Special WarfareThe Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–01–1 Winter 2001 Vol. 14, No. 1

From the CommandantSpecial Warfare

Since its creation in 1952, Special Forceshas had the mission of performing uncon-ventional warfare. Even though theresponsibility for that mission has notchanged, the definition of unconventionalwarfare has changed. In 1952, UW wasperceived as the guerrilla- and partisan-warfare operations with which early SFsoldiers had been familiar from their WorldWar II experiences. But during the manyinsurgencies of the 1960s, UW grew toinclude the concept of counterinsurgency.

Because UW has retained connotationsof the warfare of earlier eras of our mili-tary history, some soldiers in the SF com-munity have in recent years questionedwhether the concept of UW itself was athing of the past, perhaps more fittingfor the discussions of historians than forthe plans and operations of modern SFwarriors.

But as a result of discussions amongthe members of the SF community, theconcept of UW has been re-examinedfrom many points of view. In the process,the concept has been broadened to takefull advantage of its potential and to rec-ognize the realities of the jobs our SF sol-diers are doing today.

Our resulting view of UW should notpigeonhole the concept as either parti-san, guerrilla or insurgent warfare.Rather, we must see UW as an environ-ment that encompasses all those types ofwarfare and more — including, but notlimited to, subversion, sabotage andunconventional assisted recovery. In fact,UW includes many of the dimly definedsituations that our nation will face inthis century, and we should see it not asa mission of the past, but as the missionof the future.

The process of defining UW is not over:UW was a subject of discussion at thisyear’s SF Conference, and we will continueto refine the concept and to identify tasks

that require new or additional emphasis.Does our 21st-century mission require a

new kind of soldier to perform it? Interest-ingly enough, no. While the challenges thatwe will face require that we train for avariety of tasks, the soldier who will per-form those tasks best will be the kindwhom we have sought to identify and todevelop since SF’s beginnings — a soldierwho is independent, intelligent, mature andresourceful. We need soldiers who are prob-lem-solvers, not soldiers who can only mem-orize and apply doctrine and tactics, tech-niques and procedures. They will be selectedand trained for a difficult mission — ouroriginal mission and the mission that willensure our relevance in years to come —unconventional warfare.

Major General William G. Boykin

Features2 Unconventional Warfare: The Most Misunderstood Form

of Military Operationsby Colonel Michael R. Kershner

8 Special Forces: Our Core Purposeby Colonel Mark D. Boyatt, U.S. Army (ret.)

10 The Confederacy Could Have Won — Unconventionally: AThought Experiment for Special Warriors by Dr. John Arquilla

18 Unconventional Warfare: Definitions from 1950 to the Presentby Major Greg E. Metzgar

24 Unconventional Warfare: SF’s Past, Present and Futureby Captain Robert Lee Wilson

28 Unconventional Warfare: Questions, Concerns and Proposalsby CW2 Brian D. Halstead

32 Is There a Role for CA in Domestic Support Operations?by Major Dennis J. Cahill

39 Army Values: The Epitome — Dick Meadows

Departments40 Enlisted Career Notes

43 Officer Career Notes

44 Foreign SOF

45 Update

48 Book Reviews

PB 80–01–1 ContentsWinter 2001 Special Warfare Vol. 14, No. 1

Commander & CommandantMajor General William G. Boykin

EditorJerry D. Steelman

Associate EditorSylvia W. McCarley

Graphics & DesignBruce S. Barfield

Automation ClerkGloria H. Sawyer

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of theUnited States Army John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its missionis to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examinationof established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and donot necessarily reflect official Army position. Thispublication does not supersede any information presentedin other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited andshould be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare,USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: DSN239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147. SpecialWarfare reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except wherecopyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfareand the authors.

Official distribution is limited to active and reservespecial-operations units. Individuals desiring privatesubscriptions should forward their requests to:Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Special Warfare is also available on the USASOC internal web(https://asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag/sw-mag.htm).

V E R I T A S

STREBIL

A

E T

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Eric K. ShinsekiGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:

Joel B. HudsonAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army

0107314

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Unconventional warfare, or UW, isquite possibly the most misunder-stood form of United States mili-

tary operations. It is not simply a variantof guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare,unconventional assisted recovery, informa-tion operations and information support,subversion, and sabotage all play roles inUW.

Joint doctrine defines UW as a “broadspectrum of military and paramilitary oper-

ations, normally oflong duration, pre-dominately con-ducted by indige-nous or surrogateforces who areorganized, trained,equipped, support-ed and directed invarying degrees byan external source.UW encompassesguerrilla warfareand other directoffensive, low visi-

bility, covert or clandestine operations, aswell as the indirect activities of subversion,sabotage, intelligence activities and evasionand escape.”1 This broad definition supportsthe entire spectrum of UW activities.

The U.S. Army Special Forces Commandrecently conducted a series of UW semi-nars to encourage Special Forces, or SF, toreturn to its roots and to become theworld’s most relevant special force. UW hasalways been SF’s primary mission; allother tasks are subsets of this overarchingmission.

Because of its specialized training, SF isrecognized as the Army’s most relevantforce. As the Army grapples with the struc-ture, doctrine and operations of the InterimForce and of the Objective Force, SF mustremain maintain its relevance throughoutthe 21st century.

The world as a minefieldIf today’s world is any indicator of the

future, tomorrow’s world will be volatile,uncertain, complex and dangerous. Therewill be increasingly ambiguous politicaland military situations populated by non-traditional enemies, including well-fundednarcoterrorists, criminal enterprises, mili-tias and private armies. Racial, ethnic, eco-nomic and ideological differences willmake effective government increasinglydifficult. The weaker a governmentbecomes, the sooner fault lines will affectits ability either to provide for its citizens’welfare or to keep its citizens in subjuga-tion. Dysfunctional governments increas-ingly lead to porous borders, governmentcorruption and other opportunities for

2 Special Warfare

Unconventional Warfare: The Most Misunderstood Form of Military Operations

by Colonel Michael R. Kershner

Colonel Kershner’s article appeared in the Jan-uary-February 2001 issue of Military Review. —Editor

Members of a Jedburghteam receive their mis-sion instructions from abriefing officer in Londonin 1944.

National Archives

exploitation. As governments fail, anarchy,tribalism and reactionary authoritarianregimes will fill power vacuums.

Although tomorrow’s threats are unpre-dictable, they almost certainly will notcome from peer competitors. The likelihoodthat any nation will couple military ascen-dancy with dominant economic strength isvirtually nil, but that does not mean thatthe United States is more secure than ithas been in the past. The strength of theU.S. and its open democratic society pro-vide opportunities to its enemies. Forexample, when Iraqi dictator Saddam Hus-sein attempted to go toe-to-toe with U.S.forces in terrain similar to that at the U.S.National Training Center, or NTC, othernations watched his inevitable defeat andlearned appropriate lessons. Rarely does anation face such an obliging enemy. TheU.S. must not assume that its next adver-sary will be as cooperative as Hussein was.

The terms du jour for describing futurethreats are “asymmetric” and “asynchro-nous.”2 What those terms actually mean is“unconventional.” The U.S. has the world’s

premier UW weapon — U.S. Army SpecialForces. The mere existence of forces whoare trained and prepared to conduct UWserves as a warning and as a strategicdeterrent to U.S. enemies.

Today’s unsettled environment, which inthe future will become even more unset-tled, is the milieu in which UW thrives,and it is the environment into which SFwill deploy. The Army’s last conventionalconflict occurred during Operation DesertStorm. During 1999 and 2000 alone, morethan 50 identifiable UW incidentsoccurred, demonstrating the relevance ofUW expertise.3

Given their broad and complex mis-sions, SF soldiers are arguably involveddaily in UW. On any given day, more than750 soldiers conduct an average of 61 mis-sions in 39 countries.4 This ubiquitousinvolvement ensures SF’s continued rele-vance, and it has earned SF soldiers thenickname “global scouts.”5

Originally, SF was designed for UW ofthe 1950s era, taking as its model theOffice of Strategic Services’ Jedburgh

Winter 2001 3

Citizens of Mogadishudismantle a roadblockthat had separated thecity’s opposing clans.The future may seeincreasing conflict likethat in Somalia.

Photo by R.J. Oriez

teams that operated during World War II.6During the revitalization of special opera-tions during the 1980s, the Army focusedon the Soviet threat to Western Europe. Toensure its relevance during the Cold War,SF assumed a large role in direct-actionand special-reconnaissance activities.

With the demise of the Soviet Union, directaction and special reconnaissance have beeneclipsed by military operations other thanwar, or MOOTW. SF has assumed an increas-ing number of foreign-internal-defense mis-sions to support the Army and to shape thestrategic environment.7

Special forces, special skillsAs the world becomes increasingly unset-

tled and more volatile, SF must be preparedto conduct UW. By law, only the forces of theU.S. Special Operations Command, orUSSOCOM, are authorized to conduct UW.8Of all USSOCOM forces, SF is the best pre-pared to conduct UW in its broadest terms,including guerrilla warfare.

Soldiers who conduct UW must be high-ly trained, skilled and mature. They mustpossess excellent problem-solving skills,and they must be able to maintain mentalagility in the most fluid of situations. Theirflexibility and adaptability must be unpar-alleled. SF soldiers’ foreign-language capa-

bility, area and cultural expertise, andinterpersonal skills complement theirbase-line requirements. SF soldiers under-stand the situation of those whom theytrain or contact, and they comprehend therelevant social, economic and politicalmilieu. SF’s primary peacetime purpose inmultiple overseas deployments is to ensurethat the required expertise is present whencrises occur.

An SF soldier’s language expertiseshould not be confused with a linguist’s. SFsoldiers are trained to exchange ideas andto train others on complex skills in austereenvironments. By focusing on UW, SFensures that its soldiers are prepared fortheir most difficult mission. The ability toconduct special reconnaissance and directaction is embedded in the requirement toconduct UW. Although SF soldiers can con-duct these missions unilaterally, so canother DoD forces. It is SF’s unique abilityto teach direct-action and special-recon-naissance skills to surrogate or indigenousforces that sets SF soldiers apart.

UW skills can be applied in every opera-tional environment, from MOOTW to majortheater war. UW also provides the theatercommander in chief, or CINC, or the com-mander of a joint task force, or JTF, flexibleoptions with which to exert pressurethroughout the spectrum of operations.

4 Special Warfare

Soldiers from the 1stSpecial Forces Grouptrain Thai Special Forcessoldiers in fast-ropingduring Exercise CobraGold ‘98.

Photo by Raymond T. Conway

SF is discreet; neither large troop forma-tions nor large logistics footprints arerequired. SF’s contributions to informationsuperiority, dominant maneuver, precisionengagement and full-dimensional protec-tion support Army Vision 2010, ArmyVision 2020 and Joint Vision 2020. SF canmake its contributions throughout engage-ment, crisis response, war-fighting and thetransition back to engagement.

While SF uses various methods of gath-ering information and intelligence, humanintelligence is the method that has thegreatest impact on information superiority.Through close working contacts and formalrelationships, SF fills many gaps in theconventional force commander’s situation-al understanding, particularly in the morecomplex areas of intention and motivation.Human intelligence aids the conventionalforce commander in making timely deci-sions, and it provides the foundation forsuccessful psychological warfare, thusensuring the most effective use of scarceresources.

The information superiority that SF pro-vides also helps the JTF commanderachieve dominant maneuver. Surrogate orindigenous forces that SF has advised canbe leveraged to enhance maneuver domi-nance. Such force multipliers can be extra-ordinarily advantageous to the maneuver-

force commander, whether they are used indeception operations or as full-maneuverunits. SF, acting either unilaterally orthrough indigenous or surrogate forces,can also enhance information superiorityin urban terrain, where the effectiveness ofmassed fires or standoff delivery systemsis reduced. SF units or soldiers can limitthe collateral damage inherent in suchfirepower by employing laser target desig-nators and other sensor-to-shooter tech-nologies that permit precise engagement.These technologies lower the risk thatdelivery platforms and direct standoff ord-nance will fail to hit such elusive targets asindividual tanks and specific windows.Information superiority also facilitates theprecise targeting for psychological warfare.

The contribution that SF makes to full-dimensional protection is embedded inSF’s ability to leverage both informationand intelligence gathered from indigenouscontacts. SF’s unique ability to work in,among and through the local populace andresistance movements is indispensable anddramatically increases available intelli-gence. Direct-action operations, as well assabotage, subversion, and offensive infor-mation operations and information sup-port, provide the JTF commander and thetheater CINC with a better understandingof the battle space and make it increasing-

Winter 2001 5

SF soldiers are trained toexchange ideas and to trainothers in complex skills inaustere environments.

DoD photo

ly difficult for the enemy to achieve anequivalent understanding. By increasingthe enemy’s friction and fog of war, SFreduces the speed and the effectiveness ofthe enemy’s decision-making. In fact, thejudicious and early application of SF inUW roles might eliminate or greatlyreduce the need to commit general-purposeforces.

Cultivating relationships and identify-ing key personalities is a continual SF mis-sion. The combination of thorough studyand boots-on-the-ground presence engagesSF every day in prospective UW environ-ments. The U.S. Army Special Forces Com-mand leads the effort to ensure maximumUW support to special-operations com-mands that support theater CINCs.

Updating UW doctrineUW’s dynamic and versatile nature

ensures SF’s relevance. However, the mis-perception that UW is guerrilla warfareand nothing more contributes to the cur-rent neglect of UW. UW doctrine is outdat-ed, and UW training is limited.9 Currentdoctrine still maintains that UW is con-ducted in seven phases.10 That conceptshould be re-evaluated; it is more appro-priate to describe UW in terms of U.S.Army doctrinal phases — engagement, cri-

sis response, war-fighting and return toengagement.

The Army is revising and updating doc-trine to reflect current requirements andcapabilities. As UW’s flexibility and useful-ness become increasingly apparent, mis-sion guidance will become more focused, aswill training. Lessons learned about UWare not found in training after-actionreports; they come from the after-actionreports of forces who are actively involvedin UW operations. This information reser-voir should not be limited to U.S. experi-ences; it should include Russian operationsin Chechnya, Australian operations in EastTimor and other UW activities throughoutthe world.

UW is being revitalized in a numberof ways. The Special Forces Qualifica-tion Course is re-emphasizing UW. Com-bat training centers are also integratingUW at the NTC and, to a limited extent,at the Joint Readiness Training Centerat Fort Polk, La.

Tables of organization and equipment forSF groups are based on 1980s missions andmust be re-evaluated for current UW mis-sions. SF must be prepared to conduct itsshare of missions involving counterterror-ism, counterproliferation of weapons of massdestruction, and information operations.

While technology’s potential contribu-

6 Special Warfare

A captain from the 3rdSpecial Forces Groupexplains escort securityto a Polish platoon leaderduring an exercise at FortPolk, La.

Photo by Kenneth Stallings

tions to UW are important, UW’s essentialingredient is the SF soldier. It is from thishighly trained warrior’s unique capabili-ties that all other UW capabilities flow.Diversity makes UW a dynamic discipline.To extract UW’s maximum advantage, theArmy must focus on the unique soldierswho can achieve that advantage.

The concept that UW is SF’s primary mis-sion and the source of all other SF coretasks might seem radical, but it is simply aconceptual framework for analyzing currentmission sets. The U.S. Army Special Opera-tions Command mission analysis defines SFcore tasks without significantly changingaccepted definitions.11 What is different ischaracterizing tasks such as direct action,special reconnaissance and foreign internaldefense as subsets of UW. Solid UW trainingwill ensure that U.S. Army soldiers remainthe world’s most relevant and well-preparedasymmetric warriors.

Colonel Michael R. Kershner is directorof special operations at the U.S. Army WarCollege, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. He was pre-viously the deputy commander of the U.S.Army Special Forces Command and hasserved in a variety of command and staffpositions in the continental U.S., Panamaand Bosnia-Herzegovina. Colonel Kershnerholds a bachelor’s degree from the U.S. Mil-itary Academy and a master’s degree fromBoston University. He is a graduate of theU.S. Army Command and General StaffCollege and of the U.S. Army War College.

Notes:1 Joint Publication 1-02, The Department of Defense

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Wash-ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 23 March1994 as amended through 6 April 1999), 713.

2 Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, “GlobalThreats and Challenges: The Decades Ahead,” pre-pared statement before the Senate Armed ServicesCommittee, 2 February 1999, Washington, D.C.(www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1999/s19990202-hughes.html).

3 See Major Messing and William Shingleton,“National Defense Council Foundation: World ConflictList 1999” (www.ndcf.org/Conflict_List/World99.html).

4 Command brief, U.S. Army Special Forces Com-mand [location and date unknown], 2000.

5 General Peter J. Schoomaker, “Special OperationsForces: The Way Ahead” [publishing data not avail-

able], 2.6 Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth

of Special Forces (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1986),149-59.

7 National Military Strategy, chapter 2, “The Strate-gic Environment: Opportunities and Challenges,”(www.dtic.mil/jcs/nms/strategi.htm).

8 U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 167, “Unified Combat-ant Command for Special Operations Forces,”(www4.law.Cornell.edu/uscode/), January 2000.

9 See U.S. Army Field Manual 31-20, Doctrine forSpecial Forces Operations (Washington, D.C.: Govern-ment Printing Office, April 1990).10 Ibid., 9-5.11 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, “MissionArea Analysis for POM FY 02-07” (Fort Bragg, N.C.:January 1999).

Winter 2001 7

In 1997, members of the Special Forcescommunity began the process of identi-fying SF’s core ideology. Although the

process has led to much thought, discus-sion and debate, after four years, the taskremains unfinished.

According to James C. Collins and JerryI. Porras,1 an organization’s core ideologyis its enduring character — what theorganization is and what it stands for. Coreideology transcends leaders. It is deter-mined by the people who are inside theorganization. We do not create a core ideol-ogy; we identify it. Often, the success or thefailure of an organization can be traced tohow well the organization identified itscore ideology and how well it cultivated theenergies and talents of its people.

Core ideology has two components: corevalues and core purpose. By identifyingthose components, the organization defineswho its members are.

Core valuesCore values are essential and enduring

tenets. Core values are clear and powerful,and they provide substantial guidance withpiercing simplicity. After three years ofdebate, the U.S. Army Special Forces Com-mand reached a consensus on SF’s core val-ues, and the values were published in theSpring 2000 edition of Special Warfare.2 TheSF core values are warrior ethos; profes-sionalism; innovation; versatility; cohesion;

character; and cultural awareness.What remains to be resolved is SF’s core

purpose. Of the two components of core ide-ology, core purpose is the more important.It is the organization’s fundamental reasonfor being. Unlike goals or strategies, a corepurpose does not change — it inspireschange. An organization can evolve intonew areas, but it will continue to be guidedby its core purpose.

Core purposeSF’s core purpose is to achieve our

nation’s objectives and to conduct our SFmissions through, with or by surrogates,indigenous organizations or indigenouspopulations. That defining purpose sets SFapart from all other organizations. SF canconduct unilateral missions, and we canconduct them superbly, but we should con-duct unilateral missions only as a lastresort. They are inconsistent with our corepurpose.

SF was organized as a force multiplierthat would conduct unconventional war-fare. Conducting UW is still SF’s purpose.SF soldiers are trained to operate through,with or by an indigenous population toaccomplish the mission. In so doing, theyenfranchise the indigenous population,making possible a long-term indigenoussolution rather than a short-term U.S. solu-tion. The solution has enormous potential,and it is a potential that only SF can offer.3

8 Special Warfare

Special Forces: Our Core Purpose

by Colonel Mark D. Boyatt, U.S. Army (ret.)

Numerous organizations are organized,equipped and trained to conduct unilateralmissions. U.S. unilateral SOF units includeArmy Rangers, special-mission units, the160th Special Operations Aviation Regi-ment, Psychological Operations units,Navy special-warfare units, and Air Forcespecial-operations units. The U.S. MarineCorps is a non-SOF organization that has aunilateral focus.

Furthermore, one of the U.S. Army’sstated goals is to become more SOF-like.The Army’s values are mirrored in SF’score values. The Army and other organi-zations are rapidly closing the gap inaccomplishing missions “faster, further,with more precision.” The capabilities ofthe Army’s future objective force, as stat-ed in TRADOC Pam 525-66 (Draft), willinclude “soldiers of above-average maturi-ty,” who are “multiskilled, multifunction-al, agile, versatile, flexible,” and who havethe capability of “rapid mission tailoring;C2 on the move.” In the future, “smaller,faster, lightweight, modular, more lethal”will not be capabilities and characteristicsthat significantly distinguish SF fromother organizations.

What will distinguish SF is its ability tooperate through, with or by surrogates,indigenous populations and indigenousorganizations. That ability is our reason forbeing. It is the singular purpose that setsSF apart from all other organizations — inthe past, in the present and in thefuture.

Colonel Mark D. Boyatt retired from theArmy in January 2000 as the assistantcommandant of the JFK Special WarfareCenter and School. Commissioned inInfantry, he served as an Infantry platoonleader, as a company executive officer andas a company commander. His SF assign-ments include detachment commander andgroup operations and training officer in the5th SF Group; action officer in the ArmySpecial Operations Agency, Pentagon; com-mander of the 1st Battalion, 1st SF Group;chief of staff for the JFK Special WarfareCenter and School; commander of the 3rdSF Group; and deputy chief of staff for

operations for the Army Special OperationsCommand. A graduate of the Armed ForcesStaff College and of the Army War College,he also holds a bachelor’s degree from theUniversity of Tennessee at Knoxville.Colonel Boyatt is also the president of theJFK Special Warfare Special ForcesBranch Historical and Memorial MuseumAssociation.

Notes:1 James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras, Built to Last:

Successful Habits of Visionary Companies (New York:HarperCollins Publishers, 1997).

2 “SF Core Values: The Final Cut,” Special Warfare,Spring 2000, 9.

3 Civil Affairs also conducts missions through, withor by indigenous populations; however, the differenceis the mission set. SF accomplishes combat missionsets; the CA mission set is combat support, combat-service support, humanitarian assistance, infrastruc-ture rebuilding, etc.

Winter 2001 9

The American Civil War was theworld’s first conflict to be largelyshaped by the Industrial Revolution.

Weapons, especially rifles, were mass-pro-duced; millions of soldiers were mobilized

and moved to thebattlefield by rail;and command andcontrol over a the-ater of war the sizeof Western Europewas maintained bytelegraph.

Yet this was alsoa conflict in whichpreindustrial con-cepts of strategyremained domi-nant, particularlythose of BaronJomini. Union andConfederate gener-als alike strove touphold Jomini’sprecepts aboutoffense dominance,massing and interi-

or lines.1 New technologies were thus mar-ried to old concepts of operations, with dis-quieting results: Field maneuvers ofNapoleonic boldness were regularly defeat-ed by rail mobility, and massed chargeswere repulsed by increasingly accurate,far-ranging rifle fire. The overall outcomeof the war was driven by attrition rather

than by military genius, and the greaterresources of the North won out.2

Was the outcome inevitable? If not, howcould the South have won? The most likelypossibility of Southern victory would havecome from intervention by Britain (andpossibly other European powers), muchlike the alliance with France that had ledto the success of the American Revolution.Despite some dicey moments, however,Britain withheld its support, partlybecause British leaders had for so longinveighed against slavery that they foundit difficult to rally their public in support ofa “confederacy of slavers.” Also, Russia,which was engaged in a wide-ranging “coldwar” with Britain (what Kipling called“The Great Game”), worried that thebreakup of the United States would leaveno countering power on Britain’s westernflank. Russia made it clear that its coldwar with Britain might intensify if Britainwere to help the South.3

The only other realistic possibility4 ofSouthern victory would have come fromwhat James McPherson refers to as the“power of contingency.” McPherson arguesthat the outcome of the war, Britain’s non-intervention, and even Lincoln’s re-electionin 1864 were all contingent upon the inter-action of other events.

McPherson points out that the slowprogress of the Union forces during thesummer of 1864 posed a threat to theNorth’s victory: “If the election had been

10 Special Warfare

The Confederacy Could Have Won —Unconventionally: A Thought Experimentfor Special Warriors

by Dr. John Arquilla

Allan Pinkerton (left),President Abraham Lin-coln and General John A.McClernand meet nearAntietam, Md., in Octo-ber 1862.

National Archives

held in August 1864 instead of November,Lincoln would have lost. He would havegone down in history as an also-ran, a loserunequal to the challenge of the greatestcrisis in the American experience.”5

McPherson’s theory implies that if theSouth had slowed the North’s progress forthree months or more, the South couldhave won.

A delay of three months could have beenachieved only if the military leadership ofthe South had cultivated an alternativeconcept of operations, composed of twoparts. First, instead of being wedded to theever more costly tactical offensive in con-ventional battles, the Confederates shouldhave taken the defensive, as the Northwould surely have attacked them. Second,the South had one incomparable advan-tage over the North: its irregular raidingforces, who were led by some of the finestsoldiers of the war, from John S. Mosby inthe east to Nathan Bedford Forrest in thewest. Although those forces performedadmirably during the war, they could havebeen used more skillfully and more sys-tematically to disrupt Northern offensivesand to slow the Union’s overall progress(almost certainly by three months).

This two-part concept of operations hasclear antecedents in earlier American (andeven British) military experience. Duringthe Revolution, Nathaniel Greene cleverlychose a well-integrated mix of convention-al and irregular forces for his campaign inthe South — a decisive campaign thatended with Cornwallis falling back onYorktown, where he and his remainingforces were bottled up and captured.6 Thir-ty years later, the Duke of Wellington pur-sued a similar approach while fighting avastly superior French force in Iberia. Hetook the tactical defensive in his pitchedbattles and relied on Spanish guerrillaforces and commando-style Royal Navyforces to conduct offensive operations. Theresult was a masterpiece of blended war-fighting by regular forces and “special” (fortheir time and place) forces.7

Why didn’t the South see the possibili-ties in this kind of special warfare? Whostood in the way of the South’s cultivatingsuch an approach?

First of all, the general mindset of South-ern military leadership was overwhelming-ly steeped in conventional offensivenotions. Aside from forming a central partof the appeal of the Napoleonic/Jominianinfluences, the conventional offensive alsoexerted a powerful cultural pull on theConfederate commanders who saw it as amore honorable form of warfare.8

As to why unconventionally offensivestrategies and tactics were not well-culti-vated, one need look no further than to

Robert E. Lee, who said of irregular ways ofconducting war: “I regard the whole systemas an unmixed evil.”9

These are the reasons, then, why theSouth didn’t generally pursue a “specialapproach” in fighting the war. Neverthe-less, it should be noted that the South didconduct a considerable amount of specialwarfare, from extensive guerrilla opera-tions to horse-mobile deep strikes behind

Winter 2001 11

During the American Revolution, General Nathaniel Greeneused a mix of conventional and irregular forces.

National Archives

Union lines. Those unconventional opera-tions highlight the fact that the new trans-portation and communications technolo-gies were vulnerable to disruption.10 Andeven though the South carried out guerril-la operations and strikes in both the east-ern and the western theaters, it was in thewestern theater (which was more expan-

sive geographically) that special warfarehad a greater influence and seriouslyimpeded the North’s progress.

At times, Forrest and John Hunt Morgancaused such chaos that the Union forceswere compelled to retreat, as Don CarlosBuell did in his campaign against Chat-tanooga. The Confederate raiders alsobecame powerful “force divisors” because oftheir ability to strike almost anywhere andat any time. For example, at the outset ofthe crucial Atlanta campaign, GeneralWilliam T. Sherman’s forces numberedapproximately 180,000, but he held back

80,000 of them to guard his rear areasagainst the Confederate raiders.11 Sher-man’s decision dramatically reduced hisnumerical superiority over Joseph E. John-ston’s force of some 60,000, and it account-ed for Sherman’s slow progress during thecampaign.

At least one major strategic thinker, B.H.Liddell-Hart, recognized the potential inskillfully blended conventional and specialoperations. Liddell-Hart, the British propo-nent of the “indirect approach” to war(which was intended to minimize thenecessity of pitched battles), saw uniquepossibilities in the Confederate raiders,whose operations he studied closely.12 Lid-dell-Hart was one of the few Europeanswho drew deep lessons from the CivilWar.13 His research, however, only beginsto imply what might have happened hadthe Confederates more fully integratedspecial operations into their conventionalmaneuvers.

The question remaining, then, is: “Whatwould have happened had the South takena conventional tactical defensive wheneverpossible, and an unconventional strategicoffensive using the guerrilla and raidingforces at its disposal?” To answer this ques-tion, one must develop a sense of the lossesthat each side incurred and a sense of theoffense-defense balance that existed duringthe war. While there will always be someuncertainty about the exact losses, there isa consensus that the North suffered 360,000battle deaths and that the South suffered260,000. There is also wide agreement onthe number of various casualties (killed,wounded, missing, prisoners) that each sidesuffered during specific battles.14

The offense-defense balance is some-what more difficult to calculate. However,after having performed a detailed analy-sis of the offense-defense statistics, Her-man Hattaway and Archer Jones foundthat the defense won 17 of the 26 majorbattles of the war (about two-thirds).15

The South took the tactical offensive justunder half the time, with an even distri-bution of its attacks from the beginning ofthe war until the end. Hattaway andJones also found that the Union’s combateffectiveness on the attack was only half

12 Special Warfare

Irregular forces under General Nathan Bedford Forrest sometimesharried Union forces to the point that they were forced to retreat.

National Archives

that of the Confederacy’s.16

Considering that the North’s battledeaths were nearly a third higher than theSouth’s, it is clear that if the South had notmade costly attacks (such as those atShiloh, Gettysburg and Chickamauga or,perhaps worse, at Atlanta and Franklin,where Hood’s army was totally squan-dered), the North would have suffered evenmore severely.

A Southern tactical defensive at the con-ventional level, coupled with “rebel raid-ing” on the strategic offensive, would havegreatly slowed the North’s progress. Itwould have also contributed to the risingpolitical opposition to the war and to theever-growing losses suffered by the Union.Perhaps the Confederacy’s improved per-formance would have also increased thepossibility of European intervention. Whilethis scenario is hypothetical, it is well-grounded in two key concepts: (1) Defen-sive operations were dominant throughoutthe war. (2) The South had generousresources with which to engage in specialwarfare against an enemy whose railtransport system and communications sys-tem were highly vulnerable to disruption.Simply put, the South could have won.

Why should special operators be inter-ested in such historical matters? Basically,there are four central insights that the spe-

cial-operations community should drawfrom a “thought experiment” such as thisone that reanalyzes the Civil War.

First, the value in studying military his-tory is reaffirmed. For just as this recon-sideration of the Civil War has unearthedthe powerful potential of special warfareduring the 19th century, one will find thatthere has been a “special” aspect in mostother conflicts throughout history (fromthe Peloponnesian War to the SecondChechen War).

A study of special warfare throughouthistory will illuminate the strategic impor-tance of irregular operations, and it shouldalso sound a cautionary note that thesekinds of operations can be neglected onlyat the risk of failure and ruin.

Second, the current mindset of the Amer-ican military, which seems to have a fixa-tion for conventional operations and theoffensive, is based on the military’sresponse to industrialization some 150years ago. That mindset governed the mili-tary’s strategy not only during the CivilWar but also throughout our subsequentmajor wars.17

That fixation is unfortunate, becauseAmerican military culture has deep rootsin irregular warfare. From the Rangerswho helped guide conventional forces dur-ing the invasion of Canada in the French

Winter 2001 13

National Archives

Union soldiers man acaptured Confederatefortification. Had theSouth relied more on thetactical defensive, itmight have greatlyslowed the Union’sprogress and inflictedgreater casualties.

and Indian War; to the raiders of FrancisMarion, Andrew Pickens and ThomasSumter who enabled General NathanielGreene to weaken Cornwallis and to setthe stage for victory at Yorktown, earlyAmerican history is replete with specialwarfare.18 But since the Civil War, thosewho have had ideas about unconventionalapproaches to war have had to struggle tobe heard in the high councils of the Ameri-can military.

In Europe, for example, the “stay behind”idea that led to the creation of Army SpecialForces 50 years ago soon gave way, largely,to visions of a climactic armored clash in theFulda Gap. In Vietnam, the unconventionalapproach was tried briefly, and then sup-planted with the “big unit” concept of opera-tions. In the Gulf, Special Forces was rele-gated largely to coalition support. And inKosovo, an unconventional approach wasreadied but then rejected (in favor of a con-ventional air war), a decision that led tounfortunate consequences. Innocent Koso-vars, for whose welfare we were ostensiblyfighting, were subjected to the worst kind ofunfettered Serb barbarism.19

The examples above show a trend that

began during the Civil War, and that trendwill continue unless we acknowledge theunwisdom of allowing our strategic cultureto undervalue the much-needed unconven-tional complement to our conventionaloperations. We must hope that our appreci-ation for the special effect of irregularoperations will deepen as we move into anera in which the number of irregular con-flicts is likely to increase.

Third, the Civil War was waged early inthe industrial age, when a revolution inmilitary affairs, or RMA, was under way. Atthat time, the range of fire, the accuracy offire and the rate of fire were vastly increas-ing. In addition, advances in manufactur-ing, in communications and in transporta-tion were making it possible to create, sup-ply, move and control large field forces. Yetthe Confederates and the Federals failed todevelop new concepts of operations. Seniormilitary leaders on both sides relied on theever-less-relevant Napoleonic paradigm,assuming that all changes would reinforcethe timeless “principle” of the offensive.

Simply put, military leaders misjudgedthe effects of the RMA on the offense-defense balance. The results of early bat-

14 Special Warfare

William T. Sherman Joseph E. Johnston

tles did little to stimulate innovativethinking about the value of unconvention-al warfare. As a matter of fact, militaryleaders clung ever more dearly to the oldparadigm. They were not alone in theirreluctance to change. Fifty years later, themassed frontal assaults of World War Ireflected the failure of European armies tolearn lessons from the American Civil War.

The fourth lesson one can draw from theCivil War is that it is difficult to predict theeffects of RMAs at the outset. For this rea-son, militaries have had a tendency to incor-porate new technologies into earlier con-cepts of operations. For the Confederacy,that tendency proved fatal. Even though thebattle results clearly demonstrated theweakness of the old paradigm and thestrength of the irregular-warfare approach,the South remained yoked to a doctrine thatwould eventually bleed it white.

Today, technological advances are onceagain improving both the accuracy of fireand the range of fire, and they are enablingthe full networking of command and con-trol in hitherto undreamed of ways. Unfor-tunately, these technological leaps arereinforcing the existing paradigm of mod-ern maneuver warfare idealized by theaging AirLand Battle doctrine. The mili-tary’s dedication to the existing concept ofoperations persists despite the contradicto-ry information revealed by recent battles.For example, irregular Hezbollah forces

drove the Israelis from southern Lebanon;and twice, swarming bands of Chechenfighters have handled the Russian armyroughly. Clearly, an unconventional strainof military thought is on the rise — onethat the U.S. military, overall, is failing toperceive.20

If we can reflect on earlier periods ofgreat change and see the possibilities ofthe alternative approaches that existedthen, perhaps we can bring our thoughtsback to the present, refreshed and primedwith new insights that will help us visual-ize innovative ways of war that mightemerge in a new era.

During the Civil War, the Confederatescould have won if they had taken the con-ventional defensive and an unconventionaloffensive. Pursuing this tack would haveallowed the Confederates to take advantageof an RMA that not only advanced the rateand the accuracy of fire, but also made mil-itary forces vulnerable to disruption of theirtransportation and information infrastruc-tures. There would have been little theNorth could have done in response to suchan approach. In order to restore the Union,the North had to take the offensive againstthe Confederacy. Operating in Southern ter-ritory, where the local populace opposed“Yankees” implacably, the North had littlechance of successfully emulating the South’sunconventional tactics.

This in-depth reconsideration both of the

Winter 2001 15

Dead soldiers on the bat-tlefield at Gettysburg.Fifty years later, Euro-pean armies repeated themistake of makingmassed frontal assaults.

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Civil War and of the impact of industrial-ization may prove to be of particular ana-lytic value: Our current “informatizing”RMA is providing similar beneficial effectsfor fire, but it may also may suffer disrup-tion both in the logistics realm and in thecommand-and-control realm. If so, theRMA may provide a world of opportunityfor the irregularization of warfare — anopportunity we ignore at our increasingperil.

Dr. John Arquilla earnedhis degrees in internationalrelations from Rosary Col-lege (BA, 1975) and fromStanford University (MA,1989; Ph.D., 1991). He is anassociate professor of defenseanalysis at the Naval Postgraduate Schoolin Monterey, Calif. His teaching includescourses in the history of special operations,international political theory, the revolu-tion in military affairs, and information-age conflict. He has written Lessons fromthe War with Saddam Hussein (RAND,1991), Dubious Battles (Crane Russak,1992), and From Troy to Entebbe (Univer-sity Press of America, 1996), as well asmany articles, book chapters, and mono-graphs on a wide range of topics in securi-ty affairs. He is best known for his collabo-rative RAND studies with David Ronfeldt,notably Cyberwar is Coming! (1993) andThe Advent of Netwar (1996). Arquilla andRonfeldt’s most recent book, In Athena’sCamp (1997), explores the myriad political,social, and military dimensions of thefuture of conflict. Their next book, Net-works and Netwars, is due to be publishedin 2001.

Notes:1 There is some debate about Jomini’s influence. T.H.

Williams, “The Military Leadership of North andSouth,” in David Donald, ed., Why the North Won theCivil War (New York: Macmillan, 1962), argues thathis ideas loomed large. Archer Jones, “Military Means,Political Ends,” in Gabor Boritt, ed., Why the Confed-eracy Lost (Oxford and New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1992), especially p. 50, sees his role more as anexpositor of Napoleonic thought — with which gener-als on both sides were indeed enthralled. The WestPoint translation of Jomini’s Art of War (New York:

Lippincott, 1862) sums up the view at the time in itstranslators’ preface (p. 7): “Jomini is admitted by allcompetent judges to be one of the ablest military crit-ics and historians of this or any other day.”

2 There is also a view suggesting that the South lostfrom “lack of will.” See R. Beringer, H. Hattaway, A.Jones and W. Still, Why the South Lost the Civil War(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986), especial-ly p. 64. Of course, one must not dismiss Edwin Pol-lard’s 1866 diatribe against Confederate political andmanagerial incompetence, The Lost Cause, a point ofview that still has adherents. James McPherson, Bat-tle Cry of Freedom (London: Oxford University Press,1988), 854-59, takes both of these theories to task,noting that loss of will did not occur until after fouryears and many decisive defeats in the field; and thatConfederate bureaucratic mismanagement was morethan matched by Northern displays of incompetence.

3 Norman Graebner, “Northern Diplomacy and Euro-pean Neutrality,” in Donald, ed., Why the North Won theCivil War, makes both of these points convincingly.

4 This stricture about realism compels us to rule outthe idea that time-traveling South African Brödersarmed with AK-47s might have come to the South’sassistance, as Harry Turtledove speculated in his epicGuns of the South.

5 James McPherson, “American Victory, AmericanDefeat,” p. 39, in Boritt, ed., Why the Confederacy Lost.

6 On this campaign, see Russell Weigley, The Revolu-tionary Transformation of War (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1970).

7 Wellington’s approach to the Peninsular war ischronicled in detail by Elizabeth Longford, Welling-ton: Years of the Sword (New York: Harper & Row,1969).

8 This theme is nicely developed in Grady McWhineyand Perry Jamieson, Attack and Die: Civil War Mili-tary Tactics and the Southern Heritage (Montgomery:University of Alabama Press, 1982). Paddy Griffith,Battle Tactics of the Civil War (New Haven: Yale Uni-versity Press, 1989) focuses more on the Confederateidée fixe with Napoleonic ways. J.I. Harsh points outwhy Clausewitz’s notion of the superiority of thedefensive was, at this point, still unfamiliar, in his“Battlesword and Rapier: Clausewitz, Jomini, and theAmerican Civil War,” Military Affairs, Vol. 38, 133-38(December 1974).

9 Cited in Bruce Catton, The Civil War (New York:American Heritage, 1961), 177.10 On guerrilla operations, see Thomas Goodrich,Black Flag: Guerrilla Warfare on the Western Border,1861-65 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,1995). J.D. Brewer, The Raiders of 1862 (London:Praeger, 1997) provides detailed case studies of threeof the most spectacular raids of the war in the West,all of which had very significant operational effects.11 Sherman became obsessed with catching “that devilForrest,” because of all the damage he was inflicting.See John Allan Wyeth, That Devil Forrest (BatonRouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991). Forcoverage of both coup de main raids and guerrilla oper-ations in the eastern theater, see J.D. West, Mosby’sRangers (New York: Touchstone Books, 1991).

16 Special Warfare

12 B.H. Liddell-Hart, “Analysis of Cavalry Operationsin the American Civil War, with Special Reference toRaids on Communications” (written in May 1935). Thisis one of Liddell-Hart’s lesser-regarded essays, yet inmany ways it easily serves as a blueprint for the sort ofSouthern concept of operations that I am suggestingcould have won the war. See also his Strategy: The Indi-rect Approach (London: Macmillan, 1954) for a fullerexposition of his ideas. His original essay appears as anappendix in Jay Luvaas, The Military Legacy of theCivil War: The European Inheritance (Chicago: Univer-sity of Chicago Press, 1959), 237-44.13 This is a central argument of Luvaas, The MilitaryLegacy of the Civil War.14 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 854. The mostcomprehensive dataset of battles and casualties is stillColonel T.L. Livermore’s Numbers & Losses in the CivilWar in America: 1861-65 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1901).15 H. Hattaway and A. Jones, How the North Won(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 723-24.16 Ibid., 728-30. The authors arrive at this figure byextensive study of numbers and losses in all battles,as well as of the respective ratios of forces confrontingeach other in every battle.17 Russell Weigley, “American Strategy from ItsBeginnings Through the First World War,” in PeterParet, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1986), 410, notes that aninternal tension existed as early as the debatebetween George Washington and Charles Lee abouthow to fight the British. He observes that Washington“accepted European tutelage in virtually everyaspect,” while Lee “believed that a war fought toattain revolutionary purposes ought to be waged in arevolutionary manner.”18 On the role of special warfare during the Frenchand Indian War, Francis Parkman, Montcalm andWolfe (Boston: Little, Brown, 1897), gives full credit tothe Rangers’ activities as raiders and providers ofwhat we now call “ground truth.” On Greene’s will-ingness to use special warfare in an integrated way,see especially Martin Treacy, Prelude to Yorktown: TheSouthern Campaign of Nathaniel Greene, 1780-81(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,1968).19 On the big-unit war in Vietnam, see Andrew Kre-pinevich, The U.S. Army in Vietnam (Baltimore: JohnsHopkins University Press, 1986). See J. Arquilla andDavid Ronfeldt, “Need for Networked High-TechCyberwar,” Los Angeles Times, June 20, 1999, M1-M6,for a description of how special-operations forces werereadied for use — and could have won the Kosovo Wardecisively and quickly.20 On the difficulty of understanding the true implica-tions of technological change, see Keir A. Lieber,“Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security,” Interna-tional Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), 71-104.On the special-warfare paradigm that may well beemerging, see J. Arquilla and T. Karasik, “Chechnya: AGlimpse of Future Conflict?” Studies in Conflict andTerrorism, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Fall 1999), 207-29.

Winter 2001 17

In light of the ongoing discussions of thenature and definition of unconvention-al warfare, it might benefit the mem-

bers of the Special Forces community tolook at the evolution of the definition ofUW in doctrinal publications and profes-sional journals since 1950.

“Partisan Warfare,” Dictionary ofUnited States Army Terms (August1950):

Activity carried on against an enemy bypeople who are devoted adherents to acause, but who are not members of organ-ized and recognized military forces. Itincludes guerrilla action, passive resist-ance by underground groups, espionage,sabotage, and propaganda.” (Special Regu-lation 350-5-1).

(George T. Metcalf, “Offensive PartisanWarfare,” Military Review, April 1952, 54.)

FM 31-21, Organization and Conductof Guerrilla Warfare (October 1951):

Guerrilla warfare is defined in [SpecialRegulation] 320-5-1 as operations carriedout by small independent forces, generallyin the rear of the enemy, with the objectiveof harassing, delaying and disrupting mili-tary operations of the enemy. The term issometimes limited to the military opera-tions and tactics of small forces whose objec-tive is to inflict casualties and damage uponthe enemy rather than to seize or defendterrain; these operations are characterized

by the extensive use of surprise and theemphasis on avoidance of casualties. Theterm … includes organized and directedpassive resistance, espionage, assassina-tion, sabotage and propaganda, and, in somecases, ordinary combat. Guerrilla warfare isordinarily carried on by irregular, or parti-san forces; however, regular forces whichhave been cut off behind enemy lines orwhich have infiltrated into the enemy rearareas may use guerrilla tactics.

(As cited in Gary M. Jones and Christo-pher Tone, “Unconventional Warfare: CorePurpose of Special Forces,” Special War-fare, Summer 1999, 4.)

“Guerrilla Warfare” (April 1957):According to FM 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare,

March 1955, the broad aims of guerrillastrategy are to: lessen the enemy’s combateffectiveness; delay and disrupt operations ofthe enemy forces; and weaken the moraleand will to resist of a hostile military force.

(Richard L. Gruenther, “Guerrilla War-fare,” Military Review, April 1957, 61.)

“Guerrilla Warfare” (September 1957):This is the major lesson from the past; more

specific lessons which have emerged are:1. The need for training the regular army in

both guerrilla and antiguerrilla measures now.2. The preparation and planning in peace

of an organization to control, equip, andsupport guerrillas before hostilities com-mence so that guerrilla forces can go into

18 Special Warfare

Unconventional Warfare: Definitions from 1950 to the Present

by Major Greg E. Metzgar

action at the outset.3. Coordination of the activities of guer-

rilla units so that their efforts are directedto the attainment of the aim of the regularforces’ commander.

4. The necessity for ensuring the loyaltyand support of the civil population for theguerrillas; and a corollary in the case ofenemy occupied territory, not to involve thecivil population directly in case of reprisalsagainst them.

5. The value of air support in deliveryand evacuation of guerrillas and the main-tenance of forces.

(C.H.A. East, “Guerrilla Warfare,” Mili-tary Review, September 1957, 99.)

Nature of Unconventional Warfare(October 1959):

Unconventional Warfare (UW) is a gen-eral expression which designates all thoseresistance activities conducted within theenemy’s sphere of influence primarily uti-lizing indigenous personnel and resourcesin furtherance of military, political, or eco-nomic objectives. The major componentsare guerrilla warfare, psychological war-fare as it pertains to all phases of uncon-ventional warfare, sabotage, subversionagainst hostile states, and evasion andescape. These resistance activities may becompletely overt, completely covert, orsomething in between these two extremes,depending upon the effectiveness of theenemy’s countermeasures.

Resistance begins with individual resent-ment toward an established regime — dis-satisfaction with things as they are and adesire for change. The individuals who feelthis bitterness toward the government oroccupying power have no collective plan ofaction initially, although they may be per-forming individual acts of resistance.Organization of the resistance movementmay develop spontaneously under initia-tive of a strong natural leader, or it may bethrough the efforts of a representative ofan outside sponsoring power which is hos-tile to the occupying power. In either case,the development of a resistance movementis influenced by certain factors, such as thenational character of the people, the geog-raphy of the area, the civilian support, out-

side support, and whether or not theenemy’s conventional forces are otherwiseengaged.

- Unconventional forces may have politi-cal aspirations inimical to our own.

- Unconventional Warfare may be spon-taneous, with no outside sponsorship, ormay not be responsive to friendly control ordirection.

- Unconventional operations are mosteffective when coordinated with conven-tional operations.

- The tactical value of unconventional forcesbecomes increasingly important as offensiveoperations approach the guerrilla area.

(Frank A. Gleason, Jr., “UnconventionalForces — The Commander’s Untapped Re-sources,” Military Review, October 1959, 25-31.)

Objectives (May 1960):In studying the historical precedents of

guerrilla warfare and its forms of employ-ment, it can be concluded generally thatguerrilla warfare is adopted for one ormore of the following reasons:

1. To assist the regular armed forces inoperations.

2. To defend the country as a lastrecourse when the regular armed forceshave been routed.

3.To instigate a national action to regain theliberty of a country subjugated by the enemy.

4. To overthrow a dictatorial or tyranni-cal form of government.

5. To harass and weaken the existing gov-ernment causing it to fall so as to permit theestablishment of a new government.

(George B. Jordan, “Objectives andMethods of Communist Guerrilla Warfare,”Military Review, May 1960, 52.)

FM 31-15, Operations Against Irregu-lar Forces (May 1961):

The term irregular, used in combinationssuch as irregular forces, irregular activi-ties, and counterirregular operations, isused in the broad sense to refer to all typesof nonconventional forces and operations.It includes guerrilla, partisan, insurgent,subversive, resistance, terrorist, revolu-tionary, and similar personnel, organiza-tions and methods.

Irregular activities include acts of military,

Winter 2001 19

political, psychological, and economic nature,conducted predominantly by inhabitants of anation for the purpose of eliminating or weak-ening the authority of the local government oroccupying power, and using primarily irregu-lar and informal groupings and measures.

(Headquarters, Department of the Army,FM 31-15, Operations Against IrregularForces, May 1961, 3.)

FM 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare and Spe-cial Forces Operations (September1961):

Unconventional warfare consists of theinterrelated fields of guerrilla warfare,evasion and escape, and subversionagainst hostile states (resistance). Uncon-ventional warfare operations are conduct-ed in enemy controlled territory by pre-dominately indigenous personnel usuallysupported and directed in varying degreesby an external source.

(Headquarters, Department of the Army,FM 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare and SpecialForces Operations, September 1961, 3.)

Special Warfare: “Use the Right Word”(1962):

Special Warfare is a term used by theU.S. Army to embrace all the military andparamilitary measures and activities relat-ed to unconventional warfare, counterin-surgency, and psychological operations.

Unconventional Warfare includes theinterrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, eva-sion and escape, and resistance. Such opera-tions are conducted in enemy-held or con-trolled territory and are planned and execut-ed to take advantage of or stimulate resist-ance movements or insurgency against hos-tile governments or forces. In peacetime theUnited States conducts training to developits capability for such wartime missions.

A Resistance Movement is an organizedeffort by some portion of the civil popula-tion of a country to resist the legally estab-lished government or an occupying power.Initially such resistance may consist ofsubversive political activities and otheractions designed to agitate and propagan-dize the populace to distrust and lose con-fidence in the legally established govern-ment or occupying power. If not sup-

pressed, such resistance can result ininsurgency by irregular forces.

- Insurgency is a condition of subversivepolitical activity, civil rebellion, revolt, orinsurrection against duly constituted gov-ernment or occupying power wherein irreg-ular forces are formed and engage in actionswhich may include guerrilla warfare, thatare designed to weaken and overthrow thatgovernment or occupying power.

- Guerrilla Warfare is the conduct of combatoperations inside a country in enemy or enemy-held territory on a military or paramilitarybasis by units organized from predominatelyindigenous personnel.The aim is to weaken theestablished government of the target countryby reducing the combat effectiveness of the mil-itary forces, the economic means, and the over-all morale and will to resist.

- Irregular Forces refers in a broad senseto all types of insurgents, to include parti-sans, subversionists, terrorists, revolution-aries and guerrillas.

- Paramilitary Forces are those existingalongside armed forces and are professedlynonmilitary, but formed on an underlyingmilitary pattern as a potential auxiliary ordiversionary military organization.

- Evasion and Escape are those opera-tions whereby friendly military personneland other selected individuals are enabledto emerge from enemy-held or unfriendlyareas to areas under friendly control.

(Headquarters, Department of the Army,U.S. Army Special Warfare, 1962, 8.)

FM 31-21, Special Forces Operations(February 1969):

Unconventional warfare consists of mili-tary, political, psychological, or economicactions of covert, clandestine, or overt naturewithin areas under the actual or potential con-trol or influence of a force or state whose inter-ests and objectives are inimical to those of theUnited States. These actions are conductedunilaterally by United States resources, or inconjunction with indigenous assets, andavoids formal military confrontation.

Concept. UW is conducted to exploit mil-itary, political, economic, or psychologicalvulnerabilities of an enemy. It is imple-mented by providing support and directionto indigenous resistance forces where

20 Special Warfare

appropriate, or by unilateral operations ofU.S. UW forces. Its conduct involves theapplication of guerrilla warfare and select-ed aspects of subversion, political warfare,economic warfare, and psychological opera-tions in support of national objectives.

Unconventional Warfare Operations.Unconventional warfare operations may becovert, clandestine, or overt in nature.Covert operations are conducted in such amanner as to conceal the identity of thesponsor, while clandestine operations placeemphasis on concealment of the operationrather than the identity of the sponsor.Overt operations do not try to concealeither the operation or the identity of thesponsor. In an established theater of oper-ations in which significant ground opera-tions by conventional U.S. military forcewill be undertaken, UW is conducted pri-marily to complement, support, or extendconventional operations. Within geographi-cal areas under enemy control or influence,to which conventional U.S. forces will notbe deployed, UW may be conducted as aneconomy of force measure, and to reduce ordissipate the enemy potential.

(Headquarters, Department of the Army,FM 31-21, Special Forces Operations, Feb-ruary 1969, 3-1.)

FM 31-21, Special Forces Operations(December 1974):

Unconventional warfare is defined as abroad spectrum of military and paramili-tary operations conducted in enemy, enemyheld, enemy controlled, or politically sensi-tive territory. Unconventional warfareincludes, but is not limited to, the interre-lated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion andescape, subversion, sabotage, direct actionmissions and other operations of a low-visi-bility, covert or clandestine nature. Theseinterrelated aspects of unconventional war-fare may be prosecuted singly or collectivelyby predominantly indigenous personnel,usually supported and directed in varyingdegrees by (an) external source(s) during allconditions of war or peace.

(Headquarters, Department of the Army,FM 31-21, Special Forces Operations,December 1974, 3-1.)

FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special ForcesOperations (April 1990):

Unconventional warfare — A broad spec-trum of military and paramilitary opera-tions, normally of long duration, predomi-nantly conducted by indigenous or surro-gate forces who are organized, trained,equipped, supported, and directed in vary-ing degrees by an external source. Itincludes guerrilla warfare and other directoffensive, low visibility, covert or clandes-tine operations, as well as the indirectactivities of subversion, sabotage, intelli-gence collection, and evasion and escape.

(Headquarters, Department of the Army,FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special ForcesOperations, April 1990, Glossary 12.)

Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Spe-cial Operations (April 1998):

Unconventional warfare. A broad spec-trum of military and paramilitary opera-tions, normally of long duration, predomi-nantly conducted by indigenous or surro-gate forces who are organized, trained,equipped, supported and directed in varyingdegrees by an external source. It includesguerrilla warfare and other direct offensivelow-visibility, covert, or clandestine opera-tions, as well as the indirect activities ofsubversion, sabotage, intelligence activities,and evasion and escape (E&E).

SOF support strategic and operationalgoals with the capability to advise, assist,organize, train, and equip indigenous forcesand resistance movements. Working in locallanguages, SOF assist indigenous forceswith training, intelligence, communications,PSYOP operations, civic action projects, andmedical support. These activities can be con-ducted either in support of conventionalforces — acting as a force multiplier in anintegrated theater campaign — or as part ofa stand-alone unconventional operation.UW includes the following.

- Guerrilla warfare — military and para-military operations conducted by irregular,predominantly indigenous forces in enemy-held or hostile territory. It is the overt mil-itary aspect of an insurgency or otherarmed resistance movement. Guerrillaforces primarily employ raid and ambushtactics against enemy vulnerabilities.

Winter 2001 21

- Subversion — activity designed toundermine the military, economic, psycho-logical, or political strength or morale of aregime or nation. The clandestine nature ofsubversion dictates that the undergroundelements perform the bulk of the activity.

- Sabotage — an act or acts with intent toinjure, interfere with, or obstruct thenational defense of a country by willfullyinjuring or destroying, or attempting toinjure or destroy, any national defense orwar material, premises, or utilities, toinclude human and natural resources. Sab-otage selectively disrupts, destroys, or neu-tralizes hostile capabilities with a minimumexpenditure of manpower and material.

- Support to E&E Networks — an activi-ty that assists military personnel andother selected persons to: move from anenemy-held, hostile, or sensitive area toareas under friendly control; avoid captureif unable to return to an area of friendlycontrol; and once captured, escape.

(Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for JointSpecial Operations, April 1998, II-6-7.)

FM 31-20 (Initial Draft) Doctrine for Spe-cial Forces Operations (December 1998):

UW is a broad spectrum of military andparamilitary operations, predominantlyconducted by indigenous or surrogateforces organized, trained, equipped, sup-ported, and directed in varying degrees byan external source. It includes guerrillawarfare and the indirect activities of sub-version, sabotage, intelligence activities,and unconventional assisted recovery(UAR). UW is the military and paramili-tary aspect of an insurgency or otherarmed resistance movement. UW is thus aprotracted politico-military activity. SFunits do not create resistance movements.They provide advice, training, and assist-ance to indigenous resistance movementsalready in existence. From the U.S. per-spective, the intent is to develop and sus-tain the supported insurgent or resistanceorganizations and to synchronize theiractivities to further U.S. national securityobjectives. When conducted independently,the primary focus on UW is on political-military and psychological objectives. Mili-tary activity represents the culmination of

a successful effort to organize and mobilizethe civil populace against a hostile govern-ment or an occupying power. When UWoperations support conventional militaryoperations, the focus shifts to primarilymilitary objectives. The political and psy-chological implications remain, however.

Contemporary UW is significant for sev-eral reasons. Historically, SF has focusedon UW as an adjunct to a major theater ofwar. The new strategic environment, how-ever, requires SF to focus on UW duringMOOTW, especially as it relates to UAR.Moreover, global urbanization dictates ashift in SF emphasis from rural guerrillawarfare to all aspects of clandestine UW.

(Headquarters, Department of the Army,FM 31-20 (Initial Draft), Doctrine for SpecialForces Operations, December 1998, 2-1, 2-2.)

“Unconventional Operations Propos-al” (Spring 1999):

The conduct of missions and operationsthrough, with, or by indigenous or surrogateelements throughout the operational continu-um.Unconventional operations include,but arenot limited to, a broad spectrum of operationsthat can be of long duration. UO are conductedby elements that are organized, trained,equipped, supported, or directed in varyingdegrees by external sources. UO are character-ized by their joint and interagency complexionand are either overt, covert, or clandestine.Examples of UO include stability operations;guerrilla warfare; subversion; sabotage; infor-mation and intelligence activities; evasion andescape; special reconnaissance; undergroundoperations; auxiliary operations; establishingsupport systems; establishing command andcontrol systems; and direct action conducted byindigenous or surrogate elements.

(Michael J. Ivosevic, “UnconventionalWarfare: Refining the Definition,” SpecialWarfare, Spring 1999, 39.)

“Proposed definition for unconven-tional warfare” (Summer 1999):

Unconventional warfare: A broad spec-trum of military and paramilitary opera-tions that are not usually directed at theconventional objective of defeating theenemy’s military forces in combat. Itincludes subversion, sabotage, intelligence-

22 Special Warfare

collection, training and employing surro-gate forces, offensive information opera-tions, and offensive command-and-controlwarfare. These operations may be conduct-ed in peace, conflict or war, and they maybe overt, covert, or clandestine in nature. Ifthese operations are conducted when ournation is not at war, their success, failureand even exposure are politically sensitiveand carry strategic implications.

(Gary M. Jones and Christopher Tone,“Unconventional Warfare:Core Purpose of Spe-cial Forces,” Special Warfare, Summer 1999, 9.)

ConclusionDr. Tom Marks, a keynote speaker at the

April 2001 Special Forces Conference, stated,“A problem that invariably looms with defini-tions of unconventional warfare is that theyare historically bound.” This anthology is acase in point. In the early 1950s, the framersof UW envisioned its application in a Euro-pean scenario against an invading hostileSoviet force. Many have called this “partisanactions.” However, by the early 1960s, defini-tions began to take more of an “insurgent”nature, whereby UW expanded to include“forces [that] may have political aspirationsinimical to our own.” The change to this ideacan be found in the February 1969 issue of FM31-21, Special Forces Operations.

After the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam,and until the end of the Cold War, UW defi-nitions took on much of their original con-notation, in support of the AirLand Battle.Doctrinal reflection, with the exception of afew advocates, did not take place untilBrigadier General Frank Toney’s charge inAugust 2000 that Special Forces revitalizeto train under the “UW umbrella.”

However, the world has changed from thedays of the Cold War, as has the lens throughwhich the writers of early UW doctrinepeered to complete their analysis. The SFcommunity must re-examine its roots toadjust for change. We must ponder what iswritten in Colonel Wray Johnson’s recentpublication, Vietnam and American Doctrinefor Small Wars: “A major shift in doctrine canresult in a dramatic realignment of roles andmissions assigned to different military ser-vices, and can prompt determined resistance

from those with a vested interest in main-taining the bureaucratic and institutionalstatus quo.” Johnson says further: “The key isanalysis, applied to present and futurerequirements. But analysis is hampered bythe interpretative lens employed by eachgeneration and therefore by the inherentlybiased application of lessons learned to pres-ent and future challenges.”

In order for SF and UW to have any chanceof success in the 21st century, four things mustoccur. First, SF must re-establish an organiza-tion to revitalize and develop UW doctrine.Second, SF must foster an attitude of creativi-ty, and, more importantly, it must put doctri-nal debates into the open and allow thoseresponsible for executing doctrine to have asay in shaping it. Third, SF must performstrenuous simulation and testing, and thatrequires more than a computer simulation ora “panel of experts” review. Fourth, we mustaccept the fact that failure will be inevitable inthe process. Failure can be borne, but only aslong as we accurately determine what wentwrong, why, and how we will fix it. The taskswe face are difficult; nevertheless, as in thepast, we can and will establish a force that willlead the Army and the nation into the 21stcentury in a manner suiting our charge.

Major Greg E. Metzgar is theS3 for the 3rd Battalion, 7thSpecial Forces Group. His pre-vious assignments include rifle,anti-armor and support pla-toon leader in the 3rd Battal-ion, 187th Infantry; detach-ment commander and Headquarters SupportCompany Commander, 7th Special ForcesGroup; and observer/controller and special-operations planner, Joint Readiness TrainingCenter. Major Metzgar is a graduate of the AirCommand and Staff College and of the Schoolof Advanced Airpower Studies. He holds abachelor’s degree in political science from BoiseState University; a master’s in administrationfrom Central Michigan University; a master’sin military art and science from the Air Com-mand and Staff College; and a master’s inadvanced airpower studies from the School ofAdvanced Airpower Studies.

Winter 2001 23

The United States Army Special ForcesCommand recently began pursuing aseries of initiatives to ensure the rele-

vance of SF during and after the Army Trans-formation. The most dramatic of those initia-tives thus far has been the reassertion ofunconventional warfare, or UW, as the prima-ry mission of SF. At the same time, the com-mand has embraced the joint definition of UWand has broadened the scope of SF missionsets, capabilities and training requirements.1In order to plan for and to train for this com-plex mission, SF soldiers at all levels mustunderstand how UW is defined.

Defining UWJoint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of

Military and Associated Terms, defines UWas a “broad spectrum of military and para-military operations, normally of long dura-tion, predominantly conducted by indige-nous or surrogate forces, who are organized,trained, equipped, supported, and directedin varying degrees by an external source. Itincludes guerrilla warfare and other directoffensive, low-visibility, covert or clandes-tine operations, as well as the indirect activ-ities of subversion, sabotage, intelligenceactivities, and evasion and escape.”2

The April 1990 edition of FM 31-20, Doc-trine for Special Forces Operations, used thesame definition for UW that Joint Pub 1-02used3; however, in explaining SF’s role inUW, FM 31-20 focused almost exclusively on

guerrilla warfare. Until recently, almost anydiscussion of UW operations evoked imagesof the Office of Strategic Services’ Jedburghteams or the Robin Sage UW exercise inwhich all SF soldiers participate during theSpecial Forces Qualification Course. Thesoon-to-be-published FM 3-05.20 (formerlyFM 31-20) also uses the Joint Pub 1-02 def-inition, but it gives that definition a muchbroader interpretation.

Although guerrilla-warfare operations areunconventional, they are merely one of themany types of missions covered under thebroad joint definition of UW. Recent UW sem-inars conducted by the Army SF Commandhave further widened the definition by align-ing UW operations with the phases of ArmyVisions 2010 and 2020 — engagement, crisisresponse, warfighting, and return to engage-ment — rather than with the seven phases ofUW detailed in FM 31-20.4 Under the newdefinition, many missions of foreign internaldefense, or FID, are better classified as UW.Coalition support and counterinsurgencymissions also fall under the UW umbrella.

RelevanceThe UW discussion is more than word-

smithing; by redefining the core missionand the core purpose of SF, the Army SFCommand has highlighted the reason whySF units are and will continue to be rele-vant as the entire Army attempts to trans-form into a more agile and lethal force.

24 Special Warfare

Unconventional Warfare: SF’s Past, Present and Future

by Captain Robert Lee Wilson

Other units within the military can anddo perform some of SF’s missions. There areunits within the Army and other servicesthat are tailored to conduct unilateraldirect-action missions. Likewise, anincreased investment in high-technologyplatforms — coupled with the nation’s aver-sion to risking lives — indicates that spe-cial-reconnaissance missions will increas-ingly be executed by unmanned aerial vehi-cles, satellites and miniature robots.5

Forces of the U.S. Special Operations Com-mand, or USSOCOM, are the only onesauthorized by law to conduct UW opera-tions,6 and SF is the only force within USSO-COM specifically created and designed toconduct UW across the spectrum of conflict.UW is our mission; it is the only mission thatis unequivocally ours. While other special-operations and conventional units mayassume a larger role and perform many ofthe missions that SF has traditionally con-ducted, no other unit can conduct UW on thescale that SF can, or with SF’s expertise.

Broadening the definition and the scopeof UW highlights the capabilities of today’s

SF units. SF soldiers conduct FID missionsin many places where violence or instabili-ty could quickly escalate beyond engage-ment and require direct U.S. involvementin hostilities. Numerous troubled areasacross the globe threaten vital U.S. andallied interests. In many regions, fierce eco-nomic competition, tribal or ethnic con-flicts, narco-trafficking or vast ideologicaldifferences exist. They can flash in aninstant to open hostility. These threats areof a smaller scope and scale than those theU.S. encountered during the Cold War.Most are regional, and they typically do notinvolve peer competitors who can engageour general-purpose forces. They are, todescribe them more precisely, unconven-tional threats, and to deal with them effec-tively, we require an unconventional force.7

A unique and inherent ability to workwith indigenous forces is the essence ofwhat makes SF a relevant force, today,tomorrow and in the long-term. While therest of the Army attempts to transform tomeet the varied threats of today and of thefuture, SF units are engaged across the

Winter 2001 25

Until recently, any men-tion of UW evokedimages of the RobinSage exercise in whichall SF soldiers participateduring their training.

File photo

globe on any given day. The ability of SF towork with indigenous or surrogate forces topursue our national interests is of particu-lar value to our Army, which is dependenton early and rapid deployment. Early inter-vention by SF can eliminate the need todeploy a general-purpose force.

Preparing for the Future While UW doctrine is being revised to

reflect the widened scope of the UW mis-sion,8 the Army SF Command is identify-ing critical tasks that SF units will per-form during UW. As higher echelons thusrefine doctrine and tasks, subordinateunits and individual SF soldiers shouldtake the initiative and embrace UW as thecore mission of SF. Our actions right nowshould be threefold:

• Hone combat skills through intensetraining. SF soldiers must be peerless com-batants on the battlefield. They must beable to fire their weapons with precision,and they must be masters of small-unit tac-tics, because in UW operations, they may be

required to train and advise foreign mili-taries in combat operations. The SpecialForces Advanced Urban Combat Course, orSFAUCC, is an excellent example of a train-ing initiative that units can take. By adopt-ing a program of marksmanship and small-unit offensive operations tailored specifical-ly to the group’s regional area of responsi-bility, or AOR, units can rapidly elevate thecombat proficiency of their SF detachments.

SFAUCC provides an excellent start,but SFgroups can go farther. SF soldiers should beproficient at employing heavy weapons, suchas mortars and crew-served weapons. Nearlyhalf of all new SF soldiers come from non-com-bat-arms units, so it is imperative that unitsdevelop intensive training programs to buildthese skills.Groups must find innovative waysof sustaining levels of tactical proficiency aswell, since SF’s high optempo and support-cycle requirements constantly challenge SFleaders to manage time effectively.

• Sharpen cultural skills and regionalfocus. SF soldiers should be experts regardingtheir group’s AOR; they should have a thor-ough understanding of the cultures, demo-

26 Special Warfare

Deploying to other coun-tries and working withhost-nation personnelenable Special Forcessoldiers to build lan-guage capability and cul-tural sensitivity.

File photo

graphics, political situations, military capabil-ities and geography of the countries for whichtheir group is responsible. SF soldiers mustpossess the language capability and culturalskills to operate effectively in their AOR. Agreat deal of regional orientation comes fromexperience. Deploying to the AOR and work-ing with host-nation personnel expands theknowledge base, the language capability andthe experience level of SF soldiers.

SF units can do even more to build exper-tise, however.Whenever possible, units shouldprovide language instruction to SF soldiers;this training should be a command impera-tive.While SF soldiers need not be linguists toperform their duties effectively, language pro-ficiency is a force multiplier for any SF soldierdeployed in his AOR. Units should also lever-age technology to bring regional informationto the fingertips of all SF soldiers. Most SFgroups are equipped with local-area networks,or LANs. Unfortunately, the majority of theinformation passed across the LAN is admin-istrative and does little, if anything, to preparesoldiers for operational missions. The groupinformation-management officer can work inconjunction with the S2 to build databasesthat SF soldiers can easily access on the LAN.The technology exists to create a database ofdetailed maps, political information, and unitexperience that would be available instantlyto every soldier in a group.

• Maximize individual knowledge andcapability. Each SF soldier must work todevelop and sustain his personal skills inthree areas. The first is physical training, orPT. PT is a personal responsibility, and sol-diers must go beyond what is detailed in FM21-20. SF soldiers should incorporate com-batives or martial arts training into theirindividual PT plans, and they should work asmuch on cross-country rucksack marches,long-range swims and upper-body strengthas they do on cardiovascular training.

Second, soldiers should study unconven-tional conflicts across the globe, gleaningall they can from current operations inplaces such as Chechnya and Sri Lanka, aswell as reading up on past UW operations.

Third, soldiers should stay abreast of Armydoctrine. According to current SF doctrine, anSF detachment must be able to develop, organ-ize, train, advise and assist a surrogate force up

to battalion size.8 To perform these tasks effec-tively, detachment members must understandbattlefield operating systems and light-infantrytactics up to and including the battalion level.Soldiers can increase their knowledge of Armydoctrine and tactics by reading field manuals,professional journals and books.

ConclusionIt is important that SF soldiers maintain

proficiency in all their doctrinal missions,but it is especially important that theymaintain proficiency in UW, the core mis-sion of SF. UW is the only SF mission thatno other U.S. military unit is capable ofconducting. SF’s unique ability to workdirectly with indigenous or surrogateforces across the spectrum of conflict is avital capability for the U.S. in today’srapidly changing world. Regardless of howUW is ultimately defined, SF’s UW focuswill ensure our relevance as the Armytransforms around us.

Captain Robert Lee Wilson iscommander of Headquartersand Headquarters Company,7th SF Group. He previouslyserved as an SF detachmentcommander in the 7th SFGroup. Commissioned throughROTC as an Infantry officer, Wilson holds abachelor’s degree in finance from the Universi-ty of Connecticut.

Notes:1 Michael R. Kershner, “Special Forces in Unconven-

tional Warfare” Military Review, January-February2001, 84.

2 Joint Publication 1-02, The Department of DefenseDictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Wash-ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 23 March1994, as amended through 6 April 1999), 713.

3 FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April1990), 3-1.

4 Kershner, 85.5 Discussed during USASFC Unconventional War-

fare Seminar, August 2000.6 U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 167, “Unified Combat-

ant Command for Special Operations Forces”(www4.law.Cornell.edu//uscode/), January 2000.

7 Kershner, 84.8 Discussed during USASFC Unconventional War-

fare Seminar, August 2000.

Winter 2001 27

The world is a vastly different placefrom the one that saw the develop-ment of the United States Army’s

original doctrine on unconventional war-fare, or UW. Before we can attempt todevelop new doctrine on UW, we must ana-lyze what UW is and assess our role in it.

In the “total war” definition of conven-tional warfare (in which nation states bat-tle in open confrontation), the success cri-teria are clear — winners and losers. In thetotal-war model, the defeated, unable tocontinue military resistance, are forced toabide by the political will of the victors. Butbecause UW is more involved with politicalconsiderations than with military ones, thesuccess criteria are more difficult to define.

The definition of UW in Joint Pub 3-05,Doctrine for Joint Special Operations(April 1988) is:

A broad spectrum of military and para-military operations, normally of long dura-tion, predominantly conducted by indige-nous or surrogate forces who are organized,trained, equipped, supported, and directedin varying degrees by an external source. Itincludes guerrilla warfare and other directoffensive low-visibility, covert, or clandes-tine operations, as well as the indirectactivities of subversion, sabotage, intelli-gence activities, and evasion and escape(E&E).

If the purpose of UW were simply to aidconventional forces in the conduct of openwar, as it was 60 years ago, then the defini-

tion in Joint Pub 3-05 would be a good one.But we need a definition of UW that willtake into consideration not only the techni-cal advances of the past half-century, butalso the changes in the type and in thenature of our current and future opponents.

Colonel Gary M. Jones and Major ChrisTone have suggested the following defini-tion of UW: “A broad spectrum of militaryand paramilitary operations, that are notusually directed at the conventional objec-tive of defeating the enemy’s military forcesin combat. It includes subversion, sabotage,intelligence-collection, training and em-ploying surrogate forces, offensive informa-tion operations, and offensive command-and-control warfare. These operations maybe conducted in peace, conflict or war, andthey may be overt, covert or clandestine innature. If these operations are conductedwhen our nation is not at war, their success,failure and even exposure are politicallysensitive and carry strategic implications.”1

According to this definition, SOF wouldhave the latitude to conduct UW in situa-tions throughout the operational continu-um. UW is political in nature, and itsdesired end state is not so much a defeatedmilitary as it is a changed political system.If the desired change can be brought aboutby efforts short of conventional war, thenUW would be a desirable option.

The two most common questions regard-ing UW are: “In this era of shrinking bud-gets, can we and should we train for this

28 Special Warfare

Unconventional Warfare: Questions, Concerns and Proposals

by CW2 Brian D. Halstead

mission?” and “Isn’t UW an improbablemission, and shouldn’t UW training be alow priority? The answer to the first ques-tion is a resounding yes. There is no mis-sion with a higher payoff than a well-exe-cuted UW operation.

The answer to the second question is acomplicated but unequivocal no. The mostcasual observer of the news is aware ofdozens of belligerent parties, pockets of dis-content, and regions of instability aroundthe world. It is in America’s interest toachieve change, without massive U.S.involvement, in areas where there is tur-moil. UW could be an invaluable tool forachieving peace and stability in regions ofunrest and in defeating non-nation ene-mies such as drug cartels. We need doctrinethat will allow us to use all our UWoptions. And we need to look far enoughinto the future to plan for years of continu-ous operations.

If we agree that UW is a likely missionand that UW training is important, thenwhat do we train our soldiers and leadersto do? Let’s examine the tasks specified inthe proposed definition.

Subversion. To subvert is to destroy com-

pletely or to undermine character, moralsor allegiance. Subversion can be accom-plished by attacking the target’s ability tocontrol its infrastructure and populace. Wecould demonstrate to the indigenous popu-lation that our point of view is better forthem, or we could destroy the target’s abil-ity to control the populace by eliminatingthe power base. The first approach is aCA/PSYOP mission; the second approach isa direct-action mission.

While the national command authoritiesare responsible for target selection, the sol-diers at the action level must be ready to exe-cute the mission. The area in which we areleast capable is in blending with the localpopulace. “Blending in” involves more thangetting a civilian haircut — our men need tolearn techniques that will allow them to pres-ent a less distinct profile. If we wish to beable to conduct covert and clandestine opera-tions, we must cultivate the skills that willallow us to blend in with various populations.

Sabotage. Sabotage is DA, whether it isconducted unilaterally or through surro-gate forces. Our current DA exercises sel-dom allow us to plan and execute a missionoutside the established scenario. Such

Winter 2001 29

View of the city ofNuremberg at the end ofWorld War II. In conven-tional war, the loser is theone who is unable tocontinue resistance. InUW, winners and losersare more difficult todefine.

National Archives

restrictions limit the SF detachment’sopportunity for unconventional thinking.To truly disrupt an area, we must firstunderstand the attitude and the reactionof the local populace. That information iscritical in planning an operation.

Intelligence collection. Because the rulesthat apply to intelligence-collection can beconfusing, we have limited our intelligence-collecting activities to casual contact withan unwitting source. We need to strengthenintelligence training for the 180A, for the18F, and for the team as a whole. On anyUW mission, we should have an intelli-gence-collection plan and a dedicated intel-ligence manager. Over the years, as teamswere performing other missions, such as DAand SR, the 18F became the team sergeant’sassistant. If someone else on the team weredesignated to help the team sergeant, the18F would be able to perform his job as theintelligence manager.

Training and employing surrogate forces.The task of training and employing surro-gate forces is a FID mission. We performthis task almost every day somewhere inthe world. In order to be prepared to trainand to employ surrogates throughout the

operational continuum, SF should remainon the ground for a longer period of time.In many parts of the world, a familiar faceis infinitely more important than anyamount of credentials. Whether we achievefamiliarity through rotations (as we did inBosnia and in Kuwait), or by increasing theduration of our FID missions, we must bewilling to remain in the region long enoughto gain the trust of those with whom wemay need to work later.

Offensive information operations. Infor-mation operations represent the area ofgreatest change since our original UW doc-trine was developed. We are in the infor-mation age, and most of our probable ene-mies lag far behind us in their informationcapabilities. Although information opera-tions seem to refer more to CA and PSYOPmissions, we might make ourselves morerelevant by incorporating computer classesinto the SF Qualification Course.

Offensive command and control warfare.In an era in which our enemy is likely to bean organization rather than a sovereignstate, UW may become an increasinglyimportant tool for achieving our nationalgoals. SF can clandestinely infiltrate areas

30 Special Warfare

SF soldiers learn to usecamera equipment whiletraining to become SFintelligence NCOs. Theintelligence NCO serves asthe intelligence managerfor the SF detachment.

U.S. Army photo

that are denied to other forces. This capa-bility is extremely important if our missionis to strike a target within the borders of aneutral nation or of a friendly nation thatcannot act unilaterally because of domesticpolitical concerns. Language skills distin-guish SF from all other forces, and duringyears of performing FID missions, SF hasdeveloped cultural sensitivity and cross-cultural communication skills. By workingand living in troubled areas, we have inmany cases already built a rapport withpotential surrogate forces.

Once we resolve our definition of UW,we must turn our attention to doctrine,training, leader development, organiza-tion, materiel and soldier skills. Doctrinewill establish our relevance for the future.As we refine our doctrine, we should alsoidentify critical soldier skills and developtraining. How can we accomplish thesetasks simultaneously? We can train on theaspects of UW that have remainedunchanged. We can increase our trainingemphasis in two areas: battle-focus analy-sis and autonomy. We must be able toexploit an entire region, not merely anassigned country. In order to achieve themaximum effect with the minimumexpenditure of assets, we must assess thecenter of gravity of each target. Elementsat the lowest levels must be able to planoperations. How do we prepare our sol-diers to identify, organize, train, equip,and lead indigenous forces in war? Bysending those soldiers to infiltrate deniedareas; establish contacts; and equip, trainand lead indigenous groups during peace.

Autonomy in action is equally important.Some areas in the world run on trust. If wetrain indigenous groups, we should also bewilling to lead them. Otherwise, they willthink we are turning our backs on them,and they will devolve back into a mob atthe first contact with the enemy. We needto have the moral courage to state the pur-pose of our presence in an area, and thefortitude to stick to that purpose.

Clear wording of our UW doctrine isimportant. SF operators are capable ofunderstanding complex issues, but one ofthe greatest enemies they may face in UWis ambiguity. SF is the most intelligent

fighting force in the world. We owe SF sol-diers training that will enable them toachieve their objectives, doctrine thatclearly states the purpose of their activi-ties, and a purpose that is worthy of thesacrifices we are asking them tomake.

CW2 Brian D. Halstead isthe operations warrant offi-cer for A Company, 1st Bat-talion, 3rd SF Group. Afterentering the Army in 1984, heserved for five years in the2nd Ranger Battalion. HisSpecial Forces assignments include mem-ber of an SF detachment in the 1st Battal-ion, 1st SF Group; and detachment com-mander in the 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group.

Notes:1 Colonel Gary M. Jones and Major Chris Tone,

“Unconventional Warfare: Core Purpose of SpecialForces,” Special Warfare, Summer 1999, 9.

Winter 2001 31

In the mid-1990s, threats toAmerica’s homeland from nat-ural disasters and terrorist

incidents prompted the UnitedStates to begin developing policiesand programs aimed at protectingcritical infrastructure, ensuringdisaster preparedness and manag-ing the consequences of both natur-al and man-made disasters.

As part of these efforts, theDepartment of Defense, or DoD (insupport of the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency, or FEMA,the Department of Justice andother federal agencies), introducedseveral initiatives to streamlinethe military’s response to domesticemergencies.

Although DoD has always main-tained a strong role in national-security emergency preparedness, itis now developing innovative waysof supporting local, state and feder-al agencies during any kind ofdomestic emergency. Throughoutthe 1990s, DoD updated doctrinalmaterials pertaining to domestic-support operations, or DSO (alsoknown as military support to civilauthorities, or MSCA); militaryassistance for civil disturbances;and military assistance to civilauthorities.1 In addition to estab-lishing the Directorate of Military

Support and the DoD ResourcesData Base, DoD reorganized theresponse system that manages DoDassets in DSO. This response sys-tem consists of a defense coordinat-ing officer and emergency prepared-ness liaison officers, or EPLOs. Dur-ing the late 1990s, DoD conductedstudies to determine the best strat-egy for integrating the DoD reservecomponent, or RC, into “emerging”

homeland-defense responsibilities.2In addition, DoD created organiza-tions and teams to help strengthenits domestic preparedness againstweapons of mass destruction, orWMD.3

DoD Directive 3025.1 governsthe MSCA activities of all DoDcomponents in the 50 states, theDistrict of Columbia, the Common-wealth of Puerto Rico, and U.S. ter-

32 Special Warfare

Is There a Role for CA in Domestic Support Operations?

by Major Dennis J. Cahill

Major Steven Watters, 448th CA Battalion, prepares an injection for a Thai villager’s pig during Exer-cise Cobra Gold 2000.

Photo by Stan Parker

ritories and possessions. Under theprovisions of this directive, “DoDcomponents shall augment staffsresponsible for MSCA, as appropri-ate, with personnel from reservecomponents of all military serviceswho are specifically trained forcivil-military planning and emer-gency liaison duties.” The referenceto “specifically trained” personnelcould include the EPLOs men-tioned above, as well as personnelwho are assigned to active- andreserve-component Civil Affairsunits. Yet CA continues to be large-ly left out of the planning andorganization for DSO. It is time tomake a case for including CA inDSO.

In this article, we will use the spe-cial-operations mission criteria toanalyze the employment of CA inDSO. We will also discuss the activi-ties that CA could perform duringeach of the four phases of comprehen-sive emergency management. We willthen discuss recommendations forintegrating CA into the Army’s role ofsupport to domestic preparedness.

SOF mission criteriaThe special-operations mission

criteria were developed in 1991,during Operation Desert Storm, toensure that assets of special-opera-tions forces, or SOF, would be com-mitted only to appropriate mis-sions. SOF commanders and plan-ners at all levels still use the fivecriteria to assess any proposed useof SOF. These criteria, as theyrelate to CA, are outlined in FM41-10, Civil Affairs Operations:4• Is the mission appropriate for

CA?• Does the mission support the

regional commander in chief ’scampaign plan?

• Is the mission operationally feasible? • Are the required resources avail-

able for conducting the mission? • Does the expected outcome justi-

fy the risk of employing CA? What follows is an explanation of

how the mission criteria apply to CA’semployment in domestic operations.

Is the mission appropriate for CA?CA forces have acquired specializedskills and capabilities through yearsof training and experience. Some ofthe personnel in CA’s active-compo-nent, or AC, units, such as dentists,physician’s assistants, constructionengineers, veterinary-service offi-cers, and preventive-medicine offi-cers, have skills that are found else-where in the Army. But personnel inCA’s RC units are skilled in fieldsunique to the civilian sector — suchas public health, public transporta-tion, public works and utilities, foodand agriculture, emergency services,environmental management and themanagement of dislocated civilians.

CA soldiers, whether AC or RC,are experienced in applying theirskills to disaster situationsthroughout the world. They haveparticipated in foreign humanitari-

an assistance, military civic actions,emergency services, support to civil-administration operations, andexercises at the national, regional,provincial and local levels.

Before CA forces can be employedin a DSO mission, we must deter-mine whether the mission calls forCA’s unique skills and capabilitiesand whether the mission is of ade-quate strategic or operational impor-tance to justify the use of CA. JointPublication 1-02, DoD Dictionary ofMilitary and Associated Terms,defines DSO as “Those activities andmeasures taken by the DoD to fostermutual assistance and supportbetween the DoD and any civil gov-ernment agency in planning or pre-paredness for, or in the application ofresources for response to, the conse-quences of civil emergencies orattacks, including national securityemergencies.”5

DoD’s emergency-preparednessresponsibilities are clearly definedin Executive Order 12656: to devel-

Winter 2001 33

1st Lieutenant Steven Hart, 358th CA Brigade, works with a local well repairman in Timehri,Guyana, during a disaster-relief exercise, Exercise Tradewinds 1999.

Photo by Michelle Labriel

op and maintain damage-assess-ment capabilities; to coordinateemergency water-resource planningat the national, regional, state andlocal levels; to support the Secretaryof Housing and Urban Developmentin the development of plans torestore community facilities; toassist the Secretary of State in theformulation and execution of eco-nomic measures that affect othernations; and to coordinate with thedirector of FEMA on the develop-ment of plans for mutual civil-mili-tary support during national securi-ty emergencies.6

During the last two decades, CAforces have performed activities simi-lar to those outlined in ExecutiveOrder 12656 in Grenada, Panama,Kuwait, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti,Guantanamo Bay, Bosnia and Koso-vo.As a result of their extensive train-ing and experience, CA personnel canplan and conduct interagency coordi-nation; mass-care activities; civil-defense training; and the stepsrequired to transition from militarycontrol to civil control. The skills ofCA forces are applicable regardless ofthe location or the cause of a disaster.CA could even assist the Secretary ofDefense in meeting his domesticresponsibilities.

A point of clarification may be nec-essary here with respect to recent DoDinitiatives that govern the response toWMD incidents. “Crisis management”is the term used to describe the gradu-ated, flexible response to a range of ter-rorist-related incidents. The FederalBureau of Investigation is the leadagency for crisis management.“Conse-quence management” is the term usedto describe the coordinated responsethat would be required if an act of ter-rorism were to result in substantialinjury, death or collateral damage.Under these circumstances, the conse-quence-management response wouldbe similar to the response to a majordomestic disaster. FEMA is the leadagency for dealing with consequence

management. CA forces could make avaluable contribution in planning andsupporting the transition from crisisresponse to consequence management.

Does the mission support theregional commander in chief’s cam-paign plan? Although the command-ers in chief, or CINCs, of several uni-fied commands are charged withdomestic responsibilities,7 FEMA isthe primary agency responsible for“coordinating federal emergency pre-paredness, planning, management,and disaster assistance functions.”8

FEMA develops a federal responseplan, or FRP, which serves as a blue-print for FEMA’s coordination activi-ties.9 DoD, which has a supportingrole in the FRP as a force provider,normally provides support “onlywhen other resources are unavail-able, and only if such support doesnot interfere with its primary mis-sion or ability to respond to opera-tional contingencies.”10

An example of a unified com-mander’s plan to conduct MSCA in

support of the FRP is shown inFunctional Plan 2501–97 of theU.S. Atlantic Command (now U.S.Joint Forces Command), publishedFeb. 2, 1998.11 The plan’s Annex G,Civil Affairs, provides guidance forplanning and conducting CA opera-tions during a domestic disaster-relief operation. Among the plan’sassumptions are that two of theArmy’s four CA commands will beavailable to assist two designatedregional joint task forces/responsetask forces in planning domesticdisaster-relief operations.12 Theplan also calls for AC CA forces toprovide initial support until RC CAforces can be mobilized.

Is the mission operationally feasi-ble? The CA commander must realis-tically evaluate his force during themission analysis. CA is not struc-tured to perform unilateral opera-tions and should not be assigned anymission that is beyond the scope ofits capabilities.

Certain legal constraints also

34 Special Warfare

Major Jim Reed (left), 486th Civil Affairs Battalion, and Paul Hacker (second from right), a U.S. eco-nomics professor, meet with Bosnian businessmen to assist in rebuilding the Bosnian economy.

Photo by Angel Clemons

apply in DSO. Except in an imme-diate-response situation, duringwhich military commanders areauthorized to take immediateaction to save lives, to preventhuman suffering, or to mitigategreat property damage, federalmilitary forces have no legalauthority to initiate MSCA opera-tions without the approval of thenational command authorities. Asa federal force, CA cannot enforcecivil law. Doing so would be a viola-tion of U.S. Code, Title 18, Section1385 (the Posse Comitatus Act).

Finally, U.S. law and DoD policystrictly limit the use of military-intelligence assets in collecting ormaintaining information aboutU.S. individuals, associations andcorporations. CA activities in DSOmust be closely coordinated withthe staff judge advocate.13 Howev-er, as long as planners adhere tothe legal constraints outlinedabove, the use of CA forces indomestic operations would be oper-ationally feasible.

Are the required resources avail-able for conducting the mission?Should CA forces be employed tocomplement and enhance existingactivities, the organization that isbeing assisted would be responsiblefor protecting, integrating and sus-taining the CA forces. Requiredresources may include airlift, intel-ligence, communications and logis-tics. Time is another important con-sideration. Depending on the natureof the situation, AC CA forces maybe able to respond to a situationmore quickly than RC forces could,or because their time is not limited,they may be better prepared to con-duct missions of longer duration.

In most cases, military supportfor DSO is provided on a cost-reim-bursable basis. Unless CA assetshave been committed to an imme-diate-response situation, therequestor’s inability or unwilling-ness to reimburse the costs of the

support may preclude the use ofCA in DSO.14

Does the expected outcome justifythe risk of employing CA? Theobjectives of DSO are twofold: toquickly and efficiently alleviatehuman suffering and to restorebasic facilities and services to nor-mal operations as soon as possible.CA could provide soldiers whoseknowledge, skills and abilities aresuited to efficiently achieving theobjectives of DSO. The “risk” inDSO becomes clearer when we con-sider observations made during theDoD responses to hurricanes Iniki,Andrew and Hugo: “Until the CivilAffairs assets deployed into theoperational area, their normal mis-sion activities were conducted bythe (conventional) units’ staffs andleaders … (who) lacked the specialskills and experience of CivilAffairs personnel.”15 The risk,therefore, is that DSO will be per-formed by soldiers who are eitherunqualified or inefficient. The

employment of CA, on the otherhand, would mitigate the inherentchaos of disaster operations anddecrease the likelihood that otherorganizations would provideredundant capabilities.16

After having applied the five spe-cial-operations mission criteria toassess the employment of CA inDSO, we can see that the mission isappropriate; the mission can sup-port the theater campaign plan;the mission is operationally feasi-ble; the required resources areavailable for conducting the mis-sion; and the expected outcome jus-tifies the risk of employing CA.

Employment in DSOWe will now look at the activities

that CA could perform during each ofthe four phases of comprehensiveemergency management: mitigation,preparedness, response and recovery.

Mitigation phase. During the miti-gation phase, CA could perform

Winter 2001 35

In Kosovo, soldiers of the 415th CA Battalion detain an Albanian man alleged to have attacked acab driver. The soldiers are waiting for U.N. police to arrive.

Photo by Tyler Long

activities to eliminate or reduce thelikelihood of a disaster or the severi-ty of its effects. The identification ofhazards and the analysis of vulnera-bilities (which are major activities ofthe mitigation phase) are essentialin planning the other phases.

Predeployment area studies andpost-deployment area assessmentshave long been major focuses of CA’sinitial training and sustainmenttraining. Many CA units conductdisaster-preparedness planningsurveys, or DPPS, for the U.S. Pacif-ic Command, for the U.S. SouthernCommand and for the U.S. Euro-pean Command. The DPPS identi-fies the critical vulnerabilities offoreign populations and infrastruc-

tures and thenassesses the em-ergency-responsecapabilities ofhost-nation civil-defense structuresand of interna-tional and non-g o v e r n m e n torganizations.

CA’s mitigationtraining could beemployed at thelocal, regional andnational levels.For example, CAforces could assistagencies, such asthe U.S. ArmyCorps of Engi-neers, in conduct-ing assessments offlood-prone areasto determine theimpact of pro-posed mitigationplans on localcommunities. CAforces could alsoconduct modifiedDPPSs for emer-gency-manage-ment officials whoare creating, vali-

dating or updating their own emer-gency-preparedness plans.

Preparedness phase. In the pre-paredness phase, CA could reviewDoD emergency-management plansto identify situations in which CA’sexpertise could be applied. Incorpo-rating CA’s expertise would reducethe redundancy of training other sol-diers to perform disaster-relatedtasks. Including CA forces in emer-gency-preparedness exercises wouldfurther promote CA’s capabilities andfoster the Army’s goal of cultivatingteamwork among Army components.

CA could support the readinesstraining of emergency-response per-sonnel by performing observer/con-troller duties during emergency-

preparedness exercises. In return,CA forces would benefit from thetraining opportunity, and they couldprovide inexpensive consulting ser-vices to government agencies.

Response phase. The responsephase occurs during and immediatelyfollowing a disaster. Response activi-ties provide emergency assistance tovictims of disaster, and they reducethe likelihood of secondary damage.The five stages of the response phaseare notification/warning, immediatepublic safety, property security, publicwelfare, and restoration.

Because of the length of time that isrequired for CA forces to respond toan emergency (unless those forces arealready in a position to provide imme-diate response following a disaster),they most likely will become involvedduring the public-welfare andrestoration stages. During the public-welfare stage, CA forces could assessthe damage caused by the disasterand then provide assistance and carefor disaster victims. During therestoration stage, CA could plan andsynchronize the activities of the vari-ous agencies that are repairing basicfacilities and restoring services.

A case in which CA provided imme-diate response occurred in upstateNew York in January 1997. Severe icestorms had knocked out the electricalpower and had created treacherousroad conditions, stranding travelers.At the request of local authorities, CApersonnel set up generators at criticalfacilities, loaned cots to emergencyshelters, and transported civilianmedical personnel from their homesto local hospitals.

A vignette from FM 41-10 providesan example of CA activities duringthe public-welfare and restorationstages. “In the aftermath of the disas-ter leveled on southern Florida byHurricane Andrew, Civil Affairsteams were deployed to begin assess-ing the damage. Working in closecoordination with local, state, and fed-eral agencies, the teams established a

36 Special Warfare

Soldiers from Civil Affairs Task Force 489 assess property damagein southern Florida following Hurricane Andrew.

Photo by Keith Butler

civil-military operations center, orCMOC. The CMOC provided the crit-ical interface between the joint taskforce and the numerous governmentagencies, civilian organizations andlocal volunteers.”17

CA could also assist nongovern-ment agencies, e.g., the AmericanRed Cross, in running mass-careoperations. CA forces, both AC andRC, were instrumental in providingsupport during Operation ProvideRefuge, the mission that cared forand processed ethnic Albanians fromKosovo at Fort Dix, N.J., from May toJuly 1999. Like their predecessorswho had worked with displacedPanamanians in Panama City, Pana-ma, and with Haitian refugees inGuantanamo Bay, Cuba, a few yearsearlier, CA personnel assisted in set-ting up and organizing the refugeecamp, chaired meetings with thecamp inhabitants, and resolved sen-sitive interagency issues.

Recovery phase. Even thoughsome recovery efforts are performedduring the response phase, thoseefforts are short-term and aredirected at restoring basic facilities

and services only. Long-term recov-ery operations are performed dur-ing the recovery phase, the finalphase of the emergency-manage-ment cycle. Long-term recoveryoperations may continue until allsystems and the entire disasterarea have been returned to normal,or until the area has been redevel-oped for different uses. Long-termrecovery efforts may go on for years.

CA activities during the recoveryphase would be limited. During thisphase, the objective is to turn opera-tions over to local civil authorities assoon as possible. Normally, CA sup-port would end when the situationhad improved to the extent thatstate and local assets could continuethe mission. In the past, CA forceshave been instrumental in identify-ing and setting the conditions for,and facilitating the conduct of, thetransition from military control tocivilian control.

SummaryDoD forces are more likely to be

employed in some types of domestic

disasters than in others. The factorsthat determine whether they will beemployed are the nature of the dis-aster; the extent of the damage; andthe ability of local, state and federalemergency-management agencies tomanage the disaster. Because oftheir specialized experience andcapabilities, CA forces are invaluablein DSO. The employment of CAwould allow other DoD elements tofocus on their core competencies andto concentrate on their specific partof the operation.

CA’s experience and expertise couldbe applied to domestic emergencies,but CA personnel are not being fullyused either in the planning of or inthe execution of DoD preparednessinitiatives. Employing the capabilitiesof CA for domestic-support operationswould allow other military compo-nents to become better prepared todefend U.S. territory and the U.S. pop-ulation against emerging asymmetricthreats as well as man-made and nat-ural disasters.

As budgets and force structuresshrink, the Army must avoid redun-dancy in its contingency-relatedcapabilities. The importance ofincorporating CA into DSO plan-ning and exercises should not beoverlooked. The involvement of CAwould be a cost-saving measure; itwould allow the Army to capitalizeon an existing asset; and it wouldenable the Army to expand itsemergency-response capabilitiesagainst all disasters.

Major Dennis J.Cahill is chief of thetraining branch ofthe CA/CMO Divi-sion, Directorate ofTraining and Doc-trine, U.S. Army JohnF. Kennedy Special Warfare Centerand School. In prior assignments, hehas served in Company C, 96th CivilAffairs Battalion, SWCS, the 354th

Winter 2001 37

Soldiers assist in distributing supplies to Haitian refugees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. CA assist-ed in organizing the refugee camp and in resolving interagency issues.

DoD photo

Civil Affairs Brigade, and the U.S.Army Civil Affairs and Psychologi-cal Operations Command. He holdsan additional skill identifier as aCivil Defense Officer. Major Cahill isa graduate of both the Commandand General Staff College and theArmy Management Staff College. Heholds a master’s degree in businessand organizational security man-agement from Webster University.

Notes:1 The Army instituted regulations to deal

with domestic-support issues prior to the1990s (e.g., AR 500-50, Civil Disturbances,21 April 1972; AR 500-60, Disaster Relief, 1August 1981; and AR 500-70, Military Sup-port of Civil Defense, 1 October 1982). DoDhad published directives such as DoD Direc-tive 3020.36, Assignment of National Secu-rity Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) Re-sponsibilities to DoD Components, 2 Novem-ber 1988. In the early 1990s, however, witha new focus on military operations otherthan war, now known as stability and sup-port operations, DoD began publishing addi-tional directives to further clarify its roles,such as DoD Directive 3025.1, Military Sup-port to Civil Authorities (MSCA), 15 Janu-ary 1993; DoD Directive 3025.12, MilitaryAssistance for Civil Disturbances(MACDIS), 4 February 1994; and DoDDirective 3025.15, Military Assistance forCivil Authorities (MACA), 18 February1997. The Army followed suit with doctrinalmanuals such as FM 100-19, Domestic Sup-port Operations, 1 July 1993.

2 DoD conducted studies such as theReserve Component Employment Study2005, and the Department of Defense Planfor Integrating National Guard and ReserveComponent Support for Response to AttacksUsing Weapons of Mass Destruction.

3 In 1999, 10 rapid assessment and initialdetection teams, made up of full-timeNational Guard soldiers, were created tosupport local, state and federal agenciesresponding to a WMD incident. The JointTask Force for Civil Support was created inOctober 1999 to oversee all DoD support tolead federal agencies during consequence-management operations.

4 U.S. Army, FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Opera-tions, February 2000, 1-11.

5 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publi-cation 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military andAssociated Terms. DoD Directive 3025.1,MSCA, takes this definition verbatim andapplies it to the term MSCA.

6 Executive Order 12656, “Assignment of

Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities,” wassigned by President Ronald Reagan 18 Novem-ber 1988 and amended by Executive Order13074, signed by President William Clinton 9February 1998.DoD responsibilities are found inParts 1, 2 and 5 and in the amendment.

7 The CINC, U.S. Joint Forces Command,serves as the DoD principal planning and oper-ating agent for military support to civil author-ities for all DoD components in the 48 contigu-ous states and in the District of Columbia. TheCINC, Southern Command, does the same forU.S. possessions and territories in the Car-ibbean, while the CINC, Pacific Command, isresponsible for Alaska, Hawaii and U.S. posses-sions, territories and protectorates in the Pacif-ic area of operations. See FM 100-19, DomesticSupport Operations, 1 July 1993, 2-5. Note:Since the publication of this manual, DoD hasrealigned geographical CINC responsibilities.Joint Forces Command now has responsibilityfor the areas formerly assigned to Forces Com-mand and Atlantic Command.

8 This responsibility was delegated to FEMAunder the Stafford Act and Executive Orders12148, Federal Emergency Management, and12656, Assignment of Emergency Prepared-ness Responsibilities. FEMA also has been del-egated responsibility for establishing federaldisaster-assistance policy. In this stewardshiprole, FEMA has the lead in developing andmaintaining the FRP.

9 As stated in Introduction to the BasicPlan of the Federal Response Plan, April1999, “The Federal Response Plan (FRP)establishes a process and structure for thesystematic, coordinated, and effective deliv-ery of Federal assistance to address the con-sequences of any major disaster or emer-gency declared under the Robert T. StaffordDisaster Relief and Emergency AssistanceAct, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5121, et seq.).” Italso contains a terrorism-incident annex,which is the first in a series of anticipatedannexes that are incident-specific.10 Concept of Operations from the BasicPlan of the Federal Response Plan, April1999, paragraph 1.D.3., “Military Support.”11 U.S. Atlantic Command was redesignatedand reorganized as U.S. Joint Forces Com-mand in October 1999.12 USCINCACOM Functional Plan 2501-97, 2 February 1998, Annex G, Civil Affairs.13 Ibid., viii.14 DoD Directive 3025, Military Assistanceto Civil Authorities, 15 January 1993, para-graphs D.4.g. and D.5.b.15 Center for Army Lessons Learned, “DisasterAssistance.”16 The Reserve Component EmploymentStudy 2005, Volume 1 Study Report, 29 July1999, p. 4, retrieved 3 February 2000, from theWorld Wide Web, www.fas.org/man/docs/

rces2005_072299.htm, wrestled with thequestion of “whether selected RC units could beassigned homeland defense-related missions inaddition to their existing mission of fighting thenation’s wars.” The study notes that RC unitsorganized for NBC-related tasks are all appor-tioned to overseas theaters in the event ofMTW.Thus, while they could be made availablein peacetime to provide WMD consequence-management support at home, they might beunavailable for this mission if a WMD attackoccurred while they were engaged in an over-seas conflict.The same can be said for CA unitswith respect to DSO if they are mobilized forMTW. The study concluded that “it may beimpractical and costly to maintain skills forboth warfighting and specialized homelanddefense missions in a large number of RCunits.” It recommended that certain RC unitsbe remissioned or restructured to focus solelyon specialized homeland-defense tasks. Thisarticle should demonstrate that current CAmissions and structure are appropriate for bothwar-fighting and DSO.17 AAR, Hurricane Andrew, used as a vignettein FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, 1-4.

38 Special Warfare

Winter 2001 39

Army Values

The EpitomeDick Meadows

The story of Richard J. “Dick” Meadows is one ofdedication.

After enlisting in the Army in August 1947 atthe age of 16, Meadows served in Korea with dis-tinction, and at age 20, he became the youngestmaster sergeant in the Korean War.

Meadows volunteered for Special Forces in 1953 andlater served three tours of duty in Southeast Asia. Hisfirst tour was with Operation White Star, advising andassisting Laotian government forces in counterinsur-gency operations. His second and third tours were withthe Military Assistance Command,Vietnam Studies andObservation Group, or MACV SOG, conducting covertintelligence-gathering and direct-action missions inenemy-controlled areas throughout Southeast Asia.While Meadows was serving his first tour with MACVSOG, General William C.Westmoreland, the senior U.S.commander in Vietnam, recommended him for a battle-field commission, the first of the Vietnam War. In 1970,Meadows served as the assault-element leader for theraid on the Son Tay prison camp near Hanoi.

After retiring from the Army in 1977, Meadows con-tinued to serve as a civilian consultant for the organiza-tion and the establishment of the 1st Special ForcesOperational Detachment-Delta. In 1980, he helped planOperation Eagle Claw, the mission to rescue 53 Ameri-cans held hostage in Iran. Prior to the rescue attempt,Meadows worked undercover in Iran, conducting mis-sion-support activities. After Eagle Claw, Meadows con-tinued to help organize other special-mission units, andhe also served as a consultant in U.S. efforts to thwartcriminal drug trafficking.

As an NCO,as an officer and as a civilian,Dick Mead-ows was highly respected as a thorough professional.Hisextraordinary service to the United States spannedmore than three decades and epitomized the Army val-ues of personal courage, selfless service, loyalty, duty,honor, integrity and respect.

Captain Dick Meadows during the Vietnam War.Courtesy Special Warfare Museum

40 Special Warfare

Enlisted Career NotesSpecial Warfare

The selection rate for soldiers in CMF 37, Psychological Operations, duringthe 2000 sergeant-major promotion board was 28 percent, well above theArmy’s average. Of the master sergeants who were considered for promotionand for attendance at the Army Sergeants Major Academy, two were select-ed for promotion, and one of those was selected to attend the academy. Fromthe board’s review and analysis of all the records considered, the followinginformation applies to the records of CMF 37 soldiers:• While the overall comments regarding individuals’ records were favor-

able, a number of duty descriptions were vaguely written, incorrectly por-traying staff positions as leadership positions. As a result, the board haddifficulty determining the scope and the level of responsibility for some ofthe positions.

• The most important discriminator for an individual’s promotion to E9was an assignment of at least 24 months as a first sergeant. A soldierwho had less than 24 months as a first sergeant was less competitive.

• Other deficiencies were consistent with the reports of previous selectionboards: inaccurate records, records not reviewed and updated, missingor outdated DA photos, and lack of jumpmaster qualification.

Future CMF-37 selection rates for promotion to E9 will be below theArmy’s average, but selection rates for the academy will be near theArmy’s average. For more information, telephone the senior CMF 37 man-ager in the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, MSG John A.Condroski, at DSN 239-9002 or commercial (910) 432-9002.

The Special Forces Prior Service Accessions Program has established proce-dures for evaluating and accessing CMF-18-qualified NCOs who had previous-ly served on active duty or in the reserve component and who are interested inre-applying for SF service in the active component. Those who are eligibleinclude prior-service personnel, SF reserve-component personnel, and active-duty soldiers who are SF-qualified but are not serving in a CMF-18 skill.Applicants will be accessed for a minimum of three years on active dutyunder a conditional contract. The contract specifies that if soldiers are select-ed by the assessment-and-review board, they will serve on active duty inCMF 18. Soldiers who do not meet the assessment prerequisites or the boardcriteria will be reclassified into another MOS as directed by the Total ArmyPersonnel Command, or TAPC, consistent with the needs of the Army. Appli-cants who are members of the Army National Guard must have their stateadjutant general’s approval before they can volunteer.The Special Warfare Center and School will evaluate an applicant’s physicalability, duty performance, psychological stability and security clearanceprior to the applicant’s appearance before the assessment-and-review board.Evaluation criteria include a complete physical examination, the ArmyPhysical Fitness Test, psychological testing, and a 12-mile road march.

SF establishes Prior Service Accessions Program

CMF 37 exceeds Army’s promotion rate to E9

Winter 2001 41

The assessment-and-review board will convene at Fort Bragg once the can-didates have completed their assessment-and-evaluation criteria. Appli-cants who are selected by the review board will be accessed into active-duty SF in accordance with the guidelines of both TAPC and the ArmyRecruiting Command. Applicants who are not selected will not be re-eval-uated for at least 12 months.Soldiers who are interested in the program should ask their local recruiterabout the prior/former Special Forces enlistment option (USAREC mes-sage 97-034). Soldiers who were trained in a CMF-18 MOS while in thereserve component may also be eligible for the broken-service selective re-enlistment bonus. For more information, telephone MSG Brian Nulf atDSN 239-8423 or commercial (910) 432-8423.

The Army Special Operations Command and the Special Warfare Center andSchool have requested that selected CMF 37F soldiers assigned to the 9thPSYOP Battalion be allowed to attend Ranger School under the Ranger Indoc-trination Program. The request is awaiting review and approval by theDepartment of the Army and by the Infantry proponent. If the request isapproved, a limited number of the 9th Battalion’s 37F authorizations would bedesignated as the Ranger Tactical PSYOP Detachment and would be coded“V” (Ranger parachutist). Male PSYOP soldiers in those positions would begiven the opportunity to attend Ranger school, where they could enhance theirleadership ability and acquire advanced skills. If approved, the initiativewould dramatically improve the 4th PSYOP Group’s support-and-trainingrelationship with the 75th Ranger Regiment.The 9th PSYOP Battalion wouldconduct quarterly assessments to identify candidates for assignment to theRanger Detachment.The assessments would evaluate candidates in the ArmyPhysical Fitness Test, 12-mile rucksack march, five-mile run, combatives,obstacle course, swim test and weapons qualification. The assessment wouldalso serve as a prerequisite for soldiers to attend the Ranger IndoctrinationProgram. PSYOP soldiers who are interested in applying for the Ranger Tac-tical PSYOP Detachment should telephone the 9th PSYOP Battalion at DSN236-2965/8819 or commercial (910) 396-2965/8819.

The 2000 sergeant-major promotion board provided a review and analysisthat contains important information for soldiers in CMF 18. Listed beloware excerpts from the board’s analysis:• Performance and potential. For the most part, rater and senior-rater

portions of NCOERs were well-written and had appropriate bullet com-ments. A soldier’s APFT score and specific comments on his level of fit-ness can be positive discriminators.

• Utilization and assignments. An SF team-sergeant assignment was byfar the most important discriminator. If the soldier had less than 24months as a team sergeant, his competitiveness was limited. Mastersergeants who had served as team sergeants for at least 24 months andwho also had served as first sergeants or as cadre team sergeants stoodout. As a rule, the more time that one had served in a team-sergeantposition, the better.

• Training and education. The lack of a jumpmaster rating was a nega-tive discriminator. Many of the soldiers’ files had not been updated anddid not reflect soldiers’ most current military schools and civilian edu-cation. Many photos were more than five years old and did not accu-

Promotion board assessesCMF 18 candidates

Initiative would allowPSYOP soldiers to attend

Ranger School

42 Special Warfare

rately represent the awards and badges that the soldier had earned.• CMF structure and career-progression assessment. Although the overall

quality of CMF 18 is extremely high, the CMF does not have enough E9slots to allow its soldiers to be promoted to E9 at the Army’s averagerate. The panel took great care to review the files of soldiers who are inspecial-mission units. Overall, the files and the photos of soldiers inthose units were more current and better-prepared.

Some soldiers in Army Reserve troop-program units, including CMF 37Fand 38A soldiers, who completed RC NCOES Phase I before Phase II wasoffered, received the ANCOC-RC Phase I waiver for promotion to sergeantfirst class. Under current regulations of the Department of Army and ofthe Army Training and Doctrine Command, those SFCs are not consideredto be NCOES-qualified, nor will they be qualified for promotion to mastersergeant if the Phase II portion is available when they become eligible forpromotion (Phase II became available in 1995).TRADOC Reg 351-10, Institutional Leader Training and Education, para 2-16c, states: “Active and RC soldiers promoted to their current rank prior to 1October 1992 are considered NCOES-qualified commensurate with their cur-rent rank. These soldiers are grandfathered and are not required to attendANCOC or BNCOC Phase II because they are considered NCOES qualified.Soldiers completing ANCOC or BNCOC Phase I (common core) after 1 Oct 92must complete the Phase II portion to be considered NCOES qualified.”AR 140-158, Army Reserve, Enlisted Personnel Classification, Promotion,and Reduction, para 8-3b, states that soldiers who completed RC-NCOESPhase I course prior to Phase II being offered were considered NCOES-qualified only for promotion to the next higher grade. Before these soldierscan attend the next level of NCOES or receive another promotion, theymust attend NCOES Phase II. These soldiers have two options:• Attend Phase II. According to TRADOC Reg 351-10, paragraphs 5-4 and

5-5, soldiers must start Phase II within 24 months after they completePhase I. Soldiers who have cogent reasons for extending the deadline to36 months must forward their waiver request to the first general officerin their chain of command. Requests for more than 36 months must beforwarded to: Commander, TRADOC; Attn: ATTG-ILN; Fort Monroe, VA23651-5000. The point of contact is MSG Boyd, DSN 680-5677 or com-mercial (757) 788-5677.

• Apply for constructive credit, as outlined in TRADOC Reg 351-10, para 2-16a(1), through the proponent for the NCOES course. The proponent for37F40, 38A30 and 38A40 Phase II is the commanding general of SWCS.Mail applications to: Commander, USAJFKSWCS, Attn: AOJK-SP, FortBragg, NC 28310. The criteria that are considered in awarding constructivecredit are the soldier’s duty-assignment history and the soldier’s education.

TRADOC Reg 350-10 (to be published), which will supersede TRADOCReg 351-10, will further clarify this issue. For additional information, tele-phone MAJ Charles R. Munguia, the Civil Affairs Branch chief in theSWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, at DSN 239-9002 or com-mercial (910) 432-9002.

Some CA, PSYOP soldiersineligible for E9 without

NCOES Phase II

Winter 2001 43

Officer Career NotesSpecial Warfare

The 2000 reserve-component lieutenant-colonel promotion board consid-ered 173 Civil Affairs officers and selected 80. Promotion statistics are asfollows:

Considered Selected % selected

USAR (previously considered) 1440 116 8.1CA (previously considered) 37 5 13.5USAR (first consideration) 2795 1006 36.0CA (first consideration) 136 75 55.1USAR (total) 4235 1122 26.5CA (total) 173 80 46.2

The selection rate for the Civil Affairs branch continues to be higher thanthe average for the Army Reserve. In fact, during the last six years, theselection rate for CA officers has averaged 24 percent higher than the over-all selection rate for the Army Reserve.

SF Officer Branch chief LTC Pat HigginsDSN 221-3173higginsp@hoffman.army.mil

Lieutenant colonels’ LTC Ed McHaleassignments DSN 221-3169

mchalee@hoffman.army.milMajors’ assignments CPT (P) Ron Tuczak

DSN 221-5739tuczakr@hoffman.army.mil

Captains’ assignments CPT Josh NobleDSN 221-3175noblej@hoffman.army.mil

Future readiness CPT Roy DouglasDSN 221-3178douglasr@hoffman.army.mil

Field-grade tech Ms. Sandra BryantDSN 221-7915bryants@hoffman.army.mil

The commercial telephone prefix for the numbers listed above is (703) 325-.The Branch’s fax extension is -5463. Address correspondence to Depart-ment of the Army; U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; Attn: TAPC-OPE-SF; 200 Stovall Street; Alexandria, VA 22332-0414.

LTC promotion boardselects 80 CA officers

SF Officer Branch points of contact

44 Special Warfare

Foreign SOFSpecial Warfare

The guerrilla conflict in Colombia, along with its clear affiliation withinternational drug trafficking, continues to be a focus of U.S. initiatives inforeign policy and security assistance. The guerrilla conflict is also a con-cern to other states in the region, particularly those that border Colombia:Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador, Peru and Brazil. Most recently, Colombia’slargest insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, orFARC, has become directly involved with the activities of one of Mexico’slargest drug-trafficking organizations, the Tijuana Cartel, which is alsocalled the Arellano Felix Organization, or AFO. Mexican law-enforcementofficials have reported that the FARC is negotiating extensively with theAFO to make cocaine-trafficking deals. According to Mexican officials, inDecember 1999 the FARC proposed sending cocaine to Mexico in return forarms and money, and the transactions began in 2000. For its part, theFARC adamantly denies the allegations and asserts that it has never beeninvolved in drug-trafficking activities. Evidence cited by the Mexicanauthorities, however, is far more compelling, and Mexico’s Attorney Gen-eral’s Office is hopeful that arrests made in connection with this operationhave disrupted the FARC-Mexican trafficker ties.

The well-known Russian Vityaz’ (Knight) special-operations unit isapproaching its 25th year of existence. Established in December 1977 aspart of the Soviet Ministry of Interior, or MVD, Internal Troops, Vityaz’had the specific mission of countering any terrorist activity during the1979 Moscow Olympics. Fortunately, no such terrorist acts occurred duringthe Olympics, but Vityaz’ was heavily employed throughout the late Sovi-et period. Today, Vityaz’ operates under the Russian MVD. During the past15 years, elements of the unit have been active in combatting ethno-national conflicts and armed criminal activities throughout the RussianFederation. Elements of Vityaz’ that are based in Chechnya are scheduledto be withdrawn during 2001.

FARC denies traffickingactivities in Mexico

Russian special-ops unitnears 25th anniversary

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military StudiesOffice, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

MACV SOG awardedPresidential Unit Citation

Veterans of the Military Assist-ance Command, Vietnam Studiesand Observation Group gatheredat Fort Bragg’s Bull Simons Memo-rial Plaza April 4 for a ceremony inwhich MACV SOG was awardedthe Presidential Unit Citation.

During the Vietnam War, personnelassigned to MACV SOG worked withindigenous troops to conduct highlyclassified, cross-border, unconvention-al-warfare activities in North andSouth Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia andsouthern China. They operated insecret, and when the war was over,they told no one of their experiences,because until recently, the missionshad remained classified.

Lieutenant General Doug Brown,commander of the U. S. Army SpecialOperations Command, described themen of MACV SOG as,“men who con-tributed so greatly in the most dan-gerous possible environment.”

“But there is in my opinion a big-ger contribution, and that’s the guileand audacity to take the war wherethe enemy lived, to get at his sanctu-ary, to make him react, to take awayhis safe and secure environment. …It takes men of steel, willing to takerisks, willing to make the trip. … Allof us today in SOF are betterbecause of the work done by thesemen,” Brown concluded.

The Presidential Unit Citation, theU.S. military’s highest unit award forheroism, is awarded to units that dis-play extraordinary heroism in actionagainst an armed enemy.

Lieutenant General WilliamTangney, the highest-ranking MACVSOG veteran still on active duty,

accepted the citation on behalf of allMACV SOG members. Tangney isdeputy commander of the U.S. SpecialOperations Command in Tampa, Fla.In accepting the award, he expressedthe group’s gratitude to retired MajorJohn Plaster, another veteran ofMACV SOG, who worked for two anda half years to get the award approved.

“I served with such brave men —many of whom were killed or badlywounded, and they never got recog-nition. … To me, this is a final justice,a final vindication,” Plaster said.

Established Jan. 16, 1964, MACVSOG ceased operations March 31,1972, and was deactivated a monthlater.At its peak, MACV SOG and itssubordinate commands comprised2,000 American special-ops person-nel from all services, and more than8,000 indigenous soldiers. Unitmembers received more than 2,000individual awards for heroism,

including 10 Medals of Honor and 23Distinguished Service Crosses. Dur-ing MACV SOG’s history, 10 teamswere lost, 14 teams were overrunand destroyed, and more than 300personnel were recorded as eitherkilled or missing in action. Fifty arestill listed as MIA. — SSG AmandaGlenn, USASOC PAO

New SF manual reflectsupdated missions

A new field manual prepared bythe JFK Special Warfare Centerand School updates and expandsSpecial Forces doctrine to prepareSF soldiers and their counterpartsfor operations in the 21st century.

FM 3-05.20, Special Forces Opera-tions,was previously known as FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Opera-tions.The new manual, renumbered toconform to the numbering system ofjoint publications, is a guide for per-sonnel conducting SF operations whileemployed either in training or in com-bat situations. Although primarilydesigned for SF personnel, FM 3-05.20will also serve the rest of the Army andother services by familiarizing userswith SF capabilities and SF’s possibleinteractions with other forces.

The new manual reflects thechanging mission requirements forSF, and it addresses the full scope ofSF liaison activities. In 1990, FM31-20 listed SF’s principal missionsas unconventional warfare, or UW;foreign internal defense, or FID;direct action, or DA; special recon-naissance, or SR; and counterterror-ism. FM 3-05.20 lists SF’s principalmissions as UW, FID, DA, SR, com-batting terrorism, counterprolifera-tion and information operations.

Winter 2001 45

UpdateSpecial Warfare

Veterans of MACV SOG stand at attention during theawarding of the Presidential Unit Citation.

Photo by Amanda Glenn

FM 3-05.20 is scheduled to bereleased during the summer of 2001.Once published, it will also be avail-able through the Army Training andDoctrine Command’s Reimer DigitalLibrary. For more information, tele-phone CW3 Roland M. Shackford atDSN 239-8286/7690 or commercial(910) 432-8286/7690, or send e-mailto: shackfor@soc.mil.

USACAPOC welcomes new commander

Major General Herbert Altshulertook command of the U.S. ArmyCivil Affairs and PsychologicalOperations Command April 28during a ceremony held at FortBragg’s Meadows Memorial Plaza.

Altshuler, formerly commanderof the 89th Regional Support Com-mand, Wichita, Kan., replacedBrigadier General Bruce B. Bing-ham, who retired from the ArmyReserve after 33 years of service.

Altshuler’s previous positions inUSACAPOC include operations officer,14th PSYOP Battalion;chief of the oper-ations and plans division, 351st CivilAffairs Command; and commander, 7thPSYOP Group. Altshuler served in Bos-nia in 1995 as commander of the Com-bined Joint Psychological Operationsand Implementation Force InformationCampaign Task Force.

SWCS courses evaluatedfor academic credit

Evaluators from the AmericanCouncil on Education visited the JFKSpecial Warfare Center and SchoolApril 9-10 to evaluate 44 SWCScourses for civilian academic credit.

A nine-member team from theACE’s Military Evaluations Programassessed courses that included SpecialForces basic and advanced skills, Psy-chological Operations, Civil Affairs,language training, and instructortraining. Evaluators reviewed eachcourse’s curriculum outline, programof instruction and instructional mate-rials to determine whether a course’scontent is equivalent to college-level

work, and if so, the amount of creditthat the course might deserve.

The ACE’s Military EvaluationsProgram provides civilian academicinstitutions with a basis for recogniz-ing military educational experiencesin terms of civilian academic credit.ACE evaluators are either facultymembers or administrators fromaccredited colleges and universities.

According to the ACE, 78 percentof U.S. colleges and universities rec-ognize the ACE recommendations ingranting credit or advanced standingto military and veteran students.

112th SOSB to celebrate15th anniversary

The 112th Special OperationsSignal Battalion will celebrate its15th anniversary during the firstweek of September, in conjunctionwith the Army Special OperationsCommand’s C4I conference.

Anniversary activities will includea golf tournament on Sept. 6, and theAlumni Anniversary Ball on Sept. 7at the Fort Bragg Officers Club. Any-one who has served or is serving inthe 112th Signal Battalion is invitedto attend. Lieutenant Colonel RobertT. Bell Jr., commander of the 112th,

especially encourages World War IIveterans of both the 512th AirborneSignal Company and the 112th Air-borne Signal Battalion to attend theanniversary celebration.

To be added to the alumni databaseor to receive information about thecelebration, e-mail Captain BrianOverstreet at overstrb@soc.mil, ortelephone him at DSN 239-5401 orcommercial (910) 432-5401.

SF ANCOC reminds soldiersof admin requirements

Soldiers scheduled to attend theSpecial Forces Advanced NCO Courseat the Special Warfare Center andSchool’s NCO Academy should beaware of the recent changes to the SFANCOC administrative requirements:

• Soldiers who are not permanent-ly assigned to Fort Bragg are re-quired to stay in government quar-ters, which cost $32 per day. Soldiersshould make billeting reservationsat least 14 days prior to their report-ing date. Reservations can be madeby telephoning the SF ANCOCbranch chief at DSN 239-3750 orcommercial (910) 432-3750.

• Soldiers who have reserved slotsmust attend the course, or they willautomatically be removed from thepromotion list. Cancellations must bemade at least 14 days before thereporting date.

• Active-duty graduates of SFANCOC may not attend the SF Oper-ations and Intelligence Sergeant’sCourse unless they have been select-ed for the SF Warrant Officer Course.

• SF ANCOC consists of twocourses: Phase I (common core) andPhase II/III (distance learning/pro-ponent training). Students receivea separate academic evaluationreport for each course.

• Students should report with acompleted pre-execution checklist.Students who have not completedthe pre-execution checklist by Day3 will be returned to their unit.

• Students who are on tempo-rary profiles will not be allowed to

46 Special Warfare

Major General Herbert Altshuler accepts the colors of theArmy Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command.

Photo by Bob Porreca

enroll in SF ANCOC.• Expenses for rental vehicles

and excess baggage are the respon-sibility of the soldier’s unit.

• Students who are over 40 mustreport with a completed DA Form4970E, Cardiovascular Screening, orthey will be returned to their unit.

For more information, telephonethe SF ANCOC branch chief.

Risher takes reins of 353rd CA Command

Colonel Paulette M. Risher tookcommand of the 353rd Civil AffairsCommand May 5 during a ceremonyheld at New York City’s Robert P. Pat-terson Army Reserve Center.

Risher, formerly the deputy com-mander of the 350th Civil Affairs Com-mand in Pensacola, Fla., is the firstwoman to be appointed to a one-stargeneral’s post in a U.S. Army special-operations unit. She replaced BrigadierGeneral Sam Gibson, who will remainin the Army Reserve on inactive status.

Risher received her commission in1972 and served on active duty for sev-eral years before joining the ArmyReserve.As a reservist, she served withthe 361st CA Brigade for 16 years,deploying during Operation Just Causein 1989, Operation Safe Haven in 1994and Operation Joint Guard in 1996.Risher also commanded the 348th Per-sonnel Group, 90th Reserve SupportCommand, for three years. — Bob Por-reca, USACAPOC PAO

Ceremony recognizes SFveterans of Korean War

On March 26, the U.S.Army SpecialForces Command and the UnitedNations Partisans Infantry Korea hon-ored 19 American Special Forces veter-ans who served either in the 8240thArmy Unit or in the 8007th Army Unitduring the Korean War.

Until recently, classification ofthe units’ missions prevented thesoldiers from receiving any officialrecognition for their contributions.

During the award ceremony, heldin the headquarters of the Army Spe-

cial Operations Command at FortBragg, each of the veterans wasawarded the United Nations Parti-san Forces Honor Medal and a cer-tificate of appreciation fromBrigadier General Frank Toney, com-mander of the Army SF Command.

In January 1953, 60 officers and15 enlisted soldiers from the 10thSpecial Forces Group were leviedfor assignment to special-opera-tions units in Korea. Their missionwas to train South Korean troopsin special operations.

Those South Korean soldiers laterbecame members of guerrilla, parti-san and aviation units. By posing aconstant threat to North Korea’s rearareas, the South Korean soldiershelped tie down more than 75,000North Korean security forces.

Number of CA MTPs to be reduced

The Civil Affairs/Civil-MilitaryOperations Division of the JFK Spe-cial Warfare Center and School’sDirectorate of Training and Doc-trine is reducing the number ofCivil Affairs mission trainingplans, or MTPs, from eight to three.

The proposal to reduce the num-ber of CA MTPs originated duringa collective-task selection boardheld at Fort Bragg in 1996.

The original MTPs, which werepublished in 1992 and 1993, nolonger reflect current CA doctrine orCA unit organization. The replace-ment MTPs will be founded on theconcepts of FM 41-10, Civil AffairsOperations, published in February2000.

The first manual, ARTEP 41-701-10 MTP, approved and published inSeptember 2000, is written for CAgeneralists. It contains collectivetasks common to all CA teams.

The second manual, ARTEP 41-710-35 MTP, scheduled for publica-tion in March 2002, will be written forthe headquarters and headquarterscompanies, or HHCs, and for thedetachments of CA battalions,

brigades and commands. This MTPwill focus on the staff functions thatare common at all levels of command.

The third manual,ARTEP 41-701-60MTP, scheduled for publication in April2002, will explain the tasks required toperform the 16 CA functional special-ties.This MTP will focus on the special-ty teams in the HHC of the CA com-mand, in the HHC of the CA brigade,and in the functional-specialty compa-ny of the Army Reserve CA battalion.The MTP will also address the civic-action team in the CA company of thespecial-operations CA battalion.

The current eight manuals willremain in effect until all of the newMTPs have been approved. Onceall of the new MTPs have beenpublished, they will be availablethrough the Army Training andDoctrine Command’s Reimer Digi-tal Library.

Questions regarding the MTPsshould be directed to: Commander,USAJFKSWCS, Attn: AOJK-DT-CA, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-5200.

160th SOAR to celebrate20th anniversary

The 160th Special OperationsAviation Regiment will celebrateits 20th anniversary Oct. 11-13,2001, at Fort Campbell, Ky.

Activities that are being plannedfor the celebration include an air-operations symposium for seniorpersonnel of the 160th; a regimentalsocial; and, for all former membersof the regiment, a 160th SOARupdate briefing, an open-house tourof the 160th’s facilities, and staticdisplays of the regiment’s equip-ment. For additional information,visit the “Night Stalker” web site(www.nightstalkers.com).

Winter 2001 47

The Intrepid Guerrillas ofNorth Luzon. By Bernard Nor-ling. Lexington, Ky.: The UniversityPress of Kentucky, 1999. ISBN 0-8131-2118-3. 304 pages. $25.

The European aspect of SpecialForces’ World War II heritage, asrepresented by the activities of theOffice of Strategic Services’ opera-tional groups and Jedburgh teams,is well-known. It is debatablewhether that is because of ournational inclination toward thingsEuropean; or because the opera-tional groups contributed to somuch of SF’s initial organization,training and mission; or because theEuropean operators, particularlythe generally well-educated andoften socially prominent Jedburghs,wrote their accounts early andwrote them well.

The Pacific aspect of SF’s WorldWar II heritage deserves at leastequal attention. It should berecalled that of the trio of guerrilla-warfare veterans who worked forBrigadier General Robert McClurein the Office of the Chief of Psycho-logical Warfare during the effort tocreate SF — Colonels Bank, Volck-mann and Fertig — the last two hadbeen prominent guerrilla leaders inthe Philippines.

The very dimensions of the Philip-pine guerrilla operation commandour attention. It was the longest andlargest American guerrilla campaign.While the guerrilla-support opera-tions of the operational groupsextended to 10 months in Italy(August 1944-May 1945), and theJedburgh operations in France lastedfrom a few days to a couple of months,the Philippine guerrilla effort lasted

43 months (January 1942-August1945). In comparison, the entirenorthern European campaign, fromD-Day in Normandy to the Germansurrender, lasted 11 months.

The Philippine operation eventual-ly encompassed dozens of local com-mand organizations and had an even-tual cumulative strength of almost aquarter-million personnel. Unlike theOSS organizations that were the har-bingers of advancing victorious Alliedforces, the Philippine and Americanleaders of the Philippine guerrillasbegan their operations in the days ofdefeat and disaster. A highly individ-ualistic group who exempted them-selves from the surrender of Philip-pine-American forces in April-May1942, they did not have the personnel,intelligence, communications andlogistics support typical of OSS organ-izations. They also lacked training,experience and even a doctrinal basisfor guerrilla warfare. Initially, theycould not even contact distant Ameri-

can forces to tell them that they con-tinued to fight. (Months later, whenthe guerrillas established long-rangecommunications with San Franciscousing a homemade radio, theyreceived not material support, butexternal direction and requests forintelligence.) The Philippine guerril-las’ efforts to continue the war despiteenormous disadvantages richlydeserve historical recognition andpersonal admiration.

Bernard Norling does an excel-lent job of relating the experiencesof a number of these groups, con-centrating on one that was of con-siderable duration: Troop C, 26thCavalry, Philippine Scouts. Nor-ling portrays their hardships,hopes, frustrations, successes andfailures in as much detail as canbe supported by the fragmentaryrecords and by the accounts of thefew survivors.

The Philippine operation en-countered almost every problem ofguerrilla warfare — military, legal,morale, political, psychological andlogistics. The leadership’s efforts toresolve the problems underdemanding conditions are well-limned. Because the guerrilla lead-ers were strong characters whofaced their problems in isolation,their solutions were varied and, attimes, contentious.

Norling is not a completelydetached recorder. Possibly influ-enced by his research for his earlierbooks on the Philippine guerrillaexperience (Behind Japanese Linesand Lapham’s Raiders), Norlingrepeatedly sides with those whochampioned (their own) independentoperations vs. those (including Volck-mann) who sought to establish a uni-

48 Special Warfare

Book ReviewsSpecial Warfare

fied guerrilla command. Given thegeographic and communicationsrealities of the time, the “indepen-dents” might well have been right;however, the SF schoolhouse mayhave reservations on this subject.The book has only a single map(mounted on the inside covers) butbecause this is a story primarily ofcharacter, courage and endurance,not of maneuver, one map is ade-quate. The Intrepid Guerrillas is anoutstanding book of guerrilla-war-fare history. It should be welcomedby the readers of Special Warfare,particularly those in the SF andPSYOP communities.

COL J.H. CrerarU.S. Army (ret.)Vienna, Va.

Future War: Non-Lethal Weaponsin Modern Warfare. By JohnAlexander. New York: St. Martin’sPress, 1999. ISBN 0-312-19416-1. 227pages. $24.95.

Future War: Non-Lethal Weaponsin Modern Warfare is a comprehen-sive look at nonlethal weapons,how they have been used by mili-tary and law-enforcement agenciesin recent years, and how they canplay a greater role in the future.

Nonlethal weapons are designedto incapacitate personnel andmateriel while minimizing fatalitiesand permanent injuries. Nonlethalweapons have been used in law-enforcement for several decades, butthey have only recently received seri-ous attention from the military.

John Alexander argues that thereis a growing need for nonlethalweapons in war and in military oper-ations other than war. The goal ofwar is to impose one’s will on theadversary, not necessarily the physi-cal destruction of the adversary.Physical destruction may actually becounterproductive to one’s long-termgoals. Lethal action may accomplishour immediate objectives, but it mayalso begin a cycle of violence that will

perpetuate long-term problems.Changes in the international polit-

ical landscape during the post-ColdWar era are affecting the way theU.S. looks at war and conflict. Duringthe Cold War, our objective was clear:national survival. But with the grayarea between war and peace growingwider, our objectives are more limit-ed, and nonlethal weapons can helpus accomplish them.

Future War surveys the vast vari-ety of nonlethal weapons andexplains how they can be employed atthe various levels of conflict. Forexample, at the tactical level, low-kinetic-impact weapons, such as ten-nis-ball guns, concussion grenades oracoustic weapons, can be used torestrict collateral damage. At theoperational level, microbes can beused to eat an enemy’s petroleumsupplies, or chemical depolymers canbe used to destroy tires. Bothweapons can delay the entry of anenemy’s second-echelon force onto thebattlefield.

At the strategic level, attacks oncomputer networks can disable com-munications and cause the enemy’sleadership to question its situationalawareness. Psychological operationscan persuade enemy leaders to followa course of action that is consistent

with U.S. national interests.The bottom line is that nonlethal

weapons provide options that makeit easier for commanders to takedecisive action. Commanders areno longer limited to choosing onlywhether or not to use force; nowthey can choose the type of forceand the combination of weaponsthat will accomplish their objective.

Alexander emphasizes that non-lethal weapons will not completelyreplace lethal weapons, and thatthey are not without their ownproblems. For example, a shot froma low-kinetic-impact weapon thatwould temporarily disable a 200-pound man may be lethal to ateenager. Nonlethal weapons canalso be lethal if they are misused.There is also legal and moral oppo-sition to their use. Some nonlethalweapons that are chemical and bio-logical in nature may be perceivedas unethical, and their use may vio-late existing laws and treaties.

Alexander is uniquely qualified towrite on nonlethal weapons. Duringhis military career, he commandedSpecial Forces units in Vietnam andassisted in the development ofadvanced weapons systems. Afterretiring from the Army, Alexanderserved as a deputy sheriff in DadeCounty, Fla., and he has conductedresearch on nonlethal weapons atthe Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Future War will be of interest to allmembers of the special-operationscommunity. Nonlethal weapons areconsistent with the special-opera-tions imperatives, and they have agrowing role in all of our future oper-ational environments.

MAJ Bill Gormley14th PSYOP BattalionMoffet Federal Airfield, Calif.

Winter 2001 49

Special Warfare

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