space traffic management - international space university

Space Traffic Management

Final Report

International Space University

Summer Session Program 2007

Beijing, China

© International Space University. All Rights Reserved.

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The 2007 Summer Session Program of the International Space University was hosted by the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation and Beihang University in Beijing, China.

Cover Artwork by: Ayako Ono & Cian Curran.

While all care has been taken in the preparation of this report, it should not be relied upon, and ISU does not take any responsibility for the accuracy of its content. The views expressed in this report are the personal views of the authors and in no way reflect the official opinions of the countries or organizations they represent.

The Executive Summary, ordering information, and order forms may be found on the ISU website at www.isunet.edu/services/library/isu_publications.htm. Copies of the Executive Summary and the Final Report can also be ordered from:

International Space University

Strasbourg Central Campus

Attention: Publication/Library

Parc d’Innovation

1, rue Jean-Dominique Cassini

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Tel: +33 (0) 3 88 65 54 32

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e-mail: [email protected]

© International Space University. All Rights Reserved. iii

____________________________ Acknowledgements

The International Space University Summer Session Program 2007 and the work of the Space Traffic Management Team were made possible by the generous support of the following organizations and individuals:

PROJECT SPONSORS

The Arsenault Family Foundation

The International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety

PROJECT FACULTY AND TEACHING ASSOCIATES

Co-chair : William Marshall (UK), NASA-Ames Research Center, USA

Faculty Shepherds : Lucy Stojak, Institute of Air and Space Law-McGill University, Canada Isabelle Bouvet, CNES, International Affairs, France

Teaching Associate : Incigul Polat Erdogan, HAVELSAN Inc., Turkey

EXTERNAL EXPERTS:

Han Zengyao : CAST, China Kai-Uwe Schrogle : European Space Policy Institute, Austria Patrick Cohendet : HEC Montreal, Université Louis Pasteur, Strasbourg, France René Oosterlinck : ESA Headquarters, France Richard Tremayne-Smith : BNSC Representative to IADC, UK Rüdiger Jehn : ESA/ESOC, Germany Wang Ting : BUAA, China William H. Ailor : The Aerospace Foundation, USA Banavar Sridhar : NASA-Ames Research Center, USA Andres Galvez : ESA-ESTEC, The Netherlands William Glascoe : OSD-National Security Space Office, USA Richard DalBello : Intelsat Generation Corp., USA

The Arsenault Family Foundation

The International Association for the Advancement of Space

Safety

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________________________________________ Authors

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________________________________________ Abstract

Space is no longer the vast emptiness that is was at the birth of the space age in 1957. Orbits are becoming congested as a result of an increase in the number of objects in space – both operational satellites and, most significantly, orbital space debris. Moreover, currently, it is not technologically feasible to remove debris from orbit. This report focuses on space traffic rules which would reduce the probability of debris-causing collisions and thus enable space activity to continue to increase more efficiently for all actors. Three key orbital zones were identified as near-term problem areas for space traffic: sun-synchronous orbits (SSO), geo-stationary orbits (GEO) and orbits used by human-rated spacecraft. Taking into account the unique applications of these orbits, key rules have been developed to address orbit-specific problems, as well as rules for collision avoidance maneuvers for all orbits. This report on Space Traffic Management (STM) uses the IAA Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management as a starting point, and tackles several of its key recommendations. This was accomplished by an interdisciplinary team effort that integrates the technical, policy, law, and business management aspects of STM. From the outset, the aim of this report was to assess the extent of the problem of space traffic and, once this extent was established, develop effective measures to manage this. The report recommends a set of eleven technical traffic rules and two environmental rules as a basis for a long-term solution. These rules take into account current political and legal realities and are contextualized within the structure of an international system for space traffic management. The report lays out a path for the optimization and adoption of these rules utilizing existing organizations, specifically IADC and UNCOPUOS and recommends the creation of a new organization, the International Space traffic Management Organization (ISMO), as the appropriate body to manage space traffic management operations.

It is believed that this report is a step forward in understanding and dealing with the complex issue of space traffic and its consequences. Although the set of rules is not definitive, they are a starting point that lays the foundations for future analysis and the creation of realistic and appropriate solutions to the predicted increase in space traffic in years to come. Raising awareness of the space traffic problem must happen soon because if the issue of the growing use of limited orbital resources is not dealt with in its nascent form, the long-term effects and technological challenges are predicted to be formidable.


© International Space University. All Rights Reserved. vii

________________________________ Faculty Preface

The 2007 International Space University (ISU) Summer Session Program (SSP) was held during July and August in Beijing, China, at the Beihang University campus. The SSP brought together graduate students and space professionals from all over the world and immersed them in an intensive nine-week, interdisciplinary, intercultural and international curriculum of lectures, workshops, site visits and research.

A key component of every SSP is the Team Project in which the students produce a space research project on a topic of international relevance. In 2007, four different Team Projects were undertaken. This report contains the findings of one of them: Space Traffic Management, a project to design a first iteration of a system of rules and management for space traffic in Earth orbit, with the aim of enabling the future efficient use of space.

The team consisted of thirty people from seventeen countries (Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, the UK and the USA) and six continents. The project was supported by space experts from around the world, both inside and outside the ISU community.

The objectives of the project were to provide:

• A proposed set of technically viable STM rules

• The engineering analysis on the feasibility of implementation of these rules

• An overview of the policy and legal implication of these rules

• A proposed system to manage the implementation of these rules

The team was asked to identify and evaluate the design of a space traffic management system; produce a report that can influence future international planning and execution of such a system; and provide experience in a multidisciplinary teamwork environment, under pressure of limited time and resources.

During the project, the team researched the existing STM rules and literature on proposed future rules. They then modeled the propagation of debris and satellites and performed a series of collision analyses. This formed the basic knowledge which enabled them to propose a set of rules of space traffic that are technically viable. The team then analyzed the engineering means to implement such a system, including the constraint of using only freely available space surveillance data, the legal and policy options, the design of a management system and the plan for outreach of the results to the space community and public.

The STM system proposed cannot be considered final nor complete. However, notwithstanding the need for considerable further optimization, the resulting system design can be considered a first comprehensive system of STM rules that have been analyzed for technical viability, as well as the associated management systems for those rules.

On behalf of the faculty, shepherds and teaching associate, I am pleased to commend both the team and its report to you. We highly recommend that the study be assessed by space experts, space agencies and international fora, and considered as a first iteration on a path to a fully STM scheme that, once optimized, will enable the efficient use of the space domain in the years to come.

The team was fortunate to have an excellent mix of skills and the group self organized efficiently: a combination that enabled the project to go into some considerable depth given the tight time limitations. It has indeed been a great pleasure to work on this project with such a professional, smart and dedicated team.

William Marshall, Ph.D.

NASA-Ames Research Center

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________________________________ Student Preface

Space Traffic Management has potentially far-reaching effects and significant importance for the continued use of space. As such, we believe that it could very well become a reality within our lifetimes. Laying the foundation for the creation of a Space Traffic Management system has required an analysis of complex technical, political and operational challenges. This report is result of that process and we are excited to share its findings which we consider to be of sound practical value.

As is the case with all ISU team projects, the scope of this project was truly intercultural, international and interdisciplinary. It is our collective hope that the extraordinary effort put forth by all participants in the creation of this report is fully reflected in its quality, coherence and presentation. We intend to communicate our ideas to as broad an audience as possible and we look forward to a long and fruitful dialogue.

We cannot conclude our remarks herein without extending appreciation to the faculty and staff of ISU. Without the wisdom and insight of our shepherd, Lucy Stojak, we would have struggled to outline the concrete objectives of our project. We would not have been able to conduct our analyses or define the full scope of our effort without the depth of knowledge or embedded involvement of our co-chair, William Marshall. Special thanks also go to our teaching associate Incigul Polat Erdogan for her continued encouragement and to Wang Ting for his assistance with critical calculations contained in this report. Lastly, we like to express our appreciation and gratitude for the support of the rest of our ISU friends and colleagues.

Team Traffic

Beijing 2007

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______________________________ Table of Contents

1 SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT ................................................................ 6

1.1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 6

1.2 DEFINING THE PROBLEM.......................................................................................... 6

1.3 ANALOGIES WITH OTHER DOMAINS......................................................................... 7

1.4 CURRENT SITUATION ............................................................................................... 9

1.5 TECHNICAL ASSUMPTIONS..................................................................................... 11

1.6 EXISTING STM MEASURES.................................................................................... 12

1.6.1 General Principles of International Space Law......................... 12

1.6.2 International Regulations and Soft Law ..................................... 13

1.6.3 The Role of National Laws........................................................... 14

2 RATIONALE FOR ENGAGEMENT WITH SPACE TRAFFIC

MANAGEMENT .................................................................................................................. 15

2.1 MAKING THE ARGUMENT........................................................................................ 15

2.2 SUPPORTING THE ARGUMENT ............................................................................... 15

2.3 MOVING FORWARD................................................................................................. 16

3 SPACE TRAFFIC RULES............................................................................... 17

3.1 RULES CONCEPT .................................................................................................... 17

3.2 COLLISION AVOIDANCE .......................................................................................... 17

3.2.1 Method ............................................................................................ 17

3.2.2 Conjunction Assessment.............................................................. 17

3.2.3 Collision Avoidance Maneuvers .................................................. 18

3.2.4 The Effect of Data Accuracy ........................................................ 19

3.2.5 Rule I and II .................................................................................... 21

3.2.6 Rule III and IV ................................................................................ 21

3.3 SUN-SYNCHRONOUS ORBIT (SSO) ZONING ........................................................ 22

3.3.1 Background .................................................................................... 22

3.3.2 The Problem................................................................................... 23

3.3.3 Rule V.............................................................................................. 26

3.4 GEOSTATIONARY MANEUVERS............................................................................... 28

3.4.1 Background .................................................................................... 28

3.4.2 Issue: Station Keeping Maneuvers ............................................. 28

3.4.3 Rule VI ............................................................................................ 29

3.4.4 Rule VII and Rule VIII ................................................................... 30

3.4.5 Issue: Relocation and station acquisition Maneuvers.............. 31

3.4.6 Rule IX ............................................................................................ 31

3.5 THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN-RATED SPACECRAFT ............................................ 32

3.5.1 The Problem................................................................................... 33

3.5.2 Rule X.............................................................................................. 33

3.5.3 Rule XI ............................................................................................ 34

3.6 ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................... 35

3.6.1 Issues Affecting the Space Environment ................................... 35

3.6.2 Environmental Rules & Recommendations............................... 37

3.6.3 Economics of Space Environment Protection........................... 39

3.7 FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS....................................................................................... 39

3.7.1 New Classes of Small Satellites.................................................. 39

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3.7.2 Radio Frequency Identification ....................................................39

3.7.3 Auto-maneuver for Satellites without Constant TT&C .............40

3.7.4 GEO Graveyard Orbit ...................................................................40

3.7.5 De-orbit Zones ...............................................................................41

4 IMPLEMENTATION OF SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT.................42

4.1 A VISION FOR A MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ...............................................................42

4.2 OPTIONS ASSESSMENT ..........................................................................................43

4.2.1 UNCOPUOS...................................................................................43

4.2.2 ITU ...................................................................................................44

4.2.3 IADC ................................................................................................44

4.2.4 ICAO ................................................................................................45

4.2.5 New Organization ..........................................................................45

4.3 ANALYSIS AND DIRECTION .....................................................................................46

4.3.1 STM System Phases.....................................................................46

4.4 PROPOSED SYSTEM ...............................................................................................47

4.4.1 Role of IADC ..................................................................................47

4.4.2 Role of UNCOPUOS .....................................................................48

4.4.3 ISMO Strategies and Structure ...................................................48

4.4.4 Industry Response to STM...........................................................51

4.4.5 ISMO Challenges...........................................................................52

4.4.6 A Roadmap.....................................................................................53

4.5 CONCLUSIONS ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE STM SYSTEM .............................53

5 LEGAL ISSUES.................................................................................................54

5.1 EXISTING AVENUES FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN STM.....................................54

5.1.1 International Court of Justice .......................................................54

5.1.2 Dispute Resolution under the International Telecommunications Union..........................................................55

5.1.3 Dispute Resolution in Air Law......................................................55

5.1.4 Compensation under Liability Convention .................................56

5.1.5 World Trade Organization Dispute Resolution System ...........56

5.1.6 Other Commercial Arbitration Systems......................................56

5.1.7 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ...56

5.1.8 Dispute Resolution under Private International law ................56

5.1.9 National Courts and other Dispute Resolution Institutions......57

5.1.10 Recommendations for Dispute Resolution in STM ..................57

5.2 COMPENSATION AND INDEMNIFICATION ................................................................57

5.2.1 Maneuver ........................................................................................58

5.2.2 International Air and Sea Law .....................................................58

5.2.3 No compensation...........................................................................58

5.2.4 Compensation ................................................................................59

5.2.5 Options and Recommendations for Compensation .................59

5.3 COLLISION ...............................................................................................................60

5.3.1 Indemnification of Collision Regarding the Liability Convention......................................................................................60

5.3.2 Indemnification of collision regarding to the space insurance system...........................................................................61

5.4 CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................61

6 OUTREACH PROGRAM ................................................................................63

6.1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................63

6.2 SPACE COMMUNITY AWARENESS PLAN................................................................63


© International Space University. All Rights Reserved. 3

6.2.1 Agencies ......................................................................................... 63

6.2.2 Present Papers and Posters at Conferences............................ 63

6.2.3 Journals .......................................................................................... 64

6.2.4 Orbital Footprinting........................................................................ 64

6.2.5 Courses in the Workplace ............................................................ 64

6.3 PUBLIC AWARENESS PLAN .................................................................................... 64

6.3.1 Eco-Footprinting ............................................................................ 64

6.3.2 Press Release................................................................................ 65

6.3.3 Wiki .................................................................................................. 65

6.3.4 Education........................................................................................ 65

6.3.5 Civil Society STM Advocacy ........................................................ 65

6.3.6 Naming Debris ............................................................................... 65

6.3.7 Public Events ................................................................................. 66

6.3.8 Information, Education and Communication Materials ............ 66

6.4 GOALS..................................................................................................................... 66

6.4.1 Near term (0-5years)..................................................................... 66

6.4.2 Medium term (5-10 years)............................................................ 66

6.4.3 Long term (10+ years) .................................................................. 66

7 LIMITATIONS.................................................................................................. 67

8 CONCLUSION.................................................................................................. 68

9 REFERENCES .................................................................................................. 69

10 APPENDIX A: THE RULES............................................................................ 72

11 APPENDIX B: SIMULATION REPORT....................................................... 75

12 APPENDIX C: PROPOSED ‘SPACE TRAFFIC ARBITRATION

COMMISSION’ .................................................................................................................... 78

13 APPENDIX D: DEFINITIONS........................................................................ 79

14 APPENDIX E: LIST OF ACRONYMS .......................................................... 80

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_________________________________ Index of Figures

Figure 1-1: Orbital Lifetime as a Function of Altitude (Jehn 2007) ................................... 8 Figure 1-2: Catalog Data of August 2007 and Active Satellites (2006).............................. 9 Figure 1-3: Cataloged Space Objects and Calculated Conjunctions ................................. 10 Figure 1-4: Relative Velocity for Calculated Conjunctions.............................................. 11 Figure 3-1: Conjunctions for Active Satellites for Various Warning Box Sizes............... 19 Figure 3-2: Avoidance Maneuver Costs for Various Warning Box Sizes ........................ 20 Figure 3-3: SSO as a Function of Inclination and Altitude (Boain 2004)......................... 23 Figure 3-4: RGT-SSO as a Function of Altitude. Fixed altitudes are shown.................... 23 Figure 3-5: All Catalog (Aug 2007) Space Objects in SSO by Inclination....................... 24 Figure 3-6: All Catalog (Aug 2007) Space Objects in SSO by Altitude........................... 24 Figure 3-7: All Operational Satellites in SSO by Inclination............................................ 25 Figure 3-8: All Operational Satellites in SSO by Altitude................................................ 25 Figure 3-9: One Band of SSO Orbits ................................................................................ 26 Figure 3-10: All 42 Zoning Bands Spaced in Right Ascension ........................................ 27 Figure 3-11: GEO Station Keeping Boxes........................................................................ 29 Figure 3-12: GEO Maneuver zone for Relocations........................................................... 31 Figure 3-13: Lower Van Allen Radiation Belts and South Atlantic Anomaly.................. 32 Figure 3-14: All Space Objects >10cm in size Below 500 km By Launch Date .............. 33 Figure 4-2: Envisaged ISMO Planned Launch Operations Management ......................... 49 Figure 4-3: STM Roadmap ............................................................................................... 53 Figure 11-3: Comparison of Mr. Wang’s Calculations with SOCRATES ....................... 77



_________________________________ Index of Tables

Table 3-1: Collision Avoidance Alert Levels ................................................................... 18 Table 4-1: STM Phase Management................................................................................. 46 Table 4-2: STM Operational Cost Estimate...................................................................... 50

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______________________________________ Chapter 1

1 Space Traffic Management

1.1 Introduction A turning point is fast being reached in space developments. Humanity’s engagement with space is moving from a period of reckless utilization to a time when consequences for past and present actions are catching up with us. Such a consequence is the predicted increase in space traffic, which is surmised to cause a potential decrease in the utility of Earth orbits. The intention of this report is to examine the problem of space traffic, to assess its extent and to develop solutions to mitigate its effects in order to make recommendations to safeguard humanity’s future safe endeavors.

1.2 Defining the Problem The Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management defines space traffic management as follows:

“Space traffic management means the set of technical and regulatory provisions for promoting safe access into outer space, operations in outer space and return from outer space to Earth free from physical or radio-frequency interference” (COSMIC, 2006).

Hence, the purpose of space traffic management is to provide an appropriate set of guidelines for space activities to be conducted without harmful interference. The report states that:

“…conceptualizing space traffic management will turn out to become a relevant task during the next two decades. Space traffic management however, will limit the freedom of use of outer space. Therefore an international consensus on internationally binding regulations will only be achieved, if States identify certain urgency and expect a specific as well as collective benefit – including an economic benefit - from this” (COSMIC, 2006).

The report outlines first steps and directs decision makers in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to approach specific problems. These organizations are the building blocks for a future space traffic management regime.

A key issue raised by the Cosmic Study is the growing number of space objects, most of which are debris. Operational satellites account for less than 10% of all space objects that are tracked. Other issues include the difficulty in tracking small objects less than 10 cm, and the challenges of accurately predicting the future positions (errors grow with the square of the prediction time interval) of tracked objects due to various limitations in tracking data and trajectory modeling.

The Cosmic Study recommends establishing an international inter-governmental agreement that would contain three parts: (1) securing information needs for data on trajectories and radio frequencies, (2) notifying of launch, spacecraft operational lifetime, and de-orbiting plans, and, (3) developing traffic management rules that include, among other things, the



right-of-way rules for collision avoidance maneuvers and zoning for orbit selection. First steps for improving the traffic situation in space are to establish a common data policy and infrastructure for space surveillance and collision avoidance, and to establish enforcement mechanisms for obligatory notification and registration. Further research is recommended in both the technical and regulatory fields.

This report on Space Traffic Management (STM) uses the Cosmic Study as a starting point, and tackles several of its key recommendations. This was accomplished by an interdisciplinary team effort that integrates the technical, policy/law and business management aspects of STM.

1.3 Analogies with Other Domains

Imagine that you are in a car driving around any major city in the world. You have a Global Positioning System (GPS) unit installed in your dash and it tells you exactly where you are and where the roads are. This is a very good thing because all the windows on your car are blacked out and you cannot see anything except what the GPS unit tells you. Even if you could see outside, the roads lack signal lights, traffic signs, and lanes. Driving around the same city are 100 other cars, all with GPS units with their windows blacked out. To complicate the matter further, there are also 1,000 unmanned cars driving around on autopilot.

Given the above situation, would one feel safe in knowing that the chances of colliding with another car are one in a million? If the answer is yes, at what probability would one start to be concerned? What if the scenario described above also lacked a legal system to decide who was at fault for a collision and lacked a court in which you could seek restitution in if you were injured?

The above scenario is only an approximate analogy of the current situation regarding space traffic. Surface traffic (ground and water) and space traffic are not completely analogous and we cannot simply copy existing surface management systems and apply them to space. There are several important factors that are unique to space traffic. Most of these stem from orbital mechanics - the laws of physics that dictate how objects move in space.

The biggest difference between surface traffic and space traffic is velocity. The velocity of a vehicle on the Earth's surface (land or water) is almost always controllable by the operator and the operator can slow down, speed up, or even stop. In space, velocity is not a variable. The altitude at which one wants a satellite to orbit dictates the speed at which it must travel. For the Shuttle orbiting at 300 km above the surface of the Earth, this is approximately 7.7 km/s and for an object in the geostationary belt at 36,000 km altitude it is 3.07 km/s. If the Shuttle moved faster or slower it would move to a lower or higher orbit. If it stopped completely the Earth's gravity would pull it back into the atmosphere.

The second major difference between traffic on the surface of the Earth and traffic in space is the area over which it is spread. Traffic on the surface of the Earth is confined to an area approximately 511 million sq km as defined by the surface of a sphere with the Earth's radius. Traffic in Earth orbit occupies a much larger area – around 194 trillion cubic km, calculated using the volume of a sphere with a radius of 36,000 km and subtracting out the volume of the Earth and space below 150 km.

The vastness of the space traffic volume and velocity of space objects have three major impacts on any STM system. The first is that it makes it practically impossible to watch the entire area all of the time. Surveillance of space is usually done from the ground with large radar antenna and optical telescopes, but even those cannot watch everything in space all the time. Any feasible tracking operation is limited to periodic checks to see where an object is and then generating a prediction of where it will be in the future. Revisit rates to update the

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position are limited by the number of sensors and the total number of objects. Typically this results in positional updates ranging from a few hours, for very important objects, to days for tiny, hard to track pieces of debris.

The second impact affects vehicle control. When piloting a vehicle, there are two main concepts that are used to explain where the information used to make control systems comes from. These are Visual Flight Rules (VFR) and Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). VFR is used when the human senses are the primary sensor providing information used to make control decisions. IFR is used when instruments are providing this information. In automobile traffic, the majority of piloting and control is still done using the human senses - VFR. In the air traffic world both VFR and IFR are used, and a pilot must undergo specific licensing and training for both. Except for a limited number of operations that involve deliberate docking with another object, there is no VFR in space. Almost everything has to be done with sensors and computers, at speeds and distances greater than anything involved in surface traffic. These speeds and distances are so great that in most cases the human sensory and reaction system simply cannot cope. Due to these circumstances, the majority of STM operations involve trying to predict where objects will be in the future to allow humans time to make the decision, command the maneuver and allow time for the maneuver to change the object's position.

The third major difference is how long objects stay in the traffic areas. On Earth, if there is an accident it is usually only a matter of minutes or hours before all the pieces are cleared up and the vehicles involved in the collision are removed from the traffic lanes. While this may cause temporary disruption, usually there are few long-term effects. In space, it is a different matter since in space there is practically no resistance and at the velocities of spacecraft collision events are such that the debris fragments maintain most of that speed after a collision. This means that most of the pieces from a collision stay in orbit around the Earth creating a cloud of debris. On Earth, this would mean that every time there was a collision between two cars at 40 km/hr all the pieces from that collision kept traveling on the same roads between 35 km/hr and 45 km/hr.

Figure 1-1: Orbital Lifetime as a Function of Altitude (Jehn 2007)



Not everything stays in orbit forever; some objects do re-enter the atmosphere and are removed from space. The time it takes for an object to re-enter can be determined solely from its altitude as shown in Figure 1-1. An object at an altitude of 400 km will re-enter in a matter of months whereas an object above 2,500 km will re-enter in thousands of years. On human timescales, objects above 1,000 km will remain in orbit practically forever. This is very important for STM; it means that every time there is a collision between two objects, hundreds to thousands of additional objects could be created and the majority will remain in orbit for a long time. This increase in the number of objects heightens the chances of another collision. Without control, the system acts as a self-reinforcing cycle which will eventually lead to very high collision rates and certain orbits becoming unusable.

1.4 Current Situation As of August 2007, there were over 12,000 space objects (larger than 10 cm in LEO and larger than 1 meter in GEO) being tracked by the United States Strategic Command (Space-Track, 2007). These space objects include approximately 800 operational satellites and the rest are space debris (e.g., dead satellites, spent rocket stages, fragments from explosions). Figure 1-2 shows two key orbital parameters, altitude and inclination, for all tracked space objects. The operational satellites are also indicated. The catalog numbers of operational satellites were based on a database provided by Dr. Jonathan McDowell. (McDowell, 2007)

Figure 1-2: Catalog Data of August 2007 and Active Satellites (2006)

A 24 hour conjunction analysis was performed by propagating the orbital elements forward in time, and then determining if any space object entered a box-shaped zone around each operational spacecraft. The primary dimension of the box is in the along-track dimension (i.e. the direction in which a space object is traveling), and the other two dimensions are scaled by a factor of 1/5. For example, a 25 km box around a satellite corresponds to a zone that extends +/-25 km in the along-track direction, +/-5 km in the radial direction, and +/-5 km in the direction normal to the orbital plane. Figure 1-3 displays 852 conjunctions determined using the process described above, superimposed on the tracked space objects data presented in Figure 1-2.

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The conjunctions data was provided by Mr. Wang Ting, a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics at Beihang University, Beijing, China. This was further verified by comparison to other papers and to an independent analysis using Satellite Tool Kit (STK). These four data points agreed with one another on the conjunction rate within an order of magnitude as outlined in Appendix B: Simulation Report. It can be seen that most of the conjunctions are in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and many of them occur at inclinations corresponding to Sun-Synchronous Orbits. For GEO, the number of conjunctions was significantly less. However, the GEO ring is getting more and more populated with about 10 new satellites per year. These new satellites have increased mission lifetime due to strong advances in propulsion technology, and in the past 5 years only 30 % of the geostationary satellites have been properly de-orbited to the graveyard orbit according to the recommended IADC guidelines (Jehn, 2004).

Figure 1-3: Cataloged Space Objects and Calculated Conjunctions

Further analysis of the data shows that over 40% of the conjunctions involve relative speeds in excess of 12 km/s, as shown in Figure 1-4. Noting that orbital speeds in LEO are roughly 8 km/s, it follows that these are high-energy conjunctions with nearly opposing (head-on) velocity vectors.



Figure 1-4: Relative Velocity for Calculated Conjunctions

If these conjunctions have very small “miss” distances, comparable to the dimensions of a satellite, a collision will presumably result and the satellite will likely be destroyed. A high-energy collision will create a large amount of debris from the destroyed satellite, and this debris may, at a later time, collide with other space objects creating more debris. As the number of space objects increases, the probability of a collision will also increase (approximately in proportion to the square of the number of space objects), and may eventually render some high-density orbital regions unusable. Hence, actions must be taken to reduce the growth of the amount of space debris. Later in this report, we propose traffic rules for future spacecraft launched to LEO, GEO and SSO. These rules will protect human-rated craft, protect regions of high-density operational satellites, and minimize further debris in trouble areas.

1.5 Technical Assumptions While every effort was taken by the authors to conduct a thorough analysis in the time allotted, certain assumptions were made in the process:

• In the near-term, removal of existing space debris from orbit is not technically feasible.

• Launch rates will continue at or above their present-day levels.

• Launch costs per kg to LEO are an average of all boosters currently in usage as outlined in the 2002 Futron study.

• Satellite catalog data was obtained from STK 8.0.2 and was last updated in August 2007.

• The number of operational satellites used in this report are based on data provided by Dr. Jonathan McDowell.

• The upper limit for tracking accuracy is the value currently achievable by existing owner-operator methods.

• The lower limit for tracking accuracy is that of publicly available Two-Line Elements (TLEs).

• All proposed zoning rules will apply to future spacecraft and all current spacecraft will be exempted.

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1.6 Existing STM Measures Any new regulatory system related to space activities, like an STM regime, must take into account the broad spectrum of existing principles, norms and regulations the international community has elaborated for the utilization of outer space.

The basic legal principles related to outer space have been conceived and formalized through the five Treaties negotiated within the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS). Furthermore, five resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) related to space have provided supplementary recommendations or described a common understanding of previously established principles. Additionally, in June 2007, the UNCOPUOS, in its sixty-second session, endorsed Debris Mitigation Guidelines that were based on those developed by the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC). It was recommended that the UNGA adopt the Guidelines in December 2007 during their next sitting. Since the late 1990s, the UNCOPUOS has not passed any treaty relating to STM, and like all the UNGA resolutions, the IADC guidelines are non-binding (UNCOPUOS, 2007).

The five United Nations Treaties still represent the formal legal backbone for outer space activities and the basic principles they articulate constitute the basis for all provisions and regulations that have been elaborated further.

Outside the UNCOPUOS, other international fora like the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), through its frequency regulations and the IADC, provide avenues where STM issues can be addressed. International customary law remains applicable where the norms (e.g. principle of good faith, pacta sunt servanda) relevant to STM have been practiced over a period of time. In addition, certain States perform conjunction assessment for a limited number of spacecraft.

Therefore, different levels of the current legal and regulatory framework for space activities can be detailed as:

• International space law strictu senso (“the Treaties”)

• International regulations and/or soft law

• Effects of national space laws on international space activities.

In this framework, as suggested by the “Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management”, some rules can be identified as existing elements for the management of space traffic (COSMIC, 2006).

1.6.1 General Principles of International Space Law

The Outer Space Treaty (OST) establishes common principles on space utilization while the four other space Treaties deal with more specific issues. Since the scope of this project is currently limited to Earth’s orbits, provisions concerning the Moon and other celestial bodies are not analyzed.

A first group of provisions of the OST, related to STM, defines the legal status of outer space:

• Exploration and use of outer space for the benefit and in the interests of all countries (outer space as the “province of all mankind”, OST art. I)

• Freedom of access and use of outer space by all States (OST art. I)

• Non appropriation of outer space, forbidding any national appropriation by claim of sovereignty (OST art. II)

• The use of outer space for peaceful purposes (OST introduction and art. IV, inter alia)

• Promotion of international cooperation (OST art III, art X, inter alia).



Outer space’s legal status provides the framework for more specific norms related to STM:

• The principle for which the State shall be responsible for national space activities whether carried out by governmental or non-governmental entities (OST art VI), and will retain jurisdiction and control over its registered space objects (ownership of objects launched in outer space is not affected by their presence in outer space, OST art VIII and further developed by the Registration Convention of 1975)

• States are liable for damages caused by their space objects on the Earth, in air space and in outer space (OST art VII and further developed by the Liability Convention of 1975)

• States conducting activities in outer space agree to inform the Secretary-General of the UN as well as the public and the international scientific community of the nature, conduct, locations and results of such activities (OST art. XI and further developed by the Registration Convention of 1975)

• The principle that all orbits are a limited natural resource (ITU Constitution, art 44.2). It should be noted that the ITU Constitution initially only considered GEO as a limited natural resource. The Constitution was amended in 1998 to include all Earth orbits

• The recognition of astronauts as "envoys of mankind" (OST art. V and further developed by the Astronauts Agreements of 1968).

As shown by the principles listed above, current international space law does not impede the creation of a specific regime for space traffic. On the contrary, these provisions give some basic elements of a space traffic management plan (e.g. registration of space objects is a necessary step, even if not sufficient, in order to identify liability for damages caused by these same space objects) that can represent the foundations “for a more precise regulation to ensure safety and proper implementation” (COSMIC, 2006).

However, even if international space law provides principles and some basic regulations for space activities, the lack of enforcement measures reduces their efficiency. For instance, objects launched into space are not systematically registered by their owners (e.g. some military satellites). In addition, the actual purpose of a space mission can not be verified.

1.6.2 International Regulations and Soft Law

In addition to international space law, some international organizations, whose mandates are not limited to or not explicitly addressing space activities, play a role in regulating space related issues that are relevant to space traffic.

International Telecommunications Union (ITU):

The UN technical agency in charge of international coordination for telecommunication, ITU, is the regulatory body for satellites, in terms of allocation of transmission frequencies and orbital slots in the geostationary orbit (GEO). In order to avoid physical and radio-frequency interference in GEO, the international community, through the ITU, has set up a specific regime based on the principles of space law (see above) and on the criteria of equitable access to the limited resources that Earth’s orbits and radio-frequencies represent.

Based on the rule of “first come, first served,” the ITU allocation system has shown that an international regime can succeed when the international community perceives an urgent and common necessity.

Even if limited to GEO, the ITU’s regulatory framework provides concrete provisions in terms of space traffic management. Some other effective rules come from the inclusion of satellite telecommunications in the global trade domain. In this way, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has set a framework, even if limited, for an open market and dispute settlement in the sector of space telecommunication.

A different framework is constituted by those fora which, in the last twenty years, have gathered representatives from the main national space agencies. Mainly treating technical

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aspects of space activities, these entities do not have the political role that intergovernmental organizations can generally ensure. Therefore, such fora cannot produce binding agreements but recommendations that have, in general, a technical nature or coordination purpose. However, these recommendations are usually supported by the strong authority (in terms of expertise and national public role) brought in by the member agencies, and earn a status of reference in their domains that can become a commonly accepted rule (soft-law).

Inter-Agency Debris Coordination Committee (IADC):

A very special role, in relation to Space Traffic Management, has been played by the IADC. Composed of the main national space agencies, the IADC has recommended a set of agreed measures for the mitigation of space debris. These Guidelines, after some modifications, were made in order to be considered receivable by all the member States of the UNCOPUOS. They have been approved by the UNCOPUOS Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee in early 2007, approved in June 2007 by the plenary session of UNCOPUOS, and will likely become a resolution of the UNGA before the end of 2007.

Some provisions have a direct impact on the space environment (for example the prevention of on-orbit break-ups or of debris released during the operation of launch) and produce positive indirect effects on space traffic in trying to reduce hazards in space.

On the other hand, some other elements of these Guidelines have direct implications on space traffic like the removal of spacecraft at the end of operations or that of orbital stages from the orbit regions intensively used. For these purposes, the Guidelines set specific standards in order to free occupied orbits and establish disposal zones; they also set requirements for information in the case of controlled re-entry.

These Guidelines are applicable on a voluntary basis to mission planning, spacecraft design and operations and to rocket stages that will be launched into space by the organizations that have endorsed them. They only have the status of non-binding soft law but they nevertheless set forth a potential basis for specific elements of a space traffic management system.

1.6.3 The Role of National Laws

With the emergence of private actors in the space field (satellite telecommunications operators, space tourism companies, etc.) a growing number of States, even if still limited to less than twenty, have felt the need to elaborate national regulations for space activities. It is possible that States may adopt instruments such as the IADC guidelines thus making them nationally binding. This demonstrates the potential value of national law as a potential forum for stricter regulation of space activities.

The main concern leading to the creation of national space laws essentially comes from the risk connected to the international responsibility a State bears for all (governmental or private) activities carried by national entities in outer space (OST, art VI). In general, existing national laws deal with the safety of space activities (in order to reduce the risk of national liability), collision avoidance, information on space operations and prevention of environmental pollution.

Even if national space laws can provide useful inputs, the international nature of outer space activities will require international regulations for a space traffic management regime if the latter is to be implemented. Since only 98 States (UNCOPUOS, 2007) are party to the OST and most of them do not have national regulations for space activities, some private space actors could feasibly operate in space free from any international or national law. In the most common case, harmonization of space laws will have to be supported in order to avoid phenomena of competition between countries to attract private operators through more convenient regulations (“flags of convenience”).



______________________________________Chapter 2

2 Rationale for Engagement with


2.1 Making the Argument The utilization of space over the past 50 years has led to a point where Earth orbits, especially SSO and GEO, are becoming ever more congested. As the space sector continues to expand, so will orbital congestion. In addition, the orbital debris population is predicted to increase, further worsening the situation. It is assumed that at a certain point it will become infeasible to utilize specific orbits, either because of an actual collision, or series of collisions, or because the probability of collision will be so high as to require continual orbital maneuvers (meaning limited time on orbit).

The assurance of continued utilization of orbital resources in and of itself is a part of the case for both governmental and non-governmental spacecraft owner-operator engagement with a space traffic management concept. For governments, the limited utilization of space would have an impact on any one of several civil space applications, from weather monitoring and prediction, to science and human spaceflight, as well all space-based national security and military activities. For industry, the financial implications of limited opportunities in space are equally compelling. According to the Satellite Industry Association (SIA), world satellite industry revenues have averaged annual growth of 6.7% for the period 2000-2005. In 2005, the world satellite industry revenue was $88.8 billion, of which $52.8 billion was revenue generated from satellite services (SIA, 2006). It is not clear what the financial magnitude of degraded orbital utility would be, in terms of industry revenues and profits, but it is reasonable to assume that the impact would not be marginal. In addition, the risk of spacecraft collisions increases as the number of space objects increases. As this risk increases, it is reasonable to assume that the cost of satellite insurance will also increase. Taken in total, the potential impact to government and industry should be sufficient to warrant public and private sector engagement with some means of doing space traffic management.

2.2 Supporting the Argument

Unfortunately, due to both time and facility constraints, this report cannot present the detailed analytical assessment required to test the hypotheses implicit in the paragraphs above. In principle, such an analysis would aim to answer these two simple questions:

1. When does an orbit become physically unusable (in terms of the probability of a loss of a spacecraft)?

2. When does an orbit become economically unviable for spacecraft utilization?

In practice, these questions are quite complex to answer. First, one must make a number of assumptions about the growth, or lack there of, of space activity and orbital utilization.

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Simulations must be carried out to calculate the probability of collisions over time, and how that probability distribution changes depending on what mitigation measures are employed. An assessment of the cost of losing a satellite as a result of a collision must be conducted, and one must calculate how the potential cost of mitigating that loss changes as different mitigation measures are employed. There is no one single cost figure to be calculated here; governments and industry must coordinate on the definition of several cost metrics in order to fully account for impact of potential STM system. These lay the foundations for a detailed analytical evaluation of whether the implementation of a STM system will, in fact, significantly prolong the useful life of key Earth orbits and whether it can be shown that there is a clear economic impact caused by the rise in space traffic.

2.3 Moving Forward Even without conducting the analysis identified in Section 2.2 it is reasonable to assume that, in time, a space traffic management system will prove its value in both economic and technical terms. This report moves forward based on that assumption, and on the assumption that the argument offered in Section 2.1 is sufficient to convince the reader that the effort to define, for the first time, a real space traffic management system has merit unto itself.



______________________________________Chapter 3

3 Space Traffic Rules

3.1 Rules Concept The purpose of the proposed traffic rules in this report is to provide a strong foundation covering the areas of immediate concern. Future analyses should iterate these rules into a more refined state and develop additional rules to cover the remaining issues.

3.2 Collision Avoidance

3.2.1 Method

The conjunction analysis and collision avoidance results in this report were derived from custom conjunction assessment software written by Mr. Wang Ting. Mr. Wang is a PhD candidate in astrophysics at Beihang University in Beijing, China. Satellite Took Kit (STK) Version 8.0.2 provided by Analytical Graphics, Inc. was also used for certain simulations and to check Mr. Wang's software. Unless otherwise stated, all charts and statistics shown in this section were generated from the raw satellite catalog data retrieved from STK using the method outlined in Appendix B: Simulation Report.

3.2.2 Conjunction Assessment

There are two processes involved in preventing collisions: conjunction assessment and collision avoidance. Conjunction assessment is the process by which possible future collisions are predicted. Collision avoidance is the maneuver performed by the spacecraft to prevent collision. Any STM system will have to provide both functions for efficient management of traffic.

The conjunction calculation is done by first obtaining the element sets for all the operational satellites (primary objects) and all other objects in the satellite catalog (secondary objects). Boxes of various sizes are placed around the primaries to indicate warning and maneuver thresholds. The trajectories are then propagated forward for a set period of time, usually a few days. The resulting ephemeris is compared between all primary objects and all secondary objects to determine which objects come within a critical distance as determined by the boxes.

The accuracy of the estimation of the closest approach (miss-distance) depends mainly on three factors: the precision of the data, the accuracy of the propagation models, and how early the predictions are carried out. Closest approaches need to be calculated for all the cataloged objects with respect to each other. Highly accurate prediction methods require more resources in terms of equipment, time, and effort.

During the warning step, the prediction models used usually sacrifice some accuracy for speed. The precision of the calculation is also hampered by the temporal distance between epoch and the conjunction. The objects predicted to enter the warning boxes are reassessed in closer intervals of time using more accurate algorithms and are checked against a maneuver box, which is smaller than the warning box. However, the maneuver box is many

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times larger than the primary object in order to provide a safety margin since the locations of tracked space objects are not precisely known (Committee, 1997).

Some spacecraft operators already implement collision avoidance on some key assets. For example, for the Shuttle, NASA uses a defined “warning box” approximately 25 km along the track of the orbit (either leading or trailing), 5 km across the track of the orbit, and 5 km radially from the Earth. The estimated 10 to 30 objects per day that come within the warning box are reassessed using a more accurate algorithm to determine whether any come within a maneuver box of 5 km along track × 2 km across track × 2 km in the radial direction. If an object does come within these parameters, the Shuttle may initiate a maneuver to avoid collision (Klinkrad, 2005).

The actual probability of collision cannot be computed unless the error in the original position data is known for both the primary object and secondary object. This error data, usually in the form of a covariance matrix, can be used to calculate a probability distribution for both objects which give the probability of collision throughout the close approach (Klinkrad, 2005).

3.2.3 Collision Avoidance Maneuvers

When an intruding object is predicted to come within the maneuver box surrounding the spacecraft, an avoidance maneuver can be performed to change the spacecraft orbit. First the maneuver direction, magnitude, and time are determined so that the least amount of propellant is consumed while avoiding potential collisions within minimum distance margins. This calculation includes computational efficiencies within collision probability calculations using trajectory propagations as well as contour integrations and efficiencies in optimum avoidance maneuvering using gradient and searching computations (Patera, 2004).

In order to limit the amount of fuel consumed, the avoidance maneuver is initiated several orbits before the encounter event. Table 3-1 shows the different levels of alertness and the actions associated to these levels. Executing an avoidance maneuver modifies the operational orbit of the vehicle and may affect its mission objectives. One possible set of warning and maneuver boxes are summarized in the table below. They are partially derived from the rules currently used for human-occupied vehicles (Shuttle, Space Station) and a few high-cost, high-value spacecraft such as ESA's Envisat (Klinkrad, 2005).

Table 3-1: Collision Avoidance Alert Levels

Alert Level Time to Collision Actions Considered

Level 1: 1st Warning Box

10 - 20 orbits Conduct risk assessment and identify objects predicted to be in conjunction

Level 2: 2nd Warning Box

10 - 5 orbits Reevaluate risk assessment with higher fidelity tracking data and trajectory models

Level 3: Maneuver Box

4 orbits Identify avoidance maneuver for the selected maneuver box

Level 4 : Maneuver Action

< 3 orbits Execute avoidance maneuver

Once determined, the orbital maneuver is accomplished by applying thrust in a certain direction. For collision avoidance maneuvers, two types are usually considered: impulsive and non-impulsive.

An impulsive maneuver approximates a finite thrust maneuver by adding an instantaneous velocity change to a velocity in one or more directions while maintaining the position. The instantaneous changes in velocity are referred to as delta-V, and the total delta-V for all



maneuvers required in the mission is called a delta-V budget. Finite maneuvers like these are possible with high thrust-to-weight propulsion systems such as chemical rockets. Impulsive maneuver approximations remain very accurate even for long burns if conducted outside the Earth's atmosphere.

Non-impulsive maneuvers apply a low thrust over longer periods. They are less efficient due to the gravity losses. However those maneuvers can be the only option when highly efficient but low thrust-to-weight propulsion systems, such as ion engines, are used.

3.2.4 The Effect of Data Accuracy

To determine the effect of inaccurate data on collision avoidance simulated conjunctions for all operational satellites were run against all space objects for an appropriately sized warning box. The size of these warning boxes is inversely proportional to the accuracy of the surveillance data and the trajectory propagation models. Larger box sizes can compensate for uncertainties in the predicted positions of space objects, but this leads to more conjunctions and larger costs associated with avoidance maneuvers. Figure 3-1 below shows the number of conjunctions of operational satellites against all space objects over 24 hours for various warning box sizes. A geometrical-numerical algorithm was used to determine the conjunctions. This algorithm applied a geometric filter followed by a time filter, and then identified conjunctions based on a close approach function.

Figure 3-1: Conjunctions for Active Satellites for Various Warning Box Sizes

It can be seen that the number of conjunctions increases significantly with the size of the warning box. As the number of conjunctions grows, there is a corresponding increase in the effort and cost of implementing the collision monitoring and avoidance functions. This highlights the need for accurate surveillance data that enables the use of high-fidelity propagation models to predict the future positions of space objects.

As an example, Figure 3-2 below shows the cost of avoidance maneuvers over a 24-hr period for various maneuver box sizes. The starting point for the analysis is the number of conjunctions presented in Figure 3-1 above. The delta-V for the avoidance maneuvers is then computed. The least energetically costly maneuver in order to avoid the collision box is a small impulse burn at the perigee of the orbit along the velocity vector. The principle effect of this is that it changes the period of the orbit by a very small amount (order of a few seconds). This builds up linearly with the number of orbits, so that the spacecraft arrives at

20

the conjunction point at a slightly different time after completing an orbit. Equivalently, the spacecraft is displaced by a few kilometers (equal to the maneuver box size) in the along-track direction at the time when the intruding object arrives in the vicinity of its orbit. In this analysis, it is assumed that the impulse burn is executed three orbits prior to the conjunction time.

Using the rocket equation, the fuel mass fraction is calculated and multiplied by an average spacecraft mass of 1,000 kg to obtain the fuel mass for the avoidance maneuver. Finally, the maneuver cost (in terms of fuel use) is calculated by using an average cost of USD 5,000 for placing a 1 kg payload in orbit (Futron, 2002). The results are summarized in Figure 3-2 below.

Figure 3-2: Avoidance Maneuver Costs for Various Warning Box Sizes

The best possible positional accuracy for a satellite comes from a satellite owner-operator. They have access to not only the satellites internal guidance system but also the ranging and timing data from the periodic communication. For a satellite in LEO, an owner-operator can easily be able to determine its position to within 5m (Klinkrad et al, 2005) and for a satellite in GEO error is usually around 6 km (see section 3.4.3.1).

The worst level of positional accuracy comes from a third party using remote sensing means. Unfortunately, this is the only method of obtaining positional data on the 90% of objects that are not operational satellites. United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) provides basic trajectory information for most objects it can track which is the principle source of freely available data which enables one to implement a STM system today. However, it does not release the accuracy of the Two Line Element (TLE) catalog nor does it release the raw observational data that went into the creation of the TLEs. Several outside analyses have however been performed to try and assess the accuracy of the TLEs. These analyses show that for a 24 hour period into the future the TLEs have an error of approximately 1-5 km in track (Boyce 2004) in LEO and 20 – 50 km in GEO (Ailor, 2004)



3.2.5 Rule I and II

Rule I) For all predicted conjunction assessments the STM system will calculate the probability of collision, impact velocity, and probability of the breakup creating a threat to other spacecraft.

Rule II) For all predicted conjunction assessments involving at least one maneuverable spacecraft, and a collision probability over 1/10,000, the STM system will provide a suggested collision avoidance maneuver to the spacecraft owner-operator(s).

3.2.6.1 Rationale and Technical Justification

These traffic rules define the basic data products that will be provided by the STM system. Operators at the STM facility will perform a daily conjunction assessment for all operational satellites. By determining the probability and impact velocity the STM system will give the spacecraft owner-operators the data necessary to perform a risk assessment. By calculating the probability of the break-up causing a threat to other satellites the basis for deciding with which entity the maneuver-decision lies can be established.

Not all satellite owner-operators may have the data and expertise to plan and conduct an effective collision avoidance maneuver. This rule ensures that the STM system will provide whatever information they can to help the owner-operators make the proper maneuver decision.

3.2.6.2 Policy Issues

Key issues resulting from these rules are the questions of the binding nature of the STM suggested maneuver and where liability lies in terms of the STM system operator and the spacecraft owner-operators involved.

3.2.6 Rule III and IV

Rule III) If the STM predicted conjunction has the probability higher than 1/3000 of generating space debris that could endanger other spacecraft, then the spacecraft owner-operator will be strongly urged to perform a collision avoidance maneuver preferably the maneuver proposed by the STM system, but an alternative maneuver is acceptable if it is safe.

Rule IV) If the STM predicted conjunction is only a threat to the conjunctional spacecraft and has less than a 1/3000 chance of endangering other spacecraft, then the spacecraft owner-operator(s) can choose if, when, and how to perform collision avoidance.


The goal of these rules is to define situations when the predicted conjunction has the possibility to damage only the primary satellite and when it has the possibility of increasing the risk to other satellites. This is a difficult calculation to perform as, it must first be assumed that a breakup will occur on collision and then try and estimate the number and partial velocities of all the pieces from the collision. Accurate assessment of this probability depends heavily on knowledge of the size, mass and materials used in the construction of both objects in conjunction and their structural integrity.

However, given such a probability, the STM system can maintain a balance between allowing owner-operator to operate their satellites within their own economic risk assessment and still protecting space for the good of all operators.

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The STM system shall inform the satellite owner-operator whose object will generate space debris to perform a collision avoidance maneuver. One issue is that of compliance. If actors refuse, methods should be in place for legal recourse against the actor(s).

3.3 Sun-Synchronous Orbit (SSO) Zoning

3.3.1 Background

A certain class of low Earth orbit (LEO) is the polar orbit (orbits with inclinations between 96° and 102°). These inclinations above 90° allow satellites to cover every latitude on the surface of the Earth. A special case of a polar orbit is the sun-synchronous orbit, which combines altitude and inclination in such a way that an object on that orbit passes over any given point of the Earth's surface at the same local solar time. Alternatively put, it is an orbit whose orbit plane stays at a constant angle to the sun throughout the year. As a result, the satellite in SSO passes a given position on the Earth’s surface at approximately the same local solar time orbit, maintaining similar sun angles along its ground trace for all orbits.

This is a very important feature for optical imaging applications; each time the satellite passes over a location on the Earth, the features on the ground will have a consistent shadow length. This is one of the reasons SSO is a valuable and desired orbit. Variations of this constant sun angle are used for other applications to keep the satellite's solar cells under illumination at all times and/or to ensure the satellite’s sensor is either always pointed towards or away from the Sun.

To accomplish these feats, the orbit of the satellite must move around the Earth (precess) at the same rate the Earth moves around the Sun – approximately 0.98 degrees per day in the westward direction, which is opposite the Earth's rotation. The rate at which an orbit precesses around the Earth in right ascension is defined by the altitude and inclination of the orbit.

Further subsets of the SSO orbits have a repeating ground track (RGT). Not only do they pass over a location at the same local solar time each day, but they also repeat their ground track in a certain number of orbits. This is important as it establishes the revisit rate for a satellite over a certain ground location. Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-4 below show the inclinations and altitudes that result in SSO orbits with RGT.



Sun-Synchronous Condition (e=0)

Altitude, km

h

400 600 800 1000 1200 140096

97

98

99

100

101

102

103

Inclin

ati

on

, d

eg

inc

Sun-Synchronous Condition (e=0)

Altitude, km

h

400 600 800 1000 1200 140096

97

98

99

100

101

102

103

Inclin

ati

on

, d

eg

inc

Figure 3-3: SSO as a Function of Inclination and Altitude (Boain, 2004)

Altitude versus Number of Orbits per Ground Repeat for

Repeating Sun Sync Orbits

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

50 60 70 80 90 100

Number of Periods

Alt

itu

de [

km

]

Figure 3-4: RGT-SSO as a Function of Altitude. Fixed altitudes are shown.

3.3.2 The Problem

Not all of these inclinations and altitudes are used equally today. As depicted in Figure 3-5 below, orbits between 98.7° and 99° are the most crowded. Figure 3-6 shows the altitude distribution and verifies the most populated altitudes are those corresponding to the SSO orbits. The peak registering at 1000 km Figure 3-6 is almost entirely due to debris from breakups.

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All space objects in near polar orbitsAll space objects in near polar orbitsAll space objects in near polar orbitsAll space objects in near polar orbits

050100150200250300350400

96.0 96.5 97.0 97.5 98.0 98.5 99.0 99.5Inclination (degrees)Inclination (degrees)Inclination (degrees)Inclination (degrees)Number of space objectsNumber of space objectsNumber of space objectsNumber of space objects

Figure 3-5: All Catalog (Aug 2007) Space Objects in SSO by Inclination

All space objects in near polar orbitsAll space objects in near polar orbitsAll space objects in near polar orbitsAll space objects in near polar orbits

050100150200250300350400450500

~300 390 490 590 690 790 890 990Altitude of perigee (km)Altitude of perigee (km)Altitude of perigee (km)Altitude of perigee (km)Number of space objectsNumber of space objectsNumber of space objectsNumber of space objects

Figure 3-6: All Catalog (Aug 2007) Space Objects in SSO by Altitude



All active satellites in near polar orbitsAll active satellites in near polar orbitsAll active satellites in near polar orbitsAll active satellites in near polar orbits

0510152025303540

96.0 96.5 97.0 97.5 98.0 98.5 99.0 99.5Inclination (degrees)Inclination (degrees)Inclination (degrees)Inclination (degrees)Number of satellitesNumber of satellitesNumber of satellitesNumber of satellites

Figure 3-7: All Operational Satellites in SSO by Inclination

All active satellites in near polar orbitsAll active satellites in near polar orbitsAll active satellites in near polar orbitsAll active satellites in near polar orbits

01020304050607080

~300 340 390 440 490 540 590 640 690 740 790 840 890 940 990Altitude of perigee (km)Altitude of perigee (km)Altitude of perigee (km)Altitude of perigee (km)Number of satellitesNumber of satellitesNumber of satellitesNumber of satellites

Figure 3-8: All Operational Satellites in SSO by Altitude

Figure 3-7 and Figure 3-8 show just the distribution of active satellites in the SSO orbits. The concentration is higher than the overall SSO population (satellites and debris) with the vast majority of objects in the 98.8° inclination and just below 800 km in altitude. This clustering is driven by current sensor engineering limitations as well as the desire for all satellite owners to be in the prime location and because debris spreads out in orbit over time out of this zone.

Multiple 98.8° planes of these active satellites are spread out around the Earth in right ascension. All these planes intersect each other at two locations every revolution, at the same altitude. Compounding the problem are the non-functional satellites, spent rocket stages, and the thousands of pieces of debris from explosions. All of this creates a non-negligible probability of collision over time for any operational satellite in this region.

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3.3.3 Rule V

Rule V) A new system of SSO orbital slotting is defined as follows:

1. A band (or plane) of SSO orbits is formed from 12 defined altitudes between 500 km and 1000 km which have a repeating ground track period between 50 and 100 orbits and whose separation in altitude is greater than 20km.

2. Approximately 42 bands of SSO orbits are spread around the Earth separated in right ascension at the equatorial crossing.

3. Each altitude/inclination combination forms an SSO orbit. Each orbit is divided into multiple slots 50 km apart in the direction of satellite motion, for a total of approximately 1000 slots.

4. All future SSO satellites will be placed into one of these slots.


The goal of the new SSO zoning is to provide defined zones that will serve three functions: make the task of prediction and collision avoidance easier, reduce the probability of collision, maintaining the flexibility for different applications and sensor parameters.

The first step in creating the new zoning is to define altitude range and associated inclinations. A lower limit of 500 km was chosen because below that altitude the orbital lifetime of satellites is reduced from years to months. An upper limit of 1000 km is defined by the desired ground resolution, focal length, and the limit of current sensor technology. A separation of 20 km between altitude bands is needed to allow for errors in tracking and perturbations in altitude. Given all these parameters, the 12 sun-synchronous altitudes and inclinations are calculated, which also give repetitive ground tracks between 56 and 91 orbits. Figure 3-9 shows all 12 altitudes and inclinations that make up one such SSO band.

Figure 3-9: One Band of SSO Orbits

One set of these 12 inclinations and altitudes forms one SSO zoning band. Multiple copies of this band can be spaced around the Earth in right ascension. Once set at launch, the spacing of the orbital planes in right ascension will remain equal for all the planes since they are all precessing at the same rate. The minimum spacing in right ascension at the Equator should be of order the same as the altitude of the orbit to provide for a reasonable swath width. Using the circumference of the Earth and an average altitude of 750 km, the placement of approximately 42 orbital bands around the Earth is calculated as shown in Figure 3-10.



Figure 3-10: All 42 Zoning Bands Spaced in Right Ascension

Within each orbit there are slots along track for many satellites. These slots are the locations where satellites can be placed and are defined as a function of argument of perigee plus anomaly. The slots are spaced based on the error in the satellite positional data. For an estimated in-track positional error of 5 km using TLE data, 50 km is proposed as the spacing between satellite positions in the direction of satellite motion to allow for data error as well as some drift in the location. With an average orbital altitude of 750 km this provides for approximately 1,000 satellites per plane. All together, these 12 altitude bands in each of the 42 planes and 1,000 slots per plane provide structured positions for over 500,000 satellites should the need ever arise.

3.3.3.2 How the zoning scheme prevents collisions

This system provides for a method of preventing satellite collision in SSO in the following way. To start with only 12 of the 12x42 orbits will be used at all. By filling just 12 of the orbits, they can each be at a different altitude and thus their orbits will not cross unless an owner-operator loses station keeping. Up to 12,000 satellites can be placed in this way: already providing room for more than an order of magnitude growth over today’s SSO population and ensuring minimal collision risk here.

If enough satellites are put into orbit such that the first 12 orbits fill, then the STM system would begin to fill the other inclination bands spaced around the Earth. This would reintroduce the possibility of collisions where the inclination bands cross near the poles. Solving this is a matter of timing – each satellite must be placed within the zoning framework such that it will be in the area of intersection. The analysis to calculate the timing and spacing within these boxes is left as a future project.

This new zoning lays the foundation for a more orderly use of this unique orbital regime in the future. It allows for a large number of satellites to utilize SSO orbits while keeping them separated in all three dimensions. All existing SSO satellites would remain in their current orbits. A positive side effect of using this new framework would be that an explosion in one of the slots would not impact the rest of the SSO population as much as it currently does with the vast majority of the SSO satellites occupying the same inclination and altitude.

Several aspects deserve further investigation here. The 50km separation along track and 20km between different altitudes need to be analyzed to verify that this is sufficient given realistic drift rates and maneuver requirements. Further, although the system is self consistent, it has yet to be examined how well it meshes, in terms of collision probabilities, with the existing satellite and debris populations. These are areas deserving further analysis.

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In terms of policy, the most fundamental issue is how slots shall be allocated for the proposed SSO zoning. Initially, States might be reluctant to accede to the very idea of zoning as it might curtail the freedom of use of space. However, if they do accept the premise, the method of allocation has the potential to be contentious. The rationales for zoning, drawn from the analogy of the practice of ITU GEO slotting (and also air traffic which also quantizes in the altitude axis), can be applied to the peculiarities of the SSO and so be utilized to convince countries and other actors to engage with such a system.

3.4 Geostationary Maneuvers

3.4.1 Background

The geosynchronous orbit (GSO) is defined as an orbit with the same period as the Earth’s period of rotation, approximately 24 hours. A subset of GSO is geostationary orbit (GEO) which in addition to a period of 24 hours also has an inclination and eccentricity near zero. These elements combine to fix the position of the satellite as seen from the Earth as a point at a selected longitude on the equator with very little movement.

The result of these unique orbital mechanics is a geostationary ring located approximately 36,000 km from the Earth aligned with the Equator. The ring currently contains approximately 350 operational satellites and is getting more crowded every year. The crowding results from many operators all seeking to utilize this limited natural resource as a commercial commodity.

The natural structure of the geostationary orbit, with little or no relative motion among active spacecraft and movement of the satellites in the same direction with the rotation of the Earth (East), permitted the early adoption of classical traffic management practices. (Johnson, 2003) The current ITU regulations manage GEO through the licensing of operational frequencies and ‘slot’ position assignments defined by longitude along the Equator. The regulations are predominantly focused on radio frequency rather than physical interference prevention.

For a STM system to be successful in GEO, it is critical for owner-operators to share orbital position data and planned maneuvers. This will enable effective use of slots, accurate conjunction analyses and efficient orbital maneuvers. With more accurate orbital data provided by owner-operators, the STM can play an important role in filling the gap of preventing physical interference.

3.4.2 Issue: Station Keeping Maneuvers

All space objects in the geostationary belt drift due to natural forces (perturbations). The largest drift is towards East or West along the Equator caused by the asymmetrical shape of the Earth. The areas of the globe with higher density exert a higher gravitational attraction on the GEO satellites. These areas are concentrated near 75° and 255° East longitude and all objects in GEO are pulled towards whichever of these is closest to their slot. In addition, the gravitational attraction of the Sun and the Moon pull GEO objects North and South in inclination.

To maintain their assigned slot and thus their desired location over the Equator, a satellite owner-operator must perform periodic maneuvers. These maneuvers counter the drift caused by perturbations and push the satellite back towards its desired location. The distance in which a satellite can drift within the GEO box is constrained by the slot size, the tracking accuracy of the satellite owner-operator and the neighboring satellites. The latter is of importance especially when satellites share an orbital slot.

For the owner-operator to be able to maneuver their satellite efficiently, the knowledge of the orbital position of the neighboring satellites is needed in advance for planning the



maneuver. With more accurate and reliable knowledge of the neighboring satellite positions, the maneuver will be incorporated into the station-keeping maneuvers in a more cost effective way. In addition, sharing this knowledge allows for owner-operators to make efficient use of the free drift and conserve costly propellant by avoiding frequent station-keeping maneuvers (DalBello, 2007).

Case A Case B Case CCase A Case B Case C

Figure 3-11: GEO Station Keeping Boxes

Figure 3-11 above illustrates the three different cases of these station-keeping maneuver issues. In Case A, two satellites share the same 0.1 degree slot. In this case the owner-operator of the satellite on the left has a low tracking accuracy. This increased error in the estimated position of their satellite (indicated by the gray area) leaves the satellite on the right less room to drift in. This forces the owner-operator of the satellite on the right to perform station-keeping maneuvering more frequently than might otherwise be necessary.

In Case B the satellite does not share a slot with any other satellite and only normal station-keeping maneuvering is required to stay within its slot or avoid conjunctions. In Case C a slot which is shared by two satellites. The difference in this scenario is that the left satellite has improved tracking data which leaves a much greater zone for the satellite on the right to drift and accomplish station keeping.

3.4.3 Rule VI

Rule VI) All GEO spacecraft owner-operators shall, on a regular basis, provide positional data to the STM system for the purpose of conjunction assessment. This data will not be distributed outside the STM system.


The existing publicly available data on satellite positions has very limited positional accuracy for space objects at geostationary altitude. The worst-case accuracy is about 60 km for the in-track component (Ailor, 2004). This accuracy impedes the ability of the STM system to provide reliable collision prediction and avoidance maneuvers for all GEO satellites.

A satellite owner-operator can use timing techniques with telemetry to determine the position of their satellite with much greater accuracy than current tracking systems are capable of obtaining. Assuming a worst case scenario, where only one antenna is used, this method results in an average tracking accuracy of 7 km (corresponding to a 4 km error in radial accuracy). Sharing of this data between the owner-operator and the STM system will allow for a much more accurate conjunction prediction than one based on the public data alone.

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Owner-operators may be reluctant to share the position data on their satellites with other satellite owner-operators.

Protection of information of this type, including accurate information on a satellite’s location, is of concern to all satellite operators. For example, a satellite operator might worry that a competitor will take advantage of a short-term problem or that a satellite communication link might be targeted for interference. Problems of this sort could affect the value of an operator’s stock (Ailor, 2006).

Some other major concerns from operator could be: (Ailor, 2006)

• Cost for the service, preferably low or free government involvement

• The need for sufficient warning time to incorporate the maneuver in the station keeping strategy as efficiently as possibly.

• Quality of the data to permit sufficient reduction in collision risk.

As such, it is imperative that structures are put in place in a STM system that protect data privacy and guarantee data submitted is not released.

3.4.4 Rule VII and Rule VIII

Rule VII) All GEO spacecraft owner-operators shall provide notification 48 hours prior to initial station acquisition, station-keeping and relocation maneuvers to the STM system.

Rule VIII) All GEO spacecraft owner-operators are encouraged to grant consent for distribution of owner-operator derived positional data, via the STM system, to all neighboring GEO spacecraft owner-operators for the purpose of enhancing station-keeping planning.


In addition to sharing positional data, it is highly desirable to have owner-operator maneuver planning information in advance. This would allow the STM system to take into consideration future maneuvers when performing conjunction assessments to help prevent “false alarm” situations. These are cases where a future collision is predicted but a planned maneuver beforehand will eliminate it. Provisionally, the owner-operators should provide the STM with a monthly station-keeping planning report.

Knowledge about all planned station-keeping maneuvers would also allow the STM system to synchronize the maneuver plans between adjacent satellites and allow satellites to make full use of their allocated slots without fear of collision with neighboring satellites. This would be very effective in keeping the distance between the satellites optimal and allow all satellites the maximum amount of drift room to help minimize fuel usage. Over time, the STM system could be seen as an intermediary between owner-operators and enable greater harmonization of all GEO procedures.


Owner-operators may be protective of their satellite maneuvering schedules, as knowledge of this information could give a competitive advantage to other owner-operators. Having access to more accurate information on nearby satellites could significantly reduce the number of maneuvers required, and increase the efficiency of each, for station keeping operations. The cost benefits to the owner-operators are likely to counter the potential competitive or security losses from sharing this information.



3.4.5 Issue: Relocation and station acquisition Maneuvers

Two important maneuvers in GEO are station acquisition and relocation. Station acquisition operations refer to the set of maneuvers performed by a spacecraft after it has been transferred to GSO by a launch vehicle. The launch vehicle usually places the satellite into a location near GEO and additional maneuvering is needed to place the satellite in its slot. This maneuver is accomplished either by the use of the launch vehicle upper stage or by the use of an apogee “kick engine” on the satellite and puts the satellite into a drift orbit slightly above or below GEO until it reaches its desired orbital location. The satellite will then perform another maneuver to stop its drift and enter its slot.

There are also times when an owner-operator would choose to move their satellite to a new GEO slot. This might be driven by the need to replace another satellite that has malfunctioned or to move to a more profitable location. This process is carried out in much the same way as acquisition with one maneuver to drift to the desired location and another maneuver to enter the new slot.

3.4.6 Rule IX

Rule IX) The STM system shall provide orbital data on all spacecraft which perform relocation maneuvers in GEO to all GEO spacecraft operators who may be affected by the proposed maneuver. An altitude band from 41 to 200 km above and below GEO is reserved for relocation and station acquisition maneuvers.


During both types of GEO maneuvers, precautions should be taken to minimize the risk of collision. Specifically, this means precautions should be taken to avoid the crossing of satellite trajectories for other spacecraft in their GEO slots. In addition, radio frequency interference should be avoided (or at least minimized). The IADC (IADC, 2004) proposes an altitude band between 41 km and 200 km above and below GEO for relocation maneuvers Figure 3-12. This reservation allows satellites to drift at a maximum rate of 2.546 deg/day to the west and 2.576 deg/day to the east.

GEO

GEO+37km

GEO-37km

GEO+41km

GEO-41km

GEO+200km

GEO-200km

For relocation toward West

For relocation toward East

±0.1degSatellite

relocation

GEO

GEO+37km

GEO-37km

GEO+41km

GEO-41km

GEO+200km

GEO-200km

For relocation toward West

For relocation toward East

±0.1degSatellite

relocation

Figure 3-12: GEO Maneuver zone for Relocations

With the GEO box size defined by 0.1 degrees in the East-West (E-W) and North-South (N-S) direction, the maximum eccentricity amounts to 0.000873. This results in a perigee/apogee 36.8 km lower/higher than the GEO altitude. Thus, an altitude band of 37 km above and below GEO is reserved for satellite station keeping in their slots.

The altitude bands between 41km and 200km above and below GEO is reserved for relocation maneuvers. This means that when satellites relocate within GEO, the calculated

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lower drift rates are at least 0.524 deg/day towards the west or 0.525 deg/day towards the east. The lower limit is set to provide a buffer zone between the active station-keeping satellite and the drifting satellite. The upper limit it set to provide a buffer between the drift zone and the graveyard orbit (GYO) starting at 235 km above GEO (IADC, 2004).


Satellite owner-operators might argue that sharing proposed station acquisition and slot transfer maneuvers with all owner-operators of neighboring satellites is unnecessary. It is unlikely that such maneuvers would ever affect other satellites, and it would be the responsibility of the owner-operator of the transiting satellite to ensure this was the case.

Sharing this information with the STM system would however, allow for the determination of which, if any, owner-operators would be affected by a particular maneuver and determine the most efficient solution to avoid interference or collision. The STM system could then inform only the necessary owner-operators, minimizing the release of potentially sensitive information.

3.5 The Protection of Human-Rated Spacecraft Human-rated vehicles, defined as those certified to transport humans, require the highest levels of protection to ensure their safety. The presence of the Van Allen radiation belts and their point of closest approach, the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA), often restrict human-rated vehicles to orbits below 500 km. This is shown in Figure 3-13 (Green 2007).

Human-rated vehicles orbiting in the radiation belts would be subject to significant amounts of damaging radiation without high levels of spacecraft shielding. This shielding would add considerable weight to the spacecraft, thus increasing the expense of placing it in orbit. Any STM system should put in place safeguards to regulate this region below 500 km as is currently one of the most commonly used zones in which human vehicles can orbit. Regulations within this area should initially focus on reducing the chances of collision with other space objects in this human-rated zone.

Figure 3-13: Lower Van Allen Radiation Belts and South Atlantic Anomaly



3.5.1 The Problem

Figure 3-14 shows the population of all 1,100 objects that are routinely tracked currently in orbit below 500 km, sorted by launching date. Figure 3-14 shows that this region has remained relatively unpopulated since the beginning of the space age compared to other orbits. The large spikes in 1989 and 1997 originate principally from only two satellites launched on those years. Each of these satellites experienced an energetic breakup which resulted in thousands of pieces. The debris from these two events currently represents a significant portion of the space object population below 500 km.

Figure 3-14: All Space Objects >10cm in Size Below 500 km By Launch Date

3.5.2 Rule X

Rule X) Circular orbits with altitudes below 500 km are reserved for human-rated spacecraft; non-human rated civil or commercial space objects are not permitted in this zone unless they meet all of the following criteria:

• Registered with the STM system

• Will remain in orbit for less than 5 years.

Non-human rated spacecraft should also comply with the following:

• Maneuvering capability

• Satellites too small to track should have devices which allow their position to be determined.


The impact of this rule on current satellite operators is minimal. Only 32 active satellites are in circular orbits less than 500km (although some others pass through on eccentric orbits) currently orbiting in this region (McDowell, 2007). This low number is due to the drag disadvantages of placing a satellite at such a low altitude. Without constant maneuvering, a satellite placed at 500 km of altitude would re-enter the atmosphere within just a few years. This constant maneuvering represents a high cost to satellite operators as it encompasses both the need to have maneuver capability and the additional weight of the fuel on launch.

The proposed human-rated zone does not outright ban other satellites from this area. Operators that want to place satellites in this zone can do so as long as they follow the additional outlined restrictions. All operators are required to register their spacecraft with the

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STM system, ensure all pieces will remain in orbit for less than 5 years, and all operational satellites must have maneuvering capability. This adds another option for any conjunction scenario with human-rated vehicles as well as helping to reduce debris that would be generated by collisions between a non-human rated spacecraft and debris.

A particular problem is the new class of very small satellites (nano- and pico-) that are too small to track effectively as they are either at or below the current 10-cm lower limit for tracking. To operate in this region, these classes of satellites would be required to have an on-board system to enhance the ability of the STM system to determine their position.


Particular attention should be paid anytime human lives enter into a policy-making discussion and this is especially true when dealing with an environment that is as dynamic as that of space. With the commercial space tourism industry growing at a rapid pace, ensuring the enactment of a rule along the lines of the one proposed here should be of the utmost importance at the international level.

This rule highlights a key question as to the legitimacy of an STM system. Where does such a system derive the authority to make such a demarcation? The reservation of certain elements of outer space for human flight may not be considered a key priority by certain States. The additional obligation of having to include costly maneuvering capability, especially in the case of the utility of nano-satellites, for a reason that does not maximize the use of space applications for developing countries, could be argued to limit their freedom of use of outer space as laid out in the OST.

3.5.3 Rule XI

Rule XI) 48 hours before the flight of any human-rated orbital or sub-orbital vehicle, the owner-operator shall submit a flight plan to the STM system detailing the following:

• Vehicle type

• Number of passengers

• Launch date, time, and location

• Trajectory (if sub-orbital) or orbit

• Length of flight (if sub-orbital) or time in orbit

• Landing date, time, and location

• A risk assessment and compliance with STM criteria

All on-orbit maneuvers of any human-rated vehicle will, where possible, be coordinated 48 hours in advance using the same method above and providing the same information.


The requirement for all human-rated vehicle operators to submit flight plans serves two main purposes. First, it provides situational awareness to the STM system that a craft carrying humans will be in a specific region of space. Secondly, it allows the STM system to perform a pre-launch collision assessment for the trajectory of the vehicle. This assessment, combined with the number of passengers and vehicle type, will allow for a risk analysis to be performed.

The requirement to have all maneuvers of human-rated spacecraft screened serves the same function. Before the human-rated vehicle changes orbit, another collision probability should be calculated for its new orbit and another risk assessment performed.




Further to the protection of humans while traveling within the space environment is the idea of ensuring that other spacecraft registered within the STM system are aware of the presence of a vehicle carrying passengers. The data provided by the owner-operator of the passenger-carrying spacecraft is of fundamental importance when determining the safety of the flight.

None of the data required by this rule can be deemed a trade secret by the launch company as items (3), (4), and (5) are already required by the registration process of the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. The remaining pieces of information would be publicly available information amounting to the same level of knowledge one has when boarding a commercial aircraft.

3.6 Environmental Concerns and Recommendations

For the purpose of discussing the environmental effects of space traffic and space traffic management, this report classifies “the environment” as either relating to the space environment or to the Earth environment. With that distinction, environmental effects can be said to occur in one of six phases:

1. Pre-Launch: everything prior to liftoff (Earth environment) 2. Launch-earth: liftoff until entry into space environment (Earth environment) 3. Launch-space: entry into space through orbital insertion (space environment) 4. On Orbit: orbital insertion through de-orbit (space environment) 5. De-Orbit/Disposal-space: de-orbit through atmospheric re-entry/ transfer to

graveyard (space environment) 6. Reentry/Disposal-earth: re-entry until touch down/burn up (Earth environment)

In this chapter, the focus will specifically be on the space environment (phases 3, 4 and 5), as that is the focus of this report. It is recommended that the other issues related to the Earth environment not discussed here be researched and policies be developed in the near future in order to have a comprehensive plan for managing the space environment.

In addition to breaking down the major issues relating to the space environment and briefly analyzing them, this section will discuss the currently accepted UNCOPUOS guidelines for debris mitigation, recommend changes to them and identify “eco-friendly” alternatives for future space operations.

3.6.1 Issues Affecting the Space Environment

This section is concerned with the space environment, and therefore focuses on the Launch-space, On Orbit, and Re-entry/Disposal-space phases. When discussing these phases, the key issue regarding space environmental protection is debris mitigation. There are many issues that must be taken into consideration when discussing the potential for the degradation of the space environment. The following is a brief explanation of some key concerns.

3.6.1.1 Collisions Creating Additional Space Debris

When two objects collide, with the momentum typically associated with orbital velocities, they break-up into smaller pieces and create a greater number of fragments. “In low Earth orbit, the average relative velocity [between two bodies] at impact is 36,000 km/hr and in geostationary orbits… approximately 7200 km/hr. A 1 kg object at a speed of 10 km/s has the same amount of kinetic energy that a fully loaded truck, weighing 35,000 kg has at 190 km/hr. A 1 cm size object at orbital speed has the equivalent energy of an exploding hand grenade” (Bahr, 2007).

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The same report describes how a collision between a 1kg piece of debris and a typical 1200kg spacecraft will produce in the order of 1 million fragments of debris as small as 1mm wide. The debris cloud produced poses a significantly larger risk of impact to other spacecraft in similar orbits than before the collision.

3.6.1.2 Propellants Remaining in Spacecraft and Rockets

When a satellite or spacecraft reaches its end of life, there is usually some propellant remaining in its fuel tanks. A serious problem has been this propellant exploding, creating a large number of new space objects. These objects vary in size and some remaining trackable, but countless pieces are too small to be detected by radar.

3.6.1.3 The Use of Solid Propellants

Propellant used in solid rocket boosters does not always combust completely, especially towards the end of the burn. This can result in sizable particles of aluminum being expelled into space. When a spacecraft is in orbit and it releases these particles, additional space debris is created. This debris is too small to be tracked and contributes greatly to the clouds of micro-debris that are currently circling the earth.

3.6.1.4 Space “Littering”

For the purpose of this discussion, two types of littering will be discussed: intentional littering and unintentional littering.

Intentional Littering (i.e. trash jettisoning): Disposal of unwanted objects into space is a common occurrence and it happens regularly on the International Space Station (ISS). Currently when an object is jettisoned, there is no planning for its trajectory and estimated location of re-entry into the earth’s atmosphere. This is due to the assumption that the debris will burn-up on reentry, or land on the 70% of the Earths’ surface that is covered with water. While so far none of the garbage has caused harm to humans or infrastructure, the issue will need revisiting as the volume of space traffic increases and more and more objects are discarded in this manner.

A formal policy to define the conditions under which an object can be jettisoned from the ISS is currently being developed (NASA, 2005). It is important for the developers of this report to require the “litterer” to consider such properties as the objects mass and planned trajectory before jettisoning the material. Additionally, the policy which is developed should be written in a manner which will not exclude the future needs of the system which will need to deal with future space stations, space hotels, and all other space operations which could involve littering the space environment. This policy, once completed, should be considered for inclusion into the environmental rules.

Unintentional Littering (i.e. pieces falling off spacecraft): For as long as nations have been launching objects into space, pieces have been falling off of those spacecraft and have become space debris. There have been studies showing there is little chance of a high kinetic energy impact with the originating spacecraft. Additionally it has been determined by trajectory specialists that that there is no possibility of future re-contact at velocities higher than at the initial release (NASA, 2005). While this is good news for the craft in the short term, every additional piece of debris increases the probability of an impact in the future.

3.6.1.5 The Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Space

The potential for significant environmental damage resulting from discarded nuclear power sources (NPS) causes this to be a very important issue. The technical advantages, such as



increased mass to power ratio, derived from using NPS onboard spacecraft may encourage more use of such power sources in the future.

The need to discard nuclear cores prior to re-entry/de-orbit of a spacecraft results from the unacceptable risk to the terrestrial environment that would be posed if the NPS was allowed re-enter with the spacecraft. The downside of this solution is increased debris on orbit and contamination of the space environment.

For this reason, during the design and development of craft which utilize nuclear power sources, as well as when considering operational procedures for such craft, care should be taken to reduce the possibility of damage both to the Earth and space environments.

The United Nations has adopted guideline to address these issues. The purpose of these guidelines is to ensure that NPS are only used in missions where no other options are practical, to minimize the risks associated with NPS, and ensure safety is a priority any time NPS are used. These guidelines also acknowledge that future technologies and circumstances may lead to a need for further guidance on this issue.

3.6.2 Environmental Rules & Recommendations

The policy implications of environmental protection are extensive. There is a need to address these issues now, because as space travel increases in intensity, it will bring with it an increasing environmental impact. To this end, it is suggested the development of a policy framework to provide structure and direction to the addressing of key space environmental issues, with regards to debris mitigation. The content of this policy framework must be focused on the key issues of today, but should also allow room for the inclusion of future environmental developments.

In June of 2007, the UNCOPUOS approved a set of seven guidelines regarding space debris mitigation. These guidelines encompass a majority of the issues currently faced during a space mission, and this report recommends they be adopted with minor amendments.

3.6.2.1 Rules I and II

Rule I) The following IADC guidelines, as endorsed by UNCOPUOS as voluntary nonbinding guidelines, should be adopted and then enforced by the STM System (UNCOPUOS, 2007).

1) Limit debris released during normal operations 2) Minimize the potential for break-ups during operational phases 3) Limit the probability of accidental collision in orbit 4) Avoid intentional destruction and other harmful activities 5) Minimize potential for post-mission break-ups resulting from stored energy 6) Limit the long-term presence of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages in the

low-Earth orbit (LEO) region after the end of their mission 7) Limit the long-term interference of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages

within the geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) region after the end of their mission.

Rule II) The following amendments to UNCOPUOS debris mitigation guidelines should be adopted

• For guideline 6, the phrase “long term” should specifically refer to the “25 year rule” as defined by the IAASS An ICAO For Space. Therefore, the guideline would be re-written as:

6) Limit the long-term presence of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages in the low-Earth orbit (LEO) region after the end of their mission to 25 years.

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• For Guideline 7, Sun Synchronous Orbit should be considered in addition to GEO. Therefore the guideline would be re-written as:

7) Limit the long-term interference of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital

stages within the Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) and the Sun Synchronous Orbit (SSO) regions after the end of their lifetime.

3.6.2.1.1 Rationale and Technical Justification

The guidelines the IADC developed are designed to encompass the majority of space debris issues. They are written such that each guideline is vague enough to be an overarching rule defining a multitude of different mitigation issues now and into the future. In reviewing these guidelines it appears that two of them would benefit from amendments.

Regarding Guideline 6, this study recommends defining the term “long term” with regards to the length of time a spacecraft should be able to remain on orbit after its end-of-life. There is a generally accepted “25 year rule” which was defined by the IAASS An ICAO For Space, which this study is recommending to add to the UNCOPUOS guidelines.

In Guideline 7, the authors only discussed spacecraft in GEO. Previously in this paper, details of Sun Synchronous Orbits (SSO) were discussed and a traffic management plan proposed. In light of this, and the fact that in time more and more spacecraft will begin to occupy SSO, an amendment is recommended to add SSO to the overall guideline.

3.6.2.1.2 Policy Issues

As Rule I is simply applying the accepted UNCOPUOS space debris mitigation guidelines to the proposed STM system, it is not likely to create any new policy issues. The amendments suggested in Rule II, however will provide a definition for “long-term” as it relates to LEO to mean 25 years, and also provide new requirements for the SSO. These changes to the IADC guidelines have the potential to add cost for owner-operators who would place new spacecraft in these regions.

The extra cost, arising from the first amendment, could be due to the need for compliance to de-orbit spacecraft and launch debris from LEO sooner then might otherwise have been required. The need to perform a de-orbit burn would depend upon the operational altitude of the spacecraft.

Cost issues related to the second proposed amendment are less of a factor. To comply, owner-operators could perform a fuel depletion maneuver or venting operation following payload separation to use up the remaining fuel in the launch vehicle. These maneuvers would not require any extra fuel; therefore the only associated cost would be in pre-mission planning to ensure the maneuver was conducted safely. A second option could be to use more robust materials in the design and manufacture of the spacecraft which could add more cost.

Owner-operators would also need to ensure enough fuel remained onboard the spacecraft at end of life to maneuver the spacecraft into a graveyard orbit. This might lead to a shorter life time for the spacecraft or a higher cost due to the need to carry more fuel and/or have more efficient engines.

These issues could have an effect on an owner-operator’s decision whether to follow these rules or not. The STM system would need to address these concerns and possibly offer incentives to encourage compliance with these rules.

Although many believe that cleaning up space is not technically feasible today, there is one option that is currently being developed which may become realistic in the near future. ORION is a ground based laser and a beam director which detects, tracks, and eliminates debris by slightly slowing down the object and lowering its perigee. This causes the debris to re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere and burn up. “It has been projected that ORION could de-



orbit up to 30,000 pieces of debris ranging from one centimeter to ten centimeters in size at below 800 kilometers altitude, in two to three years for a total cost of $60 to $70 million” (Smith, 1997). We intend to look into this possibility further outside the scope of this paper.

3.6.3 Economics of Space Environment Protection

Environmental protection measures may put an increased economic burden on the developers and operators of spacecraft and launch vehicles. These associated costs could negatively affect the continued growth of the space industry and because of this cause resistance among these actors to the implementation of such measures.

It is envisaged that this balance will be achieved through innovation in the development of environmentally friendly technologies and practices, rather than through increased cost to the relevant actors within the space industry.

3.7 Future Developments There are several future problems that any comprehensive STM system would need to overcome for maximum efficiency:

• New classes of small satellites

• Radio frequency identification

• Satellites without full time TT&C (Telemetry, Tracking, and Control)

• GEO Graveyard Orbit

• De-orbit Zones

These areas will be briefly addressed below.

3.7.1 New Classes of Small Satellites

There are several emerging classes of small satellites known as micro-satellites, nano-satellites, and pico-satellites. Compared to average satellites that are on the order of 1000 kg, micro-satellites typically weigh between 10 kg and 100 kg, nano-satellites are typically less than 10 kg, and pico-satellites are less than 1 kg. These classes of satellites are becoming increasingly popular for universities and other entities because of their small size, mass and small manufacture and launch costs. These small satellites are often launched as secondary payloads along with much larger satellites (Zak, 2007).

However, these small satellites do pose some risk. Their small size and low cost also means that most lack the capability to maneuver and most are also not actively stabilized. In addition, some do not have any internal tracking system. Finally, these objects are at the lower limit of what can be tracked using currently available ground-based systems. The USSTRATCOM SSN and Russian SSS typically can reliably track objects as small as 10 cm. (Spencer, 1998).

These factors are mitigated by the fact that most of these satellites are in LEO and, without maneuvering capability to boost their orbit, are likely to decay within just a few years (Jehn, 2007). Furthermore, their small size actually reduces the probability that they will collide with another object and reduces the amount of debris generated from the collision.

3.7.2 Radio Frequency Identification

A less costly solution could be to use on-board transponders to enhance the ability for a ground system to track these very small satellites. This system would be similar to what is currently used for aircraft tracking. A secondary tracking system will illuminate an aircraft with a radar pulse. The aircraft's on-board transponder system then transmits a signal in response that boosts the radar signal return and the tracking ability. Additionally, the aircraft transponder can encode its altitude into the signal.

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The power requirements for such a system could be beyond the capability of many micro- and nano-satellites. In those situations, a system similar to radio frequency identification (RFID) could possibly be used. The RFID system uses tiny tags, currently approaching half a millimeter, embedded in objects. An interrogation device beams a signal at the object with the embedded RFID tag. The tag responds to the interrogation by transmitting a coded signal. The main difference is that the tag does not have its own power system. The transmit power of the RFID tag is derived from the interrogation signal. This would allow for small satellites to be able to encode and transmit either an identification code and/or their on-board position, if it is known, back to the ground system without any additional power requirements. Further analysis would be needed to determine the strength of interrogation signal necessary for the greatly increased distances involved in the space application of this technology, as well as research and development of radiation-hardened tags.

3.7.3 Auto-maneuver for Satellites without Constant TT&C

Current collision avoidance procedures require an active command from the ground to maneuver the satellite into a different orbit. If the ground link is lost or cannot be established before the conjunction occurs there would not be a chance to maneuver the satellite and prevent the collision. One possible solution to this would be an on-board collision avoidance fail-safe system. This could be similar to the Automatic Activation Device (AAD) used by skydivers. The AAD is a failsafe that activates if it detects the skydiver is still in freefall below a certain minimum altitude, usually around 250 meters. A future collision avoidance system could serve a similar function to prevent collisions.

The satellite collision avoidance system would activate only at the last possible moment as an emergency solution to prevent collision. It would need to have four main components: the ability to detect another object at some distance away, compute the probability of collision and the appropriate avoidance maneuver, perform the avoidance maneuver, and have the ability to re-establish pointing and stability after the maneuver. The distance at which detection needs to occur is a function of two variables: the time it takes to perform the collision calculation and the amount of thrust that can be delivered by the satellite. Higher thrust would allow detection to take place at a closer distance. This system would have to be able to respond to relative speeds of up to 14 km/s between the two objects.

Each satellite owner-operator would need to complete a detailed cost-benefit analysis before considering placing such a system on any satellite. Major areas of cost would be the following: added weight and power, accidental triggering, reduction in lifespan from the use of fuel, disruption of the mission due to loss of pointing or changing the ground track, and the possibility that the satellite maneuvered into a worse conjunction at a future time.

3.7.4 GEO Graveyard Orbit

The geosynchronous orbit has been deemed a limited natural resource and as such needs to be managed efficiently. When a satellite occupying a GEO slot reaches the end of its lifetime, it is usually maneuvered out of the slot to what is called a graveyard orbit (GYO), making room for a replacement. This orbit is a circular orbit approximately 235 km above the GEO belt as defined by the current IADC guidelines. The maneuver performed at the end of a satellite’s life to boost it into the GYO is usually called either “super-sync” or “re-orbit”. The satellite owner-operator does incur a cost from this maneuver: the fuel reserved for the re-orbit is fuel that would otherwise be spent on station-keeping and will reduce the satellite's on-orbit lifetime. This is further compounded by the inaccuracy of current methods used to calculate remaining fuel. A satellite owner-operator needs to balance the risk of leaving their satellite as a piece of debris drifting through the GEO belt against lost revenue.

The graveyard orbit is a very large area and is currently not very populated. For at least the next couple of decades it will serve as a cost-effective method of dealing with GEO satellites



at the end of their lifetimes. There will become a time in the future where it is politically, economically, or technically unfeasible to continue this method. A replacement solution to the problem of end-of-life could be to require that all GEO satellites above a certain size be maneuvered down to an altitude where they will re-enter the Earth's atmosphere in a reasonable time or even to actually de-orbit the satellite. Such a requirement could be very expensive to satellite manufacturers and owners as the fuel required would be equal to that used to place the satellite in GEO orbit.

A possible future solution could be an on-orbit service providing an ion engine that could attach to the satellite and slowly de-orbit in a controlled manner over several years. The cost of the service could be offset by the increased time on orbit generating revenue as the satellite would no longer have to reserve any fuel for the graveyard maneuver. The satellite could simply operate until its fuel was completely exhausted at which point the service would attach the engine and begin the process of de-orbit. This solution, along with other possibilities, should be researched in further detail.

3.7.5 De-orbit Zones

All satellites that are launched into Earth orbit will eventually come back and re-enter the Earth's atmosphere due to the effects of drag and other orbital perturbations. The time line for this natural decay can be anywhere from months for orbits below 400 km to millions of years for geosynchronous orbits as shown in Figure 1-1. The vast majority of satellites are allowed to re-enter in an uncontrolled manner. There are some objects which are intentionally de-orbited instead of being allowed to decay naturally. An example is the Progress vehicle used to re-supply the International Space Station (ISS). Upon return it is usually de-orbited over the Pacific Ocean.

The vast majority of small objects burn up during atmospheric re-entry. Certain large objects do survive re-entry and land on the ground. The probability of these objects causing damage to infrastructure or humans is low because of the relatively few re-entries each year and the fact that the Earth is 70% water. At some point in the future the number of objects re-entering and surviving will become large enough it would require management.

A recommended solution is to establish specific zones in the Earth's atmosphere where all of the space objects would be required to re-enter. These zones would be located over unpopulated areas to prevent damage to infrastructure or human life. They would also be arranged to limit any pollution from the re-entry of toxic materials and possibly allow for the recycling of spacecraft materials.

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______________________________________ Chapter 4

4 Implementation of Space Traffic

Management

4.1 A Vision for a Management System This report recommends rules for the management of space traffic and has referred on several occasions to a yet to be described ‘space traffic management system’ that either implements these rules or coordinates their implementation on an international level. It is necessary at this point in the report to describe this system in specific terms that offer long-term goals for a space traffic management system and the short-term means by which these goals may be achieved. In the long-term, an international organization is seen as the ideal means to implement a space traffic management system. In the short-term, several paths may be available to achieve this long-term goal.

This report recommends an international organization because history has proven that international organizations are the most effective means for coordinating and regulating the actions of several nations in both physical and electromagnetic space that are not the clear or obvious purview of any single nation; ITU, ICAO, and IMO are relevant examples of this. Until recently physical space has been limited to the international High Seas and to airspace. Sections one through three above demonstrate how outer space may soon require a similar kind of coordination and regulation currently applied to airspace.

An international organization responsible for space traffic management would be recognized by space-faring nations as an official coordinating body for the utilization of orbital resources as recommended in the new rules for LEO, SSO and GEO. It would register current and future users of space and other data on orbital populations in accordance with suggested zoning rules. It would also administer information to launch providers about the probability of collisions with existing space objects in advance of a launch, and would receive data on launches to measure the growth of the space debris population. The organization would also be recognized as an official body for coordinating collision avoidance maneuvers of both operational satellites and human spacecraft in Earth orbit. Stated somewhat differently, the organization would regulate the utilization of space as a limited natural resource analogous to how the ITU regulates the utilization of the electromagnetic spectrum as a limited natural resource. Similarly, the organization would manage operational space traffic on a day-to-day basis analogous to how ICAO manages operational air traffic on a day-to-day basis.

In order to function competently, such an organization must have resident within it the necessary technical expertise and facilities required to: acquire tracking information of space objects; catalog them for future reference and maintain that catalog; calculate conjunction and collision probabilities, and recommend orbital maneuvers.

In order to operate successfully, the competency and authority of this organization must be recognized by the international community. The history of the ITU and ICAO, the WTO, and the ICRC (just as examples) prove that such recognition typically develops slowly. Similarly, the use of the ITU and ICAO as analogies for the functions of a space traffic management organization suggests that there are already existing organizations that may be



suitable for taking on some of the tasks of space traffic management, even though that task, and the technical capabilities it implies, is not currently part of their mandate.

The question then remains; how do we get from the current international structure not fully engaged in space traffic management to the ideal future state where a strong international organization exists and is recognized as competent? The sections below analyze several options, including the potential creation of a new organization.

4.2 Options Assessment The development of a Space Traffic Management system can only be undertaken at an inter-governmental level due to the international nature of space activities and must exist for the benefit of all mankind, to be consistent with the principles of international space law. It is therefore natural to look at existing international organizations and committees to determine how best to create a space traffic management organization, and determine whether an organization exists today that could assume this role.

For the creation of an STM system, three key steps must be undertaken:

1. Develop Rules

2. Build Consensus

3. Implement the System

There are a number of existing organizations that play a role in the management of space traffic, such as UNCOPUOS, the ITU and the IADC, as well as national space agencies and operators. There are organizations that do not directly play a role in space traffic management today, but could be adapted to assume certain roles in such a system, such as ICAO. There is also potential for the creation of a completely new organization focusing only on STM. Each of these organizations meets one or more of the needs of a comprehensive space traffic management system.

4.2.1 UNCOPUOS

In 1959 the General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA) established The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) under Resolution 1472. UNCOPUOS is comprised of 67 Member States and has a Scientific and Technical Subcommittee and a Legal Subcommittee. The Committee and Subcommittees meet annually to review questions put forth by the General Assembly, consider reports submitted to them and examine issues raised by the Member States.

Its purpose is to review the scope of international cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space, to construct programs to be managed under the UN umbrella, to encourage research and the distribution of information on issues relating to outer space, and to investigate legal problems that arise from the exploration of outer space. UN Resolution 1721 requires UNCOPUOS to maintain a directory of launches, based on information supplied by the launching State (UNOOSA, 1961).

Between 1979 and 1988 the UN Secretariat prepared numerous documents on the issue of space debris. However, official discussions of this problem were never initiated by UNCOPUOS Member States during this time. Proposals for space debris discussion appeared in 1988 following studies published by states and governmental organizations. The UN began discussing the scientific and technical aspects of space debris in 1994. In 1999, UNCOPUOS issued the Technical Report on Space Debris, which was to “establish a common understanding of the nature of space debris that could serve as a basis for further deliberations” (UNOOSA, 1999).

The five space treaties, which were all developed in UNCOPUOS, lay the foundation in law upon which STM rules can be built.

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4.2.2 ITU

The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) can be traced back to the International Telegraph Union, established in 1865. Based in Geneva, Switzerland it is the leading United Nations agency for information and communication technologies. The Union was established as an impartial, international organization within which governments and the private sector could work together, to coordinate the operation of telecommunication networks and services and advance the development of communications technology. With membership today including 191 States and more than 700 sector members and associates, the ITU spans three core sectors: radio communication, standardization and development. Its primary goal is to maintain and extend international cooperation among the Member States for the improvement and rational use of telecommunications.

The ITU has an elected council, referred to as the Administrative Council, which oversees administration and operations of the Union. The council is responsible for budget and finance issues, as well as coordinating ITU activities with other UN organizations. It also has directors for each of its sectors, or bureaus, which coordinate the activities of each sector; the Radio Communication Bureau, the Telecommunication Standardization Bureau and the Telecommunication Development Bureau.

The Radio Communication Bureau is the body responsible for assigning frequencies and orbital slots for spacecraft. It also provides assistance to member States, helps with resolving frequency interference cases, and offers technical assistance to developing nations, in conjunction with the Telecommunication Development Bureau. The Radio Regulations Board “approves the rules of procedure to register radio frequency assignments and equitable utilization of the geo-stationary satellite orbit” (Encyclopedia-ITU, 2007). It is the body responsible for investigating frequency interference cases and resolving these issues between member States and organizations.

The Telecommunications Standardization Bureau is responsible for disseminating information regarding international telecommunications regulations and documenting and maintaining data on telecommunications standards (Encyclopedia-ITU, 2007).

The Telecommunications Development Bureau provides technical assistance and information to member States and organizations, and processes collected data for publication (Encyclopedia-ITU, 2007).

The ITU manages the most notable current STM rules: the frequency and orbital slots in GEO.

4.2.3 IADC

The Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) is an international governmental forum established in 1993, made up of space agencies from around the world, created for global coordination of activities related to the issues of man-made and natural debris in space. The IADC exists to exchange information on space debris research activities and facilitate coordination between member space agencies. In addition, the IADC identifies debris mitigation options. Its members share interests in space debris research, which has the potential to aid in the development of cooperative research activities (Hitchens, 2004).

The IADC Terms of Reference are as follows:

a. Review all ongoing cooperative space debris research activities between member organizations.

b. Recommend new opportunities for cooperation.

c. Serve as the primary means for exchanging information and plans concerning orbital debris research activities.

d. Identify and evaluate options for debris mitigation.



The Terms of Reference also state that members should share data regarding orbital debris without restriction on its use.

In 2001 IADC was asked to draft a set of space debris mitigation guidelines, in hopes that they would be adopted by the United Nations and become the global standard (Hitchens, 2004). These guidelines are an important, positive step toward space traffic management. They have been endorsed by UNCOPUOS in June 2007 as a UN legal document. They are awaiting adoption by the General Assembly in December 2007.

4.2.4 ICAO

One final organization to consider is the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). This Specialized UN Agency is the global forum for civil aviation. ICAO works to achieve its vision of safe, secure and sustainable development of civil aviation through cooperation among its 190 Member States. Established in 1947, ICAO was created to “oversee international cooperation on regulations, standards, and procedures governing civil aviation” (Encyclopedia-ICAO, 2007). To implement this vision, the Organization established the following Strategic Objectives for the period 2005-2010:

A. Safety - Enhance global civil aviation safety

B. Security - Enhance global civil aviation security

C. Environmental Protection - Minimize the adverse effect of global civil aviation on the environment

D. Efficiency - Enhance the efficiency of aviation operations

E. Continuity - Maintain the continuity of aviation operations

F. Rule of Law - Strengthen law governing international civil aviation

ICAO is organized into three bodies. The Assembly, which meets every three years, is responsible for suggesting policy, determining ICAO’s budget, and assisting the other bodies of ICAO. They also elect the Council members. The Council is in charge of the day-to-day operations of the organization. It institutes international standards and practices for civil aviation and arbitrates disputes between Member States based on the Chicago Convention. The Secretariat is headed by a Secretary General, who is appointed by the council. The Secretary General appoints the staff of the ICAO secretariat and supervises and directs its activities.

4.2.5 New Organization

An alternative to forming a management structure under an existing organization is to create a new international agency that will manage a STM System. The benefit of establishing an entirely new entity is that is can be structured around the needs and vision of a comprehensive International Space Management Organization (ISMO), rather than trying to tailor the needs to fit an existing structure. In addition, due to the rather unique nature of this system, it would be difficult for any existing organization to adopt an appropriate management structure and still meet its original responsibilities.

One major obstacle of any new organization is the need to establish credibility. An ISMO will first need to gain the confidence of the core nations participating in IADC, as well as major industry partners. Once it has established credibility and good working relationships with these key players, ISMO can begin to take shape and play an integral role in the development and management of space activities.

Establishing a new international organization may be a long process. Inter-governmental agreements can be based on a legal text, which can be set up or modified only upon consensus among the participating members. Additionally, technical annexes can be more easily accepted by the members because they describe the core activities of the future organization. The legal framework of an inter-governmental body will mainly deal with very

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politically and legally sensitive issues such as, but not limited to, its mandate, the rights and duties of each participating member, financing rules, and the location of its headquarters.

4.3 Analysis and Direction There are a number of international organizations in existence today that could take on certain aspects of a space traffic management system. Yet, no single organization has the proper mix of technical, political, managerial, legal, operational and other required background and experience to successfully complete all of the phases of STM System implementation. Such an organization would need to be able to adapt to an ever-growing and changing environment, while providing a solid foundation to ensure a safe and efficient operating environment for spacecraft. Although the organizations listed above offer several benefits to adopting a STM system in terms of credibility and experience, the area of space traffic management is too unique for any one body to shift its individual scope.

Having discussed potential organizations to comprehensively manage a STM system and found that none was appropriate, there is need to return to the fundamentals of the selection process. For such a process of creating such agreements, the purpose and objectives of an organization must first be understood. The ideal space traffic management organization would be able to meet all current and future requirements for space activities, and be flexible and efficient in meeting the needs of member States and organizations. Additionally, it would facilitate the safe operations of all types of spacecraft through broad ranging regulations and guidelines covering areas such as orbital debris mitigation, frequency allocation and the handling of flight plans for manned spaceflight.

4.3.1 STM System Phases

It is anticipated that the formulation and implementation of a comprehensive STM System will be realized in three phases. The first phase consists of further rule development. Our report can be used as a baseline assessment of necessary rules, which will continue to be refined as the need for a STM System becomes more apparent. During the second phase, the STM System will be required to gain the support of the major space organizations (both governmental and non-governmental) prior to implementation. Phase three will consist of both implementation of the STM System and defining arbitration procedures.

4.3.1.1 STM Phase Management

Table 4-1 below identifies the organizations that would have the capacity to manage each individual phase and which organization will be the likely candidate to take ownership of each stage of STM System development.

Table 4-1: STM Phase Management

Managing Body

Phase I: Rule Development

Phase II: Consensus

Phase III: Implementation of the System

(1)

Phase III: Arbitration Procedures

(2)

UNCOPUOS √ √

ITU √ √

IADC √

ICAO √ √



New Agency √ √ √

Recommendations

From the above assessments and in order for this process to be most efficient, the recommended formulation and implementation method is as follows:

Phase I: Rule Development

The IADC is perhaps the most capable organization to define the rules of STM. The organization offers expertise in many different areas and aims to identify debris mitigation options. A separate Working Group might be established for this purpose.

Phase II: Building Consensus

In order for current space-faring States to oblige with the rules of an STM System, it is imperative that these States agree to the rules developed by the IADC. Due to the number of members and the credibility of the organization, Phase II will be best handled by UNCOPUOS.

Phase III: Implementation of the System and Arbitration Procedures

Although there are a number of existing international organizations that have gained credibility in the space community, they currently do not possess the management capability necessary to implement an STM System. Therefore, our recommendation is to establish a new international agency to implement and manage the STM System. However, it is possible that such an organization might be co-located at an existing organization such as ITU or ICAO. For the second half of Phase III, development of arbitration procedures, the ITU may be an option because of their existing experience with arbitration of space activities. However, our recommendation is to create a new arbitration committee as a subset of an existing organization, which is further described in Section 5 and in Appendix C: Proposed ‘Space Traffic Arbitration Commission’.

4.4 Proposed System

4.4.1 Role of IADC

IADC has produced a set of guidelines unanimously approved by its 11 members in October 2002, which encompasses the objectives of safety, efficiency and continuity (IADC, 2004). It is important to acknowledge that this document is one of the foundation stones of all space traffic management. It is equally important to recognize the essential role of IADC as an undisputed technical body, which comprises all major space-faring countries. Those countries may represent a core of nations that could add, in the long term, a decisive momentum, which may lead other nations to join the Space Traffic Management organization, as well as the technical know-how to help develop the rules.

It is therefore proposed that the members of IADC will extend its Terms of Reference in order to allow for the development of technical STM rules. The IADC Steering Committee and subsequent working groups could perform the following functions:

- Develop the set of technically viable STM rules

- Liaise with ECSS and ISO in order to implement those guidelines into national and international norms and standards

- Pursue its effort to cover also environmental protection issues as set in the fourth strategic objective

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- Produce a set of technical traffic rules based on the present study’s recommendations (see Section 4 of this report) to comply with the fifth strategic objective

- Define, in the near term, how a permanent organizational structure could gather the different tracking data and issue early warning and collision avoidance maneuver recommendations to satellite owners and operators on a daily basis

In the long-term future, define how a permanent organization may enforce the aforementioned set of rules

4.4.2 Role of UNCOPUOS

The UNCOPUOS, as the main international body which discusses space issues and as a forum for extensive engagement of a large cross-section of the international community of nation States, would be the most effective forum for gaining international support for the idea of an STM system and for the technical rules devised in Phase I by the extended IADC model. The UNCOPUOS has an unparalleled reputation as a forum for discussion on space issues and has wide international membership. It can thus provide, as no other forum can, a ringing endorsement for STM and its rules, from the widest possible number of actors. UNCOPUOS would therefore, be the forum in which consensus could be built and in which the STM technical rules could be adopted.

4.4.3 ISMO Strategies and Structure

The vision for the International Space Management Organization (ISMO) is to ensure access to and use of space for all mankind. To implement this vision, a STM system shall define strategic objectives. The following ICAO strategic objectives may be used as a reference:

1. Safety – Enhance the safety of global activities in air

2. Efficiency – Enhance the efficiency of civil air activities

3. Continuity – Maintain the continuity of global air activities

4. Environmental Protection / Sustainable development for air activities– Minimize the adverse effect of global space activities on the environment

5. Rule of Law – Strengthen the law governing international air activities

To accomplish its purpose of ensuring space activities are safe and efficient, the ISMO will need to receive tracking data from participating nations, to maintain an exhaustive database of all space objects launched (in cooperation with the UN Secretary General office, on the basis of the 1975 convention on registration of objects launched into outer space), to evaluate the risks of collision, and to notify satellites operators and owners about the potential for collision avoidance maneuvers.

Currently, the United States Air Force conducts collision assessments for human-rated vehicles and other spacecraft that are of significant value. It also publishes data on the location of known objects in space. Though this is an incomplete list, it is a good starting place, as this is freely available information. Data collected by other nations could be used to supplement this catalog in particular to verify and improve upon the data accuracy, but would not initially be required for the start-up of

Figure 4-1:

ISMO Operational Flow Diagram



an ISMO.

Additionally, satellite owners and operators have data regarding their own satellites. If they were to provide that data to a central organization, which could then combine all tracking data, ISMO would be able to more accurately perform conjunction calculations, and provide the most efficient avoidance maneuvers to the operators. Figure 4.1 illustrates how such a system could work.

Satellite owners and operators, in return, shall notify the operations centers whether they will follow the recommendations or implement their own procedure. At that stage, participating States’ efforts will be on a voluntary basis. No binding rules shall be set.

4.5.3.1 ISMO Competencies

To carry out such a mandate, the organization could be broken down into the following sections or bureaus:

� Human spaceflight and general launching operations

� Pre-launch licensing/permitting

� Tracking, Collision Avoidance, and Compliance

� Legal and Arbitration

� General Council

Human spaceflight and general launching operations could be accomplished in a similar manner to flight control operations for civil aviation. The filing of flight plans for human-rated vehicles and the dissemination of these flight plans would logically be accomplished by spaceport operators. Use of air traffic control systems (ATC) for operations to the extent possible would minimize costs and aid in coordination for air-launched space vehicles. For vertically launched vehicles, ISMO may have primary control, but would also need to coordinate with ATC. Figure 4-2 shows how ISMO might manage launch operations.

Figure 4-2: Envisaged ISMO Planned Launch Operations Management

Pre-launch licensing and permitting would involve a review of technical specifications of satellites, their operational parameters, assigning orbital slots and frequencies, etc.

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This would also be the likely source for suggested technical standards for manufacturers and operators. The purpose of such licensing and permitting would be to ensure that all spacecraft meet such technical standards for safe and reliable operation once in orbit. The primary goal of this would be to mitigate the generation of space debris, aid in tracking of spacecraft, and increase the overall safety on orbit.

Tracking, collision avoidance, and compliance would include receiving tracking data, input of data into a STM system, analyzing orbits, disseminating warnings of probable conjunctions, monitoring for non-compliance, looking for future system needs, and coordinating on-orbit and de-orbit maneuvers. To accomplish this, an independently-owned and operated global tracking system would be ideal but it would suffice to have input from existing national systems. Additionally, an automated system for analyzing data, computing conjunctions, and monitoring the space environment would be needed. A system for communicating with owners and operators and disseminating warnings and other operational information to Member States and organizations would also be critical to the success and efficient operation of a space traffic management organization.

The management organization would need to be able to facilitate dispute resolution and address legal issues. To coordinate this and all of the other responsibilities, a general committee would need to be established. This would be an international body responsible for suggesting future rules, coordinating concerns of international members/organizations, disseminating STM information to industry and national agencies and coordinating with the UN, ICAO, IADC, ITU and national administrations. It is likely that a sub-committee would be formed to deal specifically with the legal disputes and arbitration between Member States and organizations, as well as suggest further policies to promote the organization’s goals of safe, efficient, equitable, and continued access to space.

4.5.3.2 Finance

A comprehensive STM system will potentially be relatively inexpensive considering the perceived economic benefits realized for government and commercial space operators. In terms of personnel and infrastructure, a preliminary assumption of resources needed leads to the cost estimate outlined in Table 4-2.

Table 4-2: STM Operational Cost Estimate

Staff Task Description Man-Year

Annual Cost (USD

000s)

24 Hr On-duty Operator Maintenance of Tracking Objects & registration database and determination of collision avoidance maneuvers

10 $2,600

24 Hr Liaison Officer Communication with Data Providers and Satellites owners and operators

3 $800

Senior Executive Officer Liaison with UN and other international organizations (ICAO, ITU). Reporting to participating Members States

2 $500

TOTAL 15 $3,900



The estimated operational cost for the STM system is $3.9 million per annum. This figure assumes a base cost of $260,000 per employee per year, which includes the cost of infrastructure, equipment, salaries and fringe benefits for 15 employees. This estimate represents the minimum resources necessary to run efficiently the ISMO. However, national space agencies participating in the IADC, and willing to join that structure could offer many of the above contributions in-kind (e.g. secondment of experts, IT support, etc.), which will further decrease the operational cost.

4.5.3.3 ISMO Funding

Funding the system itself and the management and operations will likely be minimal compared to the potential economic benefits captured as a result of reduced probability of collisions. Since the pertinence of an international STM agency is still to be demonstrated, it is therefore unlikely that private funding will support the development phase of the ISMO.

The ISMO will be an inter-governmental agency in which participating governments will provide the funding for the system and operations. This funding may be based on the extent to which each nation maintains a presence in outer space. This financing structure is similar to that of ICAO in which contributions by member States are assessed on a sliding scale determined by the organization. When the ISMO is operational, the participation of the private business in a Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) could definitely be envisaged.

4.4.4 Industry Response to STM

A potential area of concern for the implementation of a STM system is the reaction of existing government and commercial operators to conforming to the ISMO rules and regulations. There is existing evidence that current satellite operators are willing to comply with such an organization because they have perhaps the most interest in a comprehensive STM system from a financial perspective.

David McGlade, CEO of Intelsat, stated that, “[The United States should] begin an international dialogue on 'Rules of the Road' for space”. Although there may be disagreement as to the value of additional laws or space treaties, there seems to be general acceptance that certain guidelines or norms developed by consensus may play a useful role in ordering our activities in space. A good example is the space debris guidelines developed by the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordinating Committee, an intergovernmental body created to exchange information on space debris research and mitigation measures. The development of other non-binding guidelines, such as protocols for informing other operators when a spacecraft under your control could potentially cause damage to other space objects, should be investigated” (McGlade, 2007).

That statement, raised by the CEO of a major satellite operator, shows that private businesses are certainly interested in space traffic management issues. Shall they be ready to pay for the implementation of those “Rules of Road”? On the one hand, major satellite operators have understood that, in the long-term, space debris and the absence of rules to access outer space may jeopardize their business. On the other hand, the insurance companies do not yet consider collision with space debris a significant risk. Additionally, before considering private funding, the ISMO should demonstrate its efficiency in solving or preventing problems. Finally, satellites owners and operators may be in favor of binding mechanisms that could be applied to all space businesses in order not to distort competition among space actors.

4.5.4.1 A Time for Regulation

“Once established international organizations, if they work well can lead to increased interest in cooperation. That cooperation may be desired at different stages of a space project or program; for instance planning, research and development, operations and regulations.

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Again, different organizational structures are likely to be needed at these different stages” (Houston, 2003).

Assuming that ISMO will convince space users of its role in mitigating collision risks, improving the sustainable development of space activities and limiting the amount of space debris, it may be possible to move towards a second step in order to formalize the commitment of participating States. The formal responsibilities of ISMO will be enforced through an international legal framework making the new set of rules produced by the IADC in the STM sector binding for all users of outer space.

As devised, this will require consensus within the international community. Taking into account the competition between satellite manufacturers, satellite operators and the emergence of new launching States, we do not envisage that a small number of countries will accept binding rules that may have cost implications for satellites while other users of outer space, potential economic competitors, continue to act freely and without regulation. This long-term objective therefore, while highly desirable, will be reviewed in future studies.

4.4.5 ISMO Challenges

There are several issues with implementing such a system today. From an agency perspective, there is no immediate need for such a comprehensive system. The number of human spaceflights remains very low, the number of satellite launches is also relatively low and the amount of debris in orbit is only starting to become a problem. Frequency allocation and orbital assignments for GEO are already managed by the ITU. The IADC exists “to exchange information on space debris research activities between member space agencies, to facilitate opportunities for cooperation in space debris research, to review the progress of ongoing cooperative activities and to identify debris mitigation options” (IADC, 2006).

Another potential challenge is that it is not likely that many nations will sign any binding agreements that they may view as limiting or interfering with their freedom of access to space. Industry is not likely to participate in a system that would potentially raise the cost of their operations or possibly put them at a competitive disadvantage. To create a successful space traffic management system, Member States and organizations would need to be assured that the benefits derived from a STM regulatory regime would outweigh the associated costs. Nonetheless, it has been demonstrated in this report that there is a need to begin a process that leads to a fully integrated space traffic management system. As most international organizations take substantial lengths of time to come into effective operation and gain the credibility needed to operate on the level of other successful organizations (such as the ITU, ICAO) it is likely to be of benefit to begin this process before the need for a STM regulatory regime becomes critical (e.g. when there have been several more satellite collisions in space).

As discussed, the probability of collision between space objects is currently relatively low. If they understand the need for a STM regime in the future, launching States and satellite owners and operators, are certainly not willing to agree to binding rules that will limit their freedom of use (militarily or commercially) of outer space. The main space-faring nation, the USA, also indicated in its latest National Space Policy that “they will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space” (Global, 2006). The USA is also the main provider of tracking data for space objects. An organization established without the support of this main space actor may lack the necessary credibility.



4.4.6 A Roadmap

Figure 4-3 shows the STM roadmap:

Figure 4-3: STM Roadmap

4.5 Conclusions on the Management of the STM System

It is believed that the system laid out above fulfills the requirements of an STM system and fits to the political and capacity exigencies of the current world situation. The lack of one capable and easily identifiable organization to manage space traffic management, and a desire to limit proliferation as much as possible, has led to the recommendation of the phased system comprising of IADC, UNCOPUOS and finally leading to the creation of ISMO.

ISMO itself, as a model, is predicted to implement and manage the STM system taking into account the needs of today and being able to be reactive to the needs of the future at the lowest possible cost and at the maximum possible utility. As an organization dedicated only to STM, its mission remains clear and defined and as such will provide a highly applied and effective service to spacecraft owner-operators. With this narrow mandate ISMO will join the ranks of international organizations that have been established over the past 50 years which have, through maintaining a narrow focus and clear mission, acted as effective international facilitators.

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______________________________________ Chapter 5

5 Legal Issues

In any traffic control regime, whether on land, sea, or air, disputes may arise. The same is anticipated for a STM regime. Inevitably there will be entities that may not adhere to the traffic rules, either by ignorance or neglect, which may therefore generate disputes. Hence, a mechanism to resolve these disputes needs to be established. There is little doubt the new STM rules, as is the case with any new rules, will bring with them new legal issues. The right of way in outer space, collision avoidance and maneuvers, and active tracking are all potential areas that could generate disputes that call for settlement.

This chapter focuses on the issues of dispute settlement, compensation and indemnification. The focus has been narrowed in this way for two reasons. First, as stated above, STM as a new field introduces new concepts and areas which, if the system is to be taken seriously will need effective settlement and redress. Secondly, the failure of many international drives has in the past often been predicated on the fact that for all their good intentions, their lack of enforcement and settlement measures has consigned them to ineffectiveness and obscurity.

In light of this, existing dispute resolution institutions under relevant international legal regimes and national laws have been discussed to examine if they are competent enough to resolve STM disputes within their juridical capacity. Most of the institutions have the capability but are not ideal to deal with the entire STM regime. Some dispute resolution regimes only deal with specific issues of STM. For example, the ITU manages satellite slotting in geostationary orbit, but not in other orbits. Other fora such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) may deal with dispute resolution but are inhibited by other restrictions that may impede dispute resolution for entities other than States from effective redress. Owing to the inadequacy of the existing avenues, new ways need to be explored to effectively design a dispute settlement mechanism relevant to STM.

Inextricably linked to dispute resolution is the issue of compensation and indemnity. As discussed earlier new legal issues like collision avoidance, maneuvers and active tracking might call for compensation in the event of loss of earnings. The current legal regime on liability has not addressed these issues. It is therefore imperative to find a solution to deal with this. Insurance companies also need to review their policies and brace themselves for such cases. Below is a brief discussion on alternative dispute resolution, indemnity and compensation.

5.1 Existing Avenues for Dispute Resolution in STM

5.1.1 International Court of Justice

Under international space law the competent institution with jurisdiction to deal with disputes from breaches of international law is the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The five principal space law treaties carry provisions that mandate the ICJ to deal with disputes arising out of the breach of the treaty obligations and responsibilities. For example, pursuant to the Liability Convention (UNGA, 1971), compensation, where the launching State shall be liable to pay for damages caused by its space operations, shall be determined in accordance with international law and the principles of justice. The ICJ, through its founding Statute,



provides that States can bring claims for breach of treaty obligations (ICJ-Art.36, 1945). Thus, if a State is in contravention with international law and/or rules governing space traffic, as long as the claim fits under the jurisdiction of the ICJ, it shall have the capacity to address the dispute. Damage caused on the surface of the Earth or by on-orbit collisions, stemming from the lack of observance of safety rules, under the liability convention would be addressed by the Court of Justice. The dispute must however be in the realm of International Law. The ICJ only deals with claims brought by a State against another State (ICJ-34, 1945). In the context of STM rules however, there are more actors, namely commercial and private entities. The jurisdiction of ICJ is limited to the consent of both States to be heard by the court. Thirdly, the process of the court is lengthy. Finally, its enforcement mechanisms are weak.

A solution to the above identified issues would be to expand the jurisdiction of the Court in order for it to deal with claims of private and commercial entities. This might take a very long time, because generally the Court relies on treaties and customary law, which also rely on the classical principle of States as actors of International Law. This calls for an overhaul of almost the whole international system to accommodate the change. This represents a task which could be considered arduous for the international community.

5.1.2 Dispute Resolution under the International Telecommunications Union

The ITU Constitution provides for dispute settlement in its establishing instruments (ITU, 1994). Pursuant to the ITU Convention, Member States may settle their disputes on questions relating to the interpretation or application of the Constitution, the Convention or the Administrative Regulations by negotiation, through diplomatic channels, according to procedures established by bilateral or multilateral treaties concluded between them for the settlement of international disputes, or by any other method mutually agreed upon. If no settlement is reached, Member States party to a dispute may have recourse to arbitration in accordance with the procedure defined in the Convention (ITU, 1994).

In addition to the ITU Constitution and the Convention, the Optional Protocol to the Constitution, Convention and Administrative Regulations provides for compulsory arbitration for disputes regarding the interpretation of the Constitution, Convention, or Administrative Regulations. This is applicable only to Member States who are party to the protocol.

Nonetheless, this dispute resolution regime deals only with disputes concerning the ITU and not space traffic management as a whole. To expand its scope to deal with disputes arising from the entire STM regime would entail an amendment of the ITU Constitution and Convention. This is a lengthy process, necessarily involving all the Member States of the ITU. In terms of membership, the ITU approach is holistic because it is based upon cooperation between governments and private entities. The membership of private entities (known as Sector Members) includes “telecommunication policy-makers and regulators, network operators, equipment manufacturers, hardware and software developers, regional standards-making organizations and financing institutions” (ITU, 1994).

5.1.3 Dispute Resolution in Air Law

The Chicago Convention, which provides the basis for the operation of ICAO, addresses dispute settlement under Chapter XVII -Dispute and Default. It provides for negotiation, appeals, arbitration procedures and penalty for non-conformity. ICAO provides a framework for national licensing regimes that implement the provision of the agreement and establish mechanisms for enforcement and dispute settlement. In the case of dispute settlement governed by more than one legal regime, the parties to the dispute must decide which regime will be followed. In the case of the ‘high seas,’ for instance, an area primarily governed by the Law of the Sea, the ICAO rules stipulate that “over the high seas, the rules on force shall be those established under the ICAO Convention” (Chicago, 1944).

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5.1.4 Compensation under Liability Convention

The Liability Convention states that compensation shall be through diplomatic channels between States or through the Secretary General, provided both are members of the UN (UNGA, 1971). In the case where no settlement is achieved, the Liability Convention provides for the establishment of a Claims Commission at the request of either party. The Claims Commission shall decide the merits of the claim for compensation and determine the amount of compensation payable, if any. The decision of the Commission shall be final and binding if the parties have so agreed; otherwise the Commission shall render a final and recommendatory award, which the parties shall consider in good faith. The Commission shall state the reasons for its decision or award (UNGA, 1971).

5.1.5 World Trade Organization Dispute Resolution System

The World Trade Organization has established documentation with aspects relevant to space traffic management. They include opening of markets for satellite telecommunication services and the establishment of dispute settlement procedures within the WTO for this sector, thereby filling a gap in space law (COSMIC, 2006). Again this is more specific in nature and therefore not adequate to deal with other legal aspects of a STM system.

5.1.6 Other Commercial Arbitration Systems

With the proliferation of commercial and private activities in space, it is prudent to explore other commercial alternatives to dispute resolution potentially relevant to STM.

5.1.7 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes

International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was established to provide facilities for the conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes and to promote the flow of foreign investment between developed and developing countries while keeping in mind the need for international cooperation for economic development. The centre itself is not engaged in conciliation and arbitration, but assists in the initiation of such proceedings, performing a variety of procedural and administrative functions. This is, however, not directly related to space but can provide a venue for dispute settlement for terrestrial investment issues that may warrant the attention of ICSID. Private commercial arbitration provides an alternative since this can be performed at lower cost, and has the potential to be conducted effectively in shorter time frames compared to State-State judicial procedures. However, under the current principles of international space law, each space object is associated with a specific State. For this reason, commercial arbitration is perhaps not the best avenue for STM-related dispute resolution.

5.1.8 Dispute Resolution under Private International law 1

The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) could be used to complement the Registration Convention.

1Conflict of laws (or private international law or international private law) in common law systems, is that branch of international law and intra-national interstate law that regulates all lawsuits involving a "foreign" law element where different judgments will result depending on which jurisdiction's laws are applied as the lex causae. In civil law systems, private international law is a branch of the internal legal system dealing with the determination of which state law is applicable to situations crossing over the borders of one particular state and involving a "foreign element" [élément d'extranéite], (collisions of law, conflict of laws). Lato sensu it also includes international civil procedure and international commercial arbitration (collisions of jurisdiction, conflict of jurisdictions), as well as citizenship law (which strictly speaking is part of public law).



5.1.9 National Courts and other Dispute Resolution Institutions

Unless dispute resolution is explicitly international in nature, national courts and other existing national dispute resolution institutions are a first resort for dispute resolution. Disputes relating to space are typically international, unless both parties to a dispute are of the same nationality. The Liability Convention excludes claims for damages caused by a launching State to its nationals, and to foreign nationals if they are participating in the operation, or if they are within the immediate vicinity of a planned launch or recovery area as the result of an invitation by that launching State.

In disputes involving two States, depending on the legal regime in operation, 2 countries may decide to pursue the claim in one of the national courts of either party involved in the dispute, using private international law. With regard to STM, national law would not be the best option, especially in the event that it shall be governed under an international legal regime. The possibility of handling the disputes nationally is not disputed, but the international character of STM excludes dispute resolution at a national level.

5.1.10 Recommendations for Dispute Resolution in STM

1. Remove impediments on international institutions regarding their capacity to deal with dispute resolution in STM. This entails expanding the mandate of some institutions, such as the ITU or ICAO

2. Strengthen the capacity of international institutions in any area relevant to STM and allow disputing parties to identify relevant institutions

3. Amend the existing international legal regimes in order to have them explicitly provide for a STM and stipulate dispute settlement mechanisms for STM.

4. Subject the STM regime to judicial advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice to determine the competent institution that should be endowed the power to address dispute resolution in STM.

5. The establishment of a new arbitration institution that shall deal with STM, such as the notional Space Traffic Arbitration Commission (STAC). (See Appendix C: Proposed ‘Space Traffic Arbitration Commission’)

5.2 Compensation and Indemnification Two different cases have been identified, for which compensation and indemnification may need to be considered in a space traffic management system:

- Maneuver, in which case two satellites of different operators perform a maneuver in safety and suffer no physical damage. In this case, loss of fuel which could lead to reduction in lifetime and by extension loss of earnings could be incurred by the two operators.

- Collision, in which case two satellites collide, either because of refusal or inability to comply with STM instructions or suggestions. In this case, losses could be much higher, with the worst case scenario being an entire satellite falling out of operation.

The following definitions are used for the purposes of the discussion below:

2 For instance in the case of Maritime and air law, a party to dispute can be subjected to national courts jurisdiction of another to seek redress. For example if there is a case involving a French water vessel or air craft is in collision with a British water vessel or air craft , the parties could agree to institute a in the national courts of either the countries in claim reparation. However there are many other factors at play including the location of collision

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Indemnity: An expressed or implied contract to compensate an individual for loss or damage e.g. insurance policy.

Compensation: Something (such as money) given or received as payment or reparation (as for a service or loss or injury).

Therefore, for the purposes of the following discussion of the legal implications for maneuver and collision, indemnity is defined as a legal obligation for one party to pay compensation to another party for damages (physical or other) caused.

5.2.1 Maneuver

The following analysis considers issues associated with compensation and indemnity, in the case of two satellites which are required to perform a maneuver to avoid a collision. This scenario is fundamentally different from the case of a collision between two satellites (which is considered in the following section). The reason for this is that the principle of liability in international space law, enshrined in the Liability Convention, has less applicability, due to the fact that there is no physical damage caused, and the extent of the damage is difficult to assess and quantify.

5.2.2 International Air and Sea Law

There currently exist laws which apply to ships and aircraft in national and international waters and airspace, which provide for collision avoidance maneuvers. However, there is no provision in either international air or sea law for compensation for the cost of collision avoidance maneuvers, when these maneuvers are conducted successfully. The reasoning behind this is the fact that international air space is not owned by any one particular State, and the fact that the collision avoidance maneuver is typically shared between the two coincident craft.

This raises a question as to the applicability to a space traffic management system of compensation for the successful operation of collision avoidance maneuvers in space. However, it is pertinent to point out a significant difference between air/sea traffic and space traffic in this respect. The difference is that the performance of collision avoidance maneuvers for air and sea traffic, while imposing some cost (time, fuel, etc.) on the owners and operators of the craft in question, do not limit the ability of the craft to perform their primary function, i.e. the safe transportation of goods or persons. On the other hand, the performance of a collision avoidance maneuver on the part of a satellite may substantially impair its ability to provide a service. The consequences, which will vary depending on the specific circumstances, are considered in the following section.

As stated above, the performance of successful collision avoidance maneuvers of two satellites is unlike the case of a collision between two satellites. This is due to the fact that the extent of “damage” caused, and the liability for such damage, is not as easily identifiable.

5.2.3 No compensation

It can be argued that it is not suitable for any system of compensation to be implemented in a space traffic management system, in the case of the performance of a successful collision avoidance maneuver. Some support for this view is provided by an examination of measures in international air and sea law, mentioned above, which provide no means for compensation to any parties involved in the successful operation of collision avoidance maneuvers.

In this case, the argument is based on the principle that air space and the high seas (and, by analogy, outer space) are natural resources, not subject to ownership or sovereignty by any State or private entity, and free for use within the constraints of international law. It can therefore be said that no State or other actor can claim any higher right to use such resources, in comparison to other States and actors.



5.2.4 Compensation

A case can also be put forward regarding greater suitability of compensation for the costs of performing collision avoidance maneuvers. Such arguments are based on the assertion that, while the orbital resources of outer space are not subject to ownership, it is of great importance that the use of such resources should maximize the public benefit and allow for the provision of commercial services. To the extent that such goals are impeded by any actor involved in the performance of collision avoidance maneuvers, it may be appropriate to impose compensation costs on such an actor.

One fundamental question to address is the issue of whether the performance of a collision avoidance maneuver impairs the ability of the satellites to provide a service (rather than a simple consideration of the operating costs of performing a maneuver). This will depend on extensive technical details of specific satellite services and traffic conjunction scenarios. Various technical considerations will be the positional deviation required to conduct a safe and successful collision avoidance maneuver, any resulting loss of satellite services (in terms of time outages for service provision, loss of revenue, etc.) and the extent to which the maneuver is shared between operators.

In developing a rationale for a scheme of compensation, this may depend in part on the type of services provided by a particular satellite. For example, it may be possible to consider safety-of-life services (such as search-and-rescue, emergency radio beacon services, and other such related services) as higher in priority, and with possibly greater entitlement to compensation. However, due to the ambiguity in defining what constitutes safety-of-life services, differentiation of services and associated schemes for compensation may be open to abuse.

5.2.5 Options and Recommendations for Compensation

Based on the discussion of the previous sections regarding compensation for the costs of successful maneuvers, several scenarios are identified below. These are considered, along with potential options for compensation.

Two maneuverable satellites – shared maneuver

In the case of the successful performance of a collision avoidance maneuver, in which the two satellites involved are capable of conducting a maneuver, and both share the maneuver, it would seem most appropriate for no indemnification obligations to be imposed on either operator, due to the principles of freedom of use of outer space resources, and the responsibility which falls on satellite operators and States to make use of space resources responsibly. One possible scenario in which the payment of compensation would be appropriate is the case in which the performance of a maneuver limits the ability of a satellite to provide safety-of-life services. From an energy management point of view, this is very inefficient and as such is unlikely to be put into practice.

Two maneuverable satellites – non-shared maneuver

The following deals with the case of the performance of a successful maneuver, in which two satellites in conjunction are both technically capable of performing a maneuver, but only one of the satellites performs this maneuver. If the satellite which is not maneuvered clearly has right-of-way in accordance with STM rules, then no compensation should be due. If the owner-operators of a satellite which does not have right-of-way choose not to maneuver, causing another satellite to have to move, then in the interests of encouraging responsible use of outer space resources, it may be appropriate to impose compensation costs on the operator of the satellite which failed to maneuver. However, if the reason that the satellite is not maneuvered is due to concerns regarding a reduced ability to provide safety-of-life services, it may be appropriate for no compensation costs to be imposed on the operator of this satellite.

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Maneuverable satellite and non-maneuverable satellite

If a successful maneuver is performed, in which only one of the two satellites involved in the conjunction is technically capable of performing a maneuver, one possible course of action would be to impose indemnification obligations on the owner of the non-maneuverable satellite, if there is impairment in the ability of the maneuverable satellite to provide services. This would be an encouragement to implement and maintain the ability of satellites to conduct maneuvers, which would be of benefit to the efficient management of space traffic.

5.3 Collision The first verified collision with catalogued space debris occurred in 1996, tearing off a boom from the French satellite Cerise (COSMIC, 2006). The chances of satellite collision and the risk of collision between satellites and accumulating space debris continue to increase.

A collision can occur between a satellite and a piece of space debris, or between two satellites, either because of refusal to comply with STM instruction / suggestions (maneuver for example), or because the STM system failed. This raises a question as to how this will be managed. Even if the actual probability of a collision in orbit remains very small, in view of the very high cost of damage caused by orbital collisions, it is necessary to make producers of space debris and actors who cause collisions liable for any damages that they cause. In the following sub-sections issue of liability and indemnification for damage caused in space by collisions will be examined. In addition, observations will be made as to the lack of existing rules for appropriate indemnification of collisions.

Space activities can be public or private but States can be held liable can be engaged under international treaties for its own space activities and also for the private space activities under its jurisdiction. The actual dispute settlements are mostly on a case by case basis, in function of contract and program. There are two possibilities for a juridical action to obtain compensation for a collision. The first concerns an action under the international “Liability Convention” (I). The second possibility is an action against a private company under general domestic liability rules (II).

5.3.1 Indemnification of Collision Regarding the Liability Convention

The liability of actors engaged in space operations, and notably States, is regulated by international law, and particularly the United Nations Liability Convention.

Concerning the damages caused by space objects, the issue of liability is fundamental. The “Liability Convention” (UNGA, 1971) provides the basis of a legal framework for indemnification of collision; it undertakes the task of defining liability in case of damage caused by space objects. “Whenever two or more States jointly launch a space object, they shall be jointly and severally liable for any damage cause” (Article V 1).

Liability is attached to the “launching State”, which is the State that launches, procures a launch or from whose territory or facility the space object in question is launched. The “Liability Convention” is thus applicable on a State-to-State basis. This means that the launching State will pay for the damages caused and the private company will indemnify the State.

Claims under the “Liability Convention” must be brought by one State against another State. Private entities are not subject to the Convention. The Convention was created to supplement existing and future national laws providing compensation to parties injured by space activities. Under the Liability Convention, claims must be brought on the State level only. This means that if an individual is injured by a space object and wishes to seek compensation under the Liability Convention, the individual must arrange for his or her country to make a claim against the launching State of the object that caused the damage.



Article XII and XV (1) of the Convention provide actions to give an indemnification to a collision. A commission composed of three members, one appointed by the claimant State, one appointed by the launching state and the third member, the chairman, to be chosen by both parties jointly. The decision shall be in accordance with international law of and the principles of justice and equity.

The Convention is broad in scope, trying to include all types of possible damage that might occur in outer space in one document. It provides for the possibility of collisions and malfunctioning and their consequences. This Convention was drafted during the Cold War, where a small number of States were the only space actors. Although the drafters of the Convention attempted to establish internationally accepted principles of liability, the diverse political interests held by the USA, the former Soviet Union, India and the European nations during the negotiations have not authorized a more detailed convention.

5.3.2 Indemnification of collision regarding to the space insurance system

Commercial entities generally rely on private insurance to help cover the risks of outer space activities.

Insurance consists of the promise of reimbursement in the case of loss, paid to space companies concerned about hazards to the extent that they have made pre-payments to an insurance company. Space insurance is mainly focused on commercial space activities and has become an important economic factor. No market of this magnitude would be possible without the insurance industry. Insurers are important providers of risk capital and risk management expertise to satellite operators.

Typically, space insurance coverage is split into the launch and in-orbit phases. The in-orbit coverage, usually renewed yearly, covers damage to the satellite through technical failures and through the harsh space environment, which includes orbital debris. “In-orbit” insurance is available but mostly on a short-term basis. However, concerns about space debris may force an increase in insurance rates.

The cost of in-orbit third party liability insurance, which covers only physical damage, has increased due to the increasing risk of loss from space debris. But loss may be difficult to prove. The risk of causing damage is very small but the financial consequences are high. Consequently, insurance is worthwhile only if it covers the legal costs of defending such a case.

In the commercial space sector, high insurance premiums continue to represent a barrier to growth in the industry. As a result, a number of commercial space actors have stopped insuring their in-orbit assets and/or purchased spare satellites.

The risk of personal and property damage caused by artificial outer space objects is rising because of the numerous artificial objects in orbit. The accumulating volume of artificial space object debris, resulting from exploration and exploitation of outer space, aggravates the situation and further increases the potential for personal and property damage. The need for an effective liability regime for damage caused by debris in outer space has consequently become more urgent.

5.4 Conclusions Having considered some of the alternatives for dispute resolution, it is evident that none of the institutions discussed can comprehensively address dispute resolution in a STM regime. A Space Traffic Arbitration Commission (STAC), in preference to an organization with mediation or negotiation powers, since arbitration is binding in nature, and therefore likely to provide greater flexibility, and may be less complex and costly than other dispute resolution mechanisms, has been proposed in Appendix C: Proposed ‘Space Traffic Arbitration Commission’.

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In addition, various approaches to the issues of compensation and indemnification have been proposed, for the cases of both maneuver and collision between satellites. The fundamental issue, in the question of collision avoidance between two spacecraft in space traffic management, is whether it is necessary to develop a system which is intrinsically equitable. It should not be the case that a spacecraft with a lack of maneuvering capability is subject to a set of circumstances which are competitively more advantageous than a spacecraft that does have maneuvering capability. Why should an operator who has chosen to have the ability to move be penalized for the decision of another operator to not include such capacity?

However, there is a desire to provide incentives for engagement with an STM system. Therefore, a system of compensation for maneuver would seem a viable option. For this concept, it is imperative to define what such a system for compensation of one satellite operator by another is based on. Does the question of a loss of revenue enter into the calculations? Is it assessed on the basis of fuel costs and if so should it make a difference if the fuel used for that particular maneuver has a direct effect on the required life of a satellite as opposed to eating into the fuel margin. These are but some of the factors that must be taken into account.

Without very careful definition and regulation there is a risk that spacecraft operators will shy away from a system that could potentially make them liable for significant losses of other operators associated with a collision avoidance maneuver. These questions are incredibly difficult to quantify and are significantly beyond the scope of this study. It is concluded that there is need for feasibility study to fully establish whether compensation is appropriate for space traffic or whether collision avoidance maneuvers should be considered to be simply the 'cost of doing business' in space. If the answer is in the affirmative there is also a need for a clear elucidation of the quantitative elements on which this regime should be based.



______________________________________Chapter 6

6 Outreach Program

6.1 Introduction Outreach is the process by which this report will be presented to the world. This is important as Space Traffic Management is a global problem. In order to reach the key players (e.g. the world’s space agencies, the commercial organizations involved in developing the spacecraft, the governments who introduce and enforce legislation and the public who elect these governments), an outreach plan is needed. To this end, reasonable targets must be identified that can be accomplished in the near, medium and long term future.

The two major groups, or target audiences, are the space community and the public. The space community is defined as the people and entities within or related to the space industry. The public is defined as all people, entities and organizations (including the general public) not directly related to the space community.

6.2 Space Community Awareness Plan

6.2.1 Agencies

To be successful, a STM outreach program will need to arrange meetings and presentations with targeted individuals and departments within the following agencies, who could further develop further such a system.

• NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration)

• ESA (European Space Agency)

• FAA (U.S Federal Aviation Agency)

• United States Space Command

• CNSA (China National Space Agency)

• JAXA (Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency)

• ISRO (Indian Space Research Organization)

• Other interested agencies in the space community

6.2.2 Present Papers and Posters at Conferences

Presenting STM related papers and/or posters at different relevant conferences will help to increase awareness of the need for immediate action regarding the creation of such as system. Furthermore, this will allow industry leaders to review these suggested policies. Examples of conferences where STM presentations would be most effective are listed below.

• IAC (International Astronautical Congress): Hyderabad, India. September 24-28, 2007

• UNCOPUOS: Vienna, Austria. June, 2008

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• ITU World Conference: Geneva, Switzerland. October 22 - November 16, 2007 Plenipotentiary ITU Conference - 2010

• IAASS – 20083

• UNESCO/ESA/ESCL Conference “Legal and Ethical Aspects of Space Exploration. Paris, France. November 2007

• ECSL (European Center for Space Law) Practitioners Forum: Paris, France. March 2008

• ICAO (International Civil Aviation Authority): Montreal, Canada. 1-3 October 2007

6.2.3 Journals

Papers discussing space traffic issues and related topics should be submitted for publication in relevant peer reviewed journals and magazines, such as:

• IEEE/AAS Journal

• Debris Journal

• Ad/Astra

• Orbital Debris Quarterly News (JSC)

• ESA bulletin

• Journal of Space Law

6.2.4 Orbital Footprinting

The ecological footprint is a tool used to measure the impact of human activities on the environment.

The ‘orbital footprint’ is a measure of the impact a spacecraft has on its orbital environment in terms of using up frequency bandwidth, orbital slots, etc. Using a similar concept to eco-footprinting, a system could be designed whereby an orbital footprint could be assigned to each type of spacecraft and in some cases, to any one particular craft. The idea is that spacecraft manufacturers and public administrators could use this data to make better informed decisions relating to STM regulations and how they affect the performance of spacecraft and vise versa.

6.2.5 Courses in the Workplace

In the long run, a continued working relationship with industry leaders to adapt a plan in order to develop a comprehensive STM system that can be utilized in the future should be nurtured. To encourage and stimulate industry involvement in the STM development process, more courses with an emphasis on the STM issue should be provided for industry partners through the various agencies and organizations. These courses could be similar to those already carried out by entities such as ESA, NASA and IAASS. These may even be counted as Continual Professional Development (CPD) to increase participation.

6.3 Public Awareness Plan

6.3.1 Eco-Footprinting

As mentioned previously, an ecological footprint is used to measure the impact of human activities on the environment. Simple activities can be undertaken, such as developing an

3 No IAASS conference has been scheduled for 2008, as of this writing. However, IAASS conferences will be important events at which to present space traffic management materials.



‘Eco-Footprint’ and present it in an effective format for each type of launch vehicle and each mission. This could, for example, take the form of comparing the mission footprint with and without adherence to STM guidelines. This ‘Eco-Footprinting’ can be carried out for missions as they would appear in a projected working STM system, and compare them with the results for an industry without a STM. This may serve to illustrate the positive impact a STM has on the industry.

These ecological footprints could initially be presented to governments and agencies where the immediate impact would be most profound. This would be followed by presentations at educational institutions, such as schools and universities.

6.3.2 Press Release

A press release is a written statement distributed directly to the media, which draws their attention to a particular topic or issue. Reporters are likely to utilize a well-written press release as a feature story if they feel it is of interest to the public, more interesting than the other leads they receive and written in the proper format. With that in mind, multiple press releases should be written and submitted to many news sources, such as the Associated Press, around the globe.

6.3.3 Wiki

“A wiki is a type of website that is developed collaboratively by a group of users, and can be easily added to or edited by anyone (known as 'open editing')” (AskOxford, 2007). Currently, a wiki is being set up, which will initially be available to the ISU Space Traffic Management team, Co-Chairs, and the rest of the ISU network. This editable database can be accessed and edited over the internet from anywhere in the world and will serve to keep the project moving forward and involve the global community. In time, certain sections of this database will be made available to other interested parties not affiliated with the ISU STM team, such as governments, agencies, schools & universities and the general public. This wiki could eventually serve as a working document that will, through much iteration, become the basis for the creation of a real and workable STM system.

6.3.4 Education

Universities have long been the place to shape young people’s minds, and so a program of creating awareness of the problem and possible solutions related to space traffic should be encouraged within the curriculum implemented of universities. Core classes, through mandatory lectures and individual presentations in selected engineering and space policy universities will be targeted, and lecture plans will be developed to aid the instructors. Today, only a small percentage of universities focus on this problem, and solutions are rarely presented. Good coordination between Department Chairs and Academic Coordinators at each university would need to be implemented.

6.3.5 Civil Society STM Advocacy

Involving and encouraging civil society organizations in the space field (e.g. the Secure World Foundation, Planetary Society, Students for the Exploration and Development of Space and Space Generations) will help to carry out awareness and lobbying campaigns for a STM system within their programs. These organizations have the capacity and capability to reach out to the public and also act as a conduit between governments and the public.

6.3.6 Naming Debris

The selling of naming-rights for space debris would be a unique way to engage the public and educate them about the issue related to debris. To implement this idea, a website could be developed which allows a visitor to select an object and purchase the right to register their chosen name for the object into a database. They could then track the object as it orbits the

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Earth. Potential customers will be able to use this website to forecast an object’s trajectory and estimated re-entry date (if in LEO), and may choose to select a piece that will “burn-up” on a certain date at a specific location. The website would also contain information about the problem of space debris and the need for a STM system. The funds raised by the sale of naming rights could be used for financing further public and industry outreach.

6.3.7 Public Events

If future development of technology allows, the use of intentionally re-entering debris to create meteor showers could be explored. The idea is similar to the presentation of fireworks at large public events, such as the Olympics, music concerts, festivals, etc. These created meteor showers could be conducted in conjunction with existing events, but do have the potential to become stand alone events.

6.3.8 Information, Education and Communication Materials

Information, education and communication materials (IEC) such as t-shirts, hats, flyers, pens, etc. have become a popular marketing tool in a broad number of fields. Designing and selling t-shirts, decorated with the Space Traffic Management logo or similar artwork, may raise awareness of the issue amongst the general public. Internet based companies already selling space related products may be willing to carry these t-shirts in their product line. Another option is to incorporate a products section into the website used for naming and tracking debris, allowing the public to buy such items from there.

6.4 Goals

6.4.1 Near term (0-5years)

Eco footprinting – compare Non-STM spaceflight with STM spaceflight

Press release – present the STM issue as one of public interest

Wiki – create a forum for interested parties from both the public and within the space community

Education – target universities and schools to increase general awareness of STM related issues

Agencies - arrange meetings with the relevant agencies to coordinate efforts to create a STM

Journals – submitted for publication, papers discussing space traffic issues

Conferences - present STM papers at different relevant conferences

IEC Materials – design and produce awareness materials for sale, which publicize STM

6.4.2 Medium term (5-10 years)

Naming Debris – Create a way of naming and selling of debris to create awareness of the issues in the public

Conferences contd. – continue to present STM papers at different relevant conferences

6.4.3 Long term (10+ years)

Man-Made Meteorite Shower – use a future cleanup system to re-enter removed debris in a way to draw the public’s attention to the issue

Orbital footprinting – provide comparisons between compliant and non-compliant spacecraft



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7 Limitations

As laid out in the introduction to this project, the aim has been to provide a sound understanding of space traffic, its potential problems and possible solutions.

Taking into account the assumptions laid out at the beginning of this paper, the fundamental limitations which arose in the formulation of this report due to time and capacity constraints were;

• Technical results were insufficiently validated

• Data, of a superlative quality, was not found for input into the technical calculations

• The proposed zoning rules have not been rigorously analyzed for feasibility against the current space object population.

• The ideas of STAC, ISMO, and the organizational development path have not been mooted extensively in the international community.

• Legal and management procedures were not able to be fully laid out and need further study.

• Although basic financial analyses have been undertaken, in-depth costing has not been put in place.

As a result of the above elements, the level of rigor for the results of the final project has not been to the level initially envisaged. All of the above said however, the conceptual paths and analyses that have been undertaken in all sections have been supported where possible. Where this was not possible, any further assumptions that have made have been clearly stated and taken into account in the results.

It is believed, as a result, that the relationships and suggestions set out in this report are sound. It is envisioned that this report, as the first set of STM rules that have been assessed for feasibility from a multidisciplinary approach (technical, policy and implementation), has the technical and legal integrity to be used as a basis for future studies and deliberations on the topic of STM.

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________________________________________________

8 Conclusion

From the outset, the aim of this report was to assess the extent of the problem of space traffic and, once this scope was established, develop effective STM rules. To that end, the report recommends a set of eleven technical traffic rules and two environmental.

These rules take into account technical feasibility, current political and legal realities, and are contextualized within the structure of an international system for space traffic management. This report lays out a path for the establishment of this system utilizing existing organizations, specifically IADC and UNCOPUOS and recommends the creation of a new organization, the International Space traffic Management Organization (ISMO), as the appropriate body to manage space traffic management operations.

The recommendations of this report can be summarized as follows;

1. It is recommended that, for the sustainable development of space, the international space community should be effectively engaged on the issue of space traffic management.

2. It is recommended that member agencies of IADC, with the aim of considering an expansion of the IADC mandate, undertake the following tasks:

a. Conduct a detailed study for a future space traffic management system taking as a starting point for the rules laid out in Appendix A: The Rules, covering geostationary orbit, sun-synchronous orbit, human-rated spacecraft, collision avoidance and environmental issues.

b. Assess further organizational issues of dispute settlement and the legal issues of compensation and indemnification

c. Conduct a feasibility analysis of the phased management structure of IADC, UNCOPUOUS and the creation of ISMO.

In summary, it is believed that this report is a step forward in understanding and dealing with the complex issue of space traffic and its consequences. While the scope of this report was limited, due to time and capacity constraints, it nonetheless lays the foundations for future analysis and the creation of realistic and appropriate solutions to the predicted increase in space traffic in years to come. Raising awareness of the space traffic problem must happen soon because, if the issue of the growing use of limited orbital resources is not dealt with in its nascent form, the long-term effects and technological challenges are predicted to be formidable.



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Jehn, R., Hernandez, C., Klinkrad, H., Flury, W. 2004, 'Space Traffic Management in the Geostationary Ring', 55th International Astronautical Congress (IAC-04-IAA.5.12.4.05), Vancouver, Canada

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________________________________________________

10 Appendix A: The Rules

Space Traffic Rules

Rule I) For all predicted conjunction assessments the STM system will calculate the probability of collision, impact velocity, and probability of the breakup creating a threat to other spacecraft.

Rule II) For all predicted conjunction assessments involving at least one maneuverable spacecraft, and a collision probability over 1/10,000, the STM system will provide a suggested collision avoidance maneuver to the spacecraft owner-operator(s).

Rule III) If the STM predicted conjunction has the probability higher than 1/3000 of generating space debris that could endanger other spacecraft, then the spacecraft owner-operator will be strongly urged to perform a collision avoidance maneuver preferably the maneuver proposed by the STM system, but an alternative maneuver is acceptable if it is safe.

Rule IV) If the STM predicted conjunction is only a threat to the conjunctional spacecraft and has less than a 1/3000 chance of endangering other spacecraft, then the spacecraft owner-operator(s) can choose if, when, and how to perform collision avoidance.

Rule V) A new system of SSO orbital slotting is defined as follows:

1. A band (or plane) of SSO orbits is formed from 12 defined altitudes between 500 km and 1000 km which have a repeating ground track period between 50 and 100 orbits and whose separation in altitude is greater than 20km.

2. Approximately 42 bands of SSO orbits are spread around the Earth separated in right ascension at the equatorial crossing.

3. Each altitude/inclination combination forms an SSO orbit. Each orbit is divided into multiple slots 50 km apart in the direction of satellite motion, for a total of approximately 1000 slots.

All future SSO satellites will be placed into one of these slots. Rule VI) All GEO spacecraft owner-operators shall, on a regular basis, provide positional data to the STM system for the purpose of conjunction assessment. This data will not be distributed outside the STM system

Rule VII) All GEO spacecraft owner-operators shall provide notification 48 hours prior to initial station acquisition, station-keeping and relocation maneuvers to the STM system.

Rule VIII) All GEO spacecraft owner-operators are encouraged to grant consent for distribution of owner-operator derived positional data, via the STM system, to all neighboring GEO spacecraft owner-operators for the purpose of enhancing station-keeping planning



Rule IX) The STM system shall provide orbital data on all spacecraft which perform relocation maneuvers in GEO to all GEO spacecraft operators who may be affected by the proposed maneuver. An altitude band from 41 to 200 km above and below GEO is reserved for relocation and station acquisition maneuvers.

Rule X) Circular orbits with altitudes below 500 km are reserved for human-rated spacecraft; non-human rated civil or commercial space objects are not permitted in this zone unless they meet all of the following criteria:

• Registered with the STM system

• Will remain in orbit for less than 5 years.

Non-human rated spacecraft should also comply with the following:

• Maneuvering capability

• Satellites too small to track should have devices which allow their position to be determined.

Rule XI) 48 hours before the flight of any human-rated orbital or sub-orbital vehicle, the owner-operator shall submit a flight plan to the STM system detailing the following:

• Vehicle type

• Number of passengers

• Launch date, time, and location

• Trajectory (if sub-orbital) or orbit

• Length of flight (if sub-orbital) or time in orbit

• Landing date, time, and location

• A risk assessment and compliance with STM criteria

All on-orbit maneuvers of any human-rated vehicle will, where possible, be coordinated 48 hours in advance using the same method above and providing the same information

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Environmental Rules

Rule I) The following IADC guidelines, as endorsed by UNCOPUOS as voluntary nonbinding guidelines, should be adopted and then enforced by the STM System (UNCOPUOS, 2007).

1) Limit debris released during normal operations 2) Minimize the potential for break-ups during operational phases 3) Limit the probability of accidental collision in orbit 4) Avoid intentional destruction and other harmful activities 5) Minimize potential for post-mission break-ups resulting from stored energy 6) Limit the long-term presence of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages in the low-Earth orbit

(LEO) region after the end of their mission 7) Limit the long-term interference of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages within the

geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) region after the end of their mission.

Rule II) The following amendments to UNCOPUOS debris mitigation guidelines should be adopted

• For guideline 6, the phrase “long term” should specifically refer to the “25 year rule” as defined by the IAASS An ICAO For Space. Therefore, the guideline would be re-written as:

6) Limit the long-term presence of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages in the low-Earth orbit (LEO) region after the end of their mission to 25 years.

• For Guideline 7, Sun Synchronous Orbit should be considered in addition to GEO. Therefore the guideline would be re-written as:

6) 7) Limit the long-term interference of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages within the Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) and the Sun Synchronous Orbit (SSO) regions after the end of their lifetime.



Figure 11-1: Two-dimensional drawing of satellites shown with the ellipsoidal threat volumes. The longest ellipse side used in the simulation was 2 Km. The range (shown above) was set to zero to allow the alerts to be generated when the threat volumes intersected. Image courtesy of Advance CAT help manual, page 12.

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11 Appendix B: Simulation Report

A satellite collision risk simulation using Analytical Graphics, Inc. (AGI) - Satellite Tool Kit v8.02, was executed to analyze possible conjunctions among active satellites. A conjunction is defined as the intersection of predetermined ellipsoidal volumes, also referred as threat volumes, around a satellite or other operational space object, Figure 11-1

STK’s Advanced Close Approach Tool (Adv. CAT) uses two groups, a primary and a secondary group, to realize the propagations and computations amongst all the TLEs included in those groups. The software propagates each orbital path based on the TLE provided for the specified time duration and examines every single orbiting object in the other group that may come within the specified boundary. Given the highly computational requirements and time imposed by the software, only the interaction between currently active satellites was analyzed.

The simulation was limited to a 24 hour period using a 2007 catalog with 2006 active satellite database information for a total of 804 TLEs of active satellites at that time. The simulation yielded a total of 2 conjunctions in LEO around active satellites with a 2 Km x 0.4 Km x 0.4 Km threat volume ellipsoidal volume. The number correlates within a factor of 2-3 with the prediction and analysis conducted by other proximity assessment calculations such as SOCRATES (Kelso, 2005), a study for Collision Avoidance for Operational ESA Satellites (Klinkrad, 2005), and a custom model conjunction assessment developed by Beihang PhD candidate Mr. Wang Ting.

To correlate our results with the different and more in depth analysis done on this subject a pseudo linear relationship between our data set and the ones used by the mentioned references is assumed. The comparison across the above mentioned processes unfolds as follows: the ENVISAT scenario shows about 1 conjunction per year, extrapolating that to a number of satellites of about 3000 (number used by other two methods) and since the probability is about 1/3,000 probability (Klinkrad et al, 2005) then when compared to our data set the number of daily conjunctions becomes 804/365 = 2.2. The SOCRATES analysis

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Figure 11-2: Threat volumes of two spacecraft shown on intersection course. The software generates a flag with the speed, angle, time, and other information relevant to the event.

yielded 250 possible conjunctions for 1 Km boxes in a period of 7 days after evaluating about 2700 objects against a debris field of about 10000 objects. Converted to average daily set the calculation yields 35.7 conjunctions per day, since our set is a third of that amount (804) the effective number of size comparable approaches is about 10. Our other source for comparison data was obtained by using a geometrical-numerical algorithm to determine the conjunctions.

This algorithm applied a geometric filter followed by a time filter, and then identified conjunctions based on a close approach function. This method resulted in a 3 conjunctions per day comparable data set. Finally, our data set and analysis the interaction between the 804 active satellites resulted in 2 conjunctions in a 1 day period, given a factor of 10 in the number of objects used in the other calculations the number jumps to 20. Overall all the numbers in the many scenarios visited are within the right order of magnitude given the varying methods, data sources, and inherent uncertainty of the space objects in their ever varying environment.

The significance of the finding is important and stresses the need of a more organized and coherent approach to satellite tracking as well as an implementation of basic yet comprehensive space traffic management system in order to effectively mitigate the risk of collisions and to effectively manage the ever increasing space traffic flux.

Figure 11-2 shows a screen shot of approaching spacecraft and their surrounding threat volumes as shown during an STK simulation.

The 2 conjunctions occurred among satellites in LEO. The computational parameters for

the simulation were the following:

3. Number of TLE’s run in simulation: 804

4. Date/Time Span of Run

i. Start: 03 Aug 2007 00:00:00.000

ii. End: 04 Aug 2007 00:00:00.000

5. Out of Date Filter: ON (Time= 1.00 day)

6. Apogee/Perigee Filter: ON (2 Km)

7. Path Filter: ON (2 Km)

8. Time Filter: OFF

9. Propagator: SGP4



10. Max Sample Step Size: 300.00 seconds

11. Min Sample Step Size: 1.00 seconds

12. Threat Volume dimensions: 2 Km x 0.4 Km x 0.4 Km

13. TLE Reference Database: stkSatDb.sd (All satellite payloads)

The characteristics of the computer used are:

14. Dell Precision M90 Workstation

15. Processor: Dual Core 2.16Ghz T7400

16. RAM: 1.00GB

In order to generate an accurate close approach model using the STK software, a more powerful computer with better computational resources such as faster processors and larger amounts of RAM is needed. This problem is greatly emphasized by the increase in the estimated error over long periods of time with about 10 Km after a 7 day period. (Kelso and Alfano, 2005) Such an increase in the number of orbiting satellites added to the computations will raise the current results from the currently hundreds of weekly intersections to several thousand weekly intersections.

Figure 11-3 is an analysis of the conjunction software written by Mr. Wang Ting as compared to the SOCRATES tool available online at http://celestrak.com/SOCRATES/search.asp

Figure 11-3: Comparison of Mr. Wang’s Calculations with SOCRATES

.

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12 Appendix C: Proposed ‘Space

Traffic Arbitration Commission’

General Parameters

A Space Traffic Arbitration Commission (STAC) can be built and guided by the following basic principles. These may be subject to change depending on the evolution of STM rules and the role of ISMO.

1. The main objective of STAC would be to ensure the effective resolution of disputes rising from the implementation of the STM rules.

2. STAC should deal with disputes only after other options, specifically alternative dispute resolution institutions, have been exhausted.

3. STAC should be able to serve as an independent investigative body. 4. The parties to suit (i.e. those involved in the dispute) should be granted the

leeway to decide on the constitution for STAC. STAC shall, however, be neutral and independent in its administration of its decisions.

5. Dispute resolution in STM shall be guided by international law (Liability Convention, customary law, etc.) and national laws where applicable. The binding nature of the decisions should be considered case by case.

6. Redress, restitution and damages should be achievable. 7. STAC should provide a mechanism for proper compensation and claims for

indemnity. 8. Over time it can be determined whether STAC can be endowed with the

power to impose sanctions to parties in default of executing its decisions or recommendations. These sanctions are still to be determined.

9. STAC can have regional offices in order to facilitate easy access to all member States and organizations.

Rules and procedures can be developed using the above parameters or other parameters, as STAC deems fit and necessary.



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13 Appendix D: Definitions

Collision Avoidance: any means of actively removing the threat of a predicted future collision with another space object, usually by maneuvering

Conjunction: a point in the future when two objects in Earth orbit could possibly collide

Conjunction Assessment: the method of predicting when two objects might collide in the future using calculations

Covariance: the amount of error in a calculation

Elset: element set, an equation that describes a satellite's position and velocity in orbit

General Perturbations: analytical propagation using average forces

GTO: geosynchronous transfer orbit, any intermediate orbit used in the process of launching a space object into the geosynchronous belt

Human-rated: a spacecraft that either contains humans or has the ability to contain humans

Owner-operator: the entity that either controls a satellite (if it is operational) or placed it into orbit (if it is non-operational or debris)

Rocket Body: a rocket stage that entered orbit

Special Perturbations: numerical propagation using state vectors

UVW: inertial frame of reference for satellite orbits where U is radial direction, V in-track, and W cross-track based on the direction of satellite motion

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14 Appendix E: List of Acronyms

A

AAD Automatic Activation Device

AAS American Astronomical Society

AGI Analytical Graphics Inc.

ASAT Anti-Satellite

ATC Air Traffic Control

B

BNSC British National Space Centre

BUAA Beihang University of Aeronautics and Astronautics

C

CAST China Academy of Space Technology

CEO Chief Executive Officer

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

CNES Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales

CNSA China National Space Agency

E

ECSL European Centre for Space Law

ECSS European Cooperation of Space Standardization

ESA European Space Agency

F

FAA Federal Aviation Agency

I

IAASS International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety

IAC International Astronautical Congress

IADC Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

ICJ International Court of Justice

ICSID International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers



IEC Information, Education, and Communication

IFR Instrumental Flight Rules

IMO International Maritime Organization

ICRC Inter Committee of the Red Cross

ISMO International Space Management Organization

ISO International Standards Organization

ISRO Indian Space Research Organization

ISS International Space Station

ITU International Telecommunication Union

G

GEO Geostationary Orbit

GPS Global Positioning System

GSO Geosynchronous Orbit

GTO Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit

GYO Graveyard Orbit

J

JAXA Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency

JSC Johnson Space Center

M

MEO Medium Earth Orbit

N

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NPS Nuclear Power Sources

L

LEO Low Earth Orbit

O

O/O Owner-Operator

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

OST Outer Space Treaty

P

PPP Public Private Partnership

R

RFID Radio Frequency Identification

RGT Repeating Ground Track

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S

SAA South Atlantic Anomaly

SIA Satellite Industry Association

SSN Space Surveillance Network

SSS Space Surveillance System

STAC Space Traffic Arbitration Commission

STM Space Traffic Management

STK Satellite Tool Kit

SSO Sun-Synchronous Orbit

T

TLE Two Line Element Set

ToR Terms of Reference

TTC Telemetry, Tracking and Control

U

UN United Nations

UNCOPUOS United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

UNGA United Nations General Assembly

US/USA United States of America

USD United States Dollar

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command

V

VFR Visual Flight Rules

W

WTO World Trade Organization

space traffic management - international space university

Documents