soviet direct fire artillery
TRANSCRIPT
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A STUDYOF SOVIETUSE OF FIELD ARTILLERYWEAPONS IN ADIRECTFIRE ROLE
A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U. S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College Inpartial
fulf i l lmentof the requlrements for thedegree
MASTEROF MILITARYARTAND SCIENCE
by
LARRYW. COKER,JR., MAJ, USAB.A.,Tr in ity Unlverslty, 1974
Fort Leavenworth, KansasI986
Approved for public release; dis trlb utlon is unllrnlted.
86-3503
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MASTEROF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE
Name of Candidate: MAJ La rry W. Coker, Jr.
Tl t l e of Thesls: A Study of Sovlet Use of Fie ld Ar tl ll e ry Weapons in aDirect Fire Role
Approved By:
.
Q J e J-L , Thesis Commlttee Cha lmanMAJ(P) Robert L. Stockwell, MA
, Member, Graduate FacultyLTCbohn T. Banks, MA
/l
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TABLEOFCONTENTS
Chapter 1. IntroductionProblem Statem entLimitation s and Delim itationsSignificance of the StudySurvey of Lit erat ureMethods and ProceduresEndnotes
Chapter 2. Hi sto ric al Background
Direc t Fire i n the Great Pa tri oti c WarThe Use of A rt il le ry in Direct FireAdvantages o f Direct FireVulnerabil i ty of Di rect Fi re Weapons
The Art i l le ry offensiveIncreased Centralizatio n and Concentration of Ar ti ll er ySelf-Propelled Arti l lery
Soviet Art i l l ery f romthe 1950s o 1973Endnotes
Chapter 3. Current Soviet Ta ct ic s and ProceduresDirect Fire in the O ffense
Meeting EngagementAr ti l le ry Preparation of the AttackOther O ffensive Situation s
Direct Fire i n the DefenseSpecial Situatio ns
River CrossingsCombat in Mountainous TerrainCombat i n Bu ilt- up AreasDestruction of Fortif cations
Direct Fire in the Overall Field Ar ti l le ry MissionAdvantages of D ire ct Fi re versus Su rviv abil ity Considerations
The Advantages of D ire ct Fi reSurvivabi1i y Considerations
Endnotes
1223479
111 1
1213151720222630
333434374043
46464749505253535560
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Chapter 4. Dire ct Fi re A rt il le ry Training and EquipmentTraining Techniques
Realistic Trainingindividual and Crew T rainingDirect Fire in Combined Arms Trainlng
Di re ct F ir e GunneryTechnical Preparation of the PieceA rt il le ry Equipment and Ammun itionfor Direct FireEndnotes
636364656974757678
Chapter 5. Conclusions and Recommendations 79
Appendix A. Dir ec t F ir e Gunnery Ca lculations 83
Appendix B. Ar ti ll er y Equipment and Ammunition fo r Di rect Fire 88
Bibliography 95
in i t i a l Dis tr ibu t ion Lis t 102
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CHAPTER I
IMRODUCTION
In my 'upbrlnglng' as a He ld a rt ll le ry offlce r, I have been taught that
Held artlllery weapons are extremely vulnerable when used In a dlrect flre
role. Thls 1s especlally true when a crew employs a fie ld a rt lll er y piece
against a tank. The fl e ld a rt ll le ry plece 1s at a dls tln ct disadvantage
because Its accuracy uslng dlrec t f l r e 1s very Ilmlted beyond 1,000 meters,
wh lle a modern tank 1s capable of engaglng targets w i t h a hlgh probablllty
of a hi t a t several tlmes that range. The dlfterence In effectlve ranges
between the fl e ld a rt il le ry weapon and the tank ce rtalnly glves the tank a
slgnlflcant advantage In an engagement between them.
Current Unlted States Army doctrine conslders the use of dlrect flr eby fle ld a rt lll e ry weapons as st rl ct ly defenslve Innature. It 1s a method t o
provlde a last resort defense of the battery posltlon prlor to maklng a
hasty dlspiacement to an alternate posltlon. Dlrect flre 1s also used t o
provide protec tlon durlng road marches. For the most part, It 1s expected
to be used out of necess lty rather than by cholce.
In sta rk contrast, the Soviets are much more aggressive In employlngfl e ld ar tl ll e ry weapons fo r direc t flre. They trad ltlona lly have used such
f l r e In offensive as we ll as defenslve sltua tlons . The aggressive use of
f le ld ar t l l l e ry In dlrect f ire has a hlstorlcal b as k in the Sovlet method fo r
employment of artlllery agalnst the Germans durlng World War II. These
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methods remain basically unchanged today despite the increased lethality
of newer weapons on the bat tle fie ld .
The purpose of th is study i s t o determine why the Soviets readily use
indirect f ie ld ar ti ll er y weapons fo r direc t f ir e purposes. In studying this
question and dete rmining the reasons, there are severa l other supporting
questions tha t have to be answered.
1 What is the his to ric al basis for Soviet use of f ie ld ar t i l le ryin the
direct f ire role?
2. What are the tactics and procedures used by the Soviets in
employing fie ld a rti lle ryin the dir ec t f ir e role, and how do they provide fo r
survivability?
3. How does the direc t fi re role for Soviet fie ld a rti lle ry relate to
the overall mission in providing dir ec t support to the manewer force?4. What impact do the characteristics of Soviet weapons systems
and ammunition have on the employment and effectiveness of their f ie ld
ar t i l le ry in direct fire ?
5. What can we learn from the methods and procedures used by the
Soviets in training for use of direct fi re by the fi el d artille ry?
The effectiveness of this study i s limited by the availability of
translations of primary source material in Soviet documents. i have been
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dependent on these transla tlons due t o my ln ab lll ty to read Russlan. I do no
think thls has been a significant problem since there Is a tremendous
amount of translated ma terlal available for study.
Thls study Is concerned w lt h the Soviet f ie ld a rtl lle ry systems most
of ten found organic or attached at the Soviet regimental level. These are
the D30 122mm towed howitzer, the 2SI 122mm self propelled howltzer
and the 253 152mm se lf propelled howltzer. These weapons are pr lm ar lly
deslgned and used as lndirect f l re weapons. Although the Sovlets are one
of few modem armed forces s t l l l using speclallzed anti-tank arti llery ,
these weapons w l l l not be addressed speciflcally in th is study.The tlme perlod covered by thls study goes back to the Soviet
partlclpatlon In World War I I (the Great Pa trlot lc War) only for the purpose
of explorlng the hlsto rical context of the problem. The prim ary focus i s to
establish the current methods and reasons for employment of f leld
art i l lery in the dlrec t f lr e role.
This study w i l l serve to bring together fa cts about direct fl re from a
multitude of sources. For that reason It may be a reasonable 'prlmer' for
m il it a ry personnel on how the Sovlets may employ fi e ld ar ti lle ry fo r dlrect
fire. By studylng the Sovlet use of f le ld a r t l l le ry for direct flre, It may
also be possible to assess sig nlf cant vulnerabilities that can pote ntlally
be exploited on the future battlefield. Wlth the vast superiorlty the
Sovlets enloy In the number of fi e ld a rt lll er y tubes avallable to them, any
means to ass ist In the reductlon of that advantage w i l l be helpful.
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There i s considerably more information available on the Soviet use
of f ie ld art i l lery for direct f i re than I had in it ia ll y expected to be able to
find. It can be divided between the historical information, primarily tied
to how the Sovie ts used their art i l lery fo r direct fire in World War II, and
information on current in tent ions fo r employment.
Several sources have provided information for both the historical
basis of Soviet use of field artillery in direct fire, and the current
doctrine. The first i s The Sovi u t o es iwhich is a good bibliographical source for both types of
information. The second i s a translat ion of Jhe A rti lle rv Battal on inCombat2 by Marshal of Ar til le ry G. Ye. Peredel'skiy and published in March,
1984. This i s an excellent source fo r information on how direc t fi re i s
used now, as well as for specific historical examples from the Great
Pa trio tic War. This use of his tor ica l examples i s a significant indication
that the employment methods for ar ti ll er y in direc t f i r e have changed very
l i t t ie . The third is 'Soviet Combined Arms: Theory and Practice' by J.
Erickson. This is an unpublished defense study done a t the University of
Edinburgh that traces the development of Soviet comblned arms from the
Great Patriotic War t o present. Both The 0 fensw by AA. Sidorenko andAnt i ank Warfare by G. Biryukov and G. Melnikov are books wr it te n in the
1970s by Soviet mi li ta ry o ffi ce rs who are 'candidates of M il it ar y Science.'
Both also provide hist oric al examples for direct fi re use by a rti lle ry and
the indication tha t d irec t f i r e employment remained a va lid technique into
the 1970s.
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Strictly historical sources include a Department of the Army
translation of F.A Samsonov's W x o e r i m e of Arttllerv in the
This Is an excellent source fo r informat ion on how and why
the Soviets utilized direct fire artil lery in the Great Patriotlc War.Another good source i s the serie s of ar ti cl es th at appeared throughout the
Field Art i l le rva uring the years 1942-1944 These were w rl tt e nby Soviet ar til le ry o ffic ers tel ling the American art ill er y communlty what
was working w e ll against the Germans. There are also several articles
from 1946 and 1947, also from the Wd A rt il le ry Journal7&where Erl tish
and Amertcan officers analyze the Soviet artillery experiences of WorldWar 11 Translations are avatlable of the Sovtet UUj.tary His-a8 or Issues slnce 1978 and they have provtded several a rt ic le s tha tdiscussed the Soviet employment of artlllery in the Great Patri oti c War.
There are many other sources that provlde some historical
perspective on Soviet w e of f leld ar t l l lery for direct f l re including B.H
Lid del l Hart's Red Army9 and Raymond Garthoff's B v i e t M ili ta ry
The latter also glves good Information on the development of
self propelled artillery related to a direct f l r e role for it. The role of
self-propelled artillery Is also discussed in an art icle, 'The Postwar
Development of Tank Forces' by P A Rotmts t rw InSelected Sovlet Mllltarym 1 ompiled by the U.S. A i r Force. Another art ic le in this samebook is by I.N. Vorobyev enti tle d 'Fire, Assault, Manewer' and provides a
good historical example of offensive use of direct flre artillery. Othersources that provide analysis of Soviet artlllery development are I
War M W 9 17- I9* l 2 edited by S.L. Mayer and 'An Analysis ofS oviet A r tl ll er y D e ~ e l o p m e n t ' ~ ~y Kurt Hoffman In
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Revfew.There are numerous sources which provide inform atio n fo r my study
on current Soviet use of f ie ld ar ti lle ry fo r direc t fire. The best sources
are the numerous articles found in the Soviet tlilitary HerplQl4.
Translations are available for this monthly publication and each edition
generally has several art ic les on ar till er y. Frequently the ar tic les make
some reference to the dir ec t fi r e use of fi e ld ar ti lle ry weapons. The
ma jorit y of current informationi s to be found in periodicals. 'The Wind o f
Change in Soviet Artillery,' l ntern tl on l Defense Reviekl5 by CON.Donnelly provides some good background information as does 'Destruction
by Fire Soviet Artillery In the 1980s and Beyond,' Field Artm
,h?umll6 y Christopher Bellamy. The article by Bellamy is excellent for
providing information on the contribution of direct fire in accomplishing
the 'fire destruction' mission of Soviet artillery. The Field Artillerv
and -I8 magazine provide numerous articles on current
Soviet a rt ill e ry equipment and tactics.l9 edited by David R. Jones
provides some background mater ia l on a rt il le ry developments. Volume 8
(1983-4) discusses the apparent Soviet move to eight guns per battery in
the a rt ill er y b attalions organic t o maneuver regiments which w i l l have
implications on the quantity of artillery assets potentially available for
direct fire. Two recent books by Richard Simpkin20, Antitank and J .drm also provide information on he antitank role of Soviet artille ry.
There are several references available to provide lim ited technical
information on Soviet artillery equipment and i t s capabilities. These
include Weaoonsof the FZQQern oviet G ound Force321 edited by Ray Bonds
The Soviet Armed For= Review
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and 3poes Arr[lpyCpDdArtill= 22. The translatlonof the Fleld A r t l l l a
QfficersHandbook23by Valentin Lebedev provldes Informationon artlllery
ammunitionand direct f Ire procedures.
The prlmary method for conducting th i s study Is by making an
extensive searchof available literature concerning the subject.Although
several books are avallable to answer questionson the historical aspectof
Sovlet use of direct flre artillery, access to the vast malority of theInformation on how Soviets currently vlew thedirect flre role Is through
periodlcals.The Sovlet Army Studles Offlce (SASO) provlded nwnemus leads
onto resources avallable. Through S SO I have been able to get several
unpublished resources and also some access to the research data base at
the Sovlet Studies Research Centera t Sandhurst, England.
Another resource usedwas a discussion wlth MAJ Brian McQulstlon,
a fellow student In CGSC whose previous asslgnmentwas at DefenseIntelligence gencywhen, he followed Sovlet artlllery developments. He
read the study in Its flnal draftand provided several helpful observatlonsand comments.
The data collectedfrom these sources was organlzed Into chapters
generally along the linesof the supporting research questions addressedearlier In this chapter. Chapter 2 is an assessment of the historical
background that gave rlseto the Sovlets useof field artillery In a routlne
dlrect fire mode. The thlrd chapter discusses the current (SlnCe1975
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tact ic s and procedures used by the Sovlets In the employment of their f leld
artillery. Chapter 4 discusses current Sovlet trainlng for direct flre and
comments on current Sovlet artlllery and ammunltion for direct flre.
Finally, chapter 5 contalns the conclusions that can be drawn from thls
study and the recommendations for fu ture study.
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Endnotes for Chapter 1
1
-1982).MyronJ. Smith, Jhe Soviet Army. 1939-1980: A Guide to Sour-
2 G. Ye. Peredel'skiy, lhflArtillerv - C o m b a t 1 98 5 ).
3 A A Sidorenko, JheOffenstre(l970).
4 G. Biryukov and G. Melnlkov,Antitank Wa r f m ( 1972).
5 F. A Sarnsonov, of Artillervin the Great Patriotic( 1952).
6 The followingarticles are from the Field A r t i l l e r v J o ~AKarelsky, 'Sovlet ArtilleryFlre, 32 (July 1942): 51 1; Walter Kerr,'Death orInsanity,' 33 (October 1943): 814-6; Parapov, 'Ambushing w ith Artlllery,' 34(November 1944): 786; P. Slesanw, 'Self-Propelled Artilleryv m anks,' 34(November 1944): 787-8; L. Vysokrntrovsky, 'k'tillt?fy V~C.SWTiger andFerdinand; 33 (October 1943): 8 10- 1; , Dlrect Art il le ry Fire,'33 (September 1942): 694
7 W.R Young, 'Artillery Offensive. An Exarnlnatlon of Russian Practlce,'Fleld ArtillervJ o m 36 (January 1946): 26-9; HG. eWateviIle, 'RusslanArtillery- 1941-1945,'Field Artillery-37 (May-June 1947).
Years,' MilitarvHis tor ica l June 1978): 46-53; A Tsynkalov, 'TheGreat Patriotic War and the Postwar Period," &Uitan, Hlstorlcal J m Jul1979): 18-23; G. Peredel'skly, 'Combat Employment of Artilleryin ArmyDefenslve Operatlons; (November 1979): 16-21.
8 V. Kiselev, 'The Development of the Antltank Defense in the Postwar
9 B.H. LiddellHart, The Red rray ( 1956).
10 RaymondL. Garthoff,SPviet Militp rvDo ctr ina( l95 3) .
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1 I I.N. Vorobyev, "Fire, Assault, Manewer,' and P.A Rostmistrov, 'ThePostwar Development of Tank Forces,' from U.S. Air Force edited Selected
as 1970-1975. ASoviet Vlew(1976).12 S . L M a y e r J e d i t o r , J n Wa r ~ 1 9 1 7 -1 9 6 1977).13 KurtHofmann, 'An Analysis of Soviet Art i l le ryDevelopment,'
R ~ i w 5 ( 1982): 135-9.
14 The articles from the Soviet mite Heraldare too numerous to l i s there. They can be referenced in the bibliography.
15 C.N. Donnelly, 'The Wlnd of Change InSoviet Artillery,' i ntern ti on lQ&QS&&W 6 1 982): 737-44.
16 Christopher Bellarny, 'Destruction by Fire: Soviet Arti l lery in the1980s and Beyond," Fie ld A r t i l l e pJournal 53 (September-October 1985):40-5.
17 George R. Patrick, 'Soviet SP Doctrine.' Field Art ill eryJpytapl(July-August 1978): 27-29, Wil l iamP. Baxter, 'Soviet 122-mm Self-PropelledHowitzer,' U8LQArtillervJournal (January-February 1980): 35-7; KeithW.Dayton, 'Field Arti l lerySu rvivab ility TheSoviet Perspective,' Field ArtilmJownal (Septemberdctober 198 1): 4-50.
18 Larry W. Williams, 'Soviet Self-Propelled Artillery,' & ~ Q C(September-October 1978): 18-20; John Erickson, 'Soviet Combined ArmsOperations.' A ~ Q Q CMay-June 1980): 16-2 1,
19 DavidR Jones, Soviet Review m a l . Volymk&
20 Richard E. Simpkin, AU,W ( 1982) and ( 1984).
J983-1984 (1985).
21 Ray Bonds, editor, -e G m d F o r n( 198 .
22 -,Jane's A r m u and Artlllerv 1985-1986 ( 1985).23 Valentin Y. Lebedev, Fie ld Arti ll ery Officer's Hao&Q ?k ( 1984)
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CHAPTER 2
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
It i s appropriate to look at the historical background in order to
make an assessment of why the Soviets embrace the use of direct flre by
the ir fie ld artil lery . Presented in th is chapter are the developments that
led to the routine use of direct fire in the Great Patriotic War and the
continuation of these techniques af ter the war and Into the early 1970s.
Fire in -c War
According to Raymond Garthoff, the use of f le ld a rt il le ry by the
Soviets In the Great Patriotlc War underwent five ma lo r changes. One of
those was the tendency f o r wid e use of ar till ery pieces in direct fire. The
others were the introduction of the 'Artillery Offensive,' the increase in
centralization of ar t i l le ry command and control, the increase in
concentration of artillery weapons and the increase in use of
self-propelled weapons.' This study w i l l examine these changes and theeffect they had on use of artillery in a direct fire role during the Great
Patr iot ic War.
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he Soviets were not prepared for the attack by Nazi Germany on 22
June 1941. With the combination of the surprise of the attack and thepower of the German armor formations, the Soviets fought the first months
of the war at a great disadvantage. In this situation the Soviet troops had
to delay and defend against the tanks by any means possible.2 One of the
primary means was to engage the tanks with direct artillery fire. The
Supreme High Command required a l l a rt il le ry un its to be prepared for the
use of direct f ire w it h at tention t o the likely tank approaches. This was
not a new tact ic, but a renewed emphasis on the tac tic s discussed in the
existing Soviet f ie ld regulation^.^The renewed emphasis on direct fire techniques is confirmed in an
account by Walter Kerr who was the Moscow correspondent for the
York Herald T r bune a t the beginning of the war. He was taken on a tour of
art i l lery uni ts north of Moscow in early 1942 by Soviet Lieutenant General
Vik to r Tikhonov. There he was told by the general that since the outbreak
of the war the Red Army had issued instructions that a l l ar t i l l e ry gun
crews would train f o r antitank fi re . Enemy tanks had broken through the
lines too many times in the early weeks of the war and caught Russian
ar ti ll er y unprepared. While they were vi si tin g the arti lle ry regiment the
gunners were practicing dire ct f ir e procedures a t 600 yards4
Marshal of Art i l le ry P. Kuleshov wrote an article about the Sovietar t i l le ry in the Great Patriotic War on the occasion of the 600th
anniversary of the Russian Art ill er y in 1982. In the artic le he sa id
The high combat qualities of Soviet a r t i l l e ry . . . . .were revealedclearly a t the very beginning of the war under the extremely unfavorable
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conditions fo r our Army. Ar til le ry 's chief and most important missionin the in it ia l period of the war consisted of combating enemy tanks andaircraft. . . .It was necessary to le t the tanks come to wit h in close rangeand f i r e on them pointblank, and that i s ju s t what our artillery men
did."5
The large losses of Soviet tanks and ai rc ra ft a t the beginning of the
war made the need for artillery to fill the direct fire role even greater.
Thus, as a necessity in 1941, the Soviet artillery was routinely employed
from direct fire positions on the main defensive line at ranges from
200-900 yards in order to defeat the advancing German armor.
of D ire ct Fire. Many advantages of using direct f i r e were
discovered as a res ul t of the need to use i t defensively. These advantages
have to do w i th command and control, ammunition savings and
effectiveness.
In the early part o f the war, the Soviets had an insu ffic ient amount
of communications equipment available to allow artillery units to
communicate w i t h forwa rd observers fo r the adjustment of indire ct fire.6
In order to communicate, the maneuver commanders moved the guns
forward in to th eir formations. The ar til le ry could have the targe ts
iden tified t o them and then engage them with direct fire. It appears that
this effective method for command and control of the close support
ar till er y was used in appropriate situation s even af te r the communicationsequipment situation improved.
Another majo r advantage to the Soviets in utiliz ing direct fire was
the savings in ammunition expenditures. One or two rounds from a direc t
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fire gun could do the work of twenty rounds fired from indirect f i r e
position^. These ammunition savings were pa rtic ula rly sign ifican t a t the
beginning of the Great Pat rio tic Wa r when the Soviets were hard pressed t oput up an ef fect ive defense. Art il le ry ammunition was los t in large
quantities with the German advance and i t was necessary to make each
round count.
Finally, there was a marked advantage in the effectiveness of the
arti lle ry f ir e from direc t fi re positions. Soviet indirect fi re procedures
were not well developed and were significantly less effective than the
American capabilities in the Second World War in both accuracy and
timeliness. This was part icu lar ly applicable to engagement of targets of
opportunity where the target was called in to the arti lle ry for immediate
engagement. It did not apply to the delivery of fi re onto preplanned targets
where tim eliness was no t such a cr iti ca l factor.
A good historical example that demonstrates the effectiveness o f
the dire ct fi re techniques of the Soviet ar ti ll e ry i s an account of the actionof a towed a r t i l l e ry battery in March of 1943 in the 16th Army Sector,
possibly as pa rt of the action in the Demyansk pocket. The Soviet battery
posit ion was attacked three tim es by German tanks and infantry . Over the
course of the battle the battery was almost totally destroyed, but
successfully held i t s position. Through direc t fi re the batte ry destroyed
thirty -one tanks and ki ll ed over four hundred enemy soldiers.8 Six German
tanks were destroyed for every Soviet artillery piece lost (one artillery
piece survived the engagement). I t i s no wonder that the Soviets found i t
advantageous to use artillery, even towed artillery, in direct fire
engagements against tanks. This i s almost certain ly an exceptional case14
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regarding the number of losses in fl ic te d on the Germans by a single battery .
However, it does show how effective the Soviet artillery could be against
German tanks and infantry.
The effectiveness of using direc t f ire art i l lery was also applicable t o
offensive situations as described in this quote from Major General F.A.
Samsonov:
'Practice has shown that artillery preparation is most effectivewhen a section of the guns (of all calibers up to 203mm) are broughtforward t o fi r e over open sights a t the embrasures of the enemy's fortsand Other strong ly f o rt if ie d positions. This method reduces the tim enecessary for destroying the defense works and enables the infantry toapproach the object o f attack without loss. I t has also been found f a rmore effective and economical than spreading the fire over wholeareas.9
When providing this type of offensive support to the infantry, i t
was by no means unusual f o r the a r t i l l e r y t o move out in front of the
combat formations of the infantry.I0 The direct fire a r t i l l e ry wouldusually try to flank these fortifications, then destroy them t o allow the
infan try t o pass through and continue the attack. This flanking movement
was obviously important to the survivability of the artillery weapon and
Indications are that even when flanking a position was not
possible, the a rt il le ry moved up and did i t s job, accepting whatever losses
were required.
Vulnerabi1i t v of Direct Fir e W e a o m The ma jor disadvantage of
using artil lery in a direct f ir e role was i t s vulnerability t o enemy fire,
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particularly when considering towed a rt il le ry weapons and thei r c rew s as
in the example above. The opinion has often been voiced that the Soviets
"never shrank from hazarding losses in men and material which anAnglo-American commander would have hesitated to incur." * Sovietcommanders were more interested in results and the benefits of using
direct f i r e ju st ifi ed the costs. Direct fire was simpler for command and
control and the dramatic increase in effectiveness justified the losses.
Even a ra t io of one tank kill to each artillery piece lost may have been
considered a fair trade, especially at the beginning of the war. It i sinteresting to note here that both the f i r s t a rti lle ry soldier and the fi r s t
ar t i l lery officer decorated as a Hero of the Soviet Union in the Great
Patr iot ic War received their award fo r valor by engaging German tanks at
close range by direc t fire.
The Soviets were perhaps somewhat more concerned with the
vulnerabilities of artillery pieces used in direct f i re than we give them
credit for. An artic le from the Field A rt ill er v Journal in September I942
contained a deta iled explanation by the Soviets of th ei r development of the
tactics to use artil l ery in a dire ct f i r e role.14 Emphasis was provided on
several su rv ivab ili ty techniques. These included the need for engineer
preparation of firing positions prior to occupation of them and
establishment of defilade positions to the rear of firing positions for
ar t i l le ry t o 's i t and wait ' until t ime f o r execution of the fire missions.
Just prior t o dusk the guns would be quickly ro ll ed by hand from defilade t o
the firing positions and engagement o f targets would commence.
Withdrawal of the a rt il le ry upon completion o f the missions was by echelon
and was accomplished under the cover o f darkness. Str ic t camouflage16
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discipline was also mentioned as cr it ic a l to the success of operating w i th
guns so close to the enemy lines. Another source indicated tha t
immediately upon successful destruc tion of assigned targets the individual
ar ti ll er y pieces would march order and move to the rear.15 This amount of
preparation indicates distinct efforts by the Soviets to limit the
vulnerab ilities o f the a rt il le ry when required to use direct fire.
The e ff o rt s to camouflage the a rt il le ry weapons used in direct fire
is also confirmed in an account of preparations f o r the Soviet
counterattack from Leningrad in January, 1943. 'Great accuracy and
concealment was required in carrying out the measures directed todistribution of the direct lay ing weapons.'16 The account goes on t o
discuss that these weapons were emplaced for direct fire a t 400 to 800
meters fro m the German front lines.
The Soviets initially used their artillery in a direct f i r e role
because of the need to use all available resources to stop the German
invasion. Certain advantages became apparent w it h the use of the a r t i l l e r y
f o r direct fire, pa rtic ula rly the increased accuracy and timeliness and the
significant decrease in ammunition requirements. Although the Soviets
were very aggressive in the employment of their artillery for direct fire,
they were concerned with developing tact ic s tha t increased the chances fo r
survivability.
The Artill ervOf- e
The f i r s t months of fig ht ing against the Germans, to include the first
offensive operations of the Soviet forces in December, 1941, showed some
serious shortcomings in a rt il le ry operations. One remedy t o these17
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problems was a directive on 10 January 1942 from the Supreme High
Command to in st itut e the a rt il le ry 0ffensive.l'
The three princip les of the ar till er y offensive were t o concentrateart i l lery in the area of the main effort, to conduct 'unintermittent' fire
through the depth of the defenses and to enforce close inte rac tion between
the infantry, tanks and artil lery. The second of these principles, providing
'unintermittent' fires, had tw o reqirements. The fi r s t was to have the
battalion and regimental artillery closely accompany the manewer force
w i t h f ir e u n ti l success was achieved. The p rincipal method to achieve th is
was by 'direct laying from exposed positions.'18 Secondly, the heavier
batteries were to concentrate their fire on massed enemy troops and
arti llery . This was of course accomplished w it h ind irect fire.
The effectiveness of the 'artillery offensive' increased throughout
the war. In the later stages, with the tremendous amount of art i l lery
available, the preparation would usually close w i th one tremendous salvo
delivered by a l l guns and morta rs directed against every enemy capabilityto resi st the attack. The res ults were that 50% o 70% of the enemy troops
were put out of action even before the Soviet maneuver assault began.I9
This capability for massive destruction earned the Soviet artillery the
t i t l e of 'The God of War.'
One factor that demonstrates the effectiveness of the direct fire
technique i s that when fi re plans were drawn up to execute an art i l lerypreparation, the highest priority targets were the first t o be singled out
for destruction by direc t fire. It was only in cases where di rec t f ir e was
infeasible for a specific target that heavy concentrations of indirect fire
were used instead.2018
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There was s t i l l considerable defensive figh ting to do even af te r the
new doctrine of the ar ti ll er y offensive was implemented. The a rt il le ry
continued to play an important role in the destruction of enemy tanks bydirec t f i r e from the front line s of defensive resistance,*l The Soviets
gained proficiency in combining direct and indirect artillery fire t o break
up German armor advances.
Indirect f ir e of ar ti ll er y engaged an attacking tank formation at the
maximum range possible. Damage to tanks by indirec t fi re was not
extensive because a direct or near hit was required to destroy o r
demobilize a tank. However, i t did serve to separate the supporting
infantry and generate confusion in the attacking forces. As the tanks
approached the main line of resistance, the antitank and close support
a rt il le ry engaged the tanks a t close range. This i s where the major ity of
tank k i l l s occurred. Those tanks tha t successfully broke through were then
me t by the direc t fi re s of the ar ti ll er y tha t had been providing the indirect
fire support. This effectively insured that the tanks were subjected toar t i l le ryf i r e over the e nt ire avenue o f their attack on Soviet positions.22
Even the ar ti ll er y in indirect f i r e pos itions had a secondary antitank
role in defense in the event of an enemy penetration. Ba tterie s were
required to select direct fire positions near the ir fi ri ng positions. The
field artillery was usually massed along the second most likely armor
avenue of approach, with the bulk of the antitank artillery covering the
most l ikely route.23
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1 u t . y
The control of the Soviet artillery underwent some changes during
the Great Pa trio tic War. A rt il le ry assets were in it ia ll y distributed
re la tive ly evenly across the fro nt and employed as individual units. The
Soviets found i t necessary to centralize some ar ti ll er y in organizations a t
higher levels so that they could be rapidly moved en masse to whatever
area was being threatened and concentrate the required numbers t o create a
successful defense. This technique was enforced by the pr inciple of the
a r t i l l e ry offensive that required concentration of artillery in the area of
the main effo rt.
As the number of ar ti ll e ry weapons increased during 1942, regiments
were formed to create the beginnings of the Reserve of the Supreme High
Command (RGVK). As the size of the RGVK grew, these regiments were
further organized into artillery divisions and even a r t i l l e r y corps.
Eventually, almost 50% of all artil lery assets were in the RGVK. The
specific purpose of the RGVK was to centralize the artillery assets andprovide the capability to mass great quantities of ar t i l le ry on the main
axes o f troop operations.*"
The maneuver un its s t i l l retained their own ar ti lle ry units t o create
a dual level a r t i l l e r y organization; the centralized ar ti ll e ry described
above and a decentralized artillery. The decentralized artillery provided
support at the lowest maneuver levels and was called the close support
ar t i l le ry or the accompanying art ille ry. This close support ar ti ll er y i s
defined in the Soviet m t a r y Encvclooedic Dict ionary as:
'subunits (guns) of battations o r regiments, as well as specialself-propelled artillery, deployed in the Great Patriotic War in infantry
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and tank dispositions, to deliver fire on enemy forces impeding their
The close support a rt il le ry was able t o reso rt to direc t fi re because the
centralized art il le ry assets were available t o provide indire ct f ir e support.
The centralization of artillery assets and the increasing numbers of
artillery weapons produced by the Soviets allowed for massive
concentration of artillery. The 1941-42 norm for the density of artillery
pieces and mortars in the area of the main effort was 70-80 guns per
kilometer. That had increased to 130-200 per kilometer by 1943, 150-250
per kilometer by 1944 and 250-300 per kilome ter by 194S26 The extremewas during the final offensive against Berlin where the Sovlets massed
670 guns per kilo me ter (22,000 a rt il le ry pieces) against the Germans. An
unusually large proportion of these guns, by Western standards, were
advance. For the most pa rt delivered direct fire. -25
employed in a direct f i r e role on the front line.=27
In the sectors of greatest importance for the Leningrad
counterattack in January 1943 there were at least 40 dire ct fi re guns per
kilomete r of front. In the main attack by 2nd Army, th ir ty seven per cent
of the small caliber artillery pieces (mostly 76mm) were in direct f i re
positions, and about ten percent of the larger caliber artillery pieces
(mostly 122mrn. but some 152mm) were in direct f i r e positions. The
supporting attack by 8th Army showed about fifteen per cent less use of
direct f i re artillery.28 The weighting of the main attack w i t h direct f i re
weapons re fle ct s the importance attribute d t o the effectiveness of direct
f ire.
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- oelled Ar til le rvWhen the Soviets conducted offensive operations they discovered
quickly that the towed art i l lery in the front l ines was unable to keep upw i t h the tanks during battle, pa rticu larly those providing dir ec t f ire
support. The Soviets solved this major problem of providing continuous
fire support to mechanized formations by increasing the use of
self-propelled artillery. This use of self-propelled artillery is considered
another one of the major changes in artillery development by the Soviets.
The major role of self-propelled ar til le ry was t o use direct fi re to assist
armor forces in defea ting German tanks.
The Soviets had some experience w i t h self-pro pelled gun designs in
the 1930s, however, the indu stria l capacity p ri o r it y was t o production of
tanks u nt il the late r part of 1942. Light tank production then shifted t,o
providing self-propelled artillery. The s 1 ~ - 7 6 ~ as the f i rs t
self-propelled gun produced, but i t was not sufficiently armored or
ef fe ct iv e enough against newer German tanks. It was eventually employedpr im ar ily as an infan try support assault gun. The SU-122 entered
production shortly aft er the SU-76, and, due to i t s larg er caliber, was more
effective in the antitank role. The SU-152, the largest callber of
self-propelled artillery, appeared in early 1943 and was a very effective
antitank weapon. I t s ma jor shortcoming was a carrying capacity for only
twenty rounds of ammunition, requiring continual replenishment during
battle.30
The first self-propelled gun regiments were formed in December
1942 w ith a mixture of SU-76s and SU- 122s. By the beginning o f I944 the
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r i f l e divisions included their own self-propelled a rt ill er y and the combined
arms team of infantry, tanks and self-propelled a rt il le ry was employed.31
wrote in 1945 on the Great Patriotic War experience:
Soviet Marshal P. A Rotmistrov, Chief Marshal of Armored Forces,
The rapid pace of offen sive operations presented new requiremen tsregarding maneuverability of artillery, and practice showed that i f theattacking troops did not: have artillery support a t the right moment, i tlos t it s significance at once. There i s where self-propelled artillerycomes in. By i t s firepower and mobility i t supplements fi el d artil ler y,ass ists tanks in battle , and aids in the development of the bat tle . 32
Rotmistrov especially stressed the antitank role of such weapons
and emphatically st at ed fi el d a rti lle ry [indirect fire1 Is almost useless
against modem tanks. 33 In writ ings in the early 1970s, Rotmistrov
provided the rationale for development of self-propelled artillery during
the Great Pa tr io tic War. He re late d tha t the decision t o produce
self-propelled artillery with guns of a caliber and lethality exceeding
those of Nazi tanks was a direc t re sult o f the introduc tion of po werful new
weapons fielded by the Germans beginning at the Battle of Kursk (the 60
ton Tiger tank and 70 ton Ferdinand self-propelled gun). Soviet
self-propelled a r t i l l e ry was specifically expected t o deal with these
enemy armored vehicles.34
The use of s elf-propelled ar til le ry almost exclusively in a direct f i re
ro le r aised some controversy as t o who owned the new a r tl ll e ry weapons,
the armor commanders or the fie ld ar ti lle ry commanders. Initi ally , the
new self-propelled artillery was in fa ct subordinated t o the tank forces. I t
was determined that under the conditions of manewer warfare,
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self-propelled a rt il le ry di re ct ly accompanying the tanks provided the best
form of ar till er y s u p p 0 r t3 ~ This close maneuver un it support further
enhanced the concept of two artilleries: a centralized one capable ofmassing its assets to provide indirect fire support and another in direct
accompaniment of the maneuver forces.
The concept of employment of tanks and self-propelled artillery
together was an importan t one. The self-propelled a rt il le ry relieved the
tanks o f tasks rel atin g to the dir ec t engagement of enemy tanks allowing
the tanks to perform maneuver while the ar t i l lery provided f i r e p ~ w e r . ~ ~
This concept i s confirmed by another quote from Ro tmistrov:
.. . in case of a counterattack by enemy tanks, self-propelled gunscan draw this strike on themselves and open fire against attackers onthe spot, giving friendly tanks an opportunity to maneuver and attackthe enemy in the flank and rear. -37
Frequently self-propelled guns found themselves compelled t o r epe l
tank attacks on their own. An historical example of this shows how
effe ctiv e they were against German tanks. This is an account of action by a
Soviet self-propelled artillery unit in the Orel-Kunk sector in July of
1943. Intelligence reported the movement of a German unit of twenty Tiger
tanks and four Ferdinand self-propelled guns. A Soviet unit of twelve
self-propelled howitze rs was sent to defend against the attack. They took
up concealed positions in depth. When the German un it arrived, the Soviet
artillery opened up from defilade positions at a maximum range of 500
meters . Engagements were a t 250-300 meters at the height o f the battle.
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The Soviet unit destroyed eight of the Tigers and al l fou r of the Ferdinands,
eff ec tiv ely repulsing the attack.38
Experiences like these showedthat
self-propelled ar til le ry of alarge caliber was an extremely effective weapon against even the heavies t
German armored vehicles. It i s stressed though, that the guns had to be
properly employed from concealed pos ition s and at close ranges.
When the nature of the terraln allowed it, the self-propelled
artil lery util izing direct fire were unrivalled in effectiveness fo r tank
ambushes. Another example of this capability i s an instance lat er in the
war where the Soviets sent t wo a rt il le ry regiments to ambush an expected
German armored counterattack. The terrain was analyzed and the most
likely route for the Germans was covered by the artillery positioned in
concealed positions in depth on the route. The German countera ttack came
in the expected direction w it h a to tal o f si xt y medium and Tiger tanks and
Ferdinand heavy se lf-propelled guns. When the engagement was over the
Soviet a rt il le ry had destroyed fo rty -fiv e of the German armored vehiclesand successfully turned back the German c~u nt e ra tt ack .~ '
Self-propelled artillery played an ever increasing part in Soviet
offensive operations. As la te r models were produced they tended to have
stronger armor and increased mob ility. This made them more flexib le and
more effec tive in operations against tanks.
To conclude the lessons learned from the Great Pat rio tic War, Soviet
employment of direct fire became prominent out of the sheer need t o
defend against German armor with any means available. It had the
additional advantages of ammunition savings and overcoming the obs tacles25
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of a relatively poor indirect fire capability when engaging targets of
opportunity. It was a significant contributor to the effectiveness of the
'artillery offensive' so important to the Soviet successes against theGermans. The major disadvantage of vulnerability was an acceptable
tradeoff for the results achieved and was greatly overcome by the
development of self-propelled ar t i l le ry that could hold its own against
German armor when properly employed. The Soviets came out of the Great
Patriotic War w it h a tradition of direct f ir e a rtil le ry tactics that worked
extremely we ll fo r them.
Soviet Art l l e r vfrom the 1950s to 1973
Immediately after the war and into the mid 1950s. the tactlcal
employment of ar t i l l e ry as a major factor in antitank defense operations
remained essen tially unchanged. Direct fir e ar ti ll e ry and pa rtic ula rly
self-propelled a r t i l l e ry was expected to engage enemy armor at theforward edge of the b at tle fie ld and In to the depth of the enemy
posi io ns .4
The majo r fac tor t o subsequently affe ct a rt il le ry development in the
mid 1950s was tied to the arrival of the Nuclear Age. The cannon
artillery's pre-eminence as the prime means of mass destruction was
replaced by the mis si le and atomic weapons. The stra teg ic rocket forces
became the important service in the mi li ta ry a t the expense o f the others.
The cannon artillery faded into the background during this period and
received l i t t l e emphasis. The ult im ate means f o r carrying out direct fi re
artillery tactics, the self-propelled weapon, received only minor26
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developmental attention and no further production. The prevailing opinion
was that conventional warfare was unlikely because i t was impossible to
maintain front lines and achieve major thrusts in an era of nuclear
weapons.41
The artillery weapons that were developed were improvements of
towed artillery to further enhance its range and generally update i t from
the Great Patriotic War vintage equipment on hand. In 1955, a 203mm
towed gun-howitzer was produced tha t was capable of fi ri ng a nuclear
projectile. All the weapons tha t were produced continued to have a direct
fire capability in deference to the lessons learned early in the Great
Pat rio tic War.
By the mid 1960 the Soviets had resolved that future war would
not automatically involve the immediate massive use of nuclear weapons,
and at least the init ialstages of war could be fought conventionally. US.
studies of the Soviet use of direct fire artillery determined their
employment would be based on experience from the Great P at rio tic War. Itwas understood that the Soviets would continue to use dire ct fi re ar ti ll e ry
in both defensive and offe nsive operations. The use of di rect f i r e was
based on a conviction of i t s tact ica l usefulness from the Great P atriotic
War and the advantages derived from 'defeating targets in less t ime w ith
less ammunition using dire ct fire"42 A r t i l l e r y weapon emplacement for
direct fire was expected to be from 1,000 to 1,500 meters which is a
ref lect ion of the increased capability of the newer towed weapons that the
Soviets had developed. Studies of that t im e concluded that all Soviet fiel d
artillery weapons were capable of direct fire up to and including the
nuclear capable 203mm g u n /h o w it ~ e r4 ~ he ta ct ic s of moving towed guns27
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up in to camouflaged pos itions near the f ront lin e under cover of darkness to
accomplish dir ec t r e missions was also retained.#
Soviet sources in the early 1970s indicate that the use of dir ect fire
by artillery was indeed s t i l l a viable concept. Soviet Chief Marshal of
Armored Forces P. k Rotmistrov wrote during this period that the use of
hollow-charge shells had insured that even low i n it ia l shell veloc ity
weapons could successfully perform ant itank missions. He sta ted
specific ally: Thus, in modern offensive battle too, self-propelled ar ti ll er y. . . w i l l carry a large share of the f ig ht against enemy tanks. 45
Major General of Ar t i l l e ryG. Biryukov in his book, Ant ita nk Wa rfare ,published in 1972 s ta ted
The usual ground art i l lery (excluding the antitank art ille ry) i s st i l lan important antitank weapon in modem combat. At the same time therole of ar t i l le ry f ire in combatting tanks with usual ammunition fromcovered pos itions [i nd ire ct fire1 has considerably decreased. . . 46
He goes on to say that the problem with indirect f ire is the largeammunition expenditure and large number of guns required, and even with
this the effects on a tank form ation are minimal. It is the a r t i l l e ry placed
in covered positions which engage tanks w i t h direc t fi re that are effective.
This i s particularly important in the defense of a breakthrough by enemy
armor when ar til le ry moves from i t s indirect fi re positions to positions
allowing direct f i r e engagement. With special armor piercing and shaped
charge ammunition the artillery can destroy any modern tank. The use of
ar t i l le ry in direct fire, supplementing a powerful artillery barrage is an
eff ec tive means t o repe l massive enemy armored attacks.47
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Colonel k A. Sidorenko in his book, The Offen sive published in 1970,
stated
'Very important significance i s had during the period of the f ir epreparatlon by dlr ec t f ir e as the most ef fec tive method of destroyingobserved enemy weapons as well as destroying defensive works on theforw ard edge of the ba tt le area and in the Immediate depth. In the lastwar, guns of various calibers were used for direct fire. . . . Undercontemporary conditions artillery guns. . . . may be widely used for theconduct of d ire ct I ire.-40
W e see that even into the early 1970s. the Great Patriotic War
experience w it h direc t f i r e was carried over and considered an effective
means of employing a slgnit'icant percentage of a rt il le ry weapons.
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Endnotes fo r Chapter 2
1 Raymond L. Garthoff, Sov e t Militan/ Doctrine(1953): 303.
2 V. Pogonin, "Organizing the P lan of Fir e and Engineer Obstacles,'mtarl, HeralQ (March 1983): 101.
3 U.S.S.R. Com mis sa riat o f Defense, F ie ld S ervice Re S ov ie tArmv. 193 6 ( 1937 : 125.
4 Walter Kerr, "Death or Insanity,'Field Art l l e rvJouma 1,33 (October1943): 815.
5 P. Kuleskov, 'In the Great Pa tr io ti c War," Mil it ar v Herald (January1982): 112.
6 S.L. Mayer, editor, The Russian War Machine 19 17- 1945 1977 : 190.
7 B.H. Lid del l Hart, editor. The Red Army ( 1956): 357.
8 F.A. Samsonov, edito r, Combat Exaerience of Ar t i l l e rv in the
Pat ri ot ic War (November 1952): 85-6.
9 W.R. Young, "Art il le ry Offensive.An Examination of Russian Practice,"nal 36 (January 1946): 27.
I0 Samsonov, m t xoe ience 60.
1 1 Samsonov, &&at Fxaer ence 33.
12 H.G. dewatevi lle, "Russian Art il le ry 1941-1945,'Field A r t i ll e ry
Journal. 37 (May-June 1947): 196.
13 Kuleskov, "In the Great Pat ri ot ic War": 112-3.
14 , Direct Ar ti ll er y Fire," F ield Ar ti ll er v Journal. 3 2(September 1942): 694.
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15 Hart, Red Ar m r 358-9.
16 Samsonov, m a t x o e r i m 47.
17 L. Sapkov, "Evolutiono f A rti ll e ry Tactics and Combat Employment,'MilitaryHerald (April 1982): 120.
18 Karelsky, 'Soviet A rt il le ry Fire,' Field Art iller y Journ a32 (July1942): 5 1 .
19 J. Erickson, 'Soviet Combined Arms: Theory and Practice'(September 1979): 43.
20 Liddell Hart, 355.2 I Samsonov, -er iencq: 84-5.
22 Samsonov, Gombat ExDerienca 96-7.
23 Liddell Hart, Red 36 1-2.
24 Kuleskov, 'In the Great Patriotic War': 1 15.
25 N.V. Ogarkov, editor, M-UDedC Dictionary ( 1983):VOl I,175.
26 Sapkov, 'Evolution of Artillery': 121.
27 Garthoff, Soviet Doctr nc 123.
28 Samsonov, Combat EXDWence 47.
29 The numbers in designation of models of self-propelled ar t i l l e ryreferred t o the caliber of the gun (i.e. SU-76 i s a 76mm gun).
30 Mayer, yar Machine: 190.
3 Erickson, 'Soviet Combined Arms": 28.
32 Garthoff, Soviet Doctring 305-6.31
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CHAPTER 3
CURRENT SOVIET TACTICS AND PROCEDURES
The number of articles available from Soviet sources1 that discuss
the direct fi re use of arti llery make it clear that the use of direct f ir e i sstill seen as a viable means of employing artillery in the offense, the
defense and in special situations. The purpose of t h is chapter i s to explain
the current Soviet ta ct ic s and employment procedures fo r dlre ct fire.
The organization of Soviet ar ti lle ry is an important factor in how i t
is tact ica lly employed. The Soviets can be considered to have two a rt il le ry
forces2 The first force is decentralized and is the one we are concerned
w i t h in this study. It is a f ie ld a rt ill er y battalion organic to the Motorized
Rifle Regiment and Tank Regiment. It provides the close support artillery
assets to the manew er force and is ofte n used in a direct f lre role. This
force i s also known as organic or accompanying ar til le ry . The quan tity and
features of the organlc a rt il le ry are discussed inChapter 4.
The second artillery force is the centralized artillery that is
con trolled a t div islon and higher levels. Some of thls art i l lery is passeddown to the regiments in organizing the force for combat. The a rt il le ry
that ends up at regimental level may also find itself performing an
occasional direct fire mission, but the usual method of employment is33
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indirect fi r e 3 The centralized artil le ry retained at division and higher
levels would only rar ely be employed fo r d ire ct fire . They are, however, a l l
capable of using di re ct fire in self defense.
There are tw o primaty occasions in offensive operations where the
Soviets w i l luse their f ie ld ar t i l le ry in a dire ct fi r e role. The first is by
the art i l lery unit assigned to the advanced guard during a march inan tic ipat ion of a meeting engagement. Second, is by port ions of the organic
regimental ar till er y as part of a fire plan during the a rt ill er y preparation
of the attack. Although these a re certa inly not the only occasions where
direct fire w i l l be used, they are the mos t prevalent in current Soviet
mi i ary I erature.
he advanced guard of a Soviet regiment conducting a march is a
battalion size maneuver force. It usually has an artillery battalion
attached t o it. Ahead of the advanced guard is a forward security element
made up of a maneuver company w i t h an ar ti ll e ry batte ry attached to it.
The artillery moves in the forward elements of these formations. A
platoon size reconnaisance patrol operates far enough in front of theforw ard se curity element (5 to 10 kilometers) to provide enough reaction
time and space for the security element to move into combat formations
pr io r t o contact wt th an enemy force.
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Upon a warning o f enemy forces ahead, the m ost li ke ly deployment
fo r the a rti lle ry battery from the security element i s t o take positions that
provlde fo r dlre ct f lre engagement of the en'm y force. The batte ry locatloni s quickly selected based on the securi ty element commander's plan fo r
maneuver. Specific gun positions are dlrected upon arr lva l at the posltton.
The battery is deployed by platoon wlth several hundred meters between
them and as much as a hundred meters between guns of a platoon. The
artlllery battallon commander traveling wlth the advanced guard is
Informed of the sttuatio n and approves the c o m e of action. The battalion
commander w i l l then direc t the other tw o batteries of the battalion to
deploy Into Indirect fire positions t o provide support for the inltial
engagement as i t develops. When the enemy c o m a into the ki l l ing zone of
the direct fire battery i t opens fire and the maneuver elements o f the
securi ty element attack. The bat tery commander cont rols the flre of one
platoon and the senior batte ry o ff ic er c ontro ls the other platoon. By the
completion of this engagement the maneuver forces of the advanced guard
have also arrived and they continue to develop the s1 tu at im 4
The requlrements t o insure success in these situations are to train
for deployment from the march, achieve proficiency in preparing the guns
for firing , understand and properly react t o Control signals, and sk il lf u ll y
use the te rra in In deploying the f ir in g platoons for th ei r p r o t e c t i ~ n . ~his
las t point i s stressed in every dlscusslon 1 have read of movlng in to dire ctf i re posit ions from the march. One of the few hlStOrlCal examples from the
Great Patriotic War that tells about a Soviet defeat i s one that relates a
situa tion where the terraln was used incorrectly. The battery tri ed t o
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move in to a direct f i r e posit ion in sight of the enemy and lo st fi ve o f t he ir
six guns t o tank fire.6 The best use of the terrain i s to cover the approach
of the guns to th ei r firingpos ition s and to use i t to select positions withmaximum observation and fields of fire. i t is preferable to position the
guns t o form a 'f ir e pocket' fo r the enemy vehicles to move into. This
allows most of the guns to f i r e a t the more vulnerable sides of enemy
vehicles. Another advantageous use of t er ra in is t o emplace on the reverse
slopes of hi l ls and open close range f i re at tanks as they appear on the
crest. This effec tive ly takes away the tank's range advantage.
It seems to be a frequent requirement for both towed and
self-propelled artillery units to train in repelling a tank attack during a
meeting engagement. It is standard practice fo r the b attery operating in
the security element to deploy into direct fire positions at the report of
enemy units by the reconnaisance patrol. The ba tte ry commander of a
self-propelled artillery unit was berated in the Herald for reacting
improperly during a training excercise as part of the security element
conducting a meeting engagement.' The situati on was the same as
mentioned above, and his ta ct ic al blunder was that he put his battery in an
ind ire ct f i r e position. The evaluator mentioned several reasons f o r why the
choice should have been di re ct f i r e positions instead. The first point was
that direc t f i r e would have provided for more eff ec tiv e accomplishment o f
the miss ion w i t h less ammunition expenditure. Secondly, there were tw omore batteries fo llowing with the advanced guard that were available to
provide indirect fire support. The third point was that the side that fires
first in a meeting engagement i s the one tha t wins it, and he had lost that
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opportunity. Finally, he fai led to use the ta ct ica l features of h is
self-propelled howitzers . These were ll st ed as 'high maneuverability,
con tro lla bili ty and survivability." The bottom linein the evaluation of th isunit was tha t 'those of fi ce rs who exclude an opportunity to use today's
self-propelled artillery in dir ect f i r e are acting incorrectly.'
he second occasion where direct fire i s likely to be used in
offensive operations i s as part of the fi r e plan developed for the art il le ry
preparation of the attack. It i s routine to use some designated artillery
weapons to fire from direct fire positions to complement the traditional
heavy volume of tndlrect fires of the preparation. i t has been suggested
that this may have even more significance today than it did during the
Great Pa trio ttc War because of the current need t o reduce the t im e of the
preparation due t o improved enemy coun terfir e cap abi liti es9
The artillery preparation of the attack is intended as a powerful
surprise fir e assault by all art il le ry units against preplanned targets of
personnel and weapons on the forw ard edge of the b a tt le fi el d and through
the depths of the enemy defense to include ar t il le ry uni ts and command and
control targets. The weapons assigned di rect f i r e missions destroy
pinpoint t argets such as tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, antitank guided
mis si le launchers and emplacements on the forward edge.1 With the highlevel o f mechanization of Soviet forces, the primary focus Is on
destruction of the enemy antiarmor capability to enhance the odds of the
success of Soviet mechanized formations in the attack.
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Extensive and detailed reconnaisance i s performed of the enemy
positions t o determine the targeting requirements for the preparation.
Reconnaissance detachments, combined arms commanders and commandersof organic and attached artillery perform this reconnaisance and pass
information on targets t o higher levels. The f i r e plan i s prepared at the
highest level involved in the operation and then passed down fo r execution.
This can include direc tion fo r which spe cific targ ets w i l l be engaged w it h
di re ct fire . The most important targets on the forwa rd edge of the
bat tle fi el d are the ones tha t w i l l be engaged by direc t f i r e weapons. Theregimental artillery chief coordinates the artillery preparation for the
atta ck fo r the manewer regiment commander. He analyzes the m iss ion and
the assets available to him, and then designates which weapons w i l l be
involved in the dire ct f i r e missions. This includes the tanks and antitank
guided mis slle s of supported manewer un its as we ll as ar ti lle ry pieces.
the arti llery units on their direct fir e missions1
The regimental ar til le ry chief provides very detailed informa tion t o
1. Spec ific fi r e missions w it h primary and alternate targe ts fo r each
weapon. In many cases more than one weapon w i l l be assigned for
the destruction o f a single target.
2. The sequence fo r execution.
3. The general locations fo r fi ri ng positions.
4. The t im e f o r pos ition occupation and tim e t o be ready to open fire.5. The signals fo r commencing and ceasing fire.
6. The allow ed ammunition consumption fo r each target.
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The regimental ar ti ll er y chief prepares a f ir e chart of the weapons
used in direc t f i r e to include tanks, antitank guided missiles, and ar ti ll er y
guns. This i s considered to be the most important document of the fireplan.I2 It shows the po sltion of the weapons and the designation of their
targets.
The battery commander whose guns are t o be employed in the direct
fi re role selects the spe cific f ir in g position locations fo r each gun based
on the informat ion from the f i re plan. The positlons are chosen based on
the ab il ity to observe the target, a t a range wi th in the l im it s of direct f i re
and w i th approach routes that fa c il it a te movement into the positions. The
art il le ry commander must know the maneuver plan to Insure the dire ct f i re
Positions do not hlnder forward movement of friendly attacking forces and
the positlon i s chosen no closer than 400 meters from enemy positions to
keep it out of small arms range.I3 The ba tte ry commander also designates
the rendezvous location where the guns wl l l reassemble fol low ing
completion of the direc t fi re missions.The weapon commanders study the approach to their designated
firing position in detail. They w i l l most likely physically occupy the
position during the night preceding the preparation. They check the
technical condition of the sighting devices, prepare the ammunition for
flring and camouflage the weapon from observation. They are also
responsible fo r establishing wir e communications t o adjacent guns becauseof the wide dispersal between guns.14
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Firing from direct fire positions i s usually conducted at the
beginning of the ar til le ry preparation. This i s t o insure that the targe ts
are clearly observable pr io r t o the enemy's forwa rd edge of the ba ttle fie ldbecoming covered with dust and smoke from the shell bursts of the
ar ti lle ry preparation. The need to destroy the targets w it h a f i r s t round hit
i s greatly emphasized since la te r observation and correction of f i r e may be
extremely di ff ic u lt o r impossible. The tim e available for completion of
direct f ir e missions i s estimated to be 5-8 minutes.'
It i s tremendously importan t for the ar ti ll e ry t o defeat the enemy's
antitank cap ability during the preparation. This point i s grea tly
emphasized in current Soviet articles on the artillery preparation. It i s
considered that an ar til le ry preparation by only indire ct f ir e s would leave
enough weapons undamaged on the forward edge t o slow the attacking un its
and possibly prevent the success o f the attack. The employment o f direct
f i r e weapons and the detailed planning process fo r direc t f ir e i s done t o
insure the defeat of this antitank capab ility and to fa ci lit at e the success
of the Soviet maneuver force s in the attack.
lthough this study has discussed the two situations most often
mentioned by the Sov lets on employment of their field artil lery assets in a
dire ct fi r e role, they are not the only situations. There are many othertactical situations where direct fire employment of the supporting
ar t i l le ry is feasible. Thls is particularly the case in pursuit operations
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where the tactical situation can become very similar to the meeting
engagement already discussed.
The phase of artillery support following the preparation is the
support of the attack.I6 This phase begins immediately upon the
completion of the preparation fires and continues until the Soviet forces
have overrun the front line battalions of the enemy. The tra ns ition from
the preparatlon to support of the attack Is supposed to be lmperceptlble.
The artil le ry units in place from the preparation are capable of supporting
this phase without movement from positions because of the range
capabilities of th e ir weapons. Accompanying a rt il le ry moves forward tofo llow the advance of the manewer units and i s capable of providing direc t
fir e support The ma jori ty of the artillery remains in indirect fire
positions and continues to foll ow the f ir e plan fo r support of the attack.
The fi re plan usually cal ls fo r successive concentrations of artillery fire
on enemy positions. The concentration i s fired on the enemy position until
the fr iend ly maneuver forces reach it The concentration i s then shifted tothe next enemy position. There are additional on ca ll targ ets available i f
requested by manewer commanders. The extensive In dire ct fir es are
supplemented by the ar ti lle ry moving w i t h the manewer formations which
i s available for conduct of direct f i re i f needed. Di rect fi re use of ar t i l le ry
is probably m inima l during thls phase since it i s rarely discussed.
Despite the extensive fire planning there are indications that fire
support coordinatlon during thls period does not always meet expectatlons.
It i s a common theme in current lite ratu re that the manewer and ar t i l le ry
commanders must know each others needs better In Order to effectively
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fi gh t the combined arms battle . The emphasis fo r Soviet artil lerym en i s t o
understand maneuver, think like a maneuver commander, anticipate their
needs and provide the required fire support in a ti mel y manner.In a recent ar tic le in the Soviet pl il it ar y HeralQ,it was recommended
that the ar ti ll e ry designated t o accompany the maneuver forces in support
of the attack be completely held back from part icip ation in the preparation
so that they could be prepared t o immediately move forward. The prima ry
function of the artillery was to h i t a l l "surv iving and suddenly appearing
targets' dangerous t o the tanks. This indica tes a t le ast some requirementfor ar t i l le ry in a dire ct fi r e role. The fin al statement of the ar tic le is an
assessment that ar ti ll er y Officers 'must be imbued w l t h a tank sp ir it ' to
deploy rapidly and support tanks in a dynamic batt1e.l'
Another source re fe rs t o the accompanying a rt il le ry spe cif ica lly as a
f i r e support asset that f i l l s a void between the tank gun of the maneuver
force and the indirect artillery available from the division and army
ar ti ll er y groups. The presence of th is additional link in the fire support
chain would be very beneficial for providing a guarantee of ar t i l le ry
support in an intensive electronic warfare environment where
communication with indirect f i r e sources was lim ited or eliminated.
The final phase o f ftre support i s f i r e accompaniment in the depth of
the enemy defenses. A rt il le ry u ni ts that have provided ind irect f i r e
support displace forw ard by echelon in order t o provide continued support.The situation becomes more fluid and the advancing maneuver units may
find themselves attacking enemy defenses from the march, fighting
meeting engagements and conducting pursuit operations. As the situation
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continues to develop the likelihood of ut ili zi ng ar til le ry in a direct fire
role increases. The conduct of the leading artillery battery in a meeting
engagement w i l lbe the same here as discussed ea rl ie r in the chapter. The
accompanying ar til le ry i s also l ike ly t o deploy to direct fi re positions in
reaction to enemy counterattacks.
The Soviet use of fie ld arti l le ry fo r direct f ir e in the offense i s most
prevalent in the meeting engagement and in the art ill er y preparation for a
deliberate attack. The accompanying a rt il le ry w i l lalso have opportunity to
employ direct f i r e as i t fo ll ow s im mediately behind the maneuver forces in
the attack. As the attack succeeds against the enemy forces and the
battlefield becomes more fluid, the incidence of direct fire use of f ie ld
ar til le ry assets w i l l increase.
some of the foundations for the use of direct fire emanated from the
desperate need for the Soviets to stop the German tanks in the early part of
the Great Patr iot ic war. The soviets are extremely fond of ustng historical
situations as examples of how contemporary requtrements mu st also be
met and a large portion of the historical examples that are used for direct
fire relate t o i t s value in defending against tanks. There is no question
that an ar t i l le ry untt i s expected t o stand and flg ht and win in a defensive
engagement w i t h tanks.
There are very few references to f le ld artillery pleces being
integrated into the front line defenses of Soviet maneuver units. I have
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seen no examples of this type o f deployment in current l ite rat ure and i t i s
likely that it occurs only rarely.
The artillery prepares defensive fire plans in the same detail as inoffensive situa tions . Again, tanks, antitank guided mis si le s and antitank
ar ti ll er y are par t of the overall fi r e plan, not just fie ld ar til le ry units. The
most li ke ly enemy course of action i s targeted in the fi re plan with on ca ll
targe ts and shi ft s prepared for other situations. Ar til le ry f i r e i s conducted
by Indirect fire means and starts a t i t s maximum range t o break up enemy
formations approaching friendly positions. As the enemy approaches the
forw ard edge of the defense, maneuver unit weapons assigned to specific
sectors engage the enemy at t he ir maximum eff ect ive range. Indirect
artillery fire continues to move in closer as the enemy approaches to
maximize dest ruction and confusion. Maximum fire pow er is brought t o bear
a t the for wa rd edge of the battlefield.i9 The defense i s organized in depth
and as the enemy forces penetrate or bypass friendly positions the direct
fi re capability of the arti l ler yis brought in to action.The dir ect f i r e capa bilities of fi el d art il le ry weapons are considered
by the Soviets when they organtze thei r defense in depth. Artillery f l r ing
positions in a defensive situ ation are deliberately selected on primary tank
avenues of approach. This i s t o allow the ar ti ll e ry batte ries the
opportunity to destroy enemy tanks in the event they break Into the
defensive depth2O
The specific firing positions of the field artillery units are also
selected wi th the antitank role in mind. The battery is positioned for i t sprimary Indirect fi re rol e w i t h consideration fo r survlvabiltty from enemy
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a rt il le ry fl re. Spec lfic posltlons are also selected fo r each weapon to be
employed fo r dlr ect fl re In the case of an enemy armor at ta ck . The terra ln
should favor safe movement t o the dlrect fl re posltlon and It must allow
fo r good observation out to the maxlmum eff ec tlv e dlrect fi re range of the
weapon. The poslt lo n needs to provlde for the concealment of the art ll le ry
plece to allow the tank to move within range wlthout detectlon of the
a rt ll le ry weapon. At the pos ltlo n reference poln ts are deslgnated, ranges
are predetermined to fa cl ll ta te accurate engagement of tanks and spec lflc
zones of f lr e are allocated. The zones of f l r e Interlock and overlap to allo w
more than one a r ti ll e ry plece t o engage a target at the same time.*'
Fleld ar t i l lery unlts, particularly self-propelled howitzers, may be
deslgnated as part of the manewer unlt's antltank reserve. This reserve
would be called t o reln force manewer un lts a t threatened sectors.
When actlng as part of an antltank reserve in a planned defenslve
movement, i t Is likely that the effectiveness of the direct fire will be
enhanced by combat englneer work. The most common englneer obstacle i sthe mlnefleld. The advantage of havlng advancing tanks distracted by a
mlnefleld at the same t h e that an ar t l l lery unlt i s engaging I t In dlrect
f i r e Is significant22 It makes the tanks more vulnerable by restrlctlng
mo blll ty and enhances the surv lvab lllty of the dlrect fl re a rtill ery .
Although antitank capabllltles of a rt ll le ry In dlrect fi re positions is
by fa r the maJor subJect dlscussed, the Sovlets traln to employ dlrect fl re
agalnst personnel targets as well. The Sovlet a rt il le ry has several
ammunltlon rounds deslgned spec lflcally fo r antltank missions. For
antipersonnel mlsslons though, they sim ply use a hlgh explosive round w i t h
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a time fuze on a short setting. The major problem in effectiveness i s an
accurate determination of the range t o the target and setting the proper
fuze time relative t o the range. In an article from the mtary Heral4 theranges used t o work out optimum fuze settings were between 300 and 500
meters for a 122mm how itzer ~ n i t . 2 ~
The Soviets can be expected t o use their art i l lery for direct f i re
missions when defending in the depth of their positions. Artille ry w i l l
aggressively move out t o meet tank attacks from prepared positions on
primary tank avenues of approach. Although, the primary concern i s an
antitank capability, the Soviets have developed methods t o insure an
effe ctive antipersonnel capability in defense of battery positions as well.
There are several special combat situations discussed by the Soviets
tha t lend themselves t o the use of their field artillery ina direct fi re role.The situations I w i l l discuss here are river crossings, combat in
mountainous terrain, combat in built-up areas and the destruction of
fortifications.
Ju=Q=wThe artil lery support provided for a river crossing is likely t o
involve use of field ar t i l lery in a direct fire role. Organic artillery
weaponsare frequently moved up t o a position where they can engage
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targets on the opposite bank at the crossing sites and support the
establishment of the brldgehead.
In the case of a deliberate river crossing an ar tl ll er y preparatlon Is
planned the same as in any other deliberate attack. The dir ec t fi r e targe ts
are destroyed early In the preparation Wen the preparation flres are then
shifted to the depths of the enemy defense with the crosslng of the
attacking troops, the direct fire artillery weapons stay in place and
continue t o provide a cover of close-In fire as the bridgehead is
established. The pr io ri ty ta rge ts are tanks and antltank weapons which can
cause the most damage to crossing vehlcles. When the arti l ler y battertes
cross the river to support continuation of the attack, they occupy pos itions
on the primary avenue of approach for annor In order to repulse any
counterattack e ff o rt by dire ct f i r e to protect the bridgehead.24
An assault ri ve r crossing w i l lbe characterized in a similar nature t o
a meeting engagement. The ar ti ll e ry batte ry of the forward detachment
w i l l often be employed to provide direct f i r e support at the crossing s it eas the situation Is developed fo r the advanced guard to secure the bridge or
crossing si te fo r the main body.
ombat actions in mountainous terrain have their special
characteristics. Most action i s along valleys but the t ac tic al edge Is to the
force with the advantage of the commandlng helghts. Un its rout ine ly have
exposed flanks and a considerable distance to the next adjacent unit.
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Art i l le ryunits likew ise have disti nc t characteristics f or mountain
warfare. Each battery w i l l most often be performing i t s mission
independently. The l ike lihood fo r using guns in direct f i re i s s ignificantly
increased. The advantage of the effectiveness of di re ct f i r e i s even more
obvious w i t h the increased d i l l cul ty of conducting accurate indire ct f i r e
due t o the tremendous differences in elevation between weapon and target.
The reduced ammunition expediture that results from direct fire i s also
significant because ammunition resupply is more di ff ic u lt to accomplish in
mountainous terrain.25Another problem in the conduct of indirect artil lery lire in the
mountains i s the large dead spaces that cannot be fired into because of
trajectory limitations. A recent ar tic le from the M i l l t a r v Herald
discusses the advantages of using direct fire t o long ranges in the
mountains because of the di ff ic u lt y of indire ct fire.26 Direct fi r e to long
ranges i s conducted by semidirect laying. Wi t h semidirect laying the
direction of the tube (in the horizontal plane) is determined by direct
aiming on the targe t it se lf . The elevation of the tube ( in the vert ica l plane)
i s determined by a calculation of trajectory based on the range to the
targe t and leve ling of the indire ct fi r e sight. Although fi r s t round accuracy
is diminished at the longer ranges, i t can evidently be adjusted t o the
target more quickly than with indirect fire methods under the same
conditions. Although there i s not a specif ic e ffe ctiv e range li m i t discussedfo r using semidirect laying in the mountains, the insinuation i s tha t i f you
can see the target, use it. The comment i s made that v is ib il it y at up t o 10
kilometers is not unusual in the mountains.
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it i s inte res ting t o note the increased frequency o f dlscussions on
the nature of combat in the mountains since the Soviets have gotten
involved in Afghanistan. Some of the discussions of trainin g excercises inthe mountains make the reader wonder i f the action described is real ly jus t
an excercise.
-Combat in built-up areas i s another speclal situation that has
routine application fo r direct f ir e use of artl llery . Although It i s desirable
to avoid and bypass bu ilt-up areas wherever possible, there are sltwtions
when i t cannot be done. The tac tical employment of organic art i l lery in
large built-up area is characterized by decentralizatlon. Batteries w i l l
llkeiy operate as part of an assault group with platoons and indivldual
a rt il le ry pieces given separate and distinc t dlrect fi re missions in varlous
parts of the area of action. ind lrect fi r e cap abilities are at a disadvantage
because of the limited fields of view and difficulties of observing and
adjusting artillery rounds In a ci ty . Because of the sturdiness of large
buildings, requirements are increased f o r heavler caliber artlllery (from
152mm and up) to pe rform di rec t f ir e as well.
The range for direct fire is likely to be very short because of the
limited space available between bulldings for the artlllery to set up.
Moving in so close to a target requires increased consideration of how toprovide fo r surv iva bility of the a rt il le ry plece. One technique i s to place
the target under heavy fire from small arms, machine guns and tanks, i f
possible, wh ile the a rt il le ry piece moves int o positio n and opens fire. In
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many cases i t does not take a great number of hits from a large caliber
weapon fo r the defenders to realiz e th e ir fate. Engineer prepara tion can be
used in some situa tio ns and some cover can be gained from exis ting rubbleo r buildings. It i s not uncommon to move in to the dir ec t f i r e position under
cover of darkness2
The antitank mission fo r a rt ill er y i s also common in the city with
guns placed in covered and concealed dire ct f i r e pos itions to prote ct flanks
and approaches to frie nd ly positions from tank attacks or counterattacks.
situation that i s si mi lar t o the destruction of buildings in a c i ty i s
the requirement fo r destruction of fortifica tions . This situa tion i s easier
from the standpoint of emplacement options for the guns performing the
mis sio n However, the strength of the fo rtif ic at io n w i l lbe greater than a
c it y building. The existence of ar tic les in current Soviet military
literature discussing the techniques for destruction of fortifications
indicates that this is a va lid requirement for use of d ire ct f ir e
The use of heavy caliber weapons (152mm and 203mm) i s directed
fo r effec tive destruction of fo rtificatio ns. Concrete piercing shells w it h
delayed action fuzes are used as the ammunition. The 203mm ar t i l le ry is
considered most ef fe cti ve in the de struction of concrete structures w it h a
w al l thlckness