ssrn-id1978182.pdf
TRANSCRIPT
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NatashaTusikov
PhDCandidate,Australian National University, Email: [email protected]
1
MeasuringOrganisedCrime-RelatedHarms:ExploringFivePolicingMethods
AfinalversionofthisarticleappearsinCrimeLawandSocialChange,onlinepublicationNovember2011.
Abstract
Manylawenforcementagenciesaroundtheworldhaveadaptedriskassessmentmethodology
toanalyseorganisedcrime.Theseassessments,whichareintendedtoprovidelawenforcement
managementwithrigourousanalysistoenablerationalandobjectivedecision-making
processes,areanintegralpartofintelligence-ledpolicing.Despitetheprevalenceofthese
assessments,astheassessmentsandtheirmethodologiesareoftentightlyrestrictedwithinthe
lawenforcementcommunity,itisoftenunclearhowlawenforcementdefines,analysesand
makesdecisionsaboutorganisedcrime.Whiletheuseofriskassessmentmethodologyto
analyseorganisedcrimeinpolicingisgenerallyunder-evaluated,criticspointtoserious
methodologicalweaknesses.Anotheraspectthatislessexploredinthescholarlyliteratureis
howlawenforcementconceptualisesandmeasurestheimpactorharmfromorganisedcrime
andusesthisanalysistoinformpriority-settingprocesses.Thisarticleexploreshowlaw
enforcementassessorganisedcrime-relatedharmbyexaminingfivepolicingmethodsone
eachfromAustraliaandtheNetherlandsandthreefromtheUnitedKingdom.Thearticlefindsthatthemethodshavesignificantshortcomings:themainconceptsaregenerallyill-definedand
theoperationalisationoftheseconceptsisproblematic.Moreimportantly,theproblems
evidentintheharmmethodsraiseseveralcriticalquestions,specificallywhethermeasuring
organisedcrime-relatedharmsisempiricallyfeasibleand,ifso,canbeundertakeninamanner
thatmeaningfullyinformslawenforcementsdecision-makingandlimitsunduepolitical
interference.
Keywords:organisedcrime,harm,risk,prioritysetting
Introduction
Inthelastdecade,manylawenforcementagenciesaroundtheworldhaveadoptedriskassessmentmethodologiestoassessorganisedcrime,includinginAustralia,theNetherlands
andtheUnitedKingdom(see[44];[51]).Theseassessments,adaptedfrombusinessand
scientificriskliterature(see[5])conceptualiseorganisedcrimeasaprobabilisticriskthatcanbe
assessed,mappedandmanagedinstructuredanalysesthatdeterminetherelativeriskfrom
specificcriminalnetworks.Thewidespreadbutlargelyunder-evaluatedadoptionofrisk
assessmentmethodology(exceptionsinclude[47];[44];[16];[51])isapartofpolicing
managementstrategiesthatemphasiseproactive,preventive,andcrime-reductionapproaches,
suchasintelligence-ledpolicing.Intelligence-ledpolicingisawidelyadoptedbutcriticallyunder-
theorisedandrelativelyunprovenmanagementstrategy(e.g.,[15]).Theintelligence-led
approachispredicatedonsoundintelligencepracticesandprocessesandisintendedtoinform
arationalandobjectivedecision-makingprocess(see[31]).Lawenforcements
conceptualisationoforganisedcrimeasarisktobegovernedisalsoshapedbytherisksociety
discoursethatseespoliceaskeyprovidersandcommunicatorsofriskknowledgeintendedto
reducesocietyscollectiveinsecurity([10]).
Thestudyoforganisedcrime-relatedconsequencesorharmshasbeentraditionallyover-
shadowedbyafocusonthreat([47]). AsMaguire([27]:328)argues,howtherelative
seriousnessofcrimesisdeterminedandbywhomarecriticalquestionsinrelationtolaw
enforcementpriority-settingprocesses,particularlyasonlyalimitednumberofinitiativescan
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NatashaTusikov
PhDCandidate,Australian National University, Email: [email protected]
2
beundertakenatanyonetime.Critics,however,arguethatlawenforcementoftenlacksan
empiricalbasisforitsfindings,resultinginweakpriority-settingprocessesandthearbitrary
designationofcrimepriorities(see[44]).
Asriskassessmentsonorganisedcrimeandtheirrelatedmethodologiesaregenerallytightly
restrictedtothelawenforcementcommunity,itisoftenunclearhowlawenforcementdefines,
assessesandmakesdecisionsaboutorganisedcrime,leadingtocriticismsofmethodological
opacityandunnecessarysecrecy(see[45]).Whileanassessmentsfindingsmustremain
classified,theunderlyingmethodologyshouldbeasrigourousaspossible,meaningthatlaw
enforcementshould,wherepossible,makepublicitsmethodologyforacriticalreview.This
entailswhatKlerks([22]:97)callsadelicatebalancebetweendemocratictransparencyandthe
needtoprotectinformation.
Thisarticleassessesfivemethodsusedtomeasureorganisedcrime-relatedharmsonefrom
AustraliaandtheNetherlands,andtwofromtheUnitedKingdom.Itexaminesthereliabilityand
validityofeachmethodsoperationalisationofharm,buildinguponrecentevaluationsof
assessmentsonorganisedcrime(particularly[16];[51]).Thisarticlealsobuildsuponresearch
thatexploresthepracticalapplicationofriskassessmentmethodologytoorganisedcrime(particularly[2];[46];[33];[47];[1];[8])andseekstodevelopfurtherriskassessment
methodology.
Thisarticleisorganisedintothreesections.Thefirstsectionsituatesriskassessment
methodologiesaspracticedbylawenforcementwithinthebroaderriskandpolicingliterature.
Next,thearticleexaminestheconceptofharminriskassessmentsandexploresthetheoretical
andpracticalchallengesinvolvedintheconceptualisationandmeasurementofconsequences
fromorganisedcrime.Thefinalsectionoutlinesandthenassessesfivelawenforcement
methodsusedtoassesstheharmcausedbyorganisedcrime.
RiskAssessmentMethodologyRiskhasbecomeadefiningwordofthe21
stcentury([14]).Intherisksocietycharacterisedbya
pervasiveandconsumingsenseofinsecurityandfear,thereisaconstantneedforinformation
aboutrisks.EricsonandHaggerty([10]:6)notethatriskcommunicationandmanagement
systemsproliferateasfearbuildsuponitselfandtheproductionofsecuritybecomescentralto
publicandprivateinstitutions.Policeholdacentralbutnotexclusiveroleinthissocietyaskey
providersandcommunicatorsofriskknowledge([10]:5).Crimesareconceptualisedas
calculableandprobabilisticeventswithunequalsocialdistributionwithsomeindividualsfacing
higherrisksforparticulareventsthanothers.Policeareresponsibleforassessingandmapping
theactorsandspacesthatposehazardstothepublicinanattempttomaketheworldmore
securebyevermoreperfectknowledgeofrisk([10]:295).Theemphasisontechnology,
rationalityandprobabilisticcalculationsofrisksisdescribedasthescientificationofpolicing
([11]).
Theriskdiscourseunderliespolicingmanagementstrategiesthatemphasiseproactive,
preventiveandcrime-reductionapproaches,suchasproblem-orientedpolicing,community
policingandintelligence-ledpolicing.Thesestrategiesshare,asMaguire([27]:316,italicsin
original)notes,astrategic,future-orientedandtargetedapproachtocrimecontrol,focusing
upontheidentification,analysisand'management'ofpersistinganddeveloping'problems'or
'risks'(whichmaybeparticularpeople,activitiesorareas).Themanagementofpersistent,
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serious,andorganisedcrime-relatedrisksisatthecoreofintelligence-ledpolicingwhichwas
created,inpart,asaresponsetodissatisfactionwithtraditionalpolicingpracticesandconcern
overgrowinglevelsofcriminality(includingaperceivedincreaseinorganisedcrime)([31]).This
policingstrategyalsoemphasisesthatpolicingresourcesarefiniteandmustbeallocatedtoward
high-riskactivitiesandactors.Organisedcrimeisthereforeunderstoodasariskthatcanbe
differentiatedfromothercrimetypes.Actorsandillicitactivitiescanbeassessed,mapped,
rankedandtargetedaccordingtothelevelsofthreatandriskposed.
Theroleofpoliceasknowledgeworkers([10])becomesinintelligence-ledpolicingarelatively
specialisedfunctionthatisperformed,intheory,bytrainedintelligenceexpertsinspecialised
roles.Atthecoreoftheintelligencefunctionisthe(largelycivilian)analyticalcomponent.The
emphasisonrationalitywithinintelligence-ledpolicingrequiresatransitionfromtheanalytical
functionthatwasrelativelyintuitiveandunstructuredtoamoreformalisedapproachbasedon
specifictechnologicaltoolsandmethodologiesthatpurportstoprovideamoreobjective
assessmentofcrime([20];[11]).Despitedecadesofcallingfortheprofessionalisationof
intelligenceanalysis,practitionersandacademicsalikedebatewhetheritis(orisbecoming)a
discipline(e.g.,[12]).Criticsassertthattheresearchmethodsusedinintelligenceanalysisare
notrigourousbutratherfairlyplasticanddesignedforworkingwithdirtydatainmanufacturinganintelligenceproduct([20]:50).
Policeknowledgeaboutorganisedcrimerisksiscommunicated,inpart,throughrisk
assessments,aconceptborrowedfrombusinessandscientificliterature(see[5]).Definitionsof
threatandriskvaryaccordingtotheassessorsneeds;however,thefundamental
componentsofariskassessmentmodelarearealisticrecognitionofhazard,ascaleofriskand
adefinedprotocol([5]:182).Inthecontextoforganisedcrime,ariskassessmentwouldinvolve
anassessmentofthenatureandmagnitudeofthethreat(i.e.,actorsposingrisk),the
probabilityandfrequencyofathreatoccurring(i.e.,achievingspecificcriminalaims),andthe
determinationofthenatureandscaleoftheimpact(i.e.,harm),intentionalorinadvertent,
shouldthethreatberealised(see[46];[5]).Lawenforcementsriskassessmentsareintendedtodirectrationalandevidence-baseddecision-makingbyallocatingresourcestowardhigh-risk
issues(see[46];[49];[1]).
Thetransitionofpolicefromfront-lineresponderstoknowledgeworkerswhoareexpectedto
deliveramorerational,objectiveandcost-effectiveevaluationandtargetingofparticularcrime
risksisproblematic([20];seealso[15]).Despiteloftyclaimsbylawenforcementoffundamental
shiftsinorganisationalandoperationalstrategiesfromreactivetoproactiveapproachesto
crimecontrol,researchersquestiontheactuallevelofchangethathasoccurred([18];[27];
[32]).Skepticismoflawenforcementsclaimsofanalyticalobjectivityandrationality([35];[20])
isevidentincritiquesoflawenforcementandgovernmentalassessmentsoforganisedcrime.
Thesecritiquespointtoseriousproblemsinbothconfidentialandpublicassessmentsof
organisedcrime,particularlyweakmethodology(see,forexample,fortheNetherlands[47];
[22];[51];forGermany[48];forEuropol[45];forCanada[51];andfortheUnitedKingdomand
Belgium[16];[47]).Scholarsquestiontherigourandvalidityoftheseassessments,cautioning
thatfindingsmayreflectidiosyncraticlawenforcementinterestsratherthananobjective
measureoforganisedcrime([9]),or,morebluntly,warningthattheassessmentsaremore
ritualincantationthanaknowledge-basedprocess([45]:261).
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Despitetheinterestinboththeacademicandlawenforcementcommunitiesinapplyingrisk
assessmentmethodologytoorganisedcrime,Dorn([7]:292)rightlyarguesthateffortsto
operationaliseseriousnessandharmareintheirinfancy.Therehasalsobeenrelativelylittle
comparativeanalysisofhowlawenforcementagenciesconceptualiseandmeasureharm,or
evaluationsofthetechniquesusedtomeasureharm(notableexceptionsare[50];[9];[17];
[54]).Thisgapispartlyexplainedbyweakorundevelopedmethodologies(see[47];[22];[51];
[16])orunnecessarilysecretiveprocesses(see[45]).Aswell,academicsandpractitionershave
traditionallyaccordedgreaterattentiontothedefinitionandmeasurementofthreatoverharm
([47]).However,wheretheconceptofharmisincorporatedintoriskmethodology,as
Zoutendijk([51])notes,fewassessmentsexplicitlydefinewhatismeantbytheconceptor
indicatehowitismeasured.Moreover,theseassessmentsgenerallylackastructuredapproach
toharm([47];[16];[51]).
Thispaperfirstdescribesharmandthendiscusseskeytheoreticalandpracticalchallenges
relatedtomeasuringorganisedcrime-relatedharmsbeforeexploringfourcasestudies.
DefiningHarm
Organisedcrimeisoneofthemostcontestedtermsinacademiccriminology([36]:490),aphantom([43])characterisedbyadiversityofactivities,participants,criminalcapabilitiesand
differentorganisingstructures.Measuringorganisedcrimefirstrequires,asVonLampe([49]:
85)argues,conceptualclarityandcertainty,aconsiderablechallengeforaphenomenonthat
continuestoprovokedebateregardingitsconstituentelements(see[1];VonLampeswebsite).1
Organisedcrimeisalternatelydescribedwithafocusonorganisation(actor-andnetwork-level
analysis),ormarket-leveldynamics(bothlicitandillicit),oracombinationofboth,andeach
conceptualisationresultsinadifferentfocalpointforanalysis.
Whentheanalyticalfocusisoncriminalorganisations,damagefromorganisedcriminalityis
understoodasnegativeeffectsthatcanbedirectlyattributedtospecificcriminalactorsand
networks.Hamilton-SmithandMackenzie([16])describeaframeworkinwhichriskisdeterminedbasedonscoresofcriminalnetworksattributes,calculationsbasedonnetworks
criminalactivities,andacombinationofboth.Harmcanbemeasuredatthecriminalnetwork-
levelusing,forexample,criminal-attributescales(seeKlerks2000in[46]),criminaloffence-
scalesorstatute-penaltyscales.
Whentheanalyticalfocusisonwhatcanbetermedsector-ormarket-relatedharms,
includingconsequencestothelegalmarket(see[1]),harmisgenerallyunderstoodinbroad
(potentiallyoverlapping)categories,whichcoverarangeofdamagesthatarenotattributableto
specificcriminalnetworks,witheffectsrangingfromphysical,economic,psychological,political,
social,community,intellectualtoenvironmental(e.g.,[26];[2];[46]). Atthesectorlevel,these
effectsaremostcommonlyqualitativelyassessed,thoughsomeresearchestimatescrimecosts
usingthesecategories(e.g.,[30]).Costsrelatedtoorganisedcrimearegenerallydividedinto
tangibleeffectsthathaveclearlyidentifiablevictimsandconcretedamages(e.g.,medicalbills)
orintangibleeffects,suchasfearofcrimeorthelossofqualityoflife(e.g.,[6]).Network-level
(i.e.,micro)andsector-level(i.e.,macro)approachescanalsobecombinedtodeterminethe
1See Klaus Von Lampes Organised Crime Research website at http://www.organised-
crime.de/OCDEF1.htm.
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relativelevelofharmfromspecificcriminalnetworksand,morebroadly,assessorganised
crime-relatedharmsthatcannotbeattributedtospecificcriminalnetworks.
ChallengesintheAnalysisofOrganisedCrime-RelatedHarms
Theanalysisoforganisedcrime-relatedharmssuffersfromthesamevulnerabilitiesthattrouble
allorganisedcrimeresearch:adearthofstandardiseddataonorganisedcrimeand
victimisation,alackofcommon(orcomplementary)methodologicalapproachesandrecords-
managementsystems,restrictiveprivacylaws,andanoften-secretivepolicingculture(see[35]).
Researchchallengesrelatedtoorganisedcrime-relatedharmsarenotfurtherdiscussedinthis
articleastheyareeffectivelycoveredelsewhere(seeparticularly[28];[21]).
Thissectioninsteadexploresthedisjuncturebetweenlawenforcementsconceptualisationof
organisedcrime-relatedharmsandcriticalquestionsraisedintheacademicharmliterature.The
conceptofharmvariesaccordingtohowonedefinesandcategorisesthebehaviourthatresults
inthedamage.Whenharmisconceptualisedwithinalegalistframework,thefocusisupon
violationsofcriminallaws,whereassocio-legaldefinitionsofcrimeincludecivilorregulatory
violations,particularlyinreferencetocorporatecrime(see[50]).Ashiftfromalegalistfocusto
asocio-legalframeworkwouldenablelawenforcementtoassessorganisedcrime-relatedharms
morecomprehensivelyandalsolikelyprovidemoreattentiontocorporateharms.Someresearchersrecommendadeparturefromthelegalframeworkaltogethertoenableanalysisof
activitiesthatarelegalbutdamaging,suchastheuseofdrift-netsincommercialfisheries(see
[50]).However,suchamovewouldbeoutsidelawenforcementsmandateandtheostensible
purposeofitsriskassessments.
Lawenforcementriskassessments,notsurprisingly,alsotendtoexcludedamageinadvertent
andotherwiseresultingfromthestatesinterventionsagainstorganisedcrime.Suchcollateral
damageiswellknown,particularlyinrelationtoanti-drugmeasures,forexample,research
indicatesthatlawenforcementinterventionsinillicitdrugmarketscouldunintentionally
increaseviolence([40]:6).Therelationshipbetweencounter-measuresagainstorganisedcrime
andcollateraldamageshouldbeassessed,especiallyifthesemeasuresgenerategreaterharmsthanthecrimetargeted([8]:35)oriflawenforcementincorrectlyattributesharmcausedbyits
counter-measuresassolelycausedbyorganisedcrime.Thispresupposes,asVonLampe([48])
argues,thatlawenforcementcancriticallyandeffectivelyevaluateitspractices.Italso
presumesthatlawenforcementhasboththewillandcapacitytoreviseorhaltharmfulcounter-
measures.
Lawenforcementriskassessmentsgenerallyreflectanormativeapproachtoorganisedcrime-
relatedharmswhichrecogniseslittledistinctionbetweenharmfromconflictualcrimes( malain
se)versusconsensualcrimes(malaprohibita).Consequencesfromconflictualcrimes,suchas
fraudortheft,generallyhaveclearlyidentifiablevictimsandmoreconcretedamages.In
contrast,harmsfromconsensualcrimes(e.g.,illicitdrugs)aredifficulttodetermine,asthe
goodsarevoluntarilydemandedandsuppliedbutcanresultinnegativesocio-economiceffects
(see[4]).Somenegativeeffectsoccurirrespectiveoftheactivityslegality(e.g.,overdosesor
lostproductivityduetoalcohol),whileothers(e.g.,illicitmarket-relatedviolence)woulddecline
significantlyweretheactivitylegalised.Whenanactivityislegallypermittedinsomesettings
andnotothers,analysismustdistinguishwhetherthenegativeeffectsarerelatedtoorganised
crimeorareintrinsictotheactivity([26]:46).Analysismustconsiderwhichconsequences
relatedtoconsensualcrimesshouldbemeasured,ifany,andhowtheseshouldbecalculated.
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Lawenforcementriskassessmentsrarelyincludeaconsiderationofpositiveeffectsfrom
organisedcriminalityasthereappearsanimplicitassumptionthatallorganisedcrime-related
activitiesarenon-consensual.Manyscholars,incontrast,notethatorganisedcrimecanprovide
theruleoflawwheregovernmentisabsentandinjectwealthintoeconomies,bothdeveloping
(e.g.[37])anddeveloped(e.g.,[42];[41]).Onbalance,however,thereappearstobeaninverse
correlationbetweenorganisedcrimeprevalenceandastateseconomicwealth,asVanDijk
([41])determinedinhiscompositeorganisedcrimeindex.Harmanalysisshouldconsider,as
Maltz([26]:43)argues,boththeeconomiclossestovictimsandeconomicgainstocriminal
organisations,witharecognitionthatthelossesandgainsarenotnecessarilycomplementary
(e.g.,propertymaybedestroyed).Determiningthenetcostoforganisedcrimemayprovidea
moreaccurateaccountingofharms,althoughthiscostingisoftenpoliticallyuntenableand
problematictocalculatewithanyaccuracy.Animportantstepwouldinvolveashiftbylaw
enforcementfromanassumptionofharminallorganisedcrime-relatedactivitiestoa
determinationofdamage.
Discussionoftheaboveissuesinvariablyraisesmorequestionsthananswersanddemonstrates
aneedforacriticaldiscussionofthesocio-historicalconstructionofharmandassumptions
underlyingcurrentunderstandingsoftheconcept.Iftheanalysisoforganisedcrime-relatedharmsistobecomemorecritical,comprehensiveandrigourous,aseriousexaminationofsuch
issuesisnecessary.Lawenforcementshouldmakeclearhowitdefinesandmeasuresorganised
crime-relatedharms.
FiveApproachestoAssessingHarm
Thissectionexaminesharmmethodsconstructedbyfivepolicingagencies:theMetropolitan
PoliceService(MPS)intheUnitedKingdom,NationalPolicingImprovementAgency(NPIA)inthe
UnitedKingdom,theAssociationofChiefPoliceOfficers(ACPO)intheUnitedKingdom,
AustralianCrimeCommission(ACC),andtheNetherlandsPoliceAgency(inDutch,KLPD).2There
hasbeenlittlepublicdiscussionofthesemethodsastheyarepartofclassifiedassessments,
exceptthe2008Dutchassessmentthatwaspubliclyreleased.Hamilton-SmithandMackenzie([16])provideavaluablecritiqueoftwomethods:the2006-versionoftheMPSmethodology
(thisarticleexaminesthe2008amendedversion)andNPIAsmethodologythatformsthebasis
ofnationalassessmentsundertakenonbehalfofACPO.
Thesefiveagencieshavesimilargoalsintheirassessmentoforganisedcrime.Instrategicterms,
theassessmentsareintendedtoguidelawenforcementdecision-makingandgovernment
policy-makinginregardstocurrentandemergingrisksfromorganisedcrime.Inoperational
terms,theassessmentsareusedtoadvisepriority-settingprocessesinrelationtoorganised
crime-relatedissuesorcriminalnetworks.WiththeexceptionoftheMPS,thesemethodsare
designedtomeasureharmsatthenationallevel.3Althoughthemethodsvary,eachagency
takesaprimarilyqualitativeapproachtoharmmeasurementwithastrongbutnotexclusive
relianceonlawenforcementdata.Intelligencepersonnel,mostoftenanalysts,areprimarily
2Korps landelijke politiediensten.3The focus and mandate of risk assessment methodologies in relation to organised crime will likely shift in
the United Kingdom following significant changes outline by the Home Office which include replacing the
Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) with a National Crime Agency (NCA) and phasing out the
National Policing Improvement Agency and folding some of its functions within the NCA and perhaps
incorporating other functions within the Home Office ([19]).
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responsibleforconstructing,undertaking,andevaluatingtheiragencysassessments,with
limitedexternalinvolvement.
Thefiveagenciesoperationalisethemeasurementoforganisedcrime-relatedharmsbyfocusing
oncriminalnetwork-specificattributesandactivities(e.g.,offencescales),or,morebroadly,
assessingsector-relatedharms,suchasthecollectivedamagefromorganisedcrime-related
vehiclecrime.TheassessmentsthatareproducedonbehalfofACPOcombinebothapproaches.
Despitehavingsimilaraims,thefiveagencieshavedifferentapproachestoriskassessment
methodology.Asdiscussedearlierinthisarticle,riskassessmentsarecomprisedofvarious
componentsdependingupontheassessmentsaimandaudience.
Thefollowingsectionassessesthereliabilityandvalidityofeachmethodsoperationalisationof
organisedcrime-relatedharm(i.e.,howthatconceptwillbemeasured)and,indoingso,builds
uponrecentevaluationsoflawenforcementandgovernmentalriskassessmentsonorganised
crime(see[16];[51]).Reliabilityreferstotheconsistencyofmeasurement(i.e.,resultscanbe
reproduced)whilevalidityreferstotheextenttowhichaconceptfitsthemethodsusedto
measureit.
UnitedKingdom:MetropolitanPoliceService(MPS)
IntheUnitedKingdom,theMPSusestheCriminalNetworkHarmAssessmentMatrixtoidentify
criminalnetworks(includinggangs)causingthegreatestharm.4InSeptember2008,theMPS
amendedthe2006versionofitsmatrix5andscoreseachcriminalnetworkinthreeseparate
categories:1)harm;2)criminalcapacityandcapability;and,3)otherrisks(organisationalrisk
andcommunityharm).Harmisassessedusingthemaximum-statutepenaltiesof29offences
consideredintegraltocriminalnetworksinthreecategories:social(12offences);economic(15
offences);and,political(twoterrorismoffences).Foreachoffence,intelligenceanalystsassessa
criminalnetworksinvolvementashigh,mediumorlow(basedongivendefinitions).Highscores
receivethemaximum-statutesentence,mediumscoresreceivehalf,lowscoresaquarter,anda
lifesentenceisscoredas25years.Forexample,acriminalnetworkhighlyinvolvedinfirearmsimportation(designatedaneconomicharm)wouldscoreseven(maximumsentence),whereas
medium-levelinvolvementwouldscorefour(roundedupfrom3.5),andalowwouldscoretwo.
Themeasurementofcriminalcapacityandcapability(ameasureofthreat)isdetermined
throughsixattributes(ratedhigh,medium,orlowwithrelatednumericvalues)thatisbased
uponanabbreviatedversionoftheSleipnircapabilitymeasurementtechnique(see[38]).Each
networkisalsoscored(high,mediumorlow)forthelevelofoperationalriskitsactivitiespose
tolawenforcementorgovernment,andthelevelofcommunityimpactcaused.Criminal
networksareprioritisedforoperationalandintelligenceresourcesprimarilybasedontheir
levelsofharm;however,networkswithlowharmscoresbuthighscoresintheothertwo
categorieswillbehighlightedinthepriority-settingprocess.
UnitedKingdom:NationalPolicingImprovementAgency(NPIA)
NPIA,apolicingorganisationfundedbytheHomeOffice,developedamethodologytoassessa
broadrangeofcrimeissues,includingorganisedcrime,forthe NationalStrategicAssessment.
ThisassessmentisproducedonbehalfoftheAssociationofChiefPoliceOfficers(ACPO)ina
4The MPS Criminal Network Harm Assessment Matrix Manual(2008) is a protected document.5For a detailed discussion of the 2006 version of the MPSHarm Assessment Matrix , see [16].
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collaborativeeffortbylawenforcementagenciesacrosstheUnitedKingdom.Itiscomprisedof
situationreportsassessingfactorsincludingvolume,victimgroups,andtrenddirectionand
establishesprioritieswithinabroadrangeofcrimeissues,notsolelyorganisedcrime.6Each
crimeissueisassessedinfourharmcategories:physical;economic;psychological;
social/community;and,geographicaldistribution,andscoredaslow,mediumorhighwith
correspondingnumericvalues.Extraweightingfactorscanbeappliedtoissuesthatarea
policeforceordistrictpriority,agovernmentpriority,asignalcrime,orthatgeneratepublic
concern.
UnitedKingdom:AssociationofChiefPoliceOfficers(ACPO)
ACPO,anindependentstrategicbodywhichcoordinatesthedirectionanddevelopmentof
policingservices,managesaprojectcalledorganisedcrimegroupmappingwhichdetermines
thethreatandharmlevelsoforganisedcrimenetworksintheUnitedKingdom.Thisprocesswas
developedbyNPIAandisdescribedintheNPIAsguidancemanualsanditinformstheNational
StrategicAssessmentthatisproducedonbehalfofACPO.Harmisassessedinsixcategories:
injury;community;reputation/political(i.e.,publicattitudesofpoliceimpartialityand
effectiveness);cross-border/geography;economic;andcriminalcapacity/capability(ameasure
ofthreat).7Eachcategoryisscoredasnil,low,medium,orhighwithcorrespondingnumericscoresthatareaggregatedintoatotalimpactscore.Amultiplier,basedontheprobabilityof
criminalactivitiesreoccurring(i.e.,unlikely,possible,probable,orhighlyprobable)givesatotal
numericalscoreforeachcriminalnetwork.
Australia:AustralianCrimeCommission(ACC)
Aspartofitsannualnationalassessmentonorganisedandseriouscrime,theACCundertakesa
comparativeanalysisintendedtodeterminechangesinthenatureandlevelofharmamongst
variouscrimeissues.8Subject-matterexpertsfromlawenforcement,government,industryand
academiauseastructuredquestionnairecreatedbytheACCtoascribeanumericscoretoeach
crimeissuebasedondefinedcriteriainthreecategories:political,socialandeconomic.The
politicalcomponentanalysesthenatureandlevelofgovernmentinterest(federalandstate/territory),interestfromlawenforcementandregulatoryagencies,andlegislativeand
regulatoryefforts.Itincludesanassessmentofmediacoverage,politicalpressure,andthe
perceivedandactuallevelofcommunityconcern,alongwithrelatedactiontakenbythose
communities.Theeconomiccomponentexaminestheillicitprofitsgeneratedandthecostto
Australiansociety.Theassessmentincludesananalysisofenablingactivities,suchasidentity
theftandmoneylaundering.TheACCthenanalysestheresults,compilesanaveragescoreand
ascribesaharmlevelforeachissue.
TheNetherlands:NetherlandsPoliceAgency(KLPD)
Everyfouryears,theDepartmentofInternationalPoliceInformation(IPOL)oftheKLPD
undertakesanationalassessmentoforganisedcrimewithinvolvementfromthePolice
AcademyoftheNetherlands,regionalpoliceforcesandKLPDsNationalCrimeSquad([24]).The
KLPDsassessmentsresearchquestionsandissuesaredeterminedbyaworkingparty
comprisedoftheNationalPublicProsecutorsOffice,NationalOfficeofthePublicProsecution
6The Organised Crime Group Mapping Manual(September 2010) is a protected document produced by the
Organised Crime Partnership Board and published by the NPIA on behalf of ACPO.7Ibid.8The ACCsHarms Assessment Process (2008) is a protected document.
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Service,theMinistryoftheInterior,theMinistryofJustice,andtheIPOL.ThePoliceAcademy
producesastudyofcrime-relevantfactors(crime-generatingorcrime-inhibitivefactors)that
contextualisestheassessment.Itfocusesonmeso-leveltrends(e.g.,socio-economicfactors)
thatwillaffectlawenforcementinvestigativepractices([23]:10).
Intheassessment,organisedcrimeisunderstoodascriminalphenomenainvolvingthe
structuralcooperationbetweenpeople,withadegreeofconsistencyinthecollaboration,for
financialormaterialgain([24]:15).Consequencesaredividedintosevendirectharms:health
(physical,mentalandpublic);economic;environmental;infrastructure;disruptionofsocio-
economicrelationships;influenceoverjudicialprocedures;and,influenceofpoliticalor
administrativedecision-making.Therearethreeindirectharms:precautionarybehaviour(e.g.,
installingsecuritydevices);harmtocertaininterestsorrelations(suchaslossofreputation);
and,enablingactivities,suchidentityfraud.Therearenoobjectivecriteriafordeterminingeach
criminalactivitysharm.Theassessmentteamcollaborativelydeterminestheharmlevelina
processdescribedasinteractivesubjectivity([22]:95;see[51]).
Thearticlenowmovestodiscussingreaterdetailthevulnerabilitiesintheseharmmethods.
CritiqueoftheMethods
Measuringtheharmcausedbyorganisedcrimefirstassumesthatthephenomenoncanbe
clearlyconceptualised([48])and,secondly,thatitcanbemeasuredinavalidandreliable
manner,achallengethatisadditionallycomplicatedwhenanalysisisundertakenacrossmultiple
jurisdictionsandagencies.AsKlerks([22]:97)notesinhisobservationoftheDutchassessment
process,itisdifficulttocapturethesynthesisofmultiplereportsonabroadrangeofcrime-
relatedissuesinasinglerigourousmethodology.Toaddresstheinherentdifficultiesinvolvedin
assessingorganisedcrime,inadditiontothemethodologicalchallengesthatKlerksnotes,the
case-studyagencieshaveinstitutedseveralgoodpractices.
TheACCandKLPDbothsolicitanalysisfromexternalsubject-matterexpertsthatundoubtedlyprovidesaricherandmorediverseassessmentoforganisedcrime-relatedharmsthanasingle
policeagencycouldproduce.Thispracticeissuitedtoanalysisofbroadcrimeissues(e.g.,real
estatefraud)asinformationisavailablefrommanysources.Broadconsultationwithexternal
expertsisarelativelyresource-andtime-intensiveprocess;moreover,itisdependentondata
qualityandavailabilityandanalysisunimpededbypoliceorpoliticalinterference.TheACC,for
example,retainscontrolovertheselectionofcrimeissuesandsubject-matterexperts,
compilationoffindings,andsettingofpriorities.ObservingtheDutchassessmentprocess,Klerks
([22]:95)acknowledgesthattheinvolvementofqualifiedacademicsfurtherenhancesthe
processbutarguesthatthisconsultativeprocesscannotreplacetheopenforumofacademia.
Incontrast,criminalnetwork-focusedanalysis(e.g.,MPS)isundertakenbypoliceasitrelies
almostexclusivelyonpoliceinformationsources,thoughexternalexpertscouldbegivenaccess
topolicedatabasestodeterminehowdatacollection,collationandanalyticalprocessescould
bestrengthened.
TheNPIAcreatedmultipleguidancemanualstoensureastandardapproachintermsof
techniques,formatsandterminologyinrelationtotheassessmentprocessthroughoutthe
UnitedKingdom.IntelligenceanalystsinterviewedaboutACPOsriskassessmentprocesswere
positiveaboutthebasicutility,simplicityandpracticalityofACPOsriskassessmentmatrixand
statedthatprioritisationprocessesalignwellwithintuitivejudgments([16]:13).Despitethe
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volumeofguidancemanualsproducedandtheanalystspositivereviews,itremainsunclear
whethertheassessmentsfindingshaveagreatervalidityandreliabilitythanotherlaw
enforcementassessments.Theperceivedalignmentbetweenprioritisedrisksandanalysts
intuitivejudgmentsmayindicatethevalidityandreliabilityoftheprocess.Conversely,itmay
alsoindicateculturalandinstitutionalbiasesfromlawenforcementtowardcertaintypesof
organisingstructuresandactivities.
Akeydifficultywiththemethodsisdefinitionalrigour.Thisisanobviouschallengeasorganised
crimeisalternatelyunderstoodasacollectionofindividualsoractivities,oracombinationof
both([51]).Whereorganisedcrimeandharmaredefined,thewordingisrelativelyvagueand
opentodifferentinterpretations.Themethodsalsotendtoqualifytheirdefinitionsoforganised
crimeorharmwiththeadjectivessignificantorseriouswithoutspecifyinghowthis
characteristicisdefinedormeasured.Organisedcrimeisdifferentiatedfromseriouscrimein
severalmethodsthoughtherelevanceorutilityofsuchadistinctionisnotclear.Giventhese
definitionalchallenges,thereareproblemsofvaliditywiththeoperationalisationoftheconcept
ofharmasitisunclearwhatisbeingmeasuredandifthatisrepresentativeoftheconcept.
Moreover,themethodsalsohaveproblemswithreliabilityasdifferentinterpretationsofthe
conceptsarepossibleandthustheconceptualisationandmeasurementofharmscouldvaryamongstanalysts.
Allthemethodsconceptualiseharminbroadcategories(e.g.,economicorsocialharms)thatare
vaguelydefinedandnotmutuallyexclusive(i.e.,possibleoverlapamongstcategories).The
methodsalsolackspecifiedindicatorstomeasurethepresenceorabsenceofharm.However,
eveniftheseindicatorswereclearlydefined,VonLampe([48])arguesthatwhenlaw
enforcementandpolicymakerscontroltheselectionandanalysisofharm-relatedindicators
therearepotentialproblemsofinstitutionalandculturalbiasthatresultinpoorvalidity,
particularlyifanalysisisalsobasedprimarilyonlawenforcementsources.Theseproblems
elucidatethecase-studyagenciesdifficultiesinoperationalisingharmandillustratethe
challengesinmeasuringsuchaconceptwithanydegreeofvalidityandreliability.Thisarticlesfindingsaresimilartorecentevaluationsoflawenforcementandgovernmentalassessmentsof
organisedcrime(see[16];[51]).
Criminalnetwork-basedharmmethods(e.g.,MPSandACPO)areintendedtoassistseniorlaw
enforcementmanagementsetenforcementprioritiesbyrankingcriminalnetworksaccordingto
theirrelativelevelsofharmandthreat.ThemethodsusedbyMPSandACPOarepractical
solutionstoacomplexproblem.However,thesemethodsassumethatorganisedcriminality
canbedifferentiatedclearlyfromnon-organisedcrimeandthatorganisedillicitactivitiescan
beaccuratelyandreliablyattributedtospecificcriminalnetworks.Socialnetworks,however,
arenotstatic;networksfuzzyboundariesmakeitdifficulttodeterminewhichactorsshouldbe
includedwithinthenetwork(see[29]).Attributingillicitactivitiestoparticularnetworksis
somewhateasierwhenactorsself-identifyaspartofacriminalorganisationorareespecially
overtintheircriminality.However,evenwhenanetworkissomewhatdelineated,itis
problematictoassumethatalloffencesarecommittedaspartofortobenefitacriminal
organisation.
Criminal-offencescalespresumethatorganisedcriminalitycanbereducedtoalistofintegral
offences(seeMPS);however,thesescalestendtodemonstratelawenforcementstraditional
preoccupationwithdrug-orviolence-relatedoffencesandlesserattentiontoothertypesof
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crime,suchasfraud.Suchscalesthereforerepresentarelativelynarrowconceptualisationof
organisedcrime,anunderstandingthatislikelyattenuatedbytheprivilegingoflaw
enforcementinformationsourcesthatcontainoffence-specificdataoverotherdatasources
thatcouldofferrelevantinformation.Usingspecificoffencestomeasuredamageisadditionally
complicatedbecause,asFoxandFreiberg([13]:166)observe:thesameoffencescanvary
widelyinthemanneroftheirexecution,intheharmtheycauseandintheinterestsuponwhich
theyinfringe.Thesechallengesarecompoundedbypotentialmeasurementproblems.For
example,theMPSappearstoallowcriminalnetworksthattrafficdrugsorweaponstoalsobe
scoredforpossessionoffences,essentiallydouble-scoringtraffickingoffences.
Usingsentencestodeterminecrimeseriousness,astheMPSdoes,iswellestablishedin
criminology.Theuseofmaximumsentenceswouldappeartofacilitateconsistentscoring
throughouttheMPS,minimisethediscretionofpersonnelinscoring,andlendlegitimacyand
objectivitytotheprocess([16]:13).Theintegrityofthescoringprocess,however,dependson
thevalidityandreliabilityoftheintelligenceassessed,thequalityofanalysis,andthe
consistencyofscoringacriminalnetworkslevelofinvolvement,whichisarelativelysubjective
process(see[16]).Moreover,theuseofsentencestoestablishseriousnessassumesthatthe
seriousnessofanoffenceismatchedbyapenaltyofequivalentgravity,consistencybetweenjurisdictionsinsentencing,andsimilaritiesbetweentheorderingofoffencesaccordingto
maximumpenaltiesandtherankingofoffencesaccordingtopenaltiesimposed,whichmaynot
bethecase([13]:171).AsDornandVanderBunt([8]:35)rightlyargue,harmshouldbe
conceptualisedseparatelyfromtheresponsetocrime,asusingsentencelengthstoindicate
seriousnessiscircularinthatcurrentprioritiesaresetusinghistoricallegislativeandjudicial
judgments.
Threeofthecasestudiesformallyincorporatestateormediapressureascriteria(ACC,MPSand
NPIA).Thesecriteriaareanexplicitacknowledgementthatthesefactorsinfluencebut(ideally)
donotdominatedecision-making.However,thesecriteriaarequestionableintermsofvalidity
becauseoftheclearpotentialforpoliticisationandthetroublesomeproblemofcircularityinwhichpastconcernsandexpendituresdictatefutureefforts.Moreover,itisunclearwhat
indicatorsareusedtomeasurestateormediapressureorhowlawenforcementwouldmeasure
thesecriteriawithanydegreeofvalidityandreliability.
Usingpublicconcernasafactorinmeasuringcrimeseriousnesshasclearprecedentin
criminology(e.g.,[39])and,asCohen([4]:269)pointsout,surveyingthepublichasresultedin
relativelyconsistentrankingsovertimeandacrosspopulations.Publicopinionresearch
regardingcrime,however,hasclearlimitationastherearemisperceptionsaboutcrime
frequencyandinjuryseverity(see[4])andmuchofthisresearchdoesnotconcentrateon
organisedcrime(foranexception,see[3]).Moreover,asdecadesofcriminologicalresearch
demonstrates,thepublicperceptionoforganisedcrimeisoftensensationalised,imbuedwith
racismandanti-immigrantrhetoricandpronetothecreationoffolkdevils(e.g.,[25]),making
accurateandreliablemeasurementdifficult.Thepublicmayvieworganisedcrimeasserious
dependinguponhowthephenomenonisconceptualisedandthemoralpanicandfolkdevilsde
jourhowever,asLevi([25]:53)arguesinrelationtowhite-collarcrime,viewingsomethingas
beingseriousisnotthesameaswantingitprioritisedbypoliceorwantingitmoreheavily
sentencedthanothercrimes.
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Severalofthecasestudiesmakereferencetothereputationalharmtolawenforcement,
governmentorparticularinterests,suchasthefinancialsector.Likestateandmediapressure,
lossofreputationisaproblematiccriterionintermsofvalidity.Itisunclearifreputational
damage(tostateorcommercialinterests)canandshouldbecategorisedasharmcausedby
criminalsandhowsuchalosscouldbereliablyvalued([8]:32;seealso[16]).Reputationallossis
intheeyeofthebeholder:whatsomeinstitutionsmaydecryasdamagetoreputation,others
mayregardasawell-deservedrebukeforineffectivepoliciesorpoorperformanceordismissas
politicalin-fighting.AsDornandVanderBunt([8]:32)observe,thereisnoclearorobjective
arbitrationbetweenopposingviewsofreputationaldamageand,inanycase,theyarguethatit
isoftenreactionfrompolicy-makers,mediaandthepublicthatcausessuchdamage,not
criminalsperse.
Conclusions
Despiteitscritiqueoftheharmmethods,thisarticlefullyrecognisesthattheyareintendedto
operatewithinassessmentprocessesthathaveanambitiouslybroadscope(bothintermsof
criminalityandgeography)andavariedclientelewithdiverserequirements.The(mostly)
civilianintelligenceanalystsresponsibleforthemethodsarelikelyawareofthemethods
methodologicalshortcomings.However,theconstruction,implementationandevaluationofthesemethodsrequirededicatedtimeandmanagerialsupportandsuchresourcesareoftenin
shortsupplywithinthereactiveenvironmentoflawenforcement.Thisarticlealsoappreciates
thedifficultyofapplyingriskassessmentmethodologytotherathernebulousandinherently
controversialconceptoforganisedcrime.
Thereareseveralkeyproblemswiththemethods:themainconceptsaregenerallyill-defined,
theoperationalisationoftheseconceptsisproblematic,andtheseparationoforganisedand
seriouscrimeisnotclearnoristhesignificanceorutilityofsuchadistinction.Thesefindings
aresimilartothoseinrecentstudies(seeespecially[16];[51]).Thereareseveralproblematic
harmcriteria,inparticularpolitical/lawenforcementinterest,media/publicattention,and
reputationalharmthatcanpotentiallypoliticiseanddistortharmmeasurementandpriority-settingprocesses.Thecase-studyagencieseachhavevaryingprocessestostrengthenanalysis
andfacilitateconsistentmeasurement;however,themeasurementandsubsequentrankingare
largelysubjective.
Theproblemsevidentintheharmmethodsraiseseveralcriticalquestions,specificallywhether
measuringandrankingorganisedcrime-relatedharms(eitherfromspecificcriminalnetworks
or,morebroadly,fromcrimeissues)areempiricallyfeasibleand,ifso,canbeundertakenina
mannerthatmeaningfullyinformslawenforcementsdecision-makingandlimitspoliticisation.A
relatedquestionisthecomprehensivenessofharmmeasurement,particularlyifmethodstend
tofavourdata-richorformerhigh-priorityissuesoverlesser-known,data-poorissues.The
circularityoftheseinformationprocessesresultsinself-perpetuatingpriority-settingprocesses
inwhichcertainissuesororganisationsarerepeatedlytargetedbecausemoreisknownabout
them([36])orbecausethestateallocatedconsiderableresourcesinthepastbutdidnotachieve
itsgoals([8]:15).Someissuesdesignatedasprioritiesaresobroadandgeneric(e.g.,financial
crime)thattheyareundisputableaspriorities([17]:497)butarerelativelymeaninglessinterms
ofdirectingdecision-makingandshouldthereforebetreatedwithsomeskepticism([9]).
Whiledetermininghowmethodscanbestrengthenedforpracticalapplicationwithinlaw
enforcementispartofamuchlargerdiscussion,thisarticleconcludeswithafewsuggestions.
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Keyconcepts,particularly,organisedcrime,harm,threat,seriouscrimeandsignificantcrime,
shouldbeclearlydefinedinalldocuments,evenifsuchconceptshavebeenpreviouslydefined
internallyorinearlierdocuments.Suchdefinitionsshouldaccordascloselyaspossibletosocial
sciencestandardsofreliabilityandvalidity(see[51]).Giventhechallengesinvolvedindefining
andmeasuringpolitical/lawenforcementinterest,media/publicattention,andreputational
harm,andthegeneralweaknessofthesecriteria,policingagenciesshouldmoveawayfrom
measuringtheseareas.Instead,itwouldbemoreeffectivetofocusondevelopingstrong
indicatorstomeasurethenatureandmagnitudeofspecifictypesofharmthatuseinformation
frommultiplestateandnon-statesources.Intermsofstrengtheningtheimplementationand
useoftheanalysisofharm,theNPIAsguidancemanualsofferapracticalandusefulwayto
establishminimumstandardsandensureconsistentusagebymultiplepolicingagenciesacrossa
broadgeographicalarea.Policingagenciesshouldalsolooktoothercomponentsofrisk
assessmentmethodologythatwouldprovideamorecomprehensiveriskanalysisoforganised
crime.Lawenforcementsriskassessments,forexample,wouldbestrengthenedbythe
inclusionofmeasurestodetermineprobabilityofspecificthreatsandharmsoccurringandthe
vulnerabilityofcertainpopulationsorinstitutionstoorganisedcrime(see[1];[46]).
Thecurrentinterestfromboththescholarlyandlawenforcementcommunitiesinapplyingriskassessmentmethodologytoorganisedcrimeispromising.Thereisagreatdealoftheoretical
andpracticalresearchtobeundertakenintermsofconceptualisingandoperationalising
organisedcrime-relatedharmsanddevelopingrigourousmethodologiesthathaverealpractical
utilitytolawenforcementdecision-makingandpriority-settingprocesses.Suchresearchis
essentialifwearetodevelopfurthercriminalintelligenceanalysis(see[12];[20])and
strengthenlawenforcementsuseofriskassessmentmethodology.
Acknowledgements
TheMPS,ACCandNPIAgraciouslygrantedtheauthorpermissiontodiscussthesemethods
providedthatrestrictedinformationwasnotreleased.WhileACPOleadstheOrganisedCrime
GroupMappingproject,theunderlyingmethodologywascreatedbyNPIAwhichgrantedpermissiontodiscussthisproject.TheinformationontheDutchNationalThreatAssessment
waspubliclyavailable.
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