MARINE SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT 159

Independent investigation into the collision between the Panama flag bulk carrier

Star Sea Bridgeand the Australian fishing vessel

Sue M

east of Evans Head, NSWon 21 June 2000

Navigation Act 1912Navigation (Marine Casualty) Regulations

investigation into the collision between the Panama flag bulk carrier Star Sea Bridge

and the Australian fishing vessel Sue M

east of Evans Head, NSWon 21 June 2000

Report No 159

February 2004

ISSN 1447-087XISBN 1 877071 52 8

Readers are advised that the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) conducts investigations forthe sole purpose of enhancing transport safety. Consequently, Bureau reports are confined to matters ofsafety significance and may be misleading if used for other purposes.

Investigations commenced on or before 30 June 2003, including the publication of reports as a resultof those investigations, are authorised by the Executive Director of the Bureau in accordance with theNavigation (Marine Casualty) Regulations 1990, made pursuant to subsections 425(1)(ea) and 425(1AAA) of the Navigation Act 1912.

Investigations commenced on or after 1 July 2003, including the publication of reports as a result ofthose investigations, are authorised by the Executive Director of the Bureau in accordance with theTransport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (TSI Act). Reports released under the TSI Act are notadmissible as evidence in any civil or criminal proceedings.

It is ATSB policy to publish in full and widely distribute such reports as an educational tool to increaseawareness of the causes of marine accidents so as to improve safety at sea and enhance the protectionof the marine environment. Reports on serious marine casualties are also provided to the IMO.

Australian Transport Safety BureauPO Box 967Civic Square ACT 2608 AUSTRALIA

Phone: 02 6274 64781800 621 372

Fax: 02 6274 6699E-mail: marine@atsb.gov.au

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CONTENTS

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Sources of information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Sue M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Sequence of events – Sue M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Star Sea Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Sequence of events – Star Sea Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Sequence of events – Ever Able . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Search and rescue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

Comment and analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

Analysis of paint samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

The ship’s course recorder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

The time of the collision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

Weather at the time of the collision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

Responsibilities of both vessels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

Lights on Sue M and Star Sea Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

Fishing vessels in the vicinity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

Lookouts on Star Sea Bridge and Sue M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

Visibility form the wheelhouse of Star Sea Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

Radar detectability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

Safety equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24

Fatigue and alcohol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

An ATSB-organised dive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

Charges laid against master and second mate of Star Sea Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26

The ATSB report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27

Submissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

Annex 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35

Annex 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

Figures

1. Sue M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v

2. Layout of trawler similar to Sue M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

3. Wheelhouse similar to that on Sue M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

4. Damaged dinghy used by deckhand of Sue M to stay afloat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

5. Star Sea Bridge at Melbourne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

6. Paint scrapes on hull of Star Sea Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

7. Portion of chart Aus 813 showing tracks of Sue M, Star Sea Bridge and Ever Able . . . . . . .13

8. Debris recovered from Sue M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

9. Lifting paint samples from Star Sea Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

10. Star Sea Bridge: Course recorder trace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

11. Portion of course recorder chart expanded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

12. Frame taken from a video recording of the wreck of Sue M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

13. Star Sea Bridge and Sue M: Events and causal factors chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

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FIGURE 1:Sue M

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Summary

At about 0110 on 21 June 2000, off EvansHead, New South Wales, the skipper of theprawn trawler Sue M and the deckhand weresorting their catch on the after deck. Thetrawler, on autopilot, was heading east toanother fishing ground, when it was struck onthe port side by a southbound ship. The skipperran into the wheelhouse to attempt to takecontrol of the trawler as it rolled over tostarboard before capsizing.

The deckhand climbed over the side of thetrawler as it capsized and jumped clear before itsank. He eventually climbed into the trawler’sfibreglass dinghy which, although badlydamaged, had surfaced after breaking loosefrom the wheelhouse roof. He was rescued thenext night by another trawler.

The ship, the Panama flag bulk carrier Star SeaBridge, had sailed from Brisbane on themorning of 20 June bound for Melbourne. Atthe time of the collision, the officer of thewatch, the second mate, had been manoeuvringto avoid a northbound container ship. As thebulk carrier was resuming its original course,the second mate saw a white light, close by, tostarboard. He ordered full port rudder, but theship made contact with the white light, roughlyamidships on the ship’s side as its stern swungto starboard. The master of Star Sea Bridgewas called to the bridge and the ship was turnedabout to search the area where the collision hadoccurred. After searching and finding nothing,the ship resumed its voyage south.

At Melbourne, Star Sea Bridge was boarded byagents of the Australian Federal Police who

initiated an investigation and, subsequently,criminal proceedings against the master and thesecond mate. A concurrent, but separate, safetyinvestigation was undertaken by the AustralianTransport Safety Bureau (ATSB) under theprovisions of the Navigation (Marine Casualty)Regulations.

An extensive air and sea search was unable tolocate the skipper of Sue M. On 22 June 2001,the wreck of Sue M was located by anothertrawler. A week later, divers from the NSWWater Police recovered the body of the skipperfrom its wheelhouse.

This report concludes that:

• The fishing vessel Sue M sank, with the lossof its skipper, after colliding with the bulkcarrier Star Sea Bridge;

• The second mate and lookout of Star SeaBridge were not keeping a proper lookout;

• The skipper and the deckhand on the fishingvessel, who had been busy sorting their catchunder bright deck lights, were not keeping aproper lookout; and,

• The bulk carrier’s navigation lights wereprobably not on at the time of the collision.

The report recommends that:

• Ships’ masters and skippers of fishingvessels should ensure that a proper lookout ismaintained at all times;

• Ships’ masters, watchkeepers, fishing vesselskippers and crews take note of thelimitations of radar;

• Owners, operators and skippers of fishingvessels consider the use of appropriateequipment to improve the radar detectabilityof their vessels.

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Sources ofInformation

Master, second mate, third mate and lookout ofmv Star Sea Bridge

Deckhand of fv Sue M

Skipper of fv Starfish

Second mate and lookout of mv Ever Able

Australian Federal Police (AFP)

Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA)

Telstra Corp

The Nautical Institute

AcknowledgementAustralian Hydrographic Office

The chart section in this publication is reproduced bypermission of The Australian Hydrographic Service.

© Commonwealth of Australia 13 October 2000. Allrights reserved.

Other than for the purposes of copying thispublication for public use, the chart information fromthe chart section may not be extracted, translated, orreduced to any electronic medium or machinereadable form for incorporation into a derivedproduct, in whole or part, without the prior writtenconsent of the Australian Hydrographic Service.

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Sue M

Sue M, NSW Reg. No. 4823, was a timber-hulled prawn trawler built in Queensland in1982. It was 14 metres in length, with a beam of4.5 metres and a moulded depth of 1.85 metres.It had a white hull and wheelhouse and wasfitted with the booms and gear associated with aprawn trawler. On the after, or working, deckthere was the trawl winch just aft of thewheelhouse and, aft of that, there was also alarge rectangular ice-box on top of which wasthe fish-sorting tray. Just forward of the icebox,on each side, were hatches over two fish tanks(See figs 2 & 3). The wheelhouse had twodoors, one on the starboard side and one aft.

In the wheelhouse, Sue M was well equippedwith navigation aids, including a Koden radar,echo sounder, automatic pilot, marine VHF(Very High Frequency) radio and a Furuno GPS(Global Positioning System) receiver. Inaddition, it was fitted with a Furuno colour fish

plotter, a sonar, a UHF (Ultra High Frequency)CB (Citizens Band) radio and, at the time of theincident, carried a mobile telephone. A bracketinside the wheelhouse held an EPIRB(Emergency Position-Indicating Radio Beacon).On the wheelhouse roof, there was a smallfibreglass dinghy.

Sue M’s 164 kW Cummins diesel engine gavethe vessel a maximum speed of approximately 8 knots.

Sue M was fitted with a white masthead light,green and red sidelights and a stern light as wellas green-over-white trawl lights and ‘not-under-command’ lights. The port and starboardnavigation lights were situated on each side ofthe wheelhouse roof. The stern light was fittedaft on the wheelhouse roof. The vessel was alsofitted with three halogen decklights, one ofwhich was on top of the trawler’s A-frame, theother two about two-thirds of the way up themast. These lights illuminated the sorting tray,the after deck and an area of water around thestern.

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FIGURE 2:Layout of working deck of trawler similar to Sue M

Sue M had been owned by the skipper for theprevious 21⁄2 years and had passed survey byNSW Waterways on 31 May 2000, three weeksbefore the collision. As a Class 3C fishingvessel it was limited to operating within 30 miles1 to seaward of the coast.

The crew of two, skipper and deckhand, alsohappened to be father and son. The 43 year oldskipper held Master Class V (Fishing) and MEDIII (Marine Engine Driver III) certificates. Hehad about 22 years experience, fishing thewaters around the north coast area of NSW,while his 19 year old son had been at sea for 3 to 4 years, working on a variety of smallvessels, before his father bought Sue M.

Sequence of events – Sue MSue M sailed from Iluka at about 1530 on 20 June in the company of two other trawlers.The boat crossed the bar at the mouth of theClarence River and proceeded towards the north

east. Immediately after crossing the bar, theskipper, as was his custom, reportedly checkedthat all his navigation lights were working,considering that, if any were not, it was easierto change the bulbs in daylight. He also turnedon the radar, the fish plotter and the depthsounder to check that all were operational.

Sue M made for a position about 9 miles east ofEvans Head, to a point known to the localfishermen as Tony’s Rock. Just on sunset, they‘shot’ the port, starboard and centre nets. Thevessel then fished in north-south and south-north directions, roughly parallel with the coast,in the company of several other boats. At about2000, after the first shot, which took about 3 hours, the nets were taken in and the catchemptied onto the sorting tray. The nets wereshot again before the two men sorted the catch.When the sorting was completed, the deckhandwent to sleep on a bunk in the wheelhouse,while his father had the con of the trawler.

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FIGURE 3:Wheelhouse similar to that on Sue M

1 All miles refer to nautical miles. One nautical mile = 1852 metres.

At about 0030, the skipper woke the deckhandas the next catch was ready to be sorted. Thedeckhand dressed, putting on his wet-weathergear, noticing as he did so that the ‘LettermanShow’ was playing on the television set. Whenhe arrived on the trawl deck, they winched inthe nets and the catch was emptied into thesorting tray on the icebox. The deck wasilluminated by floodlights. The boat was makingway, on autopilot, at about 3–4 knots to afishing ground further east. When the nets hadbeen emptied, the skipper let the port andstarboard nets trail in the water to keep the deckclear. The centre net was hanging in loops fromthe gantry, with about half its length alsotrailing in the water, clear of the propeller.

The weather was fine, there was a slight chopfrom a 5–10 knot westerly breeze, a clear skyand the moon was almost full. There was nomist or haze and the visibility was good.

The two men sorted the catch for approximatelyhalf an hour, facing each other on opposite sidesof the sorting tray above the icebox, the skipperon the starboard side, the deckhand on the port

side. Eight or nine other trawlers could be seento the west, the closest about a mile away.Periodically the skipper would enter thewheelhouse to check the boat’s course.

According to the skipper of the fishing vesselStarfish, at that time about 2 miles west of SueM, Sue M’s course would have been about apoint (111⁄4°) south of east.

On board Sue M, the skipper finished sortingand, having looked out to starboard, made hisway towards the port side of the vessel. As hemade his way over some ropes which werelying on deck, there was a sudden violentimpact. The impact lifted the port side of thetrawler, causing the skipper to slip on the ropesand to fall to the deck. The deckhand, thinkingmomentarily that their fishing gear had fouledsomething on the seabed, ran to the wheelhouse,where he pulled back the engine speed and tookthe engine out of gear. There was muchscreeching of metal on metal, as the port fishingboom scraped along the starboard side of a largeship. The trawler started to roll to starboard and,looking aft through the wheelhouse door, all the

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FIGURE 4:Damaged dinghy used by deckhand of Sue M to stay afloat

deckhand could see was the side of a largevessel passing them at speed. As he ran outthrough the aft door his father pushed past him,running into the wheelhouse to try to regaincontrol of the boat.

The deckhand ran to the port quarter. The portfishing boom was being folded inwards and thedeckhand had to duck beneath it. The trawlercontinued to roll over slowly, onto its starboardside. As it rolled over, the deckhand climbedover the emerging hull but his right foot becamebriefly caught by one of the wire sweeps.Having freed his foot, he noticed that Sue Mwas sinking by the bow. The deck lights wereon and the propeller was still spinning. Hangingon to the boat’s port quarter, he screamed outseveral times to his father, but his father did notemerge from the wheelhouse.

A few moments later, the engine stopped andthe deck lights went out. The deckhand pushedoff hard and swam away from the boat as itsank, to avoid being dragged down with it. Hehad had no time to grab a life-jacket from thewheelhouse or the EPIRB from its bracket, alsoin the wheelhouse.

While sorting the catch, both men had beendressed in wet weather gear, over track pants,flannelette shirts and wellington boots. Thedeckhand struggled out of his boots and clungto two gas bottles, floating nearby. He had beenclinging to the gas bottles for about half an houror so, watching the ship’s lights disappear, whenhe noticed the glass-fibre dinghy which hadbeen torn from the wheelhouse roof and hadsurfaced. He pulled himself onto the top of theupturned dinghy, at the same time retaining ahold on the gas bottles.

His impression was that the ship had continuedon its course to the south. After what seemed tohim to be about an hour, he heard the noise of aship’s engine and a ship appeared, cruisingslowly around the area. It seemed to be adifferent ship, seeming smaller than the one thathad struck the trawler. It passed him and thenturned towards the south again. From hisposition about half a mile away, he noticed the

ship’s large deck cranes and a floodlight whichwas being directed over the side from a positionon the ship’s starboard quarter. It cruised upand down in what seemed to be an east-westdirection but did not pick him out in thedarkness. He shouted and screamed at the ship,but the ship’s crew failed to hear him.Eventually he lost his voice. The ship stoppedfor about ten minutes, at a distance of about twomiles from the deckhand. The ship’s searchseemed to him to last for about an hour and, bythe time it left the area, he was slipping in andout of consciousness.

After a few hours the deckhand, still sitting ontop of the upturned dinghy, realised that hewould have to get into it. He managed to rightthe dinghy and to climb in. It had a large hole inthe bottom of the centre section but was beingkept afloat by the buoyancy chambers under thethwarts.

Just before sunrise he saw the lights of otherprawn trawlers heading back towards Iluka, buthe was unable to attract their attention. He waslying in the dinghy when, at dawn, a sharkcircled around him twice at a radius of about 10metres. The deckhand kept quite still until theshark had cruised off. He sat in the dinghy forthe rest of that day. At one point he saw twoships pass, but they were distant. He tried topaddle to the northwest, so that he would notdrift too far out to sea. He spent most of the daypaddling and baling out water. He tried to dryhis clothes, but was unable to as, lying as hewas in the bow, each time he paddled, dog-paddling with his hands, he was getting coveredin water.

The deckhand was cold, hungry and thirsty. Hethought that, if he were to survive the nextnight, his only chance would be for a trawler topick him up. After dark that evening, he sawtwo other trawlers to his south as they turnedtheir deck lights on to fish. They were movingtowards him and one passed him less than amile away. Desperate to keep warm, he curledup, but he soon heard the sound of the engine ofthe other trawler, on the same track as the first.He could make out its navigation lights which

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indicated that it was approaching him. Hepaddled as best he could into the line of theapproaching fishing vessel, hoping to jump ontoits fishing gear, as it had all its nets hanging outof the water as it moved between fishinggrounds.

As the trawler ‘Annalyn’ approached, herecognised one of the crew, a friend of his,under its deck lights at the stern. He shouted outthe man’s name, over and over, until the maneventually heard him. The man ran into thewheelhouse and the trawler circled, slowlycoming back towards him. Unable to see him inthe darkness, the trawler was guided by thedeckhand’s shouted directions. The trawlercrew picked him up and pulled the dinghy onboard, in the position 29° 25' S 153° 46' E. Bythis time, it was approximately 2200, some 21 hours after the collision and he had driftedroughly 171⁄2 miles to the south-east, to be 21 miles east of Yamba.

When landed at Yamba he was examined by adoctor and was shortly afterwards allowed toreturn home to recover from his ordeal.

One week after the incident, divers from theNSW Water Police in Sydney, dived on thewreck of Sue M. The wreck had been locatedand buoyed by another trawler which had beenparticipating in the search. It was lying in 64metres of water in the position 29°11' 10.8" S,153° 37' 58.8'' E. The divers, acting for theNSW State Coroner, recovered the body of theskipper from inside the wheelhouse of thesunken vessel.

Star Sea BridgeStar Sea Bridge is a Panamanian flag bulkcarrier of 42 717 deadweight tonnes at itssummer draught of 11.35 m. It is classed withBureau Veritas. At the time of the incident thevessel was owned by Kaisho Marine S A ofPanama, and managed by Far East Transport Co

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FIGURE 5:Star Sea Bridge at Melbourne

Ltd of Tokyo, Japan. Manning of the vessel wasby Dolphin Ship Management of thePhilippines. The ship was on charter to StarShipping of Bergen, Norway.

Star Sea Bridge was built in 1997 byIshikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co Ltdin Tokyo, Japan. The ship has an overall lengthof 181.5 m, a moulded breadth of 30.5 m and amoulded depth of 16.4 m. It is powered by a 6-cylinder Sulzer 6RTA48T single acting, directreversing, 2-stroke diesel engine, of 6 990 kW.The main engine drives a single fixed-pitchpropeller giving a service speed of 14.5 knots.

The vessel is of standard, geared, bulk carrierdesign with 5 cargo holds that are locatedforward of the accommodation superstructure.Star Sea Bridge has four cargo cranes, each of30 tonne SWL (Safe Working Load) capacity,located on the centreline between the hatches.

The bridge is of standard design with acombined wheelhouse and chartroom, the lightfrom the chart console being shielded bycurtains at night.

At the time of the incident, the ship’scomplement of 21 consisted of a master and 3 mates, a chief and 3 engineers, an electrician,a boatswain and 4 deck ratings, 4 engine roomratings, 2 catering staff and a deck cadet. Themates maintained a traditional 4 hours on, 8hours off, watchkeeping routine.

The master of Star Sea Bridge had been a ship’smaster for the previous two years and Star SeaBridge was his third command. He had joinedthe ship in Brisbane on 19 June, about 36 hoursbefore the incident.

The second mate, on watch at the time of theincident, had served an apprenticeship withDolphin Ship Management from 1990 until1991, sailing on a log carrier. From 1991 to1994 he attended a Philippines maritimeacademy and had returned to sea, aftergraduating, serving on a woodchip carrier from1995 to 1996. After a further two years at sea,

on a bulk carrier and a general cargo vessel, hejoined Star Sea Bridge on 1 September 1999.He was to finish his contract on 30 June 2000.He held a second mate’s licence, issued by theRepublic of Panama, a radar observer’scertificate, an ARPA (Automatic Radar PlottingAid) certificate, certificates for R/T (RadioTelephone) and GMDSS (Global MaritimeDistress and Safety System) and had completeda radar simulation course. Star Sea Bridge wasthe first ship to which he was appointed assecond mate.

Sequence of events – Star SeaBridgeStar Sea Bridge sailed from Brisbane at 0915(local time), at a draught of 7.66 metresforward, 8.32 metres aft, on 20 June carrying apart- cargo of phosphates for discharge inMelbourne. The pilot disembarked at 1400 andthe ship started its voyage south, down the eastcoast.

Sunset was at about 1700, an hour after the startof the mate’s watch.

At 2000 that evening, when the third mate tookover the watch, the vessel was approximately 17 miles north-north-east of Tweed Heads (onthe Queensland/New South Wales border).According to his evidence, he checked thenavigation light panel, confirming that thenavigation lights were on when he took over thewatch.

There were some passing rain showers duringthe third mate’s watch, but the weather wasimproving. The wind was force 4 to 5. Thevisibility was good and there was a clearhorizon in the light from the moon. A number ofdistant fishing vessels were visible during thefirst half of the watch. Apart from the fishingvessels, the third mate saw no other ships duringhis watch.

The master spent some time on the bridge,retiring at 2315 after he had written up his nightorders. His night orders included instructions to

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‘keep a good and sharp look-out’ and to providea wide berth for all types of vessel ‘especiallymeeting vessel and small craft’.

At some time between 2340 and 2350, thesecond mate arrived on the bridge. Afterchecking the positions plotted by the third mate,he read some incoming messages and had a chatwith the third mate. He went to the forward partof the wheelhouse and had a look around beforereturning to the chart table and taking over thewatch at midnight. He had seen no othervessels, either visually or on radar. There was aslight sea, partly cloudy skies and the visibilitywas good; he estimated it at more than 10 miles.Star Sea Bridge was making 15 knots, with afollowing current, on a course of 189°(T).

The third mate, on being relieved, did not go tohis cabin but stayed at the chart table where heworked on the port log and some papers whichhe was to submit after the voyage. According tothe two officers, during the following hour, thethird mate had some brief conversations withthe second mate when the latter went to thechart table to check the chart.

The lookout on watch with the second mate hadgone to the bridge at 2355 and had taken overhis duties from the lookout who had been onwatch with the third mate. The two ratingsremained in the wheelhouse, talking, until 0045,when the lookout who had been on duty withthe third mate left the bridge.

Just after 0045, the lookout saw a group offishing vessels on the starboard side, which heestimated were about 7–8 miles away. Therewas no other traffic around at the time. At 0050,he saw a ship right ahead and, using the radar,saw that it was about 14 miles away. Usingbinoculars, he saw that the ship was exhibitingmasthead lights and both sidelights and hereported this ship to the second mate. He alsoreported the fishing vessels on the starboardside to the second mate, without indicating abearing or distance.

The second mate had been at the chart table,checking the chart and working on some safety

management checklists, when the lookoutinformed him that he had sighted the ship deadahead. Checking the ARPA, the second mateobserved that its distance off was about 14miles. He was also able to observe its mastheadlights and its starboard navigation light.

The second mate went back to the chart table toplot the 0100 position then, returning to thefront of the wheelhouse some minutes later, heobserved that the other vessel seemed to havealtered course to starboard. He was now able tosee only its port navigation light. When hechecked its range on the radar, he saw that itwas about 10 miles distant.

A few minutes later, at about 0110, he checkedthe ARPA once more and saw that the vesselwas now 7 to 8 miles off. He did not notice thespeed of the approaching ship, but the ARPAshowed that its closest point of approach (CPA)was 0.4 miles. At about the same time, henoticed what appeared to be two white lightsabout 2 to 3 points on the starboard bow. Theselights appeared to be approximately 7 milesaway. Nothing in this position, however, showedon the radar.

The second mate instructed the lookout tochange to manual steering and to alter course 5°to starboard, to steer 194° by the gyrocompass.He intended to increase the CPA of the othervessel.

A few minutes later, Star Sea Bridge’s coursewas steady on 194°. On again checking theradar, the second mate saw that the CPA wasnow increasing steadily. At a CPA of about amile, he instructed the lookout to graduallycome back to the original course of 189°. Whilethe ship was turning slowly back to its originalcourse, the second mate noticed a white lightabout 3 to 4 points on the starboard bow at adistance which he initially estimated to be twomiles off, perhaps less.

The lookout, at the wheel, also saw this whitelight on the starboard side. He was not sure ofits bearing, but it was forward of the beam andappeared to him to be very dim.

9

The second mate could not make out what thewhite light was, but it was closing. Hewondered how it could be getting nearer eventhough the ship was turning to port. Accordingto his evidence, he sounded the ship’s whistleand ordered the lookout to steer ‘hard-a-port’.At this point, the white light appeared to closerapidly and, moments later, it made contact withthe starboard side of Star Sea Bridge, adjacentto No. 3 hold.

Immediately, the second mate telephoned themaster who was asleep in his cabin andinformed him of the contact. The master askedhim what they had contacted and the secondmate replied that he was not sure. The mastergot up and made his way to the bridge noticing,as he did so, that the clock in his office wasshowing about 0115. Meanwhile, the secondmate and the third mate, who had come out ofthe chartroom, ran out to the starboard bridgewing to look aft over the ship’s side. They couldsee nothing. The ship, however, was still turningrapidly to port. The second mate ordered thelookout, who was at the wheel, to bring the ship

to starboard to its original course from itspresent heading which, by that time, was about050°.

As the master arrived on the bridge, he saw thered sidelight and the masthead lights of anothervessel on the starboard bow of Star Sea Bridgeat a distance of about 3 to 4 miles. Star SeaBridge had, by this time, started to swing tostarboard. When the other vessel was about 2 points on their port bow, the master asked thesecond mate to explain what had happened andthen took over the con. After a minute or two,when he was confident that the other ship wasclear, he instructed the second mate to wake themate, the chief engineer and the bosun. Whenback on the original course of 189°, he couldalso see some white lights, which he took to befishing vessels, about 8 miles to starboard. Atabout 0145, he ordered the lookout to put thewheel to ‘port 20’ so as to turn onto a reciprocalcourse, with the intention of returning to theposition of the incident to ascertain what hadcollided with the ship.

10

FIGURE 6:Paint scrapes on hull of Star Sea Bridge

At about 0154, when Star Sea Bridge hadturned onto a reciprocal course,the masterordered the mate to take some seamen and tocheck the ship’s starboard side shell plating. Bythis time, most of the crew had been called andthere were extra lookouts on the bridge. Thechief engineer was also on the bridge, at theengine telegraph. The ship was manoeuvred asnecessary to assist with the search.

The second mate had plotted the approximateposition of the incident by dead reckoning inrelation to the earlier fix of the vessel’s positionat 0100. He had not, however, pressed the ‘manoverboard’ on the GPS, to record the exactposition.

Star Sea Bridge maintained the reciprocalcourse, searching, for about 30 minutes. Afterthis time, the master, thinking of the EastAustralian current, believed that anything thatthey had hit would be drifting south. At about0229, he altered back to the ship’s originalcourse of 189°. There was a bright moon, buttheir search revealed nothing. The master,having heard from the third mate that he hadseen nothing and from the second mate that hethought they had hit a buoy, such as a weatheror fishing buoy, decided to continue with thevoyage. He had also received a report from themate and the bosun that there appeared to be nodamage to the starboard shell plating.

At about 0235, after resuming the voyage, themaster telephoned the vessel’s managers inJapan to inform them of the incident. Themanagers, on hearing the master’s report,instructed him to turn back again and conduct afurther search of the area where the incident hadoccurred. They also told him to stop at theposition of the incident. Accordingly, Star SeaBridge was again turned back onto a reciprocalcourse.

At about 0318, the vessel reached the positionof the incident, which had been recorded by thesecond mate and the engine was stopped. Thedeck lights and bridge wing floodlights wereturned on and a further search of the area wascarried out. While the vessel was stopped, a

ladder was rigged over the starboard side andthe master, the mate and the bosun conducted asecond examination of the shell plating.Portable cargo lights were rigged over the ship’sside to provide illumination. During thisexamination, they again did not detect anydamage to the ship’s side.

At 0420, having found no flotsam and nodamage to its starboard shell plating, Star SeaBridge resumed its voyage to Melbourne.

Sequence of events – Ever AbleThe northbound vessel which Star Sea Bridgehad encountered off Evans Head was the 14 807gross tonne Panama registered containershipEver Able, on passage from Melbourne toBrisbane.

At 0100 on 21 June, Ever Able was approxi-mately 11 miles south east of Evans Head,making good a speed of 17 knots on a course of011°(T). On the bridge of Ever Able were thesecond mate and the lookout, an able seaman.The second mate had been at sea for 18 yearsand had obtained his second mate’s qualificationin 1990. He had held this position aboard EverAble for the previous nine months.

To the north-north-west of Ever Able, the lightsof a number of fishing vessels were visible. Onchecking the radar, the second mate noted thatthey were approximately 7 miles distant.

Also visible on the radar was a ship approxi-mately 16 miles north of Ever Able. The ARPAindicated that its speed was about 15 knots, itscourse 191° (T). He told the lookout to watch itthrough binoculars. The southbound vessel, theStar Sea Bridge, was soon visible in themoonlight to both the second mate and thelookout aboard Ever Able. The lookout, usingbinoculars, tried to identify the navigation lightsof the oncoming vessel, but was unable to seeany. When he told the second mate that itseemed to have no navigation lights, the secondmate watched the vessel with binoculars but hetoo, was unable to distinguish any navigationlights.

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When the two ships were about 8 miles apart,the second mate altered the course to 025°. Thisincreased the CPA to 2.8 miles. As thesouthbound ship drew closer, he determined thatthe ship was, indeed, not displaying anynavigation lights.

At about this time, the second mate observedthe deck lights of a fishing vessel, close to thestarboard bow of the southbound ship. When hechecked the radar, he could see the fishingvessel as an occasional, weak, echo.

Soon after he had seen the fishing vessel, hesaw, on radar, the southbound Star Sea Bridgemake a sharp turn to port through approximately90°. Seeing this, he ordered the lookout to thehelm, telling him to change to manual steeringand to steer 050°. Star Sea Bridge was, by thistime, about 4 miles north of Ever Able and theywere closing at a relative speed of nearly 32knots.

The second mate on Ever Able was increasinglyconcerned about the manoeuvres of the othership and the fact that it was showing no lights.He intended to alter course further to starboardto give his ship more searoom.

At 0121, the second mate called the oncomingship on VHF channel 16, quoting its positionand its distance of 3.2 miles to his north, butthis call was not answered. He followed thiswith a request for the vessel to switch on itsrunning lights. Again, however, his call wentunanswered. From the starboard side of thebridge, he collected the Aldis lamp and flashedit several times towards Star Sea Bridge. As hestarted to walk back to the VHF, the lookoutexclaimed that the other ship had just switchedon its running lights. He could see the othership’s port navigation light, indicating that thetwo ships were now port-to-port. Soonafterwards, the two ships passed at a distance ofabout 2 miles. As they passed, the second matetried unsuccessfully to identify the other shipthrough his binoculars. All he could see,however, was that the ship had four deck cranesand its accommodation aft. He made a notationof the position on the chart with a note that theships had passed at 0145.

With his concentration absorbed by theapparently erratic manoeuvres of the other shipand its lack of navigation lights, the secondmate was unaware that the radar echo of thefishing boat, which he had earlier seen close tothe starboard bow of the other ship, haddisappeared.

Search and rescueAt 2206 on 21 June, AusSAR, the Australiansearch and rescue organisation, was alerted tothe incident by the Sydney Water Police,advising them that one of the crew of Sue M hadbeen recovered, but one man was still missing.The police undertook the co-ordination of thesearch.

The duty officers at AusSAR immediatelyconsulted the Australian Ship Reporting System(AUSREP) surface plot (SURPIC) for 20 Juneand identified two ships, Dixie Monarch andStar Sea Bridge, that may have been in the areaat the time of the incident. At about 2230 on 21 June, messages were sent to both shipsasking for their positions at the time of theincident, as reported by the survivor, and ifeither ship had experienced any unusual activityduring the night of 20 June.

The master of Dixie Monarch responded withhis ship’s position, which had been 16 milessouth-east of the position estimated for thecollision.

At 0015 on 22 June, a duty officer fromAusSAR contacted Star Sea Bridge bytelephone, where the officer of the watchconfirmed that they had just received themessage and that the Captain was being called.At 0135 a message was received from themaster of Star Sea Bridge, which read:

AT ABT 0110LT/21 JUN, AT 20087S/153378ETHE SECOND OFFICER CALLED ME UP NINFORMED THAT UNIDENTIFIED LIGHTMADE CONTACT WITH OUR STBD SIDEMIDSHIP. WE TURNED BACK TWICE ANDEVEN STOPPED TO THE ABOVE POSITIONTO INVESTIGATE WHAT IT WAS BUT WEFOUND NOTHING. AT AROUND 0420LT/21JUN WE RESUMED NORMAL VOYAGE.

12

13

FIGURE 7:Portion of chart Aus 813 showing tracks of Sue M, Star Sea Bridge and Ever Able

0100

0111

0112:40

0118 Ever Able

050° (T)

011°

(T)

025°

(T)

0116 Star Sea Bridge rudder put hard to port0114 Star Sea Bridge alters course towards 189° (T)

0111 Star Sea Bridge alters course to 194° (T)

0100

0046 Star Sea Bridge 15 knots

Bear

ing

of fi

shin

g ve

ssel

from

shi

p 20

2°(T

)

0046 Sue M course 101° (T)speed about 3.5 knots Collision 01161⁄2

189°

(T)

0050 Ever Able 17 knots

ACT

NSW

NT

Qld

WA

SA

Vic

Tas

NT

NSW

ACT Location ofincident

General area offishing vessels

sighted by Ever Able

0100

29°

153°E

At 0230 AusSAR notified the police of the replyfrom Star Sea Bridge. The police confirmedthat, at this time, 20 trawlers were currentlysearching the area and that fish tubs, a bottle ofmilk and gas bottles had been found.

At 0619 on 22 June, AusSAR arranged forbroadcasts to be made at regular intervalsalerting vessels transiting the area to maintain asharp lookout. A request was also passed to thepolice to arrange a similar broadcast throughvolunteer marine rescue bases, port authoritiesand fishing companies in the area.

At 0915 on 22 June, at the request of the NSWWater Police, AusSAR assumed responsibilityfor the air search for the missing crew memberfrom Sue M. Co-ordination of the surfacesearch, by some 20 trawlers, remained with thepolice at Grafton.

AusSAR co-ordinated the air search, of an areaof 800 square miles, using 6 helicopters and

3 fixed-wing aircraft, one of which was used asa communications relay aircraft. The firsthelicopter left its base at Maroochydore inQueensland at 0956 and was at the search areaat 1205 on 22 June. Another helicopter,however, had arrived first at the search area, at1148, having left its base at Archerfield at 1007.Search conditions were ideal with very goodvisibility, light winds and seas. At 1720 on 22 June, AusSAR returned the search coordi-nation to the Sydney Water Police.

Numerous items of debris, located in the searcharea, were identified as belonging to the lostvessel. An oil slick was also observed. Datumbuoys were dropped to check the drift. Thesearch was suspended at last light pendingfurther intelligence from the NSW Water Police.It was considered that, if the missing man hadsurvived, he would have been in the water for54 hours by the next morning, with a negligiblechance of survival.

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FIGURE 8:Debris recovered from Sue M

Comment andanalysis

EvidenceOn 22 June 2000, the ATSB was informed byAusSAR that a collision involving a merchantship and a fishing vessel, Sue M, had occurredoff the northern New South Wales coast earlythe previous morning. A survivor had beenrescued but a crewmember was missing fromthe fishing vessel and Sydney Water Police,with assistance from AusSAR, were coordi-nating a search for him. The survivor from thefishing vessel had stated that a ship had been incollision with Sue M at about 0300 the previousday.

The bulk carrier Star Sea Bridge was identifiedby AusSAR as being in the area at the time. The

master of this vessel confirmed that an uniden-tified light had made contact with the starboardside, amidships, of the bulk carrier. The masteralso informed AusSAR that the time of theincident was about 0110 local time on 21 June andthat the position was 29° 08.7' S, 153° 37.8' E. Hismessage to AusSAR stated that the bulk carrierhad turned back twice and had stopped at theposition of the collision but, finding nothing,had resumed its voyage south.

AusSAR thanked the master of Star Sea Bridgefor his report. They also advised the master tosecure his logs, charts and other documents ashe would be required to submit a full report onthe incident on his vessel’s arrival at Melbourne,where he was likely to be visited by police andother authorities.

The ATSB interviewed the survivor from thefishing boat at his family’s home in Iluka, NSW,on 22 June. The 19 year old survivor, thedeckhand, described events leading to thecollision, the sinking of the trawler with his

15

FIGURE 9:Lifting paint samples from Star Sea Bridge

16

FIGURE 10:Star Sea Bridge: Course recorder trace (21⁄2° low on actual course)

0429 Resumes voyage to Melbourne

0258 Commences further search on various headings

0229 Resumes original course of 189°

0154 Vessel turned to conduct search, heading 009°

189° resumed after collision01161⁄2 Collision with Sue M (rudder hard to port)Alteration to port towards 189°

0111 Alteration to 194°

189°

0100

0200

0300

0400

0500

0430

0330

0230

0130

Ship's time

Section enlarged on page 18

father apparently still on board and his ownrescue. However, he was not sure of the fishingvessel’s course and speed. Neither was he sureif the fishing vessel’s radar was on. There hadnot been sufficient time after the collision forhim to consider using the EPIRB that wasmounted inside the wheelhouse of Sue M.

The ATSB also interviewed the skipper of thefishing vessel Starfish. He had been fishingabout two miles west of Sue M after midnighton the night of the collision, when he observedtwo ships on his radar. It had seemed to him thatboth ships were heading south about 3–4 milesapart and he had heard a short VHFtransmission on channel 16. The transmission,repeated twice, seemed to mention thepossibility of an impending collision. Theskipper of Starfish was of the opinion that SueM’s course would have been the same as hisown, about a point south of east.

On 22 June, after conducting a search for themissing fishing vessel,the skipper of Starfishhad located and buoyed the wreck of Sue M inabout 64 metres of water at 29° 11' 10.8'' S, 153° 37' 58.8'' E.

AMSA considered the incident to be a veryserious prima facie breach of the InternationalRegulations for the Prevention of Collisions atSea and decided to initiate a prosecution. TheAFP, on behalf of AMSA seized documentsfrom the ship and interviewed the master andother crew under caution. The ATSB conductedseparate interviews and was provided withcopies of the necessary documents by the AFP.

Paint samples from the ship’s side, from areasconsidered to have been in contact with thefishing vessel, were taken by the AFP foranalysis by their Forensic Services division inCanberra.

The skipper of Starfish had seen two ships onhis radar east of Sue M. One of those ships wasStar Sea Bridge, southbound. The other waslater identified as the container ship, Ever Able,northbound. After the collision, AMSA sent themaster of Ever Able a questionnaire on the

incident. When Ever Able returned to Australiain July 2000, the ATSB interviewed the secondmate and the lookout who had been on thebridge at the time of the incident.

Analysis of paint samples Paint samples taken from the hull of Star SeaBridge by the AFP were analysed by theScientific Unit, Forensic Services, of the AFP todetermine if Star Sea Bridge had been incollision with Sue M (see Annex 2).

As paint samples were not recovered from Sue M, samples from cans of paint recently usedon the fishing vessel were examined.

The Scientific Unit concluded from theiranalysis that the evidence supported theproposition that:

Star Sea Bridge had collided with the fishingvessel Sue M.

However, the Scientific Unit also noted that:

… it is important to appreciate that it is notpossible to preclude other possibilities such as acollision with another object that had beenpainted with similar paints.

The ship’s course recorderUsing the charted positions of Star Sea Bridge,the ship would have altered course at around2300 (ship’s time) from 176° (T) to 189° (T) offCape Byron.

The course recorder trace confirmed that thecourse was altered at 2300 from about 1731⁄2° toabout 1861⁄2°. The time on the course recordertrace can therefore be considered to be correctto ship’s time. However, in terms of the courseitself, the trace appeared to indicate 21⁄2° lowerthan the course that was being steered.

From midnight until 0110 ship’s time, thecourse recorder trace was steady. At 0110, thesecond mate of Star Sea Bridge switched thesteering from autopilot to manual, ordering analteration of course of 5° to starboard to clearEver Able. The course recorder showed that thisalteration of course was made at about 0111.

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The trace shows that the new heading, 194°,was maintained for about three minutes beforethe course was altered gradually towards theoriginal course of 189°. Just before returning to189°, the trace started to change rapidly to port.This is likely to have occurred when the secondmate ordered the rudder hard-over to port toavoid Sue M.

Judging by the trace, full port rudder wouldappear to have been applied at about 0116 andmaintained thus for about four minutes, to avoidthe collision. The ship reached a heading of050°, before turning to starboard towards theoriginal course of 189° at which point themaster arrived on the bridge. At 0127, the vesselresumed a course of 189°.

The trace then indicates that the bulk carrierturned to port, to a heading of 009° at about0154, which heading it maintained for abouthalf an hour, before resuming its original courseof 189° at 0229. This is consistent with themaster’s statement that he had turned the vesselabout to conduct a search. Between 0154 and0229, the crew of the bulk carrier searched forthe object with which they had collided, butfound nothing.

From 0229 until 0251, the bulk carrier resumedits original course of 189° before turning

northward again. This is consistent withinstructions from the ship’s managers to themaster to conduct a second search for thefishing vessel. The course was altered to port, to009° at 0258 to resume the search. At 0310, theship was steadied on 000° until 0329. From0329 until 0415, the vessel was turned to portfrom a heading of 000°, through west and southto about 130°. This heading was maintainedfrom 0415 until 0422, before the course wasgradually altered to starboard, to 189°, at 0429,when the voyage to Melbourne was resumed.

The time of the collisionThe master of Star Sea Bridge, in a message tothe RCC, stated that contact between the twovessels had occurred at about 0110 local time on21 June.

The survivor from Sue M had reported, after hisrescue, that the collision had occurred atapproximately 0300 on 21 June. However,based on his other evidence and the fact that the‘Letterman Show’ was on TV, he is likely tohave been awakened by his father at around0030 and the collision would have occurredabout 45 minutes later.

Shortly before the collision, Star Sea Bridge hadbeen altering course from 194° to 189°. When

18

FIGURE 11:Portion of course recorder chart expanded

01161⁄2 Collision

Rudder hard to port (0116)

1115 Course altered towards 189°0111 Course altered to 194°

189°

0120

0110

0100

the second mate observed a white light close tothe bulk carrier’s starboard side, he ordered fullport rudder to avert a collision. From the slopeof the trace of the course recorder, it appearsthat the rudder was put hard to port at about0116. The collision was reported to haveoccurred just after this and the best estimate ofthe time at which it occurred would be 01161⁄2.

Weather at the time of thecollision The survivor from the fishing vessel describedthe weather at the time of the collision as ‘OK’.There was a slight chop on the sea from awesterly breeze of about 10 knots, the sky wasclear with a near full moon. He was not sure ofthe visibility at the time, as the deck lights onthe trawler had been turned on before he wasawakened. The bright lights under which he wasworking made it difficult for him to estimate thevisibility.

The master of Star Sea Bridge had described thevisibility as ‘very good’. His statement and astatement on the excellent visibility from EverAble are consistent with information receivedfrom the Bureau of Meteorology.

These conditions indicate that the weather wasnot a significant factor in the collision.

Responsibilities of both vesselsUnder Rule 5 of the International Regulationsfor Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, asamended (the Colregs), (see Annex 1 to thisreport), both Sue M and Star Sea Bridge wereobliged, at all times, to keep a proper look-outby sight, hearing and by all availableappropriate means.

Under Rule 7 of the Colregs (Annex 1);

(a) Every vessel is obliged to use all availablemeans appropriate to the prevailing circum-stances and conditions to determine if risk ofcollision exists.

(b) Proper use shall be made of radar equipmentif fitted and operational…

For crossing vessels, Rule 15 of the Colregsstates;

When two power-driven vessels are crossing soas to involve risk of collision, the vessel whichhas the other on her own starboard side shallkeep out of the way and shall, if the circum-stances of the case admit, avoid crossing ahead ofthe other vessel.

With Sue M apparently on a course of about100° (T) and Star Sea Bridge on 189° (T), thebulk carrier was obliged to keep out of the wayof the fishing vessel.

Lights on Sue M and Star SeaBridgeRule 22 of the Colregs prescribes the visibilityof lights that are required to be displayed byboth vessels, in terms of minimum ranges. Thebulk carrier’s masthead lights were required tobe visible at a distance of at least 6 miles, thesidelights and stern light for at least 3 miles.

For a vessel the length of Sue M, the whitemasthead light was required to be visible at adistance of at least 3 miles, the sidelights andsternlight for at least 2 miles. Sue M was not‘engaged in trawling’ as defined in the Colregsand she should, theoretically, have beendisplaying the appropriate lights for a power-driven vessel of her length. It could not bedetermined whether or not Sue M was, at thetime of the collision, displaying green-over-white all-round lights for a vessel engaged intrawling. Whatever the case, these all-roundlights were required to be visible at a distanceof at least 2 miles.

Evidence from the deckhand on Sue M was thatthe fishing vessel was showing its sidelights andthat the deck floodlights were also on, the latterconfirmed by the second mate on Ever Able.

According to the second mate and lookout onStar Sea Bridge, the only light seen in thevicinity of their ship immediately before thecollision was 3–4 points on the starboard bow,initially estimated by the second mate at a

19

distance of about 2 miles. Either the estimationsof the two men were seriously in error, or thelight seen was that of another fishing vesselfurther west. At this time, Sue M would havebeen about 10–12° on the starboard bow of theship.

With regard to the navigation lights on Star SeaBridge, the evidence from Ever Able, supportedby recordings of the radio traffic between thetwo vessels, is that Star Sea Bridge was notexhibiting any navigation lights.

Telstra, the telecommunications companymonitoring coastal radio traffic at the time ofthe incident, supplied the ATSB with a transcriptof communications recorded on VHF channel16. The recording of communications from EverAble to Star Sea Bridge, reproduced below, wasmade on 20 June at times listed in UniversalCoordinated Time (UTC).

1521z Vessel in 2910.8s 15238e this isnorthbound vessel 3.2 miles

I cannot see particular running light

1523z Vessel in position 2911.1s 15338.5e pleaseswitch on running light

1523z Thanks very much for switching onrunning light

1521 UTC corresponded to ship’s time of 0121on 21 June on board Star Sea Bridge.

Navigation lights were not exhibited by StarSea Bridge until about 0123, some six and ahalf minutes after the collision with Sue M.

The usual procedure on Star Sea Bridge was toswitch on the navigation lights when departingfrom a port and to put off the lights after arrivalat the next port. It is probable that, on thisoccasion, despite the third mate’s evidence, thenavigation lights had not been turned on whenthe bulk carrier had sailed from Brisbane on 20 June 2000.

Fishing vessels in the vicinityThe second mate of Ever Able was unable torecall the number of fishing vessels that were in

the vicinity of the Star Sea Bridge. He had beenable to detect some fishing vessels at a distanceof about 7 miles, most of which were, accordingto him, exhibiting deck lights.

With respect to movements of the fishing vesselnear the starboard side of Star Sea Bridge, thesecond mate of Ever Able was unable to statewhat its course was, because its radar echo wasweak. He had sighted the deck lights of thisfishing vessel when it was 8 miles or moreaway, then had detected it on radar at a distanceof about 7 miles as a weak echo. Given itsproximity to Star Sea Bridge, this was in allprobability Sue M.

The watch on Ever Able had not seen any lightor object, visually or on radar, astern of thesouthbound vessel Star Sea Bridge after thatvessel had turned to port. They had however,just before Star Sea Bridge turned to port,observed a vessel very close to the southboundship.

On Star Sea Bridge, the fishing vessel Sue Mwas sighted only moments before the collision.Neither the second mate nor the lookout on thebulk carrier detected the fishing vessel on radar.

Lookouts on Star Sea Bridge andSue MDespite the fact that the lookout on duty withthe second mate on Star Sea Bridge wassupposed to have been maintaining a watch forother vessels, he did not notice Sue M until hewas at the wheel, altering course for Ever Able.He had been talking to the lookout, who hadbeen on duty with the third mate, until 0045 andthis could well have distracted him fromkeeping a proper lookout. Just after this, heobserved fishing vessels on the starboard side,which he reported to the second mate. By thistime, however, Ever Able was visible and theattention of both the second mate and thelookout was then directed solely to that vessel.

It is difficult to explain why Sue M, with itsafter deck illuminated, was not noticed by eitherthe second mate or the lookout on board Star

20

Sea Bridge. On a near-easterly course, it wouldhave presented the same, or similar, aspect toboth Star Sea Bridge and Ever Able. Its decklights were visible to the second mate on EverAble at a distance of about 8 miles.

The second mate on Star Sea Bridge wouldhave been aware of the presence of the thirdmate’s lookout on the bridge after midnight, buthe did nothing about it. He spent some time atthe chart table with the third mate, whichsuggests that he was distracted and omitted toensure that a proper lookout was maintained.After Ever Able was sighted, he becameengrossed in ensuring that its CPA wasadequate, but he paid no attention to whatappeared to him to be two white lights on thestarboard bow of his own ship. It is possible thatthese lights were those of the fishing vessel SueM, but it was only when a collision wasimminent, that he noticed a ‘white light’ close tothe bulk carrier and attempted to take avoidingaction. According to his evidence, he soundedthe whistle at this time, but the deckhand on thefishing vessel did not hear it.

After the collision, the second mate and thirdmate of Star Sea Bridge went to the starboardbridge wing, looking aft in an attempt to seewhat the ship had hit. By then, however, thebulk carrier was turning rapidly to port. If theyhad gone to the port bridge wing, they mighthave seen Sue M sinking.

Aboard Sue M, it is not certain if the radar wason and, if it was, neither the skipper nor thedeckhand seemed to have used it to assist withkeeping a lookout. According to the deckhand,just before the collision, the skipper of Sue Mhad scanned out to starboard and was on hisway to the port side of the fishing vessel,probably to look out to that side, when thecollision occurred. The skipper and thedeckhand had been busy sorting their catch ondeck under bright lights and they would havehad found it difficult, if not impossible, to seeany approaching vessel, particularly if thatvessel was displaying no lights.

With reference to the trawler crew, who hadbeen working under bright lights, a specialist inaviation medicine, contracted by the ATSB foran earlier, similar, collision at night involving atrawler and a ship (Report No. 151), had statedthat:

Given their working environment under highintensity lighting on the night of the collision, itis highly probable that the crew would have beensignificantly night vision impaired due to thecombined effects of retinal bleaching (causingcomplete loss of dark adaptation) and workingclose-in on the back of the trawler. By workingunder bright lights, the photo-chemicals essentialfor night vision… would have been totallyinactivated. To be re-activated,… several hours of‘dark adaptation’ in a completely dark or verylow-light environment must elapse to enableregeneration of the… photo-chemicals. This isnot possible… whilst working under thefloodlighting on the back of the boat. These lightswould need to be extinguished completely (andremain so) to enable the dark adaptation processto begin.

It would not be possible for a crewman workingunder floodlighting on a trawler to walk to theside of the vessel to look into the darkness and toexpect to safely detect a poorly illuminated objectquickly…

It is also likely that the close-in nature of thework on the back of the trawler would havecaused a degree of ‘accommodation’ fixation tothe crew. This means that when they did walk tothe side of the vessel and looked out into thedarkness where there was no point of fixation,then the eye’s natural tendency to accommodateto a point in space about 1–2 metres away(‘empty field myopia’, a form of induced shortsightedness) would have occurred. This form ofmyopia (short-sightedness) would seriouslyreduce the likelihood of a crewman acquiring anight target quickly unless he had been on watchfor some time in the darkness and had beenforcefully looking for objects in the distance…

Given the physiology of sight, even had StarSea Bridge been exhibiting its navigation lights,as required by the Colregs, the chances of thefishing vessel’s crew seeing the approachingbulk carrier, other than on the radar, was signifi-cantly reduced.

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In the opinion of the Inspector of MarineAccidents (the Inspector), there was no properlookout being maintained either on Star SeaBridge or Sue M.

Aboard Star Sea Bridge, the second mate hadspent significant amounts of time at the charttable and had kept only a cursory lookout. Therating did not seem to have his mind on the job.

On Sue M, the skipper and deckhand had beenconcentrating on sorting their catch under brightlights, severely reducing their ability to maintainany sort of lookout.

Minimal manning levels on fishing vessels hasled to the inability of their crews, while engagedin fishing operations, to keep a proper lookout.

Visibility from the wheelhouse ofStar Sea BridgeStar Sea Bridge was fitted with four cranes onthe centreline of the vessel and the possibilitythat the cranes might have prevented Sue Mfrom being seen from the wheelhouse wasinvestigated.

To a lookout stationed at the centre of thewheelhouse, the nearest crane would have hadthe effect of obscuring, at most, an arc of about7° on either side from ahead. However, Sue Mwas at least a point on the starboard bow, so itwould have been visible from the centre of theship’s wheelhouse.

The only positions from which Sue M would nothave been visible from the bulk carrier’swheelhouse would have been if both the lookoutand the second mate had been standing 4 or more metres to port of the centre of thewheelhouse. The aftermost crane could thenhave prevented them from seeing the fishingvessel but this scenario is highly unlikely.

The lookout on the bridge of the bulk carriersighted Ever Able ‘right ahead’ and he hadobserved a number of fishing vessels tostarboard. His evidence, too, was that he hadmoved to the bridge wings to check the

navigation lights and it is unlikely that thecranes would have interfered, for any length oftime, with his looking out.

Radar detectability

To detect small vessels or those constructed ofmaterial giving a poor radar return, it isessential for radars to be correctly tuned and forclutter controls to be adjusted for optimumperformance.

A supplement to the journal of The NauticalInstitute, Seaways, of January 1994 commentson radar detectability and collision risk. Thearticle warns:

There are essential elements to be imprinted inevery watchkeeper’s mind. They are:

• Weak echoes can only be detected at limitedrange and are likely to be lost close in due toclutter.

• Due to the properties of propagation, ‘phaseout’ may occur and weak echoes can be lostfor a significant period of time in certainconditions.

• Radar reflectors do not enhance radar, but doassist in the detection of a small target.

A table in the article on the average radarvisibility of small vessels in moderate seasshows that from a vessel of about 40 000 tonnes(the deadweight of Star Sea Bridge), a 50 footwooden vessel (Sue M was almost 50 feet inlength) might be visible at about 6 miles.However, such targets are often lost or are seensporadically when sea clutter interferes withtheir detection, especially at the centres of radarscreens. [Two safety bulletins, Nos. 01 and 02,issued by the ATSB in 2002 and sent to theInternational Maritime Organization (IMO),refer to the limitations of radar and to theproblems of radar detection of small vessels].

With reference to the term ‘phase out’,transmissions from radar to a target arrivedirectly as well as via reflections off theintervening sea surface. If the difference in pathlengths is exactly half a wavelength or multiples

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thereof, 11⁄2, 21⁄2, 31⁄2, etc., wavelengths, thesignals cancel and no return transmission ispossible. The zones in which the target may notbe seen are named Fresnel Zones3.

There is also the issue of multiple reflectortargets. Small vessels, particularly those ofwood or non-metallic construction are made upof a number of separate reflectors such as masts,A-frames, gallows and other metal structures,each at different distances from the radarantenna. If the path length between thereflecting surfaces is a full wavelength or amultiple thereof, the radar return signal will beenhanced. Where path lengths are not fullwavelengths or multiples of the wavelength, thereturn signal will be out of phase and the signalswill subtract from one another. If the differencein path length is exactly half a wavelength, thesignals will cancel each other out.

While Ever Able’s radar detected Sue M as aweak echo, according to the second mate andthe lookout on Star Sea Bridge, the fishingvessel was not detected on the bulk carrier’sradar. It is possible that the second mate and thelookout on Star Sea Bridge were concentratingon Ever Able to the extent that they missedseeing any echoes of Sue M on radar. It is alsopossible that, with no radar reflector on thefishing vessel, there were only irregular radarechoes from it. Also, after Star Sea Bridge hadberthed at Melbourne, it was noted that the seaclutter controls on both radars were set at about40 per cent of their full scale. If the cluttercontrols were at these positions at the time ofthe collision, it is possible that any echoes of theSue M were lost on the radar as the two vesselsclosed.

Safety equipmentFishing is recognised internationally as a mostdangerous profession and the requirements forthe provision and stowage of life savingappliances for fishing boats should reflect thatfact. A report released on 25 January 2001 inRome, Italy, by the United Nations Food andAgriculture Organization has stated that the

fatality rate among fishermen in Australia is 143 per 100 000, compared with the nationalaverage of 8.1 for other occupations.

Sue M was a class 3 C seagoing fishing vesselfor use in all operational areas up to andincluding restricted offshore operations within30 nautical miles to seaward of designatedsmooth waters. As such, under the provisions ofthe Uniform Shipping Laws Code (USL Code),the vessel was required to be equipped withdistress signals, lifejackets, an EPIRB and eithera coastal liferaft or a dinghy.

Sue M was equipped with a manually launcheddinghy, which was required to be equipped withtwo oars, a painter, a bucket or bailer and meansto enable persons to cling to the boat ifupturned. The dinghy was secured to thewheelhouse top. It is probable that the deckhandwould not have survived had the dinghy notfortuitously broken away when Sue M sank. Inbreaking away the dinghy was holed, butremained afloat on its in-built buoyancy. Theoars and bailer, if stowed with the dinghy, wereprobably lost as it came to the surface inverted.

The requirements for a coastal inflatable liferaftinclude the following:

• provision to enable the liferaft to float free inthe event of the vessel sinking

• the provision of, among other items, a coverfor shelter from the elements, a sea anchor,water, rations, distress flares and an orangesmoke signal.

While a dinghy is useful for fishing relatedoperations, a liferaft would be infinitely superioras the preferred safety option. A float-freeliferaft would have afforded shelter to thedeckhand from Sue M and the opportunity touse distress signals to draw attention to hisplight.

Key safety equipment was stowed within thewheelhouse or accommodation, placesdangerous to access in the event of the vesselsinking. The lifejackets were not available on

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3 After Augustine Jean Fresnel who first investigated them.

deck and the opportunity of using this importantlife saving appliance was denied to the crew.

The EPIRB was also mounted within thewheelhouse and, therefore, could not be reachedbefore the vessel sank. While fishing vessels areat sea, EPIRBs should be mounted outside thewheelhouse, where they are more accessible inan emergency.

This is the third incident investigated by theCommonwealth, under the Navigation (MarineCasualty) Regulations, involving the loss of afishing vessel where emergency equipmentcould not be reached by the crew when theirvessel sank. Report numbers 88 (fv Jay Dee,Aug 1996) and 185 (Dec 2003), on the loss ofthe pleasure craft Tamara, identify the dangersof stowing the EPIRB in the wheelhouse.

The ATSB report on Tamara recommended thatconsideration be given by owners, operators andauthorities to the issue of fitting float-freeEPIRBS to commercial fishing vessels.

Fatigue and alcohol In the opinion of the Inspector, neither fatiguenor alcohol was likely to have been acontributory factor for the collision.

An ATSB-organised divePrior to the police dive on Sue M, the ATSB hadrequested that the divers obtain evidence fromthe wreck such as paint samples, the positionsof the light switches and the switches on theradar. The divers agreed to assist with theevidence, but they stipulated that their primaryobjective was to locate and recover the body ofthe skipper. Though the divers were able torecover the skipper’s body, they were unable toobtain any evidence for the ATSB, due to‘bottom time’ limitations while diving usingcompressed air equipment.

The ATSB then made arrangements for anotherdive on Sue M, which, after some delays due toweather, was scheduled for 4 September.

Information on currents in the vicinity of thewreck indicated that currents of up to one knotcould be expected. However, when the dive wascarried out on 5 September, sub-surface currentsin the vicinity proved to be so strong that therewas the danger that the diver, diving on oxy-helium, surface supplied, would be draggedaway and the dive had to be aborted.

A recording from a video camera that waslowered to the wreck showed that the vesselwas on a southerly heading, keel down, lyingover to starboard at an angle of about 15°. Thevideo showed the disposition of the trawl gear,the after working deck and the location oflighting for that deck. It also showed a build-upof sand on the south side of the wreck, on top ofthe wheelhouse and the after deck, an indicationthat, in time, sand would cover the trawler.

Charges laid against the masterand second mate of Star SeaBridge The master of Star Sea Bridge had not informedAusSAR of the collision until AusSAR asked ifhis vessel had experienced any unusual activityon the night of 20 June.

He was tried, and pleaded guilty, in theMelbourne Magistrates Court on 31 May 2001on a charge of failing to report an accident. Hewas fined Aus $1 500 and was also ordered topay Aus $10 000 in costs.

On 10 November 2003, the second mateappeared in the County Court of Victoria inMelbourne charged with:

• failing to maintain a proper look-out by sightand hearing as well as by all available meansappropriate in the prevailing circumstancesand conditions so as to make a full appraisalof the situation and of the risk of collision;

• failing to use all available means appropriateto the prevailing circumstances andconditions to determine if risk of collisionexisted;

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• failing to keep out of the way of a vesselengaged in fishing;

• failing to display prescribed lights on thevessel from sunset to sunrise;

resulting in a collision at sea, between Star SeaBridge and Sue M.

On 27 November 2003, however, chargesagainst the second mate were dismissed by thejudge on a point of law, raised by the defence,relating to the validity of certain sections of theNavigation Act 1912.

The ATSB reportTo avoid any possible influence on a jury,release of this report was withheld pending thetrials of the master and the second mate. Afterthe trial of the master and the dismissal ofcharges against the second mate, the draft reportwas sent out for comment to Directly InvolvedParties.

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FIGURE 12:Frame taken from a video recording of the wreck of Sue M

Debris

Boom

Buildup ofsand

Icebox

Nets

Open wheelhouse door

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Conclusions

These conclusions identify the different factorscontributing to the incident and should not beread as apportioning blame or liability to anyparticular individual or organisation.

Based on the evidence available, the incidentoccurred because of a combination of thefollowing factors.

1. The fishing vessel Sue M sank, with the lossof its skipper, after a collision with the bulkcarrier Star Sea Bridge.

2. The second mate of Star Sea Bridge was notkeeping a proper lookout, either visually orby radar, nor did he ensure that the lookouton duty with him was keeping a vigilantwatch.

3. On board the bulk carrier, the lookout onduty with the second mate was not keeping aproper lookout. Consequently, it is likely thathe had not realised that one of the fishingvessels he had seen, Sue M, was closer thanhe thought.

4. Both the skipper and the deckhand on thefishing vessel had been busy sorting theircatch and had not been keeping a properlookout.

5. The skipper and deckhand on Sue M wereworking under bright deck lights. Underthese conditions, they would not have beenable to visually detect approaching vessels,least of all one not displaying navigationlights.

6. The navigation lights on Star Sea Bridgewere probably not on at the time of thecollision.

7. The second mate on Star Sea Bridge wasinformed of the presence of fishing vesselsby his lookout, but focussed instead on theapproaching ship to the extent that he onlybecame aware of the presence of Sue Mwhen a collision was unavoidable.

8. It is not possible to determine if the radar onthe fishing vessel was in use. If it was, thereis no evidence to suggest that it was beingused to assist with keeping a lookout bytracking approaching vessels.

9. There is a significant probability that, on StarSea Bridge, the sea clutter controls on bothradars were set at levels that preventedechoes from Sue M being displayed.

In addition, based on the issue of night visionwhen working under bright lights, the Inspectorconsiders that it is unlikely that the failure ofStar Sea Bridge to exhibit its navigation lightsbefore the collision was a causal factor in thecollision itself.

The risk to the deckhand of Sue M not survivinga sinking at sea was increased significantly bythe stowage of the EPIRB and lifejackets withinthe wheelhouse and the absence of readilyavailable distress signals on deck.

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FIGURE 13:Star Sea Bridge and Sue M: Events and causal factors chart

Events

Conditions

Incident

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Submissions

Under sub-regulation 16(3) of the Navigation(Marine Casualty) Regulations, if a report, orpart of a report, relates to a person’s affairs to amaterial extent, the Inspector must, if it isreasonable to do so, give that person a copy ofthe report or the relevant part of the report. Sub-regulation 16(4) provides that such a personmay provide written comments or informationrelating to the report.

The final draft of the report, or relevant partsthereof, was sent to;

The deckhand of Sue M,

The master, second and third mates and thelookout of Star Sea Bridge,

The managers of Star Sea Bridge and,

The Australian Maritime Safety Authority

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The Inspector recommends that, since fishingvessels may be encountered anywhere off theAustralian coast at any time of the year:

MR20040001Ships’ masters and skippers of fishing vesselsensure that, in accordance with the CollisionRegulations, a proper lookout is maintained atall times;

MR20040002Ships’ masters and watchkeepers, skippers andcrews of fishing vessels take note of thelimitations of radar and the fact that radardetection of small wooden vessels is likely tooccur at smaller ranges than for similar vesselswith steel hulls; and

MR20040003

Owners, operators and skippers of fishingvessels consider the use of appropriateequipment to improve the radar detectability oftheir vessels.

The Inspector also recommends that:

MR20040004Fishing vessel owners and operators note thatlow manning levels of their vessels can lead tocrews being unable to keep a proper lookout;

MR20040005The National Marine Safety Committee inconjunction with State marine authoritiesconsider making IMO approved types of radarreflectors mandatory on commercial fishingvessels; and

MR20040006EPIRBs and other lifesaving equipment onfishing vessels and small craft be carried outsidethe wheelhouse, readily available for use whenat sea.

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Recommendations

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Annex 1

Rule 5 of the International Regulations forPreventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, as amended(the Colregs), on look-out, states that:

Every vessel shall at all times maintain a properlook-out by sight and hearing as well as by allavailable means appropriate in the prevailingcircumstances and conditions so as to make a fullappraisal of the situation and of the risk ofcollision.

Rule 7(a) states that:

Every vessel shall use all available meansappropriate to the prevailing circumstances andconditions to determine if risk of collision exists.

Rule 7(b) states that:

Proper use shall be made of radar equipment iffitted and operational to obtain early warning ofrisk of collision.

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Annex 2

Analysis of paint samplesExtracts from the report on the analysis by theScientific Unit, Forensic Services of theAustralian Federal Police follow:

1.0 Custody of Items

1.1 Receipt

1.1.1 On Wednesday 28 June 2000, thefollowing items were received fromthe Marine Incident InvestigationUnit:-

A sealed polythene bag, containingnine sealed plastic bags labelled inpart “Control samples from the hullof the ship”,

A sealed polythene bag, containingeight sealed plastic bags labelled inpart “ Items 1–8 starboard side ofStar Sea Bridge”.

The packaging of these items wereinspected and found to be in goodcondition. Photographs were taken torecord their appearance.

1.1.2 On Wednesday 5 July 2000, anenvelope was received by mail fromSenior Constable Sid Hill of the NSWpolice at Iluka. This envelopeenclosed a slip of paper inscribed“Sue M-paint samples wheel housedoor” and a plastic clip lock bagwhich contained grey and white paintchips.

1.1.3 Thursday 27 July 2000, a lockedyellow security trunk and a sealedcardboard box were received fromAnsett couriers. These boxes wereinspected and found to be in good

condition. Photographs were taken torecord their appearance. Containedwithin the security trunk were thefollowing:-

• A four litre can of InternationalInterlac 172 undercoat white.CA71GPC made by Akzo NobelPty Ltd (AFP exhibit 0003982);

• A four litre can of Pascol highgloss enamel-white. The word“Pewter” was written in blacktexta down the side. (AFP exhibit0003984);

• A four litre can of Wattyl marineCoatings Sigmachlor PrimerSealer – grey. (AFP exhibit0003986);

• A four litre can of InternationalInterprime 82 Timber Primer-grey.(AFP exhibit 0003897);

• A two litre can of Pascol highgloss enamel-black. (AFP exhibit0003987).

Contained within the sealedcardboardbox were the following:-

• A four litre can of InternationalInterlac finish – white (AFPexhibit 0003981);

• A four litre can of InternationalInterlac Longlife Antifouling(AFP exhibit 0003983);

• A four litre can of InternationalInterprimer 82 – timber primer –grey (AFP exhibit 0003885).

1.2 Custody

Members of the Australian Federal PoliceCriminalistics Team examined the items listedabove. This laboratory specialises in theanalyses of trace material and operationalprocedures are in place to maintain the integrityof exhibits. At all times after receipt, the items

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were either in a secure exhibit store, under thedirect control of the examiner, or secured withina search room in the laboratory.

2.0 Examination

2.1 The examination commenced on Thursday27 July 2000. This involved viewing thecontrol samples of the surface coatingsfrom the ship in order to recognise anymaterial that may be from another source.

2.2 The microscopical examination of thesamples taken from the damaged surfaceon the starboard side of the ship “Star SeaBridge” revealed the presence of black andwhite particles. It was apparent that theship had been in collision with a black andwhite painted object. These particles ofapparent paint were isolated for furthertesting by infra-red and x-ray fluorescencespectrometry.

2.3 The cans of paint described in 1.1.3 weresampled by excising small sections fromdrip lines that were on the exterior surfaceof the cans. This was done in order toobtain dried samples that had been exposedto a similar period of oxidation as the painton the fishing vessel. The infra-redspectrum for each sample was recorded.

The chips of paint labelled “Sue-M –wheelhouse door” were also viewed underthe microscope and analysed using infra-red spectroscopy.

2.4 The chips of paint labelled “Sue-M –wheelhouse door” were also viewed underthe microscope and analysed using infra-red spectroscopy.

3.0 Results

3.1 The infra-red spectrum of the black paintcontained in the snap seal bag labelled“Control # 8” exhibited significantdifferences to the black particles that wererecovered from the scrape marks on thestarboard hull of the ship, and the can ofPascol black paint with AFP exhibit0003898. This means that the source of theblack particles from the scrape marks was

not the same as the black paint from theship where “Control # 8” was collected.

3.2 Strong similarities were observed in theinfra-red spectra of the Pascol black paintand the questioned black particlesrecovered from the ship (Item 6 andothers). Differences in the infra-red spectra,while present, were subtle and may well bedue to environmental effects such as ultra-violet degradation.

3.3 White material with a granular matrix wasobserved adhering to the black paint fromthe tape lifts. This had the microscopicalappearance and properties of an undercoat.It was compared against the InternationalInterlac 172 white undercoat, AFP exhibit0003982. The comparison of their infra-redspectra did not reveal any significantdifferences. Similarly, the x-rayfluorescence spectra revealed a similarelemental composition.

4.0 Conclusion

4.1 The comparison of black paints revealedsufficient similarities to conclude that theblack paint from the damaged area of theship could have come from the can ofPascol paint (AFP exhibit 0003898), oranother paint of similar formulation.

4.2 The comparison of white paints revealed avery strong correlation in microscopicalappearance, physical texture, infra-redabsorption spectra and elementalcomposition. This means that the whiteparticles from the scrape marks on the shipcould have come from the can of Interlac172 (AFP exhibit 0003982) whiteundercoat or another paint of similarformulation.

4.3 This evidence supports the proposition:-“that the ship Star Sea Bridge hadcollided with the fishing vessel Sue M”,however it is important to appreciate that itis not possible to preclude otherpossibilities such as a collision withanother object that had been painted withsimilar paints.

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Star Sea Bridge

IMO Number 9168269

Flag Panama

Classification Society BV

Ship Type Bulk Carrier

Builder Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Ind Co Ltd, Tokyo

Year Built 1997

Owner Kaisho Marine S A, Panama

Gross Tonnage 24 953

Net Tonnage 13 547

Summer Deadweight 42 717 tonnes

Length overall 181.50 m

Breadth, moulded 30.50 m

Depth, moulded 16.40 m

Summer Draught 11.37 m

Engine Sulzer 6RTA48T

Speed, service 14.5 knots

Crew 21

39

40

Sue M

Registration number 4823

Survey authority Waterways Authority of NSW

Vessel type Fishing boat, class 3C

Owner Scott Lenard

Year of build 1982

Construction Timber

Length 14.0 m

Moulded breadth 4.5 m

Moulded depth 1.85 m

Engine Cummins Diesel, 164 kW

Crew 2

41

Independent investigation into the collision between the

Panama flag bulk carrier Star Sea Bridge

and the fishing vessel Sue M

ISS

N 1447-087X

ISB

N 1 8777071 52 8

ww

w.a

tsb.

gov.

au18

00 6

21 3

72

Star Sea Bridge/Sue M 02.04