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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 89483. August 30, 1990.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES THRU: THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOODGOVERNMENT (PCGG), AFP ANTI-GRAFT BOARD, COL. ERNESTO A. PUNSALANG and PETER T.

TABANG, Petitioners, v. HON. EUTROPIO MIGRINO, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,

NCJR, Branch 151, Pasig, Metro Manila and TROADIO TECSON, Respondents.

The Solicitor General, for Petitioners.

Pacifico B. Advincula for Private Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CORTES,J.:

This case puts in issue the authority of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), through

the New Armed Forces of the Philippines Anti-Graft Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board"), toinvestigate and cause the prosecution of petitioner, a retired military officer, for violation of Republic ActsNos. 3019 and 1379.

Assailed by the Republic in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus with prayer for theissuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order are the orders of respondentjudge in Civil Case No. 57092 Branch 151 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila: (1) dated June23, 1989, denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss and Opposition, and (2) dated June 26, 1989, grantingprivate respondents application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Thus, the petition seeksthe annulment of the two orders, the issuance of an injunction to enjoin respondent judge from proceedingwith Civil Case No. 57092 and, finally, the dismissal of the case before the trial court.

The controversy traces its roots to the order of then PCGG Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, dated May 13, 1986,which created the New Armed Forces of the Philippines Anti-Graft Board. The Board was created to"investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in active

service." The order further stated that" [t]he Board shall be primarily charged with the task of investigatingcases of alleged violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended)and shall make the necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies and instrumentalitieswith respect to the action to be taken thereon based on its findings." cralaw virtua1aw library

Acting on information received by the Board, which indicated the acquisition of wealth beyond his lawfulincome, private respondent Lt. Col. Troadio Tecson (ret.) was required by the Board to submit hisexplanation/comment together with his supporting evidence by October 31, 1987 [Annex "B", Petition].Private respondent requested, and was granted, several postponements, but was unable to produce hissupporting evidence because they were allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad.

Just the same, the Board proceeded with its investigation and submitted its resolution, dated June 30, 1988,recommending that private respondent be prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, asamended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as amended.chanrobleslawlibrary : rednad

The case was set for preliminary investigation by the PCGG. Private respondent moved to dismiss the caseon the following grounds: (1) that the PCGG has no jurisdiction over his person; (2) that the action againsthim under Rep. Act No. 1379 has already prescribed; (3) that E.O. No. 14, insofar as it suspended theprovisions of Rep. Act No. 1379 on prescription of actions, was inapplicable to his case; and (4) that havingretired from the AFP on May 9, 1984, he was now beyond the reach of Rep. Act No. 3019. The Boardopposed the motion to dismiss.

In a resolution dated February 8, 1989, the PCGG denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Privaterespondent moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the PCGG in a resolution dated March 8, 1989.Private respondent was directed to submit his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidence on March


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20, 1989 at 2:00 p.m.

On March 13, 1989, private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with theRegional Trial Court in Pasig, Metro Manila. The case was docketed as Case No. 57092 and raffled to Branch151, respondent judges court. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and opposed the application for the

issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the principal ground that the Regional Trial Court had nojurisdiction over the Board, citing the case of PCGG v. Pea, G.R. No. 77663, April 12, 1988, 159 SCRA 556.

Private respondent opposed the motion to dismiss. Petitioner replied to the opposition.

On June 23, 1989, respondent judge denied petitioners motion to dismiss. On June 26, 1989, respondentjudge granted the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining petitioners frominvestigating or prosecuting private respondent under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 upon the filing of abond in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).

Hence, the instant petition.

On August 29, 1989, the Court issued a restraining order enjoining respondent judge from enforcing hisorders dated June 23, 1989 and June 26, 1989 and from proceeding with Civil Case No. 57092.

Private respondent filed his comment, to which petitioners filed a reply. A rejoinder to the reply was filed byprivate Respondent. The Court gave due course to the petition and the parties filed their memoranda.Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted.

The issues raised in the petition are as follows:chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

I.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION OR ACTED WITHOUT OR INEXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER AND INTERFERING WITH THE ORDERS ANDFUNCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT.

II.

WHETHER, OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION OR ACTED WITHOUT OR INEXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED ORDER DATED JUNE 26, 1989 ENJOININGPETITIONERS FROM INVESTIGATING AND PROSECUTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR VIOLATION OFREPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ANDREPUBLIC ACT NO. 1379, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT FOR THE FORFEITURE OF UNLAWFULLYACQUIRED PROPERTY [Rollo, p. 19].

As to the first issue, petitioner contends that following the ruling of the Court in PCGG v. Pea the Board,being a creation and/or extension of the PCGG, is beyond the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. On thesecond issue, petitioner strongly argues that the private respondents case falls within the jurisdiction of thePCGG.

The pivotal issue is the second one. On this point, private respondents position is as follows:chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

1. . . . he is not one of the subordinates contemplated in Executive Orders 1 , 2 , 14 and 14-A as the allegedillegal acts being imputed to him, that of alleged amassing wealth beyond his legal means while Finance

Officer of the Philippine Constabulary, are acts of his own alone, not connected with his being a crony,business associate, etc. or subordinate as the petition does not allege so. Hence the PCGG has nojurisdiction to investigate him.

If indeed private respondent amassed wealth beyond his legal means, the procedure laid down by Rep. Act1379 as already pointed out before be applied. And since, he has been separated from the government morethan four years ago, the action against him under Republic Act 1379 has already prescribed.

2. . . . no action can be filed anymore against him now under Republic Act 1379 for recovery of unexplainedwealth for the reason that he has retired more than four years ago.


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3. . . . The order creating the AFP Anti-Graft Board (Annex "A", Petition) is null and void. Nowhere inExecutive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A is there any authority given to the commission, its chairman andmembers, to create Boards or bodies to be invested with powers similar to the powers invested with thecommission .. [Comment, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 117-118].

1. The most important question to be resolved in this case is whether or not private respondent may beinvestigated and caused to be prosecuted by the Board, an agency of the PCGG, for violation of Rep. Acts

Nos. 3019 and 1379. According to petitioners, the PCGG has the power to investigate and cause theprosecution of private respondent because he is a "subordinate" of former President Marcos. They cite thePCGGs jurisdiction over

(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, hisimmediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad,including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them,during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public officeand/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship. [E.O. No. 1, sec. 2.].

Undoubtedly, the alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth was done during the administration of Pres.Marcos. However, what has to be inquired into is whether or not private respondent acted as a "subordinate"of Pres. Marcos within the contemplation of E.O. No. 1, the law creating the PCGG, when he allegedlyunlawfully acquired the properties.

A close reading of E. O. No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated within theterm "subordinate."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Whereas Clauses of E. O. No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed byformer President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here andabroad.

E.O. No. 2 freezes "all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or hiswife, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies,agents, or nominees have any interest or participation." cralaw virtua1aw library

Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is

[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specificmeaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying

only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd. v.Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58 (1954), citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203].

the term "subordinate" as used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association orrelation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, andclose associate in E.O. No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O.No. 2.

Thus, as stated by the Court in Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. v. PCGG, G.R. No. 75885, May 27,1987, 150 SCRA 181, 205-206.

The situations envisaged and sought to be governed [by Proclamation No. 3 and E.O. Nos. 1, 2 and 14] areself-evident, these being:chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

1) that" (i)ll gotten properties (were) amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime" ;

a) more particularly, that" (i)ll-gotten wealth (was) accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,his immediate family, relatives, subordinates, and close associates, . . . located in the Philippines or abroad,xx (and) business enterprises and entities (came to be) owned or controlled by them, during . . . (theMarcos) administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public officeand/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship;"

b) otherwise stated, that "there are assets and properties pertaining to former President Ferdinand E.Marcos, and/or his wife Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, businessassociates, dummies, agents or nominees which had been or were acquired by them directly or indirectly,


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through or as a result of the improper or illegal use of funds or properties owned by the Government of thePhilippines or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by takingundue advantage of their office, authority, influence, connections or relationship, resulting in their unjustenrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of thePhilippines" ;

c) that "said assets and properties are in the form of bank accounts, deposits, trust accounts, shares of

stocks, buildings, shopping centers, condominiums, mansions, residences, estates, and other kinds of realand personal properties in the Philippines and in various countries of the world;" and.

2) that certain "business enterprises and properties (were) taken over by the government of the MarcosAdministration or by entities or persons close to former President Marcos." [Footnotes deleted].

It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee duringthe administration of former Pres. Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the respondentunlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/orhis wife. This is so because otherwise the respondents case will fall under existing general laws andprocedures on the matter. Rep. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, penalizes the corruptpractices of any public officer. Under Rep. Act No. 1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeited in Favor of the State AnyProperty Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for theProcedure Therefor), whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency anamount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and

to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall bepresumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired [Sec. 2]. The Solicitor General shall file the petitionand prosecute the case in behalf of the Republic, after preliminary investigation by the provincial or cityprosecutor [Ibid].

Moreover, the record shows that private respondent was being investigated for unlawfully acquired wealthunder Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, and not under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

Since private respondent was being investigated by the PCGG through the AFP Anti-Graft Board it wouldhave been presumed that this was under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 in relation to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and14-A. But the record itself belies this presumption:chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

(a) The letter of the chairman of the AFP Anti-Graft Board to private respondent, dated October 16, 1987,states: "This letter is in connection with the alleged information received by the AFP Anti-Graft Boardindicating your acquisition of wealth beyond legal means of income in violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 known

as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." [Rollo, p. 39].

(b) The Resolution dated June 30, 1988 of the Board categorically states:chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT: chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

This refers to the case against Col Troadio B. Tecson PC (Ret) for alleged unexplained wealth pursuant toR.A. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and R.A. 1379, asamended, otherwise known as the "Act for Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property." [Rollo, p. 43].

The resolution alleges that private respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by taking advantage of hisoffice as Finance Officer of the Philippine Constabulary. No attempt is made in the Boards resolution to link

him or his accumulation of wealth to former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.

(c) The letter of the Board chairman to the chairman of the PCGG, dated July 28, 1988, is clear: chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

Respectfully transmitted herewith for the prosecution before the Sandiganbayan is the case folder ofCOLONEL TROADIO TECSON (Ret) who after preliminary investigation of the case by the Board, found aprima facie evidence against subject officer for violating Section 8, R.A. 3019, as amended by BP 195,otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and R.A. 1379, otherwise known as an Act forthe Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property." [Rollo, p. 46].

Moreover, from the allegations of petitioner in its memorandum, it would appear that private respondentaccumulated his wealth for his own account. Petitioner quoted the letter of Ignacio Datahan, a retired PCsergeant, to General Fidel Ramos, the material portion of which reads:chanrob1esvirtual1aw library


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. . . After an official in the military unit received an Allotment Advice the same signed a cash advancevoucher, let us say in the amount of P5,000.00. Without much ado, outright, Col. Tecson paid the amount.The official concerned was also made to sign the receipt portion on the voucher the amount of which wasleft blank. Before the voucher is passed for routine processing by Mrs. Leonor Cagas, clerk of Col. Tecsonand its facilitator, the maneuver began. The amount on the face of the cash advance voucher is altered orsuperimposed. The original amount of P5,000.00 was now made say, P95,000.00. So it was actually the

amount of P95,000.00 that appeared on the records. The difference of P90,000.00 went to the syndicate.

. . . Boy Tanyag, bookkeeper in Col. Tecsons office took care of the work.

. . . In the liquidation of the altered cash advance amount, names of persons found in the MetropolitanManila Telephone Directory with fictitious addresses appeared as recipients or payees. Leonor and Boy gottheir shares on commission basis of the looted amount while the greater part went to Col. Tecson. [Rollo,pp. 184-185.].

Clearly, this alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth is not that contemplated in E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

2. It will not do to cite the order of the PCGG Chairman, dated May 13, 1986, creating the Board andauthorizing it to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired andin active service, to support the contention that PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of private Respondent.

The PCGG cannot do more than what it was empowered to do. Its powers are limited. Its task is limited tothe recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. The PCGG cannot, throughan order of its chairman, grant itself additional powers powers not contemplated in its enabling law.

3. Petitioner assails the trial courts cognizance of the petition filed by privateRespondent. Particularly,petitioner argues that the trial court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the PCGG. This matter has already beensettled in Pea, supra, where the Court ruled that those who wish to question or challenge the PCGGs actsor orders must seek recourse in the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction.The Sandiganbayans decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorariexclusively by thisCourt. [Ibid, at pp. 564-565].

The ruling in Pea was applied in PCGG v. Aquino, G.R. No. 77816, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 363, SorianoIII v. Yuson, G.R. No. 74910 (and five other cases), August 10, 1988, 164 SCRA 226 and Olaguer v. RTC,NCJR, Br. 48, G.R. No. 81385, February 21, 1989, 170 SCRA 478, among others, to enjoin the regional trialcourts from interfering with the actions of the PCGG.

Respondent judge clearly acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction when he took cognizance of Civil CaseNo. 57092 and issued the writ of preliminary injunction against the PCGG.

4. Thus, we are confronted with a situation wherein the PCGG acted in excess of its jurisdiction and, hence,may be enjoined from doing so, but the court that issued the injunction against the PCGG has not beenvested by law with jurisdiction over it and, thus, the injunction issued was null and void.

The nullification of the assailed order of respondent judge issuing the writ of preliminary injunction istherefore in order. Likewise, respondent judge must be enjoined from proceeding with Civil Case No. 57092.

But in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the prosecution of privaterespondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from proceedingwith the case, without prejudice to any action that may be taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The ruleof law mandates that an agency of government be allowed to exercise only the powers granted it.

5. The pronouncements made above should not be taken to mean that the PCGGs creation of the AFP Anti-Graft Board is a nullity and that the PCGG has no authority to investigate and cause the prosecution ofmembers and former members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines for violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019and 1379. The PCGG may investigate and cause the prosecution of active and retired members of the AFPfor violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 only in relation to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, i.e., insofar asthey involve the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of former Pres. Marcos and his family and "cronies." Butthe PCGG would not have jurisdiction over an ordinary case falling under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, asin the case at bar. E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A did not envision the PCGG as the investigator and prosecutorof all unlawful accumulations of wealth. The PCGG was created for a specific and limited purpose, as we


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have explained earlier, and necessarily its powers must be construed with this in mind.

6. n his pleadings, private respondent contends that he may no longer be prosecuted because ofprescription. He relies on section 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379 which provides that" [t]he right to file such petition[for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired wealth] shall prescribe within four years from the date of resignation,dismissal or separation or expiration of the term of the officer or employee concerned." He retired on May 9,1984, or more than six (6) years ago. However, it must be pointed out that section 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379

should be deemed amended or repealed by Article XI, section 15 of the 1987 Constitution which providesthat" [t]he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, fromthem or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel."Considering that sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379 was deemed amended or repealed before the prescriptiveperiod provided therein had lapsed insofar as private respondent is concerned, we cannot say that he hadalready acquired a vested right that may not be prejudiced by a subsequent enactment.

Moreover, to bar the Government from recovering ill-gotten wealth would result in the validation orlegitimization of the unlawful acquisition, a consequence at variance with the clear intent of Rep. Act No.1379, which provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SEC. 11. Laws on prescription. The laws concerning acquisitive prescription and limitation of actionscannot be invoked by, nor shall they benefit the respondent, in respect to any property unlawfully acquiredby him.

Thus, we hold that the appropriate prosecutory agencies, i.e., the city or provincial prosecutor and theSolicitor General under sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379, may still investigate the case and file the petition for theforfeiture of unlawfully acquired wealth against private respondent, now a private citizen. (On the otherhand, as regards respondents for violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 who are still in the governmentservice, the agency granted the power to investigate and prosecute them is the Office of the Ombudsman[Rep. Act No. 6770]). Under Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, and Batas Pambansa Blg. 195violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 shall be tried by the Sandiganbayan.

7. The Court hastens to add that this decision is without prejudice to the prosecution of private respondentunder the pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code and other related penal laws.

WHEREFORE, the order of respondent judge dated June 26, 1989 in Civil Case No. 57092 is NULLIFIED andSET ASIDE. Respondent judge is ORDERED to dismiss Civil Case No. 57092. The temporary restraining orderissued by the Court on August 29, 1989 is MADE PERMANENT. The PCGG is ENJOINED from proceeding withthe investigation and prosecution of private respondent in I.S. No. 37, without prejudice to his investigation

and prosecution by the appropriate prosecutory agency.

SO ORDERED.


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G.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th Assistant of Provincial BoholVICENTE DE LA SERNA. JR., as complainant all private prosecutor, petitioners,vs.HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol Branch II,

ANO DACULLO, GERONIMO OROYAN, MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO CAJES and MODESTO SSUELLO,respondents.

AQUINO, J.:p

The legal issue in this case is whether Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes squatting andsimilar acts, applies to agricultural lands. The decree (which took effect on August 20, 1975)provides:

SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking

advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying orpossessing the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or anyother purposes, shall be punished by an imprisonment ranging from six months toone year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand pesosat the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.(2nd paragraph is omitted.)

The record shows that on October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separateinformations against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized by PresidentialDecree No. 772. The information against Mario Aparici which is similar to the other fifteeninformations, reads:

That sometime in the year 1974 continuously up to the present at barangayMagsaysay, municipality of Talibon, province of Bohol, Philippines and within thejurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with stealth andstrategy, enter into, occupy and cultivate a portion of a grazing land physicallyoccupied, possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. as successor tothe pasture applicant Celestino de la Serna of Pasture Lease Application No. 8919,accused's entrance into the area has been and is still against the win of the offendedparty; did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and cultivate aportion of the said grazing land; said cultivating has rendered a nuisance to and hasdeprived the pasture applicant from the full use thereof for which the land applied forhas been intended, that is preventing applicant's cattle from grazing the whole area,thereby causing damage and prejudice to the said applicant-possessor-occupant,

Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. (sic)

Five of the informations, wherein Ano Dacullo, Geronimo Oroyan, Mario Aparici, Ruperto Cajes andModesto Suello were the accused, were raffled to Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr. of Branch II(Criminal Cases Nos. 1824, 1828, 1832, 1833 and 1839, respectively).

Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order datedDecember 9, 1977 dismissing the five informations on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that theaccused entered the land through "stealth and strategy", whereas under the decree the entry shouldbe effected "with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or


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tolerance of the landowner", and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does notapply to the cultivation of a grazing land.

Because of that order, the fiscal amended the informations by using in lieu of "stealth and strategy"the expression "with threat, and taking advantage of the absence of the ranchowner and/or toleranceof the said ranchowner". The fiscal asked that the dismissal order be reconsidered and that the

amended informations be admitted.

The lower court denied the motion. It insisted that the phrase "and for other purposes" in the decreedoes not include agricultural purposes because its preamble does not mention the Secretary of

Agriculture and makes reference to the affluent class.

From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. Theappeal is devoid of merit.

We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands becauseits preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communitiesor moreparticularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squating

complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.

The preamble of the decree is quoted below:

WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter ofInstruction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, directing the Secretaries of NationalDefense, Public Work. 9 and communications, Social Welfare and the Director ofPublic Works, the PHHC General Manager, the Presidential Assistant on Housingand Rehabilitation Agency, Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and City andDistrict Engineers, "to remove an illegal constructions including buildings on andalong esteros and river banks, those along railroad tracks and those built withoutpermits on public and private property." squatting is still a major problem in urbancommunities all over the country;

WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully occupying publicand private lands belong to the affluent class;

WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government's drive against thisillegal and nefarious practice.

It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. 19 refers to illegal constructions on public andprivate property. It is complemented by Letter of Instruction No. 19-A which provides for therelocation of squatters in the interest of public health, safety and peace and order.

On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public agricultural lands, like the grazinglands involved in this case, is punished by Republic Act No. 947 which makes it unlawful for anyperson, corporation or association to forcibly enter or occupy public agricultural lands. That lawprovides:

SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person corporation or association to enter oroccupy, through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, any public agricultureland including such public lands as are granted to private individuals under theprovision of the Public Land Act or any other laws providing for the of public


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agriculture lands in the Philippines and are duly covered by the correspondingapplications for the notwithstanding standing the fact that title thereto still remains inthe Government or for any person, natural or judicial to investigate induce or forceanother to commit such acts.

Violations of the law are punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand or imprisonment for not

more than one year, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court, with subsidiaryimprisonment in case of insolvency. (See People vs. Lapasaran 100 Phil. 40.)

The rule of ejusdem generis(of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply tothis case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urbancommunities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generisis merely a tool ofstatutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain (GenatoCommercial Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil. 615,618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-50).

WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal is affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.


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G.R. No. 169435 February 27, 2008

MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor,CAROLINE ARZADON-GARVIDA,petitioner,vs.MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor,

SALVADOR PILLOS, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

REYES, R.T., J.:

AS the law creating a municipality fixes its boundaries, settlement of boundary disputes betweenmunicipalities is facilitated by carrying into effect the law that created them.

Any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law creating a municipality is not thecarrying into effect of that law but its amendment, which only the Congress can do.1

For Our review on certiorariis the Decision2of the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing to a certainextent that3of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte, in a case thatoriginated from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Ilocos Norte about the boundary disputebetween the Municipalities of Marcos and Nueva Era in Ilocos Norte.

The CA declared that Marcos is entitled to have its eastern boundary extended up "to the boundaryline between the province of Ilocos Norte and Kalinga-Apayao."4By this extension of Marcos'eastern boundary, the CA allocated to Marcos a portion of Nueva Era's territory.

The Facts

The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong, Cabittaoran,

Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc, Tibangran, and Uguis which were previously organizedas rancherias,each of which was under the independent control of a chief. Governor GeneralFrancis Burton Harrison, acting on a resolution passed by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte,united these rancheriasand created the township of Nueva Era by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.)No. 665dated September 30, 1916.

The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963 pursuant to RepublicAct (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Marcos in the Province of IlocosNorte." Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 provides:

SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit inthe Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said

municipality and constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as theMunicipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:

On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barriosCapariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by theBurnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East,by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan River which is at thesame time the boundary between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West andSouthwest, by the boundary between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras.
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The Municipality of Marcos shall have its seat of government in the barrio of Biding.

Based on the first paragraph of the said Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753, it is clear that Marcos shall bederived from the listed barangaysof Dingras, namely: Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan,Ragas and Agunit. The Municipality of Nueva Era or any of its barangayswas not mentioned.Hence, if based only on said paragraph, it is clear that Nueva Era may not be considered as a

source of territory of Marcos.

There is no issue insofar as the first paragraph is concerned which named only Dingras as themother municipality of Marcos. The problem, however, lies in the description of Marcos' boundariesas stated in the second paragraph, particularly in the phrase: "on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt.Province boundary."

It must be noted that the term "Mt. Province" stated in the above phrase refers to the presentadjoining provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Kalinga and Apayao, which were then asingle province.

Mt. Province was divided into the four provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and

Kalinga-Apayao by virtue of R.A. No. 4695 which was enacted on June 18, 1966. On February 14,1995, the province of Kalinga-Apayao, which comprises the sub-provinces of Kalinga and Apayao,was further converted into the regular provinces of Kalinga and Apayao pursuant to R.A. No. 7878.

The part of then Mt. Province which was at the east of Marcos is now the province of Apayao.Hence, the eastern boundary referred to by the second paragraph of Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 isthe present Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary.

On the basis of the said phrase, which described Marcos' eastern boundary, Marcos claimed that themiddle portion of Nueva Era, which adjoins its eastern side, formed part of its territory. Its reasoningwas founded upon the fact that Nueva Era was between Marcos and the Ilocos Norte-Apayaoboundary such that if Marcos was to be bounded on the east by the Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary,part of Nueva Era would consequently be obtained by it.6

Marcos did not claim any part of Nueva Era as its own territory until after almost 30 years,7or only onMarch 8, 1993, when its Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution No. 93-015.8Said resolution wasentitled: "Resolution Claiming an Area which is an Original Part of Nueva Era, But Now SeparatedDue to the Creation of Marcos Town in the Province of Ilocos Norte."

Marcos submitted its claim to the SP of Ilocos Norte for its consideration and approval. The SP, onthe other hand, required Marcos to submit its position paper.9

In its position paper, Marcos alleged that since its northeastern and eastern boundaries under R.A.No. 3753 were the Burnay River and the Ilocos Norte-Mountain Province boundary, respectively, itseastern boundary should not be limited to the former Dingras-Nueva Era boundary, which was

coterminous and aligned with the eastern boundary of Dingras. According to Marcos, its easternboundary should extend further to the east or up to the Ilocos-Norte-Mt. Province boundary pursuantto the description of its eastern boundary under R.A. No. 3753.10

In view of its claim over the middle portion of Nueva Era, Marcos posited that Nueva Era was cut intotwo parts. And since the law required that the land area of a municipality must be compact andcontiguous, Nueva Era's northern isolated portion could no longer be considered as its territory butthat of Marcos'. Thus, Marcos claimed that it was entitled not only to the middle portion11of Nueva
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Era but also to Nueva Era's isolated northern portion. These areas claimed by Marcos werewithin BarangaySto. Nio, Nueva Era.

Nueva Era reacted to the claim of Marcos through its Resolution No. 1, Series of 1993. It allegedthat since time immemorial, its entire land area was an ancestral domain of the "tinguians,"anindigenous cultural community. It argued to the effect that since the land being claimed by Marcos

must be protected for the tinguians,it must be preserved as part of Nueva Era.12

According to Nueva Era, Marcos was created out of the territory of Dingras only. And since R.A. No.3753 specifically mentioned seven (7) barrios of Dingras to become Marcos, the area which shouldcomprise Marcos should not go beyond the territory of said barrios.13

From the time Marcos was created in 1963, its eastern boundary had been considered to be alignedand coterminous with the eastern boundary of the adjacent municipality of Dingras. However, basedon a re-survey in 1992, supposedly done to conform to the second paragraph of Section 1 of R.A.No. 3753, an area of 15,400 hectares of Nueva Era was alleged to form part of Marcos .14This wasthe area of BarangaySto. Nio, Nueva Era that Marcos claimed in its position paper.

On March 29, 2000, the SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era. The falloof itsdecision15reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Body has no alternative but to dismiss, as ithereby DISMISSES said petition for lack of merit. The disputed area consisting of 15,400hectares, more or less, is hereby declared as part and portion of the territorial jurisdiction ofrespondent Nueva Era.16

R.A. No. 3753 expressly named the barangaysthat would comprise Marcos, but none of NuevaEra's barangayswere mentioned. The SP thus construed, applying the rule of expressio unius estexclusio alterius,that no part of Nueva Era was included by R.A. No. 3753 in creating Marcos .17

The SP ratiocinated that if Marcos was to be bounded by Mt. Province, it would encroach upon aportion, not only of Nueva Era but also of Abra. Thus:

x x x Even granting, for the sake of argument, that the eastern boundary of Marcos is indeedMountain Province, Marcos will then be claiming a portion of Abra because the province,specifically Barangay Sto. Nio, Nueva Era, is actually bounded on the East by the Provinceof Abra. Abra is situated between and separates the Provinces of Ilocos Norte and MountainProvince.

This is precisely what this body would like to avoid. Statutes should be construed in the lightof the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should begiven such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief and secure thebenefits intended.18(Citations omitted)

The SP further explained:

Invariably, it is not the letter, but the spirit of the law and the intent of the legislature that isimportant. When the interpretation of the statute according to the exact and literal import ofits words would lead to absurdity, it should be construed according to the spirit and reason,disregarding if necessary the letters of the law. It is believed that congress did not intend tohave this absurd situation to be created when it created the Municipality of Marcos. This
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body, by the mandate given to it by the RA 7160 otherwise known Local Government Code,so believes that respondent Nueva Era or any portion thereof has been excluded from theambit of RA 3753. Under the principle of "espressio (sic) unios (sic) est exclusio alterius,"byexpressly naming the barangays that will comprise the town of Marcos, those not mentionedare deemed excluded. In Republic Act 4354, where Section 2 thereof enumerated the barrioscomprising the City of Davao excluding the petitioner Barrio Central as part of the said City,

the court held that there arose aprima facieconclusion that the said law abolished BarrioCentral as part of Davao City.

Historically, the hinterlands of Nueva Era have been known to be the home of our brothersand sisters belonging to peculiar groups of non-(C)hristian inhabitants with their own richcustoms and traditions and this body takes judicial notice that the inhabitants of Nueva Erahave proudly claimed to be a part of this rich culture. With this common ancestral heritagewhich unfortunately is absent with Marcos, let it not be disturbed.19(Emphasis ours andcitations omitted)

RTC Decision

On appeal by Marcos, the RTC affirmed the decision of the SP in its decision

20

of March 19, 2001.The dispositive part of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision ofthe Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte is hereby AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.21

The RTC reasoned out in this wise:

The position of the Municipality of Marcos is that the provision of R.A. 3753 as regards itsboundary on the East which is the "Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province" should prevail.

On the other hand, the Municipality of Nueva Era posits the theory that only the barrios of theMunicipality of Dingras as stated in R.A. 3753 should be included in the territorial jurisdictionof the Municipality of Marcos. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan agreed with the position ofNueva Era.

x x x x

An examination of the Congressional Records during the deliberations of the R.A. 3753(House Bill No. 3721) shows the Explanatory Note of Congressman Simeon M. Valdez,

2

nd

District, Ilocos Norte, to wit:

EXPLANATORY NOTE

This bill seeks to create in the Province of Ilocos Norte a new municipality to beknown as the Municipality of Marcos, to be comprised by the present barrios ofCapariaan, Biding Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit, all in the Municipalityof Dingras of the same province. The seat of government will be in the sitio of SanMagro in the present barrio of Ragas.
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x x x x

On the other hand, the Municipality of Dingras will not be adversely affected toomuch because its finances will still be sound and stable. Its capacity to comply withits obligations, especially to its employees and personnel, will not be diminished norits operations paralyzed. On the contrary, economic development in both the mother

and the proposed municipalities will be accelerated.

In view of the foregoing, approval of this bill is earnestly requested.

(Sgd.) SIMEON M. VALDEZCongressman, 2ndDistrict

Ilocos Norte22

Parenthetically, the legislative intent was for the creation of the Municipality ofMarcos, Ilocos Norte from the barrios (barangays) of the Municipality of Dingras,Ilocos Norte only. Hence, the Municipality of Marcos cannot add any area beyond theterritorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. This conclusion

might have been different only if the area being claimed by the Municipality ofMarcos is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Dingras and not theMunicipality of Nueva Era. In such case, the two conflicting provisions may beharmonized by including such area within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipalityof Dingras as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality ofMarcos.23(Emphasis ours)

CA Disposition

Still determined to have a more extensive eastern boundary, Marcos filed a petition for review 24ofthe RTC decision before the CA. The issues raised by Marcos before the CA were:

1. Whether or not the site of Hercules Minerals and Oil, Inc. which is within a GovernmentForest Reservation in BarangaySto. Nio, formerly of Nueva Era, is a part of the newlycreated Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte.

2. Whether or not the portion of BarangaySto. Nio on the East which is separated fromNueva Era as a result of the full implementation of the boundaries of the new Municipality ofMarcos belongs also to Marcos or to Nueva Era.25

The twin issues involved two portions of Nueva Era, viz.: (1) middle portion, where HerculesMinerals and Oil, Inc. is located; and (2) northern portion of Nueva Era, which, according to Marcos,was isolated from Nueva Era in view of the integration to Marcos of said middle portion.

Marcos prayed before the CA that the above two portions of Nueva Era be declared as part of itsown territory. It alleged that it was entitled to the middle portion of Nueva Era in view of thedescription of Marcos' eastern boundary under R.A. No. 3753. Marcos likewise contended that it wasentitled to the northern portion of Nueva Era which was allegedly isolated from Nueva Era whenMarcos was created. It posited that such isolation of territory was contrary to law because the lawrequired that a municipality must have a compact and contiguous territory.26

In a Decision27dated June 6, 2005, the CA partly reversed the RTC decision with the followingdisposition:
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WHEREFORE, we partially GRANTthe petition treated as one for certiorari.The Decisionsof both the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Regional Trial Court of IlocosNorte are REVERSEDand SET ASIDEinsofar as they made the eastern boundary of themunicipality of Marcos co-terminous with the eastern boundary of Dingras town, and anotheris rendered extending the said boundary of Marcos to the boundary line between theprovince of Ilocos Norte and Kalinga-Apayao, but the same Decisionsare AFFIRMEDwith

respect to the denial of the claim of Marcos to the detached northern portionof barangaySto. Nio which should, as it is hereby ordered to, remain with the municipalityof Nueva Era. No costs.

SO ORDERED.28

In concluding that the eastern boundary of Marcos was the boundary line between Ilocos Norte andKalinga-Apayao, the CA gave the following explanation:

Clearly then, both the SP and the RTC erred when they ruled that the eastern boundary of Marcos isonly coterminous with the eastern boundary of the adjacent municipality of Dingras and refused toextend it up to the boundary line between the provinces of Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province

(Kalinga-Apayao). R.A. No. 3753, the law creating Marcos, is very explicit and leaves no room forequivocation that the boundaries of Marcos town are:

"On the Northwest by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barriosCapariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on theNortheast, by the Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit andNaglayaan; on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the Southby the Padsan River, which is at the same time the boundary between themunicipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and Southwest by the boundarybetween the municipalities of Batac and Dingras."

To stop short at the eastern boundary of Dingras as the eastern boundary also of Marcosand refusing to go farther to the boundary line between Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province(Kalinga-Apayao) is tantamount to amending the law which Congress alone can do. Both theSP and RTC have no competence to undo a valid act of Congress.

It is not correct to say that Congress did not intend to take away any part of Nueva Era andmerge it with Marcos for it is chargeable with conclusive knowledge that when it providedthat the eastern boundary of Marcos is the boundary line between Ilocos Norte and MountainProvince, (by the time of both the SB and RTC Decision was already Kalinga-Apayao), itwould be cutting through a portion of Nueva Era. As the law is written so must it beapplied. Dura lex sed lex!29

The CA likewise held that the province Abra was not located between Marcos and Kalinga-Apayao;and that Marcos would not encroach upon a portion of Abra for it to be bounded by Kalinga-Apayao,

to wit:

Nueva Era's contention that to lay out the eastern jurisdiction of Marcos to the boundary linebetween Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province (Kalinga-Apayao) would mean annexing part ofthe municipality of Itnig, province of Abra to Marcos as Abra is between Ilocos Norte andMountain Province is geographically erroneous. From Nueva Era's own map of Region 1,which also depicts the locations of Kalinga-Apayao, Abra, Mountain Province, Benguet andNueva Vizcaya after the partition of the old Mountain Province into the provinces of Kalinga-

Apayao, Ifugao, Mountain Province and Benguet, the province of Abra is situated far to the
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south of Kalinga Apayao and is between the latter and the present Mountain Province, whichis farther south of Abra. Abra is part of the eastern boundary of Ilocos Sur while Kalinga-

Apayao is the eastern boundary of Ilocos Norte. Hence, in no way will the eastern boundaryof the municipality of Marcos encroach upon a portion of Abra.30

However, Marcos' claim over the alleged isolated northern portion of Nueva Era was denied. The CA

ruled:

Going now to the other area involved, i.e., the portion of Sto. Nio that is separated from itsmother town Nueva Era and now lies east of the municipalities of Solsona and Dingras andnorth of Marcos, it bears stressing that it is not included within the area of Marcos as definedby law. But since it is already detached from Sto. Nio, Marcos is laying claimto it to beintegrated into its territory by the SP because it is contiguous to a portion of said municipality.

We hold that the SP has no jurisdiction or authority to act on the claim, for it will necessarilysubstantially alter the north eastern and southern boundaries of Marcos from that defined bylaw and unduly enlarge its area. Only Congress can do that. True, the SP may substantiallyalter the boundary of a barangaywithin its jurisdiction. But this means the alteration of the

boundary of a barangayin relation to another barangaywithin the same municipalityfor aslong as that will not result in any change in the boundary of that municipality. The area indispute therefore remains to be a part of Sto. Nio, a barangayof Nueva Era althoughseparated by the newly created Marcos town pursuant to Section 7(c) of the 1991 LocalGovernment Code which states:

SEC. 7. Creation and Conversion. -As a general rule, the creation of a localgovernment unit or its conversion from one level to another shall be based onverifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:

x x x x

(c) Land Area. -It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more islands or isseparated by a local government unit independent of the others;properlyidentified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to providefor such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.31

The CA also expressed the view that Marcos adopted the wrong mode of appeal in bringing the caseto it. The case, according to the CA, was appealable only to the RTC. Nonetheless, despite itspronouncement that the case was dismissible, the CA took cognizance of the same by treating it asone for certiorari,to wit:

A final word. At the outset, we agonized over the dilemma of choosing between dismissingoutright the petition at bar or entertaining it. This is for the simple reason that a petition forreview is a mode of appeal and is not appropriate as the Local Government Code provides

for the remedy of appeal in boundary disputes only to the Regional Trial Court but not anyfurther appeal to this Court. Appeal is a purely statutory right. It cannot be exercised unless itis expressly granted by law. This is too basic to require the citation of supporting authority.

x x x x

By the same token, since the Local Government Code does not explicitly grant the right offurther appeal from decisions of the RTCs in boundary disputes between or among localgovernment units, Marcos town cannot exercise that right from the adverse decision of the
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RTC of Ilocos Norte. Nonetheless, because of the transcendental legal and jurisdictionalissues involved, we solved our inceptive dilemma by treating the petition at bar as a specialcivil action for certiorari.32

Nueva Era was not pleased with the decision of the CA. Hence, this petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45.

Issues

Nueva Era now raises the following issues:

a) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction on the Petition for Review on Appeal,since Sec. 119 of the Local Government Code, which provides that "An appeal to theDecision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is exclusively vested to the Regional Trial Court,without further Appeal to the Court of Appeals";

b) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion, in treating the Petitionfor Review On Appeal, filed under Rule 45, Revised Rules of Court, as a Petition

for Certiorari,under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court;

c) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals erred in its appreciation of facts, in declaring thatMARCOS East is not coterminous with the Eastern boundary of its mother town-Dingras.That it has no factual and legal basis to extend MARCOS territory beyond Brgys.Agunit(Ferdinand) and Culao (Elizabeth) of Marcos, and to go further East, by traversing anddisintegrating Brgy.Sto.Nio, and drawing parallel lines from Sto. Nio, there lies Abra, notMt. Province or Kalinga-Apayao.33

Basically, there are two (2) issues to resolve here: (1) whether or not the mode of appeal adopted byMarcos in bringing the case to the CA is proper; and (2) whether or not the eastern boundary ofMarcos extends over and covers a portion of Nueva Era.

Our Ruling

Marcos co rrect ly appealed the RTC judgment via peti t ion for review under Rule 42.

Under Section 118(b) of the Local Government Code, "(b)oundary disputes involving two (2) or moremunicipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniangpanlalawigan concerned." The dispute shall be formally tried by the said sanggunianin case thedisputing municipalities fail to effect an amicable settlement.34

The SP of Ilocos validly took cognizance of the dispute between the parties. The appeal of the SPjudgment to the RTC was likewise properly filed by Marcos before the RTC. The problem, however,

lies in whether the RTC judgment may still be further appealed to the CA.

The CA pronounced that the RTC decision on the boundary dispute was not appealable to it. It ruledthat no further appeal of the RTC decision may be made pursuant to Section 119 of the LocalGovernment Code35which provides:

SECTION 119.Appeal. -Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, anyparty may elevate the decision of the sanggunianconcerned to the proper Regional TrialCourt having jurisdiction over the area in dispute. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the
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appeal within one (1) year from the filing thereof. Pending final resolution of the disputedarea prior to the dispute shall be maintained and continued for all legal purposes.

The CA concluded that since only the RTC was mentioned as appellate court, the case may nolonger be further appealed to it. The CA stated that "(a)ppeal is a purely statutory right. It cannot beexercised unless it is expressly granted by law. This is too basic to require the citation of supporting

authority."36

The CA, however, justified its taking cognizance of the case by declaring that: "because of thetranscendental legal and jurisdictional issues involved, we solved our inceptive dilemma by treatingthe petition at bar as a special civil action for certiorari."37

The CA erred in declaring that only the RTC has appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of the SP.

True, appeal is a purely statutory right and it cannot be exercised unless it is expressly granted bylaw. Nevertheless, the CA can pass upon the petition for review precisely because the law allows it.

Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by R.A.

No. 7902,38

vests in the CA the appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards orcommissions, among others.39B.P. Blg. 129 has been further supplemented by the 1997 Rules ofCivil Procedure, as amended, which provides for the remedy of appeal via petition for review underRule 42 to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

Thus, the CA need not treat the appeal via petition for review filed by Marcos as a petitionfor certiorarito be able to pass upon the same. B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which is supplementedby Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, gives the CA the authority to entertain appeals of such

judgments and final orders rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

At th e time of c reat ion of Marcos, approval in a plebisci te of the creat ion of a local

government uni t is not required.

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, orits boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in thelocal government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscitein the political units directly affected.40

The purpose of the above constitutional provision was acknowledged by the Court through JusticeReynato S. Puno in Miranda v. Aguirre,41where it was held that:

The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous Constitutions, gave more reality to thesovereignty of our people for it was borne out of the people power in the 1986 EDSArevolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the past wherebylocal government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of thevagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of the people ofthe local government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanismto any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering theboundaries of local government units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereigncapacity decide on a matter that affects them - direct democracy of the people as opposed to


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democracy thru people's representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord withthe philosophy of the Constitution granting more autonomy to local government units.42

Nueva Era contends that the constitutional and statutory43plebiscite requirement for the creation of alocal government unit is applicable to this case. It posits that the claim of Marcos to its territoryshould be denied due to lack of the required plebiscite.

We agree with Nueva Era's contention that Marcos' claim over parts of its territory is not tenable.However, the reason is not the lack of the required plebiscite under the 1987 and 1973 constitutionsand the Local Government Code of 1991 but other reasons as will be discussed below.

At the time Marcos was created, a plebiscite was not required by law to create a local governmentunit. Hence, Marcos was validly created without conducting a plebiscite. As a matter of fact, noplebiscite was conducted in Dingras, where it was derived.

Lex prospicit, non respicit.The law looks forward, not backward.44It is the basic norm that provisionsof the fundamental law should be given prospective application only, unless legislative intent for itsretroactive application is so provided.45

In the comparable case of Ceniza v. Commission on Elections46involving the City of Mandaue, theCourt has this to say:

Petitioners assail the charter of the City of Mandaue as unconstitutional for not having beenratified by the residents of the city in a plebiscite. This contention is untenable. TheConstitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of theboundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by themajority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a newrequirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective incharacter and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came intoexistence on June 21, 1969.47(Citations omitted and underlining supplied).

Moreover, by deciding this case, We are not creating Marcos but merely interpreting the law thatcreated it. Its creation was already a fait accompli.Therefore, there is no reason for Us to furtherrequire a plebiscite.

As pointed out by Justice Isagani Cruz, to wit:

Finally, it should be observed that the provisions of the Constitution should be given only aprospective application unless the contrary is clearly intended. Were the rule otherwise,rights already acquired or vested might be unduly disturbed or withdrawn even in theabsence of an unmistakable intention to place them within the scope of the Constitution.48

No part of Nueva Era's terri tory w as taken for the creation o f Marcos un der R.A. No. 3753.

Only the barrios (now barangays) of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its territory are named inR.A. No. 3753. To wit:

SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit inthe Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the saidmunicipality and constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as theMunicipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:
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Since only the barangaysof Dingras are enumerated as Marcos' source of territory, Nueva Era'sterritory is, therefore, excluded.

Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius,the mention of one thing implies theexclusion of another thing not mentioned. If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is tooperate, everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and

effect.49

This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic andnatural workings of the human mind.50

Had the legislature intended other barangaysfrom Nueva Era to become part of Marcos, it couldhave easily done so by clear and concise language. Where the terms are expressly limited to certainmatters, it may not by interpretation or construction be extended to other matters.51The ruleproceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in astatute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expresslymentioned.52

Moreover, since the barangaysof Nueva Era were not mentioned in the enumerationof barangaysout of which the territory of Marcos shall be set, their omission must be held to have

been done intentionally. This conclusion finds support in the rule of casus omissus pro omissohabendus est,which states that a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be heldto have been omitted intentionally.53

Furthermore, this conclusion on the intention of the legislature is bolstered by the explanatory note ofthe bill which paved the way for the creation of Marcos. Said explanatory note mentioned onlyDingras as the mother municipality of Marcos.

Where there is ambiguity in a statute, as in this case, courts may resort to the explanatory note toclarify the ambiguity and ascertain the purpose and intent of the statute.54

Despite the omission of Nueva Era as a mother territory in the law creating Marcos, the latter stillcontends that said law included Nueva Era. It alleges that based on the description of its boundaries,a portion of Nueva Era is within its territory.

The boundaries of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 read:

On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barriosCapariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by theBurnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East,by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan River which is at thesame time the boundary between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West andSouthwest, by the boundary between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras.

Marcos contends that since it is "bounded on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary," a

portion of Nueva Era formed part of its territory because, according to it, Nueva Era is between theMarcos and Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary. Marcos posits that in order for its eastern side toreach the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary, it will necessarily traverse the middle portion of NuevaEra.

Marcos further claims that it is entitled not only to the middle portion of Nueva Era but also to itsnorthern portion which, as a consequence, was isolated from the major part of Nueva Era.


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We cannot accept the contentions of Marcos.

Only Dingras is specifically named by law as source territory of Marcos. Hence, the said descriptionof boundaries of Marcos is descriptive only of the listed barangaysof Dingras as a compact andcontiguous territory.

Considering that the description of the eastern boundary of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 isambiguous, the same must be interpreted in light of the legislative intent.

The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application .55We thusuphold the legislative intent to create Marcos out of the territory of Dingras only.

Courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is unraveledby the four corners of the statute, and in order to discover said intent, the whole statute, and not onlya particular provision thereof, should be considered.56Every section, provision or clause of thestatute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplatedby the legislature. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law,and every part of the act is to be taken into view.57

It is axiomatic that laws should be given a reasonable interpretation, not one which defeats the verypurpose for which they were passed. This Court has in many cases involving the construction ofstatutes always cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose of thelegislature and stressed that it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoidsuch a deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity) and that therefore "a literal interpretation is to berejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results."58

Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to beremedied. Thus, in construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and thestatute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court mayconsider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.59

WHEREFORE,the petition is GRANTED.The Decision of the Court of Appeals ispartly REVERSED.The Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Ilocos Norte is Reinstated.

SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 100970 September 2, 1992

FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and JULIA SURPOSA, respondents.

Aquino and Associates for petitioner.

Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.

NOCON, J.:

This is a petition for certiorariwith a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and preliminarymandatory injunction to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 11,1991, 1affirming the decision dated March 20, 1990 of the Insurance Commission 2in ordering petitionerFinman General Assurance Corporation to pay private respondent Julia Surposa the proceeds of the

personal accident Insurance policy with interest.

It appears on record that on October 22, 1986, deceased, Carlie Surposa was insured with petitionerFinman General Assurance Corporation under Finman General Teachers Protection Plan MasterPolicy No. 2005 and Individual Policy No. 08924 with his parents, spouses Julia and Carlos Surposa,and brothers Christopher, Charles, Chester and Clifton, all surnamed, Surposa, as beneficiaries. 3

While said insurance policy was in full force and effect, the insured, Carlie Surposa, died on October18, 198

statcon 2014 sept

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