Spoils of War:Anfal and Ali Hassan al-Majid

Douglas WhiteUtah Valley University

In the late 1980s, a large military operation called Operation Anfal1 was conducted in

northern Iraq. During it, Ali Hassan al-Majid used his power as Secretary General of the Iraqi

Bureau of Northern Command to conduct a genocidal campaign against the Kurds of northern

Iraq. This text will examine certain aspects of Operation Anfal and how this genocide was

enacted. To understand what genocide is, it is necessary to examine the UN Convention on

Genocide. This thesis will also give a short background of the Kurds in the 20th century, which

will place Operation Anfal in its historical context. It will examine contain a few documents

from the Iraqi Bureau of Northern Command and its commander, al-Majid. The Northern Bureau

recorded many of its meetings, and some of the words of al-Majid are examined. Also included

is a look at how Operation Anfal was conducted, including the prison camps, firing squads and

later amnesty. These items will explain how al-Majid conducted his campaign against the Kurds.

It will explore what historical events contributed to this genocide, some individuals who were

involved, and what happened to the Kurdish people during that time. More specifically, the text

will explore Ali Hassan al-Majid’s connections to Operation Anfal and how he was instrumental

in its execution.

Operation Anfal, the Anfals, or just Anfal all refer to the military operations conducted

by the Ba’athist2 Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein against the Kurds of northern Iraq in

1 Sometimes Operation Anfal is referred to as the Anfals or just Anfal.2 The Ba’ath party is an Arab political party in both Syria and Iraq. Its main ideological objectives are secularism, socialism, and pan-Arab unionism or the unification of all Arabia. The party was founded in Damascus in 1941 and gained the name Ba'ath in the early 1950s. In Iraq the Ba'athists first came to power in the coup of February 1963, when Abd al-Salem Arif became president. In 1968, a bloodless coup brought to power the Ba'athist general Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr. Fighting within the party continued, and the government periodically purged its dissident members. Iraq slowly moved away from Ba'athist principles, although the ruling parties retained the Ba'ath name. Saddam Hussein succeeded al-Bakr as leader of the party and president of Iraq in 1979 and remained its leader until his execution in 2006. The official language of Iraq is Arabic, while the Kurds in northern Iraq speak Kurdish. The documents used in this text are translations done by academic professionals.

1

1987 and 1988. The translations get a little difficult when referring to the Anfals.3 There were

eight Anfal operations, known as the First Anfal, Second Anfal, and so on. In this document,

unless a specific Anfal is identified, the author is referring to the operation as a whole. The eight

Anfals were scattered throughout northern Iraq, mostly near the Iranian border, but the eighth

and Final Anfal occurred north of Mosul, near the Turkish border. The maps in appendix II show

the boundaries of each of the Anfals. The Kurdish genocide in Iraq had no specific start date.

Different Iraqi governments have regularly waged wars against the Kurds. The worst of these

included Operation Anfal, which according to al-Majid killed 100,000.4 Although obtaining

accurate numbers for deaths, detainees and even those involved is difficult. Much of that

information has not yet been found.

Kanan Makiya has discussed Operation Anfal in his publications on Iraq and the

Ba’athist regime. These include Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising and the Arab

World and Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq. Makiya was an Iraqi living in exile,

thus Makiya had an agenda of his own against the Ba’athist regime. He agitated for Saddam

Hussein to be deposed in Iraq. Makiya published his books to try to persuade the Arabs to take

the lead in overcoming despotism in the Middle East, and not to rely on the international

community.5 Makiya’s books are emotionally charged, it is apparent he cares for his countrymen,

but he also extensively researched his books. He asked the question of what was really occurring

in Ba’athist controlled Iraq behind the facade. Makiya made actual excursions into Iraq to

interview and research for his books. He also tracked down Iraqis living in exile. These first-

hand accounts in Makiya’s book give an accurate picture of Iraq under Hussein’s leadership.

3 The official language of Iraq is Arabic, while the Kurds in northern Iraq speak Kurdish. The documents used in this text are translations done by academic professionals. Sometimes Operation Anfal is referred to as the Anfals or just Anfal.4 Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime of Genocide: The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 230.5 Makiya, Kanan. Cruelty and Silence, 15.

2

The sources used most often in this paper are publications from Human Rights Watch.

They are a group dedicated to searching out human rights abuses, bringing attention to them and

trying to create effective change to stop these abuses and bring about justice. Human Rights

Watch has been investigating human rights abuses for 30 years and so brought a lot of

experience into its publications. Both the book Iraq's Crime of Genocide: The Anfal Campaign

against the Kurds and the report Iraq Claims in Conflict: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in

Northern Iraq were Human Rights Watch publications. During the 1991 Kurdish uprisings,

many Iraqi documents were confiscated by the Kurdish Peshmerga.6 These documents were

translated and included in Human Rights Watch publications. They also contain many interviews

of those who survived Operation Anfal, the Anfalkan.7 Iraq's Crime of Genocide used both

documents and interviews with survivors to piece together the events of Anfal. Human Rights

Watch was searching for the facts of Operation Anfal, and the reasons behind its execution. Both

publications used the organization’s own interpreters to translate the original Anfal documents.8

Human Rights Watch wanted action to be taken by the international community to investigate

and punish these crimes of genocide. They stated that the Ba’athist Iraqi government should

provide an accounting.9 These publications were admittedly meant to pressure the international

community, the UN and the United States into action.

Much has changed since Iraq's Crime of Genocide was first published in 1995. At that

time, most of the suspected mass grave sites were under control of the Ba’athist government that

prevented excavation. Since the 2003 coalition invasion, groups of forensic scientists have been

able to work. The understanding of the Anfals has changed. Mass graves are being excavated and

6 Peshmerga is Kurdish for “those who face death” and is the name of the Kurdish militia.7 Anfalkan is a Kurdish word that refers to those who survived Operation Anfal.8 Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime of Genocide, xxiii.9 Ibid., xxii.

3

the international community no longer debates whether genocide happened during Hussein’s

reign.

Most scholarly research on Anfal was not done until after the 1991 Gulf War. Prior to

that, few groups were able to gain access to Northern Iraq to investigate the claims of genocide

made by the many Kurdish refugees coming out of Iraq. Also, the international community found

it tough to believe the tales of atrocities. When one child survivor, Taimour,10 was interviewed

by the United States Justice Department, his story was not taken seriously.11 This changed with

the research done by Human Rights Watch and the excavation of the mass graves.

It took time for the United States to acknowledge that al-Majid and Hussein had

committed genocide. The US at the end of the 1980s had diplomatic relations with Iraq, and had

even supported it during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). It was slow to accept that Saddam

Hussein’s regime had committed genocide in Operation Anfal.12 In a confidential US State

Department memo dated December 29, 1988, the State department encouraged US financial ties

to continue in Iraq despite the human rights abuses of Operation Anfal.13 It was rationalized that

established U.S. financial ties with Iraq had far greater use with Baghdad as an incentive.

However, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1991, the Anfal campaign was at the top of the list of

President George H.W. Bush’s reasons to retaliate. In 2003 the accusation of genocide was used

in the case to again invade Iraq. The chemical attack on Halabja was one particular rallying cry,

even though the United States had originally claimed that Iran was behind the attack. A Marine

Corps publication reported that the Iranians perpetrated the attack.14 The United States was

10 Taimour was a 12 year old Kurd when he survived a mass killing of women and children. His experience is explored more later in the text.11 Pringle, Heather. "Witness to Genocide." Archeology Vol. 62, No. 1 (2009).12 U.S. Department of State, “Memorandum of December 29, 1988 Subject: Export-Import Financing for Iraq,” http://i.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2008/images/11/13/export.import.financing.for.iraq.pdf.13 Ibid.14 U.S. Marine Corps.,“FMFRP 3-203 Lessons Learned: Iran-Iraq War.” (MCCDC, Doctrine Division, 1990), 100.

4

backing its ally in the region. However, when more evidence of atrocities surfaced, this view

changed, and then Operation Anfal and the Halabja attack were used as arguments for war. They

violated the UN resolution on genocide.

On the 9th of December, 1948, the United Nations adopted Resolution 96 at Convention

on the Crime and Punishment of Genocide. This resolution defined genocide as “a crime under

international law . . . condemned by the civilized world.”15 This was very direct language, but it

was without authority. The resolution did not designate a governing body to investigate

allegations of genocide or to prosecute those who are charged with such a heinous crime. This is

not to say that there has been no one prosecuted for the crime of genocide. Currently, the

International Criminal Court has taken over the prosecution of genocide. There have been some

cases, such as those of Slobodan Milosevic’s16 and Ratko Mladic’s17 acts of genocide in Bosnia.

But the International Criminal Court only prosecutes when charges of genocide have been filed

and the accused has been brought before the court. It is not the Court’s responsibility to

investigate the charges or to bring the accused to trial.

In the adopted resolution, genocide was defined as “any of the following acts committed

with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the

group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its

physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within

the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”18 Generally,

genocide is understood as occurring on a large scale to a specific national, ethnic, racial or

15 United Nations, “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide December 11, 1946,” http://www.un.org/millennium/law/iv-1.ht.16 C-Span, “Milosevic Trial,” http://www.c-span.org/milosevic/.17 BBC News, “Profile: Ratko Mladic,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1423551.stm.18 United Nations, “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide December 11, 1946,” http://www.un.org/millennium/law/iv-1.ht.

5

religious group. In bringing an alleged perpetrator of genocide to justice, these articles are used

as guidelines.

In Article I of the resolution, genocide is a crime “whether committed in time of peace or

in time of war” it does not matter. 19 Iraq and Iran were at war at the beginning of Operation

Anfal and some members of the Peshmerga allied with the Iranians, but there were many Kurds

in the Iraqi Army who remained loyal to the government.20 In fact, Operation Anfal directly

affected some of these Kurds and their families. This illustrates that the Iraqi government’s claim

that Operation Anfal was not genocide on the grounds that it was a counter-insurgency operation

during the Iraq-Iran War was false.

Article III also lists other punishable acts; conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and

public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide.

The easiest of these to prosecute is that of aiding and abetting genocide. This can be an act of

commission or an act of omission.21 Complicity in genocide is a little more difficult, it requires

an act, such as releasing a document ordering units to kill large numbers of a specific group.

Article IV specifically states that those that commit the acts previously named shall be punished,

government leaders are not excluded.22 These articles were used in the Anfal trial.23

On June 24, 2007 the Iraqi High Tribunal ruled on the Anfal trial (See Appendix I for the

sentencing of al-Majid). This court was organized to try the former members of the Ba’athist

government for its human rights abuses. Among those tried, convicted and sentenced was al-

19 Ibid.20 Ahmad, Assi Mustafa, "Letter to Saddam Hussein"; 4 October 1990.21 Grant, Dawson, and Rachel Boynton, "Reconciling Complicity in Genocide and Aiding and Abetting Genocide in the Jurisprudence of the United Nations Ad Hoc Tribunals." Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol. 21 Iss. 2 (2008), 241-280.22 United Nations, “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide December 11, 1946,” http://www.un.org/millennium/law/iv-1.ht.23 See Appendix I for the Anfal trial verdict.

6

Majid.24 The language of the sentencing is very similar to that of the articles in UN Resolution

96.25 In this trial he was convicted of perpetrating genocide and premeditated murder. In the

verdict, al-Majid was sentenced to death by hanging. Among the crimes al-Majid was sentenced

for include: coercive dislocation and taking away of inhabitants, perpetrating torture,

perpetrating coercive dislocation and taking away of inhabitants, perpetrating premeditated

assaults against civil inhabitants or civilians not directly involved in warfare, and committing

robbery against the towns taken in Anfal. 26 The sentencing for al-Majid can be found in

Appendix I. This trial and conviction was a significant step for the Kurds in seeking justice for

Operation Anfal.

To understand how the Kurdish genocide occurred, it is necessary to know a brief history

of the Kurds and the events that led up to Operation Anfal. The Kurdish people have lived in the

mountainous region at the head of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers for millennia. Even though the

Kurds are generally Muslims, they are an ethnic group distinct from those of Arabs, Persians or

Turks. This meant the Kurds were very different from the rest of Iraq, who were mostly Arabs.27

Because of this difference those who ruled the Kurds, from the Ottomans to the Ba’athists,

suppressed the Kurdish people. The Kurds had been part of the Ottoman Empire, but with its

dissolution following World War I, the British took control of the area and made an agreement,

the Treaty of Sèvres,28 with the Kurds to create their own country. This never took place; the

British coveted the oilfields in the Kurdish territory. In 1923 the Kurds rebelled and the British

24 Case Western Reserve School of Law. “English Translation of the IHT Anfal Campaign Trial Judgment, June 24, 2007,” http://law.case.edu/grotian-moment-blog/anfal/opinion.asp. 25 Ibid.26 Ibid .27 See Appendix II-Map of Iraq’s Ethno-religious groups.28 WWI Document Archive. “Peace Treaty of Sèvres,” http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Peace_Treaty_of_S%C3%A8vres. This treaty would have given the Kurds their own nation, but it was never ratified and was superseded by the Treaty of Lausanne, which divided the Kurds between Iraq, Iran, and Turkey.

7

sent forces to put down this rebellion. In retribution for the rebellion the British Royal Air Force

destroyed the village of Barzan.29 The British bombed the Kurds into submission. The British

anointed King Faisal in 1921 to lead Iraq and in 1932, the Kingdom of Iraq gained its

independence. 30

The Kurds have been in a near constant state of struggle with the Iraqi government since

Iraq was created by the British. They have revolted whenever they saw an opportunity for

independence. One of the first was the 1958 military coup in Iraq that overthrew the monarchy.31

In the chaos, an uprising among the Kurds declared Kurdish autonomy. This rebellion against the

new Iraqi government caused a crisis that contributed to the Ba’ath party seizing control of Iraq

in 1963.32 To placate the Kurds, in March of 1974 an amendment was made to the Iraqi

Provisional Constitution of 1970.33 This amendment provided for autonomy for the Kurds in the

region where they constitute a majority of the population, but the amendment was largely

ignored by the Ba’athist government.

Early in the Ba’ath party takeover, Saddam Hussein was a leading member of the party

and had great authority. He used that authority to force the removal of Kurdish people from

Kurdistan to separate areas of Iraq in 1971 and then rewarded Arabs who moved into the Kurdish

oil-producing areas of Iraq of Kirkuk and Mosul.34 This was known as the Arabization of

29 Ed Kashi, When The Borders Bleed, (New York: Pantheon Books), 14-16.30 Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq. (New York: Cambridge University Press), 47, 65.31 Ibid., 143.32 Ibid., 163.33 U.S. Department of the Army, “Country Studies/Area Handbook Series-Iraq Constitutional Framework,” http://countrystudies.us/iraq/70.htm.34 Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq, 193.

8

Kurdish lands.35 Hussein was the de facto ruler of Iraq by 1979.36 Not long after this take over,

Hussein began his preparations for a confrontation with Iran.

In September 1980, Hussein used the chaos of the Iranian Revolution to try to take back

the border areas that Iraq had seceded in the 1975 Algiers Accords to Iran.37 This led to eight

years of bloody warfare that was reminiscent of the trench warfare and massed frontal assaults of

World War I. Iran had three times the population of Iraq, but Iraq’s military was better equipped

with artillery, armor and planes.38 Iraq was supported by the “West” and the “East”, both

Washington D.C. and Moscow felt an Iranian victory would destabilize the Middle East. To try

to combat the Iranian “human waves” sent against the Iraqi army, Hussein turned to the use of

chemical weapons.39 Once he used the weapons the mere threat of using them again became a

weapon. The Iranian soldiers feared the weapons, and the Iraqis used that fear. This occurred

again during the Anfals. The threat caused such panic that expensive chemical weapons were not

always necessary. This allowed the Iraqi Army to win some victories with very little fighting.

The Kurds used the disruption of the Iran-Iraq War to revolt. Some of the Kurdish

Peshmerga fighters even allied with Iran during the war.40 This contributed to the success of the

Iranians offensive in the north of Iraq. Iran even helped to work out an alliance between the

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Kurdish rebel organizations

that had both been fighting for control of the Kurdish resistance.41 The Kurds who sided with the 35 Arabization was the process of removing Kurds from the oil-rich areas of Kirkuk and Mosul and replacing them with Arabs, mostly Sunni-Arabs. This has continued to cause problems for Iraq today as the Kurds have tried to reclaim their lost lands from these Arabs. See Appendix II, Ethno-religious map.36 Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq, 213.37 Ibid., 204.The Iraqi government had seceded these lands to get the Iranians to stop supporting the Iraqi Kurdish rebels.38 Ibid., 224.39 Ibid.40 This cooperation began before the Iraq-Iraq war. As part of the Algiers Agreement in 1975, Iran agreed to stop supporting the Kurds in their fight against the Ba’athist government. With the outbreak of hostilities in 1980, some of the Iraqi Kurds again started working with Iran. The Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) was allied with Iran, while the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) did not ally with Iran until 1986.41 Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq, 234.

9

Iranians acted as guides and even participated in some attacks. Not all of the Kurds rebelled

against the Ba’athist government. Some remained loyal. Many Kurds even fought in the Iraqi

army during the Iraq-Iran War, although some may have been forced to fight. This split in

Kurdish loyalties was used by the Northern Bureau in Operation Anfal.

In 1987, steps were taken to deal with the Kurdish rebellion. Hussein appointed Ali

Hassan al-Majid to the position of Secretary General of the Iraqi Bureau of Northern Command.

Al-Majid’s power in the region equaled that of Hussein. He was given total control of the whole

government apparatus in northern Iraq. The Iraqi president wrote of al-Majid’s appointment in

Revolutionary Command Council Decree 160, “Comrade al-Majid’s decisions shall be

mandatory for all state agencies, be they military, civilian, or security.”42 This investment of

power showed the importance the Ba'athist government placed on this operation. A former

mustashar 43 who often worked with al-Majid, said when Hussein “needs people without a heart,

he calls upon Ali Hassan al-Majid.”44 Al-Majid was Hussein’s cousin and one of the few people

he trusted. They had risen through the ranks of the Ba’athist party together.45 This appointment

was for a purpose; Hussein needed someone he could trust with such power to successfully

combat the Kurdish rebellion. In June of 1987, al-Majid began setting forth the guidelines and

objectives of what became the Anfals, eight large-scale operations against Kurdish controlled

areas. Al-Majid’s guidelines resulted in anyone living and farming in the Kurdish mountains to

be considered enemies by virtue of nothing more than their ethnicity and their presence in their

ancestral homeland.46

42 Hussein, Saddam, “Revolutionary Command Council Decree 160”; 29 March 1987.43 Mustashars translates as “advisor” and were Kurdish tribal leaders who worked on behalf of the Iraqi government.44 Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime of Genocide, 35.45 Chemical Ali. DVD. Directed by Kawa Akreyi and Jano Rojbiani. 2004.46 Ibid.

10

The forces at the disposal of al-Majid were the First, Second and Fifth Corps47 of the

regular Iraqi Army, the Jahsh48 and some other support elements, such as the General Security

Directorate. 49 The First Corps was based in Kirkuk, and the Fifth Corps was based in Irbil. The

Second Corps was sent in as general support. The split among the Kurds was exploited by the

Northern Bureau. They used the Jahsh extensively to lull the other Kurds into a sense of security.

Along with these groups, elements of the General Security Directorate were used in both

interrogation and the prison camps. 50

To better comprehend how and why the Iraqi government reacted this way, it is necessary

to understand the tribal culture since Middle Eastern conflicts cannot be separated from the

peoples culture.51 In understanding the Ba’athist mindset for the Anfals, it may be beneficial to

explore how some of the other secular governments in the area responded to tribal culture and

any other threats. Thomas Friedman of the New York Times wrote “Hama Rules” which sheds

some light onto the reactions of some of the Arabic secular governments in the Middle East. It

will help to illustrate the Arabian manner of response to such threats, whether real or perceived.

Syria, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia all faced internal threats similar to the Ba’athists in Iraq and

then they brutally crushed those revolts. In 1982, Syria was beset by Islamic extremists. When

the Syrian government recognized the uprising as coming from the city of Hama the government

destroyed the city. After days of pounding it with artillery the infantry were sent in on February

2, 1982. After the city was taken it was bulldozed flat. What had been the fourth-largest city in

Syria was completely gone. Amnesty International estimates 10,000 to 25,000 Syrians killed,

47 Iraq Bureau of Northern Command, “Directive SF/4008”; 20 June 1987.48 The Jahsh were Kurdish militia who remained loyal to the Ba’athist government.49 Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime of Genocide, 260. This was the intelligence agency of Iraq; it had been modeled and organized by the Committee for State Security (KGB) in Moscow. They reported directly to President Hussein.50 Ibid.51 Salzman, Philip Carl, "The Middle East's Tribal DNA," The Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 15 No. 1 (2008), 23.

11

mostly civilians.52 The secular governments in the Middle East react aggressively to any threats

to their power.

Ethnicity, tribalism, and sectarianism are all intertwined in the Middle East.53 This central

element factors into the many crisis in that part of the world, and has even contributed to the

failure of some nation-states, such as Lebanon. Many of the fundamentalists Muslims of the

Middle East want to live under a theocratic government. Thus, the secular governments react

swiftly and forcefully to any rebellion. Iraq’s situation with the Kurds is similar to that Syria

faced in Hama. Both governments faced rebellions and regions that were trying to secede. The

reactions were similar, also.

By naming the operation “Anfal”, the Ba’athist regime appealed to the religious side of

Islamic Iraq. The word “Anfal” came directly from the Qur’an. It literally translates as “the

spoils of war” and is a Surah (chapter) in the Qur’an. 54 The Ba’athist regime identified the

Kurds with the enemies spoken of in verse 60:

Make ready for them all thou canst of (armed) force and of horses tethered, that thereby ye may dismay the enemy of Allah and your enemy, and others beside them whom ye know not. Allah knoweth them. Whatsoever ye spend in the way of Allah it will be repaid to you in full, and ye will not be wronged.55

The Bureau of Northern Command wanted to circulate that the true faithful will unite with the

Iraqi government to pursue the enemies of Allah in Operation Anfal. This is a tactic of

psychological warfare. Surah 8 continues that “those who resist Allah, the penalty is fire.”56

There are records of some who refused to share in the slaughter.57 There is a verse to soothe

52 Friedman, Thomas L, "Hama Rules," The New York Times, 21 September 2001.53 Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith, Ethnnicity, 177.54 University of Southern California Center for Muslim-Jewish Engagement. "Translations of the Qur'an, Surah 8: Al-Anfal (Spoils of War, Booty)," http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/quran/008.qmt.html.55 Ibid.56 Ibid.57 Makiya, Kanan, Cruelty and Silence, 166.

12

those whose consciences may be troubling them due to the mass killings, verse 17, “It is not ye

who slew them; it was Allah: when thou threwest (a handful of dust), it was not thy act, but

Allah's,”58 the killing was all done by Allah, according to his will. The Iraqi Bureau of Northern

Command was very thorough in its preparations for Anfal. By naming the operation “Anfal,” the

Ba’athist government turned it into a religious struggle and attempted to religiously legitimize

the Kurdish genocide.

The Kurds were deemed as a lesser group, referred to by al-Majid as “these kind of dogs,

we will crush their heads.”59 In the Islamic culture, referring to someone as a dog is a serious

insult. Dogs are considered filthy and unclean.60 By referring to the Kurds as dogs, al-Majid

asserted that the Kurds were less than human. Al-Majid, in his meetings on the deportations of

Kurds, continued the attempt to make Operation Anfal a religious pursuit, “and we did it

everywhere, with the help of God.”61 Al-Majid used religion to justify Operation Anfal.

Al-Majid signed and issued the first directive for mass killing on June 3, 1987, called

Directive 28/3650.62 It was sent to the First, Second and Fifth Iraqi Army Corps, the Amn of the

Autonomous Region, the Istikhbarat and Mukhabarat. The first Clause of this directive

prohibited any foodstuffs, persons or machinery from going to the prohibited villages, but it also

allowed “anyone who so desires is permitted to return to the national ranks.”63 This last part of

the clause allowed anyone willing to reaffirm their allegiance to the Iraqi government to regain

their rights of citizenship. This document did give a chance to those who were no longer

58 University of Southern California Center for Muslim-Jewish Engagement. "Translations of the Qur'an, Surah 8: Al-Anfal (Spoils of War, Booty)".59 al-Majid, Ali Hassan, "Appendix A: The Ali Hassan al-Majid Tapes," In Iraq's Crime of Genocide, by Human Rights Watch (Chelsea: Bookcrafters, 1995), 256.60 Muttaqun Foundation, “Dogs According to Quran and Sunnah,” http://muttaqun.com/dogs.html.61 al-Majid, Ali Hassan, "Appendix A: The Ali Hassan al-Majid Tapes," In Iraq's Crime of Genocide, by Human Rights Watch, 255.62 Iraqi Bureau of Northern Command, "Directive 28/3650"; 3 June 1987.63 Ibid.

13

considered part of the Iraqi national ranks to repent and reaffirm their allegiance. Those who did

not reaffirm their allegiance were considered deserters and punishable by death under

Revolutionary Command Council Decree 677.64 How far was this offer of amnesty published?

When was the cutoff date? The amnesty was no longer offered when directive SF/4008 went into

effect on June 22, 1987, just over two weeks later.

In Clause 3, al-Majid declared that the Northern Bureau would no longer authorize

farming after July 15 in all prohibited areas.65 Most people who lived in those areas were

farmers. This prohibited the livelihood of hundreds of thousands of Kurds, Turkomans, and even

ethnic Arabs living in these regions. To add to this, al-Majid also ordered a stop to the use of

these lands by cattle for grazing. These orders made it obvious; get out or starve and die. This

became more evident in Clause 5, “within their jurisdiction, the armed forces must kill any

human being or animal present within these areas”66 and these orders were carefully carried out

in the prosecution of the Anfals and the treatment that the Kurdish people received from al-

Majid’s Bureau of Northern Command. Amn Erbil sent out a letter that repeated all the orders of

Directive 28/3650 to all its departments.67 The Bureau of Northern Command was stressing these

orders by repeating them in different documents. Clause 3 of Directive SF/4008 also outlawed

agriculture, and troops were allowed to fire on any animals found. The Kurds were an agrarian

society; the majority of them were farmers and prohibiting agriculture devastated their

livelihood.

The most explicit document outlining the course of action for Operation Anfal came from

Directive SF/4008, signed by al-Majid while the Secretary General of the Northern Bureau.68

64 Hussein, Saddam. "Revolutionary Command Council Decree 10," In Bureaucracy of Repression: The Iraqi Government in its Own Words, by Human Rights Watch; Appendix, Document 19.65 Iraqi Bureau of Northern Command, "Directive 28/3650"; 3 June 1987.66 Ibid.67 Amn Erbil, “Letter No. 4754”; 8 June 1987.68 Iraq Bureau of Northern Command, “Directive SF/4008”; 20 June 1987.

14

Kurdish rebels were able to seize copies of this document were recovered during the Kurdish

rebellion in 1991. US and coalition forces confiscated more copies of this document following

the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The directive was originally sent to the commanders of the First,

Second and Fifth Corps and was widely circulated throughout all the Iraqi forces involved in

Anfal. Directive SF/4008 went into effect June 22, 1987. The first paragraph declared that those

left in the villages are “saboteurs”, declaring the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the Kurdistan

Democratic Party and all “traitors to Iraq” as these saboteurs and traitors. The maps of the Anfals

in the appendix show that this amounted to a large portion of northern Iraq. There were hundreds

of villages in the restricted areas.

In Clause 2, the Northern Bureau declared that “the presence of human beings and

animals is completely prohibited in these [the security] areas” and that they “shall be regarded as

operational zones in which the troops can open fire at will, without any restrictions, unless

otherwise instructed by our headquarters.”69 This gave permission to Iraqi forces to kill

indiscriminately in all security zones.

Agriculture was outlawed in Clause 3, along with travel, to the prohibited areas. The

clause commands that respective agencies were to patrol and enforce this prohibition. There were

many of the documents issued by the Iraqi Bureau of Northern Command that contained

commands to deport, to limit food production, and to kill in all the Operation Anfal areas. It

becomes clear that this was a systematic plan of genocide against the Kurdish people. Most of

these documents contain the signature of al-Majid, the Secretary General. The Iraqi government

was giving specific orders for indiscriminate killing of people in this Kurdish populated area.

Detainment was secondary to killing in the operational zones according to the directive.70

69 Iraq Bureau of Northern Command, “Directive SF/4008”; 20 June 1987.70 Ibid.

15

Clauses 4 and 5 contain al-Majid’s command for widespread killing. Corps commander

were directly ordered to “carry out random bombardments using artillery, helicopters, and

aircraft at all times of the day or night in order to kill the largest number of persons present in

those prohibited areas.”71 The Northern Bureau specifically commanded “keeping us informed of

the results.”72 They wanted to know the effects of this bombardment on the Kurdish villages. In

Clause 5 al-Majid directed what to do with anyone who was taken; “all persons captured in those

villages shall be detained because of their presence there, and shall be interrogated by the

security services, and those between the ages of 15 and 70 must be executed after any useful

information has been obtained from them.”73 Again, this clause followed with the command

“keep us informed.” Al-Majid was taking direct control of this operation and looked to ensure

that all orders to the corps commanders were carried out. These orders showed the importance al-

Majid was placing on the Anfals. The only crime committed by these Kurds, as confirmed in the

directive, was their presence in the wrong place at the wrong time.

Finally, in Clause 7, al-Majid and the Northern Bureau permitted the seizure of all

property obtained during the operations. The Jahsh and others who assisted the Iraqi Army were

rewarded by this clause, “everything seized by the advisors or fighters of the National Defense

Battalions is considered theirs to keep.”74 Heavy, mounted and medium weapons were to be

passed on to regular Iraqi army units, but light weapons were up for grabs. This legalized the

pillaging of Northern Iraq by the Mustashars and the Jahsh. This “bonus” also motivated those

who were on the front lines of Anfal. Wealth is a powerful motivator, and allowing the Jahsh

and Mustashars to pillage these villages motivated them to successfully complete their missions.

71 Ibid.72 Ibid.73 Iraq Bureau of Northern Command, “Directive SF/4008”; 20 June 1987.74 Ibid.

16

The atrocities of Operation Anfal were not the actions of some rogue commanders; al-

Majid took steps to know the actions that were carried out. He approved the directives for Anfal,

found in Directives SF 4008 and 28/3650. In these directives, al-Majid commanded the corps

commanders who participated in the operations were to carry out these orders “keeping us

informed,”75 which was repeated many times. Al-Majid is quoted as saying they were to “solve

the Kurdish problem and slaughter the saboteurs.”76 Al-Majid commanded Operation Anfal and

he ensured that directive SF/4008 was enforced up until the time that al-Majid was relieved of

his special powers and returned to Baghdad in 1989.

The military operation of Anfal unofficially began in 1987, with artillery attacks on

several villages known to harbor Kurdish rebels. The major military campaigns consisted of

eight offensives that took place between February and September of 1988. On the April 16,

1987, in Balisan Valley, the villages of Balisan and Sheikh Wasan received artillery and

chemical attacks. This was the first recorded use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi government

on the Kurds. The Balisan Valley contained the headquarters of a regional command unit of the

PUK, a Kurdish nationalist group led by Jalal Talabani.77 These attacks were ineffective against

the PUK, but killed many civilians in the villages. These villages contained 250 households

(1,750 people) and 150 households (1,050 people), respectively.78 The artillery attack was

nothing new for the villagers, but this attack included chemical shells containing the gases

mustard and sarin.79 Dozens died immediately, and the survivors flooded nearby hospitals. Dr.

Ja’far was a worker in the Republican Hospital of Arbil and counted 380 casualties, mostly old

men, women and children, who were taken to that hospital after these attacks.80 They displayed

75 Ibid.76 Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime of Genocide, 230.77 Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime of Genocide, 40.78 Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime of Genocide, 40.79 Ibid.80 Makiya, Kanan, Cruelty and Silence, 165.

17

symptoms consistent with chemical weapons: vomiting, faces turning black, painful swelling

under the arms, a yellow watery discharge from the eyes and nose, vision disturbances or total

blindness. Dr. Ja’far continued that these casualties only stayed in the hospital for one day before

being taken by the Iraqi government. 81

Baghdad ordered a national general census to be taken on October 17, 1987. The census

had a large impact on the Anfal campaign. The results of the census were kept secret by

Hussein’s regime. But it was used to define the “National Ranks,”82 or the Iraqis who were

faithful to the Ba’athist government in Baghdad. The coming census was broadcast far and wide

in Iraq. However, the news was not broadcast in many of the villagers in Kurdistan. Many of

these Kurds were living in poverty and had no television or radio and so were not aware of the

census. Having TV was rare, considered a luxury. Many villages had no electricity and so when

the census was broadcast, or an amnesty was broadcast, many of the people were unable to learn

of it. Some of the census takers estimated that the census was only 70 percent accurate, due in

part to large portions of Kurds that were unable to take it.83 The census required all those who

took it to identify as either Arab or Kurd, even though Turkomans, Assyrians, Yazidis, and

Armenians were all ethnic groups in Iraq.84 Also, the Ba’athist government required the Kurdish

villagers to leave their villages and travel to where the census was taking place. The Northern

Bureau had an extra requirement, that anyone wanting to be part of the census be registered as

living in government approved areas.85 Those who lived in restricted areas could not be part of

the census, and so were labeled as enemies. The Northern Bureau used the census to draw the

81 Makiya, Kanan, Cruelty and Silence, 165.82 Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime of Genocide, 56.83 Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime of Genocide, 58-59.84 Ibid.85 Ibid.

18

line of loyalty to the Ba’athist regime. Those who were considered unloyal were targeted in

Anfal.

Those who did not participate in the census lost their rights of Iraqi citizenship. Every

broadcast included this threat. In a highly centralized government such as the Ba’athist regime in

Iraq, the loss of citizenship was extremely serious.86 The loss of citizenship meant that those

people would not receive government services, including medical treatment, electricity and food

rations. 87 The Bureau of Northern Command released a document that illustrated the importance

placed on the census.88 The first paragraph states Comrade Ali Hassan al-Majid, general

secretary of the Northern Bureau, led the meeting, which shows that this came from the top of

the Iraqi leadership. In Clause 2, the document specified that anyone who didn’t participate in

the census lost their citizenship and were to be considered army deserters. The penalty for

deserters is death according to the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) Decree 677.89 The

census and Decree 677 legitimized the Anfal killings under Iraqi law. Those Kurds who were

unable to take the census were labeled deserters and saboteurs by the Iraqi government. Those

who were taken in Operation Anfal and had been labeled deserters were executed by the

Northern Bureau. This provided the Iraqi government an excuse for the killing, but many of

these so called army deserters were women and children. Decree 677 also declared that the

Ba’ath Party was to do the executing of deserters, which points to who many of the executioners

were during the Anfals.90 The killings included the use of chemical weapons at places like

Halabja.

86 Ibid.87 Ibid.88 Bureau of Northern Command, "Document Reference: 4198 of 15/9/87," In Iraq's Crime of Genocide, by Human Rights Watch (Chelsea: Bookcrafters, 1995); 298-299.89 Hussein, Saddam. "Revolutionary Command Council Decree 10," In Bureaucracy of Repression: The Iraqi Government in its Own Words, by Human Rights Watch (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994); Appendix, Document 19.90 Ibid.

19

Early in the Anfal campaign, March 1988, the chemical attack on Halabja occurred.91

This was not officially part of the Anfals, but was part of the overall campaign against the Kurds

and occurred during the same time as the Anfals. The Bureau of Northern Command directed it

and al-Majid approved it. The attack occurred at the same time as the Anfal operations and killed

thousands of innocent Kurds, many of whom were women and children. The town had an

estimated population between 40,000 and 60,000. The reason for such a wide estimate is because

the number was in flux due to all the villagers displaced by the first few Anfal operations and the

Iraq-Iran War. These Anfal refugees create a link between the Anfal operations and the attack on

Halabja. The attack illustrated how the Iraqi government employed its chemical weapons

throughout Operation Anfal.

The attack started with conventional high explosive bombs and napalm, which the

villagers hid from in their makeshift bomb shelters. Soon after the attack began, they noticed a

smell of “sweet apples”, and the villagers had been warned that it meant chemical weapons. 92

Those in the shelters began to panic, frantically trying to plug the cracks and entrances with

damp towels. They pressed wet clothes to their mouths. They set fires to try and prevent the

deadly vapor from getting in. These measures did not work, and so the people were forced from

their shelters. They then received the full effects of the chemicals. These effects ranged from

blindness to death. The survivors tried to make their way to Iran, in a freezing rain, many of the

villagers being barefoot. Children died along the way and had to be left where they fell. The

village was littered with human and animal bodies.

It has been difficult to get an accurate number of dead from the attack; estimates from

4,000 to 7,000 have been reported, but Human Rights Watch has been able to identify 3,200 by

91 This attack has been widely studied and documented by Human Rights Watch, Physicians for Human Rights, Kurdish nationalist organizations, Amnesty International and the CIA among many other organizations.92 Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime of Genocide, 70.

20

collecting actual names of victims.93 Some of the survivors were treated and the effects were

documented by physicians.94 That documentation proved the use of chemical weapons. The Iraqi

government tried to blame the Iranians for the attack, but witnesses testified they saw Iraqi

markings on the planes dropping the bombs. The Iraqi government had attacked its own people

with deadly chemical weapons.

Al-Majid used chemical weapons extensively throughout Anfal as an instrument of terror

and death. This is what earned him the nickname “Chemical Ali.” The majority of the known

chemical attacks ordered by the Iraqi government during Operation Anfal occurred in the area

near Mosul during the Final Anfal, far from the border of Iran.95 The map Final Anfal in

appendix II shows where these attacks occurred. Al-Majid praised the use of chemical weapons

and the havoc those weapons created.96

Northern Bureau forces attack the villages of Upper and Lower Warani during the Third

Anfal.97 The villages were encircled on three sides, and the Iraqi troops set fire to the houses,

killed all the farm animals, and rounded up many of the villagers. Some were able to flee, but

those who were rounded up were loaded into trucks and most were never seen again. Many of

these were women and children, some of whom were survivors of attacks in other areas. The

Iraqi Army used these methods regularly throughout all eight Anfals.

The Final Anfal took place in the north of Iraq, near the border of Iraq and Turkey. It was

over 100 miles from Iran. There was no threat of an Iranian invasion here, but it was included in

93 Ibid., 72.94 Elisabeth Rosenthal, "Dedicated Group Hopes to Prove Chemicals Killed Kurds," New York Times. June 25, 2006. The Kurds took pictures and video of the attacks, and the survivors were cared for in Iran and have testified of this attack. The CIA, Human Rights Watch, Physicians for Human Rights and also the United Nations all have documented this attack.95 See the maps of the Anfals in the Appendix96 al-Majid, Ali Hassan, "Appendix A: The Ali Hassan al-Majid Tapes," In Iraq's Crime of Genocide, by Human Rights Watch, 254.97 Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime of Genocide, 90.

21

Anfal. This area was close to the oil-producing region of Mosul. The Ba’athist government

wanted to ensure control of the oil. Arabization of this area continued while these operations

took place. The Jahsh were used as part of this Arabization and Operation Anfal.

The Jahsh, or National Defense Battalions, were used extensively in each of the Anfals.

The Jahsh is an Arabic word that means “mule” in English. The Jahsh were Kurds allied with

the Iraqi government; the name of “mule” shows the lack of respect that the Iraqi government

had for this group.98 The standard operating procedure for the Jahsh during the Anfals was to go

into the villages, and try to get the villagers to go with the Jahsh. They tried to convince the

villagers that it was just another resettlement operation similar to those conducted by Hussein in

the 1970s. But Operation Anfal was different. The Iraqi Army destroyed the villages. Anyone

who tried to stay was detained and many of those detained disappeared. The Jahsh were not

often used in the fighting, the Iraqi government did not trust them as they were Kurds.. The

Jahsh were sincere in their believing that this was just another resettlement operation.99 They

were lied to by the Iraqi government. One Mustashar from the Jaff-Roghzayi tribe of Kurds said

of the Jahsh role in Anfal, “all the Jahsh did was to assist the army in finding the best ways to

get the villages and to capture escaping villagers and deliver them to the army.”100 There are no

records of them being involved in the detention or execution of any Kurds. This was left to

members of the Ba’athist government.101

98 Makiya, Kanan, Cruelty and Silence, 84.99 Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime of Genocide, 110.100 Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime of Genocide, 110.101 Ibid., 259-261.Many organizations within the Iraqi government have been implicated in Operation Anfal by Human Rights Watch. These include the Ba’ath party itself, elements of the Iraqi Army and Air Force, the Republican Guard, the General Military Intelligence Directorate, the General Security Directorate, the National Defense Battalions, and the Popular Army are some of the organizations with large roles in the Operation.

22

Those Kurds taken during the Anfal campaigns were put into prison camps such as Nugra

Salman, Topzawa and Dibis.102 In these camps, prisoners died from starvation, malnutrition and

disease.103 A survivor of one such camp was Rahman Hamid Nader of Darbarou village, who

said "we were useless. They said it was unjust to waste bread on us."104 Many prisoners were

beaten, tortured and killed by the guards. The Iraqi General Security Directorate interrogated the

prisoners and used torture extensively.105 Abd-al-Qadar106 was a prisoner at the Nugra Salman

camp. The camp was 300 miles southwest of Baghdad. While surviving only on bread and

contaminated water, Abd-al-Qadar watched his fellow prisoners die daily from these abuses. He

kept a tally of the number of dead until he was released. A complete tally of the deaths from

these camps is not available, but Abd-al-Qadar counted 517 that succumbed to the inhumane

treatment in the prison camp where he was held. 107 These prison camps show the organization

and the magnitude of the Anfal effort.

There were different types of prison camps. Some were for a more permanent detainment

and those like Topzawa were used as a hub to process, sort and then send out the detainees to

other prison camps. The Topzawa camp was on the outskirts of Kirkuk and contained segregated

prisons for the men and the women and children. Here the villagers were searched by the guards

and lost the last of their personal possessions. The cells were small and overcrowded; “the hall

measured about six meters by thirty and was very crowded. There was no room to lie down”

described one prisoner.108 This overcrowding led to the spread of disease and death. The small

102To view the location of the Nugra Salman camp, see Appendix II-Maps on the Anfal Campaigns map. To view the location of the Topzawa camp, see Appendix II-Maps on either the Anfal Campaigns map or the Third Anfal map. To view the location of the Dibis (also spelled Dibs) camp, see Appendix II-Maps on either the Anfal Campaigns map or the Fourth Anfal map.103 Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime of Genocide, 144-145.104 Ibid., 200.105 Ibid., 260. 106 Ibid., 156.107 Ibid.108 Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime of Genocide, 144.

23

rations also contributed to malnutrition, disease and death. Taimour was an Anfal survivor who

was processed through Topzawa. He stated that the prisoners were only given a piece of bread

each day to live on.109 With only a piece of bread to eat daily, a lack of vitamins quickly

weakened immune systems and made it more difficult for the prisoners to resist disease or the

prison guards.

Dibis was a camp full of women and young children from the Anfals. Nabat Fayaq

Rahman described her time in that camp. No toilets were available for the prisoners. There was

only a room dedicated as a restroom. While this room was cleaned out once a day, it would

quickly fill up again with filth. Food was mixed up in the excrement.110 The lack of proper living

conditions and overcrowding of the prisoner camps suggested that these camps were not

originally built to be prisons. However they were still used to contain the Kurds captured in

Anfal. This lack of proper living conditions contributed to many of the deaths. Survivors of the

camps can still be found in northern Iraq.

In the years following the 1991 Gulf War, Human Rights Watch scoured Kurdistan

looking for Anfalkan, survivors of the Anfal campaign. Of these, only a few were found who

personally survived the firing squads. These survivors and their stories became important in

understanding the events leading up to and the methods used in the mass executions. Such a

widespread slaughter of Kurdish prisoners could not have taken place without the knowledge and

the approval of the Bureau of Northern Command and its Secretary General.

Muhammad111 told his story of survival to Human Rights Watch. Muhammad said

hundreds of Kurds taken into the desert. To do the job, the guards used a length of rope to tie

109 Makiya, Kanan, Cruelty and Silence, 185.110 Rahman, Nabata Fayaq, interview by Dr. Choman Hardi. January 12, 2005, http://www.chomanhardi.com/anfal-interview01.html.111 Muhammad was a 32-year old member of the peshmerga from the village of Aliyani Taza in southern Germian.

24

groups of twenty-eight prisoners together in a single line by their left hand. 112 The prisoners were

ordered to stand facing the edge of a freshly dug trench, just long enough to accommodate the

twenty-eight bodies as they fell. The knot binding Muhammad’s left hand had been carelessly

tied, and he managed to tug free, run away and hide in the tall grass. Behind him he heard the

sound of gunfire as the other Kurds were killed.113

Omar and Ozer are two more survivors of the firing squads. 114 They were part of a

convoy of eighteen buses that contained hundreds of Kurds. After ten hours of driving, their bus

and five others left the convoy and drove down a dirt road. The convoy was accompanied by a

bulldozer and some army vehicles. Omar and Ozer’s bus got stuck in the sand as the others went

on. In the distance, Omar and Ozer could hear the bulldozer working and then the sounds of

gunfire and screams. Those on their bus quickly made a plan to resist, but at this time they were

so weak from lack of food and water they could not put up much of a fight. They were able to

overpower one guard, but then the other guards fired into the bus, killing the rest of the prisoners.

Both Omar and Ozer were wounded during the shooting, but managed to get away. Mustafa,

another Kurd who escaped from the buses in this group escaped by falling into one of the pits

and pretending to be dead.115

Taimour was a 12 years old boy and was one of the few known survivors of a mass

killing of women and children. Taimour was taken in a vehicle with a group of fifty women and

children. They drove till nightfall. Upon getting out, Taimour saw about thirty vehicles in the

convoy. After the guards blindfolded the prisoners, they were reloaded on the buses. The next

112 Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime of Genocide, 160-161.113 Ibid.114 Ibid., 161-167. Ozer was twenty-five at the time of Anfal, an unmarried construction worker who was a veteran of the war against Iran. He had been born in the village of Tarjil, but had moved around a lot before settling in Jafan. Omar was a 22-year old draft dodger also from Jafan.115 Ibid., 167-169.

25

time the buses stopped, the passengers got out into pits. Immediately, soldiers started firing on

them. Taimour was shot twice, but survived the shooting. He was able to get out of the pit and

run away.. Taimour survived, his mother and three sisters did not.116 In Cruelty and Silence,

Kanan Makiya points out that Taimor’s name was on a list of 7,500 names of disappeared

persons that had been gathered by some Kurds and smuggled to the outside world. This list

contained the names of all those taken from the “eliminated village” of Qulatcho. Several years

after this list was smuggled out, Taimour was found. No other person on that list has yet

resurfaced.117 There may be more out there, some who have not come forward. Survivors of the

firing squads witnessed what happened to the many Kurds taken in Operation Anfal. In their

interviews, they spoke of being in large groups, from 500 in Muhammed’s group to over a

thousand in Taimour’s group. 118

The Bureau of Northern command kept records of the planning sessions for Anfal. The

Iraqi Ba’athist regime was well known in the region for its extensive record keeping. Recordings

and notes were kept by the Bureau of Northern Command from each meeting. The Kurdish

rebels in 1991 and the Coalition forces in 2003 captured some of the tapes, along with 14 tons of

documents,119 from Hussein’s government. Several organizations, including Harvard University

and Human Rights Watch, have worked on the translations and publications of these materials.

In these tapes it is possible to understan the mind of al-Majid. They make it possible to know his

feelings for the Kurds as a people, his intent to use chemical weapons and also how he felt about

the eventual amnesty offered by Saddam Hussein.

116 Makiya, Kanan, Cruelty and Silence, 151-199.117 Ibid., 300.118 Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime of Genocide, 160, 172.119 Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime of Genocide, 9.

26

On these tapes, al-Majid claimed that the deportation was extremely detrimental to the

Kurds.120 It disrupted Kurdish society, including rebel organizations such as the Patriotic Union

of Kurdistan. Among the common people, they lost all their possessions, were deported and there

was little or no compensation from the Iraqi government. All of the Kurdish detainees’

belongings and property were taken when they were imprisoned. After being released, these

Kurds had nothing to survive on. Many of them were in poor health after being released from the

detention centers. In these tapes al-Majid verbally confirmed his intention to “destroy and

collectivize the villages and draw a dividing line between us and the saboteurs.”121 These

deportations were effective in disrupting Kurdish society and organization.

Al-Majid also made many references to the use of chemical weapons in the captured

tapes, the most poignant being when those Kurdish leaders, the Mustashars, who were allied

with the Ba’athist government balked at leaving their villages, “I told the Mustashars that they

might say that they like their villages and that they won't leave. I said I cannot let your village

stay because I will attack it with chemical weapons. Then you and your family will die. You

must leave right now.”122 Al-Majid was not even willing to spare his allies in the region. If they

tried to stay in their villages, they would die from the chemical weapons and be included in

Anfal. Al-Majid went on to show his contempt for the international community in the tapes, “I

will kill them all with chemical weapons! Who is going to say anything? The international

community? Fuck them! The international community and those who listen to them.”123 The

Ba’athists had been brutalizing anyone who showed any threat to their hold on power for

120 al-Majid, Ali Hassan, "Appendix A: The Ali Hassan al-Majid Tapes," In Iraq's Crime of Genocide, by Human Rights Watch, 253.121 Ibid., 254.122 al-Majid, Ali Hassan, "Appendix A: The Ali Hassan al-Majid Tapes," In Iraq's Crime of Genocide, by Human Rights Watch, 254.123 Ibid.

27

decades. Al-Majid did not fear what the international community would do and he was not

looking for peace with the Kurds.

Al-Majid spoke of Jalal Talabani,124 a prominent leader of the Kurds and founder of the

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Talabani tried to open up communications with al-Majid early in

Operation Anfal to negotiate an end to the deportations and Operation Anfal. Al-Majid

responded in the form of chemical attacks on Sulimaniyah and ranted that even if the war with

Iran were to end, he would never negotiate with Talabani or stop the deportations.125 Al-Majid

was not willing to negotiate, but was intent on seeing Operation Anfal through to the conclusion

of its goals as outlined in directive SF/4008. The operation was not meant to bring about

negotiations and concessions from the Kurds, but as an act of genocide to destroy the Kurds as a

people.

Even at the risk of international outrage, al-Majid wanted to send groups of operatives

into Europe to kill those Kurds who were supporting Kurdish independance movements. Al-

Majid wanted to send the mujaheddin,126 back to Iran to assasinate Kurdish leaders living

there.127 He seemed so intent on completely destroying the Kurdish resistance claiming, “I will

smash their heads. These kind of dogs, we will crush their heads.”128 Al-Majid wanted to kill the

Kurdish leaders wherever they were. His power did not extend that far, though. This may have

124 Talabani was a Kurdish leader who founded the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and was later elected president of Iraq in 2006 after the Hussein was deposed.125 al-Majid, Ali Hassan, "Appendix A: The Ali Hassan al-Majid Tapes," In Iraq's Crime of Genocide, by Human Rights Watch, 254.126The mujaheddin is an Islamic socialist organization that advocates the overthrow of the Islamic Republic government of Iran. They fled to Iraq from Iran after the Iranian Revolution. The group renounced violence in 2001 and today it is claiming the role of a parliament-in-exile dedicated to a democratic, secular and coalition government in Iran. The group had thousands of its armed members based in Iraq, but they were disarmed after the 2003 coalition invasion.127al-Majid, Ali Hassan, "Appendix A: The Ali Hassan al-Majid Tapes," In Iraq's Crime of Genocide, by Human Rights Watch, 255.128 Ibid., 256.

28

been just propaganda, but his actions in Operation Anfal followed the same philosphy against the

Kurds.

The tapes also shed light on al-Majid’s thoughts about the general amnesty. On

September 6, 1988, Saddam Hussein issued a general amnesty to all Kurds, but it gave a deadline

of October 9, 1988, for any of those wishing to regain their citizenship. This amnesty was only

offered for a month. After that time, anyone who surrendered to the Iraqi government was be

turned over to the Ba’ath Party’s Bureau of Northern Command and detained.129 Al-Majid spoke

of his feelings on the amnesty, ”I was about to get mad. But as a responsible party member I said

OK. I said probably we will find some good ones among them [the Kurds], since they are our

people too. But we didn't find any, never.”130 Al-Majid labeled all the Kurds as untrustworthy.

As part of the amnesty, Hussein ordered the Bureau of Northern Command to take good

care of those afforded the amnesty. al-Majid verbally affirmed his allegiance to Saddam, he then

stated, “take good care of them? No, I will bury them with bulldozers. Then they ask me for the

names of all the prisoners in order to publish them. I said, ‘Weren't you satisfied by what you

saw on television and read in the newspaper?’ Where am I supposed to put all this enormous

number of people? I started to distribute them among the governorates. I had to send bulldozers

hither and thither.”131 Here al-Majid admitted to sending the Kurds throughout Iraq and also

using bulldozers132 to bury those taken in Anfal. The tape that contained the recording of al-

Majid making these statements came from a Northern Bureau meeting which is undated, but

129 Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime of Genocide, 201.130 al-Majid, Ali Hassan, "Appendix A: The Ali Hassan al-Majid Tapes," In Iraq's Crime of Genocide, by Human Rights Watch, 257.131 al-Majid, Ali Hassan, "Appendix A: The Ali Hassan al-Majid Tapes," In Iraq's Crime of Genocide, by Human Rights Watch, 257.132 Bulldozers were used extensively during the Iran-Iraq war to make fortifications, so they were in plentiful supply for al-Majid’s Anfal operations.

29

found with tapes from January 1989.133 Operation Anfal was over by that time, but directive

SF/4008 was still in effect. Al-Majid may have disobeyed a direct order from Hussein and

continued persecuting the Kurds despite the amnesty. Al-Majid chose to continue harassing the

Kurds rather than obeying the president of Iraq. Just a few months after this meeting, al-Majid

was relieved of his position.

On April 15, 1989, al-Majid was relieved as Secretary General of the Northern Bureau

and recalled to Baghdad. His replacement, Hassan Ali al-Amiri, was not endowed with the same

special powers, including those over the army, as al-Majid received from Saddam in RCC

Decree 160.134 In his farewell speech, al-Majid declared that no one should ask Hassan to do the

types of things previously done, for “it will no longer be allowed for a member of the leadership

to have power over the army, because the exceptional situation is over.”135 With the end of Anfal,

al-Majid was returning to Baghdad and there was no longer any reason for the decree to remain

in effect. In this same speech, al-Majid also stated that the directives issued (such as SF/4008)

about the restricted areas and deportations have not changed and “anyone who was arrested in

those areas was to be killed immediately without any hesitation, according to the directives

which are still in force.”136 This prevented any Kurds from returning to the areas cleared during

Operation Anfal. Al-Majid was gone, but the policies remained.

On the 4th of October, 1990, a former member of the Iraqi Army, Assi Mustafa Ahmad, a

Kurd and veteran of the war with Iran, sent a petition to Saddam Hussein.137 In that letter, Assi

plead with Hussein for information on his wife, daughter and two young sons. This Kurd who

133 al-Majid, Ali Hassan, "Appendix A: The Ali Hassan al-Majid Tapes," In Iraq's Crime of Genocide, by Human Rights Watch, 257.134 Hussein, Saddam, “Revolutionary Command Council Decree 160”; March 29, 1987.135 al-Majid, Ali Hassan, "Appendix A: The Ali Hassan al-Majid Tapes," In Iraq's Crime of Genocide, by Human Rights Watch, 257.136 al-Majid, Ali Hassan, "Appendix A: The Ali Hassan al-Majid Tapes," In Iraq's Crime of Genocide, by Human Rights Watch, 257-258.137 Ahmad, Assi Mustafa, "Letter to Saddam Hussein"; 4 October 1990.

30

had been faithful to the Ba’athist regime and to Hussein received this reply, “with regard to your

petition . . . your wife and children were lost during the Anfal Operations.”138 Saadoun Ilwan

Muslih, Chief in the Office of the President signed the letter personally. The Anfal operations

affected all Kurds, even those who remained faithful. Also, this letter and response indicates the

unwillingness of the Iraqi government in assisting those who were looking for their family

members after the disruption of Operation Anfal.

After the general amnesty was declared on Spetember 6, 1988, the survivors of Anfal

began to look for their family members. Their searches continue to this day, with many of the

disappeared being found in the mass graves located all over Iraq. Before the amnesty, the

standardized response given to Kurdish family members was, “They were arrested during the

victorious Anfal operation and remain in detention.”139 After the amnesty, Hussein’s government

was flooded with requests as to the fate of those who disappeared. The standardized response

was changed to, “we do not have any information about their fate.”140 The Iraqi government was

responsible for the detainment of many tens of thousands of Kurds, and was saying they did not

know what happened to them. Both of these responses were released by the government in

Baghdad to cover up what happened to the disappeared. The Iraqi regime did not take

responsibility for the fate of those taken in Anfal.

The mass graves of Kurdish women and children show that Operation Anfal was more

than just counter-insurgency. The graves demonstrated the end result for many thousands of

those lost in Anfal. Mass graves are still being found in Iraq, and not all those that have been

found have been fully excavated. A team of U.S. Marines was assigned to find possible mass

138 Muslih, Saadoun Ilwan, “Letter Reference No.: Sh Ayn/B/4/16565”; 29 October 1990.139 N.M.R, Political Officer, "Letter to the Director of Security 25/9/1990," In Iraq's Crime of Genocide, by Human Rights Watch, 308.140 Ibid.

31

grave sites following the 2003 US-led coalition invasion of Iraq. These Marines recorded 230

probable mass grave sites. Some of those probable sites have now been excavated.141 Multiple

mass graves of Kurds have been found that contain hundreds of women and children. These

graves are evidence of Operation Anfal and also tell a story of how the executions took place, the

gender of the victims and their age. Only one excavation in Muthanna province of Iraq will be

explored to demonstrate what the mass graves looked like.

A mass grave was excavated in the Hajara Desert in Muthanna province. Not long after

the coalition invasion of Iraq, a team of highly skilled forensic archaeologists and

anthropologists were sent to Iraq. The US Department of Justice funded and organized this team.

A group was sent to the Hajara Desert to excavate a mass grave of Kurds there. The area had a

horseshoe-like ring of ridges that concealed the work of execution and burial that occurred

during Operation Anfal. There were 14 burial pits, but four were empty. The organization of this

mass grave site illustrated the systematic plan of execution.

The bodies in the grave were only a few feet down, and as the team worked on one of

these burial pits, they found 114 bodies. Of these, only thirty were adults, two men and twenty-

eight women. The rest of the 84 bodies were children, most not even teenagers. Eight of the

victims were infants or toddlers still in the arms of their mothers. The victims that were exhumed

had been led into the pit and then they were killed by machine gun fire. The average adult victim

received eight gunshot wounds, and the average child received four. Four victims had no wounds

at all indicating they were buried alive. Gunshot wounds leave many defining traces; some lead

from the bullet is left on the skeleton. These traces can be found in an x-ray. This gravesite was

treated as a crime scene according to U.S. rules, requiring reports and testing on each skeleton.142

141 Pringle, Heather, "Witness to Genocide." Archeology Vol. 62, No. 1 (2009).142 Ibid.

32

These rules ensured that care for all of the skeletons was standardized, methodical and

meticulous.

The victims’ clothing and possessions were searched. Sixteen identification cards were

found, identifying those victims as Kurds. More than 80 percent of the victims had possessions,

from the clothing to jewelry. Experts examined these possessions and found them to be of

Kurdish origin. The victims in this pit were carrying many items in the grave that gave the

impression they expected to be resettled. The prosecutors in the Anfal trial used the evidence

from this mass grave. Several of the archeologists also testified at the trial. One archaeologist

who testified at the trial, Sonny Trimble, heard Taimour’s testimony and was shocked, because

his story matched exactly the evidence found in the mass grave in the Hajara Desert.143

As the mass graves are found and their contents returned to the Kurds it provides some

closure. The Kurds fought the Iraqi government for decades, trying to establish self-governance.

Al-Majid used his power as Secretary General of the Iraqi Bureau of Northern Command to

conduct a genocidal campaign against the Kurds of northern Iraq. The steps used include

deportations, the outlawing of food production and murder. The UN Convention on Genocide is

explicit in outlining genocide. Where there is intent to destroy an ethnic group in whole or in

part, it is genocide. The Kurds faced this in the Anfals. Al-Majid approved and signed Directives

SF/4008 and 28/3650 which dictated how the Anfals were to be conducted. The stories in this

text are but a few of hundreds that are included as testimony to this period of Iraqi history.

There are many lessons to be learned from Operation Anfal and the Kurdish genocide. If

these types of events are to be prevented, people must study them and their causes. First, when

charges of genocide are made, those charges should be investigated. That is why the UN should

have an organization dedicated to investigating human rights abuses and reporting them. This

143 Pringle, Heather, "Witness to Genocide." Archeology Vol. 62, No. 1 (2009).

33

would facilitate the knowledge being disseminated to the rest of the world. Then the world can

act and prevent genocides from escalating. One of the main issues of the Kurdish genocide was

the lack of accurate information on Operation Anfal. The Ba’athist government succeeded in

suppressing information about the Anfals. This is another reason why a UN organization should

be investigating genocides, with the UN clout and experienced investigators, they could uncover

information

The history of Mesopotamia is that of conflict. Resources in that area are scarce, and so

the people are accustomed to having to fight for them. Two resources are extremely important

there today, water and oil. Water is necessary for life and oil is an opportunity for revenue.

Whoever controls these two commodities has the power in Iraq. The rise of tribal and ethnic

politics in Iraq is related to the control of resources. These politics contributed the repression of

the Kurds. They populated an oil rich area.

Iraq can learn from this dark period of its history and try to unite as a country. This is

occurring now; the current Iraqi government is a coalition of the different parts of Iraqi society.

This includes the Kurds. Ethnic groups in the Middle East look for autonomy and self rule. This

is a tribal trait expressed often in the Middle East, and the Kurds were no different.144 They

wanted to have a voice in government. Now, the Iraqi President, Jalaal Talabani, is a Kurd. As

long as each of the groups in Iraq have a say in the government, it is much less likely that

genocide will occur again.

The Kurds have often rebelled against the Iraqi government, which contributed to

Operation Anfal being unleashed by al-Majid. There are many documents and also tapes from

the Bureau of Northern Command that show the actions used in the Anfals against the Kurds.

144 Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith, Ethnnicity, 177.

34

These actions also included detaining Kurdish men, women and children in prison camps and the

slaughter of many of them in mass exections.

After the 2003 Coalition invasion of Iraq, the Iraqi High Tribunal was instituted to

prosecute those responsible for Anfal. Al-Majid and others who contributed to Operation Anfal

have been tried and some convicted, including al-Majid. He was sentenced to death by hanging145

and as of March 17, 2009 al-Majid was still awaiting his execution.146 The execution of al-Majid

illustrates the continued ethnic conflicts in Iraq. For the execution to take place, all members at

the head of the Iraqi government need to sign off on it. One of the vice-presidents is a Sunni and

is unwilling to condemn another Sunni, al-Majid, to death. Many questions are left unanswered

in Operation Anfal. Where are the many thousands still missing? But mainly, how can this be

prevented in the future? Why is genocide still occurring? The study of past genocides can

contribute to the prevention of genocide in the future. The effects of Operation Anfal will

continue to be felt by the Kurdish people as they seek to recover and rebuild their lives. It will

continue to affect Iraq as a nation for years to come.

145 Case Western Reserve School of Law. “English Translation of the IHT Anfal Campaign Trial Judgment, June 24, 2007,” http://law.case.edu/grotian-moment-blog/anfal/opinion.asp.146 CNN.com, “Iraqi Cabinet presses for 'Chemical Ali's' execution,”http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/03/17/iraq.chemical.ali.decision/

35

Bibliography

Primary Sources:

Ahmad, Assi Mustafa. "Letter to Saddam Hussein." 4 October 1990.

al-Majid, Ali Hassan. "Appendix A: The Ali Hassan al-Majid Tapes." In Iraq's Crime of Genocide, by Human Rights Watch, 253-258. Chelsea: Bookcrafters, 1995.

Amn Erbil. “Letter No. 4754.” 8 June 1987.

Amn Suleimaniyah. “Letter.” 29 October 1988.

Director of Security of Erbil Governate. “Document Ref.: Sh.S.5//13069.” 31 October 1988.

Galbraith, Peter. CBS News: The Forgotten People. interview by Bob McKeown. CBS News. 26 March 2003.

Hussein, Saddam. “Decree 160.” 29 March 1987.

Hussein, Saddam. "Revolutionary Command Council Decree 10." In Bureaucracy of Repression: The Iraqi Government in its Own Words, by Human Rights Watch, Appendix, Document 19. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994.

Iraqi Bureau of Northern Command. "Directive SF/4008." 20 June 1987.

Iraqi Bureau of Northern Command. "Directive 28/3650." 3 June 1987.

Iraqi Bureau of Northern Command. “Directive 855.” 29 December 1987.

Iraqi Bureau of Northern Command. "Document Reference: 4198 of 15/9/87." In Iraq's Crime of Genocide, by Human Rights Watch, 298-299. Chelsea: Bookcrafters, 1995.

Case Western Reserve School of Law. “English Translation of the IHT Anfal Campaign Trial Judgment, June 24, 2007,” 1/ CSecond/2006 (Iraqi High Tribunal, Baghdad June 24, 2007). http://law.case.edu/grotian-moment-blog/anfal/opinion.asp (accessed 2 October 2009).

Muslih, Saadoun Ilwan. “Letter Sh Ayn/B/4/16565.” 29 October 1990.

N.M.R, Political Officer. "Letter to the Director of Security 25/9/1990." In Iraq's Crime of Genocide, by Human Rights Watch, 308. Chelsea: Bookcrafters, Inc., 1995.

Physicians for Human Rights. Scientific First. April 23, 1993. http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1993/iraqgas/ (accessed September 11, 2009).

36

Rahman, Nabata Fayaq, “Survivor of Dibs Camp” interview with Dr. Choman Hardi. January 12, 2005, http://www.chomanhardi.com/anfal-interview01.html (accessed 9 October 2009).

University of Southern California Center for Muslim-Jewish Engagement. "Translations of the Qur'an, Surah 8: Al-Anfal (Spoils of War, Booty)."http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/quran/008.qmt.html (accessed 10 October 2009).

University of Texas Library. “Map of Iraq Ethnoreligious Groups.”http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/iraq_ethnoreligious_1992.jpg (accessed 01 November 2009).

United Nations. "Convention on the Crime and Punishment of Genocide." un.org. http://www.un.org/millennium/law/iv-1.htm (accessed 2 March 2009).

United States Department of State. CNN.com.http://i.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2008/images/11/13/export.import.financing.for.iraq.pdf (accessed March 16, 2009).

WWI Document Archive. “Peace Treaty of Sèvres.”http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Peace_Treaty_of_S%C3%A8vres (accessed 11 November 2009).

Secondary Sources:

BBC News. “Profile: Ratko Mladic.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1423551.stm (accessed 11 November 2009).

Bruni, Mary Ann Smothers. Journey Through Kurdistan. Austin: Texas Memorial Museum, 1995.

Chaliand, Gerard. The Kurdish Tragedy. London: Zed Books Ltd, 1994.

Chemical Ali. DVD. Directed by Kawa Akreyi and Jano Rojbiani. Produced by Evini Films. 2004. Surrey, UK: Journeyman Pictures, 2004.

CNN.com. “Iraqi Cabinet presses for 'Chemical Ali's' execution.” CNN.com/worldhttp://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/03/17/iraq.chemical.ali.decision/ (accessed 18 November 2009).

Friedman, Thomas L. "Hama Rules." The New York Times, 21 September 2001.

Grant, Dawson, and Rachel Boynton. "Reconciling Complicity in Genocide and Aiding and Abetting Genocide in the Jurisprudence of the United Nations Ad Hoc Tribunals." Harvard Human Rights Journal vol. 21, iss. 2 (2008): 241-280.

37

Hiro, Dilip. Dictionary of the Middle East. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996.

Human Rights Watch. Ali Hassan al-Majid and the Basra Massacre of 1999. Genocide Findings, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2005.

Human Rights Watch. Iraq's Crime of Genocide: The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995.

Human Rights Watch. Iraq Claims in Conflict: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Northern Iraq. Short Report, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2004.

Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith. Ethnicity. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Kashi, Ed. When The Borders Bleed. New York: Pantheon Books, 1994.

Kelly, Michael J. Ghosts of Halabja: Saddam Hussein and the Kurdish Genocide. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 2008.

Makiya, Kanan. Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World. New York: WW Norton & Company, Inc, 1993.

Makiyah, Kanan. Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998.

Muttaqun Foundation. “Dogs According to Quran and Sunnah.”http://muttaqun.com/dogs.html (accessed 12 October 2009).

Newton, Michael. “Iraqi Genocide” 30th Annual Holocaust Lecture. Vanderbilt University. September 20, 2007.

Pringle, Heather. "Witness to Genocide." Archeology vol. 62, no. 1 (January/February 2009).

Rabil, Robert G. "Operation ‘Termination of Traitors': The Iraqi Regime Through its Documents." Middle East Review of International Affairs vol. 6, no. 3 (September 2002): 14-24.

Rosenthal, Elisabeth. "Dedicated Group Hopes to Prove Chemicals Killed Kurds." The New York Times, June 25, 2006.http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/25/world/middleeast/25chem.html?_r=2&scp=1&sq=Elisabeth%20Rosenthal%20Kurds&st=cse (accessed March 10, 2009).

Salzman, Philip Carl. "The Middle East's Tribal DNA." The Middle East Quarterly vol. 15, no. 1 (Winter 2008): 23-33.

Sifry, Micah L., and Christopher Cerf. The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents and Opinions. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003.

38

Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

U.S. Department of the Army. “Country Studies/Area Handbook Series-Iraq Constitutional Framework.” http://countrystudies.us/iraq/70.htm (accessed 17 November 2009).

U.S. Marine Corps. FMFRP 3-203 Lessons Learned: Iran-Iraq War. Marine Corps CombatDevelopment Command, Doctrine Division, 1990.

39

Appendix I

Sentence of Ali Hassan al-Majid in the Anfal Trial:

In the Name of God the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate Iraqi High Tribunal Number/ 1/ 2nd Criminal / 2006 Second Criminal Court Iraq - Baghdad Date / 2007 June 24 Or 9 Jumada-al-Akhir 1428 Islamic calendar "Verdict Decisions"

6th. Convict 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid

1 – Sentencing Convict 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid to death, hanging until death, for perpetrating intentional murder, as well as causing severe physical and mental damages on individuals from the community subduing them intentionally to harsh living conditions aiming at total or partial eradication. According to all that, you perpetrated a genocide as per Article [11/ First: (A, B, J) and Second: (A,?)] by virtue of Article [15/ First and Second] and Article [24] of Iraqi Higher Tribunal Law No 10 for the year 2005. The sentence was defined according to Article [406/1/S(A, B, W] by virtue of contributory Clauses [47, 48 and 49] of the amended Penal Code No 111 for the year1969. The verdict had been issued by attended agreement, is revocable for cassation, and publicly acknowledged on 2007 Jun 24.

2 – Sentencing Convict 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid to death, hanging until death, for perpetrating premeditated murder as a crime against humanity pursuant to Article [12/First: (A)] by virtue of Article [15/First and Second) and Article [24] of Iraqi High Tribunal Law No 10 for the year 2005. The sentence had been defined according to Article [406/1/( A, B, W)] by virtue of contributory Clauses [47, 48 and 49] of the amended Penal Code No 111 for the year 1969. The verdict had been issued by attended agreement, is revocable for cassation, and publicly acknowledged on 2007 Jun 24.

3 – Sentencing Convict 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid to death, hanging until death, for perpetrating a genocide as a crime against humanity pursuant to Article [12/First: (B)] by virtue of Article (15/First and Second) and Article [24] of Iraqi High Tribunal

4 – Sentencing Convict 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid to 10 years imprisonment for perpetrating coercive dislocation and taking away of inhabitants as crime against humanity pursuant to Article [12/First: (D)] by virtue of Article [15/First and Second] and Article [24] of Iraqi High Tribunal Law No 10 for the year 2005. The sentence was defined according to Article [421/(B)] by virtue of contributory Clauses [47, 48 and 49] of the amended Penal Code No 111 for the year 1969. The verdict had been issued by attended agreement, is revocable for cassation, and publicly acknowledged on 2007 Jun 24.

40

5 – Sentencing Convict 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid to 10 years imprisonment for perpetrating torture as a crime against humanity pursuant to Article [12/First: (W)] by virtue of Article [15/First and Second) and Article [24] of Iraqi High Tribunal Law No 10 for the year 2005. The sentence was defined according to Article [333] by virtue of contributory Clauses [47, 48 and 49] of the amended Penal Code No 111 for the year 1969. The verdict had been issued by attended agreement, is revocable for cassation, and publicly acknowledged on 2007 Jun 24.

6 – Sentencing Convict 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid to death, hanging until death, for perpetrating individuals' forceful disappearance as a crime against humanity pursuant to Article [12

7 – Sentencing Convict 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid to life imprisonment for perpetrating inhuman identical acts which premeditatedly cause severe suffering, or dangerous damage to the body, or mental or physical health as a crime against humanity pursuant to Article [12/First: (I)] by virtue of Article [15/First and Second) and Article [24] of Iraqi High Tribunal Law No 10 for the year 2005. The sentence had been defined according to Article [393/2/( J)] by virtue of contributory Clauses [47, 48 and 49] of the amended Penal Code No 111 for the year 1969. The verdict had been issued by attended agreement, is revocable for cassation, and publicly acknowledged on 2007 Jun 2.

8 – Sentencing Convict 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid to death, hanging until death, for perpetrating premeditated assaults against civil inhabitants, for this description, or civilians not directly involved in warfare as a crime pursuant to Article [13/Fourth: (A)] by virtue of Article [15/First and Second) and Article [24] of Iraqi High Tribunal Law No 10 for the year 2005. The sentence had been defined according to Article [406/1/( A, B, W)] by virtue of contributory Clauses [47, 48 and 49] of

9 – Sentencing Convict 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid to 7 years imprisonment for perpetrating premeditated assault against buildings designated for religious and educational purposes as a war crime pursuant to Articles [13/Fourth: (D)] by virtue of Article [15/First and Second) and Article [24] of Iraqi High Tribunal Law No 10 for the year 2005. The sentence had been defined according to Article [479/2] by virtue of contributory Clauses [47, 48 and 49] of the amended Penal Code No 111 for the year 1969. The verdict had been issued by attended agreement, is revocable for cassation, and publicly acknowledged on 2007 Jun 2.

10- Sentencing the convict 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid to fifteen years imprisonment for committing robbery crime of any town or anyplace even if it was took over forcibly as a war crime pursuant to Article (13/ 4th/ H) and Article (15/ 1st/ 2nd) and Article (24) of the Iraqi Higher Tribunal's law number 10 for the year 2005 the sentence was designated according to the stipulates of Article (452) and the contributory Articles (49, 48, 47) of the amended Penal Code No.111 for the year 1969 and issued by agreement and attendance, revocable for cassation, and was publicly acknowledged on 2007 Jun 24

41

11- Sentencing the convict 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid to ten years imprisonment for committing the crime of issuing an order of relocating the civilian residents for reasons related to the conflict unless if the relocation was for the sake of the concerned civilians or for urgent military reasons as a war crime according the stipulates of Article (13/ 4th/ H) and Article (15/ 1st/ 2nd) and in virtue to Article (24) of

12- Sentencing the convict 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid to seven years imprisonment for committing a crime of destructing and confiscating the properties of the hostile party unless the destruction and confiscation was an obligation of war necessity as a war crime in accordance to the stipulates of Article (13/ 4th/ L) and article (15/ 1st/ 2nd) and article (24) of the Iraqi Higher Tribunal's law number 10 for the year 2005 the sentence was designated in accordance to the stipulates of Article (2/479) and the contributory Articles (49, 48, 47) of the amended Penal Code No.111 for the year 1969 and issued by agreement and attendance, revocable for cassation according to the stipulates of Article(182/ A) of the Criminal Procedures Law 23 for the year 1971, and was publicly acknowledged on 2007 Jun 24.

13- The detention period of the convict 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid is not counted since his fate needs to be decided in this case because he is detained on another case.

14- The severer sentence is to be executed against the convicted 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid according to Article (142) of the amended Penal Code (111) for the year 1969.

15- Confiscating the fixed and non-fixed assets of the convict 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid according to Article (6th/ 24) of the Iraqi High Tribunal's code number 10 for the year 2005.

16- The convict had been informed that case documents are automatically transferred to the Cassation Court to be verified in cassation as per Article (A/254) of Criminal Procedures Law No. (23) For the year 1971 and announced in 2007 June 24.

17- Due to the lack of acquired evidences in the case against the convict 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid pursuant to Article (H- ?- J/ 1st/ 12) of the Iraqi High Tribunal's law number 10 for the year 2005 the tribunal has decided to drop the charges against him and release him and issued unanimous decision pursuant to Article (J/182) of the amended and capable of cassation Criminal Procedures Law No (23) for the year 1971 and announced in 2007 June 24 or 1428 Jumada II 09 Islamic Calendar.

42

Appendix II-Maps

This map illustrates the Kurdish, Shi’a and Sunni regions of Iraq in 1992. The areas of

Sunni Arab and Sunni Kurd are areas where Arabization occurred.

43

These maps come from the Human Rights Watch Publication and show the layout of the Anfal

Operations. This first map is a general overview of the whole campaign. Anfals 1-7 all occurred

within 150 miles of Iran. The Final Anfal occurred near the border Iraq shared with Turkey,

more than 100 miles away from Iran.

44

45

This map shows the location of the Topzawa Prison Camp, a hub used in processing and sorting

those taken in Anfal. This map only shows the northern part of the operation.

46

This map shows the southern section of the Third Anfal.

47

48

This map shows the Final Anfal, where the majority of the known chemical attacks took place.

49

Appendix III-Directive SF/4008

June 20, 1987

From: Northern Bureau Command To: First Corps Command, Second Corps Command, Fifth Corps Command

Subject: Procedure to deal with the villages that are prohibited for security reasons

In view of the fact that the officially announced deadline for the amalgamation of these villages expires on June 21, 1987, we have decided that the following action should be taken with effect from June 22, 1987:

1. All the villages in which subversives, agents of Iran and similar traitors to Iraq are still to be found shall be regarded as out of bounds for security reasons;

2. They shall be regarded as operational zones that are strictly out of bounds to all persons and animals and in which the troops can open fire at will, without any restrictions, unless otherwise instructed by our Bureau;

3. Travel to and from these zones, as well as all agricultural, animal husbandry and industrial activities shall be prohibited and carefully monitored by all the competent agencies within their respective fields of jurisdiction;

4. The corps commanders shall carry out random bombardments using artillery, helicopters and aircraft, at all times of the day or night in order to kill the largest number of persons present in those prohibited zones, keeping us informed of the results;

5. All persons captured in those villages shall be detained and interrogated by the security services and those between the ages of 15 and 70 shall be executed after any useful information has been obtained from them, of which we should be duly notified;

6. Those who surrender to the governmental or Party authorities shall be interrogated by the competent agencies for a maximum period of three days, which may be extended to ten days if necessary, provided that we are notified of such cases. If the interrogation requires a longer period of time, approval must be obtained from us by telephone or telegraph or through comrade Taher [Tawfiq] al-Ani;

7. Everything seized by the advisers [mustashars] and troops of the National Defense Battalions shall be retained by them, with the exception of heavy, mounted and medium weapons. They can keep the light weapons, notifying us only of the number of these weapons. The Corps commanders shall promptly bring this to the attention of all the advisers, company commanders and platoon leaders and shall provide us with detailed information concerning their activities in the National Defense Battalions.

For information and action within your respective fields of jurisdiction. Keep us informed.

50

[Signed] Comrade Ali Hassan al-Majid Member of the Regional Command Secretary General of the Northern Bureau

cc: Chairman of the Legislative Council; Chairman of the Executive Council; Party Intelligence; Chief of the Army General Staff; Governors (Chairmen of the Security Committees) of Nineveh, al-Ta'mim, Diyala, Salah al-Din, Suleimaniyeh, Erbil and Dohuk; Branch Secretaries of the above-mentioned governorates; General Directorate of Military Intelligence (Istikhbarat); General Directorate of Security (Amn); Director of Security of the Autonomous Region; Security Services of the Northern Region; Security Services of the Eastern Region; Security Directors of the governorates of Nineveh, al-Ta'mim, Diyala, Salah al-Din, Suleimaniyeh, Erbil and Dohuk.

51