Bitov, Kelly

Kelly BitovSenior Thesis SeminarInternational AffairsProfessor Kimberly MartenApril 18, 2007

Soviet Jewish Emigration: Causes of Soviet Policy 1967-1990

January 10, 1973. Soviet authorities break up a demonstration of Jewish Refuseniks

in front of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the right to emigrate to Israel

Bitov, Kelly

Table of Contents

Chapter One

I. Introduction ........................................................................................................... p. 2

II. Key Questions and Cause for Research ............................................................... p. 5Method and Resources...................................................................................p. 6

III. Background .........................................................................................................p. 8

IV. Literature Review 1. The Barometer Thesis ........................................................................................... p. 132. The Arab Allies Hypothesis ...................................................................................p. 153. International Organizations, CSCE.......................................................................p. 174. Human Rights Activism ........................................................................................p. 20

Chapter Two

I. Introduction ........................................................................................................... p. 24

II. Analysis 1. The Barometer Thesis .............................................................................. p. 272. The Arab Allies Hypothesis .......................................................................p. 433. International Organizations, CSCE ..........................................................p. 554. Dissident and Refusenik Activism .......................................................... p. 62

Chapter Three

Conclusion .................................................................................................................p. 79

Bibliography ............................................................................................................ p. 83

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■ Chapter 1 ■

I. Introduction

Today, few states set restrictions on emigration; those that do are generally self-

isolated nations controlled by repressive regimes. Freedom of movement is recognized

around the world as a fundamental right of all people, supported by international law and

international organizations. This was not always so. Throughout the Cold War, emigration

from the Soviet Union was restricted or forbidden for most Soviet citizens. The example

of the Berlin Wall reminds us how many individuals lost their lives trying to cross the

border between East and West, to escape the ‘worker’s paradise’ of the Soviet Union –

and that lethal border was only a tiny portion of the Iron Curtain.

Throughout Russian history the Jews of the Russian Empire, a unique group in the

constellation of minorities drawn under the greater Russian umbrella, have suffered

varying degrees of acceptance and persecution from the Russian government and within

Russian society. Although Russian Jews experienced a ‘golden age’ and even rose high in

politics as leaders of the Revolution, the Black Years (1939-1953) loom in recent

memory.1Negative treatment of Jews has ranged from government discrimination in the

form of exclusion from certain professions and education opportunities to persecution

1 Yehoshua Gilboa, The Black Years of Soviet Jewry, 1939-1953 (Little, Brown, Boston and Toronto, 1971).3

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under Stalin’s purges, to murder in the form of pogroms and other anti-Semitic violence.

At different times in history, persecution and the accompanying need for Russian Jews to

leave Mother Russia has varied in intensity.

Soviet policy forbidding emigration had some exceptions. Individuals from

several minority populations were anomalously allowed to emigrate. Among these were

Soviet Jews.2 The government’s treatment of Jewish emigration was far from continuous.

At different times the government’s response to an individual Jew’s application for

emigration ranged from simple acceptance to unexplained denial. The Ministry of

Internal Affairs responsible for provisioning exit visas often made tenuous claims that

Jewish applicants had been given access at some point in their careers to information vital

to Soviet national security and therefore could not be allowed to leave the country. Soviet

Jews who applied to emigrate and were refused permission to leave were called

‘Refuseniks’. The denial of this human right led to the rise of the Refusenik movement,

which eventually brought Soviet Jewish emigration onto the stage of high-level

international affairs.

The story of Soviet Jewish emigration is an historic case that deserves fresh

consideration, because the Soviet Jewish movement for emigration and freedom is lauded

as one of the greatest international human rights success stories of the past century.3

Freedom of movement in the ability to leave any country, including one’s own, is an

2 Salitan, Laurie P., Politics and Nationality in Contemporary Soviet-Jewish Emigration, 1968-89 (London: Macmillan Academic and Professional LTD, 1992). p.1. “With only a few exceptions – the most notable being the Jews, Germans and Armenians – voluntary emigration from the USSR has not been possible.”3 Edward R. Drachman, Challenging the Kremlin: The Soviet Jewish Movement for Freedom, 1967-1990 (New York: Paragon House, 1991).

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internationally accepted human right under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights4,

to which the USSR was signatory. The restriction of this right was a significant abuse of

human rights. I approach the case of Soviet Jewry mainly as a human rights issue. A new

case study can take into account the wide range of work on this topic from previous

decades to demonstrate how social change is affected, how a human rights campaign is

won. Thus, this work may cultivate policy recommendations for nations and

organizations working to improve human rights.

What wins a human rights campaign? Should efforts be focused on increasing

external political pressure, or on aiding grassroots forces within a closed country? Should

international opinion be coordinated or economic sanctions imposed to combat a state’s

restrictive policies? These efforts were among those employed to try to change Soviet

emigration policy for Soviet Jews. As my study is part of larger questions human rights

organizations seek to answer - what shapes a state’s emigration policies and how is

change effected - conclusions drawn from this case study may be useful for the

amendment or creation of universal standards in ongoing struggles for human rights.

Mass Soviet Jewish emigration stands out in the context of global migration for

the amount of attention it attracted and its links to other issues of global importance. The

act of emigration and the physical presence of the immigrant population in their

destination countries were at the time highly politicized. Soviet Jewish emigration is a

notable topic in U.S. history, as Soviet Jewry had many vociferous and influential

supporters in the U.S. Indeed, in the 1960s and 1970s the cause of Soviet Jewry was

4The text of this documents may be found online at the site of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights http://www.unhchr.ch/html/intlinst.htm.

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paramount for all American national Jewish organizations and lobby groups. The exodus

to Israel had an immense impact on Israeli politics as well. Soviet Jews in both of these

countries have a significant impact on culture today.

II. Key Questions and Cause for Research

The questions of this work arise from the difficulty all Sovietologists have

encountered: the opacity of the Soviet politics during the Cold War. It is often necessary

to reconstruct the ins and outs of Soviet politics from an external vantage. Examining the

data on Soviet Jewish emigration from the years 1967 to 1991, we see that the numbers

change year by year.

Number of Persons Issued Visas to Israel by the Netherlands Embassy in Moscow, 1967-1990*

0

20000

40000

60000

80000

100000

120000

140000

160000

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

Year

# Persons

* Not all persons issued a visa to Israel actually immigrated to Israel. As no direct flights existed between Moscow and Israel, the path of immigration took emigrants from Moscow to Vienna or

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Rome, from where many ‘dropped out’ of going to Israel and turned instead to America. These numbers are reflective only of the total number of visas issued in Moscow. (Data from the Netherlands Embassy in Moscow, in reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague5)

In a normal scenario of peace, guaranteed freedom of movement and open

borders, it would be logical to assume that the number of emigrants in a year reflects the

proportion of a population for which incentives to leave outweigh incentives to stay. The

Soviet situation was far from normal. Closed borders and strict prohibition on leaving the

‘workers utopia’ meant that emigration numbers could not be representative of individual

desire alone. Instead the yearly levels of emigration we see are reflective of Soviet policy.

The ebb and flow of emigration was dependent on the will of the Soviet government.

Thus the changing numbers present a puzzle. In the 1970s emigration rose, fell

and rose again. The 1980s saw a sharp decrease and stagnation. 1987 started a slow rise

and 1989 saw an explosion of Soviet Jewish emigration. Why did this happen? If this

variance was a result of changing Soviet policy, then the question naturally follows: What

caused the changes in Soviet policy toward Jewish emigration?

I will begin this case study by examining the motivation of Soviet Jews to pursue

emigration. I will try to discern the factors central to developing their desire to leave the

Soviet Union and describe the challenges they faced in the emigration process. Next, I

will explore existing literature on this subject. I will describe competing causal

explanations, then test their explanations through primary research. Finally, I will draw

conclusions and try to answer the questions presented above.

5 Buwalda, Petrus, They Did Not Dwell Alone: Jewish Emigration from the Soviet Union, 1967-1990 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), p. 221, Appendix, Table 1.

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Method and Resources

Unlike earlier works on this topic which consider multiple factors together at the

outset, I separate out four main causal factors from the history of Soviet Jewish

emigration and examine each on its own. My research involves a comparison of

secondary and primary materials on this subject. I use primary research to test the claims

of my secondary research, ultimately weighing each of the four different factors against

one another.

My primary research utilizes various journals, US newspapers, U.S. government

documents and Soviet government documents (public and declassified), and translations

of Soviet newspapers such as Pravda and Izvestiia.6 One particularly useful source is a

collection of translated declassified documents related to Jewish emigration published by

the Cummings Center for Russian and Eastern European Studies at Tel Aviv University,7

Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration. I also use the memoirs of former Soviet and US

political personae, and interviews with Soviet Jewish activist émigrés to the U.S. and

from this time period.

6 The Foreign Broadcast Information Service is an open source intelligence component of the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology that monitors, translates, and disseminates within the US Government openly available news and information from non-US media sources. The FBIS Daily Reports on the Soviet Union are available in print and on microfilm through Columbia University. 7 Information about the Cummings Center of Tel Aviv University may be found at http://www.tau.ac.il/~russia/General_information.htm. Soviet government documents pertaining to Soviet Jewish emigration have been collected and organized in: Boris Morozov, Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration (London; Oregon: Frank Caas, 1999). This book is part of the Cummings Center’s Agmon Project for the Study of Soviet Jewry.

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Emigration statistics are drawn from international sources.8 One valuable source

is a book put together by the Canadian Jewish Congress documenting every refused case

of Soviet Jewish application for a visa between 1968 and 1973, details about their case

and reason for the government’s refusal.9 U.S. data is drawn from Jewish lobby groups

such as the National Council on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ) and the Hebrew Immigrant Aid

Society (HIAS). Israeli sources will include data from the Israeli Central Bureau of

Statistics and Ministry of Immigrant Absorption. All of this data is free and accessible

online.

My work in understanding the causes behind Soviet policy has three components.

First, because the strongest proof of causation can be found in archival materials, I will

examine declassified documents produced by the government itself that were unavailable

to the involved actors at the time10. Second, I will retrace these actors’ steps, looking for

causation in the Soviet government’s response to their actions. Finally, where holes exist,

I will seek to fill them with what could rationally be expected to cause a given outcome.

III. Background

The Jews of the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire have always been a people

‘in but not of their society”.11 This is a result of two main factors. One is the practice of

8 For example, records from the Israeli Ministry of Immigrant Absorption www.moia.gov.il, the National Council on Soviet Jewry www.ncsj.org, the Netherlands Embassy in Moscow www.netherlands-embassy.ru, Aliya and Klita Department, Jewish Agency for Israel http://www.jewishagency.org/JewishAgency/English/Home/ and the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society www.hias.org. 9 A Study of Jews Refused Their Rights to Leave the Soviet Union, (Condition Des Juifs Desireux D’Emigrer D’Union Sovietique) Volume 2, compiled by Barbara Stern, Canadian Jewish Congress (Congres Juif Canadien) 1981. 10 Translated archival sources are limited. My primary archival source has been Morozov’s Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration. 11 Zaslavsky, Victor, Robert J Brym, Soviet Jewish Emigration and Soviet Nationality Policy (New York: St. Martin’s Press), p. 4.

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traditions distinct from those of the society they live in and the consequent perpetuation

of Jewish culture. The other is treatment from external sources, co-nationalists and the

government, as different, especially through official and non-official anti-Semitism.

While the ‘Jewish Question’ defined as “What should Soviet policy towards the Jews

be?” is prevalent in Russian history, hundreds of years worth of Russian leadership, from

the Tsars to the Soviets, has come out with only two possible solutions: emigration or

assimilation. Apparently, neither solution has ever been satisfying, as time and again

“Jews who assimilated were accused of trying to take over the power in their fatherland

and Jews who emigrated were regretted as a serious economic loss or labeled as

treacherous revolutionaries.”12

A further complication of the policy question was the classification of the Jews.

Beginning with Lenin’s political philosophy, it was debated within the Soviet leadership

whether the Jews should be classified as a nationality or as a religious group.13 Lenin was

hesitant to consider the Jews a nation without an actual state behind them. The fact that a

significant proportion of Russian Jewry was secular and assimilated complicated the

matter. Yet a classification was necessary to determine government policy towards Soviet

Jews, which would either seek to eliminate their religion in adherence to communist

ideals or promote their sense of nationality in accordance with nationality policy.

In the late 1960s, the spread of official anti-Semitism was a powerful impetus for

emigration. The effects of Stalin’s persecution and simultaneous attack on expressions of

12 Chaim Potok, Wanderings: Chaim Potok’s History of the Jews (New York: Knopf, 1978).13 Alfred. D. Low, Soviet Jewry and Soviet Policy (East European Monographs, 1990). p. 20

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national culture other than the one Soviet national culture were still present.14 Jews had

been purged from all levels of government and expressions of Jewish culture were largely

prohibited. Two prevalent forms of official anti-Semitism were ceilings imposed on the

number of Jews allowed into institutions of higher education and certain professions, and

anti-Zionist campaigns that easily blended into anti-Semitic propaganda.15 Belief in

Zionist ideology, the other main impetus for Jewish emigration, varied in strength.

Zionist ideology was strong among earlier emigrants, but in later years the majority of

Soviet Jews did not emigrate out of deep nationalistic or religious convictions.16

Soviet Jewish emigration to Israel offered a solution to the Jewish policy question

that the Soviet leadership (after Stalin) seemed willing to accept. Jews began applying for

exit visas for the purpose of family reunification during the Khrushchev years. About

2500 Jews left between 1953 and 1964, an average of 18 permits per month over the

entire period.17 These Jews were mainly from the ‘periphery’ and largely elderly or infirm

(perhaps Soviet officials could see little reason to prohibit their departure). In these years

the Soviet leadership felt that removing ‘inassimilable’ Jews from the Soviet Union

through allowing emigration facilitated the Soviet objective of securing Soviet identity

throughout the Soviet Union. Jews living away from the big cities in the Soviet republics

(outside of Russia) had in most cases never become assimilated; they still lived in small

villages separate from their non-Jewish countrymen. When these Jews, mainly an elderly

population, asked to leave the Soviet Union where they had never fit in and immigrate to

14 Zaslavsky, Brym, p.18. Almost all of the Yiddish-language schools (over 1,000) in existence in the 1930s had disappeared. Jewish newspapers and books were no longer published. 15 See Drachman, p. 81, The Kremlin’s Anti-Semitic Propaganda Campaign.16 Birman, Igor “Jewish Emigration from the USSR: Some Observations”, Soviet Jewish Affairs, 9,1, 1979, p.57.17 Zaslavsky, Brym, p. 34

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Israel, their real homeland, the Soviet regime often allowed them to do so. This explains

why a large percentage of the Jewish populations in outer-lying Soviet states such as

Georgia, Latvia and Lithuania was able to emigrate between 1968 and 1977.18

After Khrushchev and before 1967, 4500 exit visas were issued – a small number

that did not cause any waves. In 1967, the Six Day war and Israeli victory marked a sharp

reversal of this policy. 19 For the Soviet Union this war constituted unwarranted

aggression against the Arab countries in the Middle East, Cold War allies that were

increasing in importance. Although the Soviet Union supported the establishment of the

state of Israel in 1948 and extended the first de jure recognition to the fledgling state, this

support was short-lived. In 1967 all diplomatic relations with Israel were dropped and

remained so until 1991. OVIR, the Visa Office of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs

(run by KGB officers), stopped considering visa applications and Jewish emigration was

frozen for over a year. At the same time, Israel’s victory caused many Soviet Jews to take

pride in Israel and the IDF, newly identify with Israel as their true ‘homeland’ and to

pursue emigration.

Even with the combination of these impetuses, the decision to pursue emigration

was a very difficult decision to make.20 The process of applying for a visa was at best

very challenging and could lead to the loss of the applicant’s job, expulsion of family

members from university or their jobs, physical harassment, arrest and even

imprisonment on such grounds as ‘treason’. In order to apply for an exit visa, an

applicant had to first receive an invitation (vysov) from a family member in Israel (all exit

18 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, special supplement (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1977), p. 324.19 Buwalda, Prologue.20 For a more detailed explanation of the process of applying for a visa, see Buwalda, pp. 47-56.

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visas were issued to Israel). Next, he had to apply for an exit permit at an OVIR office.

He had to produce character references from his place of work, which meant that the

collective now knew him to be a ‘traitor’ to the Party. He also had to obtain affidavits

from his relatives stating that they did not object to his emigration. Once these and the

rest of an exhaustive list of documents were assembled, the applicant returned to OVIR to

submit his dossier. Then he waited to receive any information about the status of his

application. The waiting period could be anywhere from weeks to months to years. The

granting of an exit permit was accompanied by immediate loss of citizenship and hefty

fees. When an exit permit was finally received the applicant had run to Moscow for a visa

before his permit expired, sometimes within a week or less. From Moscow the emigrant

would fly or travel by train to Vienna or Rome – no direct flights to Israel were allowed

from the Soviet Union.

According to Soviet policy, emigration was allowed only for the purpose of

family reunification. In documentation of Soviet Jewish emigration,21 three reasons were

given for refusing to issue a visa: 1) belief that the individual had been exposed to state

secrets 2) absence of familial consent and 3) unknown. However, “Until 1991 no legal

basis for refusal was published and consequently no appeals against OVIR decisions

could be initiated except with OVIR itself.”22 Thus a refused applicant had no way of

knowing why his application failed and no legal recourse thereafter. Refuseniks put

everything on the line, lost their jobs and friends during the application process and were

ultimately trapped.

21 One example is the compilation of individual cases by the Canadian Jewish Congress mentioned earlier. A Study of Jews Refused Their Rights to Leave the Soviet Union, Canadian Jewish Congress, 1981.22 Buwalda, p. 63

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As Refuseniks were forced to resume lives they had dismantled, they considered

their situation. Should they quietly wait for the government to change its mind or should

they protest? Soviet refusal led to the formation of the Refusenik movement. Those that

chose to protest and led the movement forward put themselves in considerable danger.

They were arrested, imprisoned, convicted on charges of loosely defined treason or

‘malicious hooliganism’ and sentenced to years in prison. Some were sentenced to hard

labor in Siberia, some were sent to psychiatric wards23 and some were sentenced to death.

One vivid description of the Soviet Jewish emigration movement described it as “a thorn

which pricked the Soviets’ projected image of a nation satisfied with Communist rule.”24

The courage and persistence of activists within the emigration movement is astounding.

Their work will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two.

IV. Literature Review

The debate in the literature on the causes of changing Soviet policy toward Jewish

emigration between 1967 and 1991 centers around one refrain: were the main forces

shaping Soviet policy internal or external, located inside or outside of the Soviet Union? I

have found four distinct sources of pressure affecting Soviet policy within this

framework: the US government, Arab allies, the Helsinki process, and domestic Soviet

human rights activism. In this section I will describe each explanation and its hypothesis.

23 The abuse of psychiatry as a punishment for dissent in the Soviet Union is well documented. See Zhores Medvedev, Roy Medvedev, trans. Ellen de Kadt, A Question of Madness (Alfred A. Knopf: New York, 1971), as well as The Chronicle of Current Events. 24 Tesher, Ellie, “Still No Easy Exit”, The Toronto Star, February 15, 1986.

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In the second chapter of this work, I will reexamine the strength of these hypotheses

through primary research.

1. US-Soviet Relations: The Barometer Thesis

According to the Barometer Thesis, Soviet emigration policy was a measure of

pressure levels between the US and the Soviet Union. Policy changes occurred in

response to actions or challenges of the US government and the level of restrictions on

emigration from the Soviet Union denoted the nature of the relationship between the two

opposing superpowers.25 Diplomacy that engendered negative consequences for the

Soviet Union was answered by the Soviet government tightening its grasp on something

within its control: emigration. In this way, the Soviet Union used Jewish emigration as an

instrument for diplomatic maneuvers within the US-Soviet relationship. When relations

were tense, emigration decreased. Alternatively, when there was a relaxation of Cold War

hostilities or pursuit of détente on both sides of the Soviet-American relationship,

emigration increased.

The pressure exerted by the US government on the Soviet government regarding

this issue was the outcome of a unique balance of pressures within the United States,

described in detail in Fred Lazin’s book, The Struggle for Soviet Jewry in American

Politics. It is important to be aware of these components and their dynamics, because the

strength of pro-pressure forces was certainly a factor in the overall strength of US

pressure over time.

25 Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, Political power, USA/USSR (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982).

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As Lazin explains, the emphasis the US government put on Soviet Jewish

emigration was closely related to the activity of the organized American-Jewish

community, America’s Jewish lobbies and national Jewish organizations. The Jackson-

Vanik Amendment is a possible demonstration of the power of the Jewish lobby within

US government. For example, the New York Times suggested that firm stance Congress

took on Soviet Jewish emigration in the early 1970s exhibited by the Jackson-Vanik

Amendment was attributable to the efforts of American Jews and the Jewish Lobby:

“The political power of the 5.8 million American Jews has two principle sources: First, Jews are regular voters and so their votes can mean the difference between victory and defeat in many key industrial states. Second, many Jews are dependable contributors to campaign funds. Third, individual Jews are kept informed of national political issues through a network of Jewish organizations and publications, and this effects grassroots support and causes educated individuals to lobby their representative nation wide.26

A listing of these organizations is a veritable alphabet soup. Some of the main

organizations were the National Conference on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ), American Jewish

Committee (AJC), Combined Jewish Federations (CJF), United Jewish Appeal (UJA),

World Jewish Congress (WJC) and the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish

Organizations (Conference of Presidents). These organizations lobbied in Washington

D.C., held meetings with key politicians, delivered petitions and sponsored trips to the

USSR for politicians and lay leaders. Non-mainstream groups also operated on behalf of

Soviet Jewish emigration. Most notable were the Jewish Defense League (JDL) and the

Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry (SSSJ), more radical groups that employed tactics of

26 David E. Rosenbaum, "Firm Congress Stand on Jews in Soviet Is Traced to Efforts by Those in U.S." New York Times, Apr 6 1973.

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civil disobedience and violence. In addition, the Israeli government worked behind the

scenes to influence the policies of these American organizations in the form of a

department called the Liaison Bureau (Lishkat HaKesher).27

2. Soviet Foreign Policy in the Middle East: Arab Allies

Soviet policy in the Middle East was the main focus of Soviet foreign policy in

the Third World in the time period under discussion. Mark Heller writes in Dynamics of

Soviet Policy in the Middle East,

“Of all the Third World regions, it is the closest (to the Soviet Union) geographically, it has attracted the greatest Soviet investment in recent decades, it is potentially the most closely linked to Soviet domestic politics, and its economic and strategic importance have historically given crises and conflicts there the greatest resonance in global politics and bilateral Soviet-American relations.”28

Given this importance, it is possible that pressure from Arab allies in the Middle East was

a driving factor behind Soviet policy toward Jewish emigration. “It has been emphasized

by Soviet and pro-Soviet spokesmen that Soviet pro-Arab policies dictate the restriction

of emigration.”29 Although it is not put forth in the literature as the primary incentive

behind Soviet policy in this area, this explanation is still an important possibility to

explore as a causal factor affecting Soviet Jewish emigration policy.

27 Lazin, Fred A., The Struggle for Soviet Jewry in American Politics: Israel Versus the American Jewish Establishment, (New York: Lexington Books, 2005), pp 23-41. The Israeli government had little ability to directly exert pressure on the Soviet Union because the two countries had no diplomatic. This forced to use other avenues to exert its influence. Israel sought the arrival of Soviet Jews throughout the time period under discussion, though the activeness and aggressiveness of its demands varied. 28 Heller, Mark A., The Dynamics of Soviet Policy in the Middle East: Between Old Thinking and New (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1991), p. 7.29 Zaslavsky, Brym p.135

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In the Cold War, the world was divided up into U.S. and USSR regions of

influence and many of the Arab states in the Middle East were picked up as Soviet allies.

By the early 1970s, the Soviet Union had become the dominant foreign power in Egypt,

Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Libya, Sudan and the Yemens.30 Most of the Arab states were anti-

West as product of their colonial past. This tied in with the Socialist worldview, in which

Socialism struggled with and would ultimately capitalism or imperialism. The Soviet

Union supported the Arab states’ so-called national liberation struggles against the forces

of imperialism (the West) with massive arms supplies and economic assistance. Although

the Soviet Union had originally supported the founding of the State of Israel, Israel

quickly emerged as a western ally and thus an extension of these global imperialist

forces. Author Mark Heller writes, Soviet exploitation of “Arab hostility to Israel for anti-

American purposes explains the dominant motifs in Soviet public analysis and diplomacy

for close to three decades: the equation of imperialism and Zionism, and the congruence

between the Soviet-American conflict and the Arab-Israel conflict.”31

Israel had the USSR’s sympathies at mid-century, 32 though the Arab states were

invested in the destruction of Israel from the moment Israel came into existence as a

modern state in 1948. When Israel was victorious in the 1967 War, which the Soviet

Union saw as an aggressive war against its Arab allies, the young state was decisively

resettled across enemy lines.33 Israel and by extension all Jews were now part of the

30 Heller, Dynamics of Soviet Policy in the Middle East, p. 25. 31 Heller, Dynamics of Soviet Policy in the Middle East, p. 42. 32 The Soviet Union had supported the founding of the state of Israel in 1948. 33 Buwalda, p. 23.

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‘capitalist empire’, opposed to Soviet goals and ideology.34 The Soviet government

proclaimed that Israel’s aggressive policies had forfeit its right to exist.

Soviet Jewish emigration supported Israel, and Israel was now an enemy of the

Soviet Union and the Arab states throughout the Middle East. Strengthening the Jewish

presence in Israel was particularly harmful to Arab interests because Israel was seen as

being formed at the expense of native Palestinians. For example, Soviet Jewish

emigration to Israel became (even more) highly politicized when Israeli leaders began to

use the new immigrant influx as reasoning for their continued policy of expansion.35 It

was rumored that new Soviet immigrants were settled in contended lands upon arrival.

With these considerations, Soviet Jews immigrating to Israel could potentially cause

escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

3. Helsinki and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe:

International Organizations

This argument, sure to be supported by liberal institutionalists, claims that the

Soviet Union’s membership in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe

(CSCE)36 had a strong impact on the Soviet government’s treatment of Soviet Jewish

emigration and caused changes in its human rights policies in general. CSCE was a series

of meetings between high-level political figures, collectively a forum for international

relations between the Soviet Union and the West. The Conference’s thirty-five

34 Low, pp. 130-169.35 Geoffrey Aronson, “Soviet Jewish Emigration, the United States, and the Occupied Territories”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 19, No.4, (Summer 1990), pp. 30-45.36 CSCE was the precursor to today’s Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), headquartered in Vienna, Austria.

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participants included all of the European states (excluding Albania and including the

Vatican), the Soviet Union, the US and Canada. When the Conference was in session

decisions were reached by consensus, with each of the participants having veto power.37

CSCE was not the only forum for international negotiations in this time period, but I have

chosen to focus on CSCE because it directly addressed the issue of Soviet Jewish

emigration.

CSCE was initiated by the Soviet Union as an opportunity to politically affirm its

holdings in Europe and the status quo of Soviet control over communist Eastern Europe

with the West. The West saw the talks as a way to reduce tension in the region, furthering

economic cooperation and obtaining humanitarian improvements for the populations of

the Communist Bloc. A Western coalition turned the Conference into a sustained

international campaign against the Soviet Union for human rights. Emigration was

brought up again and again by the West as a human rights issue, from the first meeting

and at all subsequent follow up meetings. William Korey writes, quite contrary to Soviet

expectations “the consequence of the unfolding “Helsinki process” was the very

crumbling of those [Soviet geo-political] arrangements and the collapse of the political

and ideological structure upon which they rested.” 38

CSCE began in Helsinki. Its first main achievement was the creation and signing

of the Final Act in December 1975, also known as the Helsinki Accords. All thirty-five

countries were signatory to this treaty, which enumerated the following ten points:

37 Garthoff, Raymond L., Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1994)., p. 527.38 Korey, The Promises We Keep: Human Rights, the Helsinki Process and American Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), Prologue.

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1. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty2. Refraining from the threat or use of force3. Inviolability of frontiers4. Territorial integrity of States 5. Peaceful settlement of disputes6. Non intervention in internal affairs7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought,

conscience, religion or belief8. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples9. Co-operation among States10. Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law

It is easy to see Western demands confronting Soviet demands here. The West

pushed for human rights with point seven, where the Soviet Union protected its poor

human rights record by playing the card of point six. Proposals that arose at the

Conference were designated to one of three “baskets” of issues, that came to be referred

to as Baskets I, II and III. Basket I was “Security in Europe”, Basket II covered

“Cooperation in the Field of Economics, of Science and Technology and of the

Environment, and Basket III was “Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields”.

Emigration was a Basket III issue.39

CSCE continued with a series of follow up meetings in Belgrade (October 4, 1977

- March 8, 1978), Madrid (November 11, 1980 - September 9, 1983), and Vienna

(November 4, 1986 - January 19, 1989). Some meetings were more successful than

others, as the international environment shaped the atmosphere in which the meetings

took place. Each follow up meeting was an opportunity for the West to hold the Soviet

Union accountable for its human rights record, which included discussion and

accusations regarding the status Soviet Jewish emigration.

39 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 528.

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In contrast to the previous two theses, which focused on essentially bilateral

relations and negotiations between the Soviet Union and various partners, CSCE

represents the efforts of an international organization engaging the Soviet Union in

multilateral diplomacy.

4. Dissidents and Refuseniks in the Soviet Jewish Emigration Movement: Domestic

Human Rights Activism

The Activism Thesis states that unrelenting domestic human rights activism was

the cause of the changes in Soviet policy toward Jewish emigration. Peter Reddaway

writes that the success of any Soviet dissident movement in the Soviet Union depended

upon the militancy and resourcefulness of the group’s lobbying, demonstrating

techniques and samizdat circulation, as well as the level of its domestic and foreign

support.40 Eduard Drachman gives activists great credit for changes in Soviet emigration

policy, writing, “Constant pressure by Soviet Jewish leaders and their supporters

succeeded in forcing the Kremlin to look more closely at the Jewish question...Soviet

Jews posed [a] successful challenge to the Kremlin... winning some concessions and

steadily weakening the edifice of totalitarism.”41 Alfred Low believes that the

achievements of organized Refusenik activists are proven by the Soviet government’s

response to their activities. “The authorities recognized the threat of organized political

dissent without delay and promptly reinforced the coercive and ideological apparatuses.

KGB offices were reopened and a Jewish Department created to combat the emigration

40 Reddaway, Peter, “Policy Toward Dissent since Khrushchev”, in Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1980), p 171.41 Drachman, p. 36

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movement.”42 Clearly the Emigration Movement posed a threat to the government that

required response.

Emigration activists used international treaties such as the Universal Declaration

of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 43, as

well as the Helsinki Final Act, as the legal basis for their claims against the Soviet

government. The founded the Amnesty Moscow Group and Helsinki Watch Groups to

monitor and report on the Soviet Union’s compliance with human rights standards and

international law. Samizdat or underground literature such as the Chronicle of Current

Events pursued the same goals. The Chronicle worked to disseminate information on the

human rights situation and reported on the status of individual dissidents’ cases, including

those of Refuseniks.

Activists engaged in civil disobedience and occasionally criminal activity within

the Soviet Union. For example, one such significant event in the Jewish Emigration

Movement was the Dymshits-Kuznetsov aircraft hijacking of 1970.44 A group of twelve

Soviet refuseniks were arrested while attempting to hijack a small aircraft, in which they

planned to escape to Sweden and freedom. They were seized en route to the terminal.

Additional arrests took place almost simultaneously in Leningrad and 50 homes were

searched in several cities in connection to the hijacking attempt. It was noted in the New

42 Low, p. 46.43 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was signed by the Soviet Union in 1948; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was signed in 1976; and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination was signed Jan 22, 1969. The text of these documents may be found online at the site of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights http://www.unhchr.ch/html/intlinst.htm. The relevant text in the UDHR is Article 13.2 “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country”, and in the ICCPR Article 12.2 “Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.”44 See discussion of this event in Low, p.45.

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York Times that the ability of the police to have all the names and addresses of alleged

accomplices implied “that they knew whom they wanted and they were watching these

people long before...”45 The two leaders of the group, Mark Dymshits and Eduard

Kuznetsov, were sentenced to death. Their death sentences were commuted to 15 year

terms in response to a swell of international outcry and they were later freed in exchange

for Soviet spies captured in the U.S.

Most activist strategies were less extreme. Activists organized protests in front of

government buildings (as depicted on the front cover), conducted sit-ins and hunger

strikes. They sought to challenge the Soviet government’s policy toward the Jews and

emigration and attract Western attention and support for their plight. At times, the

government allowed more vocal dissidents clamoring for visas to leave, in hopes that the

movement would lose steam and cease to be a threat to Soviet power.

The Soviet government’s response to the Emigration Movement was directed and

implemented by the KGB. Although emigration policy was most likely created by the top

government bodies, the Secretariat or the Politburo, the KGB was the government

organization that dealt with emigration and Refuseniks on a day-to-day basis. Within the

KGB, the Fifth Directorate was the division in charge of dealing specifically with the

Emigration Movement and emigration activists. Anti-Zionist propaganda was coordinated

as part of the KGB’s strategy, and an Anti-Zionist Committee was formed in 1983.46 An

awareness of the KGB’s position in the Soviet government is important within this

discussion, as the question has been posed whether “a single emigration policy existed, or

45 “A Soviet Hijacking Trial Involving Jews Is Foreseen”, New York Times, Nov 13, 1970, p.8. 46 Knight, Amy, The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988).

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an ongoing series of ad hoc decisions on emigration have had the de facto impact of a

coordinated policy.”47 As author Amy Knight explains, “The KGB executes Politburo

decisions and is subjected to Politburo authority, but it is also represented on this body

and hence is integrated into the decision-making process.”48 Post-Khrushchev, the KGB

stressed tactics of manipulation rather than coercion, demonstrating a keen awareness of

both the Kremlin’s image and that of the KGB specifically. It seems that in

implementation of its orders, awareness of this image restrained the KGB’s from excess.

Some authors believe that anti-Zionism, the term the KGB used for its anti-

Zionist, anti-Jewish and anti-emigration tactics, was mainly anti-Semitism in disguise.

“By the late 1960s anti-Semitism was a highly institutionalized method of galvanizing the

population against perceived or fabricated national threats and encouraging the citizenry

to entrust the regime to deal ruthlessly with the alleged agents of trouble.”49 Anti-Zionism

always threatens to blend into anti-Semitism as slurs against the Jewish state can easily

become slurs against Jews in general. This distinction was poorly maintained by the

KGB, if it was acknowledged at all. Anti-Semitism has a long history in Russia and the

KGB revived earlier anti-Semitic materials for its propaganda campaigns. In my opinion,

there is no reason to believe that anti-Semitism was not involved in Soviet policy toward

the Jews in some way in these years.

47 Salitan, p. 4.48 Knight, Amy, The KGB, Police and Politics in the Soviet Union (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), p. 309.49 Alfred. D. Low, Soviet Jewry and Soviet Policy (East European Monographs 1990). p. 18.

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■ Chapter 2 ■

I. Introduction

In Chapter one, I explained that the ebb and flow of Soviet Jewish emigration was

dependent at all times upon the will of the Soviet government. In the context of a

literature review, I detailed four of the leading hypotheses as to what caused changes in

Soviet policy over time.

Now I will test these hypotheses. I am interested in learning if and how an

external actor (external to the government) can cause specific changes in a non-

democratic political system. In this case, the Soviet government is the subject of

observation. All other actors, the US government, non-US Western governments, the

Israeli government, human rights activists, American Jewish lobby groups and Arab

leaders, were external actors that applied pressure to the Soviet government in order to

affect its policy toward the specific issue of Jewish emigration.

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The Logic Behind Restricting Emigration

Several general rules explain the logic behind Soviet policy restricting Jewish

emigration. First, emigration was a threat to the image of Communism Soviet leaders

sought to project. Until 1973 almost all Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union

immigrated to Israel, and their emigration could be attributed to religious beliefs, family

reunification and mistakes caused by Zionists ‘appealing to their personal weaknesses’ as

Jews. By the late 1970s 66% of emigrants per year ‘dropped out’ of the USSR to Israel

emigration route, changing their destination for the US, Canada and other countries. In

the 1980s dropouts were at 70%. The cause of emigration for these Jews was not Zionism

or family reunion - it was evident that these Soviet Jews merely wanted to leave the

Soviet Union at any cost. According to a member of the Central Committee Propaganda

Department, “The fact that some of the Jews have departed from the USSR is widely

utilized by anti-Soviet propaganda to confirm the traditional slanderous assertions of the

supposed flight from the ‘communist paradise’ and the ‘bankruptcy of the Soviet

nationalities policy’”. Such propaganda (or honest media coverage) undermined the

“authority of the USSR and the moral prestige of the socialist system”.50 Thus, Jewish

emigration was harmful to the propaganda war.

Second, Jewish emigration had negative internal consequences. As the

government saw it, the departure of a portion of the Jewish population placed all Soviet

Jews in “conditions of psychological stress, insecurity and nervous agitation – ‘What will

50 Morozov, Boris, Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration (London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1999), p. 205. .Memorandum from L. Onikov to the CPSU Central Committee. Moscow, September 30, 1974.

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become of us tomorrow?’” they now had to ask.51 The documentation of personal

accounts and interviews I have conducted demonstrate that stress was not merely

psychological; it also came from fear of physical harm and harassment. For example,

when former Refusenik Janna Kaplan’s brother immigrated to the U.S. in 1978, Janna,

who had never made plans to emigrate, was subjected to harassment and abuse in her

work and personal life. When her brother’s emigration became public, co-workers

flooded her desk with newspaper clippings of anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist cartoons and

engaged in anti-Semitic verbal harassment. Neighbors drilled holes in her shower, stole

her mail and even urinated in her teapot. This harassment forced Janna to pursue

emigration as well. 52 From the government’s viewpoint, any emigration could have a

destabilizing snowball effect on society.

Third, Jewish emigration was a political liability in international relations. The

Soviet government did not want to appear weak or anger its Arab allies.53 At the same

time, the Soviet government did not want to appear unjust or repressive, which could cost

in political legitimacy and anger the U.S. and the West.

In sum, the Soviet government acknowledged that the “negative consequences of

the departure of Jews from the USSR necessitated the development and implementation

of measures directed at the elimination of its causes.” 54 The development of effective

measures depended on correct identification of the motives behind the decision of the

51 Morozov, ibid. 52 Interview conducted on the phone, February 11, 2007. Janna Kaplan, M.S. is Senior Research Associate at the Ashton Graybiel Spatial Orientation Laboratory at Brandeis University. A former Refusenik from Leningrad, Russia, she came to the United States as a Jewish refugee in 1982 and became an American citizen in 1988. 53 The Soviet Union had varied alliances among the Arab nations throughout the time period under discussion. Among these were Egypt, Syria, Libya and the PLO. Jewish emigration to Israel was a strain on Soviet-Arab relations, as this emigration potentially escalated the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in which all the Arab nations have some interest.54 Morozov, p. 206. .Memorandum from L. Onikov to the CPSU Central Committee. Moscow, September 30, 1974.

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Jews to emigrate. Yet, it is unclear whether the government adequately understood these

motives. When activists proclaimed, “I want to leave because I consider Israel, the

homeland of the Jewish People, to be my homeland” the government responded that this

was incorrect. “This is a Zionist fabrication, the Soviet Union is your homeland.” Where

they pointed out discrimination in hiring practices, in university acceptance, in publishing

Jewish literature, the government told them they were imagining things. When they

claimed that the government’s anti-Semitic repression of Jewish culture prevented them

from leading Jewish lives, the answer was, “There is no such repression, and there is no

anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union.”

II. Analysis

For each of the causal arguments described in Chapter One, I have explored

available archival material that clearly states government policy toward Soviet Jewish

emigration. In the absence of such government documents, the effect of a particular

pressure on Soviet policy is derived from the government’s reaction to it. I test each of

the four arguments via a covariance assessment, and then evaluate the results of these

tests. The evaluations will be drawn together in my conclusion.

1. U.S-Soviet. Relations: The Barometer Thesis

The Barometer Thesis explains that changes in Soviet Jewish emigration were a

measurement of the condition of the US-Soviet Cold War relationship. When this

relationship was relatively positive and mutually beneficial, marked by cooperation, trade

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and positive diplomatic interactions, emigration would increase. Confrontation, sanctions,

and tense interactions would correspond to a decrease in emigration.

In order to test this thesis, I examine episodes of application of political pressure

by the US government on the Soviet government. In some cases US political pressure

targeted the Soviet Jewish emigration issue directly. At other times, Soviet Jewish

emigration may be considered one factor among many swept up in the tides of US-Soviet

relations. If the Barometer Thesis applies, then these episodes in US-Soviet relations

should correspond to changes in Soviet policy towards Jewish emigration.

Moscow Summit: SALT I, Highpoint of US-Soviet Détente 1972

Détente was the main feature of US-Soviet relations in the 1970s. Literally

meaning the ‘relaxation of tensions’, detente became a somewhat all-encompassing term

referring to the development of interrelationships and cooperation on military, economic

and social issues. The structure for detente was conceived in the late 1960s, and

developed by the Nixon administration in the early 1970s. The height of détente was a

Nixon-Brezhnev summit that took place in Moscow in 1972. Ten documents were signed

at this summit, establishing a joint commercial commission and promising cooperation in

many fields, including science and technology. The main agreements signed were the

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) and the Basic Principles of Mutual Relations.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was an arms control agreement that put formal

ceilings on the growth of both sides’ strategic weapons arsenals. The Basic Principles set

out guidelines of conduct between the two superpowers and confirmed the principle of

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‘peaceful coexistence’ as the basis for their relations. Estimations of the agreements

differed on each side. For example, the Soviet government saw the Basic Principles as a

giant leap forward in Soviet-US relations and in the development of international law,

while the US government saw them as mere ‘aspirations’ or a ‘road map’ for relations.

For the US, SALT (the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty or Talks, here referring to the

AMB Treaty) was the greater political achievement at this summit.55 What is important to

note within the scope of this work is that with these agreements the US government took

political action to remove tensions from the US-Soviet relationship, and it was perceived

as such by the Soviet Union.

After the Moscow summit, Kissinger wrote in his memoirs that quiet diplomacy

on Soviet Jewish emigration seemed to be proving effective.56 Soviet Jewish emigration

was increasing and even a large number of hardship cases had been granted exit visas. I

have not found record of the details of such quiet diplomacy, such as transcripts of

meetings or conversations. Kissinger’s note in his memoirs suggests that this issue was

brought up in private between Soviet and American officials, and possibly that some

agreements regarding Soviet Jewish emigration were reached off the record. Addressing

this sensitive issue in the context of positive US-Soviet detente may have had the desired

causal effect.

US Broaches Nuclear Confrontation over Middle East Conflict 1973

55 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp. 325-338. 56 Kissinger, The White House Years, p. 1271-1273.

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The Moscow Summit’s detente did not eliminate mutual suspicions, nor did it

stop the US-Soviet arms race. These suspicions and the continued existence of far-

reaching Soviet and American influence and military power – which inherently coexisted

in a constant state of possible conflict – contributed to a flare up in US-Soviet

confrontation in 1973 over war in the Middle East. Although the cooperation of the two

powers to defuse Arab-Israeli hostilities and achieve a ceasefire proceeded under the

banner of detente, this background led to a dangerous misunderstanding during the

ceasefire process that approached a nuclear clash.57

War broke out in the Middle East when Egypt and Syria attacked Israel on

October 6, 1973. This day was Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish year, and (in

spite of intelligence warnings) the attack caught Israel by surprise. Israel was America’s

Middle East ally and Syria and Egypt were in the pro-Soviet camp, although both

superpowers were courting Egypt at the time. The war represented a conflict of US and

Soviet allies, and thus threatened to engage the US and Soviet Union themselves. The

superpowers were very involved in the conflict from day one of the war, both in calling

for a cease-fire to be enforced by UN Security Council Resolution and in supplying arms

to their respective allies. A cease-fire was declared by UN Res 338 on October 22, 1973.

The cease-fire was soon broken. On October 24, Egypt called on both the US and

the Soviet Union to send forces to the region to ensure the cease-fire. In the subsequent

chain of US-Soviet communications on this matter, Brezhnev made the following

statement:

57 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp. 404-434, as well as Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 570-585.

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“I will say it straight that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally.”58

This message, combined with other US intelligence of the positioning of Soviet military

power at the time, caused the US to raise the national alert to Defense Condition Three or

DEFCON III – essentially a state of military readiness one step below actual aggression.

This alert involved US nuclear capabilities and other military forces around the world.

Brezhnev’s reply retreating from this earlier stance, which the US had taken as a threat,

allowed the US alert to be stepped down. However, the damage was already done in US-

Soviet relations. This brief confrontation demonstrated the limits of detente, and gave

critics of detente fuel for further attacks. Emigration decreased after 1973, possibly in

relation to this severe flash of tension in US-Soviet relations.

The Jackson-Vanik Amendment 1975

The Jackson-Vanik Amendment was conceived in reaction to the so-called

‘Diploma Tax’, a minor piece of Soviet legislation passed in August 1972 shortly after the

Moscow summit.59 The Diploma Tax conditioned an individual’s ability to obtain a visa

on payment of the estimated cost of their higher education to the state. This ‘tax’ was

exorbitantly high, often several times higher than an individual’s yearly salary.60 The

Soviet government claimed that the new law was not targeted at any group. This claim

58 Text of these communications may be found in Kissinger’s memoirs Year of Upheaval. Retrieved from Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 423.59 Bernard Gwertzman, “Senate Plan bars Credits if Soviet Retains Exit Fees; 71 Join Jackson in Offering an Amendment to Protest Moscow ‘Diploma Tax’”, New York Times, Oct 5, 1972. p. 97.60 Buwalda, p. 90.

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was not believed in the US, where the law was seen as another stumbling block tossed in

the path of highly-educated Jewish visa applicants.

Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson, a Cold War anti-Communist Democrat from

Washington, began to agitate in Congress for some application of pressure to force the

repeal of the Diploma Tax, as well as legislation that would force Soviet concessions on

Jewish emigration in general. The minutes of a Politburo meeting held on March 1973

between Brezhnev, Andropov, Kosygin and others reveal the Soviet leader’s response to

this development of US pressure.

Brezhnev: “The official visit to the US has been seriously impeded by the issue of Zionism. In the last few months, hysteria has been whipped up around the so-called education tax on individuals emigrating abroad. I have thought a lot about what to do...” (Since implementation, over a million rubles were collected from almost 400 emigrants with higher education.) “This is why the Zionists are yelling. Jackson relies on this, and Kissinger comes to Dobrynin and says, ‘We understand that this is an internal matter and we can’t interfere. We also have laws.’ At the same time he says: ‘Help us out somehow. Nixon can’t push through the legislation. He’s working with the senators.’ Why do we need that million (rubles)?” (They have decided not to repeal the law, rather to simply stop enforcing it.)“At this particular time, when the Zionists have incited a campaign around the Jackson Amendment and around the bill on granting us [most favored nation] status, we need to let them out.”61

This record demonstrates that US pressure likely had some influence on Soviet

emigration policy at this time. The law was not repealed, but it was agreed that it would

no longer be enforced. This victory did not stop Senator Jackson. As noted above, the

near nuclear confrontation that occurred in 1973 in spite of Soviet agreement to commit

61 Morozov, pp. 170-176. Excerpt from the Minutes of a Politburo Meeting. Moscow, March 20, 1973.

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to detente aided his anti-detente campaign. He and Representative Charles Vanik of Ohio

co-sponsored the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 US-Soviet Trade Agreement, an

amendment that denied Most Favored Nation status to countries with non-market

economies that restricted freedom of emigration. This Amendment could affect any

nation that restricted emigration, but it was directed primarily at the Soviet Union and

Jewish emigration. While the Jackson-Vanik Amendment was being pushed through

Congress in 1973 and 1974, emigration levels decreased.

The Administration was opposed to the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, as it

jeopardized various accomplishments made through detente and negotiations. The House

passed the Amendment in December 1973, over President Nixon’s protest. Nixon’s power

was severely weakened at the time by the Watergate Scandal, and Jackson-Vanik passed

by a vote of 319 to 80. When it became clear that the Amendment was going to move

through Congress, Kissinger engaged Senator Jackson in private negotiation, trying to

find a “benchmark” number of emigrants per year that would acceptably qualify as ‘free

emigration’ to Jackson and his supporters, and be accepted by the Soviets. The two men

compromised at 60,000 per year, though the highest number of Jewish emigrants to that

point had been 35,000 in 1973, and there were only 20,000 in 1974.62 Confirmation of

this number was arranged to take place in a series of private letters between Kissinger,

Senator Jackson and Gromyko – a perfect example of quiet diplomacy. However, conflict

soon arose: the US administration wanted the text of its assurances to remain

confidential, while Jackson demanded that everything be made public. Furthermore,

62 Buwalda, pp 89-112.

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Gromyko protested the American ‘interpretation’ of the Soviet position. Gromyko (in true

diplomat speak) wrote in his letter to Kissinger,

“...attempts are being made to ascribe to the elucidations that were furnished by us (regarding emigration policy) the nature of some assurances and, nearly, obligations on our part regarding the procedure of departure of Soviet citizens from the USSR, and even some figures are being quoted as to the supposed number of such citizens, and there is talk about an anticipated increase of that number as compared with previous years. We resolutely decline such an interpretation.”63

President Ford signed the Trade Bill into law with the Jackson-Vanik Amendment

intact in 1975. Senator Jackson’s public claim of victory over the Soviet position at a

press conference dealt the US-Soviet Trade Agreement a fatal wound. The Soviet

government was enraged and embarrassed, and withdrew from the Trade Agreement.

With this the heart of the trade component of US-Soviet detente collapsed. Settlement of

the Lend-Lease debt was voided and Most Favored Nation status was denied. Trade did

not stop for agreements such as the Maritime Agreement and deals on grain sales went

forward, but the elusive Most Favored Nation status had important economic and

political significance, further harming US-Soviet relations.

What was Brezhnev to do with an unstable US partner, with leaders who

promised one thing and a government that did another? Author Raymond Garthoff writes

of the Soviet position, “If the United States would not honor a fairly balanced trade

agreement the president had signed, what guarantee could there be for a new SALT

agreement or any other agreement?” Surely it must have seemed that the Americans took

advantage of Soviet willingness to directly negotiate Soviet Jewish emigration. This

63 Drachman, p. 436, Letter from Foreign Minister Gromyko to Secretary Kissinger, October 26, 1974.

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fiasco should have stiffened Gromyko against future flexibility and weakened US

negotiating power in regards to Jewish emigration. However, emigration began to

increase once more following Jackson-Vanik. In this case, increased US-Soviet tensions

did not adversely effect Jewish emigration.

President Carter’s Human Rights Crusade 1977

President Carter identified the support of human rights as a critical component of

American foreign policy.64 In contrast to the Nixon and Ford administrations which had

seen human rights as outside of the scope of US-Soviet relations, Carter named

emigration a human rights issue and rejected Soviet protest that emigration was an

untouchable internal matter. Nixon, Ford and Kissinger had all cautiously avoided

meddling in the Soviet Union’s internal affairs or criticizing the Soviet Union regarding

emigration. Kissinger’s particular style of diplomacy involved applying pressure behind-

the-scenes to achieve political goals. Shunning quiet diplomacy, Carter was vociferous in

his criticism of the Soviet Union’s human rights record. This new approach was reflected

in his first foreign policy address to the UN in 1977:

“No member of the United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its responsibilities to review . . . that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own business. Equally, no member can avoid its responsibilities to review and to speak when torture or unwarranted deprivation of freedom occurs in any part of the world.”65

In this same speech, Carter also rejected the concept of linkage within foreign policy. US-

Soviet diplomacy regarding arms control would not be contingent upon Soviet adherence

64 http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/55.htm 65 Edward Walsh, “Carter Stresses Arms and Rights in Policy Speech”, Washington Post, March 18, 1977.

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to human rights standards. These disparate positions, being rhetorically tough on human

rights but compliant in other areas, were not cohesive, causing Carter to be seen as

engaging ‘soft diplomacy’. The Washington Post reported: “The most sophisticated

Kremlin analysis understands that the American stance on human rights is essentially an

emotional one - and that the Soviet response is a defense of its ideology - whereas on the

practical matters of relations, the situation does not seem as grim. Carter has said

repeatedly that he is serious about making headway quickly on arms matters and he has

chosen a team of senior advisers known to favour strategic arms limitation.”66 Indeed,

however enraged the Soviet government was by several of Carter’s actions in the first

few weeks of his administration, such as communicating with well-known Soviet

Refuseniks and dissidents such as Vladimir Slepak, Vladimir Bukovsky, and Andrei

Sakharov, Soviet-American negotiations were not shut down.

However, the Soviet Union continued to decry criticism of human rights as anti-

Soviet slander. Pravda reflected this:

“Attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the other side are particularly disastrous for mutual confidence. And such attempts have never been raised in the United States to the level of state policy. Seemingly nice sounding motives are being chosen for them: ‘human rights’, ‘humanism’, ‘defense of freedom.’ But in fact we have here the very same designs to undermine the socialist system that our people have been compelled to counter in one of another form ever since 1917.”67

Regardless of his wish that his criticism not harm other areas of bi-lateral

relations, Carter’s criticism arguably contributed to rising Soviet-US tensions.

Brezhnev himself stated at a 1978 Politburo meeting that “the main source of such

66 Peter Osnos, “US Relations: Rosy With Thorns”, Washington Post, March 6, 1977. 67 Editorial, Pravda, June 17, 1978.

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a worsening of the situation (of US-Soviet relations) is the growing

aggressiveness of the foreign policy of the Carter administration, the ever more

sharp anti-Soviet character of the speeches of the president himself and his closest

colleagues.”68

In spite of other tensions that arose in this time period, particularly as a result of

the Soviet Union’s actions in Africa, detente in the form of arms control negotiations

continued. Emigration continued to increase from 1977 to 1979, a phenomenon that is not

explained by this hypothesis.

SALT II Succeeds...and Fails 1979

The Carter Administration’s greatest achievement for US-Soviet relations was the

signing of the SALT II agreements. SALT II was a more comprehensive arms limitation

package and represented years’ worth of negotiations that had trudged on in spite of other

areas of conflict. Brezhnev and Carter signed SALT II at a summit in Vienna in 1979. The

ever-sensitive issue of trade and Soviet Jewish emigration was raised at this summit, in a

private meeting between the two presidents.69 Carter expressed appreciation for the

unprecedented emigration levels and his intention to pursue MFN status on behalf of the

Soviet Union, which seemed plausible in a political atmosphere expected to cool as a

result of the SALT II agreements. In the context of the Vienna Summit, the relative

importance of Soviet Jewish emigration certainly paled next to Brezhnev’s concern over

68 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 668. from Meeting of the Politburo of the CC CPSU, June 8, 1978. 69 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 810.

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China and China-US relations, yet it is significant that it was brought up in the midst of

these positive negotiations.

Unfortunately Carter’s efforts were for naught. The Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan in December 1979 to support an endangered Communist political ally in the

country was interpreted by the US as a use of military force to expand its global sphere of

influence. This move was denounced by countries around the world, including many of

the Arab states, and led to a flurry of US sanctions against the Soviet Union. As author

Raymond Garthoff relates, “Not only did the administration go overboard in tossing

almost everything movable onto the sacrificial bonfire of sanctions, but it tied the whole

to the obviously unattainable maximum aim of getting the Soviets to withdraw from

Afghanistan.”70 Carter’s inflammatory rhetoric condemned the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan as ‘the greatest threat to peace since World War II’. These sanctions soon led

to the loss of détente. The invasion also led to the Carter Doctrine, renewed efforts to

confront the expansion of Soviet power particularly in the Persian Gulf region. The

Carter Doctrine was described by Radio Moscow in 1980: it was “an overt US claim to

world domination, proclaims a course towards confrontation and renunciation of the

achievements of detente, and puts forward a conception of reliance on US military might

and force.”71

The loss of détente had an unquestionable impact on Soviet-American

negotiations regarding Soviet Jewish emigration, insofar as emigration was discussed

within the context of relations overall. SALT II was not ratified and the suspension clause

70 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 1065.71 TASS, “Following a Course toward Confrontation,” Radio Moscow, January 22, 1980, in FBIS, Soviet Union, January 23, 1980, p. A.

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of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which could allow for the Soviet Union finally

obtaining MFN status, was clearly not going to be activated. American trade with the

Soviet Union dropped 60% from 1979 to 1980. With fewer cards on the negotiating table

- supposing a negotiating table was even approachable at that time - American power to

bargain about Jewish emigration was decimated. Jewish emigration rapidly declined after

the invasion, supporting the argument that emigration was tied to US-Soviet political

relations.

Era of Confrontation with the ‘Evil Empire’: President Reagan’s First Term 1981-

1985

President Reagan was elected on an anti-detente platform. As President he

maintained Carter’s attention to human rights in foreign policy, and took open criticism

of the Soviet Union further to include strong moralistic rhetoric such as the infamous

‘Evil Empire’ speech. 72 As an example of criticism of the Soviet human rights record,

Reagan was quoted as saying in 1981, “the Soviet Union is the greatest violator of human

rights today in all the world.”73 The President commonly voiced a hatred of Communism

and certainly did not pose as a friendly partner for diplomacy or negotiations.

This criticism went hand in hand with meeting with the Soviet Union’s declared

enemies: Refuseniks and dissidents. Like President Carter before him, Reagan met with

former Refuseniks such as Josef Mendelevitch, who had been involved with the

72 See President Reagan’s ‘Evil Empire’ speech, delivered March 8, 1983 speech to the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida. Text available at http://www.luminet.net/~tgort/empire.htm73 Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1994) p. 8.

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Leningrad hijacking and Avital Sharansky, Natan Sharansky’s wife and passionate

advocate. In 1983 Reagan publicly stated that the “issue of Soviet Jewry is of high

priority to the administration.”74 His Secretary of State George Shultz also went out of his

way to support Soviet Jews, focusing on the issue of Jewish emigration and human rights

in meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

US hostility during Reagan’s first administration alarmed Moscow and put the

Soviets on constant watch for a nuclear strike. US-Soviet relations in these years were

punctuated by further affronts. For example, September 1, 1983, Soviet fighters shot

down a Korean Airlines passenger jet that it claimed was on an espionage mission in

Soviet airspace. Regan’s ‘Star Wars’ Strategic Defense Initiative was announced in 1983,

and though the US insisted that this initiative was purely defensive, this also added to

Soviet suspicions and tensions. President Reagan may have been committed to the Soviet

Jewish emigration issue in these years, but the overall negative and tense US-Soviet

relationship made bargaining impossible.

New Partners in Negotiations: President Reagan’s Second Term 1985-1989

In 1985 US-Soviet relations were impacted immensely by Mikhail Gorbachev’s

acession to power. In response to the dire economic situation the Soviet Union was in,

Gorbachev instituted social reforms and policy reforms aimed at liberalizing society and

improving relations with the West. The Soviet economy had reached a point at which

military competition with the US was no longer possible, and the Soviet military-

74 Lazin, p. 183.

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industrial complex had drained the country dry. A series of summits between Gorbachev

and Regan marked continuous political efforts to decrease tensions between the two

countries. At summits in Geneva in 1985, Reykjavik in 1986 and Washington in 1987,

Reagan and Gorbachev discussed negotiations on nuclear and space arms, measures to

prevent future arms competition, to limit and reduce nuclear arms and enhance strategic

stability. Reagan and Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF)

Treaty in 1987.

It is not obvious that Jewish emigration was discussed at the 1985 meeting in

Geneva. A New York Times article written by the National Chairman of Student Struggle

for Soviet Jewry (SSSJ), who protested and was arrested in Geneva during the summit,

disparagingly notes President Reagan’s efforts to “keep every sign of protest as far away

from him as possible” and that “he hardly mentioned human rights in his summit report

to the nation.”75 However, the announcement of plans for the opening of a Soviet

consulate in New York suggests that some concessions were made in the name of

improved relations. This signaled the beginning of improvement of the US-Soviet

relationship.

Jewish emigration was addressed at the 1986 Reykjavik summit. Secretary of

State George Schultz, who had shown extra interest in the plight of Soviet Jewry

throughout his service, even attending a Passover Seder with Refuseniks in Moscow,

insisted that this human rights issue be included on the summit agenda. Significantly, a

New York Times article noted the White House’s intended approach to negotiating Jewish

75 Avraham Weiss, “A Dark Side to the Summit”, New York Times, December 7, 1985.

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emigration at the Iceland summit. A White House official explained that President

Reagan would “follow the Nixon view” that the United States “can accomplish more in

private than you can making public statements.” The US would agree not “make a

propaganda point” if Moscow allowed dissidents or Jews the right to leave.76 At the

summit the Americans offered to present a list of names, addresses and dates of refusal

for the entire known Refusenik community. It seems that at this point, the Soviet

delegation realized that the emigration issue had to by faced rather than denied. 77 Human

Rights was put on the public agenda for the 1987 Summit, and emigration began to

increase in that year. It seems as though addressing emigration in the context of

improving macro relations once again had an effect on Soviet policy.

Evaluation: The Barometer Thesis, US-Soviet Relations as a Causal Factor

In the context of the Barometer Thesis, Soviet Jewish emigration was a bargaining

chip used by the Soviets to reward or punish US action. The development of detente in

the early 1970s may have caused Jewish emigration to increase in the years leading-up to

the 1972 Moscow summit and thereafter. The 1973 near nuclear confrontation and the

movement of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment - specifically addressing Soviet Jewish

emigration - through Congress may have caused the decrease in emigration from 1973 to

1975. Deteriorating relations may have caused the decline in 1980. Likewise, improving

relations in the late 1980s may have caused the increase after 1987. For all of these years

the Barometer Thesis seems, loosely, to work.

76 Bernard Weintraub, “President Links Rights in Soviet to Summit Success”, New York Times, October 8, 1986. 77 Theodore H. Friedgut, “Passing Eclipse” in Soviet Jewry in the 1980s, ed. Robert Freedman (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 1989), p. 13.

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However, the Barometer Thesis fails to explain the emigration pattern of the late

1970s. President Carter agitated the Soviets with his harsh criticism of their human rights

record and nearly failed to offer any concessions or real rewards. Soviet activity in the

Third World increased US-Soviet tensions in these years, weakening detente. Yet

emigration increased steadily from 1975 to 1979, reaching an unprecedented level just as

relations were worsening. Petrus Buwalda, the Netherlands Ambassador in Moscow from

1986-1990, has written that hopes of obtaining a waiver of the Jackson-Vanik

Amendment and the ratification of SALT II were major reasons why the Soviet

government permitted a high level of Jewish emigration in the late 1970s.78 In other

words, Jackson-Vanik worked. Yet author Laurie Salitan notes that the lack of

international Western support for Jackson-Vanik weakened any possible impact it could

have had on the Soviet Union. France, Great Britain, Japan and West Germany never

linked trade to emigration and conducted business as usual with the USSR in these years.

Thus, the Soviet Union was able to fulfill its trade requirements elsewhere, and had no

need to please the US regarding this issue.79 I have found not primary Soviet sources to

corroborate this claim either way, and without access to complete Soviet records I leave

this point open to debate. Hopes of achieving SALT II may have caused the Soviet

government to increase emigration, but does this seem to justify increases taking place

over three years, to an unprecedented level? I leave this open to debate as well.

The Barometer thesis has strengths and weaknesses. Assuming the Barometer

Thesis to hold some water, we may ask: When did US pressure on the Soviet Union seem

78 Buwalda, pp.127-136.79 Salitan, p. 89.

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to work and when did it fail? In the period under consideration, it appears that the Soviet

Union responded to US requests for increased emigration when those requests were

issued in the context of negotiations that promised to benefit the Soviet Union and

improve the US-Soviet relationship: US carrots such as strategic arms control treaties,

negotiations on grain, credits, and improvement of trade. When these requests became

public demands, couched in harsh rhetoric and coincided with any open confrontation,

the Soviet reaction was negative.

There is also a distinction to be made between public and private criticisms of

Soviet government policy. Private criticism of Soviet policy between high-level

government officials had low-level visibility to the media and the public. As the Soviet

government continually denied the existence of a Soviet Jewish emigration problem, it

could not very well justify to its public bargaining with a foreign government over a

problem that ‘did not exist’. Kissinger-style quiet diplomacy required little

accountability; overt public pressure from the U.S. government forced the Soviets to

prove themselves to other Western critics and their own citizens. The Soviet government

clearly preferred the former. The US did not succeed in forcing the Soviet Union to

change its emigration policy – it had to be persuaded.

2. Soviet Policy in the Middle East: Arab Allies

For most of the time period under discussion, Soviet policy in the Middle East

was pro-Arab and anti-Israel, characterized by active pursuit of Arab alliances in

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competition with the US for influence in the region. If the Arab Allies thesis holds and

pressure from these Arab Allies in the Middle East caused changes in Soviet policy

toward Jewish emigration, then emigration would decrease when Soviet-Arab relations

were positive. Emigration could also decrease in moments when the Soviet Union, in

pursuit of wavering allies, sought to prove its commitment to its allies in the Arab world.

Increases in emigration would co-vary with a reversal of these policies.

In order to test this thesis, it is necessary to consider several factors: the strength

of Soviet–Arab relationships over time; the Soviet Union’s prioritization of its Arab

allies; and the tenor of Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Soviet relations. The first factor indicates

how much pressure (if any) Arab leaders would likely have been able to exert on the

Soviet policy making process, or how much influence Arab opinion on an issue such as

Soviet Jewish emigration could have had on Soviet policymakers. The second factor is

important, because the focus of a top ally’s attention on Jews and Israel would determine

the place of the issue of Soviet Jewish emigration in relations with the Soviet Union.

Assuming, as did the Arab states, that Jewish emigration to Israel strengthened the Jewish

state, the third factor is self- evident. It would be contradictory for the Soviet Union to

court Arab allies and simultaneously aid their enemy, particularly in times of Arab-Israeli

war.

A brief description of the limitations of Soviet Middle East policy will be useful

to keep in mind here. The main element of the Soviet Union’s relationship with Arab

states was military aid of some sort, and arms sales in particular. Because the Soviet

Union wished to avoid superpower conflict with the US, and any conflict (in the Middle

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East, especially between the Arab states and Israel) could potentially lead to dangerous

conflict, the Soviet Union sought to support its Arab allies without bringing them to the

point of military parity with their enemies. This need to strike a balance that would safely

maintain Soviet influence in the region put a considerable damper on Soviet-Arab

relations. The Soviet Union was constantly criticized for supplying aid too little or too

late and being a disingenuous ally. Even when Arab-Soviet relations were going well, the

Arab states viewed the Soviet Union with considerable suspicion. Soviet policy in the

Middle East was often trapped by this dilemma.

Israeli-Arab Six Day War 1967

Israel’s victory in the Six Day War of June 1967 awoke immense pride in the Jews

of the Soviet Union. It gave rise to a revivified sense of national consciousness and

eventually prompted translation of this identification with the state of Israel into a

demand for exit visas.80 In this sense, the 1967 war can be said to have sparked the

Emigration Movement. Yet, this event that was so important for many Soviet Jews was

simultaneously a disaster for the Arab World. Egypt, Syria and Jordan accused the Soviet

Union of doing too little too late for its Arab allies. The Soviet Union condemned Israel

for its ‘unwarranted aggression’, and increased anti-Zionist propaganda within its

borders.

The Soviet response to the war was consistent with its pro-Arab position (though

perhaps a bit hasty). Diplomatic relations with Israel were broken and Soviet Jewish

80 Zaslavsky, Brym, p. 1.

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emigration was shut off.81 There seems to be a very clear connection between Soviet

policy toward Jewish emigration and the Soviet Union’s ties to its Arab allies at this time.

Sadat Expels Soviets from Egypt 1972

By 1972, mass emigration was increasing and beginning to get press coverage in

the West. Apparently this was picked up on in the Arab world. Archival material from this

year shows Soviet concern with the effect the Jewish emigration issue could have on

Soviet-Arab relations. In a memo to the CPSU Central Committee, the Deputy Head of

the International Department wrote:

“This propaganda [Western media] has evoked a response in the Arab world. According to the Soviet embassies, concern in connection with the departure of individuals of Jewish nationality from the USSR to Israel has been expressed in one form or another by Syrian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Z. Ismail, by Chairman of the Executive Council of the Palestinian Liberation Organization Y. Arafat, and by certain political and public figures in Lebanon...if the propaganda campaign unleashed by anti-Soviet forces in connection with the emigration of individuals of Jewish nationality to Israel is not repudiated, it may have a negative effect on the sentiments of the Arab public, with undesirable consequences for us.”82

A subsequent briefing (attached to this memo in the archive) sent to Soviet ambassadors

in Arab countries instructed them to deny that Jewish emigration was occurring on a mass

scale, and explain that it involved only the elderly or “individuals removed from the

military register for reasons of health” and thus was “of practically no value in

strengthening the military potential of Israel.” 83 Clearly the Soviet government was

81 Buwalda, p. xii.82 Morozov p. 135. Memorandum from R. Ul’ianovskii (Deputy Head, International Department, CPSU CC) to the CPSU Central Committee. Moscow, February 21, 1972. 83 Morozov p. 136. Excerpt from the Minutes of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat. Moscow, February 29, 1972. This briefing was sent to ambassadors located in Aden, Algiers, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Khartoum, Kuwait, Rabat, San’a, Tripoli and Tunis.

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concerned enough with Arab opinions on Jewish emigration to respond to it, at least with

rhetoric such as this.

In July 1972, Anwar Sadat dramatically changed Egypt’s relationship with the

Soviet Union by expelling between fifteen and twenty thousand Soviet specialists and

military advisors from the country. This hostile move marked the beginning of Egypt’s

distancing from Moscow and reorientation toward the US. With Sadat’s move Moscow

lost its main ally in the Middle East as well as years of significant financial and other

investments. It also shook the Soviet Union’s stance in the Middle East. Certainly in light

of this and warming of the US-Soviet relationship (which the anti-West Arab states would

not have appreciated) the Soviet Union had cause to prove its commitment to its Arab

allies at this time.

It is possible that the Diploma Tax, issued in August 1972, was intended to do just

that. Kissinger writes in his memoirs that in the context of the 1972 summit and its

seemingly positive outcome for Jewish emigration, the exit tax issued only months later

made no sense. In his opinion, the most plausible explanation for this Soviet action was

that “panicked by the expulsion of advisors from Egypt, the Soviets decided to take no

further chances with Arab relations.”84 Yet, emigration did not decrease. This example

only offers mild support for the Arab allies thesis.

84 Kissinger, The White House Years, p. 1272.

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Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War 1973

In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Egypt and Syria led a coalition of Arab states in

attacking Israel, with arms supplied by the Soviet Union. As discussed above, this war

nearly escalated into nuclear confrontation between its superpower backers. Although this

war was devastating for Israel, Israel succeeded in fighting back the Egyptian and Syrian

armies. As occurred in 1967, the Soviet Union was accused of doing too little too late for

its Arab allies, as it re-supplied arms lost but did not assist by sending troops during the

war itself. It is possible that the post-1973 decrease in emigration was a result of anti-

emigration policy taken as an apologetic concession to the Arabs, proof of a pro-Arab

stance. In this sense, like the 1967 war the 1973 war may have directly effected Soviet

Jewish emigration.

The Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty that followed the end of the war marked Egypt’s

final shift from the Soviet to the US camp, and the Soviet Union had to pursue the

loyalties of other Arab allies. Furthermore, US diplomatic maneuvering had effectively

pushed the Soviet Union out of Arab-Israeli negotiations. Once this happened, significant

opportunities for Soviet-Arab partnerships were limited to countries neutral or

antagonistic to Israel. Iraq became a primary Soviet ally in spite of Ba’athist persecution

of Iraqi communists because it was oil-rich. (At this point, the Soviet government needed

hard cash to pay for the grain it was buying from the US in large quantities, and it was

able to obtain this money quickly through arms sales to willing oil-rich Arab countries

like Iraq.)

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The significance of this shift was that the Arab-Israeli conflict, which was at the

focus of Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East until the mid-1970s, became less

important in the latter years of that decade. Syria was the only leader of the Arab

opposition to Israel at that point, but for a variety of reasons the Soviet government

viewed Syria warily and there was no great trust between the two governments.85 It is

possible that with the focus of Middle East policy drawn away from Israel, Jewish

emigration could increase without significant Arab complaint – in other words, the

reorganization of Soviet partnerships in the Middle East removed the Arab constraint to

Soviet Jewish emigration.

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1979, and Iran-Iraq War 1980

The toppling of the Shah in Iran and the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini’s

revolutionary Islamic fundamentalist regime brought a new rabidly anti-Western force to

the Middle East. In the zero-sum war of ideology and influence, an anti-West power in

the Middle East was a gain for the Soviet Union. However, Khomeini’s anti-Western

regime was equally anti-Communist. When the newly established Iranian Republic was

attacked by Iraq the Soviet government was once again trapped in its usual Middle East

dilemma; trying to simultaneously support everyone and no one in an attempt to both stay

involved and stay neutral. Instead of picking a side in the war, the Soviets supported both

Iran and Iraq with aid designed to avoid one country gaining advantage over the other.

85 Nizameddin, Talal, Russia and the Middle East, Towards a New Foreign Policy (London: Hurst and Company, 1999), p. 257.

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This strategy was not durable and by the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union’s position with

both countries was fragile.86

As noted above, the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan drew major

tremendous international criticism and sanctions. The Arab states were included. The oil-

rich Gulf States backing Iraq in its war against Iran were fearful of communist expansion

and the destabilizing effect of the invasion. They utilized their oil-wealth to mobilize

Arab opposition to the invasion, including severe criticism of the Soviet Union from

Baghdad. Syria signed a Soviet Friendship treaty in 1980 in the midst of this criticism,

perhaps hoping to strengthen its ties to the Soviet Union while it had a chance.

Israeli Offensives: 1981 Osirak bombing, 1982 Invasion of Lebanon

In the early 1980s, Israel aggressively exercised its military might in the Middle

East. The bombing of Iraq’s pre-operational nuclear reactor was followed by the invasion

of Lebanon, in pursuit of the PLO terrorist organization. Israel fought a series of battles

with Syria as well as the PLO in Lebanon in 1982 and these clashes destroyed Syria’s

Soviet-supplied air power. Soviet inactivity during this invasion and the siege of Beirut

caused Soviet credibility as an ally of the Arabs to be strongly questioned, even by pro-

Soviet regimes such as Libya. 87

When Andropov came to power the Soviet legacy as the prime supporter of the

Arab Middle East was faltering. One of the greatest problems he faced was the significant

advance of the US influence in the region. The main Soviet allies at this point were

86 Heller, Dynamics of Soviet Policy in the Middle East, p. 40.87 Freedman, Robert O., Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy Since the Invasion of Afghanistan (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

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Libya, South Yemen, Syria and the PLO, allies who were at odds with each other and had

little clout in the Arab world. Even worse, while Soviet policy had been faltering, the US

had been gaining influence in the region through peace talks with Israel and the

deployment of rapid reaction military forces. The Soviet Union lamely tried to vie with

the US for power, but it was in a poor position to do so at this time.

Gorbachev and “New Thinking” about the Middle East 1985-1989

By the time Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet Union had no trustworthy allies

left in the Middle East.88 It was clear that change in Soviet Middle East policy was at

hand, as Gorbachev repeatedly expressed his intention to change the direction of Soviet

foreign policy, particularly in the Third World. The new leader instituted sweeping

personnel and organizational changes in pursuit of this goal: he replaced the top Soviet

decision makers in the party and government in the field of international affairs,

reorganized the major party and government institutions dealing with national security

issues, changed the leadership of the foreign ministry and the Central Committee’s

International Department, and created a new foreign affairs bureau that reported directly

to the Politburo.89 The new approach to the Middle East involved cultivation of capitalist,

economically useful allies and withdrawal of support for radical regimes and militant

methods of solving conflicts. After decades of cooperation with its Arab allies, the Arab

states in the Middle East were decreasing in importance to the USSR. Gorbachev’s

88 Nizameddin, Russia and the Middle East, p. 40. 89 New York Times October 21, 1988, p. 3.

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speech to the 27th CPSU Party Congress in 1986 was the first speech of a General

Secretary since 1952 to not explicitly address the problems of the Third World.90

This policy change was accompanied by an increase in Jewish emigration.

Certainly Gorbachev would have realized that an open door policy to Jewish emigration

would encourage the wrath of Arab public opinion and their governments; however,

actions such as Gorbachev lecturing Yasser Arafat at a Kremlin reception on Israeli

security concerns demonstrated that this concern was no longer of high priority.91 Syria

was told that the Soviet Union would not assist the pursuit of military parity with Israel;

the PLO was informed Soviet political support for the Palestinian cause would now

depend upon Palestinian engagement in the peace process and renunciation of terrorism;

and the Soviet Union decided to side with Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, since Iraq was calling

for a cease-fire and Iran was calling for ‘victory until death’. Overall, by 1989, Moscow

had come to play a more US-friendly role in the Arab World.

The greatest change in Soviet policy in the Middle East was the semi-formal

resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel in 1987.92 After years of supplying Israel’s

enemies with the weapons, treating Israel as the enemy, a proxy of Western imperialism,

and promoting a ‘Zionism is racism’ ideology, Moscow began to change its tune.

Diplomatic relations began on the consular level, with a Soviet consular team visiting Tel

Aviv in 1987 and an Israeli consular group traveling to Moscow in 1988. Soviet criticism

of Israeli actions against Arabs continued in these years, for example seen in the Soviet

90 Heller, Mark A., The Dynamics of Soviet Policy in the Middle East: Between Old Thinking and New (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1991), p. 50. 91 Nizameddin, Talal, p. 49 92 The ban on direct, bi-lateral contacts between Soviet officials and Israelis had never been absolute. For example, Gromyko met with Israeli foreign ministers at international conferences as early as 1984.

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response to Israel’s abduction of Hezbollah leader Sheik Obeid from Lebanon. “The act

of violence performed by Israel is unquestionably a flagrant violation of Lebanon’s

sovereignty and no motives can justify it. It constitutes and act of international

terrorism”.93 However, rhetoric was not paired with action. Soviet Jewish emigration

steadily increased from 1987 to 1989. It may be that the increase in emigration was made

possible by declining Soviet-Arab relationships and the fall of Arab allies in Soviet

foreign policy priority rankings.

Arab Protest Falls on Deaf Ears 1990

In 1990, the Arab world’s fervent protest against Soviet Jewish emigration was

heard far and wide. “Soviet officials, journalists and ordinary citizens were bombarded by

strident condemnations from almost every Arab quarter.”94 The doors to emigration had

been opened and thousands upon thousands of Soviet Jews were pouring into Israel.

Criticism came from Arab fears that Soviet Jewish immigrants would be settled in the

occupied territories, that the demographic impact of the predicted flood of immigrants

would tilt the Arab-Israeli demography war along with the Arab-Israeli power balance in

Israel’s favor, and that emigration signaled a permanent tilt toward Israel at the expense

of all past Arab-Soviet relations. Added on to all the other strains on Soviet-Arab

relations, the new Soviet release of Jewish emigration produced long-lasting

disillusionment, despair and anger toward the Soviet Union among its Arab allies and

93 Freedman, Robert O., “Soviet Foreign Policy Toward the US and Israel in the Gorbachev Era: Jewish Emigration and Middle East Politics” in Goldberg and Marantz, The Decline of the Soviet Union and the Transformation of the Middle East (San Fransisco; Oxford: 1994), p. 63. 94 Heller, Dynamics of Soviet Policy in the Middle East, p. 74.

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throughout the Arab world. Clearly at this point, any pressure from the Soviet Union’s

Arab allies was impotent. Now, Arab protest was entirely unable to cause change in

Soviet policy toward Jewish emigration.

Arab Allies as a Causal Factor: Evaluation

The Soviet Union’s relationship with the Arab World was troubled from the start,

lacking complete trust and without true commitments. Soviet-Arab relations were

strongly colored by Soviet-US relations. As the Soviet Union struggled to balance and

support various regimes in the Middle East, the US poured more and more of its support

into Israel. The two superpowers supported their allies with military equipment and

intelligence, causing wars in the Middle East to take on the aspect of proxy wars. The

debate over Soviet Jewish emigration that took place between the Soviet Union and the

US was in a sense replicated by an anti-emigration Arab voice and a pro-emigration

Israeli voice.

From 1967 to 1985, Soviet policy presented Israel as a tool of the West, that

“Washington used to attack Soviet foreign interests and the internal stability of the USSR

itself.”95 This characterization was reflected in Soviet rhetoric and propaganda. In 1967

and 1973, major Arab-Israeli wars do seem to have impacted Jewish emigration. With the

loss of Egypt as an ally confirmed and the subsequent shift toward Iraq (more neutral

toward Israel) the need for the Soviet Union to express commitment to Arab-Soviet

95 Nizameddin, p. 111.

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relations by restricting emigration would have decreased, possibly accounting for the

increase in emigration in these years.

“Given the rising costs and risks of Soviet activism and questionable return on

Third World investments, it is not surprising that a major reassessment of this

involvement took place in the 1980s.”96 From 1980-1985 Soviet policy in the Middle East

stagnated. In these years, Israeli ‘aggression’ paired with weak Soviet-Arab relationships.

However, Brezhnev’s successors tried to maintain his failing policies and Soviet

influence in the Middle East, giving reason to restrict emigration in reaction to Israel’s

aggressive moves in the Arab world. Soviet antagonism in its relationship with the US

was high, and so the Middle East remained an important theatre of countering US power.

In 1985 Gorbachev radically changed the direction of Soviet foreign policy in the

Middle East and diplomatic relations were slowly resumed with Israel. Naturally, a

central aspect of Israeli-Soviet relations was Jewish emigration. Israel gained influence

with the Soviet Union and was able to advocate for Soviet Jewish emigration, at the same

time that the importance and influence of the strongly anti-Israel and anti-emigration

Arab allies to the Soviet Union declined. Certainly, the Soviet Union’s new approach to

Israel was tied to the Soviet desire to improve relations with the US, and easing

emigration restrictions was a necessary aspect of the democratization of Soviet society.

However, Soviet desire to maintain influence in the region by playing a main role in

Israeli-Arab peace negotiations also necessitated the reestablishment of Soviet-Israeli

relations.97 Increased emigration flowed from this situation.

96 Heller, Dynamics of Soviet Policy in the Middle East, p. 20. 97 Nizameddin, p. 259.

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There is no reason to expect that any of the Arab states invested much time and

energy in preventing Soviet Jewish emigration, as there were many other issues of

importance in Arab-Soviet diplomacy. Where Soviet Jewish emigration came up as a

primary issue in relations between the Soviet Union and the US (with the help of the

organized American Jewish community), it is unlikely that a similar phenomenon

occurred with the Arab states. It is reasonable to believe that the Soviet government

engaged in small-scale restrictions of emigration as gestures of goodwill toward its Arab

allies from time to time, but that these restrictions were overall designed to avoid

compromising political relations with the U.S. I would expect the greatest effect of the

Arab allies factor to be when an important Arab ally was directly engaged in war with

Israel. The influence of Arab allies could have caused decreases in emigration, but there

is no support for any Arab action encouraging an increase in emigration. Arab pressure as

an anti-emigration factor only went in one direction, and so is a limited causal factor.

3. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: International Organizations

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) meetings

provided East and West with a forum for discussion on areas of common political

interest. Because the political negotiations that took place at CSCE meetings were often

public and highly publicized, the meetings periodically raised the level of the Soviet

government’s concern for its international image - an image that was easily (temporarily)

improved by increasing emigration and releasing a few high profile prisoners. As a

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negotiating forum, the CSCE meetings were a rough terrain. The issue of Soviet Jewish

emigration often threatened to shut down negotiations, as the Soviets blocked debate on

their ‘internal affairs’. Certainly Soviet negotiators hoped to keep human rights criticism

to a minimum in order to better gain their objectives at CSCE meetings. CSCE continued

in spite of tensions because both sides remained interested in one another’s concessions.

If this thesis holds and international attention given to a specific issue in the

context of international multi-lateral organizations can affect change in a member state’s

policy, CSCE meetings at which family reunification and Soviet Jewish emigration were

discussed should co-occur with increases in emigration.

Helsinki, 1975

Initial reactions of the Soviet government to CSCE, expressed by the Politburo,

the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers, were extremely

positive.98 However, Western appeals for human rights standards and emigration at the

Conference were denounced as unreasonable attempts to interfere in the Soviet Union’s

internal affairs. At the Twenty-fifth Party Congress in 1976, Brezhnev remarked that

some of the conference participants sought to use the Final Act as “a cover for

interference in the internal affairs of the countries of socialism, for anti-Communist and

anti-Soviet demagogy in the style of the ‘cold war’”.99 This Soviet position limited the

degree of pressure the West was willing to put on emigration as a human rights issue in

98 “On the Results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,” Pravda, August 7, 1975. 99 Twenty-fifth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, February 24-March 5, 1976: Stenographic Account, vol. 1 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1976), p. 41-2.

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CSCE at the time. This pressure was obviously hostile to the Soviets and threatened to

harm other negotiations on security and trade.

Kissinger saw the Conference and the legally non-binding Final Act as

unimportant ‘promises’ made in broad language. He was at best uninterested in the

Conference, at worst concerned that unnecessary confrontation over human rights would

damage detente.100 The Helsinki Final Act signed in August 1975, did however include

language guaranteeing human rights. Furthermore, emigration rose after the Soviet Union

signed the Final Act. This may support the argument that international attention given to

human rights in the context of CSCE affected Soviet policy, although the attention to the

specific issue of Soviet Jewish emigration and Refuseniks at this point was nebulous at

best.

Belgrade, October 4, 1977 - March 8, 1978

The CSCE participants met for a second time in Belgrade to review the progress

made on implementation of the Helsinki agreements. Right before the meeting, the KGB

moved to suppress the ‘dissent’ that had sprung up after Helsinki in the form of Helsinki

monitoring groups. Well-known activists such as Sharansky and Orlov were snapped up.

However, this series of KGB intimidations and arrests failed to quell these groups in time

for the conference, and they were in active communication with CSCE during the

Belgrade meeting.101

100 Korey, The Promises We Keep, p. 14.101 Reddaway, “Policy Toward Dissent Since Khruschev” ”, in Rigby, Brown, Reddaway, Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1980), p. 179.

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On the first day of the Belgrade meeting, the Washington Post reported, “A

sweeping indictment of Eastern European failures to live up to the pledges on human

rights made more than two years ago at Helsinki was delivered today by chief U.S.

delegate Arthur Goldberg to a conference reviewing those accords.”102 An important US

policy change regarding the Conference was occurring. In the first few days of Belgrade,

Goldberg ‘broke the silence barrier’ at the Conference, for the first time directly

addressing Soviet human rights abuses. Fingers were pointed and names were named –

specifically, seven cases of unwarranted Soviet arrests were described, including the

activists arrested just before the meeting.103 No other states joined the US in a direct

attack on Soviet actions at this time, yet Belgrade clearly established that the internal

practices of the CSCE signatory states would now be subject to international review. In

the course of the meeting, CSCE discussions moved from the search for mutually

acceptable Confidence Building Measures (CMBs) to confrontation over ‘internal affairs’

and eventually were stymied. The only conclusions of Belgrade were confirmation of all

states to pursue implementation of the Final Act and agreement to meet again. Emigration

numbers increased from 1977 to 1978 by more than 10,000. This strongly supports the

argument that attention to this specific issue at CSCE had an effect on Soviet policy.

Madrid, November 11, 1980 - September 9, 1983

A New York Times article asked in November 1980, “Is detente dead or is it just

critically ill? That should become clearer on Tuesday when 35 European and North

102 Michael Getler, “U.S. Critical, Soviets Low-Key at First Belgrade Session”, Washington Post, October 7, 1977.103 Korey, The Promises We Keep, p. 98.

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American states that signed the Helsinki Accords in 1975 gather in Madrid to examine all

the broken and unfulfilled promises on security, cooperation and human rights.”104 Such

was the US perception of the international atmosphere in which CSCE resumed in 1980.

The Soviet Union had fallen from the graces of most First World nations for its 1979

invasion of Afghanistan, and Jewish emigration was plummeting.

The deterioration of US-Soviet relations did not check the Conference. Although

US-Soviet detente had crumbled with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, this

transgression did not have the same effect in Europe. The UN and various European

countries sent diplomatic messages of disapproval to the Soviet Union, but the Europeans

continued to pursue detente after the invasion. As they saw it, abandoning detente would

only renew tensions that had effectively been relaxed in Europe.105 CSCE was pursued in

this spirit.

At Madrid head of the American delegation Max Kampleman had the

Administration’s endorsement to push human rights (like Goldberg before him). He

brought up the issue of Soviet Jews constantly at the Conference.106 Where in Belgrade

only the US had openly raised the issue of Soviet Jewish emigration, nine Western

countries did so at Madrid. These nations were the United Kingdom, Ireland, Belgium,

the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and France. Delegates from these nations

came forth with hundreds of cold and hard cases of well known Refuseniks and

dissidents, each as specific examples of Helsinki violations. The President of the

104 James Markham, “Following the Trail of Broken Promises: Detente Cuts Two Ways” New York Times, November 9, 1980. 105As a result, Europe kept up political and trade relations with the Soviet Union. Plummeting US-Soviet trade helped Europe-Soviet trade skyrocket.106 Lazin, p. 184.

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International League for Human Rights and US delegation member Jerome Shestack

raised the subject of anti-Semitism, stating that the Soviet state “restricts the right of Jews

to live as members of an ethnic and religious minority.” British delegate John Wilberforce

accused the Soviets of “apparent manipulation for political motives of the rate of Jewish

emigration.” 107 Thus, Madrid marked an historic breakthrough in international diplomacy

regarding Soviet Jewish emigration.

Unfortunately, all this new support for Soviet Jewish emigration had little effect

on the Soviet Union. Emigration decreased from 20,000 individuals to little over 1000 by

the end of the Madrid conference. Multiple nations stepped up and rallied around the

emigration issue, yet emigration decreased. This challenges the argument presented

above.

Vienna, November 4, 1986 - January 19, 1989

CSCE Vienna took place during some of the greatest changes the Soviet Union

had ever seen. Gorbachev’s influence within the Soviet Union blossomed as the

Conference proceeded, and his reforms began to take effect. The Soviet Union’s

relationship with the West began to change from one of confrontation to cooperation,

opening new possibilities for the Helsinki Process.

The West and particularly the US approached Vienna with a sense of

disillusionment. Nothing concrete had been accomplished by CSCE up to this point.

Madrid had dragged on for nearly three years with most of the conference spent in

107 Korey, The Promises We Keep, p. 134.

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adjournment, and had produced no new commitments. Perhaps this is the reason why the

West sought a higher level of human rights commitment than ever before in Helsinki

history, and applied an adamant strategy to achieve this goal.108 If they were going to keep

up these meetings, they wanted results with teeth. They succeeded. The concluding

human rights document of Vienna was a ‘milestone’, in that it contained highly specific

language and held the Soviet Union to a higher standard of human rights than ever

before. A US Helsinki Commission staff report stated, “More individual cases were cited

by a larger number of delegations than at any other time in CSCE history”,109 and many

Refuseniks were among those cases mentioned. This supports the argument that

addressing Jewish emigration in the context of CSCE caused Soviet policy to change,

however it cannot be claimed that this was the only causal factor - Gorbachev and the

changes within the Soviet Union undoubtedly had an immense effect in this scenario.

CSCE as a Causal Factor: Evaluation

Addressing Soviet Jewish emigration as a human rights issue in the context of

CSCE meetings did not seem to cause an immediate change in Soviet policy. Because the

agreements of the Conference were non-binding (although various participants treated

them as such, when this suited their interests), the commitment of Conference

participants to keep these agreements was based on their belief that their actions would

them bring some benefit. When participants felt they could afford to ignore certain

aspects of CSCE agreements without too great a loss, they would do so. For this reason,

108 Korey, The Promises We Keep, p. 273.109 Korey, The Promises We Keep, p. 270.

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President Ford noted as he signed the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, it was ‘not the promises

we make, but the promises we keep’ that would determine the value of the Helsinki

Process.110

The Soviet Union did not live up to its ‘promises’ during the majority of Helsinki.

Even when emigration increased in the late 1970s, persecution of human rights activists

throughout the Soviet Union persisted. Protest of the Soviet human rights record was

championed by the United States in all years of the Conference. However, as the

Conference continued, other states picked up the baton of protest and initiated criticism.

Over time, this amounted to a coalition of Western governments committed to shining the

limelight on Soviet Jewish emigration, among a host of other human rights issues. CSCE

did not function in a vacuum; at times, CSCE was too heavily affected by international

affairs to be truly effective. It is possible that the US presence at the Conference had a

negative effect in the years that US-Soviet relations had deteriorated.

Any causal significance of the Conference is not in the specific agreements kept

or not kept by its participants in particular years. Instead, Helsinki was a process and

must be appreciated as such. The human rights concepts introduced in 1975 and

increasingly emphasized at every follow up meeting created internationally vetted

standards that any party, from governments to individuals, could hold the Soviet Union

up to. These standards were empowering and it is arguable that their existence (and not

their year to year observance) led to the ultimate release of emigration, even though this

change was years in the offing.

110 Korey, The Promises We Keep, p. xxii.

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4. Dissident and Refusenik Activism

If organized dissident and Refusenik activism was a causal factor behind changes

in Soviet policy toward Jewish emigration, then the strength or weakness of activism in a

given year or time period should correspond to increases and decreases in emigration.

Strong public domestic protest of Soviet emigration policy should correspond to an

increase in emigration. Decline (or prevention) of public protest activities should

correspond to a decrease in emigration. To test this argument, I examine the strength and

direction of activism within the Jewish emigration movement over time, asking, what

were activists doing and what were their goals?

The strength of activism was determined primarily by internal factors: the

capabilities and commitment of the movement’s leaders to their cause, their skill in

organizing protest that would successfully gain publicity - namely, Western publicity -

and the will of individual activists to put their lives on the line for their cause. Organizing

protest was only possible when leaders were able to meet, share, and circulate

information.

The KGB was the foil for emigration activism. As far as the Soviet government

was concerned, all emigration activism was dissent, anti-Soviet, illegal and needed to be

suppressed. The KGB fought emigration activists and the emigration movement in

general with threats, intimidation, surveillance, arrests and a lot of propaganda. Thus the

KGB was an external factor (external to the emigration movement) that shaped activists’

ability to operate and their capacity for influence. In this section I consider both the 67

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coordinated efforts of the activists and their KGB adversaries, as the KGB’s actions

limited activism. Activism will be considered successful in a given year when the KGB

failed to silence it.

Start of the Soviet Jewish Emigration Movement 1968

The Soviet Jewish Emigration Movement, sparked by the Israeli victory in the Six

Day War, grew out of two events in the Soviet Union. The first was the start of the Soviet

Human Rights Movement in the late 1960s; the second was the Soviet invasion of

Czechoslovakia in 1968. The human rights movement in the Soviet Union began in 1969,

with the founding of the Initiative Group to Defend Human Rights in the USSR111. Many

leaders in the emigration movement began their activism in the human rights movement.

Refuseniks learned tactics from other Soviet human rights activists, such as sit-ins and

hunger strikes.

The Soviet suppression of the Prague Spring of 1968 sent shocks through the

human rights movement, for it demonstrated the extreme difficulty of the battle for

reform that lay ahead. On the other hand, the invasion of Czechoslovakia impressed upon

some Jewish human rights activists the idea that the Soviet Union could not be changed

at all. Now, instead of working to improve their lives within the Soviet Union by seeking

to reform the government’s policies, Jewish activists came to believe the solution to their

problems of anti-Semitism and discrimination was to escape the oppressive system

altogether- was emigration.

111 Drachman, p.183.

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As the Jewish Emigration Movement grew it came to be distinguished from the

Human Rights Movement by its goals. The goal of human rights activists was change

within the Soviet Union. The goal of members of the emigration movement was to

separate from the Soviet Union and system entirely, making it unlike any other social

movement in Soviet society. 112 Korey writes, “If the democratic dissenters had aspirations

to liberalize Soviet society by introducing the rule of law, and if the nationalist dissenters

in the various non-Russian regions of the USSR sought greater autonomy or

independence from Moscow’s imperial rule, the Jewish aim was oriented to the outside.”

113 It is unlikely that the Jewish emigration movement could have developed

independently of the greater human rights and dissident movement.

Most writers on the Jewish Emigration Movement mark as its beginning a 1968

letter from twenty-six Refusenik Lithuanian Jewish intellectuals to the Central

Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party. As has been discussed, Jewish emigration

was frozen after the 1967 war. These Jews wrote of their situation,

“We are confronted with a paradox here. We are not wanted here, we are being completely oppressed, forcibly denationalized, and even publicly insulted in the press – while at the same time we are forcibly kept here.”114

They explained that their pressing need for emigration was caused by a rising wave of

anti-Semitism in reaction to anti-Israel propaganda in the press, which had escalated in

response to Israel’s 1967 war. This letter was the first of its kind to reach the West. More

112 Some authors note that the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia contributed to this split in focus- after the invasion, some Jewish human rights activists gave up believing that the Soviet Union could be changed, and so shifted the focus of their efforts to escaping permanently. 113 Korey, The Promises We Keep, p. 52. 114 Drachman, p. 236. Letter from twenty-six Lithuanian Jewish Intellectuals, February 15, 1968, to Comrade Z. Snietsuks, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party, in Moshe Decter (ed.) Redemption: Jewish Freedom Letters From Russia (New York: American Conference on Soviet Jews, 1969), pp. 12-14.

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letters followed. Another example, a letter from Georgian Jews to the UN Committee on

Human Rights, stated,

“Each of us, summoned by a relative in Israel, has received the necessary questionnaires from the proper organs of the USSR and had filled them out. Each had received an oral assurance that there would be no obstacles to his emigration. Each of us, awaiting a permit from day to day, has sold his property and has resigned his job. However, long months have passed – and for some even years – and emigration has not yet been permitted. We have sent hundreds of letters and telegrams – they disappeared like teardrops in the sands of a desert: we hear oral, one syllabled refusals, we see no written answers, nobody explains anything...”115

A confidential government document from this time period suggests that Western

publicity of such letters caused the Soviet government to change its emigration policy. In

a joint memorandum to the CPSU Central Committee, then Chairman of the KGB

Andropov and Minister of Foreign Affairs Gromyko wrote:

“In order to contain the slanderous assertions of Western propaganda concerning discrimination against Jews in the Soviet Union, it would seem expedient, along with other measures, to renew in the coming year departures of Soviet citizens for permanent residence in Israel (up to 1500 persons). Visas will be granted to individuals of advanced age without higher or specialized education. The matter of quotas for departures of individuals of Jewish nationality in subsequent years can be dealt with later.”116

The government re-opened Jewish emigration in the second half of 1968, demonstrating

the power of Western publication of activists’ pleas.

Dymshits – Kunetsov Hijacking Affair 1970, the Movement Develops

115 Drachman, p. 242. Letter from eighteen Georgian Jews to the UN Committee on Human Rights, August 6, 1969. 116 Morozov, p. 65. Memorandum from Iu. Andropov and A. Gromyko to the CPSU Central Committee and Draft Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee. Moscow, June 10, 1968.

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The movement took off in 1970 with the Dymshits-Kunetsov airplane-hijacking

affair. 117 This hijacking exhibited a high level of coordination among Refusenik activists

and heralded the start of significant Refusenik activism. Although the KGB knew about

this event in advance, as demonstrated by the obviously pre-orchestrated arrests took

place, the hijacking was allowed to occur because the KGB believed it could be used

against the developing emigration movement. It was perhaps hoped that the objectively

criminal act of hijacking would deprive the activists of public support, and that the mass

arrests and harsh punishments of accomplices that followed would generate fear in

Jewish circles and prevent further stunts. The hijackers were subjected to show trials in

Leningrad and given harsh sentences, presumably to make an example of them.

The trials were well covered by Western media and raised strident international

protest. Even several foreign Communist parties joined in criticizing Soviet actions. The

harsh sentences imposed drew the attention of many important international figures in the

West, including the Pope118, to the cause of the Refuseniks and Soviet Jewish emigration.

Premier Golda Meir of Israel warned Israeli parliament that the Kremlin was using the

attempted hijacking to crush the spirit of Soviet Jews seeking to emigrate to Israel.119 In

response to this outcry, an appeal hearing was held with illegal haste six days later and

the death sentences were commuted. Contrary to the KGB’s plan, the hijacking

encouraged activists by demonstrating that more extreme actions could be rewarded with

Western attention. An example of emboldened activism was a 1971 hunger

117 “Soviet Reported Trying 11, Mostly Jews, in Hijacking”, New York Times, Dec. 16, 1970. p. 3 (1 page)118 Hedrick Smith, “Vatican Asks Clemency --'National Statement' Urged by Lindsay; U.S. Reported to Ask Soviet for Clemency for 2 Doomed Jews”, New York Times, Dec 29, 1970. p. 1.119 “Mrs. Meir Warns on Soviet Trials: Sees Effort in Hijacking Case to Deter Emigration”, New York Times, Nov 17, 1970.

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demonstration, staged by fifty-six Jews from Riga in the Reception Room of the

Presidium of the Supreme Soviet – described in real-time on Western short-wave radio.120

While the Dymshits-Kunetsov hijacking helped jumpstart the Jewish emigration

movement, it also forced the Soviet government to view Jewish emigration activism as a

serious problem. Peter Reddaway writing in 1980 noted that Soviet policy toward dissent

in general was remarkably consistent from 1964 on, with one outstanding change: the

decision to allow large-scale emigration in early 1971.121 This seems to support the

activism argument, and show that the hijacking did have some effect on Soviet policy.

Activism continued to spread in the early 1970s. Sharansky relates in his

autobiography,

“The driving forces of the movement were approximately a hundred Jewish activists from Moscow, Leningrad, Riga, Kiev, and other cities. We created underground seminars for learning Hebrew, maintained contacts with Jews abroad, and organized demonstrations.” He describes a demonstration; “After discreetly informing the foreign press, a handful of us would stand in a central square in Moscow and raise signs with slogans such as “We Want to Live in Israel”; “Visas to Israel Instead of Prisons”; and “Freedom for Prisoners of Zion”. A successful demonstration would continue for a minute or two until the KGB or the police arrested us. Nobody could predict what would happen next. There might be a fine of fifteen or twenty rubles, a fifteen-day jail sentence, or a far more serious penalty.” (such as exile to Siberia!) 122

If the development of the movement helped change emigration policy in these

years, it also attracted the KGB’s attentions. This is demonstrated in a report from the

KGB to the CPSU Central Committee from May 1971:

120 Mark Azbel, Refusenik (New York: Paragon, 1987), p. 243. (In Drachman, p. 258)121 Reddaway, p. 183. 122 Sharansky, Natan, Fear No Evil, trans. Stefani Hoffman, (New York: Random House,1988), p. xviii.

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“The Committee for State Security has been monitoring closely the negative processes taking place among the Jewish intelligentsia and youth, studying the reasons for their emergence and taking measures to forestall harmful consequences. The KGB organs have been focusing on operations for curtailing hostile and specially organized activity of Jewish nationalists, in particular, methods of dismantling, separating and dividing groups...”123

The KGB’s measures against the emigration movement were not unique. Rather, KGB

suppression of dissidence in general encompassed the activities of the emigration

movement. One example of KGB anti-dissident activity in these years was the (albeit

temporary) shutdown of the main human rights samizdat, The Chronicle of Current

Events, which discussed Jewish emigration efforts.124 Another was the application of

psychiatric confinement to emigration activists, as insanity was an acceptable explanation

for the irrational behavior of seeking to emigrate.125 High profile activists were assigned

KGB ‘tails’, who would surreptitiously follow their every step and monitor their

behavior. This type of direct physical persecution was less frequent, however. The KGB

preferred to utilize preventative measures such as persuasion instead of physical coercion

in its fight against dissidence. For this reason the Soviet government launched an anti-

emigration campaign in the Soviet media, which took the form of anti-Zionism.

The KGB’s Anti-Zionist Campaign of the 1970s

123 Morozov, p. 116. Report of F. Bobkov to the CPSU Central Committee. Moscow, May 17, 1971.124 Reddaway, p. 173.125 Knight, p. 197. Between 1962 and 1977, 210 persons were committed to psychiatric hospitals for political reasons. From 1977-1985, this number was about 20 persons per year. For an early discussion of the Soviet Union’s abuse of psychiatry see Roy and Zhores Medvedev’s book A Question of Madness (New York: Knopf, 1971).

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Anti-Zionist propaganda was not new to the Soviet Union. The USSR had been

producing anti-Zionism propaganda since 1949, and the production of this propaganda

had accelerated during 1967 Six Day War.126 When in the early 1970s the Soviet

government realized that the emigration movement would not disappear with the usual

tactics of intimidation, it orchestrated the propaganda machine to fight against it.

The government’s anti-Zionism media campaign had two objectives set out for it;

it had to dissuade Jews from becoming prospective emigrants and supporting the

emigration movement, and simultaneously explain away the emigration phenomenon

itself. Newspapers described Israel as militaristic, with a weak economy and poor

employment opportunities. Many letters containing personal accounts of life outside the

Soviet Union were published, in which emigrants bemoaned their decision and praised

the ‘Soviet Motherland’. A common theme in these letters and government-authored

articles to the same effect described being tricked by external Western sources. In 1976 a

television documentary titled Trader of Souls depicted Refuseniks as enemies of the state,

and signaled the expansion of the anti-Zionist campaign to television.127

In its efforts to defend the image of the Soviet Union, the government’s anti-

Zionist media campaign took on a duality in its depiction of Jewish emigrants. On the one

hand Jews were depicted as traitors. On the other hand they were described as naive

innocents duped by Zionist propaganda, and therefore not fully responsible for their

decision to leave the Soviet Union. The first description supported the idea that only the

most unworthy Soviet citizens would want to emigrate. The unwitting victims construct

126 Salitan, p. 29. 127 Korey, “The Soviet Public Anti-Zionist Committee”, in Soviet Jewry in the 1980s, p. 36.

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sought to prove that Jews were responding to forces outside the USSR rather than

electing to emigrate because of circumstances within the Soviet Union.128

Like the KGB handling of the Dymshits-Kunetsov hijacking, this approach to

decreasing emigration and silencing emigration activists also boomeranged. Due to

Israel’s nature as a Jewish homeland, much of the anti-Zionist propaganda was also anti-

Jewish in nature, taking on flavors of traditional Russian anti-Semitism that had existed

for hundreds of years. This anti-Semitic propaganda in turn inspired anti-Semitism,

which had the unintended effect of spurring the emigration movement forward. Jews that

had never considered emigration suddenly met with anti-Semitism in their daily lives,

and were quickly drawn to the movement instead of distanced from it. The demand for

emigration continued to increase, and this added numbers to the ranks of the emigration

movement.

Helsinki Watch Groups founded 1976, Key Leaders Arrested 1977

The Soviet Union’s signature on the Helsinki Final Act was fuel for the activists’

fire. After the Helsinki Final Act was signed, human rights activists in the Soviet Union

founded grassroots groups to monitor and report on the government’s implementation of

the Helsinki Agreements. These groups were called the Helsinki Watch Groups. The

Moscow Helsinki Watch Group was formed in 1976, headed by dissident activist Yuri

Orlov. Sister groups appeared in Lithuania, the Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia.129 Inspired

by this new legal basis for human rights in the Soviet Union, activism soared. Public

128 Salitan, p. 38.129 Reddaway, “Policy Towards Dissent Since Khruschev”, p. 179.

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demonstrations including hunger strikes and sit-ins were frequent, and continued to be

reported by the Western media.

Increased emigration in these years was combined with heavier persecution of

lower profile activists, which began to intensify in 1976.130 In fact, KGB suppression

activities continued to intensify up until the mid 1980s. Just before the beginning of the

Belgrade CSCE meeting, many lead Jewish and non-Jewish human rights activists were

arrested including Refusenik Natan Sharansky, Yuri Orlov, the Slepaks, Ida Nudel and

Iosif Begun. Activism continued and even rallied around the arrests, but their absence in

the field was surely a detriment to the movement in the following years.

Shift in Activist’s Tactics 1980-1985

Author Kathleen Knight postulates in her work on the KGB that by 1979, the

Kremlin may have felt that it had little to lose in initiating an anti-dissident campaign

unprecedented in severity. Reddaway writes that from 1979 on, the rate of politically

motivated arrests more than doubled, that sentences were made longer, and emigration

drastically reduced as a result of this sentiment.131 This fresh round of KGB terror

battered the Soviet Jewish emigration movement. By 1980, many of the leaders of the

movement had been arrested and were serving long prison sentences in remote locations.

Even Sakharov, Nobel Prize winner and outspoken advocate for human rights and Soviet

Jewish emigration, was finally exiled in 1980 after years of KGB threats.

130 Drachman, p. 369131 Knight, p. 189.

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The political uncertainty of the post-Brezhnev interregnum translated into greater

repression of dissidence. Amendments to the RSFSR Criminal Code put significantly

more power in the hands of the KGB and made the Soviet Union an even more closed

society.132 For example, in 1984 the government issued an official decree amending the

Criminal Code, broadening the definition of treason (Article 64) and increasing the

penalty for the crimes of anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation (Article 70). Now, many of

the activities of the emigration movement could easily be classified as treason and earn

harsher penalties. Another amendment to paragraph two of Article 70 banned “actions

carried out with the use of funds or other material means obtained from foreign

organizations or from persons acting in the interests of these organizations.” Many

Refusenik families lived off of money raised by the US national Jewish organizations, as

they were fired from their jobs and ‘unable’ to find new work (thanks to KGB

‘coordination’) after applying for visas. These individuals could now be subject to ten

years imprisonment if caught by the police. This law increased Jewish fear of refusal, and

likely deterred many Jews from applying for visas at all. Emigration was decreasing, and

the condition of Soviet Jews and Refuseniks was worse than ever.133

The Soviet government declared that family reunification, the only legitimate

reason for emigration, had been completed – this was obviously not so. The movement

had lost its leaders and the new laws and KGB pressure made public activism too

dangerous to maintain. The remaining members of the movement turned their energies to

underground Jewish education. This form of activism was not safe from KGB disruption

132 Knight, pp. 186-7.133 See Drachman, p. 322. Appeal for Urgent Action by Distraught Refuseniks, December 23, 1984, in Jewish Advocate, January 17, 1985. “There have been enough warning statements. The time has come to sound the alarm...”

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either - Hebrew teachers teaching in their own homes were arrested for their anti-Soviet

activity just as those engaging in more public protest and civil disobedience had been.

However, the underground teaching of Hebrew spread, developing a generation of young

Jews knowledgeable about their Jewish heritage – and keeping the desire for emigration

alive.

Andropov and the Soviet Public Anti-Zionist Committee 1982-1986

Andropov came to power directly from his fifteen-year post as head of the KGB.

In this position, he was at least familiar with (and at most played an active role in) the

KGB’s fight against the Jewish emigration movement. For example, Andropov’s

involvement is evidenced by the following memorandum to the CPSU Central

Committee in 1981:

“The Committee for State Security of the USSR is taking the necessary measures to thwart the plans of the Zionist organizations. In particular, invitations (vyzovs) are allowed to get through primarily to individuals without higher education, and to pensioners and invalids. At the same time, the efforts of the adversary are being deflected toward citizens who do not harbor pro-emigration sentiments. As a result, over the past year in Moscow, the number of individuals of Jewish nationality applying for exit visas to Israel has declined by more than half.”134

It is plausible that Andropov’s prior experience combating Jewish emigration caused the

new Soviet leader to consciously take a stronger stance on this issue. Andropov’s

background did not only have implications for the Jewish emigration movement; for

example, the Helsinki Watch groups were forced to disband in 1982. Instances of KGB

intimidation increased. As one author described it, Andropov’s accession to power, meant

134 Morozov, p. 236. Memorandum from Iu. Andropov to the CPSU Central Committee. Moscow, April 6, 1981. Apparently vysovs were simply confiscated in the mail.

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that the ‘new puritans’ were in command of Moscow, ready to wage war against crime,

corruption and indiscipline.”135

Enhancement of the KGB’s suppression activities was accompanied by the

creation of the Soviet Public Anti-Zionist Committee. The Anti-Zionist Committee

operated from 1983 to 1986, and served as the Kremlin’s mouthpiece for responding to

any and all Jewish questions.136 The Committee did not present the world with any

original messages regarding the Soviet position on these issues. Zionism was still

denounced as a belligerent combination of nationalism, chauvinism and racism, the

existence of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union was denied, and the continuing Jewish

emigration phenomenon was attributed to nefarious Zionist-capitalist conspiracy.

Zionism was portrayed as a Nazi-like aggressive power as well as a Nazi-type subversive

ideology, striking at the Soviet Union through the ‘canard’ of “defending Soviet Jewry”.

The Committee was very active in its production of propaganda and used prominent anti-

Zionist Jews such as Col. General David Dragunsky to deliver their messages. The

Committee maintained the position that “the considerable decrease in the number of

Jewish emigrants from the USSR was the result of the fact that the process of family

reunion flowing from World War II had been ‘basically completed’.”137

The Committee’s propaganda campaign was targeted at the West. One significant

output was sponsoring an ‘open letter’ published in Sovietish Heimland (the state-

controlled ‘Jewish’ Yiddish language newspaper) from a group of Russian Jews calling

135 Robert Sharlet, Soviet Legal Policy under Andropov: Law and Discipline” in Soviet Politics: Russia after Brezhnev, ed. Joseph L. Nogee (New York: Praeger, 1985), pp. 85-106 (quotation p. 94).136 Korey, “The Soviet Public Anti-Zionist Committee: an Analysis” in Soviet Jewry in the 1980s, ed. Freedman (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 1989) p. 29. 137 Korey, ibid, p. 33. This was in spite of evidence that 400,000 Soviet Jews had requested and received vysovs.

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for detente, peaceful coexistence and disarmament, and denying the existence of anti-

Semitism in the Soviet Union. The appeal complained that raising the issue of Soviet

Jewish emigration was harmful to detente, and should cease.138 Another highlight of the

Committee’s activity was the trip of the Rabbi of the Moscow Choral Synagogue Adolph

Shayevich, a ‘court Jew’, to tour the United States. His trip – the first of a Russian Jewish

religious figure to the West since 1976 – was intended to prove to Americans that anti-

Semitism did not exist in the Soviet Union. He dismissed pro-emigration protests, in

particular a parade down Fifth Avenue in New York where thousands of individuals

protested the mistreatment of Soviet Jews, as anti-Soviet.139 It seems that the KGB’s

Orwellian propaganda efforts, couched in the usual Soviet rhetoric, were not at all

believed in the West. I have not been able to judge the propaganda’s impact within the

Soviet Union, but Committee’s domestic activities included publishing books, arranging

symposiums and giving press conferences. In the early 1980s, activism was both silenced

and drowned out by anti-emigration and anti-Zionist forces. Low emigration in these

years support the activism argument.

KGB Reigned In, Activism Resumes 1986

Gorbachev’s accession to power in 1985 had far-reaching implications for Soviet

politics and international relations, with Glasnost, Perestroika and New Thinking

ultimately leading to a new world order. Yet, change was not effected immediately. The

new leader’s work to change the dismal condition of the Soviet Union involved reversing

138 Korey, ibid, p. 36.139 Morris Abram, “Soviet Strategy on the Jews”, New York Times, May 19, 1984.

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the legacy of repression and xenophobia left by his predecessors, and this had to be done

in small steps. It was extremely important to handle the KGB carefully in the early

moments of Gorbachev’s administration. “Numerous signs pointed to the fact that the

Gorbachev leadership was cultivating a good relationship with the KGB by maintaining

its high prestige and political status”. However, his reforms ultimately challenged the

KGB’s activities as they were carried out at the time.140

With the KGB reigned in and Glasnost and Perestroika starting to take effect,

activists could once again safely bring forward their demands for emigration. The many

Jews that participated in the emigration movement through education in the early 1980s

now brought their knowledge and practices above ground. Jewish schools suddenly

started opening, synagogues were re-opened and built, and Jewish literature published. In

a 1986 interview with L’Humanité, Gorbachev denied the existence of a ‘Jewish

Problem’ in the Soviet Union with familiar rhetoric.

“I think that the insistent “attention” of anti-Communist and Zionist propaganda to the fate of Jews in the USSR is nothing short of hypocrisy which pursues far-reaching political goals – goals, moreover, which have nothing to do with the genuine interests of Soviet Jews.”141

However, letters were still being written to the government protesting unwarranted

refusal of visas, and the demand for emigration remained. At this point, suppressing the

actions of the emigration movement would have been contrary to the sweeping domestic

changes Gorbachev was trying to instate. Emigration increased, and soon restrictions

were removed altogether.

140 Knight, p. 98.141 Drachman, p. 170. Statement by Gorbachev on Soviet Jews, 1986.

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Dissident and Refusenik Activism: Evaluation

By the beginning of the period under consideration, the Soviets had learned from

the experience that dissatisfaction with the government always had the potential to

spread. Dissent eventually put social processes in motion that led to the toppling of

regimes. Indeed, this is evident in the Soviet Union’s own history, and was a constant

problem throughout the long history of the Russian Empire. This is why it was so

important to the Soviet government to maintain control over its people. Instances of so-

called dissent or criticism of the government and its policies were threatening if other

citizens found out about them, so information had to be tightly controlled. For example, if

Jews were allowed to leave freely in large numbers, members of any minority group

could question why this group wanted to emigrate in the first place, and start demanding

the right to emigrate themselves. In a worst-case scenario this could cause the whole

system to crumble (as it did).

The world outside the Soviet Union was a potentially dangerous source of

information beyond of the government’s control, and in the struggle for emigration, the

Western media was the activists’ best ally. Emigration and human rights activism was

aimed at gaining Western attention, because the Western media broadcasted Soviet

actions back to the Soviet Union.

Thus activism was most effective when it succeeded in being publicized by the

Western media. Western publication of Refusenik activism seems to correspond with the

decision to resume emigration after 1967 and to allow mass emigration in 1970.

However, it does not account for the ups and downs of the 1970s. Activism generally 82

Bitov, Kelly

increased in the 1970s as the movement developed and enhanced its organization, making

contacts with other dissidents within the USSR and abroad. The issue of Soviet Jewish

emigration also remained prominent in the Western media. Furthermore, when the

emigration movement went underground in the 1980s in response to the KGB’s anti-

Zionist and anti-emigration onslaught, the persecution of Soviet Jews remained in

Western headlines. The resumption of domestic protest that was made possible by

Gorbachev’s new policies may explain the rise in emigration in the late 1980s, but the

Western publicity of this issue does not differ greatly from the early 1980s. Activism first

raised the alarm in the Western media, yet in the absence of public activism in the 1980s

the Western media continued to report without the activists’ public challenges.

The impact of activism within the Soviet Jewish Emigration Movement is clearly

an important part of any evaluation of the causes behind Soviet policy changes. Without

the activists’ commitment to bring this problem into the open, no other force or group

would have cared or done anything about it. Without their successful tactics of gaining

Western publicity, it is possible that the KGB would have succeeded in silencing them.

However, it does not seem that activism corresponded directly to Soviet policy. Rather,

activism fed other forces that the Soviet government could not choose to ignore.

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■ Chapter 3 ■

In Chapter One, I described the phenomenon of Soviet Jewish emigration between

1967 and 1990, its origins and crucibles. I presented four different causal theories in a

literature review, each describing a different cause of the phenomenon. In Chapter Two I

tested these hypotheses with chronological covariance events, and evaluated their

performance. I have found that while each of the four hypotheses is valid at some point,

none of them explain Soviet Jewish emigration throughout.

The Soviet government was a political animal like any other. In order to survive,

it had to be sensitive and adapt to its surroundings, which it did by balancing internal and

external supports and pressures through cost-benefit analyses. In the Soviet government’s

analysis, the costs of allowing Soviet Jewish emigration included internal instability,

possibly leading to revolution; Arab wrath and possible loss of influence in the Middle

East; damage to the image and ideology of Socialism (admitting they were wrong); and

loss of a potentially useful bargaining tool in international relations. The benefits of

allowing emigration included improved relations with the West, including arms control

agreements that would slow down the arms race, trade agreements that could help save

the sinking Soviet economy, scientific exchanges that could advance society and other

benefits such as enhancing Soviet security, quality of life of citizens. All of these factors

together constituted the policy-making environment, recreated in the chart below.

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Policy Making Environment for Soviet Jewish Emigration, 1967-1990 142

This chart is a very simple representation of the factors I have considered in this

work. It is intended to demonstrate that the different pressures influencing Soviet policy

toward Jewish emigration were not isolated. They influenced one another, as well as

influencing the government directly. As such, an assessment of all of these pressures is

necessary to understand the cause of Soviet policy at a particular time. When the pros

142 Chart adapted from David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Chicago, London; University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 110.

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Internal Pressures (domestic)

Promoting Emigration- Dissident and Refusenik Activism

Against Emigration- KGB: intimidation, surveillance- Anti-Zionist Committee- Bureaucratic Norms: anti-emigration norm, dissent must be suppressed

External Pressures

Promoting Emigration- Positive relations with the US: commitments made under detente, SALT, ABM Treaty, major trade agreements- CSCE meetings, Helsinki Process- Western publicity of human rights abuses

Against Emigration- Negative relations with the US: sanctions, Jackson-Vanik Amendment, confrontation- Middle East Policy, strong relationships with Arab nations active in fighting Israel, Israeli aggression

INPUTS

PROs

CONs

ThePolitical System

POLICY

Politburo or Secretariat

Bitov, Kelly

outweighed the cons of allowing emigration, the government would allow increased

emigration and vice versa. Thus, the fluctuations in Soviet Jewish emigration that

occurred in the time period under consideration were caused by the changing dynamics of

the Soviet policy making environment. Ultimately, the forces described that were against

emigration decreased in potency, relevance or importance, and the overall balance of

inputs to the government was pro-emigration.

What can my findings dictate for policy? Neither allowing emigration nor

restricting emigration was without some cost for the Soviet government. Any groups or

individuals outside of a political system seeking to influence a government’s policy

should first recognize where they are located in the policy-making environment. What

other forces are impacting this issue? How can they influence them? In terms of direct

influence on the government, they should discern how likely the government is to care

about their actions. If they cannot influence the government directly, they can support

other pro-change forces and reduce anti-change pressures by attacking their connections

to the political system. They should act in such a way so as to maximize the costs of the

unwanted behavior, but constantly keep in mind the influence of their actions on other

parts of the system.

In this work, I have considered Soviet policy from an external vantage because I

did not have access to primary materials regarding the Soviet government’s internal

workings. Surely, another study such as this could be done (tomes have been written) on

the inner-workings of the Soviet government itself. This is another level of complexity

not displayed in the graphic that is nevertheless extremely important in this equation.

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There is still much one can learn from a study such as mine, as my point of departure is

the same as that of most human rights advocates. In this analysis of different pressure

groups, I have learned that the Soviet system could neither tolerate a high level of extra-

systemic pressure group activity, nor, if the group had strong foreign support, could it

suppress it.143 Dissent is a symptom of a maladapted government; with the right mix of

conditions, dissent is the harbinger of political change.

143 Reddaway, p. 171.

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