIATIONS

m k

330

m k

1. RICH LANDS, POOR PEOPLE

1. Calculated based on data from anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur

2. A Behar et al, 2005, Parliament Digest: Bridging the Gap betweenParliament and People, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune, p 57

3. S Chakma, 2005, ‘Deconstructing the urban view of the jungle’,National Consultation of Draft Forest Bill 2005, Asian Centre for HumanRights, New Delhi, pp 7-8

4. Anon, 2001, ‘Total population, population of Scheduled Castes andScheduled Tribes and their proportions to the total population’,Census of India 2001, http://www.censusindia.net/t_00_005.html, asviewed on January 15, 2007

5. Rupa Jha, 2006, ‘India – struggling over tribal land’, Give me land,British Broadcasting Corporation, London, www.bbc.co.uk/world-service/worldagenda/pdf/give_me_land.pdf, as viewed on October 12, 2006

6. Analysis by the Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhibased on data on tribal districts from anon, 2003, Identification ofDistricts for Wage and Self-employment Programmes, Report of the TaskForce, Planning Commission, New Delhi and data on major miningdistricts from anon, 2007, Distribution of leases and lease area (bystate/district/minerals) as on 31.3.2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,Nagpur

7. National Mineral Policy 1993, Union ministry of mines,http://mines.nic.in/nmp.html, as viewed on November 10, 2006

8. Anon, 2005, State of Forest Report 2003, Forest Survey of India,Dehradun, p 15

9. V Shiva, 1991, ‘Mining and water conflicts’, Ecology and the Politics ofSurvival, United Nations University, Sage Publications, New Delhi,http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/80a03e/80A03E0m.htm,as viewed on May 29, 2007

10. T N Singh et al, 2006, ‘Model simulation study of coal mining underriver beds in India’, Mine, Water and the Environment, InternationalMine Water Association, Madrid, June-December, Vol 13

11. Chandra Bhushan et al, 2006, Concrete Facts, The Life Cycle of the IndianCement Industry, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, p 34

12. ‘The Damodar Valley’, Damodar Valley Corporation, http://www.dvcindia.org/about/dvc_valley.htm, as viewed on May 31, 2007

13. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Damodar_River, as viewed on May 30, 2007

14. ibid15. Uday Shankar, 1993, ‘Choking slowly to death’, Down To Earth,

Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, January 31,Vol 1, No 17, pp 25-36

16. B Iman, 2001, Preserving Sacred Places in Jharkhand, India, Sacred SitesInternational, Berkley, http://www.sacred-sites.org/preservation/endangered_jharkhand.html, as viewed on May 29, 2007

17. Anon, 1998, ‘Status of Environment in West Bengal’, Executive

Summary of Report (Vectors of Impacts on Environment): Part II, WestBengal government, Kolkata, http://www.enviswb.gov.in/ENV/env_drupal/ ?q=book/ print/43, as viewed on May 28, 2007

18. Preamble, Union ministry of environment and forests, NewDelhi, http://envfor.nic.in/divisions/cltech/Damodar/preamble.htm,as viewed on May 30, 2007

19. Anon, Water quality of rivers in Mahanadi basin, Central PollutionControl Board, New Delhi, http://www.cpcb.nic.in/pamsweb/tech-nicalreport/report1/chapter-11.pdf, as viewed on May 15, 2007

20. Coal Reserves in India, Mahanadi Coalfields Limited, Sambalpur,http://www. mahanadicoal.nic.in/egocoalfield.htm, as viewed onMay 29, 2007

21. Sanjay Srivastav et al, 2006, Environment and social challenges ofmineral-based growth in Orissa: Building partnership for sustainabledevelopment, The World Bank, New Delhi, p 18

22. ibid, p 1823. Analysis by the Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi

based on data from anon, 2003, Identification of Districts for Wage andSelf-employment Programmes, Report of the Task Force, PlanningCommission, New Delhi

24. Anon, 2001, The Encyclopedic District Gazetteers of India, Census ofIndia 2001, New Delhi

25. Anon, 2001, The Encyclopedic District Gazetteers of India, Census ofIndia 2001 and anon 2004, ‘Some measures of human development:an inter-district analysis’, Human Development Report 2004, govern-ment of Orissa, Bhubaneshwar

26. Anon, 2005, ‘Human development in Chhattisgarh’, HumanDevelopment Report Chhattisgarh 2005, United Nations DevelopmentProgramme, New Delhi

27. R Vishwanathan et al, 1999, Human Development in Karnataka-1999,Planning Department, government of Karnataka, Bangalore

28. Anon, 2002, Human Development Report Maharashtra 2002, govern-ment of Maharashtra, Mumbai

29. Anon, 2002, Rajasthan Human Development Report 2002, UnitedNations Development Programme, New Delhi

30. Anon, 2006, ‘Status paper on the Naxal problem’, Paperpresented by Shivraj Patil in Parliament on March 13, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/papers/06Mar13_Naxal%20Problem%20.htm, as viewed onMay 28, 2007

31. Anon, 2006, ‘No difference between naxalism, terrorism: minister’, The Hindu, April 12, The Hindu Group, Chennai,http://www.hindu.com/2006/04/12/stories/2006041217250300.htm,as viewed on June 2, 2007

32. Ruksan Bose, 2006, ‘Mine or yours’, Down To Earth, Society forEnvironmental Communications, New Delhi, January 15, Vol 14,No 16, p 7

33. M B Chaterjee, 2006, ‘Naxalism may deter FDI flow into developmen-tal projects: Report Risk exposure greater in pockets where Naxaliteshave joined tribals’, The Hindu Business Line, February 11, The HinduGroup, Chennai, http://www.blonnet.com/2006/02/11/stories/2006021101820700.htm, as viewed on June 1, 2007


References

34. Anon, 2007, ‘Post blockade, Prime Minister takes stock’, The IndianExpress, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi, June 29

35. http://naxalrevolution.blogspot.com/search/label/Chhattisgarh,as viewed on June 5, 2007

Box: Minerals in India1. Anon, 2001, Overview of Mining and Mineral Industry in India,

The Energy and Resources Institute, New Delhi, p 82. http://www.coal.nic.in/, as viewed on November 8, 20063. ibid4. ibid5. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,

Nagpur, pp 47-2 and 47-36. ibid p 47-277. ibid, pp 47-2 and 47-38. ibid, p 47-99. ibid, pp 17-1 and 17-210. ibid, p 17-1211. ibid, pp 17-4 and 17-512. ibid, pp 55-1 and 55-213. ibid, pp 55-3 and 55-414. ibid, p 55-2015. ibid, pp 52-1, 52-2 and 52-316. ibid, p 52-1317. ibid, pp 52-5 and 52-618. ibid, p 23-119. ibid, p 23-120. ibid, p 23-1521. ibid, pp 23-1 and 23-222. ibid, p 53-223. ibid, p 53-124. ibid, p 53-125. ibid, p 29-126. ibid, p 29-2 27. ibid, p 29-628. ibid, p 29-3

Box: Fatal overlap...Analysis by the Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science andEnvironment based on anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, IndianBureau of Mines, Nagpur and anon, 2005, State of Forest Report 2003, ForestSurvey of India, Dehradun

Box: Two presidents, two Indias http://meaindia.nic.in/speech/2001/01/25spc01.htm andhttp://www.coal.nic.in/weboflife-minessafety/Speech.htm, as viewedon June 10, 2007

Box: Parej perishesRichard Mahapatra, 2007, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi

2. THE INDUSTRY AND ITS ECONOMICS

1. S L Chakarvorty, Artisanal and Small-scale Mining in India, Mining,Minerals and Sustainable Development, IIED, World Council ofSustainable Development, Kolkata, p 7

2. Anon, 2001, Overview of Mining and Mineral Industry in India, The Energy and Resources Institute, New Delhi, p 6

3. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,

Nagpur, pp 1-24. Analysis by the Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science

and Environment, New Delhi based on data from the Union ministryof statistics and programme implementation as cited in http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=53212&ptid=12095&level=3, as viewed on October 4, 2006

5. Anon, 2006, Prospects for the Global Economy, The World Bank,Washington, pp 20

6. Anon, 2006, Trade and Development Report 2006, United NationsConference on Trade and Development, Geneva

7. David Lague, 2005, ‘Quenching China’s thirst for materials’,International Herald Tribune, New York Times Company, NevillyCedex, France, May 28, http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/27/business/wbcommod.php, as viewed on October 18, 2006

8. Anon, 2006, The Outlook for Metals Markets Prepared for G20 DeputiesMeeting in Sydney 2006, Background Paper, The World Bank Group,Oil, Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, Washington, p 10

9. ibid, p i 10. ibid, p 2811. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steel_production_by_country, as

viewed on October 16, 200612. Analysed based on data from L Jinghai, 2000, Steel in China,

International Labour Organization, Geneva, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/papers/stlmilln/chap2a.htm andanon, 2001, ‘China Steel Production rises’, People’s Daily, http://eng-lish.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200101/23/eng20010123_61174.html, as viewed on October 12, 2006

13. Analysis by the Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Scienceand Environment, New Delhi



16. Anon, 2006, Aluminium, Development Prospects Group, The WorldBank, Washington

17. Anon, 2006, The Outlook for Metals Markets Prepared for G20 DeputiesMeeting in Sydney 2006, Background Paper, The World Bank Group,Oil, Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, Washington, p 10

18. Anon, 2006, Mine: let the good times roll, PriceWaterhouseCoopers,New York, p 3

19. ibid, p 1120. David Lague, 2005, ‘Quenching China’s thirst for materials’,

International Herald Tribune, New York Times Company, NevillyCedex, France, May 28, http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/27/business/wbcommod.php, as viewed on April 18, 2007

21. Anon, 2006, Mine: let the good times roll, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, NewYork, p 6

22. ibid, p 323. Anon, 2006, Trade and Development Report 2006, United Nations

Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, p 19 24. Anon, 2006, The Outlook for Metals Markets Prepared for G20 Deputies

Meeting in Sydney 2006, Background Paper, The World Bank Group,Oil, Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, Washington, p ii

25. Anon, 2006, Trade and Development Report 2006, United NationsConference on Trade and Development, Geneva, pp 19-20

26. Anon, 2006, ‘Metals and minerals take off’, Prospects for the GlobalEconomy, The World Bank, Washington, p 1

27. Anon, 2006, Mine: let the good times roll, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, NewYork, p 30

28. Estimated by adding the value of minor minerals. The value of

331

REFERENCES

m k

minor minerals has been assumed as 10 per cent of the total value ofmineral production in the country, which is consistent with pasttrends. According to the Indian Bureau of Mines, the value of mineral production in the country, excluding minor minerals andatomic minerals, was Rs 75,699.2 crore in 2005-06. Past trends indicate that the contribution of minor minerals to the total value of minerals produced in the country is about 10 per cent.

29. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,Nagpur, p 11-2

30. Based on statistics from L E Taylor et al, 2006, World MineralProduction 2000-04, British Geological Survey, Nottingham, UK,pp 15-17

31. ibid, p 3232. http://ibm.nic.in/frames.html, as viewed on November 15, 2006 33. Reporting mines are the mines which are currently operational and

reporting to the regulatory agency (Indian Bureau of Mines).34. Anon, 2004, ‘Deeming mines for captive mines’, Rajya Sabha,

Unstarred Question No 2229, answered on December 23 35. Analysed based on information from anon, 2006, Statistical Profiles of

Minerals, 2004-05, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur 36. 1999, ‘Report for discussion at the Tripartite Meeting on Social and

Labour Issues in Small-scale Mines’, International Labour Office,Geneva, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/techmeet/tmssm99/tmssmr.htm, as viewed on November 10, 2006

37. Anon, 2001, Overview of Mining and Mineral Industry in India, TheEnergy and Resources Institute, New Delhi, p 48

38. S L Chakravorty, Artisanal and Small-scale Mining in India, Mining,Minerals and Sustainable Development, IIED, World Council ofSustainable Development, Kolkata, p 9



41. T Hentschel et al, 2002, Global Report on Artisanal and Small-scaleMining, Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development, IIED, WorldCouncil of Sustainable Development, and The Energy and ResourcesInstitute, New Delhi, p 12

42. Anon, 2006, Statistical Profiles of Minerals, 2004-05, Indian Bureau ofMines, Nagpur


44. Anon, 2001, Overview of Mining and Mineral Industry in India, The Energy and Resources Institute, New Delhi, p 50


46. 1999, ‘Report for discussion at the Tripartite Meeting on Social andLabour Issues in Small-scale Mines’, International Labour Office,Geneva, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/techmeet/tmssm99/tmssmr.htm, as viewed on November 10, 2006

47. Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt, Gendered livelihoods in small mines and quarries inIndia: living on the edge, Rajiv Gandhi Institute for ContemporaryStudies and Australia-South Asia Research Centre, AustralianNational University, Canberra, p 6

48. S L Chakravorty, Artisanal and small-scale mining in India, Mining,Minerals and Sustainable Development, IIED, World Council ofSustainable Development, Kolkata, p 6

49. Total revenue figures taken from the Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur50. Assuming the contribution from minor minerals to be totally from

small-scale mines; the data has been analysed based on informationfrom anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau ofMines, Nagpur

51. 1999, ‘Report for discussion at the Tripartite Meeting on Social and Labour Issues in Small-scale Mines’, International Labour Office,Geneva, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/techmeet/tmssm99/tmssmr.htm, as viewed on November 10, 2006

52. J J Hinton et al, 2003, ‘Women and Artisanal Mining: Gender Rolesand the Road Ahead’, The Socio-economic Impacts of Artisanal andSmall-scale Mining in Developing Countries, Balkema, SwetsPublishers, The Netherlands

53. ibid54. S L Chakravorty, Artisanal and small-scale mining in India, Mining,

Minerals and Sustainable Development, IIED, World Council ofSustainable Development, Kolkata, p 32


56. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,Nagpur, pp 3-5

57. Anon, 2006, Annual Report 2005-2006, Union ministry of coal, NewDelhi, p 50

58. This analysis does not include the lease area under minor minerals,which is significant.


60. Australia (2001-02): Anon, 2005, 100 years of change in Australian indus-try, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, December 21,http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/[email protected]/Previousproducts/1301.0Feature%20Article212005?opendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=1301.0&issue=2005&num=&view=, as viewed on April 20,2007; India (2001-02): Anon, 2006, ‘Table 3: Components of GrossDomestic Product’, Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, ReserveBank of India, Delhi, http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/AnnualPublications.aspx?head=Handbook%20of%20Statistics%20on%20Indian%20Economy, as viewed on April 20, 2007; Canada (2000):http://www.rncan.gc.ca/media/archives/newsrelease/2002/2002133a_e.htm, as viewed on April 20, 2007; USA (2005): Anon, 2006,Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by State, 2005, News Release of Bureauof Economic Analysis, October, http://bea.gov/bea/newsrel/gsp-newsrelease.htm, as viewed on April 20, 2007; Tanzania (2003): Anon,2006, ‘Tanzania investing in minerals’, International Financial LawReview, November,http://www.iflr.com/?Page=10&PUBID=33&ISS=22694&SID=659767&TYPE=20, as viewed on April 20, 2007; Brazil(2001): The Minerals Sector, World Business Council for SustainableDevelopment, www.unepe.org/Outreach/wssd/docs/further_resources/related_initiatives/WBCSD/WBCSD-minerals.pdf, asviewed on November 12, 2006


62. ibid, p 10-1 63. Anon, 2006, ‘Mineral royalties’, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian

Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 31-57 64. Anon, 2006, Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No 1178, March 165. Data from the Union ministry of coal, New Delhi, as cited in

http://www.indiastat .com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=394505&ptid=63&level=3, as viewed on November 20, 2006

66. Anon, 2004, Notification No CLL/GM(F) Pricing/289, Coal India Limited,Kolkata, June 15

332


m k

67. ibid68. Anon, 2007, ‘Steam Coal Prices for Electricity Generation’, Energy

Prices and Taxes – Quarterly Statistics, First Quarter 2007, Part II, SectionD, Table 19, and Part III, Section B, Table 16, International EnergyAgency, Paris, as cited in http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/interna-tional/stmforelec.html, as viewed on April 12, 2007

69. Anon, 2007, ‘Coking coal prices for industry’, Energy Prices and Taxes – Quarterly Statistics, Fourth Quarter 2006, Part II, Section D, Table20, and Part III, Section B, Table 17, International Energy Agency, Paris,as cited in http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/coke-forind.html, as viewed on April 12, 2007

70. ibid71. Anon, 2005, The Expert Committee on Road Map for Coal Sector Reforms,

Union ministry of coal, New Delhi, p 64 72. Union ministry of labour and employment, as cited in

http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowDataSec.asp?secid=287161&ptid=18528, as viewed on April 15, 2007

73. Anon, 2002, Breaking new ground, Mining, Minerals and SustainableDevelopment, Earth Scan Publications Ltd, London, p 43

74. Anon, 2002, ‘Canada’s mining industry strikes gold – in the taxpay-ers’ wallet’, Media Release by the Pebina Institute, Ottawa,http://www.pembina.org/media/media-release.php?id=1064, asviewed on April 15, 2007

75. Anon, 2006, Annual Report 2005-06 and past issues, Union ministry ofcoal, New Delhi

76. Chandra Bhushan et al, 2005, Concrete Facts: The Life Cycle of the Indian Cement Industry, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi

Box: Mineral classification in IndiaBased on information provided in anon, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2002-05,Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur

Box: Mining operationsBased on information provided by the Union ministry of mines in itswebsite, http://www.mines.nic.in/, as viewed on October 4, 2006

Box: The FDI storyUnion ministry of mines, http://www.mines.nic.in/, as viewed onOctober 4, 2006

Box: Travesty of a policyUnion ministry of mines, http://www.mines.nic.in/, as viewed onOctober 4, 2006

Box: The frenzy of mining ironAnalysed based on data from anon, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2002-05, IndianBureau of Mines, Nagpur; data from Minerals and Metals TradingCorporation, New Delhi; and anon, 2006, Lok Sabha Starred Question No293, December 12

Box: Rejuvenating the coal sectorAnon, 2005, ICRA Rating Feature Coal Shortage: An ICRA Perspective,Investment Information and Credit Rating Agency of India, New Delhi

Box: Battling feudalism and exploitationAnnie Zaidi, 2005, 'Silent victims of silicosis', Frontline, The Hindu Group, Chennai, Vol 22, November 4, http://www.flonnet.com/fl2222/stories/20051104002009200.htm, as viewed on March 28, 2007

Box: The story of Shyam B Dutt, 2005, Organising the Unorganised, Mine Labour ProtectionCampaign, Jodhpur

Box: The private and public in miningAnon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,Nagpur, p 8-8

Box: Importing coalAnon, 2005, The Expert Committee on Road Map for Coal Sector Reforms, Unionministry of coal, p 64 and Pricing Policy and Credit Control, Comptroller andAuditor General of India, New Delhi, http://cag.nic.in/reports/commer-cial/2000_book7/chapter9.htm, as viewed on April 15, 2007

Box: A tug-of-warA Mukherjee, 2006, ‘Mining sector against giving captive iron ore mine tosteel industry, The Hindu Business Line, The Hindu Group, Chennai,September 13

Box: Net importer or exporter?Analysis by the Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science andEnvironment, New Delhi based on data from anon, 2006, Indian MineralsYearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur

Box: Evading royaltiesAnalysis by the Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science andEnvironment, New Delhi

Box: Coal royalties1. Analysis of the data released by the Union ministry of coal, New

Delhi2. Anon, 2005, ‘Coal royalty’, Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No 3967,

Union ministry of mines, New Delhi, http://164.100.24.208/lsq14/quest.asp?qref=10874, as viewed on November 30, 2006

Box: Effective tax rate on mining in IndiaAnon, 2006, Environmental and Social Challenges of Mineral-based Growth inOrissa: Building partnership for sustainable development, The World Bank,New Delhi, p 39

Box: Coal pricing: expertspeakAnon, 2005, The Expert Committee on Road Map for Coal Sector Reforms,Union ministry of coal, New Delhi, p 64

Box: Employment: underground vs open-castUnion ministry of labour and employment, New Delhi as cited inhttp://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowDataSec:asp?secid=287161&ptid=18528, as viewed on November 30, 2006

Box: What’s new in coal?Analysis based on data collected from the Union ministry of environmentand forests, New Delhi

3. BEARING THE BRUNT: PEOPLE AND THE ENVIRONMENT

1. A Roy, 1999, ‘The greater common good’, Friends of RiverNarmada, http://www.narmada.org/gcg/gcg.html, as viewed onFebruary 15, 2007

333

REFERENCES

m k

2. J Samuel, 1999, Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation Policy: Issues andPerspectives, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune, p ix

3. A Roy, 1999, ‘The greater common good’, http://www.narmada.org/gcg/gcg.html, as viewed on April 15, 2007

4. H M Mathur, 2006, ‘Introduction and overview’, ManagingResettlement in India: Approaches, Issues, Experiences, OxfordUniversity Press, New Delhi, p 1

5. T E Downing, 2002, Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-inducedDisplacement and Resettlement, Mining, Minerals, and SustainableDevelopment, International Institute for Environment andDevelopment and World Business Council for SustainableDevelopment, London, p 8

6. W Fernandes et al, 1997, Rehabilitation Policy and Law in India: A Rightto Livelihood, Indian Social Institute, New Delhi, p 6

7. ibid, p 68. T E Downing, 2002, Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-induced

Displacement and Resettlement, Mining, Minerals, and SustainableDevelopment, International Institute for Environment andDevelopment and World Business Council for SustainableDevelopment, London, p 11

9. Gurdeep Singh, Environmental issues with the best management practicesof coal mining in India, Indian School of Mines, Dhanbad,http://www.teriin.org/events/docs/gurdeep.pdf, as viewed onNovember 11, 2006

10. T E Downing, 2002, Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-inducedDisplacement and Resettlement, Mining, Minerals, and SustainableDevelopment, International Institute for Environment andDevelopment and World Business Council for SustainableDevelopment, London, p 7

11. ibid, p 612. ibid, p 613. N C Saxena, 2005, ‘The resettlement and rehabilitation policy of

India’, Managing Resettlement in India, Oxford University Press, NewDelhi, p 100

14. Michael M Cernea, ‘Impoverishment risks and reconstruction: Amodel for population displacement and resettlement’, Risks andReconstruction: Experiences of Resettlers and Refugees, The World Bank,Washington, p 20

15. H M Mathur, 2006, ‘New livelihoods for old’, Managing Resettlementin India: Approaches, Issues and Experiences, Oxford University Press,New Delhi, p 77

16. ibid, p 7917. Michael M Cernea, 2007, ‘Financing for Development, Benefit-shar-

ing Mechanisms in Population Resettlement’, Economic and PoliticalWeekly, Sameeksha Trust, Mumbai, March 24-30, pp 1033-1046

18. Anon, 2006, ‘Making mining environmentally more acceptable’,MINENVIS, Center of Mining Environment, Indian School of Mines,Dhanbad, No 49, June, pp 5-6

19. A Behar et al, 2005, Parliament Digest: Bridging the Gap betweenParliament and People, National Centre for Advocacy Studies,Pune, p 57

20. S Chakma, 2005, ‘Deconstructing urban view of the jungle’, NationalConsultation of Draft Forest Bill, 2005, Asian Centre for Human Rights,New Delhi, pp 7-8

21. Chandra Bhushan et al, 2005, Concrete Facts, The Life Cycle of the IndianCement Industry, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, p 34

22. Anon, 2005, Corporate Sustainability Report-2004-05, Tata Iron & SteelCompany Limited (TISCO), Jamshedpur

23. Anon, 2005, Bhilai Steel Plant Sustainability Report, 2004-05, Steel

Authority of India Limited (SAIL), New Delhi24. G Venkataraman, 1992, Environmental impact of iron ore mining in Goa

through remote sensing, Centre of Studies in Resources Engineering,Indian Institute of Engineering, Mumbai, http://www.csre.iitb.ac.in/gv/proj3/studyareap3.htm, as viewed on November 23,2006

25. Chandra Bhushan et al, 2005, Concrete Facts, The Life Cycle of the IndianCement Industry, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi

26. G Rodrigo, Water, water, nowhere: a case study of Palayaseevaram villageregarding sharing of water with Chennai city and its impact on the village,Forum for Common Resources Concern (FCRC), Ghandian Unit for Integrated Development Education, Chengalpattu, p 5,www.nri.org/WSS-IWRM/Reports/Working Papers/WHIRL%20working%20paper%209_final.pdf, as viewed on March 15, 2007

27. Chandra Bhushan, 2004, ‘Overused underrated’, Supplement to Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, NewDelhi, February 29, Vol 12, No 19

28. ibid29. N Ramakrishnan, 2004, ‘To make 200 million, India needs steel vision

– Mr B Muthuraman, Managing Director, Tata Steel’, The HinduBusiness Line, December 21, The Hindu Group, Chennai,http://www.blonnet.com/2004/12/21/stories/2004122100090900.htm as viewed on May 21, 2007

30. Subhash Pathak, 2007, ‘Water scarcity may compel investors to shiftbase in Jharkhand’, The Hindustan Times, HT Media Ltd, New Delhi,July 3, http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx? id=c53dbf05-c672-42bd-bf55-26c08fe859f7&MatchID1=4455&TeamID1=8&TeamID2=5&MatchType1=2&SeriesID1=1104&PrimaryID=4455, as viewed on May 23, 2007

31. ibid32. Chandra Bhushan et al, 2005, Concrete Facts, The Life Cycle of the

Indian Cement Industry, Centre for Science and Environment, NewDelhi, p 82

33. ibid, p 8234. Based on information from application of Hindalco for Energy

Awards to Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE), www.bee-ndia.nic.in/.../EC%20Award/eca06/Award2006_CD/01Aluminium/HindalcoIndustriesLimitedSambalpur.pdf, as viewed on May 21, 2007 andpresentation made by MALCO titled MALCO’s efforts to conservewater for the future, National Award For Excellence in WaterManagement on December 21-22, 2006 and production data for alu-minium for 2006 from anon, 2006, ICRA Sector Analysis – Aluminium2006

35. Prafulla Samantra, Open Letter to Member Secretary, Orissa PollutionControl Board, Environment Protection Group, Orissa, http://www.freewebs.com/epgorissa/vedantasmelter.htm, as viewed on May 20,2007

36. S Khatua et al, 2006, ‘Ecological debt: A case study from Orissa’, India,Ecological Debt: The People of the South are the Creditors, World Councilof Churches, Geneva, p 145

37. Anon, 2000, ‘Energy Efficiency Best Practices in the AustralianAluminium Industry: A Commonwealth Government Initiative’,www.industry.gov.au/assets/documents/itrinternet/aluminium-summaryreport20040206151753.pdf, as viewed on May 10, 2007

38. Anon, 2005, ‘Environmental Management at KIOCL, Kudremukh’,MINENVIS, Indian School of Mines, Dhanbad, p 1

39. Anon, 1998, ‘Canadian mining company taken to court’, InterPressService, June 23 and anon, 1995, Cyanide Mine Waste Spill Information,Report No 2, August 23, UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs,Guyana

334


m k

40. Anon, 1993, ‘Colorado mining industry strikes again’, High CountryNews, January 25, http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?article_id=2006, as viewed on December 19, 2006

41. Anon, 2004, National Ambient Air Quality Status 2003, CentralPollution Control Board, Delhi, pp 13-14

42. Anil Agarwal et al, 1984, The State of India’s Environment, Centre forScience and Environment, New Delhi, p 23

43. http://www.ipcc.ch/ as, viewed on January 5, 200744. Anon, 2005, Opportunities to reduce coal methane emissions in India,

US-India Energy Dialogue, www.fossil.energy.gov/international/Publications/cwg_nov05_cbm_epa.pdf, as viewed on December 10,2006

45. Anon, 1999, Fugitive emissions from coal mining, website of theAustralian Academy of Technological Science and Engineering,http://www.atse.org.au/index.php?sectionid=511, as viewed onDecember 10, 2006

46. G B Misra, 1989, Mine Environment and Ventilation, Oxford UniversityPress, Kolkata, pp 8-9

47. Anon, 2003, Coal-bed Methane Outreach Program, US EnvironmentalProtection Agency, Washington, www.epa.gov/coalbed/about.htm,as viewed on December 11, 2006

48. J K Pandey, Methane mitigation in Indian coal mining, Central MiningResearch Institute, Dhanbad, www.coalinfo.net.cn/coalbed/meet-ing/2203/papers/coal-mining/CM041.pdf, as viewed on December12, 2006

49. ibid50. Tender Notice (May 23, 2003), Union ministry of petroleum and

natural gas, http://www.india-cbm2.com, as viewed onDecember 14, 2006

51. Anon, 2002, ‘Abandoned mines said gigantic problem’, Reuters,http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/15969/story.htm as viewed on December 20, 2006

52. Anon, 2002, Breaking new ground, Mining, Minerals, and SustainableDevelopment, Earth Scan Publications, London

53. Anon, 2002, ‘Abandoned mines said gigantic problem’, Reuters,http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/15969/story.htm as viewed on December 20, 2006

54. Anon,2002, Mining for the Future, Appendix C: Abandoned Mines,Working Paper by Mining, Minerals, and Sustainable Development,International Institute for Environment and Development and WorldBusiness Council for Sustainable Development, London, p C-5

55. ibid, p C-656. ibid, p C-857. http://ibm.nic.in/frames.html, as viewed on December 20, 200658. Lok Sabha Starred Question No 173, answered on July 16, 200459. Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No 3783, answered on May 16,

200660. L Farell et al, 2004, Dirty Metals, Mining, Communities and the

Environment, EarthWorks and Oxfam America, Washington, p 2461. Safety: Fatalities and fatality frequency rate in South African

mines, Chambers of Mines of South Africa, Johannesburg, www.bul-lion.org.za/Publications/Facts&Figures/04General.pdf, as viewedon November 23, 2006

62. Union ministry of labour and employment as cited inhttp://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=13332&ptid=17902&level=4 as viewed on April 15, 2007

63. L Farell et al, 2004, Dirty Metals, Mining, Communities and theEnvironment, EarthWorks and Oxfam America, Washington, p 24

64. ibid, p 2465. ibid, p 26

66. Anon, 2006, ‘Occupational safety and health’, Annual Report 2005-06,Union ministry of labour and employment, New Delhi

67. L Farell et al, 2004, Dirty Metals, Mining, Communities and theEnvironment, EarthWorks and Oxfam America, Washington, p 26

68. M H Ross et al, 2004, ‘Occupational respiratory diseases in mining’,Occupational Medicine, 2004, Society of Occupational Medicine, OxfordUniversity Press, Oxford, Vol 54, No 5, occmed.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/54/5/304.pdf, as viewed on November 12, 2006

69. Anon, 1999, ‘Silicosis – an uncommonly diagnosed common occupa-tional disease’, ICMR Bulletin, Indian Council of Medical Research,New Delhi, Vol 29, No 9, http://icmr.nic.in/busep99.htm, as viewedon November 23, 2006

70. ibid71. ibid72. V Kanhere, 2006, ‘The Clemenceau debate and occupational health’,

Indian Journal of Medical Ethics, April-June, Occupational Health andSafety Centre, Mumbai, http://www.ijme.in/142ed46.html, asviewed on November 28, 2006

73. H N Sayeed et al, 2004, ‘Occupational health research in India’,Industrial Health 2004, National Institute of Occupational Health,Ahmedabad, www.jniosh.go.jp/english/indu_hel/pdf/42-2-7.pdf,as viewed on November 24, 2006

74. ibid75. Anon, 2005, The Cement Sustainability Initiative Progress Report, World

Business Council for Sustainable Development, Geneva, June, p 1076. R P Shukla et al, 2003, Environment: Issues and Challenges in Thermal

Power Generation, Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad,India, p 4

77. D D’Monte, 2005, ‘Some concrete solutions’, India Together, Banglore,http://www.indiatogether.org/2005/may/env-flyash.htm, asviewed on May 20, 2007

78. Anon, 2005, The Cement Sustainability Initiative Progress Report, WorldBusiness Council for Sustainable Development, Geneva, p 10

79. Anon, ‘CO2 by sector: Emissions from cement manufacturing’, WorldResource Institute, Washington, http://earthtrends.wri.org/search-able_db/index.cfm?theme=3&variable_ID=465&action=select_countries, as viewed on November 20, 2006

80. ibid81. L Farell et al, 2006, Dirty Metals, Mining, Communities and the

Environment, Earthwork and Oxfam Australia, Washington, p 882. Anon, 2003, Environmental management in selected industrial sectors: sta-

tus and needs, Central Pollution Control Board, New Delhi83. Anon, Steel, India Brand Equity Foundation, Gurgaon,

http://ibef.in/artdispview.aspx? in=61&art_id=15374&cat_id=487&page=1, as viewed on May 29, 2007

84. Anon, 2006, World Steel, International Iron and Steel Institute,Belgium, p 3

85. Anon, 2006, ‘Economic Editor’s Conference 2006 – Steel’, PressInformation Bureau of India, Delhi, http://pib.nic.in/release/release.asp? relid=21801, as viewed on May 29, 2007

86. Anon, Steel consumption, India Brand Equity Foundation, Gurgaon,http://ibef.in/artdispview. aspx?in=61&art_id=15374&cat_id=487&page=2, as viewed on May 29, 2007

87. K Mandal et al, 2006, ‘Major strides in steel’, The Hindu Business Line,The Hindu Group, Chennai, October 27, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2006/10/27/stories/2006102700341100.htm, asviewed on May 10, 2007

88. Steel Authority of India Limited, Delhi, http://www.sail.co.in/envi-ronment-other-units.asp, as viewed on May 12, 2007

89. Calculated based on information given in anon, 2004-05, Tata Steel:

335

REFERENCES

m k

Corporate Sustainability Report, Tata Iron & Steel Company,Jamshedpur, p EN 13 of 25

90 . Calculated based on information given in anon, 2004-05, SteelAuthority of India: Environmental performance report, Steel Authority of India Limited, New Delhi (average for three years – 2002-03 to 2004-05)

91. Calculated based on information given in anon, 2004-05, Tata Steel:Corporate Sustainability Report, Tata Iron & Steel Company,Jamshedpur, p EN 13 of 25; this is an average for two years (2003-04and 2004-05)

92. Anon, 2004-05, Tata Steel: Corporate Sustainability Report, Tata Iron andSteel Company, Jamshedpur, p EN 13 of 25; average calculated basedon data from 2000-01 to 2003-04

93. Anon, 2004-05, Steel Authority of India: Environmental performancereport, Steel Authority of India Limited, New Delhi, p 17 (average ofthree years from 2002-03 to 2004-05)

94. Anon, 2004-05, Tata Steel: Corporate Sustainability Report, Tata Iron andSteel Company, Jamshedpur, p EN 21of 25

95. Anon, 2004-05, Steel Authority of India: Environmental performancereport, Steel Authority of India Limited, New Delhi, p 17

96. N Mahajan, 2007, ‘Trouble at Tata Bastar plant now, survey teamattacked’, The Indian Express, Indian Express Group, New Delhi,March 1, http://www.indianexpress.com/iep/sunday/story/24499.html, as viewed on May 3, 2007

97. Calculated by the Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Scienceand Environment, New Delhi based on anon, 2004-05, Steel Authorityof India: Environmental performance report, Steel Authority of IndiaLimited, New Delhi, p 17

98. Sponge Iron Manufacturer’s Association, Delhi, http://www.simain-dia. org/prodfig05-06.cfm, as viewed on May 10, 2007

99. M C Vijyanthi, 2007, ‘India will rule in sponge iron for the nextdecade’ Project Monitor, Mumbai, October 3, http://www.pro-jectsmonitor. com/detailnews.asp?newsid=9773&secid=147, asviewed on May 15, 2007

100. V S Pinto, 2007, ‘Sponge iron makers face the heat’, The FinancialExpress, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi, May 12,http://www.financialexpress.com/fe_full_story.php?content_id=163955, as viewed on May 15, 2007

101. R Krishnan et al, 2006, ‘Iron in the soul’, Down To Earth, Society forEnvironmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 15, No 8,September 15, p 27

102. ibid, p 27 103. Anon, 2005-06, Survey of Indian Sponge Iron Industry, Joint Plant

Committee, Kolkata, cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/FileStorage/7Q2KJZ3UEL2RWWO8B44D7XBSEEKBFH-, as viewed on May 11,2007

104. V S Pinto, 2007, ‘Sponge iron makers face the heat’, The FinancialExpress, Indian Express Group, New Delhi, May 12, http://www.financialexpress.com/fe_full_story.php?content_id=163955, asviewed on May 15, 2007

105. R Krishnan et al, 2006, ‘Iron in the soul’, Down To Earth, Society forEnvironmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 15, No 8,September 15, p 29

106. Anon, 2003, ‘Tata Sponge Iron to be second largest producer’, TheAsian Age, Asian Age Holdings Limited, New Delhi, April 22,http://www.tatamail.com/tata_sponge/media/20030422.htm, asviewed on May 17, 2007

Box: High tollAnalysis by the Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi

Box: From one site to the other W Fernandes, ‘Pawns in the displacement’, India Disasters Report: Towardsa policy initiative, Oxfam, Banglore, p 277

Box: Raw deal1. L Mehta, 2002, The Double Bind: A Gender Analysis of Forced

Displacement and Resettlement, First and Preliminary Draft, Workshop:Engendering Resettlement Policies and Programmes in India, NewDelhi, pp 4-5, 7, and 10

2. ibid, pp 7-83. T E Downing, 2002, Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-induced

Displacement and Resettlement, Mining, Minerals, and SustainableDevelopment, International Institute for Environment andDevelopment and World Business Council for SustainableDevelopment, No 58, Washington, p 12

4. ibid, p 105. ibid, p 126. ibid, p 12

Box: Shut out – officiallyAnon, 2005, ‘Stir threat for Orissa coal mines’, The Statesman, TheStatesman Limited, Kolkata, July 4

Box: The Amman recommendationsAnon, Draft Case Study: Mining and Protected Areas, Cardiff School of City& Regional Planning, Cardiff, UK, http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/cplan/sacl/cs-mining_pas.pdf, as viewed on January 17, 2007 and Defining ProtectedArea Management Categories, IUCN: The World Conservation Union,Switzerland, http://www.unep-wcmc.org/protected_areas/categories/index.html, as viewed on December 10, 2006

Box: Limestone from farmlandsChandra Bhushan et al, 2005, Concrete Facts, The Life Cycle of the IndianCement Industry, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, p 28

Box: Managing wastesAnon, 2000, Reclamation/restoration technique and strategy for mined-outareas, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur and anon, 1998, ‘Base metal and iron ore mining’, Pollution Prevention and Abatement Handbook, The World Bank Group, http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/gui_mining_WB/$FILE/mining_PPAH.pdf, asviewed on January 20, 2007

Box: In a tailspin1. S Dubey, 2007, ‘Toxic Fallout: Jaduguda’s Nuclear Nightmare’,

Siliconeer, New American Media, Sacramento, March, Vol VIII, Issue3, http://www.siliconeer.com/past_issues/2007/siliconeer_march_2007.html, as viewed on January 11, 2007

2. ‘Merriespruit Tailings Dam Failure, Virginia, South Africa’, TailingsInfo, University of Leeds, Leeds, http://www.tailings.info/mer-riespruit.htm, as viewed on January 22, 2007

3. S G Vick, 1996, ‘Failure of the Omai tailings dam’, Geotechnical News, BiTech Publishers Ltd, Richmond, September, www.infomine.com/publications/docs/Vick1996.pdf, as viewed on February 1,2007

4. ‘Brazil: Tailing Dam Failure in Brazil’, Corp Watch, Oakland,http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=14312, as viewed on February 1, 2007

5. ‘The San Marcelino tailings dam spill (Zambales, Philippines)’, WiseUranium Project, World Information Service on Energy, Amsterdam,

336


m k

http://www.wise-uranium.org/mdafsm.html, as viewed onFebruary 1, 2007

6. ‘The Inez coal tailings dam failure (Kentucky, USA)’, Wise UraniumProject, World Information Service on Energy, Amsterdam,www.wise-uranium.org/mdafin.html-44k, as viewed on February 1, 2007

Box: Preventing acid mine drainageAmy Rosenfeld Sweeting et al, 2000, Lightening the code – A guide to respon-sible large-scale mining, Conservation International, Washington, pp 35-38,http://www.celb.org/ImageCache/CELB/content/energy_2dmining/lode_2epdf/v1/lode.pdf, as viewed on June 13, 2007

Box: Say no to coal miningC Brahic, 2006, ‘Australian coalmine blocked over climate change’, NewScientist Environment, December, http://environment.newscientist.com/channel/earth/dn10709-australian-coal-mine-blocked-over-climate-impact.html, as viewed on February 5, 2007

Box: Closure chaos: the case of limestoneChandra Bhushan et al, 2005, Concrete Facts, The Life Cycle of the IndianCement Industry, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, p 38

Box: International best practices: land reclamationAmy Rosenfeld Sweeting et al, 2000, Lightening the code – A guide to responsible large-scale mining, Conservation International, Washington, pp 38 and 41, http://www.celb.org/ImageCache/CELB/content/ener-gy_ 2dmining/lode_2epdf/v1/lode.pdf, as viewed on June 13, 2007

Box: Of coal and death1. Anon, 2006, ‘Occupational Safety and Health’, Annual Report 2005-06,

Union ministry of labour and employment, New Delhi2. Anon, 2001, ‘Safety and public grievance cell’, Annual Report:

Ministry of Coal 2000-01, Union ministry of coal, New Delhi,www.coal.nic.in/chap120102.pdf, as viewed on December 2, 2006

3. Statistics of Mines in India, Volume-I (Coal), 2000, Union ministry oflabour, as cited in http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowDataSec.asp?secid=95898&ptid=17902, as viewed on November 27, 2006

4. A Mandal et al, The analysis of fatal accidents in Indian coal mines, IndianStatistical Institute, Calcutta, p 6

5. Union ministry of labour and employment, as cited inhttp://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=391038&ptid=17902&level=4, as viewed on November 28, 2006

Box: Impaired: what mining does to the body1. C V Beato, 2004, ‘Progress Review: Occupational Health & Safety’, US

Department of Health & Services – Public Health Services, February 18,http://www.healthypeople.gov/data/2010prog/focus20/, asviewed on November 15, 2006

2. B B Mandal et al, 2006, ‘Risk of vibration in Indian mines’, IndianJournal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, Thane, Vol 10,Issue 2, August, p 54

3. ibid, p 544. ibid, pp 53-575. ibid, p 546. ibid, pp 54-557. M H Ross et al, 2004, ‘Occupational respiratory diseases in mining’,

Occupational Medicine, Society of Occupational Medicine, OxfordUniversity Press, Oxford, Vol 54, No 5, p 304

Box: Supreme Court comes to the rescueAnon, 2000, ‘Death inside factory gate’, Down To Earth, Society forEnvironmental Communications, New Delhi, September 30, Vol 9,No 9, p 40

Box: Uranium killsC Stephens et al, 2001, Worker and Community Health Impacts Related toMining Operations Internationally, Mining, Mineral and SustainableDevelopment (MMSD), International Institute for EnvironmentDevelopment (IIED) and World Business Council for SustainableDevelopment (WBSCD), Washington, pp 20-21

4. MINING IN THE STATES

■ ANDHRA PRADESH1. Anon, 2006, ‘State Reviews’, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian

Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 3-52. http://www.aponline.gov.in/Quick%20links/apfactfile/naturalad-

vantages.html, as viewed on March 17, 20073. A Behar et al, 2005, Parliament Digest: Bridging the Gap between

Parliament and People, National Centre for Advocacy Studies,Pune, p 57

4. Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licences 2003,Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 4

5. Anon, 2006, ‘State Reviews’, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, IndianBureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 11-9, 11-12

6. Analysis based on data from anon, 2006, ‘State Reviews’, IndianMinerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-2

7. Anon, 2006, ‘State Reviews’, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, IndianBureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 11-9, 11-12

8. Anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee,Planning Commission, New Delhi

9. http://www.aponline.gov.in/Quick%20links/apfactfile/naturalad-vantages.html, as viewed on March 17, 2007

10. http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Country/india09.htm, asviewed on March 15, 2007; S Ramakrishna, 2006, ‘Mining muddle’,Sahara Time, February 18; anon, 2006, ‘NGOs get set to fight UCILproject’, The New Indian Express, Express Network Private Limited,Chennai, September 6; and anon, 2006, ‘AP uranium project hearinga farce’, Deccan Herald, The Printers (Mysore) Private Limited,Bangalore, September 12

11. Richard Mahapatra et al, 2004, ‘Red alert’, Down To Earth, Society forEnvironmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 12, No 23,April 30, p 27

12. http://www.wise-uranium.org/upin.html#LAMBAPUR, as viewedon January 28, 2007

13. Richard Mahapatra et al, 2004, ‘Red alert’, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 12,No 23, April 30, pp 28

14. Calculated based on uranium content as given in Richard Mahapatraet al, 2004, ‘Red Alert’, Down to Earth, Society for EnvironmentalCommunications, New Delhi, Vol 12, No 23, April 30, p 28

15. http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Country/india09.htm, asviewed on March 15, 2007

Box: Limestone and Andhra PradeshAnalysed based on information compiled by the Green Rating Project between 1999 and 2004, Centre for Science and Environment, NewDelhi

337

REFERENCES

m k

Box: Retribution: Nimmalapadu todayA Krishnakumar, 2004, ‘A tribal struggle’, Frontline, The Hindu Group,Chennai, Vol 21, Issue 19, September 11-24, http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2119/stories/20040924006200400.htm, as viewed on March15, 2007; Sunita Narain, 2004, ‘Defining poverty and progress’, Down ToEarth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, April 30,Vol 12, No 23; and Anirudh Bhattacharyya, 1995, ‘Projects may harm envi-ronment’, The Pioneer, Pioneer Syndication Services, New Delhi, June 5

Box: Kadapa: lessons not learntAnon, 2006, ‘AP uranium project hearing a farce’, Deccan Herald, ThePrinters (Mysore) Private Limited, Bangalore, September 9

Box: Recipe for a water-starved future?Ravi Rebbapragada, 2007, Health of the hills is wealth of the plains: the EasternGhats...our lives depend on them, presentation at the ‘First Anil AgarwalMedia Briefing Workshop and Dialogue on Mining, Environment andPeople’, Centre for Science and Environment, April 26-27, New Delhi

■ CHHATTISGARH1. Anon, 2001, Mineral Policy, Mineral Resource Department, govern-

ment of Chhattisgarh, Raipur, p 22. Based on analysis from anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005,

Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur 3. ibid4. Data on land under major minerals is for the year 2002-03, and has

been taken from anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, IndianBureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 11-22, while data on land under coalhas been taken from documents of the Department of Mines andGeology, government of Chhattisgarh, Raipur

5. http://www.pppinindia.com/states_chhattisgarh_bo.asp, as viewedon June 30, 2007

6. Anon, 2006, ‘Annexure 7’, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi

7. http://www.pppinindia.com/states_chhattisgarh_bo.asp, as viewedon June 30, 2007

8. Anon, 2006, ‘BJP MLAs accuse Raman Singh government overpollution in Bastar’, Press Trust of India, The Press Trust of IndiaLimited, Raipur, February 22

9. ibid10. Anon, 2005, ‘Natural Resources: Water, Forests and Land’,

Chhattisgarh Human Development Report 2005, United NationsDevelopment Programme, New Delhi, p 21

11. ibid, p 2112. Documents of the Forest Department, Office of the Chief Conservator

of Forests (Land Management), government of Chhattisgarh, Raipur13. Anon, 2005, ‘Natural Resources: Water, Forests and Land’,

Chhattisgarh Human Development Report 2005, United NationsDevelopment Programme, New Delhi, p 28

14. ibid, p 3115. A Behar et al, 2005, Parliament Digest: Bridging the Gap between


16. ibid, p 4917. Ejaz Kaiser, 2005, ‘Amendment to Forest Act favoured’, The

Hindustan Times, HT Media Ltd, Raipur, November 4 (article writtenunder CSE’s Media Fellowship on Mining, People and Environment)

18. Documents of the Forest Department, Office of the Chief Conservatorof Forests (Land Management), government of Chhattisgarh, Raipur

19. R Krishna Das, 2005, ‘Land grab mud on Balco’, The Telegraph, ABP

Pvt Ltd, Kolkata, June 24 20. http://www.steelguru.com/selectedNews.php?y=2005&m=

010&d=022, as viewed on April 18, 200721 http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Action/press766.htm, as

viewed on March 20, 200722. Dhananjay Mahapatra, 2006, ‘Coal unit fined Rs 300 crore in dam-

age’, The Times of India, Bennett Coleman & Co Ltd, New Delhi,September 10, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1973779.cms, as viewed on March 20, 2007

23. Goldy M George, ‘Mining to destruction and hijacking their rights tosubmission’, Countercurrents, Kumaranalloor, http://www.counter-currents.org/ index.htm, as viewed on November 28, 2006

24. Data on area under coal mining has been taken from the Departmentof Geology and Mines, government of Chhattisgarh, while that onthe area under other mining has been sourced from the IndianBureau of Mines, Nagpur

25. Anon, 2006, ‘Killing in Chhattisgarh’, The Tribune, The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh, http://www.tribuneindia.com/2006/20060503/edit.htm, as viewed on November 28, 2006

26. Goldy M George, ‘Mining to destruction and hijacking their rights tosubmission’, Countercurrents, Kumaranalloor, http://www.counter-currents.org/index.htm, as viewed on November 28, 2006

27. Anon, 2006, ‘Jharkhand Development Report 2006’, Prabhat Khabar,Ranchi, p 40

28. Anon 2006, Vision Document, government of Chhattisgarh, Raipur29. Analysis based on information obtained from Census of India 2001,

The Encyclopedic District Gazetteers of India, Human DevelopmentReports, the website of india-stat.com, and Health Information ofIndia 2003

30. Anon, 2005, ‘Human development in Chhattisgarh’, HumanDevelopment Report Chhattisgarh 2005, United Nations DevelopmentProgramme, New Delhi

31. Anon, 2006, Information about NMDC under the RTI Act 2005, peoples’website of Chhattisgarh, http://www.cgnet.in/Min/Ndmc.pdf, asviewed on December 18, 2006

32. Anon, 2005, ‘Human development in Chhattisgarh’, HumanDevelopment Report Chhattisgarh 2005, United Nations DevelopmentProgramme, New Delhi, p 193

33. Anon, 2006, Maoists fighting mindless mining in Chhattisgarh,http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Action/press1042.htm, asviewed on May 11, 2007

34. Bharti Jain, 2006, ‘Naxalites may derail dream steel run’, Times NewsNetwork, Bennett Coleman & Co Ltd, New Delhi, September 1, eco-nomictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1945336.cms, as viewed onDecember 15, 2006

35. R Krishna Das et al, 2005, ‘Rebel raid on giant – Maoist armycripples Hindalco mining unit’, The Telegraph, ABP Pvt Limited,Kolkata, May 9, www.telegraphindia.com/1050510/asp/frontpage/story_4720076.asp, as viewed on December 11, 2006

36. Anon, 2006, ‘Chhattisgarh Maoists oppose Tata, Essar plants’, TheTimes of India, Bennett Coleman & Co Ltd, New Delhi, May 17,http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1534881.cms, asviewed on December 17, 2006

37. Kaustubh A Moghe et al, 2003, Undermining India: Impacts of mining onecologically sensitive areas, Kalpavriksh, Pune, p 18

38. M N Mitra, 2006, ‘River Sankhini and Dankini in Chhattisgarh rundry’, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications,New Delhi, Vol 15, No 15, December 31, pp 48-49

39. Based on telephonic communication with Pratap Agarwal, advocate,Jagdalpur, Chhattisgarh

338


m k

40. M N Mitra, 2006, ‘River Sankhini and Dankini in Chhattisgarh rundry’, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications,New Delhi, Vol 15, No 15, December 31, pp 48-49

41. Anon, 1997, ‘Forest area hit by mining in Bailadila’, The Asian Age,Asian Age Holdings Ltd, New Delhi, March 12

42. N Sharif, 1998, ‘MEF rejects SAIL proposal to tackle iron oremining in MP’, The Observer of Business & Politics, New Delhi,September 11

43. Sanjay Sharma, 1997, ‘Mining projects threaten precious sal forest’,Sahara Times, March 8

44. K Mandal, ‘SAIL charting new mining proposal – dry beneficiationplant at Chhattisgarh’, The Hindu Business Line, The Hindu Group,Chennai, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2006/01/10/stories/2006011001990200.htm, as viewed on December 17, 2006

45. Anon, 2007, ‘Mines bureau clears Bhilai’s Rowghat’, The FinancialExpress, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi, March 27,http://www.financialexpress.com/fe_full_story.php?content_id=159153, as viewed on May 10, 2007


47. Anon, 2002, An investigation into land acquisition and state repression inNagarnar, Bastar, Chhattisgarh, The Indian People’s Tribunal onEnvironment and Human Rights, Mumbai, September

48. http://www.pucl.org/Topics/Industries-envirn-resettlement/2002/chhattisgarh.htm, as viewed on May 27, 2007

49. Anon, 2004, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’, Annual Report of theMinistry of Steel 2003-04, http://www.steel.nic.in/Annual%20Report%20(2003-04)/English/chapter-20.PDF, as viewed on May27, 2007

50. ibid51. Pratap Agarwal, PIL against Tata’s Steel Project in Bastar, peoples’ web-

site of Chhattisgarh, http://www.cgnet.in/Min/document.2006-02-25.4099241579, as viewed on May 28, 2007

52. Based on telephonic communication with Pratap Agarwal, advocate,Jagdalpur, Chhattisgarh

53. Anon, 2007, ‘Tata terror in Bastar’, Orissa Sakhi, March 9, http://san-hati.com/articles/201/, as viewed on May 28, 2007

54. Nitin Mahajan, 2007, ‘Trouble at Tata Bastar plant now’, The IndianExpress, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi, March 1,http://www.indianexpress.com/story/24499.html, as viewed onMay 28, 2007

55. Anon, 2006, ‘Chhattisgarh tribals to give up land for steel mill’,Business Sunday, July 23, http://www.indiaenews.com/busi-ness/20060723/15837.htm, as viewed on May 28, 2007

56. Anon, 2007, Bastar tribals launch protest against Tata Steels plant, SteelGuru, February 2, http://www.steelguru.com/selectedNews.php?y=2007&m=002&d=026#top, as viewed on May 28, 2007

57. Nitin Mahajan, 2007, ‘Trouble at Tata Bastar plant now’, The IndianExpress, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi, March 1,http://www.indianexpress.com/story/24499.html, as viewed onMay 28, 2007

58. Anon, 2007, ‘Tata terror in Bastar’, Orissa Sakhi, March 9, http://san-hati.com/articles/201/, as viewed on May 28, 2007

59. Anon, 2007, ‘BJP MLA protests against land acquisition for Bastarsteel plant’, Associated News of India, March 18, http://www.dailyin-dia. com/show/126477.php/BJP-MLAs-protest-against-land-acqui-sition-for-Bastar-steel-plant, as viewed on May 28, 2007

60. Anon, 2007, ‘Police harassing people to give up land for the Tataplant: CPI’, India eNews, March 11, http://www.indiaenews.com/business/20070311/42277.htm, as viewed on May 28, 2007

61. Anon, 2006, ‘Tribal protesters give go ahead to Essar Steel’, IndiaAbroad News Service, Raipur, September 13

62. M N Mitra, 2006, ‘Red Alert’, Down To Earth, Society forEnvironmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 15, No 11, October31, pp 27-28

63. Anon, 2007, ‘Farmers killed for giving land for Essar steel plant’,India Abroad News Service, April 1, http://in.news.yahoo.com/070401/43/6e195.html, as viewed on May 28, 2007

64. ibid65. Anon, 2006, ‘Tata, Essar Steel MoUs out of right to information’s

ambit’, The Hindu Business Line, The Hindu Group, Chennai,February 15, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/businessline/blnus/27151406.htm, as viewed on May 28, 2007

Box: Lawless1. Anon, 2001, ‘Nearly 1,500 illegal mining cases detected in

Chhattisgarh’, Central Chronicle, Ram Gopal Investment Pvt Ltd,Bhopal, November 12

2. Ejaz Kaiser, 2005, ‘Rampant smuggling of diamonds in the state’, TheHindustan Times, HT Media Ltd, Raipur, November 3 (article writtenunder CSE’s Media Fellowship on Mining, People and Environment)

Box: India’s diamond bowl?Ejaz Kaiser, 2005, ‘CM calls his state “Diamond Bowl”, CMDC not optimist’, The Hindustan Times, HT Media Ltd, Raipur, October 20 (articlewritten under CSE’s Media Fellowship on Mining, People andEnvironment)

Box: “We exist because forests exist”Anon, 2005, ‘Natural Resources: Water, Forests and Land’, ChhattisgarhHuman Development Report 2005, United Nations DevelopmentProgramme, New Delhi, p 26

Box: Mining has a long reachMukesh Kumar, 2005, Geospatial Evaluation of Biodiversity Pattern in MiningLandscape of Northern Chhattisgarh, India, Indian Institute of RemoteSensing, Dehradun, pp 89-94

Box: Cruel tryst with diamondsEjaz Kaiser, 2005, ‘Barnu’s cruel tryst with diamonds’, The HindustanTimes, HT Media Ltd, Raipur, October 22 (article written under CSE’sMedia Fellowship on Mining, People and Environment)

Box: The way of the Salwa JudumM N Mitra, 2006, ‘Red Alert’, Down To Earth, Society for EnvironmentalCommunications, New Delhi, Vol 15 No 11, October 31, pp 22-26

Box: In the line of fire1. Anon, 1997, ‘Forest area hit by mining in Bailadila’, The Asian Age,

Asian Age Holdings Ltd, New Delhi, March 122. G Venkataraman et al, 1992, Environment impact of Iron ore mining in

Bailadila, Bastar district, Madhya Pradesh, through Remote Sensing,Centre for Studies in Resources Engineering, Indian Institute ofTechnology, Mumbai http://www.csre.iitb.ac.in/gv/ proj4/tempo-ralp4.htm, as viewed on February 14, 2007

Box: Iron riverM N Mitra, 2006, ‘Rivers Sankhini and Dankini in Chhattisgarh run dry’,Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi,Vol 15, No 15, December 31, pp 48-49

339

REFERENCES

m k

Box: Privatisation painsAnon, 2004, Report of the Expert Group on the prevention of alienation of triballand and its restoration, Union ministry of rural development, New Delhi, p 147

Box: NMDC’s loss is Essar’s gainAnon, 2007, ‘Essar wins licence for Bailadila iron ore deposits’, IndiaPRwire, Gurgaon, March 4, http://www.indiaprwire.com/business-news/20070304/19747.htm, as viewed on May 28, 2007

Box: An insider’s accountM N Mitra, 2006, ‘Red Alert’, Down To Earth, Society for EnvironmentalCommunications, New Delhi, Vol 15, No 11, October 31, pp 27-28

■ GOA1. Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licenses 2003,

Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 1 and anon, 2006, Goa at a glance2006, Directorate of Planning, Statistics and Evaluation, governmentof Goa, p 1

2. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,Nagpur, pp 11-23, 11-24

3. ibid, p 47-9 4. Anon, 2006, Goa at a glance 2006, Directorate of Planning, Statistics

and Evaluation, government of Goa, p 1 and anon, 2005, Bulletin ofMining Leases & Prospecting Licenses 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines,Nagpur, p 11

5. Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licenses 2003,Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 3

6. ibid, p 5 7. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,

Nagpur, p 11-24 8. ibid, p 11-49. ibid, p 11-410. ibid, p 11-2411. ibid, p 11-2412. ibid, p 11-213. Anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee,

Planning Commission, New Delhi 14. Anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee,

Planning Commission, New Delhi; anon, 2006, State Finances – AStudy of Budgets of 2006-07, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai,November and anon, 2005, State Finances – A Study of Budgets of 2005-06, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, December

15. http://www.mapsofindia.com/maps/goa/goaminerals.htm, asviewed on March 23, 2007

16. Pamela D’Mello, 1998, ‘Goa environment suffering due to iron oremining’, The Asian Age, Asian Age Holdings Ltd, Kolkata, April 18

17. A Behar et al, 2005, Parliament Digest: Bridging the Gap betweenParliament and People, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune, p57 and anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licenses2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 3

18. G Venkataraman, 1992, Environmental impact of iron ore mining in Goathrough remote sensing, Centre for Studies in Resources Engineering,Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai, http:// www.csre.iitb.ac.in/gv/proj3/studyareap3.htm, as viewed on June 3, 2007

19. Raju Nayak, 2005, ‘Record rainfall does not liberate Goa from watertankers’, Loksatta, The Indian Express Group, Panaji, October 12 (arti-cle written under CSE’s Media Fellowship on Mining, People andEnvironment)

20. ibid

21. P Nair, 2007, ‘Mining companies in Goa to pay compensation for croploss’, Goa Net, August 5, http://www.goanet.org/index.php?name=News &file=article&sid=893, as viewed on August 7, 2007

22. Nair et al, Arsenic enrichment in estuarine sediments – impacts of iron andmanganese mining, National Institute of Oceanography, Cochin, p 59

23. ibid, p 5924. ibid, p 5925. ibid, p 5926. ibid, p 5927. ibid, p 5928. ibid, p 5929. ibid, p 5730. ibid, p 5731. ibid, p 5732. Raju Nayak, 2005, ‘Mining pits pose serious threat to Goa’s environ-

ment’, Loksatta, The Indian Express Group, Panaji, October 13 (articlewritten under CSE’s Media Fellowship on Mining, People andEnvironment)

33. ibid34. ibid35. ibid36. Kriti B Gupta et al, 2006, Study on NPV calculations for diversion of for-

est land for mining purposes, Federation of Indian Mineral Industries,New Delhi, pp 71-72

Box: Exporting ore, importing disaster1. Anon, 2007, Economic Survey – 2005-06, Directorate of Planning,

Statistics and Evaluation, government of Goa, Panaji, p 992. Anon, 2006, ‘How iron disappears in Bellary’, MSN India, September

11, http://content.msn.co.in/News/Business/BusinessBS_110906_1008.htm, as viewed on May 25, 2007


4. Anon, 2007, Economic Survey – 2005-06, Directorate of Planning,Statistics and Evaluation, government of Goa, Panaji, p 98

5. Anon, 2007, Annual Report – Sesa Goa Limited, Sesa Goa, Panjim,http://content.msn.co.in/News/Business/BusinessBS_110906_1008.htm, as viewed on June 16, 2007

Box: Mines that undermine farmingG Venkatramani, 1992, ‘Mines that undermine farming’, Nagpur Times,January 22

Box: Blasted and stonedVasudha Sawaiker, 2006, ‘Driven to the extreme’, Down To Earth, Societyfor Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 14, No 17, January 31

Box: OverburdenedAnon, 2006, ‘Six killed in Goa’s mining tragedy’, India eNews, October 12,http://www.indiaenews.com/india/20061210/32003.htm, as viewed onMarch 10

Box: One good showKriti B Gupta et al, 2006, Study on NPV calculations for diversion of forest landfor mining purposes, Federation of Indian Mineral Industries, New Delhi,pp 71-72

Box: Tourist paradise? A visitor’s travelogueSunita Narain, 2007, ‘Editorial’, Down To Earth, Society for EnvironmentalCommunications, New Delhi, Vol 15, No 22, April 15, p 5

340


m k

■ THE HIMALAYAN STATES1. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,

Nagpur, p 11-822. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of

Mines, Nagpur, p 11-82 and http://www.indiainbusiness.nic.in/indian-states/ uttaranchal/InvesOpp.htm, as viewed on March 29,2007



5. ibid, p 11-826. Anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee,

Planning Commission, New Delhi7. Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licences 2003,

Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 3, 88. ibid, pp 3, 89. ibid, pp 3, 810. A Behar et al, 2005, Parliament Digest: Bridging the Gap between



12. ibid, p 11-30 13. Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licences 2003,

Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 3, 514. ibid, pp 3, 515. ibid, pp 3, 516. Mahesh Joshi, 2005, ‘People unite as mining shows its ugly face’,

Nainital Samachar, Nainital, October 1-14 (article written under CSE’sMedia Fellowship on Mining, People and Environment)

17. Mahesh Joshi, 2005, ‘Mining in Pithoragarh: companies abscond afterdestroying hundreds of lives’, Nainital Samachar, Nainital, October15-31 (article written under CSE’s Media Fellowship on Mining,People and Environment)

18. Bidisha Kumar, 2006, ‘Trying to grow, soft quarries’, Down To Earth,Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 14,No 13, November 30, pp 24-26

19. Anon, 1998, ‘Digging up an eco-disaster in Kullu’, The Pioneer,Pioneer Syndication Services, New Delhi, September 13

20. Anon, 2004, ‘Quarrying poses threat to ancient temple’, The Tribune,The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh, June 4

21. Chhavinder Thakur, 1996, ‘Unchecked quarrying plays havoc withBeas’, The Indian Express, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi,October 5

22. Ravinder Sood, 1998, ‘Illegal mining, quarrying on the rise’, TheTribune, The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh, August 19

23. Anon, 1995, ‘Kangra area to be declared sensitive’, The Tribune, TheTribune Trust, Chandigarh, April 5

24. Rakesh Lohumi, 1995, ‘Illegal mining upsets eco-system’, The Tribune,The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh, February 25

25. Anon, 1996, ‘Mines working sans plans’, The Tribune, The TribuneTrust, Chandigarh, March 3

26. S P Sharma, 1999, ‘Sinking villages of Chamba’, The Tribune, TheTribune Trust, Chandigarh, January 28

27. Balkrishna Parashar, 1998, ‘Quarrying threatens highway’, TheTribune, The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh, May 15

28. S P Sharma, 2000, ‘Nod to mining in Khaniyara’, The Tribune, TheTribune Trust, Chandigarh, October 20

Box: Limestone: more flashpoints1. http://www.himvani.com/news/2007/03/08/ban-polybags-entire-

ly-in-himachal-kinkari-devi/663/environment/ddsharma/, asviewed on March 31, 2007

2. Anon, 1997, ‘Pressure on government to lift mining ban’, The Tribune,The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh, December 3

3. S P Sharma, 1995, ‘Order to close 9 HP mines’, The Tribune, TheTribune Trust, Chandigarh, October 8; anon, 1995, ‘HP closes 12 limemines’, The Tribune, The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh, February 5; anon,1996, ‘Mining, cement units denude slopes’, The Tribune, The TribuneTrust, Chandigarh, September 23; S P Sharma, 1999, ‘20,000 greentrees to be axed’, The Tribune, The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh,November 4; Baldev Chauhan, 1998, ‘Uncontrolled limestone min-ing’, The Statesman, The Statesman Ltd, Delhi, July 12 and S R Pundir,2001, ‘Illegal mining continues unabated’, The Tribune, The TribuneTrust, Chandigarh, July 5

4. P C Trikannad, 2007, ‘Mega projects in Himachal Pradesh face greenwrath’, Project Monitor, Mumbai, July 12 www.projectmonitor.com/detailnews.ap?newsid=13975, as viewed on July 15, 2007

5. Anon, 2007, ‘Protest against cement factory’, The Tribune, The TribuneTrust, Chandigarh, January 31, www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070131/himachal.htm#4, as viewed on February 14, 2007

6. Ashish Kothari et al, 2002, ‘Leasing out lives’, The Hindustan Times, HTMedia Ltd, New Delhi, March 9

Box: Soapstone seals Bageshwar’s fateBidisha Kumar, 2006, ‘Trying to grow, soft quarries’, Down To Earth,Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, November 30,2006, Vol 15, No 13, pp 27-28

Box: The Askot projectPaul M Boswell, 2006, Technical report on the Gadarwara Mineral Property,India: Report No 4677, Resource Engineering and Development Limited,Vancouver and http://www.pebcreek.com/projects.asp?p-askot-history,as viewed on June 14, 2007

■ JHARKHAND1. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,

Nagpur, p 11-372. ibid, pp 24-7, 24-83. Anon, 2007, Distribution of leases and lease area (by state/district/miner-

als) as on 31.3.2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur4. ibid5. ibid6. ibid7. ibid8. http://www.jharkhand.gov.in/depts/mines/dwdml.asp#, as

viewed on March 23, 20079. www.jharkhand.gov.in/depts/mines/dwdml.asp#, as viewed on

March 23, 200710. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,

Nagpur, p 11-211. Analysed based on data from http://www.indiastat.com/india/

ShowDataSec.asp?secid=5956&ptid=19252, as viewed on March 24,2007 and anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau ofMines, Nagpur


13. ibid, p 11-414. http://jharkhand.nic.in/mineral_collection.htm, as viewed on

341

REFERENCES

m k

March 25, 200715. Anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee,

Planning Commission, New Delhi; anon, 2006, State Finances – AStudy of Budgets of 2006-07, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai,November and anon, 2005, State Finances – A Study of Budgets of 2005-06, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, December


17. ibid18. P Ranjan, 2006, ‘Madhu Koda starts working, puts all 43 MoUs worth

of 2,00,00 crore under scanner in Jharkhand’, Indian Daily News,September 19, http://www.indiadaily.org/entry/madhu-koda-starts-working-puts-all-43-mou-worth-of-200000-crore-under-scan-ner-in-jharkhand/, as viewed on November 10, 2006

19. http://www.jharkhand.gov.in/depts/mines/acbml.asp, as viewedon March 25, 2007

20. ibid21. ibid22. Based on information published by the Indian Bureau of Mines,

Nagpur23. Anon, 2005, The State of Forest Report 2003, Forest Survey of India,

Dehradun, p 6624. Based on analysis from anon, 2005, The State of Forest Report 2003,

Forest Survey of India, Dehradun, p 66 and anon, 2005, Bulletin ofMining Leases & Prospecting Licences 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines,Nagpur, pp 6, 13

25. Based on analysis from anon, 2005, The State of Forest Report 2003,Forest Survey of India, Dehradun, p 66

26. ibid, p 6627. ibid, p 6628. Bulu Iman, 2001, ‘Preserving sacred places in Jharkhand, India’,

Sacred Sites International, Berkley, http://www.sacred-sites.org/preservation/endangered_jharkhand.html, as viewed on May 29,2007

29. Kumkum Dasgupta et al, 2001, ‘Poor little rich states’, Down To Earth,Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 9, No16, January 15, pp 41-45

30. Sanjeev Baruah, ‘Collieries set to annihilate rare animalsin Jharkhand’, Wildlife Trust of India, Dehradun, http://www.wildlifetrustofindia.org/html/news/features/051024_jharkhand_collieries.html, as viewed on November 12, 2006

31. Kumkum Dasgupta et al, 2001, ‘Poor little rich states’, Down To Earth,Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 9, No16, January 15, pp 41-45

32. ibid33. ibid34. A Behar, 2005, Parliament Digest: Bridging the Gap between Parliament

and People, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune, p 5735. Sanjeev Baruah, ‘Collieries set to annihilate rare animals in

Jharkhand’, Wildlife Trust of India, Dehradun, http://www.wildlifetrustofindia.org/html/news/features/051024_jharkhand_collieries.html, as viewed on November 12, 2006

36. Shanti Sawaiyan, ‘Forcible displacement and land alienation isunjust’, Mines, Minerals and People, http://www.mmpindia.org/shanti.PDF, as viewed on November 1, 2006

37. ibid38. Shubhangi Thatte, Growth and Distribution of Tribal Population in

Jharkhand, 1961-2001: A Census Analysis, http://paa2006.princeton.edu/download_aspx?submissionId=61800, as viewed on November12, 2006

39. http://www.jharkhand.nic.in/about.htm, as viewed on November12, 2006

40. Rajni Soren, 2006, ‘Displacement in Jharkhand’, Refugee Watch Online,July 24, http://refugeewatchonline.blogspot.com/2006/07/dis-placement-in-jharkhand.html, as viewed on December 28, 2006

41. P A Chacko et al, 2003, Pachwara coal mining project: enquiry report – PUCL-Dumka, Jharkhand Unit, PUCL http://www.pucl .org/Topics/Industr ies -envirn-reset t lement/2003/pachwara.htm, as viewed on December 28, 2006

42. Anon, 2006, ‘Jharkhand Development Report 2006’, Prabhat Khabar,Ranchi

43. ibid44. ibid45. ibid46. ibid47. ibid48. ibid49. ibid50. ibid51. ibid52. ibid53. Anil Agarwal et al, 1999, State of India’s Environment: The Citizen’s Fifth

Report, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, pp 71-75 andManoj Nandkarni, 2003, ‘Coal dust, flyash and slurry’, Down To Earth,Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, May 15

54. Anupama Kumari, 2005, ‘Displacement is their fate’, Prabhat Khabar,Ranchi, November 6 (article written under CSE’s Media Fellowshipon Mining, People and Environment)

55. Anon, 2004, Environmental Problems of Mining Areas, Indian School ofMines, Dhanbad

56. ibid57. ibid58. ibid59. ibid60. Anon, 1992, Twenty-first report of Business Advisory Committee

to Parliament, Parliament of India, New Delhi, http://parlia-mentofindia.nic.in/lsdeb/ls10/ses4/2419089201.htm, as viewed onNovember 15, 2006

61. N A Khan, 1998, ‘Quarry in quagmire’, Down To Earth, Society forEnvironmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 7, No 8, August 15,pp 20-21

62. Richard Mahapatra, 2002, ‘Consigned to flames’, Down To Earth,Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 11, No13, November 30, pp 25-29

63. Badal Sanyal, 2001, ‘CIL move to deregulate marketing policy onhold’, The Hindu, The Hindu Group, Chennai, October 20,http://www.hinduonnet.com/businessline/2001/10/20/stories/142075b6.htm, as viewed on December 6, 2006

64. Purnima S Tripathi, 2005, ‘Coal theft and vote’, Frontline, The HinduGroup, Chennai, Volume 22, March

65. Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No 3247, August 5, 2002, as cited inhttp://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowDataSec.asp?secid=56886&ptid=17902, as viewed on December 6, 2006

66. M K Pandhe, 2005, ‘What ails coal industry?’, Working Class,http://citu.org.in/wclass_oct05_a5.htm, as viewed on December 6,2006

67. Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No 1263, July 29, 2003, as cited in http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowDataSec.asp?secid=107316&ptid=63, as viewed on December 6, 2006

68. Anon, The Blighted Hills of Roro, Mines, Minerals and People,

342


m k

http://www.birsa.org/rororeport1.htm, as viewed on November 12,2006; anon, Roro hills: Legacy of asbestos mines, Blacksmith Institute,http://www.blacksmithinstitute.org/search3.php?project_id=94, as viewed on November 12, 2006; and anon, Asbestos mines vic-tim speak out, http://www.birsa.org/rororeport.htm, as viewed onNovember 12, 2006

69. Richard Mahapatra et al, 2004, ‘Red alert’, Down To Earth, Society forEnvironmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 12, No 23,November 30, pp 28-29

70. Scott Ludlum, 2000, Nuclear India, document prepared for the Anti-nuclear Alliance of Western Australia

71. Richard Mahapatra et al, 2004, ‘Red alert’, Down To Earth, Society forEnvironmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 12, No 23,November 30, pp 28-29

72. ibid, pp 28-2973. ibid, pp 28-2974. ibid, pp 28-2975. ibid, pp 28-2976. ibid, pp 28-2977. ibid, pp 28-2978. ibid, pp 28-2979. ibid, pp 28-2980. Scott Ludlum, 2000, Nuclear India, document prepared for the

Anti-nuclear Alliance of Western Australia81. Richard Mahapatra et al, 2004, ‘Red alert’, Down To Earth, Society for

Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 12, No 23,November 30, pp 28-29

82. ibid, pp 28-2983. ibid, pp 28-2984. ibid, pp 28-29

Box: Battle drawn over Chiria mineshttp://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1063670.cms, asviewed on June 12, 2007; http://www.telegraphindia.com/1061027/asp/business/story_6922627.asp, as viewed on June 12, 2007; andhttp://www.telegraphindia.com/1050908/asp/business/story_5210278.asp, as viewed on June 12, 2007

Box: Destroying SarandaRuksan Bose, 2006, ‘Mine or yours’, Down To Earth, Society forEnvironmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 14, No 16, January 15,pp 7-8

Box: The story of HoromochoRichard Mahapatra et al, 2002, ‘The Second Independence’, Down To Earth,Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 11, No 7,August 31, p 29

Box: Minerals and mining in West Bengal1. Anon, Status on Land, Department of Land and Land Reforms, gov-

ernment of West Bengal, http://www.wbgov.com/e-gov/admin/newgovtpublications/upload/Pub-Status_on_land.pdf, asviewed on May 30, 2007

2. http://ibm.nic.in/miningleases.html#2, as viewed on May 30, 2007;anon, Economic Review 2005-06, government of West Bengal,http://wbplan.gov.in/docs/eco_05_06/ch_5_Industry.pdf, asviewed on May 30, 2007

3. Anon, Economic Review 2005-06, government of West Bengal,http://wbplan.gov.in/docs/Eco_Rev 2005-06_statistical_appendix.pdf as viewed on May 30, 2007

4. Anon, 2001, ‘Advanced Table 1.1, Part A: Main workers classified byage, industrial category and sex’, Census of India 2001, New Delhi,http://www.censusindia.net/results/B_series/advtbl_1.1_India_Pt_a.pdf, as viewed on May 30, 2007; and anon, Economic Review 2005-06, government of West Bengal, http://wbplan.gov.in/docs/Eco_Rev 2005-06_statistical_appendix.pdf, as viewed on May30, 2007

5. Anon, 2001, ‘Advanced Table 1.1, Part A: Main workers classified byage, industrial category and sex’, Census of India 2001, New Delhi,http://www.censusindia.net/results/B_series/advtbl_1.1_India_Pt_a.pdf, as viewed on May 30, 2007

6. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,Nagpur, pp 11-87, 11-89

7. http://coal.nic.in/reserve2.htm, as viewed on May 30, 20078. http://envfor.nic.in/divisions/cltech/Damodar/2.4.htm, as viewed

on March 17, 20079. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of

Mines, Nagpur p 11-89; http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=415118&ptid=18528&level=4, as viewed onMay 30, 2007; http://www.indiastat.com/india/showtable.asp?secid=28155&ptid=23&level=3, as viewed on May 30, 2007

10. Anon, Economic Review 2005-06, government of West Bengal,http://wbplan.gov.in/docs/Eco_Rev2005-06_statistical_appendix.pdf,as viewed on May 30, 2007


12. ibid, p 11-8913. Anon, Economic Review 2005-06, government of West Bengal,

http://wbplan.gov.in/docs/eco_05_06/ch_5_Industry.pdf, asviewed on May 30, 2007

14. ibid15. Anon, West Bengal Mineral Policy 2002, government of West Bengal,

http://www.wbgov.com/e-gov/include/West%20Bengal%20Mineral%20Policy,%202002.doc, as viewed on May 30, 2007

16. Anon, Economic Review 2005-06, government of West Bengal,http://wbplan.gov.in/docs/eco_05_06/ch_5_Industry.pdf, asviewed on May 30, 2007

17. Ambar Singh Roy, 2006, ‘Government committed to growth, viabili-ty of public sector: PM’, The Hindu Business Line, The Hindu Group,Chennai, December 25

18. Anon, 2003, Report on the West Bengal Economy, Bureau of AppliedEconomics and Statistics, government of West Bengal, Kolkata, p19

19. http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2401/stories/ 20070126002-603600.htm, as viewed on March 17, 2007

20. Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No 3908, August 22, 2005, http://164.100.24.208/lsq14/quest.asp?qref=18829, as viewed on April 29, 2007

21. Anon, Economic Review 2005-06, government of West Bengal,http://wbplan.gov.in/docs/Eco_Rev2005-06_statist ical_appendix.pdf, as viewed on May 30, 2007

22. Anon, 2003, Undermined: Destruction of tiger habitat in India,Environmental Investigation Agency, http://www.eia-international.org/files/ reports50-1.pdf, as viewed on March 20, 2007

23. Usha Ramanathan, 2004, ‘Creating dispensable citizens, The Hindu,The Hindu Group, Chennai, April 14

24. Anon, 2007, ‘JSW steel is clear of farmland: Buddha’, The FinancialExpress, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi, January 11

Box: Dousing plans: the various responses to JhariaS P Banerjee, 2007, Coal fire in Jharia – problems and solutions, presentation at

343

REFERENCES

m k

the First Anil Agarwal Media Briefing Workshop and Dialogue on Mining,Environment and People, Centre for Science and Environment, April 26-27, 2007, New Delhi

Box: Subsidence in JhariaN A Khan, 1998, ‘Quarry in quagmire’, Down To Earth, Society forEnvironmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 11, No 17, August 15, pp20-21Note: 1That part of the mines from which the minerals have been removedpartially or wholly.

Box: All clear?B Sanyal, 2006, The Hindu Business Line, The Hindu Group, Kolkata,February 9

Box: The death traps of Raniganj1. Anon, 2004, ‘SC orders rehabilitation of subsidence victims’, The

Statesman, The Statesman Ltd, Kolkata, February 262. Debdutta Ghosh, 2001, ‘Bengal threatened by illegal mining’, The

Asian Age, Asian Age Holdings Ltd, New Delhi, January 293. Shaikh Azizur Rahman, 2006, ‘India’s largest coal mines turn into

death pits’, The Washington Post, November 254. http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=394758&

ptid= 17902&level=3, as viewed on June 30, 20075. http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=412139&

ptid=17902&level=3, as viewed on July 10, 20076. Anon, 2002, ‘Picket to protest illegal mining’, The Telegraph, ABP Pvt

Ltd, Kolkata, February 17. http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=89926&

ptid= 17902&level=3, as viewed on June 30, 20078. Debdutta Ghosh, 2001, ‘Bengal threatened by illegal mining’, The

Asian Age, Asian Age Holdings Ltd, Kolkata, January 299. M N Mitra, 2007, ‘Fault lines’, Down To Earth, Society for Environ-

mental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 15, No 9, February 28, p 1410. Lok Sabha Starred Question No 124, March 7, 2007, http:// 164.100.

24.208/lsq14/quest.asp?qref=39553, as viewed on June 30, 200711. Anon, 2006, Annual Report 2005-06, Union ministry of coal, New

Delhi, p 7212. http://web.cmc.net.in/wbcensus/DataTables/02/Table-12.htm and

http://www.wbplan.gov.in/docs/Handbook_2004/Burdwan.pdf,as viewed on July 10, 2007

Box: A parallel economyPratim Ranjan Bose, 2004, ‘In Asansol, parties turn blind eye to illegal mining’, The Hindu, The Hindu Group, Chennai, April 27, 2004

Box: Black: three stories on illegal mining1. Manish Tiwary et al, 2000, ‘A nationalised nightmare’, Down To Earth,

Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 9, No 4,July 15, p 37

2. Anupama Kumari, 2005, ‘Their day starts with coal’, Prabhat Khabar,Ranchi, October 29 (article written under CSE’s Media Fellowship onMining, People and Environment)

3. Anupama Kumari, 2005, ‘Where the world changes with sunset’,Prabhat Khabar, Ranchi, November 6 (article written under CSE’sMedia Fellowship on Mining, People and Environment)

Box: The story of Nirjal BirhorKuntala Lahiri-Dutt, 2007, article written for the Centre for Science andEnvironment, New Delhi

Box: Santhals in turmoilUhnau: Asha for Education, http://www.ashanet.org/projects/document-view.php?id=3539, as viewed on March 17, 2007 and anon, 2002, ‘Dumpedand in despair’, The Telegraph, ABP Pvt Ltd, Kolkata, February 1,http://www.telegraphindia.com/1020202/national.htm, as viewed onMarch 17, 2007

Box: Up in arms in PachwaraRichard Mahapatra, 2005, ‘Theirs to mine?’, Down To Earth, Society forEnvironmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 13, No 22, April 15, pp 26-27

Box: Accident at Jadugudahttp://www.jadugoda.net/Accidents/index.html, as viewed onDecember 18, 2006

Box: Banduhurang: another Jaduguda?Anupama Kumari, 2005, ‘Don’t turn our village into another Hiroshima-Nagasaki’, Prabhat Khabar, Ranchi, November 6 (article written underCSE’s Media Fellowship on Mining, People and Environment)

Box: In dire straits: India’s nuclear plansRichard Mahapatra et al, 2004, ‘Red alert’, Down To Earth, Society forEnvironmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 12, No 23, April 30,

1. David Hart et al, ‘Nuclear power in the third world: An analysis’, EcoWorld, http://www.ecoworld.com/home/articles2.cfm?tid=402, asviewed on December 18, 2006

2. A Roul, 2006, India’s nuclear power assisting energy independence or adangerous experiment? Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility,http://www.ccnr.org/third_world_nukes.html#in, as viewed onDecember 18, 2006

■ KARNATAKA AND MAHARASHTRA1. A Behar et al, 2005, Parliament Digest: Bridging the Gap between

Parliament and People, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune, p 57


3. ibid, p 11-424. ibid, p 11-25. ibid, p 11-26. Data from http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowDataSec.asp?

secid=5956&ptid=19252, as viewed on March 24, 2007 and anon,2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,Nagpur


8. Anon, 2006, ‘Annexure 7’, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi; anon, 2006, StateFinances – A Study of Budgets of 2006-07, Reserve Bank of India,Mumbai, November; and anon, 2005, State Finances – A Study ofBudgets of 2005-06, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, December


10. ibid, p 11-4 11. ibid, p 10-7 12. ibid, p 3-5 13. Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licenses 2003,

Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 14 14. Deepa Kozhisseri, 2005, ‘High on Chinese demand’, Down To Earth,

344


m k

Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 14, No10, October 15, pp 36-37

15. Josh Chin, 2006, ‘Mining frenzy’, Frontline, The Hindu Group,Chennai, Vol 23, Issue 11, June

16. Anon, 2006, ‘How iron disappears in Bellary’, MSN India, September11, http://content.msn.co.in/News/Business/BusinessBS_110906_1008.htm, as viewed on May 25, 2007


18. M Ahiraj, 2007, ‘Mining industry: roll back export duty on iron ore’,The Hindu, The Hindu Group, Chennai, March 4

19. Deepa Kozhisseri, 2005, ‘High on Chinese demand’, Down To Earth,Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 14, No10, October 15, pp 36-37

20. M Ahiraj, 2007, ‘Mining industry: roll back export duty on iron ore’,The Hindu, The Hindu Group, Chennai, March 4

21. Deepa Kozhisseri, 2005, ‘High on Chinese demand’, Down To Earth,Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 14, No10, October 15, pp 36-37

22. M T Shivkumar, 2005, ’Mines and misery – pathetic condition ofwomen’, Prajavani, Bellary, October 22 (article written under CSE’sMedia Fellowship on Mining, People and Environment)


24. Anon, 2006, ‘How iron disappears in Bellary’, MSN India, September11, http://content.msn.co.in/News/Business/BusinessBS_110906_1008.htm, as viewed on May 25, 2007

25. ibid26. Josh Chin, 2006, ‘Mining frenzy’, Frontline, The Hindu Group,

Chennai, Vol 23, Issue 11, June27. ibid28. ibid29. Deepa Kozhisseri, 2005, ‘High on Chinese demand’, Down To Earth,

Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 14, No10, October 15, pp 36-37

30. ibid31. ibid32. ibid33. ibid34. ibid35. ibid36. Ravi Sharma, 2001, ‘Kudremukh Concerns’, Frontline, The Hindu

Group, Chennai, Vol 18, Issue 18, September37. J Krishnaswamy et al, 2002, Impact of Iron Ore Mining in Kudremukh on

Bhadra River Ecosystem, Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology and theEnvironment, Bangalore, http://www.wcsindia.org/sedimentre-port.pdf, as viewed on April 25, 2007

38. Pavithra Sankaran, 2005, ‘Kudremukh mining: closure in sight?’,India Together, Bangalore, October 30, http://www.indiatogether.org/2005/oct/env-kudremukh.htm, as viewed on April 22, 2007

39. Anon, 2002, ‘Shivanahalli residents bear brunt of illegal quarrying’,Deccan Herald, The Printers (Mysore) Pvt Ltd, Bangalore, December 14

40. Anon, 1995, ‘New checkposts to curb illegal quarrying’, The Hindu,The Hindu Group, Delhi, April 26

41. Anon, 2003, ‘Illegal quarrying in protected forests continues’, DeccanHerald, The Printers (Mysore) Pvt Ltd, Bangalore, January 22

42. Anon, 2003, ‘Illegal quarrying on at B R Hills’, Deccan Herald, ThePrinters (Mysore) Pvt Ltd, Bangalore, May 6

43. Anon, 2003, ‘Mining goes unabated in Sirsi forests’, Deccan Herald,The Printers (Mysore) Pvt Ltd, Bangalore, June 15

44. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,Nagpur, pp 11-40, 11-41; and Chandra Bhushan et al, 2005, ConcreteFacts: Life Cycle of the Indian Cement Industry, Centre for Science andEnvironment, New Delhi

Box: A code for landownersB T Venkatesh, 2007, Consultation Meet on Artisanal, Small-scale Mining inIndia, Mine Labour Protection Campaign, March 20, 2007, New Delhi

Box: The little labourers of BellaryShantha Sinha, 2005, ‘Breaking the backs of India’s children’, The AsianAge, Asian Age Holdings Ltd, Bangalore, May 16

Box: Mines and misery: the women miners of BellaryM T Shivkumar, 2005, ’Mines and misery – pathetic condition of women’,Prajavani, Bellary, October 22 (article written under CSE’s MediaFellowship on Mining, People and Environment)

Box: Livelihood versus environmentRavi Sharma, 2006, ‘Waiting for a Miracle’, Frontline, The Hindu Group,Chennai, Vol 23, Issue 1, January 14-27 and Binayak Das, 2002, ‘Deep con-cerns’, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, NewDelhi, Vol 10, No 20, March 15, pp 44-45

Box: Struggle saga1. Ravi Sharma, 2001, ‘Kudremukh Concerns’, Frontline, The Hindu

Group, Chennai, Vol 18, Issue 18, September2. Binayak Das, 2002, ‘Deep concerns’, Down To Earth, Society for

Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 10, No 20, March15, pp 44-45

3. Binayak Das, 2002, ‘Deep concerns’, Down To Earth, Society forEnvironmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 10, No 20, March15, pp 44-45

Box: The sands of Tungabhadra1. Anon, 2003, ‘Illegal sand mining continues on Tungabhadra river

bank’, Deccan Herald, The Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd, Bangalore,March 9

2. Anon, State of Environment Report 2003, Karnataka Department ofEcology and Environment, Bangalore, http://www.parisara.kar.nic.in/PDF/ Mining.pdf, as viewed on February 12, 2007

3. M G Chandrakanth et al, Whither groundwater? Negative externalitiesdue to sand mining in India, Department of Agricultural Economics,GKVK, UAS, Bangalore

Box: Mining in Maharashtra1. Directorate General Factory Advice Service & Labour Institute,

Union ministry of labour and employment, New Delhi,http://dgfasli.nic.in/publication/reports/maharashtra/Chapter2.htm, as viewed on March 21, 2007


3. ibid, p 574. The area under mining leases, says the Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005

published by the Indian Bureau of Mines, is 15,998 ha: 25 per cent ofthis would mean 4,057 ha. However, the area under mining leasesdoes not include coal and minor minerals.

345

REFERENCES

m k


6. Based on data obtained from various publications of the IndianBureau of Mines, Nagpur

7. Based on data from anon, 2006, ‘State Reviews’, Indian MineralsYearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-56

8. ibid, p 11-569. ibid, p 11-56 10. ibid, p 11-5611. Anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee,

Planning Commission, New Delhi 12. ibid13. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,

Nagpur, p 3-514. ibid, pp 3-5 and 11-5615. ibid, p 3-516. Analysed based on data from anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook

2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 3-517. Anon, 1997, ‘Uttan-Dongri residents plan protest against destruction

of eco-system by quarries’, Deccan Herald, The Printers (Mysore) PvtLtd, Banglore, August 17

18. Anil Singh, 1998, ‘Hotels ‘rape’ Matheran hills in quest of construc-tion material’, The Times of India, Bennett Coleman & Co Ltd,Mumbai, July 4

19. Anon, 2002, ‘Government action against bauxite mining’, The Times ofIndia, Bennett Coleman & Co Ltd, Bangalore, May 28, http://time-sofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/11202921.cms, as viewed onMarch 27, 2007

■ KERALA AND TAMIL NADU1. Based on information from documents published by the Indian

Bureau of Mines, Nagpur2. Anon, 2006, ‘State Reviews’, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian

Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-463. Anon, 2007, Economy: Minerals, Kerala government,

http://www.kerala.gov.in/, as viewed on March 23, 2007 4. ibid5. G K Nair, 2004, ‘Kerala’s NOC for mineral sand mining revives

controversy’, The Financial Daily, The Hindu Group, Chennai,March 23

6. Anon, 2006, ‘New areas for gold mining spotted in Kerala’, IndiaPRwire, Gurgaon, http://www.indiaprwire.com/businessnews/20061202/8916.htm, as viewed on March 5, 2007

7. Based on information from documents published by the IndianBureau of Mines, Nagpur


9. Department of Geology and Mining, government of Tamil Nadu,Chennai, http://www.tnmine.tn.nic.in/TN-Mining.htm#Reserves,as viewed on March 26, 2007

10. ibid11. ibid12. ibid13. Analysis based on anon, 2006, ‘State Reviews’, Indian Minerals

Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-8014. State Planning Commission, government of Tamil Nadu, Chennai,

http://www.tn.gov.in/spc/annualplan/chapter10-3.htm, as viewedon March 27, 2007; and http://www.tn.gov.in/spc/annualplan/default.htm as viewed on March 27, 2007

15. Anon, 1998, ‘Sand mining: The bane of Kerala rivers’, The FinancialExpress, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi, June 16 (according tothe Financial Express, in 1998, the “Periyar support[ed] eight villagepanchayats which earn[ed] over Rs 1 crore each from auctioning sandmining rights each year.”)

16. ibid17. ibid18. ibid19. Anon, 1999, ‘Kerala urged to search for alternative to river sand’, The

Hindu Business Line, The Hindu Group, Chennai, August 620. Anon, 1999, ‘Sand mining to be prohibited’, The New Indian Express,

Express Network Private Limited, Kochi, October 921. T P Alexander, 1999, ‘Sand mafia sucks Kerala rivers dry’, The Pioneer,

Pioneer Syndication Services, Delhi, November 1422. Anon, 1998, ‘Sand mining: The bane of Kerala rivers’, The Financial

Express, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi, June 16 23. Anon, 2003, ‘Pampa’s tributary vanishes’, The New Indian Express,

Express Network Private Limited, Kochi, July 2424. G K Nair, 2002, ‘Sand mining shifts to Kerala paddy fields’, The Hindu

Business Line, The Hindu Group, Chennai, July 425. Anon, 2002, ‘HC orders probe into illegal sand mining in Eloor’, The

New Indian Express, Express Network Private Limited, Kochi, April 526. Anon, 2003, ‘Illegal sand mining posing threat to Ranni bridge’, The

New Indian Express, Express Network Private Limited, Kochi,February 23

27. Anon, 1998, ‘Sand quarrying threatens eco-balance in Kerala’, TheHindu Business Line, The Hindu Group, Chennai, February 12

28. Anon, 2004, ‘Ban on sand mining in river Bharathapuzha’, TheFinancial Express, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi, April 4

29. Anon, 2004, ‘Licence of sand mining ghats cancelled’, The New IndianExpress, Express Network Private Limited, Kochi, October 6

30. Anon, 2004, ‘Sand mining in Cauvery river stayed’, Express NewsService, Express Network Private Limited, Kochi, November 30

31. Anon, 2004, ‘Warning against sand mining’, The New Indian Express,Express Network Private Limited, Kochi, December 25

32. Anon, 2006, ‘Issuance of licence for sand mining ghats stopped’, The New Indian Express, Express Network Private Limited, Kochi,January 13

33. Anon, 2006, ‘Panel moots ‘River Protection Squads’’, The Hindu, TheHindu Group, New Delhi, March 3

34. S Vishwanathan, ‘Mining dangers’, Frontline, The Hindu Group,Chennai, Vol 19, Issue 10, May 11-24, http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1910/19100440.htm, as viewed on November 28, 2006

35. G Rajasekaran, 2006, ‘Eco concerns raised over silicon mining’, TheNew Indian Express, Express Network Private Limited, Chennai,August

Box: CollapseP Sudhakar, 2006, ‘Heavy sand mining leads to collapse of checkdam’, TheHindu, The Hindu Group, Chennai, November 24, http://www. thehin-du.com/2006/11/24/stories/2006112404780300.htm as viewed on March23, 2007

Box: Stopped in its tracksAnon, 2007, ‘Court halts sand mining in Tiruvallur lake’, The Hindu, TheHindu Group, Chennai, March 22, http://www.hindu.com/2007/03/22/stories/2007032218740400.htm, as viewed on March 23, 2007

Box: Selling the coast1. A B Kumar, 2001, ‘Bailing out turtles’, Down To Earth, Society

346


m k

for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 9, No 23,April 30, p 41

2. M. Suchitra and P N Venugopal, ‘Coastal sand mining push despiteeco-risks’, India Together, Bangalore, http://www.indiatogether.org/2005/jun/ env-sminerals.htm, as viewed on March 23, 2007

3. ibid4. L K Sekhar and S K Jayadev, 2003, ‘Mining in the Alappuzha coast of

Kerala – a people’s perspective’, Proceedings of the Third InternationalConference on Environment and Health in Chennai, Department ofGeography, University of Madras and Faculty of EnvironmentalStudies, York University, December 15-17, p 478

5. M Suchitra and P N Venugopal, ‘Coastal sand mining push despiteeco-risks’, India Together, http://www.indiatogether.org/2005/jun/env-sminerals.htm, as viewed on March 23, 2007

■ MADHYA PRADESH1. Anon, 2006, ‘State Reviews’, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian

Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-51; and anon, 2005, Bulletin of MiningLeases & Prospecting Licenses 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 3

2. Anon, 2006, ‘State Reviews’, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, IndianBureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-47

3. Anon, 2006, ‘State Reviews’, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, IndianBureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-51; and anon, 2005, Bulletin of MiningLeases & Prospecting Licenses 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 3

4. ibid5. Anon, 2007, Madhya Pradesh Economic Survey 2006-07, government of

Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal, p 1226. Anon, 2006, ‘State Reviews’, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian

Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-51; and anon, 2005, Bulletin of MiningLeases & Prospecting Licenses 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 3

7. Anon, 2006, ‘State Reviews’, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, IndianBureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-3; and anon, 2006, ‘Annexure 7’,National Mineral policy, Report of the High-level Committee, PlanningCommission, New Delhi

8. Analysis based on anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, IndianBureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-4

9. http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=5958&ptid=19252&level=4, as viewed on July 10, 2007

10. http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=3749&ptid=19204&level=4 and http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=101761&ptid=19204&level=4, as viewed on June 30, 2007

11. http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=3834&ptid=19190&level=4, as viewed on June 30, 2007

12. http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=20117&ptid=19219&level=4 and http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid= 56902&ptid=19219&level=4, as viewed onJune 30, 2007

13. Based on data from Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, IndianBureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 8-3, 8-4, 11-51


15. ibid, p 11-5116. ibid, p 29-317. ibid, p 11-51 18. ibid, p 24-119. ibid, p 24-920. ibid, p 53-721. Based on data from anon, 2006, ‘State Reviews’, Indian Minerals

Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-5122. ibid, p 11-50

23. ibid, p 11-5124. Anon, 2001, ‘Advanced Table 1.1, Part A: Main workers classified by

age, industrial category and sex’, Census of India 2001, New Delhi,http://www.censusindia.net/results/B_series/advtbl_1.1_India_Pt_a.pdf, as viewed on May 30, 2007

25. Anon, 2003, Labour and Women in Mining: Background paper for seminaron women and mining, Mines, Minerals and People, New Delhi, April


27. ibid28. Sate profile: advantage Madhya Pradesh, Destination Madhya Pradesh,

Global Investors Summit, 2007, http://www.destinationmad-hyapradesh.com/state-profile/invest-scenario.htm, as viewed onJune 30, 2007

29. http://ibm.nic.in/frames, as viewed on April 20, 2007 30. Based on data from anon, 2005, Wasteland Atlas, Department of Land

Resources, Union ministry of rural development, New Delhi,http://dolr.nic.in/WastelandsAtlas2005/Madhya_Pradesh.pdf, asviewed on July 10, 2007

31. Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licences 2003,Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 15-17

32. ‘Forests of Madhya Pradesh’, State of Forest Department Report 2003,Forest Department, Madhya Pradesh, http://www.forest.mp.gov.in/Foresttable2.html, as viewed on April 2, 2007


34. ibid35. Anon, 2004, ‘MP targets Rs 600 crore from mining’, Business Standard,

Business Standard Ltd, New Delhi, July 836. Anon, 1997, ‘MP urges centre to amend Mines and Minerals Act’, The

Financial Express, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi, June 1937. Anon, 2005, ‘Conditional renewal of MP diamond mine lease’, The

Hindu, The Hindu Group, Chennai, November 1238. ibid39. ibid40. ibid41. Anon, 2002, ‘SAF to help check illegal mining’, Central Chronicle, Ram

Gopal Investment Pvt Ltd, Bhopal, August 1442. Anon, 2002, ‘HC orders stay on mining’, Central Chronicle, Ram Gopal

Investment Pvt Ltd, Bhopal, June 643. Anon, 2005, ‘HC fiat on MP stone mines’, The Hindu Business Line,

The Hindu Group, Chennai, July 2144. Abhilash Khandekar, 2002, ‘Panel finds MP minister guilty of illegal

mining’, The Hindustan Times, HT Media Ltd, New Delhi, April 145. Anon, 2002, ‘Writ filed in SC against illegal mining’, Deccan Herald,

The Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd, Bangalore, December 1446. Abhilash Khandekar, 2002, ‘Panel finds MP minister guilty of illegal

mining’, The Hindustan Times, HT Media Ltd, New Delhi, April 147. Anon, 2002, ‘Writ filed in SC against illegal mining’, Deccan Herald,

The Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd, Bangalore, December 1448. ibid49. Deepak Tiwari, 2005, ‘The great diamond loot’, The Week, Malayala

Manorama Publications, Kochi, March 1650. ibid51. Rumni Ghosh, 2005, ‘Who owns the closed diamond mines?’, Dainik

Bhaskar, Bhaskar Group, Bhopal, November 152. Deepak Tiwari, 2005, ‘The great diamond loot’, The Week, Malayala

Manorama Publications, Kochi, March 1653. ibid54. ibid

347

REFERENCES

m k

55. Rumni Ghosh, 2005, ‘Who owns the closed diamond mines?’, DainikBhaskar, Bhaskar Group, Bhopal, November 1

56. ibid57. Anon, 2006, ‘Govt to seek SC nod for sand mining’, The Pioneer,

Pioneer Syndication Services, New Delhi, July 2158. Directorate of Geology and Mining-Madhya Pradesh, Mineral

Resources Department, government of Madhya Pradesh, http://www.mp.gov.in/geologyandmining/ and Northerm Coalfields Ltd, Sidhi,http://ncl.gov.in/new/profile.htm, as viewed on April 27, 2007

59. Anon, 2000, More than 3 million poor displaced by World Bank project,Centre for International Environmental Law, Washington,http://www.ciel.org/Ifi/pressreleasevigil.html, as viewed on April27, 2007

60. ibid61. http://www.sidhi.nic.in/english/d_e_population.htm, as viewed

on April 27, 200762. John Samuel et al, 2000, Unjust Mining: Issues and Campaign, National

Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune63. Anon, 2000, More than 3 million poor displaced by World Bank project,

Centre for International Environmental Law, Washington,http://www.ciel.org/Ifi/pressreleasevigil.html, as viewed on April27, 2007

64. Fossil Fuels and the World Bank, The Whirled Bank Group,Washington,http://www.whirledbank.org/environment/fuels.html, as viewedon April 27, 2007

65. ibid66. Polluted Places, A project of the Blacksmith Institute, New York,

http://www.pollutedplaces.org/region/south_asia/india/sin-grauli.shtml as viewed on April 27, 2007

67. Anon, 2003, ‘This is no fiction, mercury is rising’, The Economic Times,Bennett Coleman & Co Ltd, New Delhi, September 21

68. Polluted Places, A project of the Blacksmith Institute, New York,http://www.pollutedplaces.org/region/south_asia/india/sin-grauli.shtml as viewed on April 27, 2007

69. R C Srivastava, Guidance and Awareness Raising Materials under New UNEP Mercury Programs (Indian Scenario), Centre forEnvironment Pollution Monitoring and Mitigation, Lucknow,http://www.chem.unep.ch/mercury/2003-gov-sub/India-submis-sion.pdf as viewed on April 27, 2007

70. ibid71. Polluted Places, A project of the Blacksmith Institute, New York,

http://www.pollutedplaces.org/region/south_asia/india/sin-grauli.shtml as viewed on April 27, 2007

72. ibid

Box: SuppressedAnon, 1995, ‘MP govt formulates new mineral policy’, The FinancialExpress, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi, February 2; and Sudhir KSingh, 2003, ‘Narmada andolan to protest adivasi arrest’, The Asian Age,Asian Age Holdings Ltd, New Delhi, September 29

Box: Hand-in-gloveUmesh Singh, 2007, ‘Jyotiraditya to stage dharna on mining issue’, TheHindustan Times, HT Media Ltd, Bhopal, March 31, and Neeraj Mishra,1996, ‘Madhav National Park may fall prey to mining mafia’, The IndianExpress, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi, September 20

Box: Amarkantak endangeredhttp://www.mp.gov.in/geologyandmining/SHAHDOL/shah_main.htm

as viewed on April 15, 2007; V Shiva et al, ‘Conflict over natural resourcesin India’, Ecology and the Politics of Survival, United Nations University,Sage Publications, New Delhi, http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unup-books/80a03e/80A03E0m.htm, as viewed on April 15, 2007

Box: The official encroacherAnon, 1999, ‘WCL and SECL operating illegal mines in the state’, MadhyaPradesh Chronicle, Bhopal, June 21

Box: Diamonds or the tiger? Gar Smith, 2006, ‘Save the tigers’, The Edge, January 19,http://www.earthisland.org/project/newsPage2.cfm?newsID=784&pageID=177&subSiteID=44, as viewed on April 25, 2007; P Devarajan, 2007,‘Development projects to dissect the Panna’, The Hindu Business Line, TheHindu Group, Chennai, January 24

Box: Daku tax Deepak Tiwari, 2005, ‘The great diamond loot’, The Week, MalayalaManorama Publications, Kochi, March 16

Box: Nothing holy about this Deepak Tiwari, 1999, ‘Holy hitch’, The Week, Malayala ManoramaPublications, Kochi, February 21

■ THE NORTH-EAST1. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,

Nagpur, p 11-2 2. ibid, p 11-23. ibid, p 11-4 4. ibid, p 3-55. ibid, p 3-56. Anon, 1998, ‘Stink in the northeast’, Down To Earth, Society for

Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 6, No 18, February15, pp 16-17

7. Uma Shankar, ‘A greenscape goes black’, Down To Earth, Society forEnvironmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 2, No 24, May 15,pp 47-48

8. ibid, pp 47-489. Anon, 1998, ‘Stink in the northeast’, Down To Earth, Society for

Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 6, No 18, February15, pp 16-17

10. ibid, pp 16-1711. ibid, pp 16-1712. H P D Borauh, 2006, Geochemical and Biochemical Properties of Coalmine

Tailings of North Eastern Collieries of Assam, India, Regional ResearchLaboratory, Jorhat, July, http://crops.confex.com/crops/wc2006/techprogram/P13641.HTM, as viewed on January 17, 2007

13. Gurdeep Singh, 1987, ‘Mine water quality deterioration due to acidmine discharge’, International Journal of Mine Water, Hungary, Vol 6, No1

14. ibid15. Pankaj Sekhsaria ed, 2006, ‘MoEF opposes quarrying at Mikir Chang

near Kaziranga’, Protected Area Update, Kalpavriksh, Pune, Vol XII,No 2, April, http://www.wii.gov.in/envis/paupdates/60apr06.doc,as viewed on February 15, 2007

16. Dilpeet B Chhabra ed, 2007, ‘Stone quarrying in KKL threatenswildlife’, Jungle Express, WWF-India, New Delhi

17. ibid18. Shiv Shankar Chatterjee, 1998, ‘Living on the edge’, Rashtriya Sahara,

July 1

348


m k

19. ibid20. Richard Mahapatra et al, 2002, ‘The second independence’, Down To

Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol11, No 7, August 31, p 28

21. ibid, p 2822. http://www.wise-uranium.org/upin.html#KYLLENG, as viewed

on January 28, 200723. ibid24. ibid25. ibid26. ibid27. ibid28. ibid29. ibid30. ibid31. ibid32. ibid33. ibid

Box: A rocky issueAnon, 1996, ‘The Fortnight’, Down To Earth, Society for EnvironmentalCommunications, New Delhi (Vol 4, No 18, February 15; Vol 4, No 22,April 15; Vol 4, No 23, April 30; and Vol 5, No 11, October 31)

Box: Meghalaya’s lost treasureRaymond R Kharmujai, 2005, ‘Meghalaya’s lost treasure’, Down To Earth,Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 14, No 2,June 15, p 20

Box: The story of three villagesRatna Bharali Talukdar, 2005, ‘Uncertain future lies ahead: KhumtongHakum’, Asomiya Protidin, Guwahati, December 8 (article written underCSE’s Media Fellowship on Mining, People and Environment)

■ ORISSA1. Anon, 2006, ‘Forests and biodiversity’, State of Environment Report

Orissa, government of Orissa, Bhubaneswar, p 1222. Sanjay Khatua et al, 2006, ‘Ecological debt: A case study from Orissa,

India’, Ecological Debt: The Peoples of the South are the Creditors, WorldCouncil of Churches, Geneva, p 136

3. Based on analysis of data from anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur

4. ibid5. Prafulla Das, 2006, ‘Orissa witnesses frenzied investment activity’,

The Hindu Business Line, The Hindu Group, New Delhi, July 24,http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2006/07/24/sto-ries/2006072402120300.htm, as viewed on April 22, 2007

6. R K Sharma, 2006, Indian mining industry, presentation by theFederation of Indian Mineral Industries, New Delhi

7. P Das, 2005, `Industrialisation will harm Orissa’s ecology greatly, TheHindu Business Line, The Hindu Group, Chennai, June 7,http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2005/06/07/sto-ries/2005060702321700.htm, as viewed on April 20, 2007

8. ibid9. Anon, 2001, Industrial Policy – 2001, government of Orissa,

Bhubaneshwar, http://orissagov.nic.in/industries/IPR2001A.htm,as viewed on February 12, 2007


11. ibid, p 11-4

12. Based on data collected from Indian Minerals Yearbooks 1997 to 2005,Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur

13. Envis Centre, Centre for Environmental Studies, http://www.cesorissa.org/economics.asp, as viewed on January 17, 2007

14. http://www.cesorissa.org/economics.asp, as viewed on January 17,2007; anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau ofMines, Nagpur, p 11-2

15. http://www.cesorissa.org/economics.asp, as viewed on January 17,2007

16. Publications of the Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur (this does notinclude data on land used for extracting minor minerals)

17. A Aruna Murthy, 2006, Status Paper on Mining Leases in Orissa,Vasundhara, Bhubaneshwar (based on information obtained underthe RTI Act from the Directorate of Mines, Orissa)

18. ibid19. ibid20. ibid21. ibid22. ibid23. ibid24. Anon, 2004, ‘Introduction’, Human Development Report 2004, govern-

ment of Orissa, Bhubaneshwar, p 325. Calculated based on data on total geographical area collected

from Orissa Forest, Orissa Forest Development Corporation,Bhubaneshwar, http://www.orissafdc.com/orissaforest_ofdc.php,as viewed on February 12, 2007; data on total area under mining col-lected from A Aruna Murthy, 2006, Status Paper on Mining Leases inOrissa, Vasundhara, Bhubaneshwar (based on information obtainedunder the RTI Act from the Directorate of Mines, Orissa)

26. A. Behar et al, 2005, Parliament Digest: Bridging the Gap betweenParliament and People, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune, p 57

27. ibid, p 5728. Anon, 2005, ‘Environmental clearance to industries in Orissa’,

Unstarred Question in Lok Sabha, Union ministry of environmentand forests, http://164.100.24.208/lsq14/quest.asp?qref=18969, asviewed on November 10, 2006

29. Ranjan Panda, 2006, Impending Ecological Anarchy: Orissa will turn intoa barren land!, Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict, New Delhi,http://www.sspconline.org/article_details.asp?artid=art100, asviewed on March 14, 2007

30. Anon, 2005, ‘New Elephant Reserve Plans Hit Mining Roadblock’,The New Indian Express, Express Network Private Ltd, New Delhi,October 4

31. Anon, 2005, Ruling of the Central Empowered Committee, SupremeCourt of India, www.esgindia.org/moefsuno2005/Vedanta%20Alumina% 20Orissa.doc, as viewed on April 17, 2007

32. Anon, 2006, Vedanta’s aluminium refinery project and bauxite miningproject on Niyamgiri: Environmental and social costs vis-s-vis benefits toOrissa and its people, Environment Protection Group, Orissa,http://www.freewebs.com/epgorissa/A%20note%20on%20Environmental%20and%20Social%20Costs%20of%20Vedanta%20vis.doc, asviewed on April 17, 2007

33. Ranjan Panda, 2007, Thirsty mines, dispossessed communities, articlewritten for the Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi

34. ibid35. Manish Tiwary et al, 2000, ‘A nationalised nightmare’, Down To Earth,


36. ibid, p 36

349

REFERENCES

m k

37. Ranjan Panda, 2007, Thirsty mines, dispossessed communities, articlewritten for the Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi

38. ibid39. ibid40. ibid41. ibid42. ibid43. http://www.cpcb.nic.in/Water/Doc/Chapter4.doc, as viewed on

April 17, 200744. Manish Tiwary et al, 2000, ‘A nationalised nightmare’, Down To Earth,


45. Anon, 2006, ‘Mining’, State of Environment Report-Orissa, governmentof Orissa, Bhubaneshwar, p 212

46. Anon, 2005, ‘Prayer, answer to government apathy’, The Hindu, TheHindu Group, Chennai, November 25, http://www.hindu.com/2005/11/25/stories/ 2005112506050700.htm, as viewed on April 30, 2007

47. Anon, 2007, ‘Lingaraj coal mine fire causes health problems’, TheStatesman News Service, The Statesman Ltd, Kolkata, January 17

48. Anon, 2007, ‘MCL official held’, Newindpress.com, Express NetworkPrivate Ltd, New Delhi, March 18, http://newindpress.com/NewsItems.asp?ID=IEQ20070317223426&Page=Q&Title=ORISSA&Topic=0&aDate=3%2F18%2F2007, as viewed on April 30, 2007

49. Anon, 2007, ‘Dust pollution from coal mine hits life’,Newindpress.com, Express Network Private Ltd, New Delhi, March 8,http://newindpress.com/NewsItems.asp?ID=IEQ20070307234811&Page=Q&Title=ORISSA&Topic=0&aDate=3%2F8%2F2007, as viewedon April 30, 2007

50. Abhayaraj Naik et al, 2007, Green Tapism: A Review of the EnvironmentalImpact Assessment Notification – 2006, Environment Support Group,Bangalore

51. Sanjay Khatua et al, 2006, ‘Ecological debt: A case study from Orissa,India’, Ecological Debt: The Peoples of the South are the Creditors, WorldCouncil of Churches, Geneva, p 136

52. Aman Sethi, 2007, ‘Deep dent’, Frontline, The Hindu Group, Chennai,Vol 24, Issue 10, June, http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/ fl2410/stories/20070601001804100.htm, as viewed on April 10, 2007

53. Anon, 2004, ‘Internal displacement is a global crisis affecting 52 coun-tries. The facts...’, Drishtikone, August-November, p 12, eficor.org/publications/Internally_Displaced_People.pdf, as viewed on April10, 2007

54. Anon, ‘Alcan’t in India, A Solidarity Campaign with the Advisasis ofKashipur’, South Asian Action Network, http://www.saanet.org/alcant/context.htm#facts, as viewed on April 10, 2007

55. Kundan Kumar, 2006, Disposed and displaced: A brief paper on tribalissues in Orissa, Environment Protection Group, Orissa,http://www.freewebs.com/epgorissa/Orissa%20mining%20and%20industrialisation%20note.doc, as viewed on April 17, 2007

56. ibid57. Sanjay Khatua et al, 2006, ‘Ecological debt: A case study from Orissa,

India’, Ecological Debt: The Peoples of the South are the Creditors, WorldCouncil of Churches, Geneva, p 140

58. Richard Mahapatra, 2005, ‘Theirs to mine?’ Down To Earth, Society forEnvironmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 13, No 22, April 15,p 28

59. ibid, p 2860. ibid, p 2861. D Sathapathy, 2006, ‘Orissa pays the price for progress’,

Rediff News, January 10, http://www.rediff.com/money/2006/jan/10orissa.htm, as viewed on April 10, 2007

62. J M Kujur, 2005, ‘“Development” not for tribes’, Mines andCommunities, June 18, http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Country/india17.htm, as viewed on April 10, 2007

63. Anon, 2006, ‘Tribals blockade India Steel mill’, British BroadcastingCorporation, London, January 10, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ south_asia/ 4599986.stm, as viewed on April 10, 2007

64. Anon, 2004, ‘Introduction’, Development Induced Displacement in India:Impact on Women, National Commission for Women, New Delhi, pp 2-3,http://ncw.nic.in/pdfreports/Development%20Induced%20Displacement%20of%20Women.pdf, as viewed on April 10, 2007

65. Sanjay Khatua et al, 2006, ‘Ecological debt: A case study from Orissa,India’, Ecological Debt: The Peoples of the South are the Creditors, WorldCouncil of Churches, Geneva, p 150

66. Manipadma Jena, 2006, ‘Orissa: Draft Resettlement andRehabilitation Policy, 2006’, Economic and Political Weekly, ASameeksha Trust Publication, Mumbai, February, pp 384-387,http://www.epw.org.in/epw/uploads/articles/1660.pdf, as viewedon April 10, 2007

67. Anon, 2006, ‘Nalco appeals to people’s body to call off stir’, StatesmanNews Service, The Statesman Ltd, Kolkata, February 15

68. F Dubois, 2004, ‘Alcan in troubled water’, Montreal Serai, Vol 17, No2, http://www.montrealserai.com/2004_Volume_17/17_2/Article_5.htm, as viewed on April 12, 2007

69. http://angul.nic.in/industry.htm#COALFIELD, as viewed on April12, 2007

70. Imran Khan, 2000, ‘Dark side of coal mining’, Business and PoliticalObserver, October 4; anon, 2006, ‘Talcher coalfield in troubled times’,Newindpress.com, Express Network Private Ltd, New Delhi, October19, http://newindpress.com/NewsItems.asp?ID=IEQ20061019015959&Page=Q& Title=ORISSA&Topic=0&aDate=10%2F19%2F2006as viewed on April 12, 2007; and Bijay Mishra, 2006, ‘MCL, govern-ment incur Rs 115 Cr losses due to coal mine oustees’ stir’, Mining andIndustrialisation Update-Orissa, Vol 1, No 3, January-February, p 5,http://www.freewebs.com/epgorissa/M%20I%20Update/Mining%20Update_Jan_Feb_2006.pdf, as viewed on April 12, 2007

71. Anon, 2006, Posco India extends specialized medical assistance to the peo-ple of Orissa, Press Release by Posco India, Jagatsinghpur, July 2,http://posco-india.com/website/press-room/posco-india-extends-specialized-medical-assistance.htm, as viewed on January 30, 2007

72. Anon, 2006, ‘Locals to continue anti-Posco stir’, Mining andIndustrialisation Update-Orissa, Environment Protection Group,Orissa, Vol 1, No 3, January-February, p 3, http://www.freewebs.com/epgorissa/M%20I%20Update/Mining%20Update_Jan_Feb_2006.pdf, as viewed on April 12, 2007

73. Anon, 2006, ‘Posco to buy more land to compensate farmers’, OrissaDaily News, Bhubaneshwar, November 20

74. Anon, 2007, ‘Arcelor Mittal’s Orissa steel plant runs into controver-sy’, Mining and Industrialisation Update-Orissa, EnvironmentProtection Group, Orissa, Vol 2, No 5, January, p 10, http://www.freewebs.com/epgorissa/M%20I%20Update/Draft%20January%202007%20Mining%20Update[1][1].pdf, as viewed on April 12, 2007


76. Anon, 2005, ‘SC committee says no to Vedanta/Sterlite’s Orissa refin-ery’, Mines and Communities, September 24, 2005, http://www.mine-sandcommunities.org/Action/press747.htm, as viewed on April 17,2007

350


m k


78. Sandeep Mishra, 2006, ‘Vedanta’s Orissa project faces hurdle’, TimesNews Network, Bennett Coleman & Co Ltd, New Delhi, August 4

79. Anon, 2005, ‘Tribals protest against Vedanta’, The Statesman, TheStatesman Ltd, Kolkata, December 5

80. Marianne Barriaux, 2006, ‘Tribal activists carry Indian mining protestto London’, The Guardian, August 3

81. Peter Popham, 2006, ‘Indian villagers pay a high price as commodityboom comes to rural Orissa’, The Independent, August 6

82. Jackie Range, 2006, ‘Vedanta harmed environment in India’, DowJones Newswire, August 2

83. Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No 733, Union ministry of environ-ment and forests, July 12, http://164.100.24.208/lsq14/quest.asp?qref=1469, as viewed on February 17, 2007

84. N Patnaik, 1996, ‘SAIL brass face suit over illegal mining’, EconomicTimes, Bennett Coleman & Co Ltd, New Delhi, August 24

85. Sanjay Srivastav et al, 2006, Environment and social challenges of miner-al based growth in Orissa: Building partnership for sustainable develop-ment, The World Bank, New Delhi, p 48

Box: A failed attemptP Ghosh, 2006, ‘Federal express’, Down To Earth, Society for EnvironmentalCommunications, New Delhi, Vol 14, No 16, January 15, p 16

Box: Bauxite bonanzaAnalysed by the the Industry and Environment Unit of Centre for Scienceand Environment, New DelhiNote: 1 Assuming per capita consumption of 55 litre as recommended bythe Union ministry of rural development

Box: Saving a hillA B Mishra, 1987, ‘Mining a hill and undermining a society – the case ofGandhamardan’, The Fight for Survival, Centre for Science andEnvironment, New Delhi, pp 125-144

Box: No place for elephantsAnon, 2005, ‘New elephant reserve plans hit mining roadblock’, The NewIndian Express, Express Network Private Ltd, New Delhi, October 4

Box: OrphanedAnon, 2006, ‘Life under threat as expended mines go without sand filling’, Mining and Industrialisation Update-Orissa, EnvironmentProtection Group, Orissa, Vol 2, No 2, October, p 22, http://www.freewebs.com/epgorissa/M%20I%20Update/Final%20Mining%-20Update%20-%20October%5B1%5D.pdf, as viewed on April 2, 2007;and anon, 2006, ‘HC notice on environmental threat to Talcher’,Newindpress.com, Express Network Private Ltd, New Delhi, November 1, Cuttack, http://newindpress.com/NewsItems.asp?ID=IEQ2006-1101012604&Page=Q&Title=ORISSA&Topic=0&aDate=11%2F1%2F2006,as viewed on April 2, 2007

Box: Mines obliterating water sources Braja Kishore Mishra, 2005, ‘Khandadhar sacrificed at the mining altar’,Samaja, Bhubaneshwar, October 23 (article written under CSE’s MediaFellowship on Mining, People and Environment)

Box: Women struggle for waterAnon, 2004, ‘Introduction’, Development Induced Displacement in India:

Impact on Women, National Commission for Women, New Delhi, pp 16-17,http://ncw.nic.in/pdfreports/Development%20Induced%20Displacement%20of%20Women.pdf, as viewed on April 10, 2007

Box: Darlipali: raring to go Ranjan Panda, 2006, ‘Undermined’, Down To Earth, Society forEnvironmental Communications, New Delhi, May 15, Vol 14, No 24, pp 35-40

Box: Poison river, chromite countryAnon, 2006, Envis Newsletter, Centre for Environmental Studies, Orissa,Vol 5, May-July; C S Dubey et al, 2001, ‘Chromium VI in waters in parts ofSukinda chromite valley and health hazards, Orissa, India’, Bull. Environ.Contam. Toxicol. (2001) 67:541–548, New York; anon, 2004, Mining-relatedchromate water pollution in the Sukinda watershed (Orissa, India),Environment Process Division, BRGM, France

Box: Ill assessedAnon, 2006, Studies on impact of proposed Lanjigarh bauxite mining on biodiversity including wildlife and its habitat, Wildlife Institute of India, Dehradun, http://www.freewebs.com/epgorissa/WII%20-Report%20on%20Niyamgiri.pdf, as viewed on March 15, 2007;http://www.freewebs.com/epgorissa/%20New%20Folder/4.Rungta%20iron& %20Bauxite%20in%20Koida.doc, as viewed on March 15, 2007;http://www.freewebs.com/epgorissa/-%20New%20Folder/11.%20pub-lic%20hearing%20for%20putullipani%20iron%20ore%20mines.doc, asviewed on March 15, 2007; and http://www.freewebs.com/epgorissa/-%20New%20Folder/12.%20utkal%20d%20block%20coal%20mining%20at%20Raijharan.doc, as viewed on March 15, 2007

Box: Subverting the Samata judgementKushal P Yadav, 2003, ‘Breach of law’, Down To Earth, Society forEnvironmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 12, No 6, August 15

Box: Displaced AGAIN?E-mail communication with Prasanna Behera, environmental activistworking with Nature, Environment and Wildlife Society, Angul, Orissaand anon, 2007, ‘People facing second displacement’, The Statesman, TheStatesman Ltd, Kolkata, January 15

Box: People’s protest against UAILRichard Mahapatra, 2005, ‘Theirs to mine?’, Down To Earth, Society forEnvironmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 13, No 22, April 15, pp26-27; A Mishra, ‘Orissa aluminum project breaking law to build, expand’,Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi,Vol 15, No 13, November 30, pp 7-8

■ RAJASTHAN AND GUJARAT1. Bahar Dutt, 2005, Organising the Unorganised, Mine Labour Protection

Campaign, Jodhpur, p 7 2. Anon, 2007, State of Environment Report for Rajasthan: 2006, Rajasthan

State Pollution Board, Jaipur, March, p 423. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,

Nagpur, pp 11-73-11-74, 15-4, 21-3, 45-4, 52-7, 52-8 4. ibid, p 11-4 5. ibid, p 11-46. Anon, 2007, State of Environment Report for Rajasthan: 2006, Rajasthan

State Pollution Board, Jaipur, March, p 477. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,

Nagpur, p 11-2

351

REFERENCES

m k

8. Data from http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowDataSec.asp?secid=5956&ptid=19252, as viewed on March 24, 2007 and anon,2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur


10. Anon, 2006, ‘Annexure 7’, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi; anon, 2006, StateFinances – A Study of Budgets of 2006-07, Reserve Bank of India,Mumbai, November; and anon, 2005, State Finances – A Study ofBudgets of 2005-06, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, December

11. Anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee,Planning Commission, New Delhi

12. Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licences 2003,Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 23

13. ibid, pp 4, 18-20 14. ibid, p 315. ibid, pp 18-2016. ibid, pp 18-20 17. Anon, 1998, ‘Australian mining giants to undertake surveys in

Rajasthan’, The Financial Express, The Indian Express Group, NewDelhi, March 7

18. Anon, 2007, State of Environment Report for Rajasthan: 2006, RajasthanState Pollution Board, p 43

19. ibid, p 4320. ibid, p 4321. ibid, p 4322. Sunny Sebastian, 2006, ‘Villagers up in arms against sand mine oper-

ators’, The Hindu, The Hindu Group, Delhi, May 823. Bahar Dutt, 2005, Organising the Unorganised, Mine Labour Protection

Campaign, Jodhpur, Preface24. ibid, p 725. ibid, p 726. ibid, p 727. Anon, 2002, ‘Rampant illegal mining in Rajasthan’, The Times of India,

Bennett Coleman & Co Ltd, New Delhi, February 1928. Bahar Dutt, 2005, Organising the Unorganised, Mine Labour Protection

Campaign, Jodhpur, p 629. Anon, 1995, ‘Mine safety rules flouted’, The Pioneer, Pioneer

Syndication Services, New Delhi, June 2930. ibid31. Deepak Malik, 2005, ‘Silicosis – a dusty tale in Rajasthan’, India

Together, Bangalore, http://www.indiatogether.org/2005/aug/env-lungdust.htm, as viewed on February 21, 2007

32. Indira Khurana, 1997, ‘The killer mines’, Down To Earth, Society forEnvironmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 6, No 12,November 15, pp 44-45

33. ibid, pp 44-4534. Anon, 2007, State of Environment Report for Rajasthan: 2006, Rajasthan

State Pollution Board, Jaipur, p 5035. http://www.rajforest.nic.in/general_intro.htm, as viewed on March

28, 200736. A Behar et al, 2005, Parliament Digest: Bridging the Gap between


37. S Mishra, 1996, ‘Mining on forest land continues despite ban’,Business and Political Observer, Jaipur, February 25

38. ibid39. Anon, 2002, ‘SC notice on Sariska mining’, The Hindu Business Line,

The Hindu Group, Chennai, November 1640. Sukhmani Singh, 2002, ‘Mined over matter’, The Indian Express, The

Indian Express Group, New Delhi, April 2141. ibid42. Sudhanshu Mishra, 1996, ‘Mining on forest land continues despite

ban’, Business and Political Observer, Jaipur, December 2543. Usha Rai, 1997, ‘Renewal of mining in Rajasthan likely’, The

Hindustan Times, HT Media Ltd, New Delhi, January 1644. Anil Sharma, 2003, ‘Rajasthan stone industry in trouble’, The

Statesman, The Statesman Ltd, New Delhi, June 2345. Anon, 2005, ‘Court asks for report on illegal mining in Sariska’, The

Pioneer, Pioneer Syndication Services, New Delhi, May 646. Anon, 2006, ‘Illegal mining threatening Rajasthan sanctuary’, Sahara

Samay, March 1847. Indira Khurana, 1997, ‘The killer mines’, Down To Earth, Society for

Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 6, No 12,November 15, pp 44-45

48. Anon, 2007, State of Environment Report for Rajasthan: 2006, RajasthanState Pollution Board, p 47

49. Indira Khurana, 1997, ‘The killer mines’, Down To Earth, Society forEnvironmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 6, No 12,November 15, pp 44-45

50. ibid, pp 44-4551. ibid, pp 44-4552. http://stonesofindia.org/papers/18%20-%20Gainful%20

Utilization%20of%20Marble%20Wast%20%20Siddharth%20Pareek.doc, as viewed on February 1, 2007

53. ibid54. http://www.iricen.gov.in/, as viewed on February 1, 200755. Anon, 2003, ‘Green marble, soapstone quarrying stopped’, The Hindu

Business Line, The Hindu Group, New Delhi, December 1356. Anon, 2003, ‘SC notice on illegal mining’, The Hindu Business Line,

The Hindu Group, New Delhi, January 2457. Anon, 2003, ‘On a track to disaster’, The Hindustan Times, HT Media

Ltd, New Delhi, July 2758. Anon, 2004, ‘HC order forces 20,000 mines in Rajasthan to suspend

work’, The Tribune, The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh, May 1759. Rakesh Bhatnagar, 2004, ‘HC warns Rajasthan for flouting pollution

norms’, The Times of India, Bennett Coleman & Co Ltd, New Delhi,November

Box: Unaccounted1. Anon, 2007, Database, Mine Labour Protection Campaign, Jodhpur,

http://www.minelabour.org/Database.PDF, as viewed on March 26, 2007

2. P Madhavan et al, 2005, Budhpura: Ground Zero, Sandstone quarrying inIndia, India Committee of the Netherlands, The Netherlands, p 6

Box: Unorganised: Jodhpur’s sandstone minesRekha Wazir, 2001, Child Labour in Jodhpur District, Mine Labour ProtectionCampaign, Jodhpur

Box: Mining cooperatives – the way ahead? Anon, 2003, A Case Study of Mineworkers Cooperative at Sanfa, Barmer, MineLabour Protection Campaign, Jodhpur, and conversations with RanaSengupta of Mine Labour Protection Campaign, March 28, 2007

Box: All above the law1. Anon, 2007, State of Environment Report for Rajasthan: 2006, Rajasthan

State Pollution Board, Jaipur, p 422. ibid, p 503. Gopal Krishna, 2006, ‘White asbestos, a health time bomb’, India

352


m k

Together, Bangalore, April 12, http://www.indiatogether.org/2006/apr/ hlt-asbestos.htm, as viewed on March 28, 2007

4. Anon, 2007, State of Environment Report for Rajasthan: 2006, RajasthanState Pollution Board, Jaipur, p 51

5. Anon, 2005, ‘Supreme Court stays mining operations in Rajasthan’,The Times of India, Bennett Coleman & Co Ltd, New Delhi, April 13

Box: Playing with fire1. Anon, 2006, Elimination of asbestos-related diseases, World Health

Organization, Geneva, p 2 2. Anon, 2006, ’Asbestos’, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau

of Mines, Nagpur, pp 15-7, 15-83. Anon, 2006, Chrysotile Asbestos Mining, Government of India, March

10, http://pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=16464&kwd, asviewed on May 2, 2007

4. Anon, 2006, Elimination of asbestos-related diseases, World HealthOrganization, Geneva, p 1

5. ibid, p 1 6. Anon, 2006, ‘Asbestos’, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau

of Mines, Nagpur, p 15-77. ibid, p 15-18. ibid, pp 15-1 to 15-49. ibid, p 15-610. Telephone conversation with Dr Ahmad, May 7, 2007; and e-mail cor-

respondence, May 7-8, 200711. Anon, 2006, ‘Asbestos’, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau

of Mines, Nagpur, p 15-712. ibid, p 15-813. Anon, 2006, Elimination of asbestos-related diseases, World Health

Organization, Geneva, p 2

Box: A campaign diesAnalysis by the Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science andEnvironment, New Delhi

Box: The changing hillsKazimuddin Ahmed, 1999, ‘Digging the earth’, Down To Earth, Society forEnvironmental Communications, New Delhi, June 30, pp 20-21

Box: The case of ChittorgarhRitu Gupta, 2005, ‘A slur’, Down To Earth, Society for EnvironmentalCommunications, New Delhi, Vol 13, No 22, April 15, pp 50-51

Box: At riskPalak Nandi, 2007, ‘Mined’, The Indian Express, The Indian Express Group,New Delhi, January 15

Box: Mining in Gujarat1. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,

Nagpur2. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,

Nagpur, pp 11-40, 11-41; and Chandra Bhushan et al, 2005, ConcreteFacts: Life Cycle of the Indian Cement Industry, Centre for Science andEnvironment, New Delhi

3. Anon, 2005, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines,Nagpur

4. http://www.gujaratindustry.gov.in/resource.html#mineral, asviewed on March 17, 2007

5. Anon, 2001, ‘Advanced Table 1.1, Part A: Main workers classified byage, industrial category and sex’, Census of India 2001, New Delhi,

http://www.censusindia.net/results/B_series/advtbl_1.1_India_Pt_a.pdf, as viewed on May 30, 2007

6. Anon, 2006, Socio-economic Review 2005-06: Gujarat State, Directorateof Economics and Statistics, government of Gujarat, Gandhinagar


8. V Thapar, 1997, ‘Violating India’s national treasure’, Seminar 485,Sanctuary Asia, Vol XVII, No 5, http://www.india-seminar.com/2000/485/485%20valmik%20thapar.htm, as viewed on April 2, 2007

9. Anon, 2000, ‘SC bans mining near chinkara sanctuary’, The HinduBusiness Line, The Hindu Group, Chennai, February 22,http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1708/17080650.htm, as viewedon April 2, 2007


11. V Thapar, 1997, ‘Violating India’s national treasure’, Seminar 485,Sanctuary Asia, Vol XVII, No 5, http://www.india-seminar.com/2000/485/ 485%20valmik%20thapar.htm, as viewed on April 2, 2007

12. Deep Joshi, 2000, ‘Lignite quarry leaves tribals with no place to callhome’, The Indian Express, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi,July 25


14. Darshan Desai, 2005, ‘Rampant mining eats into Saurashtra coast’,The Times of India, Bennett Coleman & Co Ltd, Ahmedabad, June 22

15. Anon, 2004, ‘Villagers up in arms against mining project’, The Timesof India, Bennett Coleman & Co Ltd, Ahmedabad, September 10

5. THE CHALLENGE OF GOVERNANCE

1. Anon, 2006, Environmental and Social Challenges of Mineral-basedGrowth in Orissa: Building Partnership for Sustainable Development, TheWorld Bank, New Delhi, p 50

2. Anon, 2005, Mining and Industrialisation Update: Orissa, EnvironmentalProtection Group, Orissa, Vol 1, No 2, November-December, p 9

3. Anon, 2001, Forestry Statistics India 2001, Indian Council of ForestryResearch and Education, Dehradun

4. Padmaparna Ghosh, 2006, ‘Pricing forests: net present valueassessed’, Down To Earth, Society for EnvironmentalCommunications, New Delhi, June 30, Vol 15, No 3, p 19 and S KDatta et al, Study on NPV calculations for diversion of forest land for min-ing purposes, Federation of Indian Mining Industries, New Delhi

5. Sonu Jain, 2005, ‘SC defines green cost for projects built on forestland: cost per hectare will factor in trees, biodiversity, density’, TheIndian Express, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi, September29,http://envirovaluation.org/index.php/2005/09/29/indian_express_www_indianexpress_com, as viewed on April 24, 2007

6. Based on information from Circular Nos 14 and 19 of 2003, IndianBureau of Mines, Nagpur

7. Anon, 2006, Mining Information Kit for Aboriginal Communities,Government of Canada, p 78

Box: Pollution standards for miningCentral Pollution Control Board, New Delhi and Directorate-General ofMines Safety, DhanbadNote: 1‘Respirable asbestos fibre’ means any fibrous form of mineral silicates of chrysolite, actionolite, amosite, anthophyllite, crocidolite,tremolite or any admixure thereof with a length of greater than 5

353

REFERENCES

m k

micrometres and a diameter of less than 3 micrometres and a length-to-diameter ratio greater than three-is-to-one.

Box: Indian Bureau of Mines: ineffective?Analysis based on data from Annual Reports, Union ministry of mines,New Delhi

Box: Off bounds?Anon, 1994, ‘Schedule 1’, Environment Impact Assessment Notification,Union ministry of environment and forests, New Delhi,http://envfor.nic.in/, as viewed on October 20, 2007

Box: The Hoda reportChandra Bhushan et al, 2007, ‘Poor folks, rich land’, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communication, New Delhi, Vol 15, No23, April 30, pp 29-32

Box: Mine sharks (The Hoda report)1. S Kirsch, 2002, ‘Anthropology and Advocacy: A Case Study of the

Campaign against OK Tedi Mine’, Critique of Anthropology, SagePublication, London, p 176

2. Anon, 2004, ‘Ruined land, poisoned water’, Dirty Metals, Mining,Communities and the Environment, Earthworks, Oxfam America,Washington, p 7

3. S Kirsch, 2002, ‘Anthropology and Advocacy: A Case Study of theCampaign against OK Tedi Mine’, Critique of Anthropology, SagePublication, London, p 176

4. ‘Buyat Bay, Indonesia’, No Dirty Gold, EarthWorks and OxfamAmerica, Washington, http://www.nodirtygold.org/buyat_bay_indonesia.cfm, as viewed on March 15, 2007

5. ibid6. Anon, 2006, ‘Mine giant settles pollution case’, British Broadcasting

Corporation News, London, http%//news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/4718672.stm, as viewed on March 15, 2007

7. ‘Buyat Bay, Indonesia’, No Dirty Gold, EarthWorks and OxfamAmerica, Washington, http://www.nodirtygold.org/buyat_bay_indonesia.cfm, as viewed on March 15, 2007

Box: Escaping liability1. K S Bergmann, 2004, Bankruptcy, Limited Liability and CERCLA:

Closing the Loophole and Parting the Veil, School of Law, University ofMaryland, p 5, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1079&context=fac_pubs, as viewed onMarch 11, 2007

2. J Kuipers, 2003, Putting a Price on Pollution: Financial Assurance forMine Reclamation and Closure, Mineral Policy Centre, Washington,MPC Issue Paper No 4, p 27, http://www.earthworksaction.org/pubs/ PuttingAPriceOnPollution.pdf, as viewed on March 10, 2007

3. ibid, p 124. K S Bergmann, 2004, Bankruptcy, Limited Liability and CERCLA: Closing

the Loophole and Parting the Veil, School of Law, University of Maryland,p 3, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1079&context=fac_pubs, as viewed on March 11, 2007

5. M B Snell, 2006, Going for Broke, Sierra Club, San Francisco,http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/200605/goingforbroke/page1.asp, as viewed on March 20, 2007

6. ibid7. Anon, 2004, ‘Midnite Uranium Mine, Washington’, Westerners for

Responsible Mining, http://www.bettermines.org/midnite.cfm, asviewed on March 20, 2007

8. Anon, ‘Zortman-Landusky Gold Mine, Montana’, Westerners forResponsible Mining, http://www.bettermines.org/zortman.cfm, asviewed on March 20, 2007

9. J Kuipers, 2003, Putting a Price on Pollution: Financial Assurance forMine Reclamation and Closure, Mineral Policy Centre, Washington,MPC Issue Paper No 4, p 14, http://www.earthworksaction.org/pubs/ PuttingAPriceOnPollution.pdf, as viewed on March 10, 2007

10. ibid, p 14

6. REHABILITATION: THE REGULATORY ROADBLOCKS

1. Anon, 2001, Report of the Steering Group on Rural Poverty Alleviation,Watershed Development, Decentralised Planning and Panchayati RajInstitutions, Planning Commission, New Delhi, planningcommis-sion.nic.in/aboutus/committee/strgrp/stgp_rural.pdf, as viewedon May 25, 2007

2. Pradeep Baisakh, 2006, ‘Move to amend tribal land law dangerous’,India Together, December, http://www.indiatogether.org/2006/dec/soc-pattalaw.htm, as viewed on May 25, 2007

3. Theodore E Downing, 2002, Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-inducedDisplacement and Resettlement, Mining, Minerals and SustainableDevelopment, International Institute for Environment andDevelopment and World Business Council for SustainableDevelopment, Washington, p 13

4. ibid, p 85. Anon, 2006, Gist of Communication sent by the NAC to the

Government of India in regard to the National Rehabilitation Policy,National Advisory Council, New Delhi, http://nac.nic.in/communi-cation/rehabilitation.html, as viewed on May 10, 2007

6. Nitin Sethi, 2006, ‘India’s rehabilitation policy under a scanner yetagain’, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications,New Delhi, Vol 15, No 3, June 30, p 7

7. Walter Fernandes et al, 1997, ‘Hundred years of involuntary displace-ment’, Rehabilitation Policy and Law in India: A Right to Livelihood,Indian Social Institute, Pune, p 17


9. Michael M Cernea, 2004, Impoverishment Risks, Risk Management, andReconstruction: A Model of Population Displacement and Resettlement,UN Symposium on Hydropower and Sustainable Development,Beijing, p 14, http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/sdissues/energy/op/hydro_cernea_population_resettlement_backgroundpaper.pdf,as viewed on May 23, 2007

10. ibid, pp 31-3411. Theodore E Downing, 2002, Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-induced

Displacement and Resettlement, Mining, Minerals and SustainableDevelopment, International Institute for Environment andDevelopment and World Business Council for SustainableDevelopment, Washington, p 10

12. Anon, 1999, Involuntary Resettlement in IDB Projects: Principles andGuidelines, The Inter-America Development Bank, Washington DC,November, p 10

13. Theodore E Downing, 2002, Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-inducedDisplacement and Resettlement, Mining, Minerals and SustainableDevelopment, International Institute for Environment and

354


m k

Development and World Business Council for SustainableDevelopment, Washington, p 10

14. Michael M Cernea, 2004, Impoverishment Risks, Risk Management, andReconstruction: A Model of Population Displacement and Resettlement,UN Symposium on Hydropower and Sustainable Development,Beijing, pp 38-39, http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/sdissues/ener-gy/op/hydro_cernea_population_resettlement_backgroundpaper.pdf, as viewed on May 23, 2007


16. ibid, p 13

Box: How useless is a wasteland?Padmaparna Ghosh, 2006, ‘SEZ how?’, Down To Earth, Society forEnvironmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 15, No 12, November 15, p 25

Box: The struggle for landShailesh Kumar, 2007, ‘UP farmers continue protest against land acquisi-tion by Reliance’, Down To Earth, Society for EnvironmentalCommunications, New Delhi, Vol 15, No 18, February 15, pp 20-21;Maureen Nandini Mitra, 2007, ‘Testimonies from Nandigram’, Down ToEarth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 15, No22, April 15, pp 13-14; and Padmaparna Ghosh, 2006, ‘SEZ how?’, Down ToEarth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 15, No12, November 15, p 22

Box: A colonial legacyhttp://banglapedia.search.com.bd/HT/L_0039.htm, as viewed on May15, 2007

Box: Legalising the ‘encroachers’?Anon, 2006, Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers(Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, Union ministry of law and justice,New Delhi, http://www.grain.org/brl_files/actTA06.pdf, as viewed onMarch 17, 2007

Box: A landmark judgement Richard Mahapatra, 2005, ‘Theirs to mine’, Down To Earth, Society forEnvironmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 13, No 22, April 15

Box: The question of compensationSebastian Morris, 2000, ‘Chapter II’, India Infrastructure Report 2001 – Issuesin Regulation and Market Structure, Oxford University Press, New Delhiand analysis by the Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Scienceand Environment, New Delhi

Box: Under-financing and R&RM M Cernea, 2007, ‘Financing for development: Benefit-sharing mecha-nisms in population resettlement’, Economic and Political Weekly,Sameeksha Publications, Mumbai, March 24

Box: What’s in a policy?Performance Standard 5: Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement,International Finance Corporation, The World Bank, http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/pol_PerformanceStandards2006_PS5/$FILE/PS_5_LandAcqInvolResettlement.pdf, as viewed on May 28,2007 and Involuntary Resettlement in IDB Projects: Principles and Guidelines,The Inter-American Development Bank, www.iadb.org/sds/doc/Ind-ADeruytterePGIRPE.PDF, as viewed on May 25, 2007

Box: States and their R&R: the case of OrissaOrissa Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy 2006, government of Orissa,Revenue Department, Bhubaneshwar, http://www.orissa.gov.in/rev-enue/R&RPOLICIES/Relief%20and%20Rehabilitation/R&R2006/r&R1.html, as viewed on May 12, 2007; Orissa R&R Policy, 2006: Key Features,government of Orissa, Revenue Department, Bhubaneshwar,http://www.orissa.gov.in/revenue/R&RPOLICIES/Relief%20and%20Rehabilitation/key%20features/key%20features.html, as viewed onMay 10, 2007

Box: The benefits of sharing Sanjay Srivastav, 2006, Environmental and social challenges of mineral-basedgrowth in Orissa: Building partnership for sustainable development, The WorldBank, New Delhi

Box: Power to the communitiesAnon, 2004, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotionand Protection of Human Rights, Working Group on Indigenous Populations,Twenty-second session, p 5 and information compiled by the Industry andEnvironment Unit, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi

Box: The Papua New Guinea modelSanjay Srivastav, 2006, Environmental and social challenges of mineral-basedgrowth in Orissa: Building partnership for sustainable development, The WorldBank, New Delhi, pp 84

355

REFERENCES

m k

356

m k

Anupama Kumari, news writer, Prabhat Khabar,Ranchi (Jharkhand)Braja Kishore Mishra, freelance journalist reportingfor Samaj, Bhubaneswar (Orissa) Ejaz Kaiser, staff reporter, The Hindustan Times,Raipur (Chhattisgarh) Kulsum Talha, freelance journalist reporting for The Pioneer, Lucknow (Uttar Pradesh)

Mahesh Chandra Joshi, assistant editor,Nainital Samachar, Nainital (Uttarakhand) M T Shivakumar, district correspondent,Deccan Herald and Prajavani, Bellary (Karnataka) Raju Nayak, principal correspondent, Loksatta, Goa

Ratna Bharali Talukdar, freelance journalist reporting for Sambhar and Asomiya Protidin, Guwahati(Assam) Sashidharan Mangathil, sub-editor, Mathrubhumi,Kottakkal (Kerala)Sunny Sebastian, special correspondent, The Hindu,Jaipur (Rajasthan)

CSE media fellows, Fifth CSE Media Fellowships on Mining, Environment and People’s Protests, 2005

Achyut Das, director, Agragamee, Rayagada (Orissa)A K Sharma, scientist E (management and systems),Bureau of Indian Standards (New Delhi)Anil Kumar Sharma, chief engineer, ChhattisgarhEnvironment Conservation Board, Raipur (Chhattisgarh)Asha Krishnaswamy, assistant editor, DeccanHerald, Bangalore (Karnataka)Ashim Roy, general secretary, New Trade UnionInitiative (New Delhi)Ashok Mahapatra, editor-in-chief,nakshatranews.com, Bhubaneswar (Orissa)B Babu Rao, former controller of mines, IndianBureau of Mines, Nagpur (Maharashtra)Biswajit Mohanty, secretary, Wildlife Society ofOrissa, Cuttack (Orissa)Carin J Fischer, director, public policy and regulatoryaffairs, Partnership for Responsible Development (New Delhi)Dionne Bunsha, special correspondent, Frontline,Mumbai (Maharashtra)Gurdeep Singh, professor and head of department,Centre of Mining Environment, Indian School of Mines,Dhanbad (Jharkhand)Himanshu Upadhyaya, Intercultural Resources (New Delhi) J N Kini, director (production and projects),Kudremukh Iron Ore Company Ltd, Bangalore(Karnataka)Kanchi Kohli, Kalpavriksh (Delhi)K S Kashinath, general manager (CP&TS),Kudremukh Iron Ore Company Ltd, Bangalore(Karnataka)Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt, fellow, Research School ofPacific and Asian Studies, The Australian NationalUniversity, Canberra (Australia)Madhumita Dutta, Corporate Accountability Desk,The Other Media, Chennai (Tamil Nadu)Mahesh K Patil, general manager-environment, SesaGoa Ltd, Panaji (Goa)Mahesh Langa, senior correspondent, The IndianExpress, Ahmedabad (Gujarat)

Manshi Asher, programme officer, National Centrefor Advocacy Studies, Pune (Maharashtra)M Bhagyalakshmi, director, Sakhi, Hospet(Karnataka)Meena Gupta, secretary, Union ministry of tribalaffairs (New Delhi)Nicholas Barla, general secretary, Gangpur AdivasiForum for Socio-cultural Awakening, Sundargarh(Orissa)Patrik Oskarsson, PhD researcher, School ofDevelopment Studies, University of East Anglia,Norwich (United Kingdom)Philip Neri DeSouza, Don Bosco Agro-Ed Complex,Quepem (Goa)Pradeep Kumar, special secretary, Union ministry ofmines (New Delhi)Prafulla Samantara, president, Lok Shakti Abhiyan,Berhampur (Orissa)Prakash Joshi, deputy general manager, V S Dempo& Co Pvt Ltd, Panjim (Goa)Ramendra Gupta, chairperson and managing director, Uranium Corporation of India Ltd, Jaduguda(Jharkhand) Ramesh S Gauns, teacher and mining activist,Bicholim (Goa)Rana Sengupta, campaign manager, Mine LabourProtection Campaign, Jodhpur (Rajasthan)Ranjan Sahai, controller of mines, Indian Bureau ofMines, Nagpur (Maharashtra)Ratnakar Gedam, joint advisor (minerals), PlanningCommission, Government of India (New Delhi)Ravi Awasthi, chief reporter, Deshbandhu, Bhopal(Madhya Pradesh)Ravi Rebbapragada, chairperson, Mines, Mineralsand People, Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh)R C Kataria, senior environmental engineer, CentralPollution Control Board (Delhi)R Sreedhar, convenor, Mines, Minerals and People(New Delhi)Sachin K Tendulkar, programme manager, MineralFoundation of Goa, Panaji (Goa)

Samit Carr, general secretary, Occupational Safetyand Health Association of Jharkhand, Jamshedpur(Jharkhand)Sanjay Raj, president, SANCHARICA, Jaipur(Rajasthan)Sapan Bohidar, district correspondent, Samaj andPTI, Balangir (Orissa)Saurav Bora, sub-editor, The Assam Tribune,Guwahati (Assam)Shekhar Singh, director, Centre for Equity Studies(New Delhi)Shiv Kumar, special correspondent, The Tribune,Mumbai (Maharashtra)Shriprakash, filmmaker and member, JharkhandiOrganisation Against Radiation, Ranchi (Jharkhand)Shubhranshu Choudhury, freelance journalist,Ghaziabad (Uttar Pradesh)S K Aggarwal, director, Union ministry of environment and forests (New Delhi)S P Banerjee, former director-in-charge, Indian Schoolof Mines, Dhanbad (Jharkhand)S Ramakrishna, freelance journalist, Hyderabad(Andhra Pradesh)Sushant Kunkolienkar, senior reporter, Daily TarunBharat, Margao (Goa)T V Singh, scientist E (mechanical engineering department), Bureau of Indian Standards (New Delhi)U K Ray, deputy director general, Geological Survey ofIndia, Patna (Bihar)Vaibhav Sridhar, special correspondent, Nai Dunia,Raipur (Chhattisgarh)Vasavi Kiro, editor, Sarjom Sakham, Ranchi(Jharkhand)Vibhash Kumar Jha, reporter, The Hindustan Times, Raipur (Chhattisgarh)Virendar Singh, member secretary, RajasthanPollution Control Board, Jaipur (Rajasthan)Y K Saxena, vice president-enviroment, health andsafety, Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd (New Delhi)Yousuf Beg, secretary, Patthar Khadan MazdoorSangh, Panna (Madhya Pradesh)

This book would not have been possible without the invaluable inputs provided by the following:

Participants at the Media Briefing Workshop and First Anil Agarwal Dialogue on Mining, People and Environment, New Delhi,April 26-27, 2007

TO THE PEOPLE WHO HAVE LOST EVERYTHING TO MINING

1 9 4 7 - 2 0 0 2

Governments in India love to talk

about poverty but usually serve

the interests of contractors and

companies. The trouble is that

mineral exploitation can easily

destroy the natural resource base of

the poor – forests and biodiversity,

in particular – unless there is a

strong governance of these

resources which involves the local

people instead of alienating them

Anil AgarwalFounder Director, CSE

‘‘

‘‘

CSE’s PublicationsFor 30 years, Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) has researched and published, authoritativematerial on environment. It is an unparallel database with in-depth analysis on Climate, Forests,Biodiversity, Industry, Air Pollution, Water, Desertification, Health, Toxic Waste, Education,Sustainable Development…

Check out our Publication Packages! Visit the CSE Store at: http://csestore.cse.org.in

MANAGING WATER

Making Water Everybody’s Business: Practice & Policyof Water Harvesting Edited by: Anil Agarwal, Sunita Narain & Indira KhuranaThis report provides in-depth analysis of traditional practices, technologies, policy issues and the work ofgovernments and NGOs. (Pages 456) PB: Rs 490 / US $22

Poison vs NutritionA briefing paper on “Pesticide Contamination and FoodSafety” — The CSE studies on pesticides in water andsoft drinks, pesticide contamination and its healthimpacts, regulatory apparatus and processes, right toclean water and the industrial use of water. (Pages 74) PB: Rs 250 / US $20

Sewage Canal: How to clean the YamunaSeveral crore rupees have been sunk into plans to clean up the Yamuna. The authorities have been busychasing targets to fulfill these plans. But the riverremains dirty. Backed by hard facts and data this latestbook explores the various options available to clean theYamuna. (Pages 180) PB: Rs 350 / US $14

Nectar To PoisonA briefing paper on Arsenic Contamination of GroundWater — an exhaustive set of FAQs on key issues, it'scauses, spread and technology available to mitigate theeffects. Contains an exhaustive database of resourceperson and institution working in the area. Also available in Hindi.(Pages 58) PB: Rs 100 / US $8

A Wastewater Recycling Manual for Urban Areas withcase studies A comprehensive documentation of localised community-level approaches in urban wastewater management.(Pages 52) PB: Rs 250 / US $20

A Water Harvesters’ Manual for Urban AreasThis manual is built out of CSE’s experience in providingtechnical advice to implement rainwater harvesting in theurban context. Available in English, Hindi, Marathi, Tamiland Telugu. (Pages 35) PB: Rs 100 / US $8

DOWN TO EARTH BOOKS

Anil Agarwal Reader: a decade of incisive commentaryon environment-development issuesThe Anil Agarwal Reader collects in three volumes someof his writings on the environment. They range from the1990s to the early years of this decade. The volumesshowcase the intensity and acuity with which he engagedwith the dominant concerns of the times. They are anessential introduction to environmental questions, movingseamlessly between local, national and internationalperspectives. (Pages Vol-1: 348, Vol-2: 220, Vol-3: 268) PB: One Volume: Rs 300 / US $15, Three Volume set: Rs 750 / US $35

Agenda UnlimitedAcross India, people have taken their destinies into theirhands – Improving their future. A compendium of suchstories. Reported over 12 years. (Pages 288) PB: Rs 490 / US $29

Survival Primer – Down To Earth Special Issue Contains prominent articles collated from 200 issues ofscience and environment fortnightly, Down To Earth, from1992 onwards. (Pages 240) PB: Rs 290 / US $10

STATE OF INDIA’S ENVIRONMENT

First Citizens' Report (SOE-1) Edited by: Anil Agarwal, Ravi Chopra & Kalpana SharmaThis report analyses the little understood relationshipbetween development and environment, the impact ofenvironmental degradation on individual, social groups,tribals and nomads. (Pages 192) PB: Rs 190 / US $10

Second Citizens' Report (SOE-2)Edited by: Anil Agarwal, Sunita NarainThis report describes major environmental changes inIndia. It’s a balance sheet of India’s resources andfocuses attention on the effect of ecological degradationon the poor. (Pages 393) PB: Rs 290 / US $12

Third Citizens' Report (SOE-3): Floods, Flood Plains &Environmental MythsEdited by: Anil Agarwal, Sunita Narain This report remains one of the few chronicles of theecological change taking place in the Indo-Gangetic plains— India’s most densely populated area. (Pages 167) PB: Rs 190 / US $10

Fourth Citizens Report (SOE-4): Dying WisdomEdited by: Anil Agarwal, Sunita NarainThis report provides a comprehensive overview of India’s millennia-old traditions of rainwater harvesting.Triggered a nationwide interest in community-based watermanagement. Also available in Hindi. (Pages 404) PB: Rs 390/US $14, Hindi Rs 290/US $12

Fifth Citizens' Report (SOE-5)Edited by: Anil Agarwal, Sunita Narain and Srabani SenThis report documents the extraordinary initiatives in therural sector and the crisis the urban sector faces. (Pages:Part I-440; Part II-256) PB: Rs 590 / US $33

GREEN POLITICS

GEN-1: Green PoliticsEdited by: Anil Agarwal, Sunita Narain, Anju Sharma This book provides a close analysis of importantenvironment related conventions and institutions fromtheir origins, and demystifies the politics of ‘saving theenvironment’. (Pages 409) PB: Rs 590 / US $31

GEN-2: Poles Apart Edited by: Anil Agarwal, Sunita Narain, Anju Sharma & Achila ImchenThe second in the series this book includes updates on theissues dealt within the first report, Green Politics. Thisreport has also new chapters on five conventions andinstitutions, and updates on issues covered in the firstreport. (Pages 441) PB: Rs 690 / US $33

Global Warming in an Unequal World: A case of environmental colonialism.Edited by: Anil Agarwal, Sunita Narain (Pages 34) PB: Rs 100 / US $8

INDUSTRY AND ENVIRONMENT

Concrete Facts – The life cycle of the Indian cementindustryA state of the art compilation of facts on the Indian cementindustry. It assesses its environmental, economic andsocial performance by covering issues ranging from rawmaterial sourcing to technology and finally benchmarks theperformance of 38 Indian cement plants with the globalbest practises. (Pages 164) PB: Rs 3,000 / US $90

All About Paper – Green Rating of Pulp & Paper IndustryA comprehensive Life Cycle Analysis (LCA) approach forassessing the environmental performance of pulp andpaper industry in various phases of life cycle ranging fromraw material sourcing to pollution generation and control.(Pages 344) PB: Rs 5,000/US $125

Mileage – Green Rating of Indian Automobile IndustryIn-depth Life Cycle Analysis of the environmentalperformance of major players in the Indian automobilesector. Also analyses technological issues, comparativeanalysis of best practices with global players andrecommends future outlook. (Pages 238) PB: Rs 490 / US $18

Environmental Rating of Indian Caustic-Chlorine Industry An exhaustive life cycle analysis of players in the Indiancaustic chlorine sector and its impact on environment.(Pages 334) PB: Rs 2999/US $90

POLLUTION AND HEALTH

The LEAPFROG FACTOR – Clearing the air in Asian citiesCaptures 10 years of action, impacts and learning toaddress the complex air pollution challenge in Asia. Thisbook is a survival guide for Asian cities trying to steertheir way out of the pollution haze. (Pages 448) PB: Rs 590 / US $35

Body burden: Health and Environment in IndiaA degraded environment brings with it a set of healthproblems – some new and some, which have posed achallenge over the years. Presenting Body Burden, acompilation of reports from Down To Earth on the healthimpacts of environmental pollution in India. (Pages 344) PB: Rs 390 / US $31

Homicide by Pesticides Edited by: Anil AgarwalA series of articles discuss the effects of environmentalpollution on public health – a must have. (Pages 128) PB: Rs 75 / US $7

Slow Murder: The Deadly Story of Vehicular Pollution inIndia Edited by: Anil Agarwal, Anju Sharma & Anumita RoychaudhuryThis report discusses the issue of smog and smogmakers with shocking revelations on vehicular pollution.(Pages 148) HB: Rs 390 / US $18,

SCHOOLS AND ENVIRONMENT

Green Schools Programme ManualThis manual is designed as a self-learning and assessmenttool so that teachers can work with students to audit theiruse of natural resources and to experiment withenvironment friendly practices. (Pages 78)PB: Rs 125 / US $10

Note: HB – Hardback and PB – Paperback. Prices include postage and delivery charges.

Contact: Sales & Despatch Department

Centre for Science and Environment41, Tughlakabad Institutional Area,

New Delhi - 110 062 India

Tel: 91-11-2995 5124/6110/6394

Fax: 91-11-29955879

Email: [email protected] Website: www.cseindia.org

IFC IBC

RICH LANDSPOOR PEOPLE


RICH LANDS POOR PEOPLE





“We call Koera chora bhuian, the land oftheft and the miners, doko, meaning

dacoits. They come and take our forests,land, rivers and even our lives.

They take away everything”– TRIBAL FROM KOERA, KEONJHAR DISTRICT,

ORISSA

“Mining and mineral industry operations arebecoming increasingly environmentally

conscious. Yet there are many conflicts thatarise in all mineral development projects

due to differing perceptions of the owners,investors, consumers and other

stakeholders. While much remains to beaccomplished to ensure compatibility

between environment and mining, with thecurrent arsenal of new technology tools

available, clean mining is withinthe realms of possibility”

– DECLARATION, 19TH WORLD MINING

CONGRESS, 2003, NEW DELHI

“The miner eventually leaves the landand can recreate or even improve

upon the forest as it existed beforecommencement of operations”

– HODA COMMITTEE REPORT, PLANNING

COMMISSION, 2006, NEW DELHI

“My ministry has recently assessed the status of compliance of environmental

safeguards stipulated for various miningprojects. I regret to tell that the status of

compliance is poor, to say the least. If perceptible improvement in performance on

environmental matters is not to be seen,the government will be constrained to

take a hard view” – T R BAALU, FORMER MINISTER OF

ENVIRONMENT AND FORESTS, SPEAKING AT THE

34TH ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING OF THE

FEDERATION OF INDIAN MINERAL INDUSTRIES,2000, NEW DELHI

“Miners will never create jobs forthe tribal people. Compensation money will

finish in two years, and after that,we’ll be left with nothing”

– BAHA KISKO, COMMUNITY LEADER,PACHWARA, PAKUR DISTRICT, JHARKHAND

ISBN 978-81-86906-41-5