soviet international propaganda its role, effectiveness, and future

8/12/2019 Soviet International Propaganda Its Role, Effectiveness, And Future

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Soviet International Propaganda: Its Role,

Effectiveness, and Future

By ZYGMUNT NAGORSKI, JR.

Zygmunt Nagorski, Jr., a graduate ofthe University ofCracow (Poland) Law School,came to the United States in 1948, and spent his first few years on the staff oftheChattanooga Times and as a contributor to the Christian Science Monitor. In 1956 hejoined the U.S. InformationAgency and served in Washington, D.C., the UnitedArabRepublic, South Korea, and France. He is currently a staff member of the Council on

Foreign Relations, New York.

ABSTRACT: The Soviet message to the West is handi-

capped before it is even dispatched. A closed society has littleto offer an

openone. The

tendencyin Moscow is to look at

the West through Marxist glasses. The result is poor. In-stead of making inroads, the Marxists are mostly ignored. Intheir messages to the Third World, the Russians run on a doubletrack of respectability and rough, unpleasant intervention in theinternal affairs of the target country. The Sino-Soviet schismmoved the context of the message from the ideological to the

partisan category. Problems within the Communist bloctheCzechoslovak invasion, as a prime exampleput the SovietUnion on the defensive. And once again the ideological baseof the message was weakened, if not entirely lost.There is little in the cards suggesting a more effective, more

acceptable message from the Soviet Union in the future. Dif-ferent directions, a broader scope, more flexibility, and a much

deeper understanding of the Western world are needed. Noth-ing short of a change of system will make Moscow once againa source of dynamic, new, revolutionary ideas.


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Y OUNGFrench revolutionaries in

May, 1968 elevated the walls ofParis to the role of an important me-dium.

Theycovered them with

slogans.One of these read: &dquo;We are sure thattwo plus two no longer makes four

1

THE MEANING OFA SIGNAL

Was the meaning clear? It was morethan clear. The old order no longerstood pat; the old values were no longertaken for granted. A full generationhad been born and had grown up under

conditions created by the makers andthe soldiers of World War II. For morethan half the worlds population of to-day is under twenty-five years of ageand many of the crucial issues of mid-

century conflict appear irrelevant tothem. The young are assisted byothers. Revisionist historians, influ-enced by waves of youthful dissatisfac-tion with the power structure in the

United States, are attempting to rewritehistory and to find the sources of post-war conflict here rather than in Moscow.

The tragedy of the Vietnam War, af-fecting principally the United States,the SouthAfrican problem in the Com-

monwealth, and the Chilean experimentin South America-to cite the most

striking examples-are further erodingthe postwar value system. Open soci-

eties have torn their windows out oftheir frames in order to live in full view

of friends and foes alike. Never before

in history was so much visible to so

many. One has at his disposal com-munications media eager to expose, to

outwit government secrecy, and to offerthe maximum of facts, figures, andcomments.

There is, however, an element of com-

plexity in this situation. A humanbeing with a definite point of view caneasily see how the existing system con-

forms to or differs from his own ideas

and still stand strong in his beliefs.

The overwhelming majority of human

beings, however,do not have

strongopinions. Some, like the young people,are quick in spotting flaws and defects.But they often stop at challenging. If

they are assured that two plus twono longer makes four, what is theirformula to replace this old-fashionedmathematical notion? Others are

simply confused by the profusion ofreported events, by the written andbeamed

opinions,and feel lost and

frustrated. They would much prefersimplicity to complexity.

Frustrations and doubts are the primetargets for Soviet propaganda, and sim-plification is their instrument. Observ-

ing their own internal scene and inter-

preting events within the Western world

according to the pattern of their ownthinking, Soviet information specialists

drawsome

rather startling, simple con-clusions. It is relatively easy, theymight conclude, to manipulate peopleanywhere in the world. For proof ofthis one need only look at the passivestate of the majority of Soviet citizens.It is also clear to them that a set of

contradictory conditions has developedwithin the capitalistic world, just asKarl Marx predicted: a cycle of labor

strikes keeps disrupting the economy;a major war undertaken on behalf of adistant people has created dissent andinflation and is rapidly leading to adead-end situation; money appears tobe playing a key role in theAmericanelectoral process, another indication tothem that the bourgeois class is fightinga rear-guard battle to retain its control.The Soviet propaganda planners,

therefore, may easily conclude that thetime is riper than ever to support youth-ful doubts about the Western conceptof parliamentary democracy, to point acritical finger at the role of the militaryinAmerican society, and to use simplis-

1. Julien Besanon, Les Murs ont la parole:journal mural mai 68 (Paris: Tchou, editeur,1968), p. 61.


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tic slogans in addressing the silent ma-jority. After all, this group, as in anycountry of the world, is the easiest to

manipulate. Soviet ideologists, prison-ers of their own system and of the con-straints of Soviet society, are still livingin a value system that does not tolerate

questioning of official dogma. Thus,thinking is very narrowly bounded.Western openness is equated with weak-ness. Western toleration of dissent is

viewed as the inabilty to deal with ele-ments of destruction. Yet, every time

a Western country decides to takea

firm approach to individuals openly benton bypassing the legal system and re-sorting to violence, the Soviet media

disgorge tons of words and pictures ac-

cusing the West of intolerance and dis-crimination. They apply this doublestandard gleefully. It is just and rightto sentence Soviet citizens to death for

attempted hijacking, but it is unjust and

wrong to execute the Rosenbergs or toprosecuteAngela Davis. Double talk,leading to pre-arranged conclusions, hasbeen re-introduced into the bloodstream

of the Soviet system.Examples of how the system works

are numerous. Among the current in-

terpretations ofAlexander Solzhenitzynsdisgrace in the Soviet Union it may beworth citing at least one. A Pravda

editorial entitled &dquo;Renegades BeggingWhisky&dquo; reads in part:

The commanders of anti-Communism de-

cided to raise a fuss around the name ofAlexander Solzhenitzyn, with his silentconsent. Alexander Solzhenitzyns libels

against the Soviet people, The Feast o f the

Conquerors, The First Circle, Cancer Ward,which have blackened the progress and

achievements of our homeland and the

worth of the Soviet people, have turnedout to be suitable material for the new

anti-Soviet campaign waged in the West....

The great Shakespeare wrote aboutthe &dquo;quicksand of falsehood.&dquo; These sands

are an unreliable base in the international

war of ideas .2

But the &dquo;quicksand of falsehood&dquo; ac-

quires a special color when the innercontradictions in Soviet society itselfsurface. In 1959 the young Russian

critic Andrei Sinyavsky looked back-ward on the path that his country hadtraversed:

So that prisons should vanish forever, webuilt new prisons. So that all frontiersshould fall, we surround ourselves with aChinese Wall. So that work should become

a rest and a pleasure, we introduced falselabor. So that not one drop of blood beshed any more, we killed and killed andkilled.... Yes, we live in Communism.It resembles our aspirations about as muchas the MiddleAges resemble the free super-man, and man resembles God.3

Four years later the Soviet poetAlex-ander Tvardovsky added his thoughts

in a poem:

Hard to admit its all in vain,The years of hope and work and pain.If there were a God, wed pray,But since theres not-what then? what

then?

In this evil hour, bitter hour of reckoning?4

POLITICAL PRAGMATISMAND THE

WAR OF IDEAS

The interpretation of &dquo;falsehood&dquo;should also be examined. The inter-

action between the two principal powerblocs is often based on non-interactingvalue judgments. The propagandathemes on both sides are almost identi-

cal, i.e., peace, independence, eco-nomic development, racial equality, andcultural freedom; but the interpreta-tions are diametrically opposed. West-

2. Reprinted in The New York Times,December 29, 1970.

3.Anatole Shub,An Empire Loses Hope(New York: W. W. Norton, 1970), p. 35.

4. Shub, ibid., p. 34.


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ern outputs stressing national indepen-dence and cultural freedom are based

upon our own concepts rooted in the

philosophies of Rousseau, Mill, Locke,Thoreau, and others. Soviet notions arerooted in interpretive Marxism andLeninism. What one side considers

falsehood, the other sees as truth. Theresult is predictable: the cross-currentof communication lines bypass eachother in a void.

This, however, is only part true. Inboth societies, the policy-making elites

are fairly immune. Their views arefirm, and their negotiating powers areflexible within the limits of certain re-

straining factors, the nuclear deterrent

being one of the most important. Theseleaders have moved with the times from

an ideological to a much more pragmaticapproach. The SALT talks on armslimitation reflect the realities of Soviet-

American relations.55 Secretary Rogers

Middle East initiative and the show ofAmerican firmness during the Jordanianevents lent credibility to the Western po-sition. The Soviet invasion of Czecho-

slovakia and the birth of the Brezhnev

Doctrine put the Soviet Union on recordas not tolerating any change in thestatus quo in Europe. There is littleto indicate, however, that either thefirmness or flexibility of the two major

opponents has been influenced by thewar of ideas.

The war of ideas, therefore, bypassesmost of the decision-making elements inthe principal antagonistic blocs. TheSoviet Union, in directing its messageto the West (Wes-ern Europe and theUnited States), addresses itself to the

masses. So does the West in the op-

posite direction. The difference lies in

approach. The Soviets and their allies

still concentrate their efforts on theweaknesses of the developed societies,while Britain and the United States

work from the principle of trying to

penetrate the Iron Curtain with infor-mation on events, thoughts, and devel-opments not normally reported. ThisSoviet approach is more ideologicallymotivated, while the West acts on thepremise that a better-informed people

may somehow liberalize the Communistsystem. But Soviet propaganda effortsalso have pragmatic political goals.Their most successful project centeredaround the &dquo;ban the bomb&dquo; issue; theirmain theme now is Vietnam, example ofanother &dquo;imperialistic&dquo; war. Their ad-vocacy of theArab cause was born out

of the opportunity offered to them inthe mid-fifties to exploitArab national-

ism, which had been insulted byAmeri-can refusal to build theAswan Dam.

Currently, a pro-Arab stand serves theSoviet propaganda machine exceedinglywell by facilitating attacks on Zionismand by enabling it to link domesticproblems with a &dquo;cosmopolitan con-spiracy.&dquo;

In Europe, as well as in other areas,the Soviet message is often aimed at

the Communist cadres. In 1969 in non-Communist Europe, there were seven-teen Communist parties, of which tenwere represented in parliaments and fivewere illegal. The total membership ofthese parties was estimated at 2,013,950,a number which does not reflect the

voting strength of the party in suchcountries as France or Italy.6 Nor-

mally,the

Partywould be a

powerfultransmitting belt for Soviet propaganda,

5. The Presidential Committee of the World

Peace

Council,a

Communist-front group,sent

a message to the SALT negotiators in Helsinkiexpressing hope for their success, which maylead to complete disarmament. Moscow Radiobroadcast in English, November 5, 1970, at7:52p.m.

6. Ian Greig, The Assault on the West(Petersham, England: Foreign Affairs Pub-lishing Co., 1968), appendix, p. 315.


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but complications have arisen due to the

increasing divergence of views amongvarious camps and countries, a diver-

genceaccentuated

bythe Czech inva-

sion. The Sino-Soviet dispute and thecontinued Cuban-Soviet differences in

LatinAmerica have also called for ad-

justments in Soviet propaganda outputsand techniques.

Yet, Soviet propaganda efforts fall ondeaf ears, creating hardly a ripple onthe surface of theAmerican politicalscene. This is certainly not due to a

lack of material, for the social andeconomic convulsions of our open soci-

ety provide an almost unlimited sourcefor the Soviet propaganda machine.But when an open society interpretedby the rulers of a closed one is reportedback to its citizens, the message is

warped. Neither a sense of identity nora sense of ideological affinity emerges:when a group of prominent Soviet scien-

tists protested the trial ofAngela Davits,President Nixon responded by invitingthem to observe the trial themselves.

Fearing the establishment of a precedentof reciprocity, the Soviet governmentignored the invitation.

Western Europe presents a different

target for Soviet propagandists. This iswhere active Communist parties exist and

produce a massive electoral vote. This

is also where anti-American feelings usedto run high but where, too, the issueof a divided Germany and the status ofBerlin persist. A massive Soviet propa-ganda barrage is directed at WesternEurope. It includes direct broadcasting(a total of 1,355 hours a week) inseveral languages, placement of bloc-

supplies programs on local radio andtelevision stations, a large film distribu-

tion network, a considerable network ofpublishing houses and bookstores spe-cializing in Soviet bloc literature, andextensive participation in trade fairs.Once again, a lack of deeper under-

standing of Western societies on the

part of the Soviet strategists hamperstheir work. Western Europe as well asthe rest of the developed world hasnot been

standingstill. The evolution

of concepts, ideas, and thoughts hasaffected everyone, including men andwomen who vote Communist. Writingin ForeignAffairs,Andr6 Fontaine of-fered an interesting analysis of thenature of the Communist strength inWestern Europe.

In France and Italy millions of workerscontinue to give their votes to the Com-

munist Party, but their daily behavior isonly affected in a relative way by thispolitical choice. Indeed, belonging to theParty ... now indicates the need for par-ticipation in social activity; the hope of arevolution has been put off too long foranyone to believe it imminent. The Com-

unist Party and the GGT, with their hier-archies, their festivals, their schools, theirpreferments, their newspapers, have be-come a society that is not so much a

rival of capitalist society as complementaryto it.77

THE THIRD WORLD-A PROCESS

OF FORMATION

The Third World presents a totallydifferent picture. If the developedcountries are approached more as enti-ties with fairly calcified tops,8 the ThirdWorld is tackled with the knowledge

that the new elite is still in the forma-tive process and its views are far from

firm. The main force, therefore, ofCommunist propaganda activity is nowdirected toward the elite of the develop-ing countries. This shift to the elite,

7. Andr Fontaine, "The Real Divisions ofEurope," Foreign Affairs 49, 2 (January,1971), p. 312.

8. One exception in the Soviet treatment of

the United States is the magazine on theUnited States published by the Institute ofAmerican Studies of the SovietAcademy ofSciences. It is sophisticated, and cognizant ofsome of the major social and political forcesinAmerica; but it is published in Russian,principally for elite home consumption.


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indicating a major policy decision, didnot occur until the late sixties. It par-alleled the intention of Soviet foreign-

policy plannersto

bringa

messageof

support and concern to areas in whichthe Soviet Union expects to play a moredecisive role in the future. The Soviet

appeal to the newly emerging elitesstresses the blocs attempts to act as a

holding device against a West still benton colonialism and imperialism. Forsuch a task, of course, South Africa

provides a never-ending source of ma-

terial. Portugal is also branded by theSoviets as an instrument of the West,and the liberation movements inAngola,Mozambique, and Portuguese Guineareceive full support. It is a line which

finds easy acceptance.Two examples of the Soviet approach

to the Third World are worth exploring.One is India, the largest non-Communist

country inAsia; the other is the Middle

East. The differences in their treat-ment and the Soviet ability to capitalizeon as well as to alienate some of the

target areas provide a few insights intoSoviet psychology.

Target: Indaca

Why does India deserve such specialtreatment from the Soviet Union? The

most obvious reason is that, within the

Sino-Soviet dispute, India could becounted on as a Russian ally. This

assumption, however, is not substanti-ated by the realities of the Soviet ap-proach in India, which is a mixture of

aggressive, direct political interferenceand subtle economic wooing. Thesecond reason is that, as a tremendous

conglomerate of races and languages,India presents a relatively easy target

for Soviet influences. Discontent amongyoung Indian intellectuals, the caste

system and feuds within it, the leftist

experiments at Kerala, the economic

wants, and the religious prejudices, canall be exploited. There also exists the

Indians distrust of the West, a residueof the colonial era. Yet, anyone in theSoviet Union or in Communist China

whoseriously hopes

for aproletarianrevolution in India in the foreseeable

future may be accused of wishful

thinking.No matter what the motivation, India

looms large in the program of the Soviet

propaganda machine.A torrent of com-munist periodicals, with India as theprincipal subject, is printed and distrib-uted inside and outside India. Publica-

tions originatingin

communist countriesnumber in the tens. They are led bythe Soviet Unions two giants, SovietUnion and Soviet Woman, both of whichhave large circulations as a result of

aggressive promotion campaigns. Com-petitions were organized offering topsubscription salesmen prizes of trips tothe Soviet Union, transistor radios, cam-eras, wrist watches, and electric shavers.

In addition, a large number of commu-nist periodicals are published in Indiaitself. Soviet Land is a fortnightly pic-torial in thirteen Indian languages, aswell as English; Sputnik Junior catersto Indian children in Hindi and in

English; Soviet Review appears fivetimes a month in nine languages. Bul-

garia puts out a periodical in nine lan-

guages, East Germany puts out two in

eight languages, and Poland puts outone in several languages.The most interesting developments

have, however, taken place in the fieldof radio. This is where the mixture of

subtlety and bluntness appears to bemost blatant. During the two-yearperiod of 1967/69, Radio Moscow be-gan transmitting in four new Indianlanguages, Assamese, Gujarati, Kan-

nada, and Oriya. By the end of 1969,it broadcast seven hours a week in eachof these languages. Another channel ofcommunication that utilizes Radio Mos-cows technical facilities is called RadioPeace and Progress, and its tone is more


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belligerent, its thrust more pointed, its

message much more inflammatory, thanthat of Radio Moscow itself. Yet, the

Soviet government disclaims any re-sponsibility for the station. It is, ac-

cording to the official explanation, an

&dquo;unofficial, independent radio station.&dquo;9

Its concentrated efforts to influence In-

dian elections and to attack Indian pub-lic figures have earned for the stationofficial and unofficial irritation.

The tone of this stations programssomehow do not jibe with the more

subtle, much more civilized way theSoviet Union &dquo;officially&dquo; treats India.In the Soviet Information Centers and

Houses of Soviet Culture located in

major Indian cities, cultural affinity,mutual interests, and non-interventionare some of the key themes. Once

again, the dual approach does not seemto worry Soviet information specialists.This method, however, appears to elicit

limited results.

Target: The Middle East

The Middle East is a much more

clear-cut proposition. The ideologicalapproach has been discarded in favor of

pragmatic but friendly assistance. Thisis an area where the Communist bloc

presents itself as an ally and a partner.Israel is the enemy. TheArab states

are friends which need help againstexternal aggression. And while Arableaders certainly realize that the SovietUnion is playing pure power politics inan attempt to establish itself firmly inthe Mediterranean, her assistance isgratefully received, with mutual declara-tions of eternal friendship.There is even more to this collusion

of interests than would have been sus-

pected in the earlier days of the Soviet-Arab love affair. The Soviet Union has

not been free of internal dissent. It is

muted, spotty, and seldom visible to for-eign eyes, but it exists. When it ceasesto be muted, it develops into a causeclbre in the Western world: Pasternak,Solzhenitzyn, and young Litvinov havebeen painful thorns in the Soviet side.Some of the protesters and many of theaccused have been Jews. Consequently,the old theory of the international Zion-ist conspiracy from pre-Soviet and Sta-

linist days has been dusted off andplaced back on the shelves of currentSoviet textbooks. Zionists, a part ofthe cosmopolitan conspiracy against theSoviet state, are enemies. These same

people are working against theArabs.And the collusion between theAmerican

imperialists and Zionist circles is anestablished fact. Thus, the cycle iscomplete, and theArabs and the Sovietscan pat each others shoulders in a

comradely way.

INTERNAL SPLITAND OUTSIDE EFFECTS

The spectrum of the war of ideas is

incomplete without a quick look atintra-bloc quarrels. The days of unityhave been over for some time. This

complicates the Soviet approach to the

West and further dims the prospects formaking a substantial impact. BothMoscow and Peking have adopted a bel-ligerent tone vis-A-vis each other as anessential part of the propaganda effort.The major thrust of their mutual accu-sations is deviation from the Marxist-

Leninist line. A corollary to this isthe accusation of co6perating with im-perialism. Communist China attacks

the Soviet Union for military aggressionagainst the mainland, for attempting tosuppress national liberation movements

in developing countries, and for damag-ing the cause of communism by em-bracing such theses as peaceful co-

9. In an interview with The Times of India,the chief editor of Radio Peace and Progress,Lev Talanov, stated: "We definitely have a

point of view. It is the point of view of our

public, contained in declarations of Soviet

public organizations" (January 16, 1968).


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existence, different roads to socialism,and the non-inevitability of war. Thisdid not prevent China from unleashing

a violent attack on the Soviet Unionafter the Czechoslovak invasion. Dia-

lectical differences were forgotten. Thefact that the Soviet Union had done

exactly what China had advocated witha people trying to develop their ownroad to socialism was overlooked. An

obvious conflict arose: the fear of a

Soviet move into the Balkans, whichwould threatenAlbania, overshadowed

ideological principles.Vietnam provides another field for the

Sino-Soviet feud. Peking keeps ac-cusing the Soviet Union of encouragingthe United States to continue aggres-sion and of supporting various peaceinitiatives. Vietnam, according to the

Chinese, provides proof of the applica-bility of Maos thesis of a &dquo;peopleswar.&dquo; Moscow, in turn, accuses China

of preventing the passage through itsterritory of war material for the Viet

Cong and of preventing the formationof a united Communist front.

In the Middle East a similar line of

difference between the two countries

appears. Peking throws its supportbehind the Palestinian liberation move-

ments in accordance with the same

&dquo;peoples war&dquo; principle. The Soviet

Union concentrates on support of tradi-tional governments and their detach-

ment from the West.

There is, finally, the internal Soviet

problem of how to treat her East Euro-pean satellites. Propaganda outputs di-rected toward Eastern Europe were

rather mild. Local media were doingthe job, anyway. But the minuteCzechoslovakia started to balk, fast

changes in the output occurred. Radiobroadcasting from the Soviet Union to

Czechoslovakia, previously kept at thelevel of 17 hours a week, jumped toa saturation level of 168 hours a week

during the height of the crisis, dropping

to 84 hours per week later in September,1968. Not satisfied with these efforts,the Soviets put into operation a special

twenty-four-hour station which calleditself Radio Vlatura. It was kept onthe air with the use of East German

transmitters until February, 1969. Thisoperation was assisted by Radio Berlin

International, which initiated 120 hoursa week of programs in Czech and

Slovak. Not to be outdone, Hungaryand China started for the first time to

beam programs to Czechoslovakia.

Did all this help? Probably notmuch. But in accordance with the prin-ciple of mobilization of all available re-

sources, the Soviet Union included mass

communication media in its arsenal.

Czechoslovakia was thus bombarded

with words as well as bullets. She fi-

nally succumbed, but doubts still lingerin the outside world as to the extent

that Czechoslovak communist reformers

changed their views. They were simplysilenced with a deafening barrage.

THE FUTURE:A DIMINISHED IMPACT

And so the propaganda war continues.It is fairly safe to predict that it will

go on during the decade of the seventiesat the same pace, using the same slo-

gans, the same approaches, and aimingat the same principal targets. The frag-mentation of the Communist bloc willcontinue to call for a more diversified

approach, but once the red signal ofdanger flashes again on the big boardin Moscow, as it did in 1968, all maskswill be torn off and power will reassert

itself. Within the present system of

mutually acknowledged spheres of in-fluence and the war of the airwaves,books and other media appear to be

marginal. The lines are drawn, the ad-versaries are firm. No one is going to

give, within his own area. Because ofthe openness of its society, however, theWest has much more difficulty keeping

; or giving, being firm or flexible. Chile


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is a prime example of this difficulty.The Western world has witnessed its

first major political defection through

the use ofan

accepted tool-the ballotbox. Chile is a Marxist country todaybecause of its democratic structure, not

because of Soviet propaganda. This isa major victory for free societies. Yetthe Communists claim their victoryhere, too, of course. Both sides are toa degree correct in their assessments.

CONCLUSION

The crisis in the communist move-

ment has deep roots in the philosophicaldoubts of today, which undermine,among other things, the effectiveness of

propaganda. One of the functions ofmodern technology is to permit peopleto live better, but another function isto permit them to question more.Western affluence has caused deep scars

on the surface of personal and nationalidentities. Todays philosophical crisisis a function of an attempted drive on

the part of the advanced nations tounite and on the part of developingcountries to establish firm national

postures. It is also a function of the

eternal conflict of generations catapultedinto greater prominence than ever beforebecause of new communication media

and new tools at the disposal of mostof mankind. It is a function of a

struggle for political freedom among thehave-not nations which is often punctu-ated by despair and frustration leadingto dictatorships and military coups.The conclusion is simple. In the

third postwar decade, the war of ideas

appears to have less influence and fewer

adherents. The international propa-

ganda machine built during and sincethe war is in desperate need of over-

hauling. Men concerned with the dailytask of survival are turning deaf ears tooutside voices preaching the global con-flict of ideas. This is one of the reasons

why economic and technical assistance

programs are high on the agenda of boththe Soviet Union and the United States.

Direct help and a directly positive pres-ence earn more respect and producehigher political dividends than wordsover radio waves.

The waning significance of the world-wide propaganda campaign can also beattributed to the clarification of the bigpowers political goals and their spheresof influence. In Eastern Europe-theprime target of Western propaganda ef-

forts-people have ceased to wait fora liberation message. They tune inWestern radio for news and commen-

tary. In the developing countries, the

prospects for economic assistance weighheavily on relations with the Socialistbloc. China and the Soviet Union,locked in a fundamental struggle, prob-ably deeply distrust each others exter-nal appeals.

There is, of course, a natural advan-tage that the West enjoys over theCommunist countries. The Western

messages are often the only nongovern-mental and non-party voices heard.

Thus, they acquire the allure of forbidden

fruit, for which a human being reacheswith instinctive eagerness. The advan-

tages of the Communist countries stemfrom the nature of our open society, in

which grievances, problems, crises,and frustrations are constantly aired,viewed, and discussed. It is mucheasier for the Soviet Union to depictthe United States as a nation riddled

with problems and contradictions thanit is for the United States to pay back

the compliment. But the Communistbloc suffers and will continue to sufferfrom the inflexibility of the methods

and content of its propaganda.The fact that French students in 1968

questioned the simple formula of twoplus two equaling four was due to theirown grave doubts and deep intellectualand emotional traumas. It also testified


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to the vitality of French youth. Giventhe opportunity, the young people ofFrance opted for more democracy and

less centralized rule. The Soviet Union,centralized, closely controlled politically,systematically dogmatic, jails those whodoubt the two plus two formula. Thisis her major weakness. This is, or couldbe, one of the major targets of theWestern message directed toward the

Soviet Union.

In order to be more effective, Soviet

propaganda efforts would require dif-ferent directions and a broader scope.

These, in turn,can

only be made pos-sible through a change in their system.The fact that there are very few signs onthe political horizon that the system isabout to change, or to abandon its

rigidity, is yet another indication thatSoviet propaganda efforts are destinedto continue on a downward curve.

soviet international propaganda its role, effectiveness, and future

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