start 2010 fallout over europe

8/3/2019 START 2010 Fallout Over Europe

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ADVANCED MASTER OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES

START 2010 fallout over Europe

- or -

How I Learned to Stop Worrying and

Love the Shield

Author: Mentor:Marko Sui, dipl.iur. prof.dr.sc. Vlatko Cvrtila


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Introduction

In 2009, the election of Barack Obama as 44th president of USA gave new hope forimprovement of American Russian relations. Soon after, in March 2009, Hillary Clinton asthe American Secretary of State and Sergei Lavrov, Russian foreign minister, announcedreset in US-Russia relations. After years of rising tensions among cold war adversarieswhich left EU and NATO divided, European states welcomed new relations perspective.

For a moment everything seemed to be going smoothly. The planned secondagreement on Strategic Arms Reduction, or New START, was supposed to be the first realstep towards better relations with Russia and a nuclear free world. But through ratification

process both US Congress and Russian state Duma added amendments which could temperthe very spirit of the treaty.Conflicting positions about sensitive issues like Tactical NuclearWeapons (or TNWs) and anti-ballistic missile shield will test cold-war adversaries' will tocooperate. It looks like European countries are again just spectators in a process that might inthe end turn out to be a new arms race.

Focus of this paper will precisely be on defense issues left unresolved after newSTART treaty in Russia-EU-US triangle.

START 2010

On April 8, 2010, in Prague, presidents Obama and Medvedev signed the NewSTART Treaty, a follow-up on the START Treaty, which expired on December 5, 2009. TheTreaty limits each side to 1550 deployed strategic warheads, 700 deployed strategic deliveryvehicles, and 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM(inter-continental ballistic missile)launchers, SLBM(submarine launched ballistic missiles) and heavy bombers equipped withnuclear armaments.1

Promoting non-proliferation and ultimately freeing the world from all nuclear weaponswere proclaimed reasons to negotiate new START, as president Obama clearly stated in hisPrague speech in April 20092. However these goals may be further away than ever in armsrace.

Limitations thresholds itself were not too difficult to negotiate. It was necessary tomaintain Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) balance which means that neither side couldstrike first without risking to be annihilated in retaliatory strike. While agreed numbers mightseem as huge reduction from cold war peak levels of almost 20 000 warheads and 8000delivery vehicles on each side (data for 1981)3, the treaty does not actually imply anydestruction of warheads. In fact, because of a new counting rule that attributes one weapon to

1

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-russia-relations-reset-fact-sheet2http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/3http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/nuclear_arms_race.htm

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http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-russia-relations-reset-fact-sheethttp://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/nuclear_arms_race.htmhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-russia-relations-reset-fact-sheethttp://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/nuclear_arms_race.htm


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each bomber rather than the actual number of weapons assigned to them, each country will beable to deploy many more warheads than would otherwise be the case. Considering that USwill retain after new START somewhere between 40-60 heavy bombers, each capable ofcarrying a load of 10-20 nuclear cruise missiles, no significant reduction will be made fromlevels allowed by former START.

Furthermore, treaty does not provide any limits on the deployment of missiles withmultiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV),which means both sides will retainits arsenal of MIRV ICBMs and even allow development of new ones. A MIRV warheadactually consists of several nuclear warheads capable of striking different targetssimultaneously. Only a couple of successful MIRV strikes from missiles such as the RussianSS-18 or the US Minuteman would be enough to end civilization as we know it. So it seemsMAD balance is safe for the years to come, or is it really? This time an anti-ballistic shieldsystem might unbalance the equation.

As the new START noted in its preamble4 Recognizingthe existence of the

interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that thisinterrelationship will become more important as nuclear arms are reduced. From thebeginning it was obvious that an agreement on so-called defensive arms will be a key for allother development.

Ballistic Missile Defense and its cost

Ballistic shield itself is not a new idea, with its roots in Sentinel program proposed by

United States Defense Secretary Robert McNamaraback in 1963. In its original idea it wassupposed to be a system capable of defending continental US against large scale attack bysoviet ICBM's 5 The proposal was soon widely criticized as technically impossible and in factvery dangerous, since deployment of even alimited system of this kind could provoke a

preemptive strike against itsfacilities in order to prevent strategic imbalance. In 1967president Nixon decided to deploy scaled-down version called The Safeguard, designed todefend U.S. cities from a "limited" attack such as that from the People's Republic of China.6

Safeguard also proved to be insurmountable challenge for engineers and was abandoned soonafter first unit was built.

ABM treaty7 was signed in 1972 and till today no actual shield beyond ABM limits of

two sites with no more than 100 launchers positioned at least 1300km apart, were ever built orput into operation.

In 1983 President Regan proposed Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) system thatwould effectively end all ballistic missile threats using a complex network of ground-launched interceptors and space based weapons platforms. It was supposed to cover both USAand Soviet Union preventing all ICBM launches, thus ensuring that the time of nuclear danger

4http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/04/08/new-start-treaty-and-protocol5

although in 1962 SSSR had only a few of their first generation ICBMS, the SS-6

http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1996_h/h960927l.htm

6http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/fal01/costanzo.html

7http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/abm/abm2.html

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http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/04/08/new-start-treaty-and-protocolhttp://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1996_h/h960927l.htmhttp://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/fal01/costanzo.htmlhttp://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/fal01/costanzo.htmlhttp://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/abm/abm2.htmlhttp://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/abm/abm2.htmlhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/04/08/new-start-treaty-and-protocolhttp://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1996_h/h960927l.htmhttp://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/fal01/costanzo.htmlhttp://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/abm/abm2.html


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would end forever. Because it would use direct energy weapons like lasers, it was ironicallynamed star wars system, after George Lucas famous science fiction movie.

Although it was never built, all US administrations since then have allocatedsubstantial funds for development of some kind of National Missile Defense (NMD). During

Bill Clinton's second term in the White House, forward based X-band HAVE STARE radarcapable of detecting objects in 1-10 cm range was installed in Wardo, Norway.8 Its intendeduse is to provide precise acquisition and tracking data on ballistic missiles from boost intomidcourse which would be used in engineering future ballistic shield components.

Spending was especially pushed by so called hawks inside George W.Bushadministration, who prompted enormous funding for research, development and procurementof various shield components. Many analysts suggested that increased defense spending wasthe main drive force behind such expensive research, as many political figures that pushedspending were either directly involved with private arms producers or were elected in regions,such as San Diego9, that rely on arms producing industries as base for employment.

According to report made by the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation andEconomists Allied for Arms Reductiontitled, "The Full Costs of Ballistic Missile Defense10,it was estimated that the entire life-cycle cost of all the various missile defense programs

being envisaged by the Bush administration could range from $800 billion to $1.2 trillion. Ifballistic missile defense is a necessary insurance policy for the mightiest country in the worldwith such a high premium, we must really live in a dangerous world.

Many (including myself) felt audacious enough to hope that Barack Obama wouldchange US policies concerning defense expenditures. It proved to be just wishful thinking asObama introduced defense budget of$708 billion in fiscal 2011. Although Defense SecretaryGates announced cuts to several programs in a new budget proposal, like purchase of F-22

and F-35 stealth fighters, missile defense will not be significantly cut down.1112

figure 1 figure 2

8http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/havestare.htm

9http :// www .sdbj .com /news /2010/ apr /26/pentagon - spending - shelters - regional - economy - recess /10

http://www.epsusa.org/publications/papers/bmd/bmd.pdf11

http :// www .bloomberg .com /news /2011-01-07/ defense - contractors - may - benefit-from - pentagon - cuts .html12

http :// www .reuters .com /article /2010/02/02/us - obama - budget -pentagon - idUSTRE 6103 C 520100202

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http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/havestare.htmhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/havestare.htmhttp://www.sdbj.com/news/2010/apr/26/pentagon-spending-shelters-regional-economy-recess/http://www.sdbj.com/news/2010/apr/26/pentagon-spending-shelters-regional-economy-recess/http://www.sdbj.com/news/2010/apr/26/pentagon-spending-shelters-regional-economy-recess/http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-07/defense-contractors-may-benefit-from-pentagon-cuts.htmlhttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-07/defense-contractors-may-benefit-from-pentagon-cuts.htmlhttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-07/defense-contractors-may-benefit-from-pentagon-cuts.htmlhttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-07/defense-contractors-may-benefit-from-pentagon-cuts.htmlhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/02/us-obama-budget-pentagon-idUSTRE6103C520100202http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/02/us-obama-budget-pentagon-idUSTRE6103C520100202http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/02/us-obama-budget-pentagon-idUSTRE6103C520100202http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/02/us-obama-budget-pentagon-idUSTRE6103C520100202http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/havestare.htmhttp://www.sdbj.com/news/2010/apr/26/pentagon-spending-shelters-regional-economy-recess/http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-07/defense-contractors-may-benefit-from-pentagon-cuts.htmlhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/02/us-obama-budget-pentagon-idUSTRE6103C520100202


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Even ratification of new START in US Senate had a high price as Obama had to giveconcessions to senators who opposed the treaty in order to secure necessary votes. End resultwas increased spending over the next 10 years - $180billion more for Department of Defense(DOD) to modernize nuclear weapons delivery systems and production facilities, and$175billion to National Nuclear Security Administration(NNSA) to build new nuclear

weapons factories, testing and simulation facilities, and modernizing and extending the life ofthe nuclear weapons in the stockpile. 13 Also new delivery vehicles program is under way andreplacement of existing warheads with new ones (W88 warhead project) will be boosted to 80

per year by 2020.

In 2002 US withdrew itself from ABM treaty arguing that the cold war is over and thatABM treaty prevents US from developing defense against new threats such as roguestatesthat are acquiring increasingly longer-range ballistic missiles14. Although in the samedocument it is stated that Russia is not an enemy, official Kremlin and even Paris voiced itsconcerns over possible ABM deployment that could potentially start a new arms race15. Sixmonth later Russia withdrew from (then active) START obligations, and decided not to

destroy its strongest weapons, SS-18 missiles, but to extend their lifespan until 201616

. It wasapparent that a policy shift was under way, but building a missile defense shield was noteverything that was being prepared.

Soon, Bush administration made a huge policy shift from just possessing deterrence orbuilding ABM system to preparations for the possibility of a preemptive first strike againststates that harbor terrorism and could strike US with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Inofficial National Security Strategy(NSS 2002) from September 2002, it is stated thatdeterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders ofrogue states, more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and thewealth of their nations17and Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a

terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents;whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is

statelessness. In order to cope with such security threats a new doctrine was formed - that anassault is the best form of defense, because We cannot let our enemies strike first18.

Being aware of danger to its deterrent potential, Russia urged discussion and warnedthat if any ABM components would be deployed unilaterally, locations of those componentswould become primary targets for Russian military. When an announcement was made that anearly warning radar would be installed in Czech Republic and 10 missile interceptors inPoland, Russia responded with plans to deploy Iskander tactical missile systems toKaliningrad. But was there indeed a need for Russia with its entire arsenal to fear of 10

interceptor missiles?

In order to understand what a preemptive strike doctrine could mean in ABM context,it is necessary to explain what ABM or MSD actually stands for. A nuclear shield is usuallydiscussed in public as a system capable of defending a nation or its allies from a nuclear strikedelivered by ballistic missiles. Since ICBMs are considered to be weapons of strategic value itis also called strategic or national shield. For protection against cruise missiles and airplane

13http :// www .fas .org /blog /ssp /2010/07/ stockpileplan .php

14http :// georgewbush -whitehouse .archives .gov /news /releases /2001/12/20011213-2.html15http :// www .guardian .co .uk /world /2001/ dec /14/ russia .usa 216

http :// www .guardian .co .uk /world /2002/ aug /20/ russia .nickpatonwalsh17http :// georgewbush -whitehouse .archives .gov /nsc /nss /2002/ nss 5.html18 Also NSS 2002

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http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/07/stockpileplan.phphttp://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/07/stockpileplan.phphttp://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/07/stockpileplan.phphttp://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/07/stockpileplan.phphttp://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011213-2.htmlhttp://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011213-2.htmlhttp://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011213-2.htmlhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/dec/14/russia.usa2http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/aug/20/russia.nickpatonwalshhttp://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss5.htmlhttp://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss5.htmlhttp://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss5.htmlhttp://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/07/stockpileplan.phphttp://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011213-2.htmlhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/dec/14/russia.usa2http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/aug/20/russia.nickpatonwalshhttp://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss5.html


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delivered nuclear bombs, which are considered to be tactical nuclear weapons, usual name istactical or theater missile defense. But ABM is far from being a purely defensive weapon.

Theater missile defense is feasible on the current level of technological development,since it consists of nothing more than upgraded anti-aircraft (AA) defense system.

Furthermore, if theater defense would be successfully deployed, MAD balance won't beendangered, since entire ballistic deterrence potential would still remain intact. But if trueballistic missile shield would be considered, it might start a new arms race.

Effective defense from strategic missiles is difficult to achieve mainly because ofimmense technological challenge of stopping ICBMs. A ballistic missile is a missile guidedonly during relatively brief initial powered phase of flight, its course subsequently governed

by laws of classical mechanics. After initial burnout, ICBM flies at altitudes of over 1000kmand some can even achieve speeds of over more than 24.000Km/h19. Until recently it wasthought to be impossible to achieve a direct hit to disable it or change its trajectory. Othersolutions were to detonate a low-yield nuclear weapon in vicinity of ICBM20 that could harm

it with either a direct blast wave or electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) released in the blast. SDI orstar wars system was conceived with intention to stop ICBMs during initial burnout or mid-course flight with use of energy weapons that are still not developed today.

Purely defensive nature of SDI was questioned by Lt. Colonel Robert Bowman, aformer Director of Advanced Space Programs Development for the U.S. Air Force in the Fordand Carter administrations, and a former United States Air Force Lieutenant Colonel. He saidin a radio interview on April 12, 2007: The argument over the technological feasibility of adefensive shield is entirely irrelevant, because Star Wars has nothing to do with defense. It is

an attempt to deploy offensive weapons disguised as defense... (Ronald Reagan) assignedthem two missions. One: Destroy opposing satellites and seize control of space. Two: Destroy

targets on the surface of the earth from space without warning. There wasnt a word in thereabout shooting down ballistic missiles. 21 If that was true, then George W.Bush wasn't thefirst to conceive preemptive strike doctrine, he just voiced it explicitly.

President Barack Obama proclaimed a different policy in his Prague speech, linkingentire European missile defense to a single threat: As long as the threat from Iran persists,we will go forward with a missile defense system that is cost-effective and proven. If the

Iranian threat is eliminated, we will have a stronger basis for security, and the driving force

for missile defense construction in Europe will be removed.

If Iran was the main threat, a land-based missile shield in Turkey would be muchcheaper, closer to threat and would not spark fear in Russia. But as Obama scraped plans for

missile interceptors in Poland, he also announced that missile defense will continue withemphasis on sea-based interceptors. This development of navy missile shield also requires amore detailed analysis.

19

http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/Mmiii.html20

a system allowed by ABM treaty and deployed around Moscow would use such detonations21http://www.thepeoplespeakradio.net/2008/dr-robert-m-bowman/

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http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/Mmiii.htmlhttp://www.thepeoplespeakradio.net/2008/dr-robert-m-bowman/http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/Mmiii.htmlhttp://www.thepeoplespeakradio.net/2008/dr-robert-m-bowman/


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AEGIS ballistic missile defense

In a detailed congress report, specialist in naval affairs Ronald ORourke laid out

details ofThe Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program

22

. Aegis is a ship combatsystem consisting of an integrated collection of sensors, computers, software, displays,weapon launchers, and weapons for defending ships against aircraft, anti-ship cruise missiles(ASCMs), surface threats, and subsurface threats.Heart of the system is a AN/SPY-1 radarsystem that can simultaneously follow and engage op to 100 land, air, and undersea threatsand attacks.23 The navy Aegis ships include 27 Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers and 62Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers with total procurement cost of$42.7 billion. TheBMD interceptor missiles used by Aegis ships are the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and theStandard Missile-2 Block IV (SM-2 Block IV). The SM-3 is designed to intercept ballisticmissiles above the atmosphere, in the midcourse phase of flight, while The SM-2 Block IV isdesigned to intercept ballistic missiles inside the atmosphere, during the terminal phase of

flight. There are also Aegis Ashore sites, that consist of land-based aegis radar and SM-3missiles, a block of which was supposed to be deployed to Poland.

Report states that both missiles are able to engage short and interim range ballisticmissiles, with limited ability to engage ICBMs. While it is not clear what limited ICBMcapability actually means, wording was probably chosen not to upset the Russians whilehiding its true nature. During tests, SM-3 missile achieved 11 hits in 12 attempts, including astrike against satellite orbiting 247 kilometers over the Pacific Ocean as it traveled in space atmore than (27000 km/h)24.

In budget plans for fiscal years 2009-2018 a total of 43 Aegis ships were to be BMD

ready and equipped with 436 SM-3 missiles and 75 SM-2 Block Ivs.

While report states that the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europeis not intended to, and will not, provide a missile defense capability relative to the ballistic

missile deterrent forces of the Russian Federation, or diminish strategic stability with theRussian Federation, it is also noted that congress should investigate if those missile numbersare enough to fulfill their mission. What mission could need 436 interceptor missiles?

The Russian Strategic Missile Forces reportedly have 369 land based ICBMs25, 160SLBMs deployed on 12 strategic(SSBN) submarines26 and 76 strategic bombers27 A single ss-18 caries 40 decoys and 10 warheads covered with uranium 238 armor, capable of

withstanding laser or EMP strike28, but its MIRV components are released in final flight stage.Considering that SM-3 is designed to intercept ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase and todo so using a kinetic strike29, MIRV components would not be able to deploy and eachsuccessful strike would mean one complete ICBM terminated.

22Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)Program: Background and Issues for Congress;http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33745.pdf23http://www.missilethreat.com/missiledefensesystems/id.9/system_detail.asp24

http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/sm3-test.htm25

http://russianforces.org/missiles/26

http://russianforces.org/navy/27

http://russianforces.org/aviation/28

http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/news/2005/space-050218-rianovosti01.htm29

http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/sm3.htm

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http://www.missilethreat.com/missiledefensesystems/id.9/system_detail.asphttp://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/sm3-test.htmhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/sm3-test.htmhttp://russianforces.org/missiles/http://russianforces.org/missiles/http://russianforces.org/navy/http://russianforces.org/navy/http://russianforces.org/aviation/http://russianforces.org/aviation/http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/news/2005/space-050218-rianovosti01.htmhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/news/2005/space-050218-rianovosti01.htmhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/sm3.htmhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/sm3.htmhttp://www.missilethreat.com/missiledefensesystems/id.9/system_detail.asphttp://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/sm3-test.htmhttp://russianforces.org/missiles/http://russianforces.org/navy/http://russianforces.org/aviation/http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/news/2005/space-050218-rianovosti01.htmhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/sm3.htm


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In the last two decades Russian overall navy and submarine capabilities have beendiminishing, leaving in 2010 only 12 strategic submarines30, with two being overhauled inshipyards. Russian navy today is not able to perform all tasks set before it and will be forcedto choose whether to hold consistent readiness to deliver a nuclear strike, to defend SSBNs orto intercept enemy SSBNs. Plans for procurement of new submarines are very ambitious and

would probably ensure enough SSBNs to maintain deterrence level if implemented. At thesame time not enough attack and multi-purpose submarines are planned for procurement 31,which means Russian navy abilities may be further deteriorated. Decaying numbers andaging fleet of attack submarine means that they cannot protect SSBNs when being tracked byUS attack submarines while on patrol in high seas. In wartime conditions being trackedusually means being destroyed, and without enough attack submarines, SSBNs would makean easy target. Only SSBNs on patrol in Okhotsk Sea would probably be safe because ofnatural shield that Kuril Islands provide. Bulava missile might become even a bigger problemwith only 7 out of 14 test launches successful32. Russian navy practically seems not to havethe alternative, as it is planned for Bulava missiles to be deployed on all 8 of new Borey classsubmarines33.

While it is not possible to count US missile interceptors against Russian strategicmissiles and declare a shield effective, this ratio does have its strategic weight. Such a shieldis not capable of stopping Russia from delivering a massive first strike, but it might just beenough to stop weapons that would survive in an event of US first strike. Such a doomsdayscenario is in fact more feasible today than ever before, mostly because of degradation ofRussian deterrence potential. And at the same time, contrary to many predictions, presidentObama introduced most expensive defense budget since World War II3435

While it is highly unlikely that even politicians nicknamed hawks, like DonaldRumsfeld or Dick Cheney, would actually launch massive nuclear strike on Russia, even a

possibility of such strike to be successful would ensure US nuclear primacy. MAD balancewould then be irrelevant, because US could strike first without risking of being fired upon.

Nuclear Primacy combined with conventional armed forces primacy, control of the world seatrading routes and a control of world main trading and reserve currency would give USA anunprecedented power in world affairs, stronger even then that of Imperia Britannica at its

peak.

Consciously ordering a nuclear preemptive strike is an unimaginable task to mostrational people, but for a nuclear holocaust to start sometimes no such decision would benecessary. A hostile environment with active ballistic shield and space defenses is itselfdangerous enough. During cold war there were many involuntary incidents that almost ended

in a full-scale war and only really reliable remedy against them is an environment of mutualtrust. Deployment of a shield would greatly increase possibility of serious incidents, most ofall a nuclear war by miscalculus. Considering a BMD to be a weapon of a possible first strike,a window of strike-back opportunity would be much narrower than today and every strayairplane or unreported satellite launch could provoke response.

30http://russianforces.org/navy/

31http://rusnavy.com/nowadays/structure/sub_future.htm

32http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20101029/161127864.html

33http :// en .rian .ru /mlitary _ news /20101019/161011788.html

34http :// thewillandthewallet.org /2010/12/21/ a - leaner - and - meaner - defense /

35http :// www .globalissues .org /article /75/world - military - spending

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http://russianforces.org/navy/http://russianforces.org/navy/http://rusnavy.com/nowadays/structure/sub_future.htmhttp://rusnavy.com/nowadays/structure/sub_future.htmhttp://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20101029/161127864.htmlhttp://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20101029/161127864.htmlhttp://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20101019/161011788.htmlhttp://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20101019/161011788.htmlhttp://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20101019/161011788.htmlhttp://thewillandthewallet.org/2010/12/21/a-leaner-and-meaner-defense/http://thewillandthewallet.org/2010/12/21/a-leaner-and-meaner-defense/http://thewillandthewallet.org/2010/12/21/a-leaner-and-meaner-defense/http://www.globalissues.org/article/75/world-military-spendinghttp://www.globalissues.org/article/75/world-military-spendinghttp://www.globalissues.org/article/75/world-military-spendinghttp://russianforces.org/navy/http://rusnavy.com/nowadays/structure/sub_future.htmhttp://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20101029/161127864.htmlhttp://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20101019/161011788.htmlhttp://thewillandthewallet.org/2010/12/21/a-leaner-and-meaner-defense/http://www.globalissues.org/article/75/world-military-spending


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A mere possibility of a nuclear supremacy is enough to make Russias leaders verycautious toward anything that could limit its deterrence potential. Russian Prime MinisterPutin explained their concerns: If we are not developing AMD, then theres a threat thatwhen our partners create an umbrella over themselves to protect them against our offensive

system, they might feel completely safe. And that might mean that our partners will feel they

can do anything they want the level of aggression in politics and economics will rise rightaway. The balance will be lost()The issues of anti-missile defense and offensive combat

systems are interconnected. Even during the cold war the peace was maintained thanks to this

balance of power, which includes the correlation of forces between AMD, air defense and

offensive arms. 36

While President Obama announced that missile defense was being transformed froma source of tension [with Russia] into a source of potential co-operation."37, it is still a longway to achieve that goal. One of the reasons why Russian Duma and US Senate adoptedunilateral statements about BMD can be found in a sudden move by President of Romaniaannouncing that his state would host missile interceptors38. This statement was a surprise,

because it was made when negotiations on text of the treaty were already finished whichalmost led to total abandonment of the whole process39

Russia cautiously accepted the need for limited ABM or Theatre defense shield, butinsisted that it is possible only in cooperation with Moscow. As Russian Defense MinisterAnatoly Serdyukov said:"We have proposed to share responsibility and Russia is ready to actin some part and take on anti-missile defense responsibility...Anyway, we must work out a

system that can overcome the European missile defense shield and naturally not decrease the

potential of the Russian nuclear forces,"40 Russian President also warned that if the talks onbuilding joint shield in Europe fail, Russia will have to take countermeasures, and EU securitywill again be determined by a nuclear arms race. "I'd like to speak plainly about the choice we

face in the next ten years: either we reach an agreement on missile defense and create ameaningful joint mechanism for cooperation, or if we fail to do so, a new round of the arms

race will begin, and we will have to make decisions on the deployment of new strike

weapons,"41

Non-strategic nuclear weapons

Even with the new START in force non-strategic nuclear weapons will remain the

least-regulated category of WMDs in arms control agreements. Non-strategic or tacticalnuclear weapons (TNWs) typically refer to short-range weapons, including land-basedmissiles with a range of less than 500 km and air- and sea-launched weapons with a range ofless than 600 km.

The only legally binding document that addressed sub-strategic nuclear weapons wasthe 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty which provided for the elimination of all

36http :// rt .com /usa /news /russia - develop - offensive - arms /37

http :// www .guardian .co .uk /world /2010/ dec /01/ russia -putin - missile - defence - threat38

http :// www .france 24.com /en /20100204- romania - us - anti - missile - shield - defence - military - europe39

http :// www .nytimes .com /2010/03/27/ world /europe /27 start.html ? pagewanted =2&_ r =1

40http :// en .rian .ru /russia /20101213/161751524.html

41http :// en .beta .rian .ru /analysis /20101201/161569725.html

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http://rt.com/usa/news/russia-develop-offensive-arms/http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/01/russia-putin-missile-defence-threathttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/01/russia-putin-missile-defence-threathttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/01/russia-putin-missile-defence-threathttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/01/russia-putin-missile-defence-threathttp://www.france24.com/en/20100204-romania-us-anti-missile-shield-defence-military-europehttp://www.france24.com/en/20100204-romania-us-anti-missile-shield-defence-military-europehttp://www.france24.com/en/20100204-romania-us-anti-missile-shield-defence-military-europehttp://www.france24.com/en/20100204-romania-us-anti-missile-shield-defence-military-europehttp://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/27/world/europe/27start.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/27/world/europe/27start.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/27/world/europe/27start.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1http://en.rian.ru/russia/20101213/161751524.htmlhttp://en.rian.ru/russia/20101213/161751524.htmlhttp://en.rian.ru/russia/20101213/161751524.htmlhttp://en.beta.rian.ru/analysis/20101201/161569725.htmlhttp://en.beta.rian.ru/analysis/20101201/161569725.htmlhttp://en.beta.rian.ru/analysis/20101201/161569725.htmlhttp://en.beta.rian.ru/analysis/20101201/161569725.htmlhttp://rt.com/usa/news/russia-develop-offensive-arms/http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/01/russia-putin-missile-defence-threathttp://www.france24.com/en/20100204-romania-us-anti-missile-shield-defence-military-europehttp://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/27/world/europe/27start.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1http://en.rian.ru/russia/20101213/161751524.htmlhttp://en.beta.rian.ru/analysis/20101201/161569725.html


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land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 km, although itdid not address sea- or air-launched nuclear weapons within that range category.

In some respects, TNWs are more dangerous than strategic weapons. Their small sizeand vulnerability to theft make the existence of TNWs in national arsenals a risk to global

security. Robert Walpole, the CIA analyst responsible for the National Intelligence Estimatesaid in Congressional testimony: "In fact, we project that in the coming years, U.S. territoryis more likely to be attacked with weapons of mass destruction from non-missile deliverymeans (most likely from non-state entities) than by missiles, primarily because non-missile

delivery means are less costly and more reliable and accurate. They can also be used withoutattribution."42 It is also important to notice that a stolen TNW can be used by terrorists nomatter how effective missile shield is in place.

Historically, TNWs were intended for use in battlefield and theatre-level operations inconjunction with conventional forces. Such a use would constitute a world war III scenariowith tens of thousands of USSR tanks rolling across Europe. With special program of their

use by host allied country, US insured that such a country would not pursue their own nuclearweapons program. Today strategic weapons are much more important for deterrence purpose,and military role for TNWs is greatly reduced. During cold-war peak in 1971, almost 7300 ofthem were deployedby western allies in Europe43. Since the breakdown of USSR both UnitedStates and Russia have been unilaterally reducing their numbers, although no formalagreements have been signed. In the fall of 1991, U.S. President George H.W. Bush andSoviet President Mikhail Gorbachev adopted parallel unilateral declarations on tacticalnuclear weapons; Gorbachev's declaration was confirmed by Russian President Boris Yeltsinin 1992 in the name of the Russian Federation. According to these declarations (knownas Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, or PNIs), the vast majority of warheads for short-rangedelivery vehicles were subject to either dismantlement or storage at central storage facilities.

According to Federation of American Scientists,currently there are 150200 UStactical air bombs deployed in Europe, stored at six bases in five countries (figure 3) Russiacurrently possesses roughly 2,050 deployed tactical nuclear weapons, allocated to Air forceand Air/missile defense (figure 4), while 700 that are supposed to be deployed to navy arecurrently removed from ships and submarines.

figure 3 figure 4

It is important to notice that even with such disparity in numbers TNWs were not anissue of START negotiations, because they are not crucial to maintaining MAD balance.

42http :// www .rmbowman .com /ssn /SW 2.htm

43http :// bos .sagepub .com /content /66/1/74.full.pdf + html

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Russia's foreign minister Sergei Lavrov insisted that negotiations about TNWs can begin afternew START has been implemented and it should also include conventional and space-basedweapons with necessary involvement of other countries like China44. In that statement he also

provided the best explanation of role of TNWs in Russian military doctrine to balanceunbalanced conventional forces ratio between NATO and Russia and to avert possible China

intrusion over their large eastern border45

.

In 2010 Lisbon conference NATO made second Strategic Concept review since theend of Cold war which left more questions than answers concerning non-strategic nuclearweapons. New Strategic Concept states that it is thestrategic forces of the United States, in

particular, and to some extent of Britain and France, that provide the supreme guarantee ofthe security of the Alliance. Its members declared that NATO poses no threat to Russia butalso in case of TNWs: In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russianagreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these

weapons away from the territory of NATO members. Any further steps must take into accountthe disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons46

It remains unclear why is it necessary to link reduction of NATOs obsolete TNWswith Russias if agreed START limits are enough to provide deterrence? And what is theintent of request to relocate TNW's away from NATO members while it is NATO thatexpanded closer to Russian borders and Russia's proclaimed goal of keeping them is

protection from NATO conventional strike. Russia declared that any further reduction in itsTNW arsenal must also be linked with an update in Conventional forces in Europe treaty(CFE) whichplaced verifiable limits on NATO and Warsaw Pact offensive conventionalweapons. Russia postponed its treaty commitments after NATO member countries did notratify the adapted CFE Treaty, which addresses the significant changes in Europe's military

balance after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact.

It seems there are conflicting positions in NATO itself about these questions that aremore of a political than military nature. Strongest call for withdrawal came again fromGermany47, where even coalition agreement had provision for nuclear free Germany andEurope. In April 2010 withdrawal request was followed by foreign ministers of Belgium,

Norway, Luxembourg and the Netherlands48. Former NATO General Secretary GeorgeRobertson openly criticized German request for TNW withdrawal as being dangerous anddeclared that Germany does not want to share the risk of mutual protection as a NATOmember. He also called for steps toward reducing disparity in TNWs and asked the NATOTNWs to remain as a bargaining chip for reduction of Russian ones49. At the same timeanother former NATO General Secretary Willy Claes said in an interview that "The presence

of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, from a military point of view, no longer makes anysense"50 Also some NATO countriesdemand the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgiaand Moldova in accordance with the 1999 Istanbul commitments before they ratify theadapted CFE.

44http :// online .wsj .com /article /SB 10001424052748704307404576079953654840710.html

45China's army currently has 1,700,000 active personnel against 321,000 of Russian land armyhttp://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/man/militarysumsfolder/index.html46http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf47

http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,618550,00.html48

http :// www .ippnw 2010.org /index .php ? id =10949

http :// www .spiegel.de /international /germany /0,1518,678013,00.html50

http :// www .ippnw 2010.org /index .php ? id =109

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It is necessary to analyze to what purpose could NATO intend to use its TNWsarsenal. When range of European tactical airplanes is considered,except from Turkey, allother TNW's in Europe are positioned in a way that their only possible target is Russia. Theyare very old weapons in form of gravity bombs that have to be dropped directly over targets.Since effective range of Russian standard S-300PMU2 anti-aircraft defense system is around

200km51

and for the new S-300PMU3/S-400 it is even 400km (with a hit probability of 0.7-0.9)52, it is highly unlikely that a successful strike could be achieved without stealth aircraft.

No European country possess a stealth airplane in their arsenal and even f-35 Joint StrikeFighter that is under development is not designed to carry TNWs. For a number of years onlyUS bombers will be able to successfully complete missions with tactical gravity bombs, andthere is no need for them to be in Europe when they can be flown directly from USA.

Non-strategic nuclear weapons have no military value in post-Cold War Europe, butare regarded in Washington as still useful means for the political purpose of confirming U.S.commitment to its European allies as the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europeremains a pillar of NATO unity53 Or, perhaps, contrary to it?

Geopolitical significance of START 2010

As the main reason for NATO's existence - a defense of Europe from Soviet invasion -ceased to exist, and with further developing ties between Germany, France and Russia, it isunderstandable that significance of Atlantic partnership might shrink. And it is alsounderstandable that European request for TNW withdrawal might seem ungrateful, after forthe half of century US protected European allies with its own nuclear forces. Otherwise thanungrateful, US might consider closer partnership of European countries with Russia asgeopolitically dangerous.

Two decades after breakdown of Soviet Union, European countries are engaged ineconomic and political cooperation with Russia not seen from the late 19th century. The fallof Iron curtain created a new area for development stretching from Atlantic to Urals,hosting states that are basically democratic, with constitutional protection of private propertyand free entrepreneurship. There are no more ideological divisions that would prevent furthercooperation, and tensions between east and west were already calming down for some time,even before breakdown of Soviet Union.

In one perspective, ballistic shield and TNW's are the instruments Washington uses forcreating disorder among European allies thus preventing a possible alliance of most relevantEurasian countries54. Possibility of such development was described by British geographerHalford Mackinder, father of geopolitics almost century ago. Mackinder constructed theconcept of a Eurasian Heartland that if controlled by one power or alliance could be a base forworld domination. Such alliance would also be a direct contester to Great Britain, as one ofthe main pillars of Imperia Britannica power was control of world oceans.

51http :// www .globalsecurity .org /military /world /russia /s -300pmu 2.htm52 Meaning that there is 70-90% chance of successful hit,http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/s-400-specs.htm

53Report of the Secretary of Defense, Task Force on DOD Nuclear Weapons Management, (Schlesinger report) December 2008

54http://www.engdahl.oilgeopolitics.net/Geopolitics___Eurasia/Missile_Defense/missile_defense.html

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USA replaced Great Britain as a force that controls world oceans and sea trade routesand thus placed itself in the same geopolitical position. Soviet Union was an excellentadversary to rally allies against, but once it was gone, alternate strategies had to be made.

Although Barack Obama might be an idealist with sincere intensions, crudegeopolitical realities affect policies of nations during much longer periods than one or two

presidential mandates. And just how much opposition is in US towards better relations withRussia (and vice versa) is best witnessed by heated parliamentary debates around new STARTagreement.

As US invasion of Iraq created division between the new and old EU members,55 warin Georgia left NATO itself divided, with Germany as main blocker of any possible Georgianmembership in organization. East European states, still tormented with Soviet era memoriesare reluctant to cooperate with Russia and seek stronger partnership with US as counterweightto their powerful neighbor. They are the main supporters of ballistic shield deployment and

opposed to TNW withdrawal. On the other hand western states, most notably Germany, wantto broaden economic cooperation with Russia and remove all issues that might spark tensions

between them. This division is one of the main problems on the way to strengthening EU-Russia relationship.

What can happen when political issues arise could be witnessed when Ukraine, duringa row with Russia over the gas price, decided to withhold some gas that was supposed to bedelivered to EU. Consequences from that incident led to decision that the route for new gas

pipeline which would ultimately connect Russia and Germany should go under the Baltic Sea.On that way it would bypass Poland, which historically has the biggest fears from anyGerman-Russian cooperation.

Realization of new START agreement along with other agreements in security spherethat might follow will prove exactly how much cooperation is actually possible at thismoment.

Conclusion

As ever in military history, for every weapon it is possible to develop itscountermeasure. Forts design changed with arrival of modern artillery, cavalry raids lost their

significance with use of fast-loading rifles with bayonets, heavy fortifications lines wereabandoned with blitzdoctrine and even nuclear weapons were stopped with possibility ofcounterstrike. In the same manner, a remedy for ballistic shield will be developed ifnecessary.

A brilliant satirical movie from Stanley Kubrick Dr. Strangelove, or how I learned tostop worrying and love the bomb, tells a fictional story of a similar attempt. Events are

placed somewhere in the peak of cold war tensions as Soviet Union develops a doomsdayweapon that would disperse radioactive dust in atmosphere which would cover entire planetand produce nuclear winter for at least 100 years. Since this weapon would be activated incase of nuclear attack against Soviet Union, it would be perfect deterrence because attacker

country would also be devastated. But at that point an old Nazi scientist, now working for US55

http :// news .bbc .co .uk /2/ hi /europe /2775579.stm

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intelligence, comes up with an idea how to defeat this weapon. As nuclear winter woulddestroy most life on the planet surface, he considers using deep mine shafts as vaults for

preserving base of population that would someday emerge on surface and claim victory. Buthe immediately warns that Soviets will plan something similar and that ultimately winner will

be who will have more mine shafts with more population preserved. Movie ends at that point,

with a war-crazy US general shouting to the president we cannot allow a mine shaft gap.

It is not likely that vision of nuclear-free world will be achieved any time soon.Actually if that would be the case tomorrow it could only spark more conventional wars

because, as absurd as it might be, a MAD balance is what kept cold-war cold during last halfcentury. In order to achieve nuclear-free world a global reduction in all weapons types isnecessary and just how far we are from it is shown in figure 2 info graphic.

A journey of hundred miles starts with first step and it is best to perceive new STARTas just that - above all a confidence-building treaty. It might not contain far-reaching goals,

but it could be start of a process that could eventually produce more tangible results. Perhaps

cooperation would never even be possible without threat of mutual destruction.Einstein once said, The release of atomic energy has not created a new problem. It

has merely made more urgent the necessity of solving an existing one.

Marko Sui, dipl.iur.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction...1

START 2010.........1

Ballistic Missile Defense and its cost....2

AEGIS ballistic missile defense....6

Non-strategic nuclear weapons.8

Geopolitical significance of START 2010..11

Conclusion...13

Table of Contents14

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start 2010 fallout over europe

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