Special WarfareThe Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–03–4 May 2004 Vol. 16, No. 4

In recent years, the JFK SpecialWarfare Center and School hasplaced a great emphasis on theSpecial Forces training pipeline,and much of our activity has beenconcerned with recruiting,assessing and training SpecialForces Soldiers to enter the fightagainst terrorism.

Less well-publicized, but never-theless important, are our activi-ties devoted to training SpecialForces Soldiers in advancedskills. These skills, such as mili-tary free-fall, underwater opera-tions, target interdiction andurban warfare, make our Soldiersmore proficient in their close-combat missions and better ableto infiltrate and exfiltrate with-out being detected. Located atFort Bragg, at Yuma ProvingGround, Ariz., and at Key West,Fla., the cadre of the 2nd Battal-ion, 1st Special Warfare TrainingGroup provides such training.

Not surprisingly, the global waron terrorism has engenderedgreater demand for Soldiers withselected advanced skills. Despitefunding constraints and short-ages of personnel, SWCS militaryand civilian personnel have beeninnovative and agile in respond-ing to the new requirements.

The success of Special ForcesSoldiers in the global war on ter-rorism has validated our trainingprocesses on a daily basis. Our

focus on a core curriculum ofunconventional warfare andcounterinsurgency, coupled withadvanced human interaction andclose-quarters combat, hasproven to be on-the-mark againstthe current threat.

Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert

From the CommandantSpecial Warfare

Features2 2nd Battalion, 1st SWTG: Sharpening the Edge of the Spear

by Lieutenant Colonel Sean P. Mulholland

5 Blending Technology With Warrior Skills: Co. A,2nd Battalion, 1st SWTGby Chief Warrant Officer 4 Bruce R. Watts

8 Training SF Advanced Skills in the Air: Co. B,2nd Battalion, 1st SWTGby Major Buck Dellinger

11 The SF Underwater Operations School: Co. C,2nd Battalion, 1st SWTGby Major David K. Hsu

14 Providing Relevant Training for the GWOT: Co. D,2nd Battalion, 1st SWTGby Major Shannon Boehm

19 SF Warrant Officers to Become Part of SF Officer Branchby Chief Warrant Officer 5 William A. McPherson and Chief Warrant Officer 4 Douglas Jenkins

20 The Cody Conference: Discussing the War on Terrorism and the Future of SFby Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert

28 The 18X Program: Ensuring the Future Health of Special Forcesby Command Sergeant Major Michael S. Breasseale

32 Evaluating Psychological Operations: Planning Measuresof Effectivenessby Sergeant First Class Robert H. Kellogg

38 Analysis of Operation Gothic Serpent: TF Ranger in Somaliaby Major Marshall V. Ecklund

48 ‘Father of Special Forces’ Dies at Age 101 in California Home

Departments50 Enlisted Career Notes

51 Officer Career Notes

52 Foreign SOF

54 Update

56 Book Reviews

PB 80–03–4 ContentsMay 2004 Special Warfare Vol. 16, No. 4

Commander & CommandantMajor General Geoffrey C. Lambert

EditorJerry D. Steelman

Associate EditorJanice L. Burton

Graphics & DesignBruce S. Barfield

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of theUnited States Army John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its missionis to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examinationof established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and donot necessarily reflect official Army position. Thispublication does not supersede any information presentedin other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited andshould be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare,USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: DSN239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147. SpecialWarfare reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except wherecopyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfareand the authors.

Official distribution is limited to active and reservespecial-operations units. Individuals desiring privatesubscriptions should forward their requests to:Superintendent of Documents, U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. SpecialWarfare is also available on the USASOC internal web(https:asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag/sw-mag.htm).

V E R I T A S

STREBIL

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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Peter J. SchoomakerGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:

Joel B. HudsonAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army

0332802

Headquarters, Department of the Army Cover: Underwater photo and photo of Soldiers in kayak copyright David Doubilet and Jennifer Hayes.

While the Special Forces pipelinetrains Soldiers in the SF basicskills, SF advanced skills make

Soldiers more lethal, better able to gatherintelligence and harder to detect duringinfiltration and exfiltration. Advanced-skills training is the job of the 2nd Battal-ion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group.

Many Soldiers are impressed, and right-ly so, by training in advanced skills, suchas sniper operations, military free-fall andunderwater operations. But those whohave never been assigned to the SpecialWarfare Center and School, or SWCS, or tothe 1st Special Warfare Training Group, orSWTG, have no appreciation of the train-ing apparatus “behind the waterfall.” Theymay not be aware of the difficulties oftraining management or of the day-to-day

execution of special-operations courses.There are many challenges within SWCS

that outsiders never see — challenges suchas providing manpower, resources and facil-ities for expanding training in SOF skillsets. This challenge is especially daunting for2nd Battalion because it is the last priority inSWTG.

The battalion does, however, enjoy twounique benefits. One benefit is that in certaincompanies, cadre members and students aremembers of other services, and the variety oftheir experience and terminology lends ajoint nature to the training. Another benefitis the large number of retired SOF soldierswho serve as civilian instructors throughout2nd Battalion. Their special-operations expe-rience and their teaching experience areinvaluable to the success of 2nd Battalion’straining.

Training modificationsOver the past two years, 2nd Battalion

has modified its courses, equipment andinstruction in order to remain relevant forits customers — U.S. special-operationsforces. The battalion has made great stridesin opening communications with the U.S.Special Operations Command, the U.S.Army Special Operations Command, theU.S. Army Special Forces Command, andthe rest of the SOF community in order tovalidate current instruction or to makechanges based on customer feedback. In

2 Special Warfare

2nd Battalion, 1st SWTG: Sharpening the Edge of the Spear

by Lieutenant Colonel Sean P. Mulholland

Graduates of the SF Warrant Officer Basic Course areprepared to serve as assistant SF detachment commanders.

U.S. Army photo

making those changes, the battalion worksclosely with various elements of the SWCSDirectorate of Training and Doctrine.

Using feedback from operational units andfrom instructors who have just come fromoperational units, 2nd Battalion follows theinnovate, change and execute process, orICE. ICE is constant, dynamic and cyclic, andit applies to every course taught by 2nd Bat-talion. Examples of innovation are the recentchanges to the program of instruction in theSpecial Forces Advanced Reconnaissance,Target Analysis, Exploitation TechniquesCourse, the Special Forces Warrant OfficerBasic Course, the Special Forces WarrantOfficer Advanced Course, the Special ForcesIntelligence Sergeant Course, the IndividualTerrorism Awareness Course and the Com-bat Diver Qualification Course, or CDQC.Other examples include instructor assistancefor CDQC pre-scuba; the integration of com-puters into the Advanced Special OperationsTechniques Course, or ASOTC; cadre adjust-ments for larger class sizes in the MilitaryFree-Fall Parachutist Course, CDQC,ASOTC and the Special Operations TargetInterdiction Course; and the creation of theMilitary Free-Fall Challenge Course for Spe-cial Forces.

In some cases, the changes have beenmore drastic, affecting methods of instruc-tion, course content or the courses them-selves. Examples of those changes are the

development of the Special Operations Ter-minal Attack Control Course (in conjunctionwith the U.S. Marine Corps) and the SpecialForces Intelligence Sergeant Course; theplans for doubling the number of studentslots in ASOT before fiscal year 2005; the

May 2004 3

U.S. Army photo

An SF Soldier learns tocoordinate close air sup-port in the Special Oper-ations Terminal AttackControl Course.

SF Soldiers practice waterborne-infiltration skills in theSF Underwater Operations School at Key West, Fla.

Photo copyright David Doubilet and Jennifer Hayes

development of the Advanced RegionalStudies Course; the change in the automat-ic-opening device used in SWCS militaryfree-fall operations courses; and the plan-ning and development of the Special Opera-tions Uninhabited Platform TrainingCourse, a future course designed to institu-tionalize tactical training in the use ofunmanned aerial vehicles.

All 17 of the battalion’s courses havebeen modified to some degree to give stu-dents every opportunity to grasp the con-cepts being taught, to be successful in thecourse and to return to their unit ready tofind, fix or destroy the threat.

Instructor cadreSoldiers should take advantage of any

opportunity to serve as instructors inSWTG. It is a rewarding experience thatwill broaden exponentially Soldiers’ hori-zons and their understanding of trainingand training management. It will also givethem a chance to serve among the ranks ofthe top-shelf military and civilian instruc-tors at SWTG. The 2nd Battalion’s instruc-tors, whether military or civilian, are allprofessionals. They are teachers who havea deep desire to improve the force. Theydefine success not as weeding students outbut as helping them to understand theinstruction, to learn to execute the tasks athand and to pass the course.

Despite the instructors’ desire to see stu-

dents succeed, there is attrition in 2nd Bat-talion’s courses. The battalion’s instruc-tors, as all instructors in SWTG, do notlower or compromise standards in anycourse. The cadre drops students who com-mit safety violations or fail to follow proce-dures. Some students withdraw or failbecause they lack proper pre-training andpreparation, or because they have extremedifficulty learning or lack a sufficientdesire to train.

But despite their adherence to highstandards, the battalion’s instructors havereduced attrition in all courses over thepast 18 months. As a result, the 2nd Bat-talion is producing more graduates of SFadvanced-skills training than ever before,giving commanders more options for mis-sion accomplishment and making the forcemore lethal and more undetectable.

Lieutenant Colonel Sean P. Mulholland isthe commander of 2nd Battalion, 1st SpecialWarfare Training Group, JFK Special WarfareCenter and School. His previous assignmentsinclude infantry platoon leader, 2nd Battalion,14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division; pla-toon leader and executive officer, Company B,3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment; detach-ment commander and assistant group S3, 7thSF Group; exchange officer and Lanceroinstructor, Tolemaida, Colombia; companycommander, battalion S3 and group S3, 7thSF Group; chief of current operations, SpecialPrograms Branch, Special Actions Division,U.S. Special Operations Command; and com-mander, Combined Joint Special OperationsTask Force, Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He holds a bachelor’s degree inbiology from Catholic University of America,Washington, D.C., and a master’s degree innational security and strategy from the NavalWar College, Newport, R.I.

4 Special Warfare

U.S. Army photo

Students practice urban-combat operations dur-ing the Special ForcesAdvanced Reconnais-sance, Target Analysis,Exploitation TechniquesCourse.

Working in a variety of environ-ments, Special Forces Soldiersmust be able to employ ad-

vanced special-operations techniques,and they must be as comfortable workingwith computers and digital imagery aswith maps, pencils and paper. Providingtraining to ensure that flexibility is thejob of Company A, 2nd Battalion, 1st Spe-cial Warfare Training Group.

Company A conducts four courses; theSpecial Forces Warrant Officer BasicCourse,or SFWOBC; the Special Forces War-rant Officer Advanced Course, orSFWOAC; the Advanced Special Opera-tions Techniques Course, or ASOTC; andthe Special Forces Intelligence SergeantCourse, or SFISC.

SFWOBCThe SFWOBC provides newly appoint-

ed SF warrant officers with entry-leveltraining in Military Occupational Spe-cialty, or MOS, 180A prior to their firstassignment as assistant SF detachmentcommanders within one of the SF groups.SF warrant officers are the only combat-arms warrant officers who lead soldiersin direct ground combat. They haveproven themselves in combat and inother operations in Panama, Kuwait,Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraqand in the many other places where SFhas operated.

The 19-week SFWOBC is taught twice ayear and has a class capacity of 24 stu-dents. The course awards a military edu-cational level 7, or MEL 7. SFWOBCtraining modules include general sub-jects; regional studies; training manage-ment; force protection; advanced special-operations techniques; SF doctrine, organ-ization and operations; and personnelrecovery. Students learn to conductresearch, to improve their writing skills,and to design and conduct military brief-ings. Warrant-officer candidates whohaven’t already attended the Survival,Evasion, Resistance and Escape, or SERE,

May 2004 5

Blending Technology With Warrior Skills: Co. A, 2nd Battalion, 1st SWTG

by Chief Warrant Officer 4 Bruce R. Watts

Students in the SF War-rant Officer AdvancedCourse learn to performstrategic and crisis-action planning.

U.S. Army photo

Level III Course will also attend SEREtraining. Each class also makes a week-long visit to Washington, D.C., where stu-dents receive capabilities briefings at theCentral Intelligence Agency, at theDefense Intelligence Agency and at thePentagon.

SFWOACThe SFWOAC is a nine-week course

that is conducted twice a year and has acapacity of 20 students. Senior warrantofficers receive training in the history ofunconventional warfare; in joint, strategicand crisis-action planning; in antiterror-ism; in force protection; and in personnelrecovery. The course objective is to pre-pare SF warrant officers to perform theirduties at a forward operating base, asmembers of a joint special-operations taskforce, or as members of the staff of a the-ater special-operations command.

ASOTCThe ASOTC is a 13-week course that is

conducted six times each year. “Advancedspecial-operations techniques” is a gener-al description of the techniques, tacticsand procedures covered in the course. Forspecific information on the type of opera-tions that ASOTC teaches, refer to FM 3-05.220, (S) Special Forces Advanced Spe-

cial Operations Techniques (U). The FMwill assist units in preparing individuals,their equipment and their orders forcourse attendance.

ASOTC is taught at Fort Bragg, but inSeptember 2004, a detachment fromCompany A will begin teaching thecourse at Fort Lewis, Wash., with classesrunning concurrently with those at FortBragg. The ASOT (West) Detachment,already permanently assigned to FortLewis, will also provide information nec-essary to assist units of the U.S. ArmySpecial Operations Command, orUSASOC, and selected Navy special-war-fare units in preparing their personnel toattend ASOTC. Detachment memberswill also serve as USASOC subject-mat-ter experts on ASOT, providing assist-ance to all theater special-operationscommands seeking to employ their staffsin planning and preparing ASOT supportfor their operations.

SFISCThe SFISC, established at the Special

Warfare Center and School in 2003, trainsselected SF NCOs in the intelligence func-tions that are necessary for supporting SFmissions across the operational continu-um. The SFISC detachment conducts the13-week course three times a year. SFISC

6 Special Warfare

The SF Intelligence Ser-geant Course teachesstudents traditional andstate-of-the-art tech-niques in intelligence-gathering.

U.S. Army photo

graduates are awarded MOS 18F (SFintelligence sergeant) and are qualified tofill positions ranging from the SF-detach-ment level to the unified-command level.In addition to training students in the tra-ditional skills of SF intelligencesergeants, SFISC trains them in the lat-est techniques of intelligence-gatheringand analysis, and it acquaints them withrecent advances in the technology of geo-spatial information systems. The result isthe creation of an SF intelligence sergeantwho is prepared to leverage technologyand his analytical skills in order toachieve information dominance by estab-lishing a holistic, network-centric per-spective of warfare in any operationalenvironment.

ConclusionRecent reports from the field reveal

that Company A’s advanced-skills train-ing has contributed significantly to battle-field successes in the global war on terror-ism. Today, more than ever, the skills thatSF Soldiers learn in Company A’s coursesare in high demand. Company A’s cadrefaces the challenge of keeping pace withthat demand, keeping abreast of rapidly-changing technology, and maintainingtime-honored traditional SF advancedskills. To meet the challenge, the cadreconstantly examines the threat environ-ment and operational demands in order to

develop tactics, techniques and proce-dures that will integrate emerging tech-nologies with the traditional SF warriorethos, allowing SF Soldiers to fight andwin in the network-centric environment ofthe 21st century.

Chief Warrant Officer 4 Bruce R. Wattsis the commander of Company A, 2nd Bat-talion, 1st Special Warfare TrainingGroup. Prior to his current assignment,CWO 4 Watts spent 21 years in the 5th SFGroup, serving in a variety of duty posi-tions that included SF engineer sergeant,SF intelligence sergeant and assistant SF-detachment commander. From 1990 to1995, he was commander of SF Detach-ment 546, which saw service during theGulf War and in Somalia. During his mostrecent assignment, CWO 4 Watts was amember of Forward Operating Base 51,participating in the planning and execu-tion of operations in western Iraq. CWO 4Watts holds a bachelor of science degree inpublic management from Austin PeayState University, Clarksville, Tenn.

May 2004 7

U.S. Army photo

A Special Forces warrantofficer talks with Iraqicivilians during Opera-tion Iraqi Freedom.

When missions call for SpecialForces Soldiers to perform airinfiltration or to coordinate

close air support for ground operations,Soldiers rely on the advanced-skillstraining provided by Company B, 2ndBattalion, 1st Special Warfare TrainingGroup.

Company B trains four advanced-skillscourses: the Military Free-fall Parachutists

Course, or MFFPC;the Military Free-fallJumpmaster Course,or MFFJMC; theAdvanced MilitaryFree-fall ParachutistsCourse, or AMFFPC;and the Special Op-erations Terminal At-tack Control Course,or SOTACC. Sincethe summer of 1995,Company B has been

based at Yuma Proving Ground, Ariz. YumaProving Ground’s consistently favorableweather, nearly unlimited air space andabundant ranges make it an excellent train-ing location that allows consistent and effi-cient year-round training.

MFFPCThe MFFPC is a 20-day course that

qualifies members of special-operationsforces to conduct night combat-equip-

ment, oxygen-assisted parachute infiltra-tions from high altitudes — generally12,500 feet above ground level and high-er. The course is taught 10 times peryear. Training begins at Fort Bragg, N.C.,where students learn body stabilizationin a free-fall simulator. During their fivedays of training at Fort Bragg, students“fly” for 42 minutes in the vertical windtunnel — 14 flights of three minuteseach. Each of their wind-tunnel flights isdigitally recorded and later reviewed bythe student and an instructor. On thesixth day, the students and cadre travelto Yuma, where they conduct 28 free-falljumps, using the MC-4 RAM-air para-chute system, during the next 14 days oftraining.

Generally, the first five days of MFFPCtraining at Yuma are one-on-one trainingwith an instructor, including the stu-dents’ jumps with combat equipment andoxygen. The next five days focus on thecollective skills of grouping, ending withtwo high-altitude, high-opening, orHAHO, jumps. The second of theseHAHO jumps is conducted from 17,500feet above ground level and requires stu-dents to use oxygen and carry combatequipment. The last four days of trainingare conducted at night, and training con-cludes with two night, combat-equip-ment, oxygen jumps.

Recent changes to MFFPC traininginclude the addition of the two HAHO

8 Special Warfare

Training SF Advanced Skills in the Air: Co. B, 2nd Battalion, 1st SWTG

by Major Buck Dellinger

The MFFPC now includestwo high-altitude, high-opening jumps, one withcombat equipment andoxygen.

U.S. Army photo

jumps. Equipment changes include thereplacement of the AR2 automatic para-chute-opening device with a military ver-sion of an electronic automatic-activationdevice equipped with closing loop cutters.Another equipment change is the replace-ment of the improved equipment-attach-ment sling (known as the spider harness)with the Parachutists Drop Bag.

MFFJMCThe MFFJMC is a 17-day course that

trains students to conduct safe, stan-dardized military free-fall operations.Taught 10 times per year, the course isopen to officers, warrant officers, NCOsand enlisted members of all the services,as well as to selected students of alliedcountries.

The bedrock of the MFFJMC trainingplan consists of jumpmaster personnelinspections, oxygen operations, calcula-tion of the high-altitude release point,and jumpmaster actions in the aircraft.Historically, the attrition rate of

MFFJMC has been high, but new tech-nology, training aids and the dedicationof the instructor cadre have increasedthe student success rate to nearly 90 per-cent. Taking into account lessons learnedfrom recent operations, military free-fallinfiltration planning has been added tothe portion of training that covers jump-master duties and responsibilities. Thegoal of the addition is to provide studentswith a framework for considering allaspects of military free-fall infiltration,from pre-mission isolation through con-solidation on the drop zone.

AMFFPCThe AMFFPC is a 40-day course

taught four times per year to selectedpersonnel assigned to special-operationsunits and to the Department of Defense.AMFFPC focuses on producing advancedmilitary free-fall trainers for the forcewhile creating a pool of future militaryfree-fall instructors. During the course,students make an average of 140 jumps

May 2004 9

Instructors evaluate a stu-dent’s free-fall techniqueand ensure that he isaware of his “pull” altitude.

U.S. Army photo

as they are being taught multiple in-airskills and evaluated on their perform-ance. Like MFFPC, AMFFPC begins atFort Bragg, with five days of training inthe vertical wind tunnel, where each stu-dent receives nearly five hours of indi-vidual training. The remainder of thecourse is taught at Yuma ProvingGround. The final tests in AMFFPC focuson observing and critiquing individualsand groups as they conduct military free-fall operations.

SOTACCLessons learned during operations in

Afghanistan and Iraq have shown thevalue of close air support to SF opera-tions, and SOTACC is the newest coursetaught by Company B’s cadre. The 19-daycourse, a joint effort by the Army and the

Marine Corps, aims at producing fully cer-tified joint tactical attack controllers.

SOTACC uses state-of-the-art comput-er simulations and live aircraft controlsin training. The simulations replicate thevarious types of call-for-fire missions(mortars and artillery) and tacticalattack controls of all common aircraft.

Prior to controlling live bombing runs,students receive prerequisite trainingand a comprehensive written test. Dur-ing the last week of training, studentsmove out onto Yuma Proving Ground’svast range facility, where they will con-trol at least 12 live bombing runs byfixed-wing fighter aircraft. SOTACC alsoemploys the most recent battle-testedlasers and other equipment used for ter-minal guidance of aircraft. In the nearfuture, the cadre plans to expand theSOTACC lesson plan to include the useof unmanned aerial vehicles in call-for-fire operations.

Major Buck Dellinger is the command-er of B Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Spe-cial Warfare Training Group. His previ-ous assignments in Infantry and SpecialForces units include service with the82nd Airborne Division, the Joint SpecialOperations Command, the 10th SF Groupand the U.S. Military Academy. Commis-sioned in 1988 from the U.S. MilitaryAcademy, Major Dellinger holds a mas-ter’s degree in international relationsfrom Rutgers University. He is scheduledto assume duties as the 1st Special War-fare Training Group S3 during the sum-mer of 2004.

10 Special Warfare

Students in SOTACC control live bombing runs by fixed-wing fighter aircraft at Yuma Proving Ground.

U.S. Army photo

A student falls away fromthe aircraft, followedclosely by the instructorwho will critique his performance.

U.S. Army photo

In 1964, the Army began sending Spe-cial Forces A-detachments to KeyWest, Fla., on temporary duty to train

selected special-operations forces in theinfiltration skill of combat diving. Today,that training, marking its 40th anniver-sary, continues through the permanentcadre of Company C, 2nd Battalion, 1stSpecial Warfare Training Group.

During the late 1960s a permanentcadre was assigned to Key West to formthe SF Underwater Operations School.Since the school’s creation, the majority ofthe instructors have been Soldiers fromSF, but over the years, the instructor pop-ulation has grown to include ArmyRangers, Navy SEALs, Navy deep-seadivers, Air Force combat-control techni-cians and Air Force pararescuemen. Thejoint cadre brings a broad spectrum ofexpertise and experience to the training offuture combat divers.

The cornerstone of the training at theUnderwater Operations School is clandes-tine underwater infiltration usingrebreather technology. Through the years,the rebreather equipment used at theschool has changed from the Emerson rigto the CCR-1000 to today’s Draeger LAR V.

Despite changes in the cadre makeup,the replacement of antiquated equipmentwith new technology and the replacementof old training events with new ones, themission of the school remains unchanged:to train special-operations forces to be

competent, safe and tactically proficientcombat divers.

Company C conducts three courses: theCombat Diver Qualification Course, orCDQC; the Combat Diver SupervisorCourse, or CDSC; and the Dive MedicalTechnician Course, or DMTC.

CDQCCDQC is a 24-day course, taught five

times per year, that qualifies members ofspecial-operations forces as combatdivers. Instructors train students on twounderwater breathing apparatuses: open-circuit scuba and closed-circuitrebreathers. The focus of CDQC is subsur-face infiltration, and the course empha-sizes underwater navigation. Studentscomplete navigation dives ranging from500 meters to 2,000 meters. Throughout

May 2004 11

The SF Underwater Operations School: Co. C, 2nd Battalion, 1st SWTG

by Major David K. Hsu

The Underwater Operations School is located on Flem-ing Key, near Key West, Fla.

Photo copyright David Doubilet and Jennifer Hayes

the course, students swim distances ofmore than 30 kilometers.

Open-circuit training involves naviga-tion, search dives, a 130-foot deep dive,submarine operations and a 50-foot free-swimming ascent. Closed-circuit traininginvolves underwater individual and teamnavigation, as well as procedures forestablishing a beach-landing-site.

CDQC also includes a rigorous academ-ic component. Students receive more than

seven hours of instruction on dive physi-ology and dive physics, four hours ofinstruction on U.S. Navy dive tables, twohours of instruction covering diveinjuries, and two hours of instruction ontides, waves and currents.

In October 2004, CDQC will add the fol-lowing critical tasks:• Nautical navigation and charts.• Small-boat operations (combat rubber

raiding craft and kayaks).• Maritime air-operations classes (rotary-

wing personnel casting and personnelrecovery, and infiltration of boats by air).In the past, Company C trained these

waterborne-infiltration skills during thesix-week Combat Waterborne InfiltrationCourse, or CWIC. When CWIC was can-celled, the JFK Special Warfare Centerand School distributed those basic criticaltasks to the pre-CDQC and the CDQC. The

graduate of CDQC will also receive train-ing in selected advanced CWIC criticaltasks after he returns to his home station.

Recently, SF soldiers have attendedCDQC in record numbers. More 18-seriesSoldiers have graduated from the past twoiterations of CDQC than previously gradu-ated during an average year — enough tofill more than four SF dive detachments.

CDSCCDSC, three weeks long, runs concur-

rently with the DMTC. Both courses areconducted two times per year. In order tobe selected to attend CDSC, applicantsmust have served on dive status for atleast one year. CDSC graduates are qual-ified to plan and supervise military com-bat-diving operations. The dive supervi-sor is to the combat diver as the jump-master is to the parachutist. Thus, thedive-supervisor personnel inspection,dive planning and emergency proceduresform the bedrock of this intense course.

Training also includes nautical naviga-tion, inspection of closed-circuit rigs, andoperation of the hyperbaric chamber.During the final mission of CDSC, theemergency-procedures situational train-ing exercise, students work closely withstudents of the DMTC in retrieving,assessing, transporting and treatinginjured divers.

DMTCThe DMTC is three weeks in length.

Applicants for the course are notrequired to be dive-qualified, but theymust be members of military occupation-al specialty 18D (SF medical sergeant) ormembers of MOS 91W (medical special-ist) who are also graduates of the SpecialOperations Combat Medical Course.DMTC covers the prevention, assessmentand treatment of dive injuries. A divemedical officer, SF medics and Air Forcepararescuemen provide instruction onsubjects including neurological exams,decompression, anatomy and physiologyof the neurological and cardiopulmonarysystem, dive pharmacology, decompres-sion sickness, diving diseases and inva-

12 Special Warfare

Students practice underwater navigation while wearing closed-circuit rebreather equipment.

Photo copyright David Doubilet and Jennifer Hayes

sive procedures. Students also conduct achamber dive of 165 feet while treating apatient.

FutureThe future of combat diving is one of

expansion, in personnel as well as in tech-nology. Fiscal year 2004 has already wit-nessed the addition of a second divedetachment to each SF battalion, whichdoubled the requirement for SF personnelwho are qualified as combat divers. Inaddition, the Air Force, which has longsent students to the CDQC, projects agreater than 90-percent increase in thenumber of Air Force students who willattend CDQC over the next two years.Although the number of students will dra-matically increase in the coming years,the objectives of the school will notchange, and the cadre will ensure that thequality of training will not decline.

Recent technological breakthroughspromise dramatic improvements inunderwater safety, underwater naviga-tion, underwater mobility and underwatercommunications. As the subject-matterexperts in combat diving, the cadre mem-bers of Company C are taking part inidentifying future technologies that willaid underwater infiltration. Cadre mem-bers are studying the capabilities ofunderwater global positioning systems,diver-propulsion vehicles, and diver-to-diver and diver-to-ship communicationssystems.

Underwater infiltration remains a criti-cal capability for Army special-operations

forces. In its 40th year of operations, theUnderwater Operations School remainsdedicated to providing professionalinstruction and to training competent,safe and tactically proficient special-oper-ations divers.

Major David K. Hsu is the commanderof Company C, 2nd Battalion, 1st SWTG,which conducts the SF Underwater Oper-ations School at Key West, Fla. Commis-sioned in the Infantry Branch upon hisgraduation from Boston University, heserved as a Bradley Infantry FightingVehicle platoon leader and staff officer inthe 3rd Infantry Division in Schweinfurt,Germany. Since his graduation from theSF Qualification Course in 1995, MajorHsu has served as detachment command-er for A-detachments 125 and 126 in the1st Battalion, 1st SF Group. He holds amaster’s degree in defense analysis fromthe Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,Calif.

May 2004 13

Students conduct dry-land based submarine escape trunk lock-out procedures at theSF Underwater Operations School.

Students in the CDQC line up at the edge of the pool,ready to begin training.

Photo copyright David Doubilet and Jennifer Hayes

Photo copyright David Doubilet and Jennifer Hayes

Some of the most directly beneficialand relevant training for Army spe-cial-operations forces, or ARSOF, who

are successfully prosecuting the global waron terrorism, or GWOT, is taught by Com-pany D, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special WarfareTraining Group.

Company D trains Soldiers in the UnitedStates Army Special Operations Com-mand, or USASOC, in advanced skills andserves as USASOC ’s subject-matter exper-tise base for close-quarters battle, or CQB;breaching operations of a commander’s in-extremis force, or CIF; and the tactics,techniques and procedures, or TTPs, of spe-cial-operations sniper and antiterrorismoperations.

To accomplish its training mission, Com-pany D is organized into a headquartersdetachment and three training units: theSpecial Forces Advanced Reconnaissance,Target Analysis, Exploitation TechniquesCourse, or SFARTAETC, Committee; theSpecial Operations Target InterdictionCourse, or SOTIC, Committee; and theAntiterrorism Detachment, or ATD.

Although the courses conducted by Com-pany D provide training critical to success-ful prosecution of the GWOT, the customerbase for each course varies in accordancewith classified and unclassified training-mission guidance and directives, as well aswith command priorities. SFARTAETC is anon-solicitation course, taught exclusivelyto 18-series Soldiers who are assigned to or

on orders to an SF CIF. SOTIC exclusivelytrains Soldiers assigned to SF, Ranger orother ARSOF units.

ATD conducts three antiterrorism cours-es: the Individual Terrorism AwarenessCourse, or INTAC; the AntiterrorismInstructor Qualification Course, or AIQC;and the United Nations PeacekeepingObservers Course, or UNPKO. All threeare Department of Defense-directed train-ing courses available to service personnelwho are on orders to high-threat locationsoutside the continental United States.

Although many members of ARSOF areaware of the existence of the courses listedabove, many are not aware of the courses’scope or intent, or of the numerous changesthat have recently occurred in the training.That lack of awareness has created a num-ber of misconceptions, outdated perspec-tives and inaccuracies regarding CompanyD’s training courses.

During the past two years, Company Dhas expanded the scope of its training con-siderably, from being responsible for con-ducting four 48-man SFARTAETC itera-tions and five 24-man SOTIC iterationseach year to absorbing the ATD and itscourses, increasing SFARTAETC to 68-man classes, planning and resourcing theexpansion of SOTIC to 10 32-man classesper year, and standing up the Special Oper-ations Terminal Attack Control Course(later transferred to the 2nd Battalion’sCompany B).

14 Special Warfare

Providing Relevant Training for the GWOT: Co. D, 2nd Battalion, 1st SWTG

by Major Shannon Boehm

The resourcing and manpower changesnecessary to support this training growth,although they were a substantial chal-lenge, were essential for meeting the needsof the force. To date, Company D hasaccomplished many of the increases andhas done the planning necessary for theothers, all the while maintaining the high-quality training for which Company D isknown.

SFARTAETCSFARTAETC, taught four times per

year, is an eight-week course that focuseson providing quality training in advancedmarksmanship and CQB assault. BecauseSFARTAETC provides specialized andcomprehensive instruction and training inthe TTPs needed by CIFs, it is the prereq-uisite qualification course for assignmentto CIFs.

During the eight weeks, students receivetwo weeks of advanced combat marksman-ship followed by six weeks of training inCQB. The marksmanship training involveshigh-risk, live-fire drills that emphasizethe employment of pistols and carbinesand focus on the precise application of dis-

criminate fire. The CQB portion includestraining in combatives; rappelling; special-ized target assaults; and breaching byexplosive, mechanical and ballistic means.

In September 2002, USASOC directed theJFK Special Warfare Center and School toexpand the size of SFARTAETC classesfrom 48 students to 68 students in order tobetter meet operational-force requirements.Iterations of the 68-man classes began inJanuary 2003, but because of instructorvacancies created by operational contingen-cies, SWCS temporarily curtailed theincrease in class size until the instructorshortage could be alleviated. As of March2004, the SFARTAETC committee is onceagain conducting 68-man classes.

Another significant change in SFAR-TAETC during the last year has been theimprovement in the student graduationrate. Based on input from the operationalforce and suggestions from instructors,Company D made substantial refinementsto the execution of the SFARTAETC pro-gram of instruction. During the last fivecourses, the graduation rate has beengreater than 80 percent. This represents asignificant increase from the course’s his-toric graduation rate of 66 percent. The com-

May 2004 15

U.S. Army photo

SFARTAETC providesstudents with high-risklive-fire assault training.Instruction focuses ondiscriminate target en-gagement and close-quarters battle.

mittee has increased the graduation ratewhile maintaining high-quality trainingand adhering to validated standards. Thesuccess of SFARTAETC graduates whentheir units are deployed on operational mis-sions continues to validate SFARTAETC’straining methods and content.

SOTICThe six-week SOTIC is taught five times

per year. SOTIC trains selected personnelin the technical skills and operational pro-cedures necessary for delivering precisionrifle fire from concealed positions (sniping)in support of ARSOF missions. SOTIC isthe only Level-1 sniper-qualification coursefor ARSOF soldiers, and it is the bestcourse in DoD for learning the art and skillof accurate, discriminate, long-rangesniper engagement.

SOTIC students focus the majority oftheir time training on the essentials oflong-range, precision shooting. In the proc-ess, they become intimately familiar withtheir assigned weapon and with foreignand nonstandard sniper weapons systems.SOTIC provides students with the solidfoundation of skills essential for them toform effective sniper-observer teams.

During the course, students are trainedin distance determination; precisionengagement (static targets out to 800meters, snap targets out to 400 meters andmoving targets out to 300 meters); multi-

ple target engagement; stalking; camou-flage and concealment; observation tech-niques; reporting techniques; and hide-siteconstruction. SOTIC begins training withiron-sight, known-distance marksmanship(advanced rifle marksmanship). The coursesoon transitions to known-distance marks-manship using optics (sniper marksman-ship), and further evolves to unknown-dis-tance sniper marksmanship (field fire).SOTIC culminates in a comprehensivefield-training exercise that tests the stu-dents’ capabilities for infiltration; move-ment; fieldcraft; distance-judging; observa-tion; target-surveillance and -reporting;and sniper engagement.

As with SFARTAETC, in September 2002,USASOC directed SWCS to expand theSOTIC student output. That expansion —from 120 to 320 students per year — wouldmean increasing the size of each courseiteration from 24 to 32 students andincreasing the number of annual iterationsfrom five to 10. Unfortunately, the lack ofan adequate number of existing rangefacilities and the scarcity of land suitablefor the construction of new ranges at FortBragg has stalled SOTIC expansionefforts.

In May 2003, SOTIC underwent a criti-cal task skills board, or CTSB, throughwhich the operational force identified addi-tional training requirements. Despite theconstraints on facilities, the SOTIC com-mittee has implemented changes to

16 Special Warfare

SOTIC students receivetraining in a variety ofsubjects, including cam-ouflage and conceal-ment, stalking, observa-tion techniques andsniper engagement.

U.S. Army photo

address some of the needs identified dur-ing the CTSB: training on day and nightdigital and video systems; better limited-visibility shooting exercises; and morecomplex urban-sniping scenarios.

SOTIC is also in the midst of integratingthe newly fielded universal night sight, the.50-caliber Barrett sniper system, and theSR-25 sniper system. In concert with thosechanges, the committee has updated theSOTIC program of instruction to incorpo-rate the new equipment and to support themandated 320-man annual output once therequired range facilities have beenapproved and constructed.

ATDATD executes the only DoD-directed

training in the SWCS 1st Special WarfareTraining Group. The combined course stu-dent load for INTAC, AIQC and UNPKO is650 per year, and the student populationranges from sergeants to general officers.

INTAC is a five-day antiterrorismcourse, with a class load of 20 students,taught 24 times per year. INTAC is intend-ed for DoD personnel (and their adultdependents) who are scheduled for assign-ment to high-threat locations outside thecontinental U.S. INTAC provides classroomtraining on antiterrorism TTPs, as well aspractical exercises on surveillance-detec-tion, survival shooting and evasive-drivingprocedures. The course is recognized as thepremier AT course in DoD by the J-34,Joint Staff.

AIQC is a two-week qualification coursefor antiterrorism instructors. Taught eighttimes per year with a class load of 16 stu-dents, AIQC is open to DoD officers andNCOs who will be assigned as antiterror-ism officers, or ATOs. AIQC provides poten-tial ATOs the Level-1 AT training informa-tion and the instruction skills they willneed for conducting unit-level AT training.

Recent analysis of the AIQC by J-34 per-sonnel resulted in the expansion of thecourse’s program of instruction from theoriginal Level 1 AT curriculum to a Level 2AT curriculum. The course change hasresulted in the inclusion of a force-protec-tion module that includes practical exercis-

es in threat-vulnerability assessment andin surveillance-detection.

UNPKO is a 10-day course coordinatedwith the State Department and DoD.UNPKO provides military officers andNCOs on assignment to U.N. missions theAT training they will need in order to workand survive in high-threat locations outsidethe U.S. After five days of training that areidentical to INTAC, UNPKO provides addi-tional instruction on off-road vehicledynamics, mine-awareness and first-aidskills. Students also receive classified brief-ings pertinent to the U.N. mission to whichthey will be assigned. The course is taughttwice per year, in June and in December,and has a student load of 20 to 45 per class.

The logic of having SF warriors — expe-rienced in working, living and surviving inhigh-threat regions — instructing otherswho will be assigned in small numbers tohigh-threat locations outside the U.S. isindisputable. The ATD instructors areworld-class, and the constantly increasingdemand for the three AT courses validatesthe quality and relevance of the trainingthe detachment provides.

FacilitiesIn support of its courses, Company D uses

many facilities in and around the FortBragg installation. The Miller TrainingComplex is the hub for all the company’straining, consolidating the classroominstruction and support components. FortBragg’s Range 37, Range 66E and Range 30,as well as the ATD driving track, serve as

May 2004 17

INTAC includes training in terrorism awareness, surveil-lance-detection, and self-defensive measures such asvehicle bomb-checks.

U.S. Army photo

the primary ranges for Company D’s rangework and practical exercises.

The SFARTAETC Committee also usesFort Bragg facilities for military opera-tions on urban terrain, or MOUT, andother selected target areas on and off themilitary installation. The SOTIC Com-mittee uses several additional ranges onFort Bragg for training in distance fireand field fire, uses drop zones and train-ing areas for stalking and observationexercises, and uses the Fort BraggMOUT facilities for training in urbansniping techniques. The ATD uses vari-ous facilities in and around Fort Braggfor its surveillance-detection trainingand for practical exercises in threat-vul-nerability assessment. For all three ofCompany D’s subelements, the use ofnumerous facilities creates flexibility,enables continued training executiondespite operational priorities, and pro-vides increased training realism by miti-gating the tendency to execute “canned,”unrealistic scenarios.

ConclusionIn conclusion, Company D conducts a

number of high-risk, realistic and relevanttraining courses. The focus of all CompanyD’s courses is the live-fire or practicalapplication of each course’s skill sets. Thatfocus on practicality makes the trainingvaluable, effective and relevant to currentoperations. In the ongoing GWOT, thetraining provided by Company D is vali-dated every day. The instructors who manthe organization, epitomizing the quietprofessional, maintain their focus onimparting advanced-skills training that isessential for operational forces to be suc-cessful on the battlefield.

Major Shannon Boehm is the command-er of Company D, 2nd Battalion, 1st Spe-cial Warfare Training Group, JFK SpecialWarfare Center and School. His previousSF assignments include detachment com-mander and company executive officer, 1stBattalion, 5th SF Group. He was commis-sioned through the U.S. Military Academy.

18 Special Warfare

On July 9, 1984, one monthafter the first class of 24Special Forces warrant offi-

cers graduated from the SF War-rant Officer Technical CertificationCourse at the JFK Special WarfareCenter, the Army created the SFWarrant Officer Branch. The SFwarrant officers were brought intothe force to provide the SF detach-ment with tactical and technicalexpertise based on their in-depthknowledge and experience of SFoperations.

On July 9, 2004, the 20thanniversary of the SF Warrant Offi-cer Branch and the 86th anniver-sary of the Army Warrant OfficerCorps, SF warrant officers willbecome part of the SF OfficerBranch. Their change of status willbe acknowledged by the changing oftheir collar branch insignia fromthe warrant-officer eagle, worn byall Army warrant officers since May1921, to the crossed arrows, worn bySF officers since June 1987.

When the Army created the SFWarrant Officer Branch, MilitaryOccupational Specialty 180A, SF war-rants were designated as SF techni-cians, in keeping with the Army tra-dition of warrants serving as techni-cal experts and advisers to command-ers. But from the beginning, SF war-

rant officers were different from otherwarrant officers. SF warrant officersare language-qualified; regionally ori-ented and regionally experienced.They are trained in mission-planning;staff organization; combined tactics;advanced special-operations tech-niques; and survival, evasion, resist-ance and escape. While they have ful-filled the role of technician, the SFwarrant officers have also had theadditional requirement of command-ing at the SF-detachment level, andthey are designated as combat com-manders.That requirement has led toSF warrant officers’ re-designation asassistant detachment commanders —a change that recognizes theirunique capabilities and leadershipresponsibilities.

Today SF warrant officers servewith pride and distinction through-out the special-operations commu-nity: on SF detachments, at the SFgroup level, in the JFK SpecialWarfare Center and School, in theU.S. Army Special Forces Com-mand, in the U.S. Army SpecialOperations Command, and in the-ater special-operations commands.Sought for their experience andmaturity, SF warrant officers alsoserve on various joint special-oper-ations task forces actively involvedin the global war on terrorism. The

SF warrant officer has become anessential member of the modernspecial-operations force.

The JFK Special Warfare Centerand School is planning a ceremonyto commemorate the 20th anniver-sary of SF warrant officers and thechanging of their branch. Detailson the ceremony will be releasedthrough command channels andvia e-mail as soon as the planningis complete.

Chief Warrant Officer 5 WilliamA. McPherson is the chief warrantofficer of the SF Branch and thewarrant officer proponent managerin the SWCS Special OperationsProponency Office. Mr. McPherson,formerly assigned to the 10th SFGroup, has more than 30 years ofservice in the Army.

Chief Warrant Officer 4 DouglasJenkins is chief of the CollectiveTraining Branch, Special ForcesDoctrine Division, Directorate ofTraining and Doctrine, SWCS. Mr.Jenkins has served more than 21years in SF, and his assignmentshave included service in the 1st,2nd and 3rd battalions of the 1stSF Group and the 1st and 2nd bat-talions of the 7th SF Group.

May 2004 19

SF Warrant Officers to Become Part of SF Officer Branch

by Chief Warrant Officer 5 William McPherson and Chief Warrant Officer 4 Douglas Jenkins

On Jan. 15 and 16, 2004, an eclecticgroup of thinkers assembled inCody, Wyo., to identify concepts that

will be necessary for shaping the future ofUnited States Army Special Forces.

Hosted by the commander of the JFKSpecial Warfare Center and School, MajorGeneral Geoffrey C. Lambert, the groupconsisted of participants from academia,industry, the media, the military and thepublic-service sector.1 Cody was selectednot only for its central location but alsobecause its accommodating, relaxed atmos-phere might foster uninhibited intellectualdebate.

Addressing a range of issues pertaining tothe war on terrorism, the conference focusedprincipally on the role of Special Forces. Itbegan with an attempt to define terrorists’operational and behavioral characteristics,followed by a debate on appropriate respons-es to the terrorist threat. The participantsthen discussed contributions made by Spe-cial Forces, as well as courses of action thatmight be pursued by the JFK Special War-fare Center and School in preparing special-operations forces to meet the changing threatof terrorism.

This article is an attempt to capture thefruits of the Cody Conference’s debate anddiscussion. It is not a critical essay on ter-rorism or a definitive solution for theproblems associated with the global waron terrorism. Instead, it presents a mapfor further exploration and development

by collecting the ideas, opinions and sug-gestions of a group of gifted, informed andcommitted American citizens.

Terrorist characteristicsThe terrorists the world faces today are

masters of deception and denial. The ter-rorist threat is global, regional and local.Terrorists are spread out in classic cellularstructures and use centralized guidanceand decentralized planning and execution.They are astute at indirect warfare, propa-ganda, training, recruitment, dispersion,operational security, fieldcraft skills thatprevent the detection of their cellularstructures, and logistics. Many terroristorganizations are well-funded, and theymake extensive use of multilayered fronts.Terrorists are skilled in the use of auxil-iaries and support networks, both humani-tarian and paramilitary, including auxil-iaries that provide security and support inproximity to key cells. The Internet pro-vides disparate terrorist groups a ready-made medium for collaborating, exchang-ing ideas and sharing lessons learned.

Terrorists operate in failed states, inungoverned or uncontrolled areas, and inthe seams and cracks where nation-statesare lax or ineffective. Terrorists seek sup-port — including technology, funding, logis-tics support, recruits, transnational mobil-ity and media access — from a wide base ofsponsors, although nation-state sponsor-

20 Special Warfare

The Cody Conference: Discussing the War on Terrorism and the Future of SF

by Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert

ship appears to be decreasing.Ideology is key to terrorists’ success.

Islam is the source of legitimacy for radicalIslamists. Radical Islamist terrorism hassignificant informational advantages toexploit: U.S. support for Israel and theU.S.’s insatiable need for oil are successfulterrorist propaganda themes that the U.S.has yet to counter effectively. Ideologiescan be defeated (as was Marxism); howev-er, defeating ideology requires long-termplanning and persistent efforts over time.

For the radical Islamist terrorist, thestrategic goals may be to spread his ideolo-gy and to attain a Middle East that is freeof Western influence. Recent pronounce-ments by al-Qaeda and other groups, cou-pled with tactical target selection that isbased on achieving the maximum psycho-logical effect (such as the March 11, 2004,attacks in Spain), seem to support thosestrategic goals. However, the terrorists’intent may also be to make a long-termeffort to destroy strategic economic targetssuch as the Panama or Suez canals, there-

by isolating the U.S., eroding the will of itscoalition partners, and escalating costs ofimported goods in the U.S. to intolerablelevels.

As al-Qaeda has demonstrated, terroristorganizations adjust rapidly to take advan-tage of any opportunity. In Iraq, the call toarms to fight the “crusaders” is an exampleof agile armed propaganda. It exploitsopportunities of killing Americans forpropaganda value while it supports thestrategic goal of eroding American willover time.

Tribes historically have believed in theirrespective goals, yet tribes have changedover time. The Internet has created newtribes — those connected globally and hor-izontally by common interests. Analyzingand engaging the threat in the context ofthe Internet will have merit as linkagesdevelop, as support groups mutate, and as“delinked” supporting tribes emerge.

While the U.S. is constrained by rulesleft over from the Cold War and the post-Vietnam era, the terrorist threat is unfet-

May 2004 21

tered. To win the global war on terrorism,we may need to wage unconstrained war-fare, but we need to envision a return tonormal constraints after the victory. TheU.S. has forced the terrorist leadership fur-ther into the shadows and has shattered atleast two-thirds of terrorists’ leadershipand organization. Yet terrorists continue toco-opt other groups, winning support inIndonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh,Iraq and other locations. Although al-Qaeda has been rocked by the worldwideefforts of the U.S. and its allies, the groupretains its agility and can still strike whenand where it desires.

What must be doneWe must gain and maintain the initia-

tive. We must decapitate terrorist organi-zations by killing or capturing their lead-ers. We must deter, punish or destroy spon-sors; harass, attack and eliminate nonstate

sponsors; and use courts, economic sanc-tions or other means as necessary.

We must penetrate enemy organizationswith human intelligence, or HUMINT. Thisdifficult task may fall to surrogate intelli-gence personnel or to intelligence assets ofother nations. We have to create a globalenvironment of seamless information- andintelligence-sharing; improve coalition,allied and surrogate intelligence and oper-ational capabilities; and advance our capa-bilities of intercepting low-level signalintelligence. It is imperative that we con-duct deception operations to throw theenemy off balance. Conduct of area-denial,area-control and remote-area operations,either directly or with partners, is critical,as are integrated computer attack anddefense capabilities. It is essential that wedevelop and execute plans for disruptingterrorist recruiting and flatten the enemy’sexecution structure. We must re-energizemilitary-to-military relationships with our

22 Special Warfare

allies to assist in building a global consen-sus against terror.

We must begin, develop and support anIslamic renaissance. The U.S. and U.N.should export ideas, and they shouldrebuild, fund and support modern univer-sities overseas. The best and brightest ofthe Middle East, both civilian and military,should be educated in the U.S., and thereshould be an increase in studentexchanges. Scholarships for U.S. languagestudents overseas should be coupled withthe development of cultural, academic andbusiness exchange centers. Economic aidshould include funding for publishers totranslate more books into Arabic and otherappropriate languages. Economic-assist-ance programs that would encourage, trainand fund Muslim countries to alter livingconditions and create better opportunitiescould also be beneficial.

The U.S. should adopt a broader defini-tion of “just governance.” Promoting safeand secure operations of nongovernmentorganizations, and expressing universalvalues (not only U.S.-based “freedom anddemocracy”) could have merit as a meansof moving neutral audiences away fromterror. By winning the support of uncom-mitted Muslims around the world, the U.S.could deprive al-Qaeda and other organiza-tions of potential allies and recruits.

What can be done betterWe should separate the metrics of the

global war on terrorism from those of Oper-ation Iraqi Freedom. Operation Iraqi Free-dom is a regional combat activity withimplications for the global war on terror-ism. Global measures of effectiveness needto be carefully articulated, and we need tograsp the international ramifications ofinformation.

The image of self-policing Muslim gov-ernments is priceless. Why didn’t Muslimpolice capture Saddam Hussein? Why didAmericans announce his capture? Why wasthe “we” who captured him not the popu-lace whose members he had murdered bythe hundreds of thousands?

Global perceptions and cooperation domatter. In the long term, it will be other

nations’ intelligence, and possibly theirpolicing actions, that will win the globalwar on terrorism. We need to define ourenemies as narrowly as possible and ourallies as broadly as possible. Cold War def-initions of our enemies — even pre-9/11definitions — no longer apply.

We must develop strategic themes andstrategic information campaigns, thenstreamline our information operationsand delegate the approval authority forinformation products down to the lowestlevels — the country teams and militaryunits. Bringing public diplomacy fully intothe mix of informational tools will help.

Decapitating terrorist organizations willwork well in the near-term, but over time,new leaders will arise if we do not examineand address the root causes of terrorism.Not all unemployed, underemployed or rest-less youth in many societies, including Mus-lim societies, are willing to commit suicideor to join radical, murdering clans. Weshould develop campaigns that synchronizeand balance U.S. objectives against those ofemerging indigenous leaders or factionsthat are attempting to recruit. If we are tobe successful in disrupting terrorist recruit-ing, our examination needs to analyze themechanics of terrorist recruitment.

Potential SF contributionsSpecial Forces’ niche is unconventional

warfare, which includes counterinsurgencyand guerrilla warfare. Special Forcesshould be chartered to monitor and combatinsurgencies, even though other U.S. forceswill move on to new priorities.

To effectively combat nagging insur-gency problems and to conduct sustainedguerrilla warfare, the U.S. needs to developa standing, deployable Special Forcesheadquarters. The headquarters wouldhave to be capable of conducting long-termoperations in multiple locations.

In order to gain allies against the terror-ist threat and to develop the long-term per-sonal relationships needed for information-sharing and teamwork, the Special Forcesheadquarters would conduct preventionand mitigation operations. Those opera-tions would include advising and training

May 2004 23

host-nation military forces or police, intel-ligence units, counterterrorism forces, bor-der guards and other members of the statesecurity apparatus.

The headquarters could also conduct med-ical civil-assistance programs, joint/com-bined exercises and training, mobile train-ing teams, engineer civil-assistance pro-grams, and other projects in high-threatareas in order to improve the situation, tocreate opportunities and to open doors.

If required, Special Forces could operatein denied areas, assisting insurrections byrecruiting guerrillas or other armed enti-ties. The best examples of the success of anindirect approach in the global war on ter-rorism is the expulsion of the Taliban gov-ernment by the 5th Special Forces Groupand other government agencies and thevirtual elimination of the terrorist threaton Basilan Island in the Philippines by the1st Special Forces Group.

Special Forces must be capable of gath-ering and exploiting HUMINT. SF mustalso be educated in the latest techniquesfor collecting signal intelligence andimagery intelligence and equipped withthe latest technology for both. These intel-ligence skills will allow Special Forces toprepare the battlespace with ground-truthintelligence and information.

Intelligence assets must be on the street —everywhere. Special Forces has the abilityto train and assist other nations and gov-ernment agencies in penetrating enemyorganizations. We should develop a capa-bility for tracking and analyzing insurgentmovements worldwide for the long term,guaranteeing an indefinite “eye on theproblem” regardless of changing nationalthreats. We should publish new doctrinefor counterinsurgency and guerrilla war-fare that captures ongoing field develop-ments and lessons learned.

The worldwide deployment and rotationof Special Forces regional experts provideslong-term presence in problematic areas.The Special Forces unit of action willremain the SF Operational DetachmentAlpha, which is designed, trained andequipped to operate in remote, isolatedareas. This force multiplier conserves con-ventional military force for the main efforts.

Special Forces can conduct operations toforce enemy activity — any action or reac-tion that can be analyzed. SF operationsallow us to expand the intelligence data-base, to conduct raids where appropriate orto deliver precision fires anywhere in thebattlespace. Even down to the individuallevel, Special Forces Soldiers can beemployed as a national asset.

Actions for transforming SFInvest in people and training. We must

ensure that Special Forces Soldiers remainthe best in the world, tuned for independentoperations far from logistics support. Our pri-mary goal should be to build regionalexperts. We should consider seconding offi-cers to foreign armies and allied specialforces. We could also recruit selected minori-ties and native speakers, and employ off-the-street and out-of-college recruiting programs.We might also explore the use of non-citi-zen/no-security-clearance detachments orbring women into the force for use in certainspecial-operations fields. If Special Forceslooks the same after the war on terrorism,someone will have failed.

Special Forces must revolutionize itslanguage program. Language and culturaltraining must be intensified and revolu-tionized by creating partnerships withleading civilian and military educationalinstitutions. Consideration should be givento immersion education overseas, extendedparticipation by the Defense LanguageInstitute, and other solutions. Promotionfor Special Forces officers and enlisted Sol-diers should be tied to their language capa-bility and to their completion of improvedtraining in cross-cultural communicationand negotiation.

We should develop an out-of-system Sol-dier track that would allow Special ForcesSoldiers who have unique skills and poten-tial to “max out” at a certain pay grade inorder to contract out or go outside of servicepromotion norms to become regionalexperts or subject-matter experts in otherareas, such as weapons of mass destruction.

We must train and develop SF personnelto work in smaller elements that will beemployed in urban terrain and in covert or

24 Special Warfare

clandestine environments. To allow Soldiersto learn to fight battles before they begin, itis a necessity that we create enemy-terraintraining sites in all theaters. These wouldprovide Soldiers with opportunities fortraining with the fires and mobility plat-forms requisite in that theater.

Another component of educational changewould be to refocus the Army Special Opera-tions Battle Lab, or ARSOBL, on solving theproblems of unconventional operations andcounterinsurgency. ARSOBL should be a“skunk works,” a hothouse of creative thinkingthat generates strategies in its distinctiveareas of operations.

Intelligence is now a basic competency ofSpecial Forces. Each Soldier graduatingfrom the Special Forces QualificationCourse, or SFQC, must have a journey-man’s understanding of intelligence opera-tions, emphasizing HUMINT. Expansion ofthe Special Forces intelligence curriculumwould require developing and implement-ing an additional Special Forces advanced-skills intelligence course.

Another part of the education realignmentwould be integrating and sharing instruction

and training exercises with other governmentintelligence organizations. Special Forcesshould create an interagency exchange pro-gram.The interagency training could prepareindividuals for challenges yet undefined, andthe blending of intelligence and operationalcapabilities would result in a dynamic andproactive force. The new interagency poten-tial would allow operators to provide a moreintellectual response at the tactical level andpolicy-makers and planners to distinguishbetween the threat and the environmentalcontext within which the threat is emerging.In addition to interagency training and coop-eration, we must develop aggressive coali-tion-training programs that align with theprograms of our potential partners in theglobal war on terrorism.

The JFK Special Warfare Center andSchool, or SWCS, must develop a world-class special-warfare network that pro-vides Special Forces Soldiers and their sur-rogates with full-time access to training,resources and lessons learned. SWCSneeds to develop a simulations capabilitythat is multinational-compatible and capa-ble of analyzing and comparing unconven-

May 2004 25

tional-warfare courses of action. All SWCSinstruction must develop and continuouslyimprove students’ skills in information-management and Internet use.

A Special Forces Soldier’s best weapon isbetween his ears. Special Forces instruction-al education and training must be physicallyrobust and academically challenging —kinetic as well as nonkinetic. Special Forcesmust foster adaptive thinking and innovativeexecution by leveraging advanced behavioraland cognitive concepts with tough, imagina-tive, practical exercises. Through the uncon-ventional-leader development program, wemust develop Soldiers who can transitionquickly from kinetic to nonkinetic solutionson the battlefield.

Army Special Forces officers should beawarded branch-qualification credit for fight-ing on the staffs of joint/combined special-operations task forces or in similar positionsin theater special-operations commands.This would be a reversal of the current para-digm: Instead of placing officers in key jointbillets after they have attained their Armyqualification, we would place them in keyjoint billets that would provide their Armyqualification. Special Forces must alsodevelop career paths for specialties thatrequire skills for planning and coordinat-ing unconventional-warfare operations atthe strategic and operational levels.

Enhance battle command/operations. Wemust build a standing, deployable SpecialForces headquarters that is focused on thelong-term, shadowy, unconventional fights ofsurrogate and guerrilla operations, and coun-terinsurgency. The headquarters would sus-tain the focus on terrorism after the regionalcomponent commands, services and othernational resources have shifted to the nextthreat.

We must build small, rotational SpecialForces elements in problematic regions andcountries. These elements, immersed in thespecific language and culture, would be char-tered to establish permanent relationships inthe host nation and to maintain potential bas-ing and training sites. Engagement programswill be tailored to force enemy action, to act asa deception, or to build beneficial relation-ships and establish avenues for information.

Special Forces must make improvements

in HUMINT training, skill sets and field-craft through a comprehensive focus on theredesign of military occupational specialty-producing courses and advanced-skillscourses. We must redesign reachback andinformation-sharing networking to uncon-ventional-warfare centers of excellence andbuild a precision-fires school that will beopen to joint and interagency audiences. ASpecial Forces course should also bedesigned to teach the use of uninhabitedvehicles for reconnaissance, fires anddeception. We must also imbed joint-fires ele-ments into Special Forces and use all “engage-ment” tools available for shaping the battle-space, including unconventional-warfare fis-cal rules of engagement.

We must develop and continually enhanceour capabilities of intelligence, surveillanceand reconnaissance, or ISR. We must alsodesign and adopt interagency and interser-vice intelligence systems, and the ISR capa-bility would allow improved interagencytraining, exchange of information, integra-tion and experimentation.

Develop or procure materiel. SpecialForces must make equipping the Soldier itsnumber-one priority. The nature of our oper-ations requires that special-operationsforces-specific, compatible, nonlethalweapons be developed or purchased; thatfixed-wing, short-take-off-and-landing avia-tion capability be procured; and that SpecialForces mobility platforms be developed thatare tailored for each theater of operation.

We must make advancements in theareas of unmanned aerial vehicles andunmanned ground vehicles, integrated andpersistent ISR technology, and state-of-the-art communications.

Special Forces units should be moved tobetter locations for long-term trainingand theater alignment (in conjunctionwith the 2005 Base Realignment andClosing program).

Modify doctrine. Special Forces mustpublish new doctrine for interagencyoperations, counterinsurgency, guerrillawarfare and counterguerrilla operations.Special Forces must also expand its use ofthe military decision-making process tobetter address course-of-action develop-ment in an operational environment that

26 Special Warfare

comprises disparate adversaries. We mustdevelop the tactics, techniques and proce-dures needed for flushing the enemy out asa component of “finding and fixing.”

ConclusionThe Cody Conference was a valuable

tool in focusing the requirements forchange and transformation for U.S. ArmySpecial Forces. Transformation does nothappen overnight, because Special ForcesSoldiers cannot be mass-produced. Never-theless, Special Forces institutions mustwork quickly and untiringly so that ourSoldiers will be prepared for the ever-changing face of the global war on terror-ism. A participant at the conferenceasked, “How do we train people for a taskthat does not yet exist?” The answer isthat we must educate them to improvise,adapt and overcome on their own … any-thing, anytime and anywhere.

Major General Geoffrey C.Lambert is commanding gen-eral of the JFK Special War-fare Center and School. Hepreviously commanded theU.S. Army Special ForcesCommand, which providedSF units for operations in Afghanistan,Iraq, the Horn of Africa, the Philippinesand Colombia in the global war on terror-ism. He has been an Infantry and SpecialForces officer for more than 30 years, andhe has held the additional specialties of for-eign area officer and Civil Affairs.

Notes:1 Participants were:

• Dr. Patrick Geary, professor of medieval history, Uni-versity of California-Los Angeles.

• Robert D. Kaplan, contributing author, Atlantic Month-ly; author of Balkan Ghosts, Warrior Politics:The Endsof the Earth and The Coming Anarchy.

• William H. Lyerly Jr., director of the Office of Weaponsof Mass Destruction Operations and Incident Man-agement for the Department of Homeland Security’sUnder Secretary for Science and Technology.

• Dr.Gordon McCormick, chairman of the Department ofDefense Analysis; director of the special-operationsdegree program at the Naval Postgraduate School,Monterey, Calif..

• Marc Prensky, founder, president and chief creative

officer of games2train.com and Corporate GamewareLLC.

• Jim Quinlivan, senior analyst for the RandCorporation.

• Linda Robinson, senior writer, U.S. News and WorldReport, and member of the Council on Foreign Rela-tions and the International Institute for StrategicStudies.

• Sarah Sewall, project director, Carr Center for HumanRights Policy, Harvard University; former DeputyAssistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping andHumanitarian Assistance.

• Major General Sidney Shachnow, U.S. Army (ret.), for-mer commanding general of the JFK Special WarfareCenter and School and of the U.S.Army Special ForcesCommand.

• Major General John K. Singlaub, U.S. Army (ret.),member of the Office of Strategic Services duringWorld War II, former commander of the Joint Uncon-ventional Warfare Task Force, MACV-SOG during theVietnam War, and former Chief of Staff, UnitedNations Command, United States Forces, Korea andof the Eighth U.S. Army in Seoul, Korea.

• Wayne Williams, president of U.S. Comm-SultsInc.; member of the Greater Tampa Chamber ofCommerce.

• Dr. Leonard Wong, associate research professor ofmilitary strategy (human and organizationaldimensions), Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.Army War College.

May 2004 27

How much better our unit will be if weever learn that length of service andexperience are no test whatsoever ofthe capacity to lead; and that charac-ter fortified by knowledge is the onlycharm which attracts unequivocalsuccess.

— Major General Eldon Bargewell

The truth is, business as usual will notprovide the capabilities we need to dealwith the transnational and asymmet-ric opponents of tomorrow. A rapidlychanging world deals ruthlessly withorganizations that do not change. …We must constantly reshape ourselvesto remain relevant and useful membersof the joint team. … As new threatsarise we must decide which of our cur-rent capabilities to retain or modify,which new ones to develop, and whichold ones to discard.”

— General Peter J. Schoomaker

Recently a senior leader in the UnitedStates Army Special Forces Commandasked my opinion of the Special Forces

Initial Accessions Program, known as the18X program. This article is an expression ofthat opinion. As the command sergeantmajor of the 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group, myviews and opinions are narrow in scope, andit is difficult for me to comment on the entireSF career field. But based on my knowledge

of the three 18X Soldiers who have come intoour battalion during the past year, and on mylimited exposure to some of the 18X candi-dates undergoing training during SF assess-ment and selection, I believe the 18X pro-gram is selecting the right Soldiers.The 18Xsassigned to our battalion are some of thefinest operators with whom I’ve ever had theprivilege of serving.

Twenty-five years ago, the Army made anattempt to recruit SF Soldiers “off the street,”and the experiment caused controversy andnegative perceptions that persist today. The18Xs of 2004 are better Soldiers: They aremore mature, their average GT score is 121and 50 percent have attended college.

The U.S. Army Recruiting Commandbegan recruiting 18X Soldiers in January2001. Training for 18X Soldiers lasts for twoyears. A Soldier enlists in the Army as an18X and attends Infantry one-station unittraining and airborne training at Fort Ben-ning, Ga. He then makes a permanent-change-of-station move to Fort Bragg, N.C.,to attend Special Forces Assessment andSelection. If he is selected for SF, he attendsthe SF Qualification Course, or SFQC, as anSF weapons sergeant or SF engineersergeant. Following the SFQC, he willattend language training and the Survival,Evasion, Resistance and Escape Coursebefore being promoted to sergeant. Approxi-mately 150 18Xs are expected to arrive inSF groups during FY 2004, and eventually,SF detachments will average receiving a

28 Special Warfare

The 18X Program : Ensuring the FutureHealth of Special Forces

by Command Sergeant Major Michael S. Breasseale

new 18X every eight to 12 months.The quality of the 18X recruits is impres-

sive, and so far, the 18Xs have exceeded allexpectations.The success of the 18X programto this point could be due to many factors, butfour factors are most critical: the maturity ofthe operators, the 18Xs’ patriotism, the 18Xs’commitment to the global war on terrorism,and the Army’s decision to pursue the bestinterests of the SF force.

MaturityIt is primarily the maturity of the 18X

that puts him a step above his predeces-sors from the late 1970s. The 18Xs in the3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group, are, on aver-age, 26 years old. They are not teenagerecruits experiencing life away from homefor the first time. They have sown a fewwild oats and have made a conscious deci-sion to better themselves and to serve ahigher calling than they found in the civil-ian world.

The 18X is also being assessed, selectedand trained by a more capable force that isdrawing on experiences from Grenada, ElSalvador, Panama, Iraq, Haiti, Somalia,the Balkan Theatre and current operationsin Afghanistan and Iraq. The 18X’s SFtraining is complemented by his previouscivilian education and life experience. Twoof the three 18Xs in our battalion holdundergraduate degrees in political science.The dedication and commitment theydemonstrated in earning a college degreeis being applied to their new occupation asan SF Soldier. Being an SF Soldier requirescunning, an ability to operate alone or insmall groups with little or no supervision,and the highest levels of integrity and hon-esty. SF Soldiers must do what is rightwhen no one is watching. Combine all ofthese attributes and you have a personwho has made a career decision, not a first-time enlistee who is seeking college bene-fits or a paycheck.

PatriotismThe maturity of our 18X Soldiers is

backed by their desire to serve the nationas patriotic warriors. Part of my positiveperception of the 18Xs may come from my

own history. I joined the Army in 1980because of the Iran hostage crisis; I feltthat it was my chance to serve the nationand to make a difference. The hostageswere released before I got my chance toparticipate in their rescue, but I continuedto serve in the U.S. Army for the last 24years.

Today, I see Soldiers, particularly 18Xs,coming to SF to join in the fight againstterror. Timing is everything. Many heroescame to light only because of an exception-al need, higher than any personal agenda,when our nation is at war. When I talkwith 18Xs, the global war on terrorism is acommon theme of conversation. Patriotismis not lost on these young men — they areneither cynical norembarrassed abouttheir pride in theircountry. This issomething that can-not be taught in aclass. Every time Ihave conducted myCSM interview withincoming 18Xs, theyhave made it clearto me that theywere successful incivilian life and did not need to enter theArmy in order to make ends meet. Theycame into SF because of a desire to be partof a very special and unique family of high-ly trained men who want to serve theirnation. I find that to be the truest definitionof patriotism.

CommitmentBut it is the 18Xs’ commitment to be the

best from the very beginning that setsthem apart from the average Soldier. Themajority of new 18-series personnel comefrom the ranks of officers and NCOs whohave spent three or more years learningand understanding what it takes to be aSoldier. They are men who have made adecision to stay in the Army beyond theirinitial enlistment, and they realize whattheir commitment to the Army and theircareers will involve.

The 18X shows up with a commitment and

May 2004 29

Photo copyright Hans Halberstadt

An 18X candidate per-forms a road march. Thequality of recruits for the18X program to this pointhas been impressive.

dedication that speaks for itself. For example,one of our battalion’s 18Xs was the distin-guished honor graduate of his SF engineer-sergeant course, another made the comman-dant’s list for the SF engineer-sergeantcourse and has passed the Pre-Scuba Course,and another has already graduated from theCombat Diver Qualification Course and 7thGroup’s Special Forces Advanced UrbanCombat Course, Level III.

Best interests of the forceDespite the obvious quality of the 18Xs

in our battalion, at this point we might askthe question, What is the big picture — isthe 18X program good for the future of theSF community?

In order to remain relevant, SF mustgrow and develop. That will demand a sig-nificant increase in the personnel invento-ry of Career Management Field 18 as webuild over the next few years to meet therequirements of the Enhanced SpecialForces Group. In May 2003, during the U.S.Army Special Operations Command’s Pre-Command Course, the commander of the1st Special Warfare Training Group gave apresentation on 18X recruitment. Heexplained that even if current in-service SFrecruiting reaches its goals, there will be alarge gap — about 1/3 of the total force —between the manpower requirement andthe actual manpower level. The 18X pro-gram is intended to help fill that gap, but it

is not so much a “fix” for the currentrecruitment shortage as it is a means ofensuring the health of SF in the future.

ContinuityThe 18X program will provide not only

more SF Soldiers but also more long-termcontinuity in the force. SF NCOs today arefortunate if they can serve four continuousyears on an A-detachment before they mustmove to an assignment at the Special War-fare Center and School or to positions withinthe U.S. Army Special Forces Command orthe U.S. Army Special Operations Command.An 18X could easily serve multiple SF-detachment tours of four years or more, aswell as additional nontactical assignments,prior to being considered for promotion tomaster sergeant. Ironically, at a time whenSF skills are highly sought-after, a large pro-portion of our SF NCOs are reaching retire-ment eligibility. The 18X program, bringingan infusion of quality SF Soldiers who havethe potential of serving nearly 20 years in thecommunity, is a critical force-managementtool. The bottom line is that without the 18Xprogram, SF will be extremely hard-pressedto maintain its current manning levels, not tomention actually growing as a force.

MentorshipWhile 18X recruitment has been a

resounding success, the true success of the18X program will be determined only inyears to come. We, the current generationof leadership in SF tactical units, not therecruiting system or the training pipeline,will determine the ultimate success or fail-ure of the 18X program.

When the new 18X shows up in his bat-talion, it is extremely important that he beput on a strong team that has an excellentteam sergeant. The significance of the ini-tial team assignment cannot be stressedenough. We all learn positives and negativesfrom our leaders, and as we get more seniorin rank, our ability to discriminate the goodfrom the bad increases. But a young opera-tor coming to his first team will get a look atSF, and the Army, for the first time. His eyeswill be wide open, and he will take good andbad influences indiscriminately. The

30 Special Warfare

Photo copyright Hans Halberstadt

The 18X program willprovide not only more SFSoldiers but also long-term continuity for theforce.

impressions he receives will last his entirecareer, which could be either a long andrewarding experience or a short and nega-tive one, depending upon whether he has asuperior team sergeant for a role model.

If the 18X program has an inherentweakness, it is that the new 18X Soldierhas served all his Army time in a schoolenvironment, without experiencing thedaily drill and discipline of a regular Armyunit. His frame of reference doesn’t encom-pass the huge disparity between the free-dom and autonomy granted to the SF NCOand the strict control prevalent in conven-tional units. An 18X put under the mentor-ship of a mediocre senior NCO might neverlearn to appreciate what “right” looks like.This “1/3 of the force” contains many oftomorrow’s team sergeants, and the 18Xs’first two years on an SF team will be criti-cal in their development.

Suggested programAs a final observation, I believe the

demonstrated success of the 18X programfor the NCO corps could lead to relatedprograms for the officer corps. While thequality of the SF warrant-officer programis high, recruiting successful WO candi-dates is difficult, and it may never be suc-cessful at keeping SF detachments fullymanned with WOs. We have many SFNCOs who choose not to “go warrant”because of their current job satisfactionand their love of the NCO corps.

If the 18X program succeeds, then whynot have a similar program for officers,recruiting second lieutenants to supple-ment and complement the SF warrant offi-cers? The new SF lieutenants would notonly help relieve the WO shortages at thedetachment level but would also sustainthe force in the future as company execu-tive officers and staff officers. When thefirst lieutenant made captain and wasassigned to be a detachment commander,he would be an experienced, trained assetfrom the start.

Today, SF detachment commanders arefortunate if they get 24 months on a teambefore they must move to other assign-ments or to mandatory schooling. This is

an even greater problem than the stabilityof NCOs on SF teams. With a program forSF lieutenants, we could have future com-pany commanders with more than fouryears of detachment time and a muchbroader understanding of special opera-tions — from team to SF-group activities.Maintaining a core of experience while con-tinuing to stabilize the NCOs and officersis what will make SF a viable fighting forcein the future. Bringing back the SF lieu-tenant to complement the 18X programwould take SF into the next two decades,ready to fight for our nation in the globalwar on terrorism.

In closing, I reaffirm my belief that the 18Xprogram is successful. Current selection,assessment and training of the 18X appearsto be hitting the mark. To remain relevant,SF will need not only to constantly reviewand modify the 18X program but also to con-sider other programs, such as the SF lieu-tenant program, in order to meet the chal-lenges of the global war on terrorism and theunforeseen threats of tomorrow.

Command Sergeant Major Michael S. Bre-asseale is the command sergeant major forthe 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group. During 24years of Army service, he has served in a num-ber of special-operations leadership assign-ments, including senior enlisted adviser andcompany sergeant major to the Europeancombatant commander’s in-extremis force,Company C, 1st Battalion, 10th SF Group,Stuttgart, Germany; training and exercisesNCO, Joint Special Operations Command;and Ranger team and squad leader, 2nd Bat-talion, 75th Infantry, Fort Lewis, Wash. Com-mand Sergeant Major Breasseale served incombat during Operations Urgent Fury andJust Cause. He has served in operations otherthan war in Colombia, Ivory Coast and theBalkans Theater. In addition to graduatingfrom the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Acade-my and a number of other military schools, heholds an associate’s degree and has complet-ed four years of undergraduate study atCampbell University, Buies Creek, N.C.

May 2004 31

In the current military operating environ-ment of two major conflicts, PsychologicalOperations forces will play a larger and

more visible role as combat operations giveway to counterterrorism, counterinsurgencyand rebuilding operations. But with morevisibility will come closer scrutiny, and it willbecome more important for PSYOP forces toprovide analyses of what they have done andhow effective their actions have been.

Assessing the effectiveness of a PSYOPeffort is always a difficult task. In the past,PSYOP forces have measured their effec-tiveness by numbers of products dissemi-nated or by interesting anecdotal occur-rences that do not, with any certainty, indi-cate the effectiveness of the PSYOP effort.

An example of an anecdotal occurrence is,“PSYOP was successful because General RatkoMladic sent a letter of complaint to the IFORcommander about our information activities.”In the case of General Mladic, had PSYOPcaused a behavioral change? Did its informa-tion activities influence him to change the sub-versive behavior of his subordinates?

Before we can determine a PSYOP effort’seffectiveness, we must develop specific mea-sures that will allow us to collect the necessaryindicators. By identifying those measures ofeffectiveness during planning instead of fol-lowing execution, PSYOP forces will improvetheir ability to evaluate the effectiveness oftheir efforts. A complete and coherent PSYOPplan is thus essential to an evaluation ofPSYOP effectiveness. This article proposes an

evaluation method that relies heavily on in-depth, articulated planning of PSYOP efforts.The proposed method will allow PSYOP forcesto effectively assess their activities during —not following — an operation, so that they canmake adjustments that will ensure the suc-cess of the PSYOP effort.

PSYOP objectivesPlanners develop the PSYOP plan using

several sources of information in the sup-ported unit’s operations plan, or OPLAN, oroperations order, or OPORD. Those sourcesinclude the commander’s intent or end-state,tasks to PSYOP units, and verbal guidancefrom the supported commander.

Planning begins with mission analysis andthe development of psychological objectives, orPOs, that will enable the supported commanderto achieve his desired end-state. POs are thecenterpiece of the PSYOP plan: They can bethought of as what PSYOP will do for the sup-ported commander.A PO is a statement of mea-surable response that reflects the desired behav-ior or attitudinal change of selected foreign tar-get audiences, or TAs.

POs should be written in a verb-object for-mat.The verb describes the type and directionof the desired change. The object is the overallbehavior or attitude that is to be changed.Some verbs commonly used in POs are“reduce,” “decrease,” “prevent,” “increase,”“gain” and “maintain.”Verbs that are not mea-surable, such as “inform,” “publicize,” “dis-

32 Special Warfare

Evaluating Psychological Operations: Planning Measures of Effectiveness

by Sergeant First Class Robert H. Kellogg

suade,” “encourage” or “facilitate,” should notbe used in POs. For example, a specified taskfrom the commander’s intent of the OPORDcould be, “Create a safe and secure environ-ment for the people of Pineland.” This is not astatement of measurable response thatreflects a desired behavior or attitudinalchange. Restated as “Decrease violence in thearea of operation,” it would describe a behav-ior or change of attitude that could be mea-sured, and it could be used as a PO.1 Otherexamples of valid POs are:• Increase participation in national demo-

cratic institutions.• Decrease effectiveness of insurgents or

opposition force.• Decrease casualties caused by mines

and unexploded ordnance.The PSYOP planner must develop POs

that will cover all aspects of the operation,from the entry of U.S. forces (whether theentry is permissive or nonpermissive) to thetransition back to host-nation authorities.Depending on the size of the operation, plan-ners may develop from four to 10 POs.

Although POs are developed at the highestlevel of PSYOP support, they do not changewhen subordinate units develop their ownplan. Soldiers assigned to the PSYOP taskforce, or POTF, and Soldiers assigned to tacti-cal PSYOP teams, or TPTs, use the same POs.For example, the POTF may develop the PO,“Decrease combat effectiveness of enemyforces.” At the beginning of the operation,PSYOP forces might develop, design and pro-duce a radio broadcast disseminated by Com-mando Solo aircraft that would advise enemysoldiers not to activate their air-defense-artillery equipment.The broadcast would sup-port the PO at the operational level. Twoweeks later, after ground forces had enteredthe area of operations, a TPT might broadcasta loudspeaker message that would instructenemy soldiers how to surrender. The loud-speaker message would support the PO at thetactical level. Even though the PSYOP forceswould implement the PO in different ways,the objective would remain constant.

Supporting PSYOP objectivesPlanners next develop supporting

PSYOP objectives, or SPOs. SPOs are what

PSYOP will do to influence the TA in orderto achieve the POs. They are the specificbehavioral or attitudinal responses desiredfrom the TA as a result of PSYOP.

All SPOs must assist in accomplishingthe POs. SPOs are specific to each PO, andeach PO should have two or more SPOs. Ifplanners cannot develop at least two SPOs,then the PO is probably too narrow in focusand should be rewritten.

SPOs should be written in a noun-verb-object format, and the noun should alwaysbe “TA.” Specific TAs are not written intothe SPOs because often several TAs can betargeted to accomplish the desired behavior

or attitudinal change. The verb-object com-bination describes the desired behavior orattitudinal change.2 Figure 1 is an exampleof the linkage between the PO and its SPOsand the proper format for stating POs andSPOs. The SPOs shown support the PO ofreducing the effectiveness of insurgentactivity. SPOs that could be used for othertypes of operations include:• TA voluntarily eradicates coca crop.• TA decreases number of acts of intereth-

nic violence.• TA reports the locations of mines and

unexploded ordnance.• TA registers to vote.

Target audiencesAfter they develop POs and SPOs, plan-

ners begin identifying potential TAs — theaudiences who have the ability to accom-plish the SPOs. Planners then group poten-tial TAs under the appropriate SPOs. Theinitial potential target-audience list, or

May 2004 33

PO: Reduce effectiveness of insurgent activity in the AO.

SPO 1: TA ceases insurgent activity.SPO 2: TA decreases support for insurgent activity.SPO 3: TA provides information about insurgent

activity.

Figure 1. Example of PO and SPO Linkage

PTAL, will be broad, as the planner rarelyhas time to perform exhaustive research onTAs. The PTAL will be refined severaltimes during the PSYOP process.3

Figure 2 shows what the PSYOP planwould look like at this point. The numberof POs, SPOs and TAs needed for a PSYOPplan will be determined by the size of theoperation and the culture or cultures with-in which the operation takes place.

The concepts of POs, SPOs and PTALsare not new to PSYOP planners. In fact, tothis point our example of the planning proc-ess has been grounded in PSYOP doctrine.But PSYOP doctrine does not specify anyevaluation structure that can be establishedduring planning. We will now explore theidea that POs, SPOs and PTALs, ratherthan being the final steps of planning, arethe basis of further steps. Those furthersteps are essential in building a structurefor determining the extent to which PSYOPforces are achieving their objectives.

Measures of effectivenessPSYOP doctrine states that measures of

effectiveness, or MOEs, provide a system-atic means of assessing and reporting theeffect that a PSYOP program (PSYOP

products and actions) has on TAs. PSYOPMOEs change with the mission, and theyencompass a range of factors that are fun-damental to the overall effect of PSYOP.

Simply put, MOEs are questions to beanswered at set points during the operation.For example, for one of the SPOs used in Fig-ure 1, “TA decreases support for insurgentactivity,” MOEs for a hypothetical operationcould be, “How much money does the Nation-al Liberation Front give to the Slobovia dis-gruntled slave traders?” or “How manyrecruits (male, ages 15-18) from Garbonejoined the Slobovia disgruntled slave tradersthis month?” Neither of these MOEs alonewould determine whether the SPO was beingachieved. They would be, however, verifiableoccurrences that could be measured.

The key to effective evaluation is focus-ing the data collection on factors that willindicate the extent to which POs are beingmet. MOEs must be developed during theplanning process to ensure that organicassets and PSYOP enablers, such as theassets for intelligence, reconnaissance andsurveillance, or ISR, can be tasked to assistin collecting the answers to MOEs for eval-uation by PSYOP forces. If other Army orjoint assets can answer some of the MOEs,it lessens the intelligence-collection burden

34 Special Warfare

TA 1 TA 2 TA 1

SPO 2

TA 2 TA 1

SPO 3

TA 2 TA 1

SPO 1

TA 1TA 1

SPO 2

TA 2 TA 2 TA 3

PO DPO C

SPO 1 SPO 7

TA 1 TA 2 TA 1

SPO 2

TA 2 TA 1

SPO 3

TA 2

PO B

SPO 1

TA 1 TA 2

PO A

SPO 1

TA 1 TA 2 TA 3

SPO 2

Figure 2. Example initial portion of a PSYOP Plan

on the PSYOP force. Furthermore, whenMOEs are written as part of the initialPSYOP plan, PSYOP units will know whatto look for as they conduct their missions.

Given the inherent difficulties and com-plexity of determining cause-and-effect rela-tionships regarding human behavior, it maytake weeks or longer to evaluate the effec-tiveness of PSYOP.4 MOEs enable thePSYOP force to assess an operation as itprogresses and make adjustments to ensurethat POs and SPOs are being addressed,rather than waiting until the end of an oper-ation to determine the degree to which thePSYOP plan succeeded.

MOEs need to be assessed more thanonce. Initial answers to the MOE questionsgive PSYOP forces the baseline data, andsubsequent assessments help determinewhether the SPO is being achieved. Figure3 shows what the PSYOP plan would looklike once MOEs have been developed.

Impact indicatorsImpact indicators are particular events or

facts that can be known at a particular time.Collectively, they provide an indication of the

effectiveness of the PSYOP program. Forexample, under the SPO, “TA decreases sup-port for insurgent activity” and the MOE“How many recruits (male, ages 15-18) fromGarbone joined the Slobovia disgruntledslave traders this month?,” the impact indi-cators might be 12 recruits on Feb. 1 and ninerecruits on March 1.An impact indicator mayalso be a spontaneous, unpredictable eventthat can be linked directly or indirectly to thePSYOP effort. Spontaneous indicatorsinclude events, such as bombings or riots,that do not occur over time, but which mayserve as signs of a PSYOP program’s impact.

AnalysisA series of PSYOP products and actions

are disseminated to a TA in an attempt tomodify the TA’s behavior. PSYOP units orintelligence-collection assets then obtainimpact indicators, which they analyze inrelation to the products disseminated andthe TA’s actions to see if there is a correla-tion between the PSYOP program and theTA’s behavior. That analysis will allow thePSYOP commander to determine the extentto which he has achieved his objectives and

May 2004 35

MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3

TA 1

SPO 1

MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3

TA 2

MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3

TA 1

SPO 2

MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3

TA 2

MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3

TA 1

SPO 3

MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3

TA 2

PO B

MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3

TA 1

SPO 1

MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3

TA 2

MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3

TA 1

SPO 2

MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3

TA 2

MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3

TA 1

SPO 3

MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3

TA 2

PO A

Figure 3. PSYOP plan with MOE determined

to identify any necessary adjustments. Fig-ure 4 shows a PSYOP plan that uses mea-sures of effectiveness and includes sponta-neous impact indicators.

PSYOP units can assess the impact oftheir programs only after they have analyzedmultiple impact indicators that have beenrecorded over a specified period of time. Sucha collective analysis will indicate to thePSYOP commander or to the supported com-mander the degree to which the SPOs, andultimately the POs, are being achieved.

In the fictional operation shown in Figure4, PSYOP planners have determined thatthey must focus on three TAs for the accom-plishment of SPO 1, “TA decreases supportfor insurgents.” They have developed twoMOEs for each TA that, once answered, willgive insight into whether or not there hasbeen any behavioral change. The MOEswere initially addressed on Feb. 1. Theimpact indicators for Feb. 1 are considered to

be the baseline data, and PSYOP forces willimplement their plan to decrease supportfrom the baseline levels. In the example, theMOEs have been assessed at weekly andmonthly intervals so that PSYOP forces canmonitor behavioral changes over time.

Within TA 1, the number of recruitsdeclined during the two months follow-ing Feb. 1. Circulation of the insurgentnewspaper ceased after March 1 (this isexplained by the spontaneous event ofthe burning of the print facility).Assessing these impact indicatorsagainst the PSYOP products dissemi-nated may show the positive effectPSYOP is having on this TA.

The first MOE for TA 2 concerned NLFfinancial support to the insurgents. Theamount decreased as of March 1, but itincreased dramatically the following month.The increase may reflect money collected tohelp finance the repair of the burned printing

36 Special Warfare

4000 Copies 1 Feb 02

4000 Copies 22 Feb 02

$3750 1 Feb 02

3 1 Feb 02

17 1 Feb 02

12 22 Feb 02

4000 Copies 1 Feb 02

4000 Copies 22 Feb 02

12 1 Feb 02

4000 Copies 8 Feb 02

4000 Copies 1 Mar 02

$2775 1 Mar 02

2 1 Mar 02

14 8 Feb 02

10 1 Mar 02

4000 Copies 8 Feb 02

4000 Copies 1 Mar 02

9 1 Mar 02

4000 Copies 15 Feb 02

0 Copies 8 Mar 02

$6000 1 Apr 02

1 1 Apr 02

15 15 Feb 02

9 8 Mar 02

4000 Copies 15 Feb 02

0 Copies 8 Mar 02

7 1 Apr 02

MOE 1 – How many Garbone recruits have been attained this month?

MOE 2 – What is the weekly circulation of insurgent newspaper?

MOE 1 – How much money has the NLF given to the insurgents this month?

MOE 2 – Number of meetings between Alar Sablah and Halah Islat this month?

MOE 1 – How many females attended the weekly Garbone tribal council this week?

MOE 2 – What is the weekly circulation of insurgent newspaper?

TA 1 – Garbone men age 15-18

TA 2 – National Liberation Front Members

SPO 1 – TA decreases support for insurgents

PO A – Reduce effectiveness of insurgent activity

TA 3 – Politically active Garbone females age 18-35

Insurgency print facility burnt

Anti-insurgent rally 400 people

Bomb exploded under empty PSYOP vehicle

Local radio station attacked – 3 killed

Answers to what degree PSYOP has achieved or not achieved its objectives

Impact Indicators (Answer to MOE)

Impact Indicators (Spontaneous Events)

Analysis (In terms of what has been done by PSYOP forces)

Supporting PSYOP Objective (SPO) Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) Impact Indicators (Spontaneous Events)

PSYOP Objective (PO) Target Audience (TA) Impact Indicators (Answer to MOE)

LEGENDLEGEND

Figure 4. Example structure for evaluating PSYOP

facility. Further indicators may show theincrease as a spike in support, or perhaps aspart of a greater financial commitment.

The impact indicators for the secondMOE show that there has been diminishedcontact between the leader of the NLF andthe leader of the insurgents. The PSYOPseries aimed at dividing these two individ-uals may be working; however, in an actu-al operation, additional MOEs would needto be developed — perhaps an MOE todetermine the number of phone conversa-tions, letters and e-mails between them.PSYOP may want to concentrate on TA 2’sfinancial support of the NLF and continueto monitor it to see if the April 1 figureswere indeed a spike or if the NLF is com-mitting greater resources to the insurgentcause. If so, PSYOP in future months mayneed to concentrate more heavily on theNLF/insurgent relationship.

Politically active females compose TA 3,and the impact indicators demonstrate acontinuous decrease in their meeting atten-dance. Indicators also show that the fire inthe print facility eliminated newspaper cir-culation. Although the correlation betweenthe unanticipated elimination of the news-paper and meeting attendance by females isanecdotal, it provides evidence that thePSYOP series discouraging female partici-pation in public meetings may be working.

When we evaluate the impact indicatorscollected for the six MOEs under SPO 1, fiveof the MOEs indicate that support for insur-gent activities is decreasing. One area —financial support — may actually beincreasing, although that may be explainedby an attempt to overcome the spontaneousevent of the burning of the print facility. ThePSYOP analyst must also factor in the anti-insurgent rally, which supports the SPO.The bombing of the PSYOP vehicle must beevaluated to see if it is connected withinsurgents trying to decrease the PSYOPforces’ ability to reduce support for insur-gents. The radio station was attacked afterit agreed to increase the amount of PSYOPair time. Taking all these impact indicatorsand assessing them against the PSYOPproducts and actions allows PSYOP forcesto conclude that they have succeeded duringthree months in reducing support for the

insurgents. Analysis also indicates thatPSYOP may need to focus further efforttoward reducing the financial support thatthe NLF is giving to the insurgents.

This hypothetical example does not includethe complete breadth of factors that would betaken into account during an actual operation;however, it does give an insight into whatmust be done by PSYOP forces so that theycan successfully evaluate their efforts.

ConclusionTo be truly effective, PSYOP planners

must articulate clear objectives and identi-fy potential target audiences that can ful-fill those stated objectives by exhibitingthe desired behavioral change. Plannersshould also develop MOEs that will help toidentify the impact indicators that will aidPSYOP forces in measuring their progressand identifying necessary adjustments. Inorder for PSYOP forces to effectively assessthe impact of their actions, it is imperativethat the MOEs be established during plan-ning and not after the operation has ended.

Better integration of MOE developmentinto the PSYOP planning process will cueISR assets to collect the necessary intelli-gence. It will also allow PSYOP personnelto better communicate to supported com-manders the importance of the early inte-gration of PSYOP into the operational-planning process.

Sergeant First Class Robert H. Kellogg is adoctrine writer assigned to the PsychologicalOperations Training and Doctrine Division,Directorate of Training and Doctrine, JFKSpecial Warfare Center and School.

Notes:1 A further discussion of PSYOP objectives can be

found in Chapter 4 of FM 3-05.301, PsychologicalOperations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.

2 A further discussion of supporting PSYOP objec-tives can be found in Chapter 4 of FM 3-05.301.

3 A complete discussion of target-audience analysiscan be found in Chapter 5 of FM 3-05.301.

4 This is the definition, with a few minor changes forclarity, given in Chapter 4 of FM 3-05.301.

5 The examples used in this graphic and throughoutthe article are fictitious.

May 2004 37

On Oct. 3, 1993, the UnitedStates Task Force Rangerexecuted a raid into General

Mohamad Farah Aidid’s strongholdnear the Olympic Hotel inMogadishu, Somalia, seeking tocapture two of Aidid’s key lieu-tenants.1 Although the task forcecaptured 24 Aidid supporters,Somali clansmen shot down twoMH-60L Black Hawk helicoptersusing rocket-propelled grenades, orRPGs.

With the downing of the firstMH-60L, TF Ranger’s missionchanged from capturing Aidid’ssupporters to safeguarding andrecovering American casualties.From a tactical perspective,2 theactions of TF Ranger members todefend the position of the downedBlack Hawks and to retrieve thedead and wounded demonstratedtheir superb training, courage, ini-tiative, individual Soldier skillsand dedication to one another.

Several articles, research papers,

studies and books have assessedthe U.S. intervention into Somalia.While there has been an abun-dance of lessons learned from TFRanger, the lessons have focusedprimarily on tactical-level leader-ship, small-unit tactics and indi-vidual Soldier skills. Little hasbeen written on the mission as astrategic employment of special-operations forces, or SOF.

This article will examine theactions of TF Ranger within a the-ory of special operations in thehope that it will assist other spe-cial-operations Soldiers in plan-ning and executing direct-actionoperations.

BackgroundThe 1993 decision of the United

Nations to intervene in the clashbetween warring factions in Soma-lia was unique — it was the firsttime the U.N. had intervened in anation where it was not only unin-vited but also warned by the antag-onists not to intercede. On June 5,1993, an ambush by one of theantagonists, Somali warlordMohamad Aidid, killed 24 Pak-istani soldiers who were part ofU.N. Operations Somalia II, orUNOSOM II.3 In response, the

U.N. Security Council passed U.N.Resolution 837, which called forthe apprehension of those responsi-ble for the ambush.

Retired U.S. Navy AdmiralJonathan Howe, the U.N. SpecialRepresentative to the SecretaryGeneral in Somalia, pressed theClinton administration to deploy aspecial-operations task forcespecifically trained and equippedfor the task of apprehension andcapable of responding if any U.N.workers were taken hostage byAidid’s clan.4 Partially in responseto Howe’s persistence, the adminis-tration finally approved thedeployment, but only after fourU.S. Marines had been killed andseven others wounded on Aug. 21,1993, in two separate incidentsinvolving remote-controlled landmines.

The U.S. Special OperationsCommand, or USSOCOM, madenumerous objections concerningthe appropriateness of the missionthrough Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff General Colin Pow-ell. The objections appeared to fallon deaf ears, and the task force,named Task Force Ranger, depart-ed for Somalia on Aug. 24.

TF Ranger, under the commandof Major General William Garri-

38 Special Warfare

Analysis of Operation Gothic Serpent: TF Ranger in Somalia

by Major Marshall V. Ecklund

Opinions expressed in this articleare those of the author and do not rep-resent the viewpoints of the JFK Spe-cial Warfare Center and School, theU.S. Army Special Operations Com-mand or the U.S. Army. — Editor

son, was a battalion-sized, self-con-tained joint force consisting of 440personnel5 who represented each ofUSSOCOM’s components, withselective augmentation from con-ventional forces. TF Ranger’s chainof command was separate fromthat of the other U.S. forces inUNOSOM II (see Figure 1). Garri-son reported directly to GeneralJoseph P. Hoar, the commander ofU.S. Central Command, orUSCENTCOM, without goingthrough U.N. channels, but hemaintained a close working rela-tionship with the commander ofU.S. forces supporting UNOSOMII, or USFORSOM,6 Major GeneralThomas Montgomery.

TF Ranger’s mission was to “ini-tiate military operations in Soma-lia to capture General Aidid, toinclude the capture of his principallieutenants and targeting of hisTier I infrastructure.” Hoar direct-ed, “operations should retain [the]primary objective of capturingAidid, with the secondary objectiveof capturing blacklist personnel.”He authorized the task force toneutralize Aidid’s critical com-mand-and-control nodes and “other

targets … only if intelligence indi-cates that Aidid or any of his lieu-tenants are present and likely to becaptured as a result of the opera-tion.” The commander’s intent stat-ed, “rehearsals are mandatory andinclude infiltration, isolation of theobjective area, and exfiltration”and that, based on recent activi-ties, “it is reasonable for Aidid toexpect this type of operation will beconducted by U.S. forces,” there-fore, “special preparations must bemade to ensure operational securi-ty and force protection.”7

USSOCOM defined mission suc-cess as the capture of Aidid or des-ignated personnel, and it made theassumption that Aidid would prob-ably remain underground inMogadishu, using his lieutenantsto direct continued attacks on U.S.and U.N. forces, and employ morelethal weapons in ever-increasingnumbers.

The Oct. 3 raid was the seventhassault the task force had conduct-ed since its arrival in Mogadishu.TF Ranger’s operations werefounded on speed, surprise and vio-lence of action. Success wasdependent on “react[ing] with a

launch of a direct action force …from pre-launch to launched in 25minutes or less,”8 and getting awayfrom the target as quickly as possi-ble. TF Ranger was “normally onthe target for just a matter of min-utes before they began exfiltra-tion,”9 which did not allow theSomalis time to react to the assaultforce in a cohesive manner. Duringthe Oct. 3 mission, however, aseries of unanticipated eventscaused the assault force to spendtoo much time on the target.

McRaven�s theoryIn Spec Ops: Case Studies in Spe-

cial Operations Warfare: Theory andPractice, William H. McRaven ana-lyzes eight special operations: sixdirect-action operations performedby various countries during WorldWar II; the 1970 U.S. raid on theSon Tay prisoner-of-war camp inNorth Vietnam; and the 1976 Israelirescue of skyjacked hostages inEntebbe, Uganda.

McRaven’s analyses of the opera-tions are based on his refined defi-nition of a special operation: “A spe-cial operation is conducted by forcesspecially trained, equipped, andsupported for a specific targetwhose destruction, elimination, orrescue (in the case of hostages), is apolitical or military imperative.”McRaven, now a Navy SEAL admi-ral, describes the military and polit-ical background of each operation,reconstructs the operation itself,and analyzes the operation in termsof six principles.

According to McRaven, “Six prin-ciples of special operations ... sim-plicity, security, repetition, sur-prise, speed and purpose … domi-nate every successful mission.” Hefurther asserts, “Gaining relativesuperiority requires proper inte-gration of all six principles … [and]the practitioner of special opera-tions must take account of the

May 2004 39

Commander USCENTCOM

Force CDR UNOSOM II

US Forces UN Forces

Deputy Force CDR UNOSOM II

Commander USFORSOM

Commander TF Ranger

Task Force Ranger

Quick Reaction Force

Other US Forces – Somalia

Other UN Forces – Somalia

Figure 1. UN/U.S. force structure and relationships with TF Ranger

From After Action Report for Task Force Ranger Operations in Support of UNOSOM II; 22 August-25 October 1993 (U), Tab A to Enclosure 1, 1-A-1.

Coordination Line (Liaison) MG Thomas M. Montgomery, USA

principles in the three phases of anoperation: planning, preparation,and execution.”

McRaven defines relative superi-ority as “a condition that existswhen an attacking force, generallysmaller, gains a decisive advantageover a larger or well-defendedenemy.” He asserts there are threebasic properties of relative superi-ority. First, “Relative superiority isachieved at the pivotal moment inan engagement when a decisiveadvantage is achieved, usuallywithin five minutes of the initialengagement.” Second, “Once rela-tive superiority is achieved, it mustbe sustained in order to guaranteevictory.” Finally, “If relative superi-ority is lost, it is difficult toregain.”10

The key to successful special-operations missions is to gain rela-tive superiority early in the engage-ment, because, “The longer anengagement continues, the more

likely the outcome will be affectedby the will of the enemy, chance, anduncertainty, the factors that com-prise the frictions of war.”11

McRaven uses graphs to showhow and when each of the eightspecial-operations forces he dis-cusses achieved relative superiori-ty. The author’s graph (Figure 2)shows how TF Ranger lost andfinally regained relative superiori-ty. According to McRaven, theintersection of the X-axis (time)and the Y-axis (probability of mis-sion completion) is the point of vul-nerability, or PV, which he definesas the point in a mission when theattacking force reaches theenemy’s first line of defenses. Thearea of vulnerability is a functionof the time required for missioncompletion. The longer it takes togain relative superiority, the largerthe area of vulnerability and thegreater the impact of the frictionsof war.

The graph also “provides a visu-al demonstration of the three prop-erties of relative superiority: thepivotal moment can be seen as adramatic rise in the probability ofmission completion; sustaining rel-ative superiority is a gradual risefrom the pivotal moment to mis-sion completion; and a decisivedrop in the probability of missioncompletion shows a loss of relativesuperiority.”12

McRaven’s six principles of spe-cial operations are interdependent.When depicted in a graphic model(see Figure 3), McRaven’s theoryrepresents his idea that “Specialoperations forces succeed, in spiteof their numerical inferiority, whenthey are able to gain relative supe-riority through the use of a simpleplan, carefully concealed, repeated-ly and realistically rehearsed, andexecuted with surprise, speed andpurpose.”

Although McRaven’s definition

40 Special Warfare

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

All Forces Inserted TF Begins Raid (RS Achieved)

GRF L/U at TGT House at 1604 hrs

Super 61 downed by RPG at 1620 hrs

Super 64 downed by RPG at 1641 hrs

QRF arrives at 1710 hrs

Helos begin insertion at 1542 hrs

GRF returns to AF at 1740 hrs

QRF/GRF plan complete at 1835 hrs

QRF/GRF launch rescue at 2323 hrs

QRF/GRF move to port area for L/U with

tanks/APCs at 2130 hrs

Probability of Mission Completion

(Y-axis)

Point of Vulnerability (PV)

Helos launch at 1532 hrs Time in Hours (X-axis)

3 OCT 1993 4 OCT 1993

Mission Complete – Main Force arrives Stadium at 0630 hrs

Exfil begins (“Mogadishu Mile”) at 0542 hrs

QRF/GRF departs site #2 at 0330 hrs

QRF/GRF arrive site #2 at 0227 hrs

QRF/GRF arrive site #1 at 0155 hrs

Last body recovered by QRF/GRF at site #1

at 0530 hrsRelative

Superiority Line

(RS Line)

LEGEND

APC armored personnel carrier

QRF quick reaction forceGRF ground reaction forceL/U link upTGT targetRS relative superiorityRPG rocket-propelled

grenadeAF airfield

Figure 2. Author’s relative superiority graph for TF Ranger’s raid on 3-4 October 1993

Area of Vulnerability

of a special operation has not beenwidely accepted within the Depart-ment of Defense, his theory of spe-cial operations seems extremelywell-suited to an evaluation of TFRanger’s mission.

SimplicityOf the six principles, McRaven

says, “simplicity is the most cru-cial, and yet sometimes the mostdifficult, principle with which tocomply.” He lists three elements ofsimplicity critical to success: a lim-ited number of objectives, goodintelligence and innovation. Hebelieves, “Limiting the objectives toonly what is essential focuses thetraining, limits the number of per-sonnel required, reduces the timeon target, and decreases the num-ber of ‘moving parts.’ ”

He insists that good intelligence“simplifies a plan by reducing theunknown factors and the numberof variables that must be consid-ered.” “Innovation,” he states, “sim-plifies a plan by helping to avoid oreliminate obstacles that would oth-

erwise compromise surprise and/orcomplicate the rapid execution ofthe mission.” “Innovation is nor-mally manifested in new technolo-gy, but it is also the application ofunconventional tactics … Eithernew technology or innovative tac-tics [must] assist the assault ele-ment in reaching the objective andthen quickly and effectively elimi-nating the enemy.”13

From the onset of TF Ranger’splanning, two elements wereessential to success: timely, accu-rate and reliable intelligence, andthe ability to respond quickly towhatever mission scenario devel-oped. The initial focus of all of TFRanger’s intelligence-collectionand analysis was to locate Aidid.14

Thus, mission success for TFRanger was highly dependent uponaccurate and timely intelligence,15

specifically human intelligence, orHUMINT.16

General Wayne Downing, theUSSOCOM commander, said, “Ikept telling [Garrison] … bepatient, be careful, eventually youwill get a shot at Aidid … I told him

that (1) he needed to be careful inpopulated areas, and (2) in certaincircumstances not to go near theBakara market … We did not havegood intelligence about that part ofthe city. We didn’t have any pres-ence there or good HUMINT.”17

The most robust and critical por-tion of TF Ranger’s technical sys-tems was its information infra-structure (intelligence system).While TF Ranger’s operationsdepended heavily upon the greatlydeficient HUMINT system inSomalia, its other systems wereextremely effective, accurate andtimely. TF Ranger had a markedadvantage in technical intelligencecollection, not only over the war-ring clans but also over otherU.N./U.S. forces in Somalia,because of the establishment of anintelligence fusion cell that provid-ed the most capable intelligencenetwork in the country. Unfortu-nately for TF Ranger, “high tech-nology applications [did] notalways overcome a low- to no-tech-nology environment.”18

TF Ranger’s mission was simple

May 2004 41

FRICTIONS OF WAR MORAL FACTORS

PREPARATION

EXECUTION

PLANNING

SECURITY REPETITION

SIMPLICITY

SURPRISE SPEED PURPOSE

Figure 3: McRaven’s Special Operations Model(From Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice, 11.)

in terms of the number of its objec-tives. With only one major mission,TF Ranger had a task architecturethat was relatively straightfor-ward, and it varied only slightlyduring any of the seven missionsTF Ranger conducted in Somalia.

The task flow began with anoperations order, or OPORD, thatdelineated responsibilities for allTF Ranger members during theexecution of one of two missiontemplates. Because the missionswere templated, TF Ranger used astanding OPORD for the durationof its mission. To change theOPORD, the task force simplyissued a fragmentary order.

As TF Ranger received time-sen-sitive intelligence, it analyzed thedetails, applied them to the appro-priate template, and quickly syn-chronized the operation. Time per-mitting, the task force conductedrehearsals of the actions on theobjective while it conducted finalcoordination with adjacent unitsand obtained approval from higherunits. Once approval and coordina-tion were completed, the task forcecould launch to accomplish theraid. The entire “notification-to-launch” process usually took lessthan an hour.19

It could be argued that changesin Somali tactics should havecaused TF Ranger to modify itstechniques. Yet TF Ranger failed toeffectively use unconventional tac-tics, innovation and superior tech-nical systems to its advantage, andthe routine of TF Ranger’s opera-tions gave an exploitable advan-tage to the Somalis.

Security“The purpose of tight security,”

McRaven says, “is to prevent theenemy from gaining an advantagethrough foreknowledge of the im-pending attack.” Because of thenature of special operations, “it is not

so much the impending mission thatmust be concealed as the timing and,to a lesser degree, the means of inser-tion.” Security is important in achiev-ing relative superiority “because itprevents the enemy from gaining anunexpected advantage.”20

A prevailing factor in the successof special operations is the ability ofthe attacking force to know whatdefenses the enemy has prepared. Afailed security effort could allow theenemy to spring a surprise of hisown and either pre-empt the attackor reduce the attackers’ speed ontarget, either of which would dra-matically reduce the possibility ofachieving relative superiority.21

Only eight days prior to TFRanger’s raid, Somalis had usedan RPG to shoot down a UH-60Black Hawk helicopter from theair component of the 10th Moun-tain Division Quick ReactionForce, or QRF.22 Knowledge of thatshootdown, coupled with reportsthat Somalis had fired at least 12RPGs at TF Ranger helicoptersduring their sixth mission, shouldhave caused TF Ranger to changeits method of operations, especial-ly its means of insertion.23 Thefailure to learn that lesson con-tributed to the two helicoptershootdowns on Oct. 3.24

After conducting six similar mis-sions prior to Oct. 3, TF Rangerhad become somewhat overconfi-dent in its abilities and in the dom-inance of its means of infiltration.Had TF Ranger’s leadership ade-quately assessed the change inSomali tactics evidenced by esca-lating RPG use against heli-copters,25 they would have realizedthe increased operational risk tothe task force. The failure to appre-ciate the increased operational riskand to anticipate contingenciesalso caused TF Ranger to launchwithout most of their night-visiondevices, without water sufficient tolast more than two hours,26 and

without ammunition sufficient forsustained combat operations.

Aidid’s use of civilians as part ofthe prepared defenses also con-tributed to TF Ranger’s lack ofspeed on the target. In a report tothe U.N. Security Council on July1, 1993, Howe stated that therewas “increasing evidence that Gen-eral Aidid deliberately and person-ally directed the use of women andchildren for attacks on UNOSOMII soldiers; and that he directed hismilitia to shoot into the crowd onJune 13 in order to create casual-ties and embarrass … UNOSOM IIbefore the assembled worldpress.”27 Armed with the knowl-edge of Aidid’s willingness to puthis civilians into harm’s way, TFRanger could have better preparedits Soldiers for the Somalis’ even-tual use of civilians as humanshields.

RepetitionDiscussing the principle of repeti-

tion in rehearsals, McRaven specifi-cally addresses units with missionssimilar to TF Ranger’s. He states,“in the preparation phase, repeti-tion, like routine, is indispensable ineliminating the barriers to success.”McRaven contends, “certain combatunits, such as counterterroristteams … perform standard missionprofiles as a matter of routine. Thisroutine hones those tactical skills toa degree that allows quick reactionto a threat, provided that threat fitswithin the standard scenario forwhich the unit has been practicing.”Additionally, he believes, “repetitionhones individual and unit skills,while full-dress rehearsals unmaskweaknesses in the plan,” and that“both are essential to success on thebattlefield.”28

Largely because of personnelconstraints imposed by higherheadquarters, TF Ranger deployedwith a smaller force than usual29

42 Special Warfare

and without support from AC-130H Spectre gunships — the taskforces’ accustomed platform forclose air support, air interdictionand armed reconnaissance. Insteadof modifying its tactics to accountfor the degradation in capabilities,TF Ranger operated as though ithad a complete and battle-proventask-force organization. While TFRanger generally faced threatsthat fit into the standard scenariofor which the unit had rehearsed,the task force had not deployedwith all the tools it had used inrehearsals at Fort Bragg, N.C.Standard mission profiles, conduct-ed without the accustomed tools,are anything but routine.

In order to mitigate some of theshortcomings of equipment andintelligence, assault[s] had to beplanned and initiated as quickly aspossible (using pre-rehearsed bat-tle drills fine-tuned for the actualsituation). TF Ranger minimizedmission-planning time in anattempt to ensure operationalsecurity and to maximize speedand surprise. There was generallyno time available to rehearseactions at the objective prior tolaunch.

To facilitate rapid planning forany given situation, “two missiontemplates were developed,30 onefor strongpoint assault and theother for assault against a movingconvoy.”31 While routine hones tac-tical skills to a degree that allowsquick reaction to a threat, especial-ly in counterterrorist units, therewere too many other “movingparts” and “mission specificdetails” that required more thor-ough rehearsals in order to suffi-ciently increase the probability ofsuccess.

The task force’s failure to con-duct full-dress rehearsals withU.N. QRF units that were eventu-ally used to rescue the task forcealso contributed to problems with

extraction because the situationhad not been considered duringcontingency planning, and timewas lost accomplishing essentialcoordination and familiarization.32

The task force commander evident-ly never anticipated and “neverthought of a contingency plan forbackups of equipment like tanksand APCs [armored personnel car-riers],”33 all of which were readilyavailable from coalition forcesunder UNOSOM II, and which ulti-mately proved to be invaluable inthe extraction of personnel pinneddown on Oct. 4. Believing in secre-cy and operational security, TFRanger kept its distance from thenations comprised by the U.N.coalition, to avoid possible leaks tothe Somalis.

SurpriseAccording to McRaven, “special

operations forces do not generallyhave the luxury of attacking theenemy when or where he is unpre-pared.” SOF must typically attack inspite of enemy preparations. There-fore, in McRaven’s opinion, surprisemeans simply catching the enemy offbalance. “In a special operation, sur-prise is gained through deception,timing and taking advantage of theenemy’s vulnerabilities.”34

Using its six previous missionsas indicators of its dominance inMogadishu, TF Ranger becomeoverconfident, underestimatedAidid’s leadership35 and militarycapabilities, and violated funda-mental special-operations princi-ples of deception and timing. Itconducted operations during day-light hours and relied on the sameoperational templates in order toachieve rapid planning and execu-tion. By conducting daylight oper-ations, TF Ranger allowed theSomalis to observe its tactics,techniques and procedures, virtu-ally eliminating any of the tactical

advantages of speed, surprise andtechnology that it could havegained by conducting operationsduring hours of limited visibility.

Given the low altitudes and therelatively low air speeds of TFRanger’s helicopters operating inthe urban environment, the heli-copters were much more vulnera-ble than TF Ranger’s planassumed. For example, during thefifth and sixth assaults conductedby TF Ranger (both made duringdaylight hours on Sept. 18 and 21),the Somalis had fired increasingnumbers of RPGs at TF Ranger’shelicopters. The Somalis weremerely waiting for the helicoptersto fly closer to their RPG gunnersto use their new tactic with devas-tating results. Overconfidence ledto the downing of the first MH-60LBlack Hawk helicopter, Super 61“Thunderstruck.” Journalist MarkBowden wrote that this “crackedthe task force’s sense of righteousinvulnerability ... [since] they werethe trump card in this God-forsak-en place … The Somalis couldn’tshoot [Black Hawks] down.”36

In terms of surprise, the raid ofOct. 3-4 failed to achieve anythingthe task force desired to do. TFRanger failed to: (1) delay theenemy’s reaction or divert theenemy’s attention, (2) attack wherethe enemy was weakest (the Bakaramarket was Aidid’s strongest loca-tion and his center of gravity), or (3)attack at a time that was most ben-eficial. Other than the unsuccessfulsignature or “profile flights” used toprotect actual mission launches, thetask force did little to deceive theSomalis or to delay their reaction toan actual operation.37

SpeedIn a special-operations mission,

McRaven says, “any delay willexpand [the] area of vulnerabilityand decrease [the] opportunity to

May 2004 43

achieve relative superiority …[because] in special operations theenemy is in a defensive position andhis only desire is to counter [the]attack.” McRaven’s theory assumesthat the enemy’s will to resist is agiven and that his ability to react isa constant. The enemy’s ability toreact makes it essential, “to move asquickly as possible regardless of theenemy’s reaction.”38

With the most sophisticatedequipment available, and withaccess to virtually every product ofthe national-level intelligence-col-lection architecture, the task forcewas prepared to launch an assaulton extremely short notice, usuallya matter of minutes. That level ofreadiness required a high level oforganization, training and rehears-al. To ensure tactical surprise, TFRanger depended on a rapidresponse and on spending the min-imum time on target once it con-ducted an assault. Tactical sur-prise was facilitated by the use ofextremely sophisticated assaultaircraft such as the MH/AH-6 Lit-tle Birds and the MH-60L, as wellas aerial-reconnaissance assets,such as the P-3C Reef Point andOH-58 Kiowa Warrior.

Because of the urban environment,land-based or vehicular technologywas relatively “low-tech,” consisting offive-ton trucks and both cargo andarmored HMMWVs. With few excep-tions, the robust communicationsarchitecture, even when it employedas many as five separate radio nets,worked nearly perfectly.The ability tomove quickly and stealthily, to shootaccurately and effectively, and to com-municate with relative ease facilitat-ed decisive operations in a short dura-tion of time.

Unfortunately for TF Ranger,gaining relative superiorityrequired the proper integration ofall six principles of special opera-tions. The monopoly that TFRanger possessed in speed was not

enough to overcome the shortcom-ings in the other five interdepend-ent special-operations principles.

PurposeAccording to McRaven, “purpose

is understanding and then execut-ing the prime objective of the mis-sion regardless of emerging obsta-cles or opportunities.” He con-cludes that there are two aspectsto the principle. First, “the pur-pose must be clearly defined bythe mission statement. … The

mission statement should be craft-ed to ensure that in the heat ofbattle, no matter what else hap-pens, the individual soldier under-stands the primary objective.” Thesecondly aspect of purpose is per-sonal commitment to the extentthat “the men must be inspiredwith a sense of personal dedica-tion that knows no limitations.”39

After the first of the MH-60Ls wasdowned, the mission of TF Rangerchanged from one of capturingAidid’s supporters to one of safe-guarding and recovering Americancasualties. The actions of TF Ranger

members to defend the position ofthe first downed Black Hawk and toretrieve the dead and woundedreflected credit on their training,courage, initiative, individual Soldierskills and dedication to one another.Their actions were automatic andrequired no prompting. The loyaltyand sacrifice they displayed could becharacterized only as “knowing nolimitations.” The clearly defined pur-pose of TF Ranger’s “new” missionensured that even in the fog of battle,and no matter what else happened,the Soldiers understood their prima-ry objective and would die before fail-ing to accomplish that mission. Ifthere was any lack of purpose, it wasclearly above the tactical level.40

Above the tactical levelThe mission of TF Ranger is

typically regarded as more a polit-ical failure than a military or tac-tical one. From the outset, themission had only a 50 percentchance of success if HUMINToperations were working well, and20 percent if they were not.41 Withsuch a low probability of success,TF Ranger’s failures seem ulti-mately attributable to those whoplaced the task force in such a dis-advantageous situation.

A noted authority in national-security affairs, Dr. Lucien S. Van-denbroucke, classifies TF Ranger’smission as a strategic special oper-ation.42 TF Ranger’s deploymentwas “approved at the highest levelof the U.S. government afterdetailed review,” and it clearlysought “to resolve, through the sud-den, swift, and unconventionalapplication of force, major prob-lems of U.S. foreign policy.”43 Van-denbroucke further asserts, “stra-tegic special operations are alsohigh-risk ventures, for they seek toachieve difficult objectives in a sin-gle bid, with deliberately limitedmeans. Because failure in such

44 Special Warfare

The clearly defined pur-pose of TF Ranger’s‘new’ mission ensuredthat even in the fog ofbattle, … the Soldiersunderstood their primaryobjective and would diebefore failing to accom-plish that mission. Ifthere was any lack ofpurpose, it was clearlyabove the tactical level.

operations is typically both highlyvisible and dramatic, the ensuingdamage to U.S. prestige tends to begreat.”44

TF Ranger found itself as thebest choice of bad alternatives. AsVandenbroucke explains, “In someinstances strategic special opera-tions may seem like the only solu-tion to otherwise intractable majorforeign-policy problems. … Deci-sion-makers can become insidious-ly attracted to strategic operations,to the point of engaging in wishfulthinking, in which hopes distortperception and wishes are mistak-en for reality.” This is usuallyattributable to the fact that “thesenior decision-makers who evalu-ate and approve these operationsoften receive poor information andadvice.”45 Powell was under greatpolitical pressure to provide aquick military solution to the prob-lems in Somalia. He did not conveythe potential consequences or polit-ical ramifications of a mission fail-ure to Defense Secretary LesAspin. If he had, Aspin might haveconcluded that the risk of TFRanger’s failure outweighed thebenefits to be gained from captur-ing Aidid and would have lookedfor other alternatives to resolve theforeign-policy crisis in Somalia.

Noted strategic theorist anddefense analyst Dr. Colin S. Grayadvances an explanation similar toVandenbroucke’s in his examina-tion of the strategic utility of SOF.Gray says special operations mustbe conducted in support of foreignpolicy, and that SOF are a “nation-al grand-strategic asset; they are atool of statecraft that can beemployed quite surgically in sup-port of diplomacy, of foreign assist-ance (of several kinds), as a vitaladjunct to regular military forces,or as an independent weapon.”46

But Gray reminds us, “tacticalexcellence in the conduct of specialoperations is no guarantee of stra-

tegic effectiveness,”47 and thatthere is always the potential strate-gic disutility of special operationsas well.

In order to ensure that strategicends support national strategy,Gray says, “SOF need an educatedconsumer, political and militarypatrons who appreciate what SOFshould, and should not, be asked todo,” in order to “offer the prospectof favorably disproportionatereturn on military investment.”48

TF Ranger’s tactical operationswere expected to overcome aneglected area of U.S. foreign poli-cy, but instead they proved to be astrategic disutility.

Crucial to the strategic failure inSomalia was the uncoordinated,unclear, shifting and inconsistenttwo-track policy of the U.N./U.S.When UNOSOM II assumedresponsibility for the mission inSomalia, “the goals of the interna-tional effort … were greatly expand-ed to include: forcibly disarming thewarring factions; political reconcili-ation; and nation-building. … ThisU.N. policy, which was supported bythe Clinton administration, wasbeing implemented at the sametime that the administration waspursuing a second policy track,which directed U.S. military leadersto reduce the U.S. military presencein Somalia.”49

Even as the situation continuedto change for the worse, policies andstrategies were never adapted to fitthe new environment. This contra-diction in policy resulted in reduc-tions in the size of the task force, thedeletion of the AC-130 support fromthe package, the refusal to sendarmor support requested by Mont-gomery in September 1993,50 andthe lack of adequate personnel andresources for USFORSOM to suc-cessfully conduct its missions insupport of UNOSOM II.

The only strategic player whorealized the need to adapt was

Hoar, who in September 1993attempted to force policy-makers toclarify their goals in Somalia. Hoarforwarded “an updated strategyassessment to Powell because heviewed the increase in U.S. mili-tary operations in Mogadishu as anunjustified expansion in the mis-sion. Hoar’s assessment called for areview of the U.N. strategy thatwould either require the U.N. to‘scale back its objectives’ or requirethe U.S. to significantly ‘increase itscommitment to underwrite this oper-ation for an indefinite period.’ ”51

Hoar never received a response.Another critical failure was the

inappropriate use of SOF in anenvironment in which both U.N.and U.S. policies were uncoordi-nated and unclear. As Under Sec-retary of Defense for Policy FrankF. Wisner stated, “The single mostserious flaw in our policy was thatwe tried to accomplish politicalobjectives solely by militarymeans.”52 Wisner also stated, “Noone in the UNOSOM headquar-ters was in charge inMogadishu,”53 correctly assessingthe fact that operations lacked a“coordinated over-arching theater-level strategy that integrated thepolitical, economic (humanitari-an), geographic, and military ele-ments of power in Somalia.

Political, humanitarian, and mili-tary strategies were developed inde-pendently. There was no senior-levelUN strategy group charged withdeveloping a coherent, integratedapproach to operations in Somaliathat encompassed the entire mis-sion.”54 Compounding the effects ofthis issue is the fact that TF Rangerwas not under the operational con-trol of UNOSOM II and wouldnever be fully integrated into theUNOSOM II/USFORSOM opera-tional-level strategy. Although polit-ical and military leaders in the U.S.realized these factors, they neveradjusted their policies and strate-

May 2004 45

gies to ensure success. Thus, thedecision-makers at the strategicand policy levels sealed TF Ranger’sfate as a military misfortune.

ConclusionBecause the mission resulted in

a strategic disutility, the tacticalvictory of the 15-hour engagementhad and will continue to have anegative affect on U.S. foreign pol-icy. While the task force succeededin its mission of capturing the 24Aidid supporters,55 its combinedfailures at the tactical levelcaused it to lose relative superior-ity. Relative superiority wasregained only with the interven-tion of conventional heavy forces.Even though U.S. forces eventual-ly achieved a tactical victory, abetter appreciation of the six prin-ciples of special-operations suc-cess could have produced a quick-er and more decisive victory, fewerU.S. casualties, and fewer nega-tive political consequences.

Major Marshall “Vito” Ecklund isa student at the Army Command andGeneral Staff Officer Course, FortLeavenworth, Kan. His previousassignments include company execu-tive officer and assault detachmentcommander (SFODA 794) in Compa-ny C, 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group inPuerto Rico; detachment commander(SFODA 763), Company C, 2nd Bat-talion, 7th SF Group; and battalionair operations officer, company execu-tive officer and rifle-platoon leader inthe 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry,101st Airborne Division. Major Eck-lund holds a bachelor’s degree in for-eign-area studies (Latin America)from the U.S. Military Academy anda master’s degree in defense analysisfrom the Naval Postgraduate School,Monterey, Calif.

Notes:1 Also referred to by different spellings of his

name: Mohammad and/or Farrah, and/orAideed. I am using the spelling from an officialmemorandum that was personally signed byhim in 1993.As for the actual target, it is oftenincorrectly identified as being the OlympicHotel itself. Actually, the target on Oct. 3,1993, was a house in the Habr Gedir section oftown that was close to the hotel. The allegedfinance minister and top political advisor forAidid, Omar Salad, was to be at the meetingsite. Thus, the actual target was the Saladhouse and not the Olympic Hotel.

2 The tactical level of war is divided intobattles, engagements and small unit/crewactions. The raid on Oct. 3-4, 1993, is mostcorrectly defined as an engagement.

3 UNOSOM II, during the period of TFRanger’s involvement, was a coalition of 21nations with an approximate strength of17,200 (Headquarters, Department of theArmy, “Subject: United States Forces Soma-lia (USFORSOM) After-Action Report[SAAR] (U), DRAFT, Version 4, Change 1,Volumes I and II, July 1997,” Vol. I, 7. Down-loaded from the USSOCOM History andResearch Office’s Historical After ActionReviews/Lessons Learned Database( h t t p : / / w w w. s o c o m . s m i l . m i l / s o c s -ho/aarll/somalia) on 12 February 2003.Overall classification (S), and hereafterreferred to as USFORSOM AAR).

4 Frank H. Akers, Jr. and George B. Single-ton, Task Force Ranger: A Case Study Examin-ing the Application of Advanced Technologiesin Modern Urban Warfare (Oak Ridge, Tenn.:National Security Program Office for theDepartment of Energy, November 2000), 4.

5 Thomas K. Adams, US Special Opera-tions Forces in Action: The Challenge ofUnconventional Warfare (Portland, Ore.:Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 261. AlsoSusan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare:Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces(Washington, D.C.: Brookings InstitutionPress, 1997), 253.

6 USFORSOM’s mission was to “conductmilitary operations in Somalia in support ofUNOSOM II to establish a secure environ-ment for humanitarian relief operations nSomalia as outlined in the Terms of Refer-ence (TOR).” (USFORSOM AAR, Vol. I, 19.)

7 U.S. Department of Defense, “Subject:After Action Report for TASK FORCERANGER Operations in Support of UNO-SOM II; 22 August-25 October 1993 (U),”dated 5 January 1994, 10. (Downloaded fromthe USSOCOM History and ResearchOffice’s Historical After Action Reviews/Lessons Learned Database [http://www.socom.smil.mil/socs-ho/aarll/somalia]12 February 2003. Downgraded version withoverall classification (U), and hereafterreferred to as AAR for Task Force Ranger.)

8 Colonel James T. Faust, “Task Force Rangerin Somalia: Isaiah 6:8” (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S.Army War College, 1999), 29.A U.S.Army WarCollege Personal Experience Monograph.

9 Akers and Singleton, 6.10 William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: CaseStudies in Special Operations Warfare: The-ory and Practice (Novato, Calif.: PresidioPress, 1996), 4-6.11 McRaven, 4-6.12 McRaven, 6-8.13 McRaven, 11-14.14 Lieutenant Colonel W.H. Northacker,United States Special Operations Com-mand History Office, “Subject: LessonsLearned Somalia (TF Ranger),” dated 20May 1998, 2. Talking paper to provide back-ground for the Defense Writers Group dis-cussion. Downloaded from the USSOCOMHistory and Research Office’s HistoricalAfter Action Reviews/Lessons LearnedDatabase (http://www.socom.smil.mil/socs-ho/aarll/somalia) on 12 February 2003.Overall classification (U).15 AAR for Task Force Ranger, 3.16 The impact of the clan culture of Soma-lia, and its impact on successful HUMINToperations cannot be overstated. Access tocertain areas of Mogadishu depended onhaving the proper clan, tribe, sub-clan, evenso far as family pedigree. Somalis, beingtotally dedicated to these hierarchies, madeit very difficult for TF Ranger to recruitSomalis to work against their own.17 U.S. Senators Carl Levin and John Warner,“Subject: Review of Circumstances Surround-ing the Ranger Raid on October 3-4 1993 inMogadishu, Somalia” (Washington, D.C.: U.S.Senate Committee on Armed Services, 29 Sep-tember 1995), 39-41. Memorandum for Sena-tor Strom Thurmond, chairman of the SenateArmed Services Committee, and Senator SamNunn, ranking member of the Senate ArmedServices Committee (hereafter referred to asthe Warner-Levin Report).18 Faust, 33.19 After the first raid, operations were sub-ject to the following criteria prior to launch:(1) receive current/actionable target intelli-gence; (2) coordinate with the commander,USFORSOM; (3) verify initial intelligencereport using reconnaissance or other disci-pline; (4) confirm no NGO/U.N. facility loca-tions near the target; (5) deconflict UNO-SOM operations; and (6) notify commander,CENTCOM. (AAR for Task Force Ranger,enclosure 2, 5.)20 McRaven, 14-15.21 McRaven, 15.22 Warner-Levin Report, 8.23 If there was a single critical variable thatwas unknown to TF Ranger, it was the clans’ability to adapt their operational tactics and

46 Special Warfare

organize quickly to fight TF Ranger. Duringthe fifth and sixth assaults, the use of RPGshad begun to pick up. Fortunately, the ter-rain during those assaults made effectiveRPG use much more difficult than duringoperations in downtown Mogadishu.24 When I questioned retired Major GeneralGarrison on May 28, 2003, about his decisionto ignore increased Somali RPG use againsthelicopters, he argued that the fact was notignored. He stated that he made his decisionto continue using helicopters in the samemanner as in the previous missions based onadvice provided by the pilots and the unitcommander of the 1st Battalion, 160th Spe-cial Operations Aviation Regiment. Theyinformed/recommended to Garrison that itwas an acceptable risk that could be mitigat-ed at their level. I assumed this to suggestthat the pilots believed that such a nonpreci-sion weapon was ultimately no match fortheir flying skills. That assumption was con-firmed in Colonel Faust’s monograph, inwhich he describes a conversation with one ofthe pilots who had met with other pilots todiscuss the 25 September shootdown of theUH-60 from the 10th Mountain Division’sAviation Task Force: “In their [the pilots’]opinion, the shoot down was lucky, i.e., ‘bigsky, little bullet.’ ” According to Faust, thepilot suggested that TF Ranger aircraft “flewrapidly random and irregular flight profiles,”and that “the combination of experience andbetter tactics minimized the RPG threat toTFR aircraft.” (Faust, 40.)25 AAR for Task Force Ranger, tabs E and Fto enclosure 3, 3-E-2 and 3-F-1.26 Using all six previous missions as anindicator, the majority of the assault andblocking forces on the 3 October missionhad not brought their NVDs or sufficientwater, since the mission began in daylightand all were certain that the mission wouldend hours before dark.27 Warner-Levin Report, 22.28 McRaven, 15-16.29 Warner-Levin Report, 38-39.30 Because all operations were conductedfrom one of two operational templates, allmembers of the task force had to know theirindividual jobs inside and out; in this man-ner the task force could reduce any variabil-ity, control and predict behavior of the Sol-diers, and regulate the activity as much aspossible. Through the standardization ofrules such as operating on the basis of jointtactics, techniques and procedures, TFRanger was able to ensure that all membersfrom varying services and operational back-grounds were focused on the same “tactical”sheet of music and speaking the same“joint” language. The task force had stand-ard operating procedures for everything,

and this formal set of procedures was fol-lowed on every mission. TF Ranger’s lack ofcompetition should have allowed it to bevery deliberate and thorough in its decision-making and execution. While TF Ranger’stemplate planning was deliberate and thor-ough, once the task force arrived inMogadishu, mission planning and executionwas anything but slow and deliberate.31 Northacker, 3.32 AAR for Task Force Ranger, tab G toenclosure 3, 3-G-3. When I questionedretired Major General Garrison about thisdecision on May 28, 2003, he stated thatprior coordination with the QRF units, aswell as pre-positioning them at the TFRanger airfield, would not have resulted inan earlier launch time for the rescue. Hestated that his intelligence indicated that,historically, Mogadishu turned into a ghosttown at about 2300 hours every night, andthat he didn’t launch the joint U.N./QRF/TFRanger rescue force until 2323 hours forthat very reason. He indicated that launch-ing them that late would give the rescueforce the best chance for success, consider-ing that many of the Somalis might alreadyhave called it quits for the day.33 Warner-Levin Report, 33.34 McRaven, 17-18.35 “In the postmortem of the October 3 bat-tle, it transpired that Aidid’s militia dividedMogadishu into eighteen sectors, each with atactical commander … Colonel Harif HassanGiumale, the commander of the Somali forcethat engaged Task Force Ranger on October3, had attended a Soviet military academy inOdessa for three years. His subordinate,Colonel Ali Aden, summed up his command-er’s perspective on U.S. tactics: ‘If you use onetactic once, you should not use it a third time.And the Americans had already done basi-cally the same thing six times.’ ” (JonathanStevenson, Losing Mogadishu: Testing U.S.Policy in Somalia [Annapolis, Md.: NavalInstitute Press, 1995], 93-94.)36 Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down — AStory of Modern War (New York: AtlanticMonthly Press, 1999), 80.37 “TF Ranger randomly launched missionsfor training and rehearsal at all times of theday and night. We could not protect ourlaunches but the idea was to put the chal-lenge on the surveillance to determine if itwas a real launch or not.” (Faust, 16.)38 McRaven, 19-21.39 McRaven, 21-23.40 After the events of 3-4 October 1993,Aidid’s tactic of “killing Americans” and hav-ing that broadcast worldwide succeeded inchanging a previously apathetic U.S. publicand focused their anger on U.S. policy inSomalia (Lester H. Brune, The United States

and Post-Cold War Interventions: Bush andClinton in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, 1992-1998 (Claremont, Calif.: Regina Books, 1999),33. In the words of Montgomery, “It’s obviousthat, if there was no political will in theUnited States to hang in there and see itthrough, we had to come out.” (Adams, 265.)41 This assessment of probabilities of mis-sion success (capturing Aidid) in relation toHUMINT was confirmed by retired MajorGeneral Garrison on May 28, 2003.42 Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, PerilousOptions: Special Operations as an Instru-ment of US Foreign Policy (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, Inc., 1993), 4.43 Vandenbroucke, 4.44 Vandenbroucke, 4.45 Vandenbroucke, 6-7.46 Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996), 149.47 Gray, Explorations in Strategy, 143.48 Colin S. Gray, “Handfuls of Heroes on Des-perate Ventures: When do Special OperationsSucceed?” Parameters (Spring 1999). Down-loaded from Parameters On-Line (http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/99spring/gray.htm) on 4 February 2003.49 Warner-Levin Report, 4.50 In August 1993, Montgomery assessedthat the situation required heavy forces(mechanized infantry units) in order to pro-vide adequate force protection to U.S. logis-tics convoys and installations. He sent arequest to Hoar in early September 1993.After Hoar scaled back the request by morethan 75 percent, he forwarded the requestfor additional forces through the JointChiefs of Staff. On Sept. 23, 1993, the com-mander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff made theSecretary of Defense aware of the request,but the Secretary elected not to approve therequest at that time. The request was notconsidered essential by policy-level authori-ties to carrying out the mission (USFOR-SOM AAR, Vol. I, 22-23.)51 USFORSOM AAR, Vol. I, 36.52 Warner-Levin Report, 26.53 Warner-Levin Report, 19.54 USFORSOM AAR, Vol. I, 30-31.55 “The ground force fought its way back tothe airport from the target. … The vehiclesleft the target with 24 live and uninjuredSomalis. There were only 22 alive when theconvoy returned. Two Somali prisoners weredead; a third died shortly after we unloadedthe vehicles. All were victims of Somali fire.”(USFORSOM AAR, Vol. I, 54-55.)

May 2004 47

The man most often credited withfounding United States Army Spe-cial Forces died April 1 at his home

in Dana Point, Calif., at the age of 101.Retired Army Colonel Aaron Bank,

known throughoutthe military’s spe-c i a l - o p e r a t i o n scommunity as “TheFather of SpecialForces,” died of nat-ural causes withhis family at hisside. He was buriedat Riverside Na-tional Cemetery inRiverside, Calif.,April 5 with fullmilitary and Spe-cial Forces honors.

Bank most no-tably broke newground when in1952 he was namedcommander of theFort Bragg-based10th Special ForcesGroup — the Ar-my’s first officialspec ia l -war fare

unit, for which he had led the fight to create.The announcement of Bank’s death has

been difficult news for Special Forces Sol-diers around the world, said Special Forcesspokesman Major Robert Gowan.

“Colonel Bank’s passing marks a sad dayfor the Special Forces regiment,” Gowansaid. “Colonel Aaron Bank was the fatherof Special Forces — he was a legend. Hisinitiative and vision allowed the Army tocreate the U.S. Army Special Forces as weknow them today, and every Special ForcesSoldier in the Army will mourn his death.”

Born Nov. 23, 1902, in New York City,Bank traveled extensively in Europe andbecame fluent in French and Germanbefore entering the U.S. Army in 1939.

In 1943, after completing Officer Candi-date School, Bank volunteered for dutywith the Office of Strategic Services andwas assigned to a Jedburgh team — asmall, first-of-its-kind unconventional-warfare outfit. Bank and his Jedburghteam made a combat parachute jump intoSouthern France in August 1944, wherethey successfully employed hit-and-runtactics to harass Nazi forces that werewithdrawing up the Rhone River.

Later, Bank was chosen as the com-manding officer for Operation Cross (oftenerroneously referred to as Operation IronCross), a high-risk plan to snatch AdolphHitler and key members of his inner circleshould they retreat to the “nationalredoubt” in the Bavarian Alps. FromFrench prisoner-of-war camps, Bankrecruited a company-sized unit of anti-Nazi Germans, most of whom were com-munist sympathizers. They were to operateas an ersatz German mountain infantry

48 Special Warfare

‘Father of Special Forces’ Dies at Age 101in California Home

Aaron BankCourtesy USASOC archive

company. They spoke German during alltheir training, wore German uniforms andcarried German weapons. The mission wasnever launched, however. Bank got wordthat the operation was aborted while heand his unit were waiting to board the air-craft that were to drop them into the targetarea.

After the aborted mission, Bank wastransferred to Indochina to search forJapanese POW camps around the Vien-tiane-Laos area. His team located 143French civilian internees at Naung Kai, 14French internees at Vientiane, and eightFrench internees at Thakhek, supplying allwith medical supplies and special fooditems for the numerous children held inthe camps.

When World War II ended, the OSS wasdisbanded, but Bank and Colonel RussellVolckmann, another former OSS operative,remained in the military and worked tire-lessly to convince the Army to adopt anunconventional, guerrilla-style force. Theyfound an ally in Brigadier General RobertMcClure, who at the time headed theArmy’s psychological-warfare staff at thePentagon.

Bank and Volckmann convinced Armyleaders that there were areas in the worldnot susceptible to conventional warfare —especially Soviet-dominated easternEurope — that would be ideal candidatesfor unconventional-warfare operations.Special operations, as envisioned by thetwo men — and Bank in particular —would be a force multiplier, meaning that asmall number of highly-trained Soldierscould create disproportionate amounts oftrouble for enemy forces.

It was a bold idea that went against thegrain of traditional concepts of warfare,but by 1952, the Army was ready toembark into a new era of warfare. Aftermonths of preparation, the 10th SpecialForces Group was activated at Fort Bragg,N.C., with Bank as its commander.

On the day of its activation, the 10thGroup had a total strength of 10 Soldiers —Bank, one warrant officer and eight enlist-ed men. But that would soon change, andjust over 50 years later, the nearly 10,000Soldiers of the U.S. Army Special Forces

Command continue to sustain the fightthat Bank began at the opening of the ColdWar.

Today, the Special Forces and other spe-cial-operations units that Bank helped cre-ate serve as the tip of the spear for the U.S.military in the global war on terrorism,serving in contingencies such as OperationIraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Free-dom and many others around the world.

Bank is survived by his wife, Catherine,and their two daughters, Linda Ballantineof Dana Point, Calif., and Alexandra Elliottof Anaheim, Calif.

The Bank family asks that donations bemade to the Special Operations WarriorFoundation; P.O. Box 14385; Tampa, FL33690.

This article was written by the U.S. ArmySpecial Operations Command PublicAffairs Office.

May 2004 49

During the funeral serv-ice for Aaron Bank, Sol-diers from the 1st Spe-cial Forces Group foldthe flag that was drapedover the coffin.

Photo by Kyle J. Cosner

50 Special Warfare

Enlisted Career NotesSpecial Warfare

The commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, the propo-nent for Civil Affairs, has approved the submission of a request to the U.S.Army Human Resources Command to add the Civil Affairs career man-agement field, CMF 38, to the active Army. With the concurrence of thecommanders of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the U.S.Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, the SWCScommander directed the Special Operations Proponency Office to submitthe proposal on March 31, 2004. The Human Resources Command initiat-ed Armywide staffing for comments on April 14, with a suspense of June14. If approved, the action will recode all enlisted positions in militaryoccupational specialty 38A to MOS 38B and authorize the MOS to be heldby Soldiers in the active army and the U.S. Army Reserve effective Oct. 1,2005. Proposed growth in the force structure of the active Army willexpand the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion to a brigade with four battalions.The establishment of CMF 38 as an active-component CMF would enableReservists to transition to the active component and complete a career onactive duty. The change would also reduce the strain on Civil Affairs man-power growth and training requirements. For additional information, tele-phone Major Michael J. Karabasz at DSN 239-6406, commercial (910) 432-6406, or send e-mail to: karabasm@soc.mil.

According to an agreement between the U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School and the U.S. ArmyInfantry School, Fort Benning, Ga., the Special Forces Enlisted Branch willbegin filling seven drill-sergeant positions at the Infantry School duringfiscal year 2005, in support of the 18X program. The SF Enlisted Branchis seeking volunteers from MOSs 18B and 18C for the positions but willconsider SF Soldiers in MOS 18E on a case-by-case basis. The Soldiersselected will attend Drill Sergeant Course as early as July 2004 and willreport for duty at the Infantry School in October 2004. Requirements arethat applicants have at least 48 months service on an SF A-detachmentand be able to pass the drill-sergeant selection process and backgroundscreening. Drill-sergeant duty lasts 24 months; Soldiers in the positionswill not receive jump pay, but they will receive special duty assignmentpay at the drill-sergeant level, which is $375 a month. For additional infor-mation on these assignments, contact Sergeant First Class Jorge Vargas atthe SF Enlisted Branch, DSN 221-8399, commercial (703) 325-8399, orsend e-mail to vargasj@hoffman.army.mil.

Proposal would make CMF 38part of the active Army

SF Branch seeks drillsergeants for 18X program

May 2004 51

Officer Career NotesSpecial Warfare

Lieutenant General Franklin L. Hagenbeck, the Army G1, has authorizedall officers who are career field-designated as Functional Area 39C (CivilAffairs) to regimentally affiliate with the Civil Affairs Corps in the UnitedStates Army Reserve. This is an exception to AR 600-82, The U.S. ArmyRegimental System. To request authorization to regimentally affiliate, FA39C officers must submit their request via DA Form 4187 to: Commander,United States Army Human Resources Command, Attn: AHRC-OPY(colonels) or AHRC-OPF-B (majors and lieutenant colonels); 200 StovallStreet; Alexandria, VA 22332-0411. For additional information, telephoneJeanne Goldmann at DSN 239-6922 or commercial (910) 432-6922, or sende-mail to: goldmanj@soc.mil.

The new DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Development andCareer Management, is scheduled to be published during the summer of2004. The Army is undergoing significant changes in personnel manage-ment, and Special Forces will see changes, though not necessarily as far-reaching as the rest of the Army. An extract of the SF chapter of DA Pam-phlet 600-3 was printed in the February 2004 issue of Special Warfare, butall SF officers are strongly encouraged to read the new DA Pamphlet 600-3,as there have been changes since the extract was published. For additionalinformation, telephone Lieutenant Colonel Mark A. Strong at DSN 239-3296or commercial (910) 432-3296, or send e-mail to: strongm@soc.mil.

FA 39C officers can regimentally affiliate

with Branch 38

SF officers should read new DA Pam 600-3

52 Special Warfare

Foreign SOFSpecial Warfare

Citing a growing role for German military forces in light of the world’schanged political circumstances, commentators in and out of the German gov-ernment continue to identify a need to expand Germany’s special forces.According to some concepts, the expansion would include the small, elite Spe-cial Forces Commando, or KSK, and the 8,000-man Division of Special Oper-ations, or DSO, which now comprises four airborne battalions. Elements ofthese forces have been widely reported as having been active in the Balkansand, more recently, in Afghanistan. Some anonymous officers have suggestedthat Germany — drawing on the KSK, DSO and other elements — should cre-ate larger special forces that would include a counterterrorist force, form DSOforces similar to U.S. Army Rangers, and focus on the interaction between spe-cial-operations forces and specialized detachments such as underwater-opera-tions and air-rescue personnel.The establishment of a coordinating joint head-quarters has also been postulated. Impediments to the proposed expansionand restructuring would be the long-standing shortfall in volunteers who canmeet the rigorous selection criteria and the necessity of beefing up transportcapabilities. These, along with considerations common in military restructur-ing — budget constraints, domestic political considerations and differences ofviewpoint within the military establishment — will shape the structure andthe mandate of future German special forces.

Fatal clashes between Mexican police and army units and the well-armed criminal group “Los Zetas” have increasingly concerned Mexicanauthorities and underscore the near-parity that well-funded criminalgroups can achieve with law-enforcement and military organizations.Los Zetas provides firepower, security and coercion for the Gulf drug-trafficking cartel and provides the force needed for settling scores withrival drug-trafficking organizations. Mexican law-enforcement and mili-tary officials believe that Los Zetas is composed, at least in part, of for-mer Mexican military personnel — more so than any other such group inMexican history. Mexican military special-operations units, such as theAirborne Special Forces Groups, or GAFES, have been used extensivelyin counterdrug operations, but the units have had problems with cor-ruption and human-rights violations. Disaffected members of the GAFESand similar groups have joined Los Zetas and turned their skills to mur-der, kidnapping and “narco-military” actions. Authorities have reportedapproximately 100 members of Los Zetas taking training in weapons andequipment at a site that resembles a GAFES training center. There isevidently some form of Zeta internal organization, given the existence ofknown Zeta components like “Comando Negro,” or the Black Command.In addition to having military training and organization, group membersare also well-armed. A 40-minute firefight in Nuevo Laredo in August2003 revealed that in addition to the standard automatic weapons (AK-47s and AR-15s), Los Zetas possessed grenade launchers and a 50-cal.machine gun.

Germans consider increasing special forces

Armed group challengesMexico�s police and army

May 2004 53

Early in November 2003, a report attributed to sources in the Indian CentralReserve Police Force, or CRPF, raised the probability that the CRPF would cre-ate a “special strike unit” to deal with what the report characterized as a grow-ing effort by Pakistan’s Inter Service Intelligence, or ISI, to destabilize Indiausing left-wing extremist groups in at least six Indian states. The strike unitwould work hand-in-hand with the actions and efforts of other securityresources in the affected states. A special concern is the reported ISI effort tomobilize the Marxist-Leninist/Maoist Naxalite groups in this effort, as well as toobtain support from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. There are severaldozen Naxalite groups in India whose roots stretch back to 1948. Naxalitegroups have had a mixed inventory of old armaments, but they have recentlyacquired more sophisticated weapons. In 2002, Naxalite terrorists launched1,465 attacks and killed 482 people. Serious and fatal attacks continuedthroughout 2003, featuring more sophisticated small arms and explosivedevices. The Naxalite development takes place against the backdrop of a moregeneral CRPF expansion: During the last two years, the CRPF has added 17new battalions. CRPF recruiting for 22 additional battalions is already underway, and the force could add as many as 25 additional battalions during 2004 —which would bring the expansion to 64 new battalions in three years. If theexpansion is successful, the additional 64 battalions would give the CRPF a totalof 220 battalions and would likely make it the largest counterinsurgency/para-military force in the world.

Combat operations in Chechnya continue to generate casualties and damage toall aspects of the infrastructure. The Russian Interior Ministry — which con-ducts more than two-thirds of combat operations — as well as the Ministry ofDefense and other special units, bear the main burden. Oil represents a specialconcern: The principal threat is the diversion of oil and the establishment byirregular forces of small, illegal oil-production enterprises. Russian authoritiessay oil diversion and illegal production are used to generate great sums of moneyfor the support of Chechen armed-opposition groups.They liken the profits fromoil diversion to drug-trafficking revenues. The problem of securing oil pipelinesand other resources that are subject to attack by irregular forces has preoccu-pied military forces in many parts of the world. In Chechnya, where Russianforces and the key infrastructure they seek to protect face the potential of dailyattack or theft, republic police have constituted what they refer to as an “oil spe-cial forces regiment” of some 1,200 men. Armed and equipped much like theRussian Interior Ministry’s special police, the force is divided into mobile groupswhose mission is to provide continuous protection to the pipeline as well as toChechen oil-production facilities generally. The “oil units” patrol roads and stopsuspicious trucks they believe to be carrying stolen oil. If their suspicions areborne out, they destroy the vehicles. The oil units come under attack from guer-rillas and need to be continually prepared to defend themselves.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr., who recently retired from the U.S. Army’s For-eign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Russian special force protects Chechen oil

resources

Indian counterinsurgencyforces expand dramatically

Parker assumes commandof SWCS

Major General James W. Parkerassumed command of the UnitedStates Army John F. Kennedy Spe-cial Warfare Center and SchoolJune 10 in the SWCS Auditoriumat Fort Bragg, N.C.

Parker previously served asDirector of the Center for SpecialOperations, U.S. Special OperationsCommand, MacDill Air Force Base,Fla. His other assignments includedirector, Intelligence and Informa-tion Operations Center, USSOCOM;commander, Special OperationsCommand South; operations officerand chief of staff, U.S. Army ForcesCommand; deputy commandinggeneral, U.S. Army Special Opera-tions Command; commander, 7thSF Group; commander, 1st Battal-ion, 3rd SF Group; staff officer,USSOCOM J3 Directorate; and U.S.adviser to the Salvadoran 4thInfantry Brigade in El Salvador.

A native of Miami, Fla., Parkerenlisted in the Army in 1970. Hebegan his special-operations careerat Fort Bragg, where he served onan A-detachment with the 7th SFGroup before attending OfficerCandidate School in 1975.

The previous SWCS commander,Major General Geoffrey C. Lam-bert, relinquished command June 4and is scheduled to retire from theArmy in August.

SWCS writing new MTP forPSYOP dissemination units

The JFK Special Warfare Centerand School’s Psychological Opera-tions Training and Doctrine Divi-sion, Directorate of Training and

Doctrine, is writing a new missiontraining plan, or MTP, for PSYOPdissemination battalions. The MTPwill delineate the collective tasksand describe operations conductedby the highly skilled Soldiers inthose unique units.

The MTP,ARTEP 33-715-MTP. willapply to active-duty and reserve-com-ponent PSYOP units.The 3rd Psycho-logical Operations Battalion, 4thPSYOP Group, is the only active-dutyPSYOP dissemination unit. Thereserve-component PSYOP dissemi-nation unit is the 7th PSYOP Group’s17th PSYOP Battalion, which hascompanies in Joliet, Ill., and LosAlamitos, Calif. In the future, theArmy plans to add an additionalreserve-component PSYOP dissemi-nation battalion.

PSYOP dissemination battalionsprovide audiovisual and printedmaterials, signal support, media-broadcast capabilities and electronic-maintenance services to PSYOPgroups, regional PSYOP battalionsand tactical PSYOP battalions. Thenew MTP will provide doctrinalguidance to assist dissemination bat-talions in developing their trainingplans. The MTP will address thetasks required to train Soldiers onPSYOP-specific systems, such as theSpecial Operations Media System B,Deployable Print Production Center,Theatre Media Production Centerand the new Media Operations Cen-ter located at Fort Bragg, N.C.

Active- and reserve-componentsubject-matter experts are develop-ing the author’s draft of the newMTP with input from key personnelfrom the 3rd and 17th PSYOP bat-talions. The initial draft is sched-uled to be available for review in the

spring of 2005. The PSYOP Train-ing and Doctrine Division will alertunits when the new manual will bestaffed for comments.

PSYOP commanders, staff offi-cers and Soldiers of every skilllevel should review the initial draftand provide input. Once approved,the MTP will be accessible throughthe ASOCNet, the DOTD Web site,the PSYOP section of the ARSOFDoctrine and Training Library, andthrough Army Knowledge Online.

For additional information, contactthe project officer, Captain MatthewBerriman, commander of the 306thPSYOP Company (310-995-6288); orStaff Sergeant John Tuel, DOTDPSYOP Division (910-432-7257, DSN239-7257 or e-mail: tuelj@soc.mil).

Manuals to update doctrinefor SF advanced skills

The JFK Special Warfare Centerand School is working on new andupdated doctrinal publicationsthat have applicability to SpecialForces advanced skills.

The Advanced Skills Branch, SFDoctrine Division, Directorate ofTraining and Doctrine, has pro-duced a new manual, FM 3-05.221,Special Forces Advanced UrbanCombat. Incorrectly printed thefirst time, FM 3-05.221 has beenreprinted and is being distributedto SF units. For more information,telephone Master Sergeant Step-hen M. Ryan at DSN 239-5952 orcommercial (910) 432-5952, or sende-mail to: ryanst@soc.mil.

The Advanced Skills Branch isalso completing the final draft ofFM 3-05.212, SF Waterborne Opera-tions. The FM has been updated

54 Special Warfare

UpdateSpecial Warfare

with changes that will enable usersto conduct waterborne missionsmore efficiently. The final draft ofFM 3-05.212 is scheduled to beready for distribution by September.For more information, telephoneCWO 3 Jeff Kula at DSN 239-5952or commercial (910) 432-5952, orsend e-mail to: kulaj@soc.mil.

The Advanced Skills Branch isalso making changes to update FM3-05.211, SF MFF Operations. Theupdated manual will contain com-prehensive information on militaryfree-fall missions so that users willnot need to consult any other pub-lications. FM 3-05.211 is alsoscheduled for distribution to fieldunits by September. For moreinformation, telephone CWO 3Randall C. Wurst at DSN 239-5952or commercial (910) 432-5952, orsend e-mail to: wurstr@soc.mil.

In conjunction with the ArmyCorps of Engineers and the RegularArmy, the Advanced Skills Branchhas produced a new training circu-lar, TC 28-8-1, Army Special Opera-tions Forces Training Ranges, whichis a restricted supplement to TC 25-8, Army Training Ranges. TC 28-8-1describes innovative ranges andcomplexes that can be built andused by Regular Army units or byunits of Army special-operationsforces, or ARSOF.

The information in TC 28-8-1 willgive units the opportunity and theability to train in state-of-the-artcomplexes and ranges. TC 28-8-1standardizes 10 ARSOF ranges thathave been approved by the Army andincorporated into the Army’s MasterRange Program. For more informa-tion, telephone Master SergeantStephen M. Ryan at DSN 239-5952or commercial (910) 432-5952, orsend e-mail to: ryanst@soc.mil.

The Advanced Skills Branch hasalso produced a six-part CD-ROMvideo collection of tactics, tech-niques and procedures to be usedwhen working with pack animals.The videos are for use in conjunc-tion with FM 3-05.213, SF Use of

Pack Animals. For more informa-tion, telephone Master SergeantJoseph Register at DSN 239-5952or commercial (910) 432-5952, orsend e-mail to: registej@soc.mil.

With SF at the forefront in thewar on terrorism, capturing emerg-ing SF doctrine is critical to the suc-cess of the force. Anyone who hasbetter techniques or lessons learnedshould forward the information tothe SF Doctrine Division so that itcan be documented and distributedto other SF Soldiers. Sharing theinformation can make SF a saferand more lethal fighting force.

3rd SF Group receives new commander

Colonel Patrick M. Higginsaccepted command of the 3rd Spe-cial Forces Group June 8 at DickMeadows Field, Fort Bragg, N.C.

Higgins was previously opera-tions officer for Special OperationsCommand Central, MacDill AirForce Base, Fla. His other special-operations assignments includedetachment commander, battalionS4, battalion executive officer andbattalion commander, 5th SFGroup; assignments officer, SFBranch, Total Army PersonnelCommand; action officer, SpecialOperations Division, OperationsDirectorate, The Joint Staff; andchief of the Special Forces Branch,Total Army Personnel Command.

The previous 3rd Group com-mander, Colonel Joseph D. Celeski,is scheduled to retire from theArmy in October.

SWCS civilian instructorreceives Simons award

A civilian employee of the JFKSpecial Warfare Center and Schoolhas received a lifetime achieve-ment honor for his five decades ofuniformed and civilian service withthe Army and SF communities.

Ernest K. Tabata, a demolitionsexpert and SF instructor, receivedthe Bull Simons Award May 12

from General Bryan Brown, com-manding general of the U.S. Spe-cial Operations Command, atMacDill Air Force Base, Fla.

Named for legendary SF ColonelArthur D. “Bull” Simons, theSimons Award is presented to indi-viduals who embody the spirit, val-ues and skills that Simons exem-plified. Previous award recipientsinclude H. Ross Perot, the Honor-able William S. Cohen, GeneralEdward “Shy” Meyer, the Honor-able John O. Marsh Jr., ColonelAaron Bank, Lieutenant GeneralSamuel V. Wilson, Lieutenant Gen-eral Leroy Manor, the HonorableSam Nunn and Brigadier GeneralHarry “Heinie” Aderholt.

After serving two years with theHawaiian Territorial Guard, Taba-ta enlisted in the Army in 1948. Heserved in the Korean War and wasdischarged in 1952 but re-enlistedin 1955. After serving as a para-trooper in the 82nd and 11th Air-borne divisions, he volunteered forSpecial Forces training in 1961.

Soon after completing SF train-ing, Tabata volunteered for a clan-destine mission in Laos, OperationWhite Star, led by then-LieutenantColonel Bull Simons. Tabata laterserved three tours in Vietnam, twoof them with the Military Assist-ance Command, Vietnam Studiesand Observation Group, or MACVSOG. On his first MACV SOG tour,Tabata was a reconnaissance-teamleader. In 1981, after 30 years ofactive-duty service, he retired as acommand sergeant major.

In 1984, Tabata returned to SFas a civilian instructor at SWCS.Twenty years later, he continues toteach engineering and demolitionsskills to SF candidates. At age 73,he still makes static-line parachutejumps as required in the course ofhis duties. — Captain John DeNi-cola, USN; USSOCOM PAO

May 2004 55

Deterrence and Influence inCounterterrorism: A Compo-nent in the War on al Qaeda. ByPaul K. Davis and Brian MichaelJenkins. RAND National DefenseResearch Institute report MR-1619-DARPA, November 2002. ISBN: 0-8330-3286-0. 109 pages. $20. Avail-able for downloading at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1619/.

This short report from RAND is amust-read for operators and for poli-cy-makers who are developing strat-egy for the global war on terrorism.

War in our civilized age is aimedat influencing the behavior of anadversary by destroying, or threat-ening to destroy, what he values —usually military forces or economicassets. However, our adversaries inthe current war do not have a tra-ditional target array for us todestroy or threaten. Those targetsthat exist are small, mobile andoften hidden among innocents.Davis and Jenkins analyze the al-Qaeda terrorist organization as a sys-tem and propose a method for deter-mining ways of influencing both theindividual parts of that system andthe system as a whole.

The authors are well-qualified andbring complementary capabilities andperspectives to the report. Dr. Paul K.Davis, a research leader and professorat the RAND graduate school, hasextensive practical, academic andresearch experience in military affairsand analysis. He served six years inthe federal government, eventuallybecoming a senior executive and anacting deputy assistant secretary inthe Department of Defense.

Brian Michael Jenkins brings field

and research perspectives to thereport. He served as a Special Forcesofficer during the United States inter-vention in the Dominican Republicand in Vietnam. An acknowledgedterrorism expert, he serves as a con-sultant and writes extensively oninternational terrorism.

The authors open the report witha discussion of terrorists’ motiva-tion and commitment to theircause, the cultural traditions ofviolence, and al-Qaeda’s organiza-tional structure. The discussioncovers all parts of the terrorists’organization, from grass-roots sup-port and sympathetic governmentsto the terrorist core. It providesstrategic insight into how eachpart of the terrorist system can —or cannot — be influenced anddescribes techniques for evaluatingand predicting the interactionsbetween parts of the terrorist sys-tem. Those interactions can then

be exploited to influence the behav-ior of the terrorist “foot soldiers.”

In any conflict, there is a range ofcoercive options available for influ-encing enemy behavior — from co-option to persuasion, deterrence todestruction. As the title suggests, theauthors focus on deterrence. Theyassert that governments must iso-late individual terrorist vulnerabili-ties (family, tribe, home and people)and use both the mailed fist and thevelvet glove to deter and disruptfuture terrorist plans.

A successful counterterrorist strat-egy, they argue, shows attributes ofmanifest determination, relentlessactions, moral validity, and a strategythat balances political, economic, mil-itary and cultural components. Thelesson for operators and policy-mak-ers is that a strictly military strategycannot defeat terrorism.

While there may be no single centerof gravity for terrorists, vulnerabilitiesshould be exploited using a series ofeffects-based actions and a portfolio ofinfluence techniques.A key emphasis inthe authors’ prescription is the use oftailored, decentralized and adaptiveresponses. The report recognizes thatone of the most effective ways of deter-ring terrorist actions is to either disruptattempted attacks or to destroy asmuch of the terrorist system as possiblein response to an attack. The authorsmake a fundamental assumption thatmost terrorists (even suicide bombers)are rational and will shy away fromfutile efforts to concentrate on moreeffective and damaging attacks.

The authors complete the reportwith broad strategic prescriptionsand discussions on deterring the useof weapons of mass destruction, onpolitical warfare, and on the clash

56 Special Warfare

Book ReviewsSpecial Warfare

between American values and thoseof several of our regional allies.

Davis and Jenkins cannot pro-vide a complete strategy in a shortreport, but they do provide a usefultemplate and techniques for devel-oping a comprehensive strategy forthe global war on terrorism. Theirreport should be on the reading listof every policy-maker or strategist.

Colonel John D. Jogerst, USAFSpecial Operations ChairAir UniversityMaxwell AFB, Ala.

Across the Fence: The SecretWar in Vietnam. By John StrykerMeyer. St. Ann, Mo.: Real War Sto-ries, 2003. ISBN 0-974-3618-1-X.$24.95. 246 pages.

During the Vietnam War, thecross-border reconnaissance teamsof the Military Assistance Com-mand, Vietnam’s Studies andObservation Group, or MACVSOG, suffered casualties on a levelreminiscent of Civil War units.

Initially, SOG had no formal in-country training programs. Thatwas a reflection of the newness ofthe program and the quality, actu-al and anticipated, of the partici-pants. In order to train theirteams, team leaders employed allthe skills that they had acquired inyears of Army training and in com-bat in Korea, in Laos and duringearlier Vietnam tours. Amongthese early leaders were combat-savvy veterans such as MasterSergeants Dick Meadows, JerryWareing, “Snuffy” Conroy, TedBraden and Don Fowler.

Unfortunately, the early personnelwealth did not last. Casualties, pro-motions, commissionings, retire-ments, the rotation policy and thecompeting demands of both SF andthe “big Army” for skilled NCOs sooncreated a shortage of experiencedoperators. Replacements reporting toSOG were soon considerably lessexperienced than desired.

A couple of years later, SOG haddeveloped training courses for itsnewly assigned reconnaissance per-sonnel. including one for the recon-naissance leaders, or “one-zeros.”

During the interim between theera of highly experienced personneland the establishment of in-countrytraining programs, the author ofAcross the Fence, John StrykerMeyer, arrived at SOG. In the gradeof specialist, Stryker, a 21-year-oldradio operator who had less than 18months in the Army, faced demandsfor which he had no experience andhad received scant training.

When Meyer arrived, the bleakoperational conditions that were toexist throughout the duration of theSOG reconnaissance effort prevailed.Specifically, SOG’s ability to reinforceengaged teams was greatly restrictedby the extended operational rangesand the small number of available liftaircraft. The operational ranges alsoobviated any support by ground fires.The teams were totally dependent onU.S.Air Force aircraft that were with-in FM radio range for communica-tions, for reporting intelligence, forrequesting air support and forrequesting withdrawal.

Also by the time Meyer arrived,the enemy had recognized the

inherent vulnerabilities of thesmall SOG reconnaissance teamsand had made provisions for find-ing and destroying them. Few mis-sions were without enemy contact.Meyer, with only local team train-ing, was soon running missions“across the fence,” i.e., into Cambo-dia and Laos, first as a radio oper-ator and later as a one-zero. Hisdescriptions of these missions arethe essence of the book.

Meyer describes the missionsessentially as he experienced them.Only rarely does he allow subse-quent reflection or facts determinedlater to intrude into his account. Heis an excellent writer, describing peo-ple, equipment, events, emotions andthoughts with accuracy and a dis-arming frankness.

One of the few faults of this bookis its total lack of maps. Pictures arelimited to two on the book’s dustjacket, but pictures from opera-tional areas were difficult to takeand to retain: the intelligence oper-ators demanded everything. Thegeneral reader unfamiliar with theclothing, equipment and aircraftMeyer describes might wish to havea copy of John Plaster’s SOG, aPhoto History of the Secret Wars(Paladin, 2000) within reach.

This book does not purport to behistory. It is a highly personal andexceptionally detailed memoir. Forsuch a level of detail to be includedin a book written 35 years after theevents is truly impressive. Acrossthe Fence is recommended readingfor those who want to know whatSoutheast Asia reconnaissanceoperations were really like andwho want to know the quality ofthe SF men who conducted them.

COL J.H. CrerarU.S. Army (ret.)Vienna, Va.

May 2004 57

Special Warfare

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