sp 3.2 session 9 u boats

American Sea Power Unprecedented Global Reach

session ix U-boats

His Majesty’s Undersea Boat U-1, built by the Germania Shipyard

“IT WAS JANUARY 1917 before Wilhelm accepted that the U-boats

would have to be unleashed in an unrestricted campaign against British supply lines. The decision was taken under the influence of the military.• Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, appointed to supreme command of land forces in Aug 16, after the failure of the Verdun offensive,…”

Peter Padfield, Maritime Dominion and the Triumph of the Free World; Naval Campaigns that Shaped the Modern World, 1852-2001. p. 184.

17Unrestricted U-boat War, 1917

“…Verdun offensive, and his intellectual right hand,• Gen Erich Ludendorff. Both were archetypal men of iron, descended from the Prussian warrior-landowning nobility. Ludendorff in particular was a repository of the most extreme values of the caste: he regarded war, like Treitschke,• as the meaning and ultimate goal of the state….”


Ibid.

“…the state. “He was in a position to realize the concept. The war had exposed Wilhelm’s temperamental inability to exercise supreme command and the army had seized control,…”


Ibid.

“…seized control, taking the place in the highest council, which Bismarck had devised to concentrate all power in his own hands. In fact, if not in name, Hindenburg and Ludendorff were the military dictators of Germany. They had determined on a ruthless campaign against merchant shipping as the only way to knock out Britain, financier and energizing force of the enemy alliance. It was a desperate gamble, certain to provoke the United States, yet it had to be taken because the central powers could hardly survive another year of the blockade….”


Ibid.

“…the blockade. Severe food shortages caused by loss of labor to the armed services and war industries and lack of fertilizers from abroad had hit the civilian population especially hard—since fighting men were favored in the distribution of provisions. Rage, presently directed against the British ‘Hunger Blockade,’ could all too easily turn against the government. Unrest was palpable. Meanwhile, the armies were locked in static trench warfare and outnumbered by the Allied armies….”

Padfield. pp. 184-185.


“…Allied armies. “Bethmann argued for a negotiated peace, but since Hindenburg, Ludendorff and the naval staff, backed by the magnates of heavy industry, insisted on retaining the great swaths of conquered territory occupied by the central powers he was unable to offer anything remotely acceptable to the Allies. He made an approach in Dec but it was rejected out of hand. Woodrow Wilson then offered to mediate, but neither side wanted an American-imposed solution. Now, like Falkenhayn earlier, Hindenburg and Ludendorff saw U-boats as the only weapon to force their annexationist peace….”

Padfield. p. 185.


The Race Was On

Could Germany bring the British to their knees with a submarine “blockade”?

Would Wilson maintain his preferred neutrality policy?

But if America did enter the war, could she mobilize her peace-time armed forces and project them overseas past the U-boats and fast enough to tip the scales in the Allies’ favor?”.

What about the Eastern Front?

Germany was truly rolling the dice…

jbp

Major Topics

I. Introduction

II. U-boat Offensives

III. America’s Road to War

IV. Convoys

V. Victory

Introduction“Only Lord Fisher anticipated the submarine menace, but [First Lord] Churchill and Adm Prince Louis of Battenberg, the First Sea Lord at the outbreak of war, discounted his warnings.”—Sea Power, p. 455.

The Admiralty Extension (which is also one of the two buildings which are sometimes referred to as the "Old Admiralty") dates from the turn of the 20th century.—Wikipedia

“The continuing war at sea was conducted mainly for the protection, interdiction, or destruction of shipping—military and mercantile. From the first to the last day of fighting, each side carried on this unceasing battle, for on its outcome depended all else, on land, sea, or in the air. Britain, following her tradition of centuries, imposed a blockade on Germany, expecting it to be even more effective than in the past because of the increased need for imports imposed on Germany by industrialization. Yet by judicious stockpiling, development of substitute materials, and by imports through neutrals, Germany blunted the edge of the blockade and endured four years of relative isolation from the markets of the world. She struck back at sea, weakly at first, but with gradually increasing effectiveness. Her most telling instrument in this counterblockade, the U-boat, was at the beginning discounted by nearly everyone as an inefficient means of commerce raiding, as indeed it was if used in accordance with the then generally recognized rules of visit and search. Used unrestrictedly however the U-boat brought Germany to the brink of victory. ““Conceived as a scouting auxiliary to the fleet and as a means of making underwater attacks on warships, the SS appeared at first to present no vital danger to merchant shipping.….”

Potter & Nimitz, eds., Sea Power, p. 455.

25:The War against Shipping

“…merchant shipping. In fact commerce raiding occupied a low position in Germany’s initial strategy, for the continental-minded General Staff expected to win the decision quickly on land. Even in the German navy this view of commerce raiding prevailed,• for as students of Mahan’s writings they believed that guerre de course could not result in the destruction of enough shipping to force Britain from the war, and would have even less effect against France. “Both the British and the German navies viewed the naval war largely in terms of conventional naval battle. Each side recognized the North Sea as the area of decision. Specifically designed for North Sea ops, the German High Seas Fleet had a combat radius of only 575 mi. Hence most of its ships were useless as raiders. With no possibility of the German main fleet’s breaking out into the Atlantic to interdict supplies to Britain, all Britain had to fear were small squadrons such as Spee’s in the Pacific, occasional surface raiders such as the Emden, and armed, disguised merchant ships. The possibility that the SS might prove a new and deadly peril to Britain’s Merchant Navy, outside as well as inside the North Sea, was foreseen by few and generally dismissed from serious consideration.• Only Lord Fisher anticipated the SS menace, but Churchill and Adm Prince Louis of Battenberg, the First Sea Lord at the outbreak of war, discounted his warnings.”

Ibid.

“Britain’s establishment of the blockade against Germany was not as simple as it had been against France in the Napoleonic wars. In the first place, Germany had control of the Baltic and could import freely from northern neutrals. Second, changes in ships and guns, the invention of the SS and mine, and the threat of the still untested airplanes made close blockade impossible, and distant blockade could not be fully effective. Yet under International law, a blockade to be legal must be effective. In an effort to resolve this dilemma, an international commission had met in London in 1909. The resulting Declaration of London defined new distinctions in contraband: absolute contraband, such as munitions and other obvious war materials, and conditional contraband, including food, clothing, and railroad equipment, which could be used for peaceful as well as wartime employment. Finally there remained free goods, presumably of no war value. The Declaration applied the doctrine of continuous voyage only to absolute contraband, so that in perfect conformity with the doctrine, Germany during the war would presumably be able to import any item on the conditional contraband list through neutral countries.”

op. cit., pp. 455-456.

The British Blockade

“…neutral countries. ”Britain had refused to ratify the Declaration of London, which would have struck at the heart of her sea strategy. When war broke out she adhered to its provisions only for a few months, and even then only as she chose to interpret them. By frequent Orders in Council she arbitrarily transferred items from the conditional to the absolute contraband list. She enforced her contraband-control measures primarily by the Tenth CL Squadron, based at Liverpool and the Shetland Islands. This squadron, consisting of 18 and later 24 CLs and armed merchant cruisers, intercepted and sent to British ports many German vessels making for home. But they could

op. cit., pp. 455-456.


not intercept them all in the characteristic conditions of low visibility in the North Sea….”

“…North Sea. ”In order to control neutral shipping, the British on 2 Oct 14 proclaimed a mine field across the southern end of the North Sea from the Thames to Belgium. Neutrals had to call at English ports for contraband-control search before receiving sailing instructions through the mine field. A month later the British Admiralty proclaimed the entire North Sea and the waters between Iceland and the Norwegian coast a war zone and prescribed one swept route through the Channel and into the Baltic. The effect of these two proclamations was to give Britain control of all shipping to Northern Europe, for, with negligible exceptions, merchant ship captains were glad to put into British ports, even though it meant inspection of cargo, in order to get clearance and safe passage on to their destinations. Germany not unnaturally proclaimed the blockade to be uncivilized warfare waged against helpless women and children and strove with all possible means to break it. Her first U-boat ops struck at the blockading warships with the sinking in Sept 14 of CLs Pathfinder, Aboukir, Hogue, and Cressy, all engaged in blockade patrol.• Such ops however could have little effect on Germany’s situation. Since her own merchant marine was largely swept from the sea, she turned more and more to neutral bottoms to import the necessities of life….”

op. cit., p. 456.


“…of life. British inspections of neutral ships resulted in the confiscation of any contraband consigned to Germany. Further, the British also rationed neutral imports of certain strategic commodities to the average of pre-war levels in order to cut down on transshipment to Germany. These measures caused keen resentment in neutral countries, but the British had to ignore such reactions in order to keep the blockade effective. To encourage the maximum amount of shipping, the British inaugurated a State War Risks Insurance scheme which was effective for all ships carrying British goods, provided their masters conformed to Admiralty routing instructions.”

Ibid.


U-boat Offensives Returning to Bremen after a successful “hunt.”.— jbp

“In response to the British declaration of 2 Nov 14 of the entire North Sea as a War Zone, Tirpitz submitted to his government an appreciation urging the use of U-boats against Britain’s trade. Since it took considerable time to weight the political implications, including the possibility of American entry into the war against Germany, U-boat warfare against merchant ships was delayed until Feb 1915. On 4 Feb,• Adm Pohl…” op. cit., pp. 456-457.

The First U-boat Campaign,22 Feb to 20 Sept 15

“…Adm Pohl published in the Imperial Gazette the following warning:

“To implement the first U-boat campaign, the German navy had 24 U-boats ready for ops, a gain of six since the opening of the war.…”

op. cit., pp. 456-457.


(1) The waters around Great Britain and Ireland including the whole of the English Channel are hereby declared to be a War Zone. From 18 Feb onwards every enemy merchant vessel encountered in this zone will be destroyed, nor will it be possible to avert the danger thereby threatened to the crew and passengers.

(2) Also neutral ships will run a risk in the War Zone, because in view of the British authorization of 31 Jan of the misuse of neutral flags and hazards of sea warfare, it may not always be possible to prevent attacks on enemy ships from harming neutral ships.1

______ 1 Arno Spindler , Der Handelskrieg mit U-booten, (Berlin, 1932), III, 87.

“…the war. U-boats employed in WW I fell into four main classes, as follows: (1) • U-cruisers: with great range and maximum surface speed of 16 to 17 knots, but carrying comparatively few torpedoes; (2) • U-boats: generally 600 to 900 tons surface displacement,…”

op. cit., pp. 456-457.


“… surface displacement, having a surface speed of 15 to 16 knots and an underwater speed of 7.5, and carrying from 10 to 16 torpedoes or from 34 to 36 mines; (3) • UB-boats: approximately 125 tons, later enlarged up to 500 tons, with a surface speed of 12 to 13 knots and a submerged speed of 7.5 knots, and carrying four torpedoes;.…”

op. cit., p. 457.


“…four torpedoes; and (4) • UC-boats: principally designed for minelaying, at first 150-ton boats of 6-knot surfaced and 5-knot submerged speed; later versions displaced 400 tons.…”

op. cit., p. 457.


“… 400 tons. “The principal U-boat bases were in the German Bight of the North Sea, with a d d i t i o n a l t r a i n i n g establishments at Kiel and Danzig. In the Med the operating bases were Pola and Cattaro on the eastern shore of the Adriatic.…”

op. cit., p. 457.


“…the Adriatic. In Mar 1915 the Flanders U-Flotilla was established, operating chiefly UB- and UC-boats from Zeebrugge and Ostend with repair facilities at Bruges..…”

op. cit., p. 457.


“…at Bruges. Boats proceeding from Germany usually took station in the North Sea or followed the long route around Scotland to reach the Western Approaches area,• the local waters to the W of the British Isles through which all ships bound for British ports had to pass. Flanders-based boats operated generally in the English Channel and up to the mouth of the Thames and also employed the Channel as a short route to the Western Approaches.…”

op. cit., p. 457.


“…Western Approaches. Not until the summer of 1918 were the British able effectively to. close the Dover Straits to U-boats. “In response to orders based on the declaration of 4 Feb, some 20 U-boats took station in the North Sea, the English Channel, and the Western Approaches area. In spite of neutral, especially American, protests against a ‘paper blockade’ the U-boats struck, sinking an average of 1.9 ships daily for the remainder of the year, or nearly 100,000 Gross Register Tons per month.2.…”

Ibid.


______ 8 Gross Register Ton, abbreviated G.R.T., is an internationally accepted measure of the carrying capacity of a cargo ship, computed on the basis of 100 cubic feet of cargo space per ton. Warship tonnage is measured in displacement tons. A freighter of 3,000 G.R.T. would have about 5,000 tons displacement.

“…per month.2

“The first campaign soon fell foul of stronger American diplomatic pressure.• On 7 May 15 the unarmed, unescorted British liner Lusitania, steaming slowly off the coast of southern Ireland,• was torpedoed and sunk by U-20.…” Ibid.


“…by U-20. Among the dead were 128 Americans.…”

Ibid.


“…128 Americans. The US dispatched a stiff diplomatic protest to Germany, characterizing the attack as murder on the high seas. The note demanded guarantees for the safety of Americans on the seas, and immunity of passenger steamers to attack.…” Ibid.


“…to attack. Germany merely dismissed the note with the reply that the Lusitania had been carrying war materials and therefore was a legitimate target of war. Great was American indignation, yet, as Germany had foreseen, the US was not prepared to go to war. “A few months later, in Aug, the British steamer Arabic,• off Kinsale, Ireland, crossed the path of U-24, which promptly sent her to the bottom.• The loss of three American lives in this sinking brought American protests to the point of threatening war. Germany now wavered….” op. cit., pp. 457-458.


“…now wavered. Chancellor Theobald v Bethmann-Hollweg and Adm Georg v Müller of the Emperor’s naval staff both urged a conciliatory approach to the US. As a result, all U-boats not in the operational area were held at dockside until a decision could be made. On 20 Sept, the first phase of the U-boat campaign came to an end with the order that passenger liners would be immune from attack. In view of the tense diplomatic situation in the North Atlantic, Germany shifted all focus of her ops to the Med, where she sank over 100 Allied merchantmen during the remainder of the year….”

op. cit., pp. 457-458.


Germany’s U-boat Ace

Lothar v. Arnauld de la Perière1886-24 Feb 1941

Vizeadmiral Lothar von Arnauld de la Perière (March 18, 1886 – February 24, 1941), born in Posen (now Poznań, Poland) and of French-German descent, was a German U-boat commander during World War I. With 194 ships and 453,716 gross register tons (GRT) sunk, he is the most successful submarine ace ever. Нis victories came in the Mediterranean, almost always using his 8.8-cm deck gun. During his career he fired 74 torpedoes, hitting 39 times….During World War II, he was recalled to active duty as a rear admiral, and was killed in a plane crash near Paris in 1941 while taking part in secret negotiations with the Vichy French government.—Wikipedia

At the end of 1915 SM U 35 was taken over by Kptlt. Lothar von Arnauld de la Perière. He was to become the most successful U-boat skipper of all time, a record which still stands. During his war time career, he sank 194 ships totaling 454,000 tons, always strictly according to prize rules often with his boat's 88 mm deck gun. His patrol performance was outstanding: in April/May 1916 he sank 23 ships, totaling 68,000 tons on a five week patrol and in July/August 1916 in four weeks he sank 54 ships, totaling 91,150 tons using only 4 torpedoes (one miss). Arnauld, who stayed in command of SM U 35 until 1918 and conducted 15 war patrols with it, later commented on this patrol: "My record cruise was quite tame and dull. We stopped the vessels. The crews boarded the lifeboats. We inspected the ships' documents, told the crews how they could reach the next port and then sank the stopped prize." For his achievements the Prussian aristocrat Arnauld, who was a modest but very skilled skipper respected by his crew, was awarded the Pour le Mérite.—U-boat.net

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vizeadmiral

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pozna%C5%84

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U-boat

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_register_tonnage

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mediterranean

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Torpedo

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vichy_French

“…the year. “The year 1915 ended without either side gaining a decisive advantage in the commercial war. Britain’s new construction replaced all but a few thousand tons of her merchant ship losses. German U-boat losses remained within acceptable limits. Germany had lost 23 boats from all causes since the beginning of the war, but she now had 68 in commission. Her construction-to-loss ratio was almost five to one. In spite of the limitations imposed on the U-boats, they had done a remarkable job, and senior naval officers such as Tirpitz and Scheer • longed to release them for unrestricted SS warfare.” op. cit., p. 458.


“Early in 1916 Germany reconsidered her U-boat policy.• Gen Ludendorff and Adm Tirpitz mistakenly believed that the US had become somewhat more sympathetic toward U-boat warfare. But the Kaiser,• after considerable wavering,• brushed aside the protests of Gen v. Falkenhayn and, ignoring Tirpitz altogether, postponed the campaign and prescribed that attacks without warning be made only within the war zone and on merchant ships carrying guns for protection against SSs. Deeply offended,• Tirpitz resigned.….”

Ibid.

Germany’s Second U-boat Campaign,1916

“…Tirpitz resigned. “Within two weeks a new German-American crisis arose. On 24 Mar UB-29 sank the unarmed, unescorted French steamer Sussex.• Three Americans were injured. The US immediately threatened to break diplomatic relations with Germany unless she conducted SS warfare in strict conformity with International Law. The German government replied with the ‘Sussex pledge,’ promising that SS attacks commerce would be conducted in the future in strict conformity to Prize Law, which required visit and search and provisions for the safety of passengers and crew before sinking….”

Ibid.


“…before sinking. Adm Scheer, believing that war conducted by U-boats in accordance with Prize Law could not possibly succeed, recalled his SSs from Western waters and announced that the U-boat campaign against British commerce had ceased.• The Kaiser approved of Scheer’s abandonment of the war against merchant shipping and ordered a vigorous U-boat campaign against warships. “From May to Sept 1916 the Germans attempted several U-boat ambushes of the type • Jellicoe had foreseen when he wrote his famous letter to the Admiralty of Oct 1914.3 Scheer planned raids against unfortified British east coast cities, using surface units as bait and SS to ambush any British forces lured out. A dozen U-boats were so employed at the time the British Grand Fleet sortied out for the sweep that led to the Battle of Jutland. In Aug U-boats sank the British CLs Nottingham and Falmouth. “In the Med the war against commerce continued unabated. In mid-Mar 1916, Britain began to direct Australian and Far Eastern shipping from the Suez Canal-Med Sea route to the longer but safer passage around the Cape of Good Hope. This measure proved a prudent anticipation of the German threat, for losses in the Med were second only to those in the North Sea.”

Ibid.


______ 3 See page 434, above. [This letter is quoted in the Jutland presentation, frame 14.]

“As 1916 drew to a close, increasing pessimism in the German army brought recognition that if Germany was to win the war, her chief hope lay in the U-boat arm. Gen Field Marshal Paul v. Hindenburg, now Chief of the German General Staff, realized that Germany was losing the war simply because she was not winning. No longer could she afford a military stalemate. The great Verdun offensive had drained German manpower, and the inexorable crush of the British blockade had caused suffering in the Fatherland itself. All weapons had been tested and exploited to the full except one—the U-boat. In the first campaign of 1915 the Germans believed that they had destroyed a monthly average of 120,000 G.R.T. of Allied shipping and in the second of 1916, 216,000 G.R.T. “Conditions appeared ripe for a coup de grâce to the weakened British merchant marine….”

op. cit., pp. 458-460.

Germany’s Decision to Adopt Unrestricted U-Boat Warfare

“…merchant marine. On 22 Dec 16,• Adm Henning v. Holtzendorff, Chief of the Naval Staff, wrote Hindenburg an appreciation that was to become the basis for the final German decision. In this document, Holtzendorff categorically stated that the SSs if unleashed in Feb 1917 could force Britain to surrender by Jun, before the summer harvest could be reaped. He reviewed the situation of Britain’s shipping and her food imports….” op. cit., pp. 458-460.


“…food imports. His estimate was that 10,750,000 tons of cargo vessels, about two-thirds of which were British registry, were bringing food to Britain. Assuming that the U-boats could sink 600,000 monthly for five months, neutral shipping would be driven from the traffic by the frightful losses, and the surviving merchantmen and cargoes would be insufficient to prevent famine in England. “Holtzendorff dismissed possible counter-arguments. America aid to the Allies, if given at all, would be too little and too late. Convoys as an Allied defense measure were obviously not practicable, he assumed, or the British would have already employed them. He also believed the large number and improved efficiency of the underwater force Germany could throw into the campaign would outweigh Allied antisubmarine technological improvements. These predictions, except for the estimated tonnage to be sunk, were to prove completely wrong. “Impressed by Holtzendorff’s estimates,• Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg finally supported the idea of unrestricted U-boat warfare….”

op. cit., p. 460.


“…U-boat warfare. American diplomatic action over the Lusitania, the Arabic, and the Sussex had checked the SS campaigns of 1915 and 1916, but now the German High Command was ready to take the supreme gamble and disregard the danger of an American declaration of war.• “On 9 Jan 17 the Kaiser ordered his 82 North Sea and Flanders boats to begin unrestricted SS warfare on 1 Feb. ‘The U-boat war is the last card,’• commented Bethmann-Hollweg ominously. For better or for worse Germany had set her fate upon a cast and now waited the hazard of the die. Ironically enough, a month after the campaign began revolution broke out in Russia [The first of two. A Provisional Government would keep up the fight until the following winter before starting peace negotiations] and soon [sic] German troops from the Eastern Front became available for service in the West. By this time however, American troops were ready to counterbalance German reinforcement of the Western Front. [The dramatic German breakthroughs on the West Front would not begin until Mar 1918 and American troops begin to matter until Jun 1918.] ….”

op. cit., p. 460.


“…Jun 1918.] As the first step in implementing unrestricted U-boat warfare, Germany proclaimed ‘Barred Zones’ around Britain, France, Italy and in the Eastern med, in which all ships, British, Allied or neutral, were, after 1 Feb 17, liable to be sunk without warning. (see map page 459.) “To open the campaign in Feb 17, the first wave of boats from the North Sea Flotilla undertook to run the Straits of Dover to the Western Approaches,…”

Ibid.


“…Western Approaches, for the roundabout route N of Scotland normally consumed 50% of a U-boat’s patrol time. Thus, employment of the short passage added substantially to the number of U-boats on station in the Western Approaches.• Other heavy concentrations operated in the North Sea and in the Channel. The curve of sinkings shot up rapidly. Although the Germans overestimated Allied losses by about a third, the actual sinkings exceeded Holtzendorff’s estimate.5 British economy and war potential reeled under the onslaught. It soon became obvious that if sinkings continued at the present rate, Britain must yield.”

Ibid.


______ 5 Allied and neutral losses for the first six months of unrestricted U-boat campaign as estimated by the Germans and actual figures:

Month of 1917 German Estimate —GRT Admiralty record— GRT

Feb 781,500 536,334

Mar 885,000 603,440

Apr 1,091,000 875,023

May 869,000 594,654

Jun 1,016,000 684,667

Jul 811,000 549,047

Monthly Average 908,917 680,628

“The initial use of U-boats in 1914 primarily against warships encouraged the British Admiralty in its belief that no special precautions would be necessary for the protection of merchant ships. The consensus in the RN was that the best way to deal with the U-boat was to continue blockade, patrol of the sea routes, and knocking out the bases from which the boats operated. hence the British made bombing raids on the u-boat bases and sent increasing numbers of SSs, airships, and surface ships to patrol waters traversed by the U-boats. “At the outset the Admiralty and the War Council decided that the convoy system that had safeguarded British shipping in the wars against France would not be reinstituted during the war against the Central Powers. A spirit of laissez faire had come upon British shippers and on their government during the century of peace following the defeat of Napoleon.• British ships carried the Red Ensign to all parts of the world, following well recognized routes and bringing to Britain 80% of her foodstuffs and most of the raw materials essential for war. Since the coming of steam propulsion made predictable schedules possible, British shipping had come to an increasing extent to run on a timetable that war restrictions and the frustrations of convoy would upset completely….”

op. cit., pp. 460-461.

British Antisubmarine Warfare

“…upset completely. Also, it was argued, should the British government impose war restrictions on British shipping, neutral carriers would be quick to take over large portions of the intensely competitive carrying trade. To sum up: economic considerations argued that government control of shipping, even in time of war, was undesirable. “Another reason for the decision to allow shipping to proceed on a peacetime basis was the overwhelming professional opinion that convoys, economically feasible or not, merely served to bunch targets, to add to the dangers of collision, to delay sailings, and to cut the efficiency of shipping to an unacceptable extent. While these assumptions could not be statistically proved, neither could the contrary, for marine insurance underwriters such as Lloyds no longer had valid actuarial documents. During the Napoleonic wars Lloyds had offered insurance at substantially lower premiums to ships sailing in convoy than to those undertaking an independent voyage. The reason was obvious. Their statistics showed that ships in convoy were four to five times safer than ‘runners,’ as independents and those who broke convoy were called….”

op. cit., p. 461.


“…were called. But with the Industrial Revolution, the vast increase size and cargo capacity of ships, and the regularity of routes and schedules made the lessons of the past appear to be no longer applicable. Proponents of the status quo argued that if the ships were well spread out in their customary routes the enemy could not hope to destroy more than single units, while with expert gunnery he might be able to wipe out an entire convoy. The Admiralty, they maintained, should make the sea routes safer by patrol. “Behind this expression ‘sea routes’ lies a major revolution in naval thought headed by Mahan,• whose books had affected professional thinking in the admiralties of the world. Unfortunately Mahan, having to invent a terminology to carry his meaning, had borrowed from land warfare such phrases as ‘lines of communication,’ ‘communication routes,’ and ‘sea lanes.’ These expressions quickly became catch phrases to naval strategists. Since it is easier to quote Mahan than it is to read him, his disciples employed his terminology without noting the careful qualifications he had employed. As long as great circle lines could be drawn on a chart, they became ‘sea lines of communication’ and by 1914 navies conceived it their duty to protect these ‘lines.’…”

Ibid.


“…these ‘lines.’ Actually their business was and is to protect ships. Sea lanes of communication carry nothing; ships carry the trade of the world. No major naval power has ever failed to protect a reasonable number of its when it did not divert its efforts in the attempt to protect sea routes.6

“When the Germans launched their first campaign against merchant shipping in the spring of 1915, the British Admiralty continued the same methods of patrolling and minesweeping since it was physically impossible to patrol and sweep the entire area customarily used in peacetime, and since the British had themselves by means of minefields closed large areas of the waters around the British Isles to shipping, the plan was to force merchant ships into well-defined channels, which in theory would be easy to protect. The end result however was to make it easier for the U-boats to find their victims. The mere presence of patrolling vessels usually indicated that ships would follow, for it was British practice to hold shipping until a ‘safe route’ had been prepared. Many an enterprising U-boat commander merely kept out of the way until the patrols were past and then waited confident that a freighter would blunder his way.…”

op. cit., pp. 461-462.


______ 6 The best study of routes vs. ships is to be found in David W. Walters, “The Philosophy of Maritime War,” Journal of The Royal Naval Scientific Service, May and July, 1958.

“…his way. Under this system of ‘offensive patrolling,’ U-boats by the end of 1916 had sent to the bottom 1,660 ships, a few by SS-laid mines, but most by torpedo and gunfire. In addition, delays in waiting for ‘safe routes’ caused a 30% loss in shipping capacity. “The British meanwhile desperately sought any measure to carry the war to the U-boat. Almost from the first, large merchant ships were provided with guns and gun crews so that they could fight it out with a surfaced U-boat. These vessels were at a considerable disadvantage. The silhouette of a U-boat offered a small target to their generally poorly trained gun crews. To make matters worse, many armed merchant ships never had a chance to use their guns at all, for the Germans regarded them as warships, not entitled to any of the conventions protecting merchant ships under International Law. Hence many were sunk by torpedo without warning. “The problem of locating a submerged U-boat remained the crux of the antisubmarine effort. The hydrophone, invented in 1915, had very limited use until late in 1917, This was a device that could pick up underwater noises and indicate their bearing but not their range, although a skilled operator could make an estimate of the range by the volume of noise made by a propellor.…”

op. cit., p. 462.


“…a propellor. If two hydrophones could be employed from widely differing bearings, the cross bearings would then give a reasonable approximation of the location of a U-boat. Unless the U-boat was moving, the hydrophone was useless. U-boat commanders quickly learned that by lying quietly on the bottom, they could escape detection. “The next major problem was to destroy the U-boat. Early experiments with howitzers proving of little success, the British turned to the depth charge, a canister of TNT fitted with a hydrostatically operated pistol to function at a pre-set depth. There were two types of depth charge, one containing 300 pounds of TNT, the other, 120 pounds. The limited supply of depth charges restricted the allowance per patrolling ship to two of each type. In practice not even all DDs obtained their complete allowance and other ASW [antisubmarine warfare] vessels received none at all. Not until 1917 were production details ironed out. The small model was then abolished. Early in 1918 DDs carried 30 to 40 of the larger model. “One of the most enthusiastically attempted countermeasures was the SS decoy known as the ‘Q-ship.’…”

Ibid.


Cobh, then Queenstown, c.1890

During the First World War, Queenstown was a naval base for British and American destroyers operating against the U-boats that preyed upon Allied merchant shipping. Q-ships (heavily armed merchant ships with concealed weaponry, designed to lure submarines into making surface attacks) were called Q-ships precisely because m a n y w e r e , i n f a c t , fi t t e d - o u t i n Queenstown. The first division of American destroyers arrived in May 1917, and the sailors who served on those vessels were the first American servicemen to see combat duty in the war. When that first convoy arrived in port after enduring a rough passage in what were little more than open boats, its members were met by a crowd of sailors and townspeople, thankful for their anticipated help towards stopping the U-boats that were blockading western Europe. Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, commander of the Coast of Ireland station, met the senior American officer, Commander Joseph Taussig, at the dock and inquired as to how soon the weatherbeaten American ships could be put to use. "We're ready now, sir!" was the widely-quoted answer from the American.—Wikipedia Ibid.

“…’Q-ship.’ First employed in 1915, Q-ships operated with considerable success from Queenstown, Scapa Flow, and elsewhere.…”


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_World_War

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Atlantic_(1914%E2%80%931918)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Q-ship

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armed_merchantmen

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Submarine

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lewis_Bayly_(Royal_Navy_officer)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Taussig

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Taussig

“…’Q-ship.’ First employed in 1915, Q-ships operated with considerable success from Queenstown, Scapa Flow, and elsewhere until the adoption of unrestricted U-boat attacks rendered their tactics useless. Nearly every type of vessel was employed in this service—cargo carriers, drifters [“A drifter is a type of fishing boat. They were designed to catch herring in a long drift net. Herring fishing using drifters has a long history in the Netherlands and in many British fishing ports, particularly in East Scottish ports.”—Wikipedia], trawlers, sailing ships, ketches, and ‘convoy sloops,’ so-called to distinguish them from standard sloops. At first the method was for the Q-ship to allow herself to be stopped by the surfaced U-boat, whereupon she would drop screens concealing guns and open fire. Picked gun crews proved so effective that U-boats became wary and began to rely more and more on submerged torpedo attack. Q-ships then countered with some small success with hydrophones and torpedo tubes which could fire torpedoes set to hit a submerged U-boat. “Underwater traps for the U-boats were also attempted in narrow straits and off important headlands.…”

Ibid.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fishing_boat

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herring

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drift_net

“…important headlands. SS nets were occasionally effective, although most U-boats managed to wriggle free. best results were achieved by a combination of nets and mines, with patrolling a/c and surface vessels to force the U-boats to submerge. It was this combination which in Jun 1918 caused the general abandonment of the Dover Strait route for boats of the North Sea U-flotilla. “In spite of all these measures, in spite of the employment of thousands of surface craft and hundreds of a/c , in spite of the laying of more than 22,000 mines by the end of 1916, the sinkings continued. In Sept 1916 three U-boats operated in the small area of the Channel between Beachy Head and Eddystone. In that same area were patrolling 572 antisubmarine vessels—49 DDs, 48 torpedo boats, 7 Q-ships, and 468 armed auxiliaries. The presence of U-boats was known, shipping was delayed, and every effort was made to track down and sink the three U-boats. At the end of a week they escaped unscathed, having sunk 30 ships.7

“By late 1916, the Germans were sinking an average of over 150 ships per month, and several prominent offices, including Adm Jellicoe,• predicted Britain’s collapse unless some means could be devised to counter the U-boat and to offset losses.”

op. cit., pp. 462-463.


______ 7 Example taken from D.W. Waters, “Historical Survey of Trade Defense Since 1914,” Royal United Services Institute Journal, Aug, 1954.

“From his flagship at Scapa Flow, Jellicoe had bombarded the Admiralty with memoranda on the U-boat peril, partly as a result of these notes,• Lloyd George, on taking office as PM in Dec 16, appointed Jellicoe First Sea Lord. The continuing loss of merchant shipping Jellicoe made his chief concern. He realized that he faced a revolution in naval warfare. The U-boat by its grim efficiency in destroying ships, had given a secondary naval power the capacity to defeat a major sea power dependent for survival on imports by sea. “To enable hm to grapple with this new realization, Jellicoe obtained approval of a reorganization of the Admiralty which brought about two outstandingly important reforms. Before this reorganization, the First Sea Lord, as we have seen, had no effective control over ops, which in practice were carried out by the Chief of Staff, often on instructions coming directly from the civilian First Lord. The primary responsibility of the First Sea Lord lay in logistics and material for the naval establishment, and he was too burdened with petty administrative decisions to deal adequately with major strategic problems.…” op. cit., p. 463.

Reorganization of the Admiralty

“…strategic problems. After the reorganization, the First Sea Lord took on the title also of Chief of the Naval Staff and became in fact head of plans and ops. He thus had a role equivalent in function to the US CNO, an office established two years earlier. Under the First Sea Lord were a Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, to conduct fleet ops, and an Assistant Chief of Naval Staff, to direct the defense of merchant shipping and the war against the U-boat. The effect was to give increased emphasis to antisubmarine measures and the protection of shipping.”

Reorganization of the Admiralty

Ibid.

America’s Road to War

The sinking of this British passenger ship by U-20 began the series of events which will finally, almost two years later, trigger American entry as an “Associated Power.”—jbp

1,195 passengers and crew of RMS Lusitania, including 128 Americans, died on 7 May 1915.

“When Europe went to war in 1914, the US was fully occupied with its domestic problems [and embroilment in Mexico’s revolution] and had little thought to spare for the conflict beyond the seas. Economic depression had gripped the country since 1909, and voter dissatisfaction in 1912 had resulted in the election of a Democratic President,• Woodrow Wilson. Although Wilson favored the Allied cause, he was determined on a policy of strict neutrality. Yet in the face of British sea power, actual neutrality was impossible. If the US sold goods to all customers, she would aid France and Britain, whose navies cut off all shipments to Germany. If the US embargoed war shipments, she would not only be cutting her own economic throat, she would aid the Germans by weakening the Allies. Because most American government leaders were pro-Ally in sentiment, and because no one in or out of office dreamed of crippling American economy by means of an embargo, the US elected to sell goods to all comers….”

The United States Navyin 1914-1915

Ibid.

“…all comers. The primary concern was for American enterprise, rapidly recovering under the war boom. Aid to the Allies was a more or less by-product. “The same sea power that preserved Britain brought her trouble with the US. As one of the largest participants in the world’s carrying trade, the US demanded of the belligerents neutral rights, freedom to trade where she pleased [Wilson’s future Point II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants] , and guarantees for the safety of ships and crews. This policy collided head-on with Britain’s blockade. Since inspections of ships for contraband on the high seas in SS waters was a risky business for the inspecting warship, the British, arguing ‘exceptional conditions,’ ordered neutral ships into British ports where complete inspections—sometimes requiring months—could be made. Infuriated ship owners, whose demurrage costs, rose spectacularly, denounced the British and demanded protection from these seizures….”


op. cit., pp. 463-464.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_of_navigation

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_of_navigation

“…these seizures. American protests went regularly to Britain, but the British, with the acquiescence of the pro-British American Ambassador • Walter Hines Page, played a waiting game. Their strategy was sound. With every passing week, American economy, emerging from depression, became more bound to Allied war purchases. Soon many of those who had most loudly clamored for American men-of-war on Britain’s doorstep happily accepted Allied contracts and sent their ships regularly to Britain and France. Nonetheless, incidents involving stoppages and delays of American ships remained to some degree a cause of Anglo-American friction until the US entered the war. “The USN in 1914 looked on the war in Europe as remote and undertook no program of preparedness specifically envisioning American participation. Still thinking in terms of a navy ‘second only to Britain’s,’ American naval leaders concerned themselves with the fleet as an instrument of international force, without concern over where that force might best be applied. The 1914 program of the General Board increased its previous year’s recommendations only slightly,…”

op. cit., p. 464.


“…only slightly, and, in the name of economy, SecNav Josephus Daniels cut these proposals drastically. ‘In the interests of efficient planning and ops, the Navy had for some years sought to create an Office of Naval Operations. This plan, drafted anew in 1915, fell foul of opposition on the part of those in Congress who feared military influence high in government and those representatives from inland states who saw little value in the navy. Eventually a much weakened version was passed, providing for a Chief, ‘who shall, under the direction of the SecNav, be charged with the ops of the fleet, and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war.’.…”


Ibid.

“…in war.’ In Mar 1915 RAdm William S. Benson • became the first CNO. He brought his broad experience to bear on problems of readiness. He required the Bureaus to report on their war readiness, and provided for naval inspection of merchant vessels to determine their fitness for service in time of war.…”


Ibid.

“…of war. He gave full support to improvements in radio communications and communication security and arranged for the procurement of additional ordnance and ammunition. In 1915 the USN established a Consulting Board, including such prominent scientists as Thomas A. Edison,• Elmer Sperry, and Dr. William Coolidge, to study problems in technological research and development, particularly in antisubmarine warfare (ASW). This move marked the beginning of the navy’s close alliance with science and industry which made possible some of the greatest advances of the 20th century.”


Ibid.

Samples of “skillful British propaganda”

“In 1916 American public opinion came increasingly to favor the Allies. The change was partly a result of skillful British propaganda;• partly, the result of increasing numbers of sinkings by U-boats of ships carrying Americans. The Lusitania case and the legalistic excuses of the German Foreign Office cut the ground from under many German sympathizers and stiffened • Wilson in his determination to insist on American rights. German had strengthened Wilson’s pro-Ally position. The President saw a great difference between the British blockade which merely cost money and the counter-blockade by Germany which cost the lives of women and children. In vain might Germany protest that the British blockade would starve many more women and children than would ever be lost at sea….”

“A Navy Second to None”

Ibid.

“…at sea. So strong was Wilson’s second note to Germany on the Lusitania sinking that the pacifistic Secretary of State,• William Jennings Bryan, resigned in protest, averring that it would bring war. “Wilson, too wise to repeat the error of 1812 by going to war with a divided country, frankly joined the ranks of those who counseled preparedness and swung his weight behind the naval building program pending before Congress….”


Ibid.

“…before Congress. Entrenched opposition appeared so strong that Wilson took his case to the country, speaking of the need for America to have the ‘greatest navy in the world.’ After much maneuvering, the Naval Act of 1916 became law on 29 Aug. Behind it lay America’s new desire to possess a navy equal to any afloat—‘a navy second to none,’ as the slogan became. During the debates,• the Battle of Jutland had strengthened the hand of those favoring big ships. If Germany could defy the Grand Fleet, America must look to her own navy, for the British might not be there the next time to block the Germans. Then, so the propaganda went, America would be vulnerable to forays by a successful expansionist Germany. As a result, the Act proposed to add to the American navy in the short space of three years 10 BBs, 6 BCs, 10 scout Cs (CLs?) , 50 DDs, 9 fleet SSs, 58 coastal SSs, and 14 miscellaneous vessels. Other important features of the Naval Act of 1916 were the enlargement of the Office of Naval Ops and the statutory requirement that its CNO hold the rank of admiral. It provided for a Naval Flying Corps and a Naval Reserve Force, thus providing a way for the navy to correct some of its glaring personnel deficiencies….”


op. cit., pp. 464-465.

“…personnel deficiencies. “The passage of the Naval Act did not mean that the USN was getting ready to enter the war. The act was long range in its aims, being interpreted by the Administration as a plan to insure ‘normal growth,’ envisioning a postwar situation where America would take her rightful place as a world leader. Meanwhile, despite protests from administrative offices and from the CNO,• Secretary Daniels resisted all pressure to prepare for war. He refused to allow the navy to build suitable antisubmarine vessels,• to equip and man the ships they had in commission, or to put the ships themselves in top condition. President Wilson was running for re-election on the slogan ‘He kept us out of war.’ The Secretary regarded effective war preparations as politically inexpedient [‘incorrect’].”

op. cit., p. 465.


“Before Wilson had taken the oath of office for his second term, Germany announced her policy of unrestricted U-boat warfare. The note proclaiming this decision as delivered to the US contained the mocking provision that one American vessel per week would be allowed to proceed to and from Britain, provided the vessel conformed strictly to German instructions and carried no contraband. In the face of this calculated effrontery, Wilson, as he was bound to do by his stand on the ‘Sussex pledge,’ severed diplomatic relations with Germany on 3 Feb 17. Shortly afterward followed the notorious Zimmerman note of 1 Mar, an attempt to bribe Mexico to join Germany in the event of war with the US in return for Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico. This sensational proposal had been intercepted by the British [decoded by Room 40,• but presented as the fruit of a daring burglary by one of their agents of the German embassy in Mexico City] and turned over to the Americans. It roused even those Americans still urging neutrality. “Meanwhile, on 26 Feb, Wilson had requested authority from Congress to arm American merchant ships.…”


Ibid.

“…merchant ships. Passed overwhelmingly in the House of Representatives, the legislation was killed in the Senate by a filibuster. ‘A little group of willful men,’ Wilson declared, ‘have rendered the great Government of the United States helpless and contemptible.’ Wilson’s legal advisors then assured him that he already had, as part of his [implied] executive powers, the authority he desired. Accordingly Wilson issued orders for American ships bound for the war zone to be armed. In Mar the first merchantmen so armed put to sea.• “Wilson still hoped that Germany would not go to the length of sinking American ships. Lacking ‘overt acts,’ Wilson was prepared to go no further. On 12 Mar the American steamer Algonquin was sunk without warning near the British Isles by gunfire by a German U-boat. A week later three more ships went down before U-boat attack with the loss of 15 lives. Now there was no more hesitation.…”


Ibid.

“…no more hesitation. On 2 Apr, Wilson grimly told Congress, ‘The world must be made safe for democracy…The right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts.’ Four days later the US declared war.”


Ibid.

Convoys The resistance to implementing this tactic is hard to

comprehend from our modern perspective

“In early 1917 the Allies fared badly in the war at sea. Ships were going to the bottom faster than the shipyards could replace them. In the four months following the declaration of unrestricted U-boat warfare, sinkings from all causes rose to 1,175 ships totaling over two and a half million tons. Yet these figures do not tell the whole story. The British Admiralty had not kept differential statistics indicating the losses in short voyage as opposed to long voyage ships or between coastal and cross-Channel as opposed to ocean shipping. From the beginning of the war the Admiralty had released weekly statements of the numbers of arrivals and departures from British ports and the number of ships sunk. Since the arrival and departure figure averaged about 5,000 and the weekly losses, even as late as Mar 1917, amounted to only 60 ships a week, the impression was given that only1.17% of shipping was going down. But actual ocean entrances and clearances averaged only 140 a week, and the loss among ships engaged in ocean trade was in the neighborhood of 20%….”

The Crisis of the War

op. cit., pp. 465-466.

“…of 20%. “This method of announcing shipping losses was of course intended to keep the Germans from accurately assessing the success of their U-boat campaign. Nonetheless, it concealed even from those in high positions the gravity of the situation. It also wedded the Admiralty to the defense-of-routes theory, for it was obviously impossible to provide escorts for 5,000 ships a week. “In early Apr,• RAdm William S. Sims USN was sent to England to study the shipping situation and make recommendations for the employment of the American navy in the event of war with Germany. By the time he reported to Adm Jellicoe on 9 Apr,• the US had entered the war. When Sims learned of the desperate condition of British shipping, he was appalled. In Feb U-boats had sunk nearly half a million tons. They had increased this figure in Mar. Apr promised to be even worse. The RN frankly predicted defeat by Nov unless the U-boat could be conquered. Jellicoe could see no solution except additional patrolling, mining, and evasive routing—intensification of methods already proved unsuccessful.”

op. cit., p. 466.

The Crisis of the War

“A group of younger officers in the Admiralty headed by Cdr Reginald Henderson RN had been quietly studying shipping ops and losses. They found that cross-Channel coal convoys, instituted in Feb at the demand of the French, were getting through almost unscathed. Out of 2,600 sailings in that service by the end of Apr, U-boats had sunk five ships, a loss rate of 0.19%. During this period losses had mounted not only in the North Sea and Western Approaches but in the very waters being traversed by the successful convoys. In the trade with Norway in the spring of 1917 the loss rate was in the neighborhood of 25% for the round trip. In Apr, on his own responsibility, the officer in charge of the shipping began convoys on that route. A month later the loss rate had dropped to 0.24%, a 120-fold reduction.“Armed with such figures as these, Henderson’s group recommended that the Admiralty adopt convoy generally, especially ocean convoy. The Admiralty refused even to consider the recommendation. The Sea Lords deemed convoy essentially defensive; only offensive measures, patrolling and mining, said they, could defeat the U-boat….”

Ibid.

The Adoption of the Convoy

“…the U-boat. They had four principal objections to convoy as such: (1) valuable time would be lost by reducing the speed of convoys to that of the slowest ship; (2) simultaneous arrival of a large convoy would jam port loading and unloading facilities; (3) merchant masters could not sail in the tightly packed formation in convoys without undue losses from collision; and (4) vessels could not be spared from offensive duties to undertake defensive escort of convoys. “Each of these arguments proved specious in the event. Te reduction of a convoy’s speed to that of the slowest member could be minimized by separating slow and fast ships into separate convoys over the same route. The dependability of arrival of a convoy at a certain port on a certain date made it possible to plan unloading and transport from the harbors more efficiently than had been possible with independently sailed ships, maintaining radio silence and therefore likely to appear with no notice. Merchant masters generally proved quite capable to maintain station in convoy. Supplying convoy escorts never required more than 15% of the naval ships in commission and more generally no more than 5%….”

Ibid.


“…than 5%. For the most part the ships engaged in escort duties came from the ineffective patrols and were not suited for fleet ops. “After studying the recommendations of Henderson’s group,• Sims enthusiastically supported their arguments. Having the opportunity for discussion with PM Lloyd George,• Sims forcefully argued for the convoy system. Lloyd George, once convinced, became one of the strongest supporters of convoys. His pressure upon the Admiralty led • Jellicoe to order Henderson to prepare an even more systematic study. As a result the Admiralty at length decided that convoys were ‘entirely practicable.’ Reluctantly, on 30 Apr, the Sea Lords assented to an experimental ocean convoy. “Sims meanwhile had kept the US informed of developments. He told the grave news of Britain’s desperate situation, urging that every possible antisubmarine vessel be sent. In spite of his urgent requests, the ships were slow in coming and came in smaller numbers than Sims had requested….”

op. cit., pp. 466-467.


“…had requested. Like the British Admiralty, the US Navy Department was not convinced of the efficiency of convoys and had in addition a fear of American interests being subordinated to those of the British. The reasons were not difficult to find. In the first place, American strategic planning had been preoccupied with the Caribbean, scene of the US’s most recent war, and now doubly important because of the newly completed [Jul 1914] Panama Canal. Professional thinking of American naval officers had been much conditioned by the War Games of 1915, called War Plan Black, which assumed engagement with an enemy battle fleet in the Caribbean. It was no easy matter for the Navy Department to shift its strategic vision to war in European waters and to accept the prospect of moving substantial numbers of its ships to the other side of the Atlantic. On 2 Jun Sims received a cable from the SecNav:• ‘In regard to convoy, I consider that American vessels having armed guard are safer when sailing independently.’• In the previous six weeks 30 armed merchantmen had been sunk near Britain….”

op. cit., p. 467.


“…near Britain. Sims turned to his friend Ambassador Page,•who supported him in every particular, for aid in convincing the Navy Department that American ships were needed in European waters and that convoy was the only way of defeating the U-boat.• “On 2 Jul the Navy Department accepted convoys but sent Sims a list of six principles foe Anglo-American cooperation, a list which indicated that the USN was still wedded to the ‘defense of routes’ theory. Among the points included was an offer of ‘most hearty cooperation’ only Department’s list the SS problem, modified by a statement that the main role of the Navy lay in ‘safeguarding the lines of communication’ of the Allies. The Navy Department did however promise to send all antisubmarine vessels that could be spared from home needs. Although the Navy Department’s list rejected the idea of strictly defensive ops—and American naval officers as well as British considered escort of convoy as defensive—it did pave the way for substantial aid in escorts for convoying shipping….”

Ibid.


“…convoying shipping. It enabled [CNO] Benson to take action as he saw fit in using American forces to combat the U-boat menace. Sims, in his new capacity as Commander US Naval Forces Operating in European Waters, immediately threw himself and his gradually growing forces into the battle against Germany’s U-boat offensive. The first six American DDs, DesDiv Eight, under command of Cdr Joseph Taussig,• arrived at Queenstown on 4 May. The story of their arrival has become something of a naval legend….In the ensuing three months, 31 additional DDs and two ADs • arrived. All of these forces were assigned to antisubmarine work, mostly escorting under British command. “Meanwhile the convoy system was getting started. Regular Homeward Ocean Convoys of ships bound for the British Isles began in mid-Jul. The U-boats thereupon promptly concentrated their attacks on outward-bound ships. A month later Outward Ocean Convoys came into being. As the number of ships convoyed increased, the sinkings steadily decreased despite increasing numbers of U-boats at sea in the War Zone….”

Ibid.


“…War Zone. The number of ships sunk per boat per month fell dramatically from 10.6 in Apr 17, to 4.9 in Jul, to 2.0 the end of the year. The diagram on page 468 shows the story graphically….”

Ibid.


“…story graphically. “In Nov 1917 the convoy system was extended to the Med. There, despite minimal convoy escorts because of the CinC’s belief that patrol was much better, the convoy loss rate was 1% and convoy escorts accounted for two-thirds of all U-boats sunk in that area during the year of convoy ops. “In the Atlantic the convoy system forced the U-boats to resort to submerged torpedo attacks, though against independent ships they still freely employed their guns unless it appeared that the victim was armed. Finding the ships too well protected in the Western Approaches, the U-boats moved into the Irish Sea and the English Channel. Except for the cross-Channel coal convoys, shipping in these areas sailed independently and here the U-boats reaped a rich harvest. As the convoy system expanded, the sinkings by U-boats fell almost in proportion….”

op. cit., pp. 467-470.


“…Jul 17. The results of the injudicious policy on SS maintenance soon made themselves felt. With increasing losses of U-boats, and the cut-back in U-boat building, another result the wishful estimate of Allied collapse, the number of U-boats at sea steadily declined.• “To offset losses, the Germans undertook large U-boat construction programs in the fall of 17, not only in Germany but also at Pola and Cattaro. By Sept 18 the delivery rate of new boats approached 30 a month,• and Scheer had obtained the Kaiser’s approval to increase it to 40 a month. By this time however the increased production was too late to have any decisive effect in the war.” [A whopping understatement! The High Seas Fleet was in mutiny and the shipyards were rife with Marxist revolution!]”

Ibid.


“In May 1917 the Admiralty formed a Convoy Section under the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff. This organization had the duty of assembling, routing, and protecting convoys, while the office of the Ministry of Shipping, acting in close liaison with the Convoy Section, controlled wharfage, loading and unloading, and procurement and allocation of ships and coordinated shipping requirements with convoy needs. Each port of assembly both in Britain and overseas had an officer charged with organization of convoys, with providing sailing orders and other instructions to the masters of the ships, and with reporting movements to the Admiralty. “The merchant ships of the convoy were controlled by a convoy commodore who was usually a retired captain or admiral or, occasionally, a very experienced merchant master. He came under the overall command of the entire convoy. At sea the escort commander received frequent reports from the Admiralty on estimated U-boat positions. The Admiralty also issued changes in routing instructions to keep the convoy clear of U-boat concentrations. “The word convoy has two meanings. In discussing naval ops it is customary to use the word to mean the entire collection of vessels, both warships and merchant ships, sailing in company….” Ibid.

Convoy Operations

“…in company. In describing convoy ops, the practice is to limit the word convoy to mean only the merchant ships, while the warships are termed the escort or screen. An escort may be formed of any type of accompanying warships, while strictly speaking a screen is an antisubmarine escort. “Outward ocean convoys from the UK had a screen as far as 15º W. Here the convoy dispersed, the ships continuing their voyages independently, while the ships of the screen met a homeward-bound convoy that had crossed the Atlantic under the control of a single escort, either a CL or an armed merchant cruiser. “The ocean convoy of WW I tended to be small, with 20 or 30 ships, formed in four, five, or six columns, while the escorts generally patrolled the flanks. Slow convoys, those sailing at eight to ten knots, had escorts ahead as well as on the flanks. The Gibraltar convoys, slowest of all, were routed at seven knots. Fast convoys included ships up to 16 knots. Ships able to make greater speeds customarily sailed independently. Cooperation on the part of the merchant masters and naval officers, and between the British and American navies, made the system work.8”

op. cit., pp. 469-470.

Convoy Operations

______ 8 The principal inbound convoy routes were: (1) Gib to England, every four days (2) Sierra Leone, Afr. to England, every eight days (3) Dakar to Eng., every eight days (5) NY to Eng., every eight days (6) Halifax to Eng., every eight days (7) Sydney to Eng., every eight days. The outward ocean convoy routes were similar but the frequency of sailing was slightly different.

“Since 1915 the Royal Naval Air Service had undertaken air ops against U-boats. Increasing numbers of a/c enabled more extensive patrols to be flown over coastal and transit waters. Until the institution of the convoy system in 1917, a/c had little success, but with careful coordination of air ops and shipping schedules, the increasing effectiveness of the air branch became apparent. During the last six months of the war, 565 a/c of all types, land planes, sea planes, and lighter-than-air ships, were assigned to antisubmarine ops in support of convoy. With 312 available daily for ops, they flew a monthly average of 14,000 hours,9 sighted 28 U-boats, and attacked 19. Although they achieved no kills themselves, having no lethal attack weapons, their presence effectively discouraged U-boat attacks. Of the hundreds of convoys with air as well as surface escort, only six were attacked and only five ships were sunk. With improved weapons and improved methods of detection, the airplane in WW II was destined to become an important U-boat killer.”

op. cit., p. 470.

Antisubmarine Air Operations

______ 9 A record unequaled in World War II until mid-1943.

Victory“The defeat of the U-boat by the convoy system helped make possible the transport of two million American soldiers to France, more than enough to offset the collapse of the Russian army, enough in fact to assure Allied victory.—Sea Power, p. 150.

“In an attempt to prevent U-boats from getting to the operating area, the Allies decided on three more mine barrages. The most famous, the vast North Sea Mine Barrage extending from the Orkneys to Norway,• received Allied approval at the end of Nov 1917 in spite of Sims’ active opposition.• Concurrently a British-laid Dover Strait Barrage during the winter months of 1917-18 blocked the Flanders U-boat flotilla from working the Channel. Because this was a relatively small area, easy to patrol against German minesweeping ops and offering easy opportunities for replacing lost mines, the Dover barrage proved highly effective, destroying some 12 U-boats by Aug 1918, completely closing the Strait, and forcing abandonment of the Flanders U-boat base….”

Ibid.

Mining Operations

ORKNEY IS

Map of the North Sea Mine Barrage, laid in the Summer of

1918. The mine barrage consisted of 18 rows of mines laid in an east-west direction

between the Orkneys and Norway. The minefield was laid by British and U.S. ship, 56,571

of the 70,177 mines were deployed by the U.S.N.—Wikipedia

“…U-boat base. The story was quite the reverse with the North Sea Mine Barrage. Encouraged by the unqualified success of the Dover Barrage, both the British and American navies enthusiastically supported this most extensive mining op in history. The field was 235 mi long and 15 to 25 mi wide, with the mines at random depths from the surface down to 240 ft. The development of the American antenna mine [a contact mine fitted with antennae which, when touched by a steel ship, set up galvanic action to fire the mine] …brought the required number down to a quarter of the original estimate. Nevertheless over 70,000 mines were laid, 80% by American forces. Possibly one U-boat was lost as a result of this vast undertaking. The conditions of visibility and the great distances in the North Sea made effective anti sweeper patrol impossible, and U-boats continued to use the waters at will, occasionally escorted by German minesweepers….”

Ibid.

Mining Operations

ORKNEY IS

“…German minesweepers. “With the third barrage the British attempted to close the Strait of Otranto and bottle the Med U-boats up the Adriatic. The barrage sank one U-boat, but the Germans continued to use the route freely until the end of the war. “The SS also proved an effective killer of U-boats, sinking 19. The psychological effect on the Germans was even greater than the actual losses, for the threat of an unexpected torpedo in a submerged U-boat greatly reduced morale in the U-boat service.”

op. cit., pp. 470-471.

Mining Operations

“To strike at ‘the hornet’s nest’ instead of ‘hunting hornets all over the farm’ as President Wilson put it,• the British planned to block the two exits of the Flanders U-Flotilla at Ostend and Zeebrugge….”

Anti-U-boat Raids

op. cit., p. 471.

“…and Zeebrugge. Command of the expedition fell to VAdm Roger Keyes.• He planned a simultaneous assault on the two ports, to sink blockships in the channel entrances, and then to evacuate under cover of darkness and smoke. The problem at Ostend can be stated simply, although its solution was far from easy. Since gun defenses her could not be neutralized, the blockships would simply have to force their way in unsupported by diversionary activity. “At Zeebrugge a long curving mole mounting heavy gun emplacements had to be neutralized, or the blockships would be sunk before they could get into position….”

Anti-U-boat Raids

op. cit., p. 471.

“…into position. Keyes planned to seize the mole by amphib assault, blowing up a viaduct leading to the shore in order to prevent reinforcement. “After two false starts cancelled because of wind shifts, Keyes got underway on 22 Apr 18.An old ACR, HMS Vindictive, had been especially modified for the raid, mounting extra topside guns and a series of ramps by which the assaulting marines and sailors could climb up to the mole. As the Vindictive entered the harbor just before midnight, she came under heavy fire and missed her assigned position by some 340 yards.•

Ibid.

Anti-U-boat Raids

“This error brought her troops under heavy fire and prevented them from seizing their assigned guns….”

HMS VindictiveSS Daffodil

op. cit., pp. 471-472.

Anti-U-boat Raids

“…assigned guns. Meanwhile an old British SS loaded with explosives ran under the viaduct, her crew setting fuses and then escaping in a skiff.• The SS blew up wrecking the viaduct.•The blockships,• all this time under heavy fire, valiantly strove to reach their assigned positions. When at last they had been scuttled one by one in approximately the correct locations, the Vindictive signaled the recall and all forces retired.….”

op. cit., pp. 471-472.

Anti-U-boat Raids

“… forces retired. “The attack on Ostend resulted in complete failure. Neither of the two assigned blockships was able to reach its assigned position. The entire op cost the British over 1,200 casualties in killed, wounded and missing.• “The results of the raid are difficult to assess. The primary aim, hindrance of the Flanders U-Flotilla, failed, for U-boats could use the Ostend exit at once, and after a few hours the Germans managed to dredge a passage around the scuttled ships at Zeebrugge….”

op. cit., p. 472.

Anti-U-boat Raids

“…at Zeebrugge. By mid-May no impediment remained. However the Ostend-Zeebrugge raid was officially proclaimed a highly successful op. Hence it acted as a valuable tonic for public morale, depressed by the great German spring offensive in France. [“In war, truth is the first casualty.”—Philip Snowden, 1916]. Most important, it showed that Gallipoli had not killed amphib ops, although the British now tended to think of raids rather than massive assaults. From the raid on Zeebrugge was born the idea of especially trained raiding troops, the famous Commandos of World War II.•”

Churchill asked Keyes toform the famed BritishCommandos after thebungled Norway op,

Apr 1940.Keyes’ son Geoffrey

Ibid.

American Contributions

“America’s role in the war at sea was undramatic. Setting up three main bases at Queenstown, Gib, and Brest, as well as numerous smaller ones in Britain and France, the USN participated extensively in patrol and convoy escort ops. One of America’s particular contributions was the 110-ft wooden-hulled submarine chaser.• Manned almost entirely by reserves, these SCs were armed with 3-in guns and depth charges. Eventually nearly 400 SCs operated from such diverse places as Murmansk, Queenstown, Plymouth, Brest, the Azores, Gib, and Corfu. They were particularly effective in the English Channel in protection of convoys after the ocean escort had left….”

Ibid.


“…had left. “Reversing its earlier policy on piecemeal commitment of the American fleet, the USN sent five BBs to Scapa Flow to reinforce the Grand Fleet and help to insure against forays by the German High Seas Fleet.• BB Div Nine, the New York, Wyoming, Florida, and Texas, commanded by RAdm Hugh Rodman,• operated as Battle Squadron Six of the Grand Fleet, employing British tactical doctrine and British methods of signaling. The Allies thus had an overwhelming preponderance of strength in the vital North Sea….”

Ibid.


“…North Sea. “The USN bore primary responsibility for the safe transport of American troops and supplies to France.• Gen Ludendorff had estimated that the U-boats would prevent passage of significant American forces to Europe. Here again convoy proved its worth….”

op. cit., pp. 472-473.


“…its worth. Strongly escorted troop convoys regularly made the transatlantic passage with no losses on the eastbound run. The more lightly escorted westbound troopship convoys lost only three ships. By mid-summer 1917, 50,000 troops a month made the crossing to France in convoys of four to twelve heavily escorted transports. A year later the monthly average reached 200,000. In all, over two million American troops crossed the Atlantic, 46% in American ships and 48% in British. Americans. Americans provided almost all the escort forces and in addition stationed three BBs, the Nevada, Oklahoma, and Utah, in Bantry Bay….”

op. cit., p. 473.


“…the Leviathan. The newly designed, mass-produced Liberty ships appeared in large numbers, while experimental ships of wood and even concrete carried vital supplies. “Much of the American material and the majority of American troops entered France through the port of Brest.…”

op. cit., p. 473.


“…the Leviathan. The newly designed, mass-produced Liberty ships appeared in large numbers, while experimental ships of wood and even concrete carried vital supplies. “Much of the American material and the majority of American troops entered France through the port of Brest. At first almost unusable because of shortage of fuel storage space and lack of shop and repair facilities, Brest became of increasing importance as the US supplied the material to build it up as a fully equipped naval base. Its geographic position made it possible to avoid exposing troop convoys to U-boat concentrations in the narrow waters of the English Channel.”

U.S. Battleship Division Nine steaming in to Rosyth, Scotland, 1918.—Wikipedia.

Ibid.

The 1918 Crisis and Allied Victory

“The transfer of German troops from the Eastern Front as result of the Russian collapse gave Germany a numerical superiority on the Western Front for the first time since 1914….”

Ibid.


“…since 1914. Germany hoped to exploit this advantage to force a decision before the US could make its weight felt. The new improved infantry tactics, supported by tanks and creeping barrages, had restored the advantage to the offensive. Evidently a war of movement had again become possible. Ludendorff, with an army retrained in the new tactics [e.g., Sturm

Abteilungen— storm sections, basis for the Nazi SA] planned to drive wedge between the British and the French and roll the former back into the Channel and the latter to Paris. On 21 Mar 18 he hurled a massive offensive against the British but failed to take Amiens….”

Amiens

SOMME OFFENSIVEFirst German Drive21 Mar-4 Apr

LYS OFFENSIVESecond German Drive

9-29Apr

AISNE OFFENSIVEThird German Drive27 May-4 Jun

NOYON-MONTDIDIER OFFENSIVE

Fourth German Drive8-12 Jun

CHAMPAGNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE

Fifth German Drive15-17 Jul

Ibid.


“…take Amiens. In this military crisis, the Allies agreed on the appointment of a supreme commander in France and designated French Field Marshall Ferdinand Foch for the post.• As casualties mounted, the Allies urgently appealed for troops from the US. There followed a race against time as the Americans and British attempted to transport enough troops to Europe to alter the balance before Germany could win the war….”

Ibid.


“…the war. “On the Western Front the crisis came on 18 Jul 18, when Paris was threatened in the Second Battle of the Marne….”

Ibid.


“…the Marne. American troops aided the weary French in checking the German drive and saving Paris. Then Foch struck decisively….”

Ibid.

“…struck decisively. The British and Belgians in the NW, the French at the center, and the Americans in the SE rolled back the Germans so swiftly that by Nov most of occupied Belgium and three quarters of German-held France were liberated. “Part of the American navy went ashore during the campaign of 1918. Some of the heaviest fighting fell to the lot of 25,000 US Marines at Chateau-Thierry, Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel, and Meuse-Argonne, where they s u f f e r e d s o m e 2 , 5 0 0 casualties….”


A.E.F.= American Expeditionary Force

Ibid.


“…2,500 casualties. Meanwhile large caliber naval guns mounted on railway flat cars struck at German railroads, bridges, and ammunition dumps. The effectiveness and accuracy of this fire played no small part in the Allied offensive. “Germany’s offensive of 1918 had been a last desperate gamble. She could not make another….”


“…make another. “The slow strangling blockade had done its work. By 1916 Germany was already suffering terrible privation [“Turnip Winter”]. Only the conquest of Romania and the occupation of the Ukraine had enabled her to secure the crops needed to prevent widespread starvation. Shortages developed in oil, fertilizer, meat, and fats. Austria-Hungary suffered even ore than Germany. The Central Powers never managed to recover from the shortages of 1916. In spite of being able to draw on the resources of a continent, Germany and Austria suffered from a lack of critical materials to such an extent that the efficiency of the fighting forces went downhill. The war had already cost Germany more than twice her entire pre-war annual national income. “By Oct 1918, her SSs defeated at sea by the effectiveness of Allied convoys, her armies reeling back to German soil, her High Seas Fleet in mutiny, her population reduced to near starvation level, and with revolution imminent, Germany could see no solution but surrender. On 9 Nov, the Kaiser abdicated, and two days later German representatives affixed their signatures to the Armistice document.”

op. cit., pp. 473-474.

Colorized photograph, which depicts from left to right: German Admiral Ernst Vanselow, German Count Alfred von Oberndorff (1870 - 1963) of the Foreign Ministry, German army general Detlof von Winterfeldt, British Royal Navy Captain Jack Marriott (Naval Assistant to the First Sea Lord), Matthias Erzberger, head of the German delegation Center party member of the Reichstag (1875 - 1921), who was later murdered by Freikorps rightists for his role in the Armistice, British Rear-Admiral George Hope (Deputy First Sea Lord), British Admiral of the Fleet Sir Rosslyn Wemyss (First Sea Lord), Marshal of France Ferdinand Foch (1851 - 1929), and French general Maxime Weygand (1867 - 1965).

The victors pose outside the railway carriage in the forest

of Compiègne.

In this same carriage on 22 June 1940 Hitler will stage his triumphant armistice

ceremony after defeating theFrench.

“The Russian civil war, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and a similar treaty forced on Rumania two months later gave Germany mastery of the continent from the Baltic states and the shores of the Black Sea in the east to Belgium and the most industrially productive north-eastern regions of France in the west, and allowed Hindenburg and Ludendorff to transfer some forty divisions totaling 600,000 troops from the eastern and Italian fronts to face the Allies in the west. They prepared a massive offensive before the Americans arrived in force. “It was too late. US entry into the war had enabled the commercial blockade of the central powers to be tightened. In Jan 1918 food shortages brought 200,000 workers in Vienna out on strike and towards the end of the month Berlin workers followed suit; they were soon joined by thousands in other major German cities. The demonstrations were suppressed under martial law, but the popular unrest stood in contrast to the relative quiet in Britain, where the diet of workers actually improved after the introduction of a fair system of rationing that year, and mortality rates declined.…”

Padfield,. p. 193.


“…rates declined. The U-boat campaign had failed, owing not only to the convoy system, but also to increased merchant ship construction, particularly in the US, and the enticement of neutral shipowners with high freight rates and war risks insurance. Von Holzendorff had met his sinking targets at the beginning of the campaign, but the total shipping available to supply Britain far exceeded his estimates. “Hindenburg and Ludendorff launched their final offensive…on 21 Mar 18,• the main thrust aimed at the British sector of the front on the Somme around St Quentin. Achieving tactical surprise and initial success, they squandered it in pursuit of changing tactical objectives. They also lacked transport to bring up supplies. They had 36,000 motor vehicles against 300,000 on the Allied side. It had been an industrial war from the beginning; the advantage had tipped decisively to the Western Allies, both in scale of production and innovation. The tank was one example…. “Heavy artillery played an even more significant role in the final phase in the summer of 1918 after the German offensive had been halted and the Allied armies, including substantial numbers of US troops, counterattacked….”


Ibid.

“…troops, counterattacked. The great guns set the pattern of battle. Tanks and infantry advanced behind moving curtains of shellfire directed with previously unattainable accuracy to knock out opposing batteries and isolate enemy positions. The expenditure of ammunition was prodigious. On the British sector a record 943,847 shells were fired in one 24-hour period between 28 and 29 Sept, an average of over 650 rounds every minute. The Germans termed it the Materialschlacht—the materiel battle. It was clear they had lost it. They were also faced with the arrival of ever more fresh American divisions. Morale at the front was already affected by food shortages at home • and it was clear to objective staff officers by the end of Sept that the war was irretrievably lost; they foresaw the disintegration of the army and Bolshevik revolution in the cities unless negotiations were opened with the Allies.• Even Hindenburg and Ludendorff were persuaded of the need for an armistice….”


op. cit,. pp. 193-194.

Hungersnot=Famine

“…an armistice. Wilhelm appointed a new Chancellor,• [Prince Max von Baden] who formed a government representing the majority socialist-liberal coalition the Reichstag and sent a note to President Wilson seeking peace talks. Only the Naval Staff planned offensive action. The overriding impulse was concern for the honor of the naval officer corps. The plan was drawn up on 10 Oct as Op Order No. 19.•Two groups of DDs would be used as bait to draw the Grand Fleet down over lines of U-boats and new minefields in the southern North Sea, where the High Seas Fleet would be waiting to meet it in the decisive battle off the Dutch coast….”


op. cit,. pp. 193-194.

“…Dutch coast. “It was not to be. The fleet had been idle for too long; the men had been infected by the collapse in morale of the civilian population and socialist agitation for peace among shipyard workers in the home ports. Grievances over food further embittered relations. The men ate better than shore workers but their diet lacked variety and they knew that the officers enjoyed abundant fare they could only dream of, and wines and tobacco in their messes ashore….”


op. cit,. pp. 193-194.

“…messes ashore. It was exposure to the hardships suffered by civilians and radical socialist agitation for peace among workers ashore, however, together with the entry of the US with its inexhaustible resources which had the greatest effect on morale. When, towards the end of Oct, Hipper ordered the fleet prepared for sea, the men rebelled, suspecting the officers only wishing to retrieve their honor with a glorious death in battle; Their pent-up anger flared. Sailors and stokers refused duty; petty officers were locked in their cabins, officers feared for their lives. Hipper was forced to call off the op, and in an attempt to split the mutineers, dispersed some ships to other bases. This only served to spread the disaffection. Sailors joined industrial workers in north German ports and marched behind red flags through the streets.…” op. cit,. p. 194.


“…the streets. As with the Russian revolution, sailors,’ soldiers,’ and workers’ and the revolt spread inland to the industrial cities. By 9 November it had reached Berlin.…”

op. cit,. p. 194.


Anti-war speeches in the Reichstag, theJanuary, 1918 munition strike, even the

“Black Day of the German Army” didn’tbegin the revolution. But when the High Seas Fleet mutinied on October 28, 1918

the revolution can be said to have begun.

Matrose (sailor), Volksmarine (People’s Navy) Division

Nazi Origins, session iv “Freikorps Years,” (3 Oct 2007)

“…reached Berlin. “That day Wilhelm’s new Chancellor resigned in favor of [Friedrich Ebert] the leader of the SPD in the Reichstag. His [Max von Baden’s] representatives had already traveled to Compiègne and • in a railway carriage outside the town heard the harsh armistice terms the Allies were imposing on a defeated Germany, including a continuation of the blockade to ensure the conditions were met….”

op. cit,. p. 194.


“…were met. Ludendorff, who had suffered a nervous breakdown, had resigned previously;• now Scheer reported belatedly that the fleet could no longer be relied upon. Wilhelm’s world had crumbled; his chief ally, Austria-Hungary, had secured an armistice the previous week. Now even his fleet had deserted him….”

op. cit,. p. 194.


“…deserted him. He fled to the Netherlands in exile.”


“… in exile. “It was fitting that his beloved creation, the fleet, should have been a catalyst for his destruction. Not only had it brought Great Britain and finally the US into an alliance against him, its personnel policies, designed to defend the privileges of a small corps of executive officers [the USN term is line officers, as in officers in the line of command] against engineers and other specialists, were,• as Holger Herwig has put it, ‘a mirror of the Wilhelmine class state with its growing antagonisms that ultimately split and paralyzed German society as a whole.”

op. cit,. p. 194.


The War After the War

1914—British socialist novelist Herbert G. Wells published a pamphlet titled



During the war the phrase often morphed into “the war to end all wars.”

It is often mistakenly attributed to Wilson, though he only used it once. He much preferred the phrase “to make the world safe for democracy” when he tried to inspire his countrymen to support American entry.



During the war the phrase often morphed into “the war to end all wars.”

It is often mistakenly attributed to Wilson, though he only used it once. He much preferred the phrase “to make the world safe for democracy” when he tried to inspire his countrymen to support American entry.

By 1919 cynicism had set in and many began to mock it. Staff officer Archibald Wavell, a future field marshal and Viceroy of India, said despondently of the Paris Peace Conference, “After the ‘war to end war’ they seem to have been at Paris making the ‘Peace to end Peace’.”

We have seen how defeated Germany had begun its horrible descent towards the Null Stunde of 1945. But few of the participants in the Great War would escape the social turmoil, revolution and actual war which persisted until the middle of the next decade.

jbp

What Are the Lessons of the

Great War?

sp 3.2 session 9 u boats

Education