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HISTORICAL COLLECTIONDIVISION HR70-14 DATE:

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Soviet Commentary on the Capabilities

of US General Purpose Forces

SR RP 74-6

July 1974

COV 189

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYDirectorate of Intelligence

July 1974

RESEARCH PAPER

Soviet Commentary on the Capabilities

of US General Purpose Forces

Key Findings

Soviet analysts--as reported by the militarypress,have favorably appraised some features of US gen-eral purpose forces and programs:

-- the sophisticated technology incorporated incertain weapon systems

-- the flexibility of US general purpose weaponry

-- the professional competence and thoroughtraining of various US units

-- the size of the US military R&D effort andthe speed with which new weapon systems aredevised and deployed to the field

-- the opportunity afforded the US by the Vietnamwar to test and improve its general purposeforces.

Soviet military commentators have spoken disparag-ingly of certain other features:

-- older US weapon systems which, though stilloperational, are judged obsolescent

Comments and queries regarding this paper are welcomed.They may be directed to

Strategic Research

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-- the vulnerability of certain US systems toenemy fire

-- the inadequate kill effectiveness of someUS systems

-- theater. combat service support facilities.

Soviet commentary suggests that US general purposeforces have been evaluated against the standards ofan implicit Soviet model for satisfactory combat per-formance. There are clear indications, however, thatthe criteria used to assess weapon systems do notinclude comparative assessments with their Sovietcounterparts. In several cases, Soviet operationalweapon systems suffer from the same deficiencies forwhich US equipment is criticized. There are alsosome suggestions that Soviet modeling of ground forces

--- interactions contains serious shortcomings and thatthe Soviet scenario for a Central European war re-flects a highly optimistic view of the outcome.

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Introduction

This research paper addresses a series of ques-tions raised by Andrew W. Marshall, Director of NetAssessments, Office of the Secretary of Defense.Mr. Marshall requested an analysis of the character-istics and activities of US general purpose forceswhich in the Soviets' view made the greatest impact-on -the Soviet national security community. He sug-gested that an examination of 'Soviet commentary onAmerican weaponry and technology, combat experienceand peacetime maneuvers, and training and professionalconduct in the general purpose forces might yield in-formation which would identify those elements of USmilitary power which are viewed with particular in-terest by Soviet defense decisionmakers.

This paper discusses the following aspects of thesubject: (1) the institutions and processes -through--which components of the Soviet national security com-munity obtain their data and develop their views onUS military forces; (2) the assessment of US generalpurpose forces which is reflected in the Soviet sce-nario for war in Central Europe; and (3) the substanceof Soviet opinions regarding US ground forces, tacticalair forces, air transport, and general purpose navalforces.

This paper aggregates and analyzes explicit Sovietstatements which appear to reflect perception and eval-uation of US general purpose military capabilities.Soviet commentary in this area is abundant. It con-sists of a large amount of straightforward descriptionof US weapon systems and military activities and aconsiderably smaller number of evaluative statementson these subjects.

The material is derived from Soviet open andclassified published commentaries on military affairs,

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mnation in open military journals is generally consis-tent with that in classified articles and with dataavailable from other sources. Classified commentaries,however, have sometimes been based on informationapparently acquired through Soviet intelligence efforts.The primary research effort for this paper has focusedon data available after 1967.

The substantive evaluations of US general purposeforces contained in Soviet material have been treatedcautiously. Articles in both the classified and un-classified military press are usually written byfield grade officers with expertise in the subjectareas. It is apparent that such commentaries carrysome degree of authority, since they must be approvedfor -publication by higher officials. Explicit evalu-ations of US forces presented in the articles arefrequently identified as the opinions of unnamed"foreign military specialists." Such citations appearto be carefully selected. Therefore, this papertreats opinions presented in this manner as equivalent

- to the approved professional judgments of the Sovietauthors themselves. In addition, this study identifiesimplicit evaluations in Soviet descriptive materialsf T

Contents

Page

Soviet Evaluations of US Military

Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Strengths Ascribed to US Forces . . . . . . . 8

Weaknesses Imputed to US Forces.. . . . . . . 10

Omissions in Soviet Commentary . . . . . . . 11

Soviet View of Central European War as anAssessment of US General Purpose Forces . . . . 13

Soviet Intelligence Collection and Analysis . . . 17

Intelligence Requirements . . . . . . . . . . 17

Intelligence Exploitation . . . . . . . . . . 19

Commentary on Specific US Capabilities:

Ground Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Tank Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Artillery . . . ... . . . . . . ..... 26

Antitank Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Tanks and Artillery . . . . . . . . . .. 28- Antitank Guided Missiles . . . . . . . . 28

Other Antitank Ordnance. . . . . . ... 29Helicopter Gunships in Antitank Role . . 30

Armored Personnel Carriers . . . . . . . . . 31

Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 31

Tactical Surface-to-Surface Missiles . . . . 32

Reconnaissance and ECM Equipment . . . . . . 34

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Page

Air Mobility................. . .. .. .... 35

Helicopter Gunships........ . . ....... 35Transport and ReconnaissanceHelicopters........... . . ... ..... 36

Tactics and Organization..... .. .. ... 37

Training and Professionalism..... .. .. ... 40

Naval Forces.......... ...... ....... .. .. .. ... 42

Ships and Equipment........... . .. .. ... 43

-Aircraft Carriers........... .. ..... 43Frigates, Destroyers, DestroyerEscorts.... ....... .. ..... ..... .... 45Small Combatants........... . .. ..... 46Logistic Support Ships . .. .. .. .... 46Amphibious Ships........... . .. ..... 47Submarines............... . ... .. .... 48

Ordnance.................... .... . .. ..... 49

Mines.................... . ... .. ..... 49Torpedoes................ . ... .. .... 49Cruise Missiles........... . .. .. ... 50

Antisubmarine Warfare.......... . .. ..... 50

Tactics........................ .... .. ..... 52

Amphibious Operations....... .. .. ... 52

Mine Warfare........... . .. .. ..... 53

Tactical Air Forces and Air Transport.... ... ... 53

Weapon Systems............... . ... .. .... 55

Fighter Aircraft........... . .. ..... 55Airborne Missiles.......... .. ...... 57Precision-Guided Munitions..... .. .. ... 58Airborne Electronic Countermeasures .. 59Pilotless Vehicles........... .. .... 59Transport Aircraft........... .. .... 59

Tactics..................... .... . ....... 60

Tactical Air Defense................ . .. ..... 61

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Soviet Evaluations ofUS Military Capabilities

Adversary perception is an important dimensionof the US-USSR military relationship. Assessmentsof US military.capabilities are employed by severalcomponents of the Soviet national security communityin defense planning and policy implementation. TheSoviet weapons development community, for example,uses reports on the status of Western equipment todevise both emulative and offsetting systems. Sovietmilitary planners incorporate judgments of the stra-tegic and tactical concepts which such Western equip-ment reflects as well as interpretations of the meaningof general Western military doctrine into their ownplanning for a possible war in Central Europe. Assess-ments of US military capabilities are also disseminatedthroughout the Soviet Armed Forces as part of a stan-dard process of education and indoctrination. Finally,in the formulation and implementation of defense policy,individual components of the Soviet defense communityappear to find it advantageous to manipulate the degreeof threat presented by the US when lobbying for theirown military programs.

The final judgments on US military forces areintegrated into long-term defense policy planning,into programs for future weapons development and pro-curement, and into guidelines for current deploymentand operation of Soviet forces. Through the analysisof intelligence materials, it is possible both tooutline the Soviet view of US forces and to suggestthose factors which affect the Soviet evaluation.

Soviet commentary on US general purpose militarycapabilities suggests that they are evaluated againstthe standards of an implicit Soviet model of satisfac-tory combat performance. This model appears to bebased on assessments by the Soviets of the limits ofcurrent technologies, their own achievements in weap-ons development, their observations of foreign accom-plishments in particular sectors of military activity,and their projections of reasonable developments in,modern combat. US weapons appear to be rated for

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their survivability, employment flexibility, and killeffectiveness. US forces also appear to be judgedaccording to the proficiency of their personnel.

There are clear indications; however, that USforces are not always rated on the basis of compara-tive assessments with their Soviet counterparts. Inseveral cases, Soviet operational weapon systems areknown to suffer from the same deficiencies for whichSoviet military commentators have criticized similar

US equipment. Moreover, in some cases the Sovietspossess nothing even roughly comparable to the USsystem under critical examination.

Strengths Ascribed to US Forces

1. Soviet military commentators have shown greatadmiration for the technological sophistication ofUS weapon systems and equipment. Antitank missiles,precision guided munitions, influence mines, antiair-craft and antisubmarine armaments on the newer USsurface combatants, and improved fire-control systemsfor tanks, artillery, and aircraft have been citedfor their potential for delivering greater firepowerwith higher accuracy. American ground electroniccountermeasures (ECM) equipment has been credited withcapabilities both to disrupt enemy operations and toreduce the vulnerability of US systems. All aspectsof Western technology are closely followed by Sovietanalysts because of the possibility that new develop-ments could radically change battlefield tactics andalter military doctrine.

2. Soviet authors have consistently acknowledgedthe flexibility of US general purpose weaponry. Theyhave noted improvements to the cross-country capabili-ties of tactical missiles and artillery, the develop-ment of helicopter gunships for fire support opera-tions, the use of helicopter-mounted antitank missiles,and the reliance on airmobile operations--all recog-nized as contributing to the speed with which US fire-power can be concentrated and dispersed in combat.Attack carrier strike units and fighter-interceptorelements have also been cited for the rapidity and

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flexibility with which they can be employed through-out a combat theater. Attack carriers have receivedattention for the great variety of weapon systemswhich they can bring to bear in crisis and combatoperations.

3. Soviet military writers have recognized theprofessional competence and the thorough training ofvarious US forces. The success of US tactical airforces in bombing and.minelaying operations duringthe Vietnam war has been attributed to the realistictraining and skill of the pilots. US tactical missile

-- - forces and airborne units have been classified asformidable opponents because. of their high state ofcombat readines:s. The: meticulous training of specialfiorces, airborne, and airmobile units, and amphibious

- forces, demonstrated in their operations in Vietnam,has been cited. US air transport and sealift capa-bilities and the lengthening of attack carrier on-station time have been noted in contexts which suggestSoviet respect for the proficiency of the personnelinvolved. Commentators have noted the ease withwhich US forces adopted new tactics to meet incremental improvements in North Vietnam and Viet Cong capa-bilities. The potential of the all-volunteer systemfor increasing and stabilizing the number of qualifiedspecialists available to US general purpose forceshas also been discussed.

4. Soviet commentators have shown respect forthe size of the US military research and developmenteffort, the speed with which the US weapons develop-ment community can devise new weapon systems, and therapidity with which such weaponry can be deployed tothe field. The Soviets have been especially impressedby the development of helicopter gunships, improvementsin airborne ECM capabilities, and the rapid evolutionof helicopter-mounted antitank guided missile systems.Their comments indicate admiration for the responsive-ness of the US weapons community to the needs of thearmed forces on the battlefield.

5. Soviet commentators have reflected envy ofthe capability afforded the US by the Vietnam war totest and improve its general purpose military forces.

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----- They have noted that the war stimulated developmentof general purpose weaponry and that US military per-sonnel were given a unique opportunity to obtainfirst-hand combat experience.

Weaknesses Imputed to US Forces

While most evaluations have been positive, thereare some recurring criticisms in Soviet commentaryon US general-purpose military capabilities.

-- 1. The Soviets depreciate many US weapon systemswhich they consider obsolescent. These systems, whichwere developed and initially deployed at least a decadeago, include the M60Al tank, a substantial portionof the Navy's destroyer fleet-and amphibious landingcraft, the Pershing and Sergeant tactical missiles,the MK-46 ASW torpedo, and the Bullpup air-to-surfacemissile. The Soviets appear to reach their assessmentsin three ways:

a. they observe that the US has undertakenthe development of replacement systems;

b. they perceive that aging of the systemhas significantly impaired its operational performance;

c. they judge that the capabilities of thesystem under discussion are not adequate to meet whatthey label as modern combat requirements, a phrasewhich probably reflects the standards of their impliedmodel.

2. The Soviets have frequently faulted US weaponsystems as vulnerable to counterweapons, includingamong these systems tanks, fighter aircraft, pilotlessreconnaissance drones, and reconnaissance, transport,and attack helicopters. Such criticism apparentlyreflects judgments that the weapon systems do notpossess a level of survivability adequate for sus-tained effective combat.

3. The Soviets have criticized several US systemsfor inadequate kill effectiveness, including the Side-

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winder and Sparrow air-to-air missiles and the Shrikeantiradar missile. A few systems, including the Bull-pup, the Shrike, the MK-48 torpedo, and the Vulcanantiaircraft artillery system, have been specificallyfaulted for lacking enough explosive power to disablethe target when a hit is scored.

Omissions in Soviet Commentary

A few important elements of US general purposeforces have not received appreciable critical atten-tion in Soviet commentary. This suggests that theSoviets do not consider them significant and thus arelikely to underrate US capabilities in these areas.

1. Soviet commentators have rarely discussed UStheater combat service support capabilities. Althoughthey have frequently commented favorably on Americanlong-distance airlift and sealift capabilities, theyhave hardly analyzed the administrative, maintenance,medical, supply, and transportation elements associa-ted with US ground and air units. The specialized

- -monthly journal dealing with these subjects--RearServices and Supply of the Soviet Armed Forces--forexample, has not published an article on US theatercombat service support capabilities in the past decade.The monthly Foreign Military Review has recentlypublished one article on NATO mobile ground forceswhich commented on the "complexities of logisticsupport" for these units.

The late Minister of Defense., Marshal Malinov-skiy, addressed this subject in the early Sixties.In a highly classified military publication he de-scribed American logistic support as "cumbersome" andclaimed that the leaner Soviet combat formations wouldenjoy "great advantages" in "conducting operationsunder conditions of nuclear weapons employment."Another Soviet author, in a classified assessment ofa NATO exercise held in the early Sixties, also criti-cized the redundancy, compartmentation, and complexityof NATO's theater support services. In light of in-creased Soviet and American efforts over the pastseveral years to prepare for conventional combat, the

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- continued validity of these judgments is not certain.The recent published reference to NATO's logisticcomplexities does suggest that the Soviets continueto discount these capabilities. This evaluation couldbe influenced by their doctrine for war in CentralEurope, which envisages overwhelming NATO's defensesso quickly that there would be no requirement forsustained logistic support.

2. The Soviets have not commented on the growingantitank potential of tactical air power. Althoughthey have expressed respect for US ground and helicop-ter-borne antitank weapons and have reported favorablythe general features of precision-guided munitions,the commentators have not discussed the increasedantitank capabilities of US tactical aircraft usingcluster bombs (Rockeye) and precision-guided munitions(Maverick, Hobo). This omission probably is simplythe result of inadequate lead time for the appearanceof Soviet critical commentary, as the US capabiliteshave only recently been demonstrated. The success of

- these-US-made systems in Israeli-hand-s-during-the --October 1973 war and the flood of favorable Westerndiscussion that followed are likely to have triggereda careful Soviet examination of these systems whichis yet to be reflected in the commentary.

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- Soviet View of Central European War asan Assessment of US General Purpose Forces

Over the past 15 years the Soviets have developedplans for a possible war in Central Europe, and haveregularly conducted military exercises, in accordance

____with a basic scenario which outlines a r-apid defeatof NATO by the Warsaw Pact. In the early Sixties,Soviet doctrinal writings and Warsaw Pact exerciseshad postulated that nuclear strikes from strategicforces based in the Soviet Union, delivered at the

- beginning of hostilities, would permit advances byPact ground forces at a rate approaching 100 kilo-meters per day. These nuclear strikes would-befollowed by a sustained and rapid advance of mobile,heavily armored Pact ground formations. In a seriesof high-intensity assaults., these units would. beexpected to break through NATO's forward defenses..and overrun Western Europe within 14 to 20 days.

Since the mid-Sixties the Soviet scenario hasadded a nonnuclear phase to the opening stage ofhostilities and adopted a lower estimate of the rate*of advance of Warsaw Pact forces. -During the non-nuclear phase Soviet planners expect massed Pactformations to assault NATO defenses, rapidly exploitthe resulting breaches in the NATO lines, and rollback NATO forces at a rate of 30 to 50 kilometers

____ per day. In the subsequent nuclear phase, Pact move-ments across Europe would be expected to accelerateto 60 to 80 kilometers per day, a rate of advancebelow- that, projected in the early Sixties.. Despitethese refinements, Soviet plans still anticipate arelatively quick triumph by the Warsaw Pact.

This scenario may reflect the influence of two dif-ferent frameworks of analysis and judgment. The Sovietplan may be derived from an examination of the rela-tive combat capabilities of the -Pact and NATO. Inthis case, Soviet assessments could be drawn fromdetailed force-against-force analyses, from intuitiveprofessional judgments, and from study of NATO doc-trine and exercises.. Alternatively, the basic scen-ario may represent an idealized product of the norms

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established by traditional Soviet military doctrine.In this case, the plan would simply assume the suc-cessful completion of individual operations and wouldscarcely be linked to any assessment of NATO capabili-ties. The existing evidence is insufficent to supportconclusively either interpretation.

Soviet classified military writings include manyexplicit claims that aspects of the projected theatercampaign have been based on "experience gained in com-bat training exercises, computer calculations, researchprojects, and war games." Many of these activities.have been identified as the work of higher militaryacademies of the Ministry of Defense.

Although analytical studies are undoubtedly under-taken in support of Soviet military planning, evidencesuggests that the simulations and mathematical modelshave serious shortcomings. One commentator in aclassified military journal indicated that Sovietinteractive computer analyses of opposing groundforces were at an elementary stage of development.He noted that the results of-simulated battles whichhad been held were "insufficiently conclusive, debat-able, and sometimes even. doubtful" because of disa-greements over terms of reference and the poor qualityof the data used. A recent exchange of opinions pub-lished in a limited-circulation military journal wasmarked by disagreement over the development of the

-_ basic equation for calculatin the rate of advanceof ground_ forces.

indicated that Sovietmodeling of NATO general purpose force capabilitieswas rudimentary. Thus it is doubtful that Soviet pro-jections regarding the likely course of a war inCentral Europe reflect complex net assessments ofWarsaw Pact and NATO forces.

Soviet estimates of likely victory may representlargely intuitive professional judgments which roughlyweigh the size, deployments, and doctrines of NATOand Warsaw Pact forces. Soviet assessments in thisarea could easily be influenced by careful study ofNATO's major military exercises. The Soviets have

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monitored these exercises closely and often have pro-duced detailed classified critiques. These commen-taries have noted that since the mid-Sixties NATOscenarios for the biennial Fallex and Wintex serieshave uniformly depicted steady Soviet advances of 30to 50 kilometers per day during the opening, conven-tional phase of war.

The Soviets are aware that the NATO exerciseshave consistently called for the selective use ofnuclear weapons to stem the Pact's advance. Theirassessments note that this selective use is expectedto fail and that NATO then employs a large-scalenuclear attack throughout the theater. Soviet plan-ners realize that this nuclear attack is intended tohalt the Pact offensive and to permit the initiationof a successful NATO counteroffensive. The assess-ments of NATO and Warsaw Pact general purpose forcecapabilities which are implicit in NATO exercisescenarios could easily be assimilated by Soviet ex-perts into their own planning process.

The Soviet outline for victory over NATO in theCentral European theater may also reflect arbitrarilymandated objectives. Since the mid-Thirties Sovietmilitary doctrine has tended to define the course ofcombat operations within a relatively rigid frame-work of traditional norms and prescribed planninggoals. According to these precepts, massed armoredformations would undertake bold offensive actions,seize the initiative, and overwhelm their opponents.

Soviet doctrine in the nuclear age continues toreflect these standards, but the military plannershave raised the anticipated rate of advance of Pactforces, specifically noting that the nuclear battle-field would be highly conducive to the assault-break-through-exploitation doctrine. Soviet commentatorshave stated that the rate of advance must be fastenough to prevent the regrouping of NATO forwardforces, and the planners may also have intended arate which would ensure the complete occupation ofWestern Europe before NATO was fully mobilized andbefore the US could dispatch substantial reinforce-ments.

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- Classified military writings of the early Sixtiessuggest that the rate of advance represents an arbi-

-_ trarily ,selected planning norm. Most writers simplyasserted without analysis that rates of 80 to 100kilometers per day were to be maintained during theoffensive. A few authors noted that such speedswere unrealistic and not likely to be achieved ifPact forces encountered serious enemy resistance.The 100-kilometer rate was nevertheless identifiedby one author as the "requirement of the Minister ofDefense."

- Classified writings of the late Sixties suggestthat these rates continue to represent planning ob-jectives rather than the products of force interac-tion studies. A senior military commander statedthat Warsaw Pact forces could "hardly count" onattaining -the prescribed 70 to 80 kilometer dailyrate of advance since they could be expected tosuffer large losses from NATO nuclear strikes. An-.other commander noted that during Soviet exercises

- - prescribed -rates of advance had "-often--failed---to - -coincide with actual capabilities." He claimedthat incorrect estimates of the influence of ruggedand mountainous terrain accounted for frequent dis-ruptions in the timetables of exercises. Anotherauthor discussed engineering work required toassure the accomplishment of the "prescribed rateof advance."

In sum, the Soviet scenario for a war in Europeprobably is an admixture of both the traditionaldesired course of operations and a highly confidentdepiction of the outcome of such a war. NATO - War-saw Pact comparative evaluations which can be inferredfrom these plans may be based on only the numericaladvantages which the Pact enjoys in the forward areas.It is doubtful that the depreciation of NATO impliedin the Soviet scenarios represents a rigorous netassessment of US general purpose force capabilities.

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Soviet Intelligence Collection

and Analysis

Intelligence Requirements

-The collection efforts directed against US generalF purpose forces by the Soviet intelligence community

fall into two categories: routine monitoring of orderof battle information, exercises, deployments, andweapons characteristics; and specialized intelligence-gathering operations undertaken during crises and inresponse to unique collection opportunities. Theseefforts exploit the full range of Soviet collectioncapabilities, including agents, communication inter-cepts, satellite photography, and unclassified Westernpublications.

Routine monitoring of US order of battle and.tactical data is. coordinated with requirements devel-oped by several elements of the defense establish-ment. Specific requests by individual agencies areorganized into aggregate lists.which are distributed.to components of the intelligence community for collec-tion. For example, the General Staff disseminates toWarsaw Pact members, apparently on an annual basis, acomprehensive list of intelligence requirements relatedto US and NATO forces.

The General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate(GRU) also issues guidelines to its signal intelli-gence units and local agents, which designate signif-icant areas of information connected with US and NATO

- forces. Local GRU Sigint units routinely dispatchdata to GRU headquarters on the status and activitiesof US theater forces in Europe and US general purposenaval forces.

a standing requirement to report NATO combatreadiness checks immediately to GRU headcuarters inMoscow- data gathered

___ from Sigint sources on tactical nuclear missiles, USand NATO higher command personnel, scenarios andcritiques of US and NATO exercises, and the US posi-tion on MBFR (mutual and balanced force reductions)were routinely summarized and dispatched to Moscow.

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high priority was assigned to theCollection of ~dt n the US Seventh Fleet.

Field agents working for the GRU and the KGBapparently gather similar information. The GeneralStaff has used clandestine sources to obtain NATOexercise scenarios and expects to rely on agent intel-ligence during a war in Central Europe to furnish.adequate advance warning of a NATO decision to usenuclear weapons. Soviet military advisers attachedto North Vietnamese units probably furnished a sub-stantial portion of the observations on US aerialtactics which have appeared in classified Sovietmilitary publications. Soviet military attachestake full advantage of invitations extended by USservices to observe military forces and equipmentin action and gather other relevant military datafor dispatch to the GRU.

The routine collection of foreign scientific andtechnological military data is handled in a similarmanner. The GRU and KGB compile and disseminatecollection requirements concerning developments inUS military technology. Design bureaus and factoriesinvolved with weapons development and production areable to request technical data on US military equip-ment through their parent ministries. These require-ments are usually coordinated by the Military-Indus-trial Commission (VPK) and then levied on informationcollection agencies. In accordance with guidelinesfurnished to the field, GRU and KGB agents procuresamples of US weapons and ordnance, operations manualspublished by the armed services, and manufacturers'information on selected equipment. Soviet militaryattaches and special military advisers stationed incrisis or combat areas endeavor to gather informationand samples of US weapons. For example, Soviet mili-tary advisers attached to North Vietnamese units wererequired to collect US equipment both on their owninitiative and through formal liaison channels es-tablished with the -North Vietnamese government.

Soviet intelligence collection agencies haveshown heightened sensitivity to the activities of USforces during periods of international-crisis. At

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the outbreak of the 1973 M~iddle East war, a contin-gency plan calling for increased Middle East collec-tion and reporting was implemented by at least one

U Sigint regiment in a Soviet military district.During the war, Sigint units in this district were

0 ordered to increase the surveillance of military andcivil air transport flights which might carry volun-

- teer personnel and materiel for Israel. Shortlyafter the US announced on 25 October that its forceshad been placed on alert, the Soviets stepped upSigint collection, especially by units in those areas

___ of the USSR nearest the Middle East. These unitswere ordered to go on double shifts

Soviet collectors also engage in large-scale,coordinated intelligence-gathering efforts in responseto unique collection opportunities. Although littlecoordination of efforts normally exists between GRUand KGB field agents, during the latter part of theVietnam war,-about 1972, the Politburo sanctionedvigorous joint efforts by the-intelligence agenciesto gather all available technical data on US aircraftshot down over North Vietnam. There is evidence thata major intelligence-gathering effort, sanctioned bythe Politburo, was undertaken behind Egyptian linesafter the conclusion of the October 1973 Middle Eastwar.

Intelligence Exploitation

The data gathered by intelligence collectors onUS military forces are analyzed by several agencieswhich furnish information to the Soviet nationalsecurity community. The assessments made by thesecomponents are disseminated through many channels tointerested recipients in the community.

In extensive, parallel efforts, several Sovietagencies engage in systematic extraction of materialson US military forces from open publications. Somedefense industrial ministries and their designbureaus maintain open-source data files on Westernweapon systems relevant to their areas of interest.

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The Ministry of Defense engages in a similar efforton a larger scale: the Central Institute of Military

-- Technical Information and scientific and technicalsections within each of the military services main-tain their own information systems on developments inWestern technology and tactics. Departments of mili-tary-technical information in scientific researchinstitutes and certain academic institutes, mostnotably the USA Institute and the Institute of WorldEconomics and International Relations (IMEMO), alsocollect data from US open publications on Americanweapons development and US national security policy.

The results of this careful monitoring of opensource materials are seen in the numerous articleson US military activities carried in Soviet militarypublications of both the unclassified and restricted-circulation types. Commentaries on US weapons pro-grams and military tactics are frequently written bymilitary journalists and members of academic insti-tutes and are commonly attributed to materials "fromthe foreign press." These materials are the basicsource of information on US capabilities for mostmembers of the Soviet Armed Forces.

the articles and foreigntranslations published in the limited-circulationmonthlviareign Military News provided

|background on the US military. Thispublication is frequently cited in classified mili-tary documents as the source of data on Westernmilitary forces.

Similar data are published in unclassified mono-graphs on miltiary subjects and in textbooks used atmilitary training institutions. Defense productionministries prepare a variety of publications whichabstract foreign literature in their areas of exper-tise. Books and articles on US forces and defensepolicy are published by members of the academic insti-tutes.

The open-source materials on US military programscollected in the Institute of World Economics and In-ternational Relations have been used as the basis forstudies prepared for a more limited audience. Staff

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members of the Institute have employed these resources-- to conduct exercises simulating international negotia-

tions, the results of which are forwarded to the appro-priate departments of the Central Committee. A specialclosed section staffed by military personnel is reportedto have utilized the Institute's unclassified data onmilitary matters in combination. with Soviet attachereports, to respond to requirements for-analis__siub-mitted b the General Staff.

studies on US military affairs done in the closedsection may cover a variety of subjects related to

-- defense policies and weapon systems.

Classified descriptive data on US weapon systemsare prepared in Ministry of Defense facilities foruse within the Ministry, in the weapons developmentcommunity, and at military schools. The CentralInstitute of Military Technical Information, forexample, issues reports on foreign arms to componentsof the Ministry of Defense and the defense industries.A typical report contains a detailed description ofa system, photographs, maps indicating its probabledeployment, an evaluation of its capabilities andrecommendations for tactics to counter it.

the use of a 50-pageSoviet book on the C-5A transport at the Antonovdesign bureau.the existence ofclassified studies on many US weaponsystems which are used by students at militaryacademies in research on tactical problems.

a 40-page book which described andanalyzed the capabilities of the US Hawk surface-to-air missile system for his own tactical problem.

similar infor-mation on other weapon systems.

More sophisticated analyses of current weaponsprograms, trends in weapons development, tactics, andUS and NATO exercises are prepared within the GeneralStaff. Most of these reports are based in part ondata obtained clandestinely from the West, in crisisor combat areas, or through Sigint resources. The re-sults have appeared in classified military periodicals,in articles analyzing US or "enemy" capabilities in

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- discussions of the conduct of theater operations andspecific tactics of battlefield engagement. TheCentral Institute of Military Technical Informationhas prepared forecasts of foreign weapons developmentin accordance with what its members perceive to be*the objectives of the foreign powers. The highermilitary schools of the Ministry of Defense perform-similar work, preparing assessments and projectionson specific types of military equipment.

The products of General Staff and similar analyseshave sometimes been contained in detailed briefingdata periodically distributed to active units ofitlhearmed forces.|

~a 302 to50-page secret information bulletinwhich summarized and evaluated air combat operationsin Vietnam was received regularly.

General Staff assessments of US military forceshave also been distributed to- the members of theWarsaw Pact. The speeches of the chief of staff ofthe Warsaw Pact to the Pact Military Council often

r-ibimtddT5Whe Soviet General Staf f on the effec-tiveness of US and other NATO ground forces. TheGeneral Staff has also prepared detailed analysesof NATO exercises and supplied them to Pact members.

Elements of the weapons analysis, R&D, and pro-duction community also make use of materials origi-nally acquired by agent sources. The Bureau ofForeign Military Literature in the Ministry of Defensedistributes documents and diagrams of foreign originat the request of factories. The appropriate depart-ments of the State Committee for Science and Technol-ogy have received samples of US military equipmentfor analysis. One committee member claimed that hisdepartment examined parts of an F-111 aircraft. TheAntonov aircraft design bureau used data books pre-.pared by the Boeing Corporation on the 707 and 727passenger aircraft.

the receipt of data on Boeing and Lock-heed airplanes. which had been acquired clandestinely

- from sources in Great Britain and West Germany.

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Members of the Engineering Research Instituteattached to the Military Engineering Academy atKuybyshev used the data books prepared by the USmanufacturer of the Bark and Lark amphibious vehiclesas the developed a similar craft.

Soviet forces in Eas ern urope havegreat amounts of data, largely in the form of Depart-ment of Defense manuals, on US military hardware.

Commentary on Specific US Capabilities:

Ground Forces

Warsaw Pact military planners apparently haveemployed both quantitative and qualitative criteriato evaluate the relative effectiveness of Westernground forces. Using these standards, they haveconsistently rated both US and FRG forces as the mostimportant components of NATO_. .. There is very-littleevidence to suggest that the Soviets have alsoassessed the comparative effectiveness of NATO andWarsaw Pact forces. However,

the Soviets consider the Bundeswehrand their own armies to be the main battle forces inCentral Europe.

quantity of equip-ment, mobilization capability, quality of weaponry,

-- combat readiness, and combat experience as criteriawhich have been used by military planners to assessthe strength of the Warsaw Pact's potential adver-saries, instructors atthe Military Diplomatic Academy in Moscow consistentlycited quantity rather than quality of forces as thestandard of judgment used to evaluate the balancebetween NATO and the Pact. This comment is consistentwith the heavy emphasis on the need to achieve numer-ical superiority along selected axes of attack whichpervades Soviet mililtary doctrine.

somewhat more sop is icated efforts ave been under-taken by the Warsaw Pact to assess NATO ground forces.

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theGeneral Staff prepared monthly evaluations of selected

--- NATO forces, including the US Seventh Army. Thesereports contained assessments of equipment, combatreadiness of forces, and quality of personnel. Thegrades assigned. apparently were consistent withstan,-dards established by Soviet planners.

the existence ofratings prepared by the Soviet General Staff whichwere based on evaluations of Western equipment andpersonnel, drawn from World War II and Korean War data.

estimates, En 1968 theGeneral Staff rated US combat readiness at

4 on a scale of 5. in 1970Soviet assessments assigned the a measure of effec-tiveness of .8 on a scale of 1. In the latter case,the West German Army was given the highest evaluation.

The Soviets' respect for the Bundeswehr appearsto rest upon their judgments regarding its size andquality as well as their previous combat experience

- with German armies.Soviet military commanders have a high opinion

of the quality of West German reserves and attachgreat importance to the FRG's rapid mobilizationcapability.

Tank Warfare

Tanks. Soviet military commentators and commandpersonnel have frequently asserted that Soviet armoredforces are superior to those of the US. Thisopinion has been confidentl expressed by Sovietgeneral officers

JThis assessment appearsto be based on three factors. First, the WarsawPact, according to classified Soviet documents, credits

- itself with an overall superiority in the number oftanks and artillery available against NATO. Second,Soviet military doctrine provides for the rapid mar-shaling of numerically superior mechanized artilleryand armored forces at the outbreak of hostilities

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1A-

along a few selected sectors of the front, where theyare expected to be capable of achieving a breakthroughof NATO's forward defenses. Third, the Soviets havebeen critical of US tanks. Marshal P. A. Rotmistrov,a frequent defender of the role of armored forces inmodern combat, has claimed in the open press thatSoviet tanks are "superior in performance and fire-power to the best Western and American models," al-though he has failed to note the criteria used toreach this conclusion.

Some Soviet writers have commented on the capa-bilities of specific tank models in the US inventory.Authors in the open military press, for example, havesuggested that the M60Al is obsolescent. A 1971article in the monthly NCO journal (Starshina-Serzhant)concerning the abortive US - West German MBT-70 tankproject referred to US "dissatisfaction" with thecombat capabilities of the M60Al. Rotmistrov hasstated that the West German Leopard tank surpassesthe M60Al in speed, cruising range, and roadability,and has noted its lower profile. Several writers inRed Star, the daily newspaper of the Ministry of Defense,have also noted the merits of the Leopard, and theSoviets apparently regard it as the best tank in theNATO inventory. Nevertheless, in the context ofWestern efforts to improve the firepower of tanks,other commentators in the open press have mentionedUS efforts to modernize the M60A1 by installing newballistic computation equipment, improved rangefinders,and an improved cannon stabilization system (which

-- permits the vehicle to fire while moving). They havealso noted the larger crew compartment, which permitsthe M60Al to carry more ammunition.

Commentators in the Soviet classified press havedescribed a dual-purpose conventional shell and mis-sile launcher as the optimal tank weapon system. Onearticle cited the 152mm cannon mounted on the M60A2tank, which is capable of firing both conventionalshells and Shillelagh missiles, as part of an argu-ment for the development of dual-purpose gun barrelsfor Soviet tanks. The author predicted that the mainbattle tanks of most Western nations would be armedwith both cannons and missiles by the end of the

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-- Seventies and that such armaments would enhancetheir antitank capabilities.

Commentators in the open press, however, havedepreciated the utility of dual-purpose weaponry onUS tanks. Rotmistrov has said that tank-launchedmissiles do not now have the capability to competewith conventional tank cannons. He and authors inthe monthly Military Herald and in Starshina-Serzhanthave cited West German arguments against arming newtanks with antitank missiles, including the assertionthat battles in Central Europe will be fought atranges too close to make the use of missiles feasible.A writer in Military Herald also has disparaged theUS emphasis on dual-purpose armament.

Military commentators have followed with interestUS development of the M551 Sheridan light amphibioustank. Although they have generally conceded thepoor performance of light tanks during World War II,they have noted that the Sheridan is air-transportableand can be delivered by parachute. When these factorsare combined with an amphibious capability, "the mostimportant characteristic for a tank's mobility," aRed Star commentator has asserted, the result is avehicle that can increase the mobility of groundforces. Writers have also called attention to theSheridan's 152mm dual-purpose gun. Rotmistrov hasnoted that the Sheridan has been combat-tested bythe US in the Vietnam war, but no Soviet commentatorhas presented an assessment of its performance there.

Artillery. theinstructors at e i itary Diplomatic Academy inMoscow generally described US artillery weapons asmore flexible, mobile, and mechanized than Sovietmodels. Open-source.writings have cited the additionof 155mm and 175mm self-propelled field guns to theinventory of US forces in Europe as. an example ofcontinuing US attention to the improvement of self-propelled field artillery. A recent classified arti-cle stressed the mobility and firepower of US artillery,noting that most US artillery was self-propelled, hencedifficult to destroy in combat. It credited US artil-lery with great firepower because of its ability to

- fire nuclear projectiles.

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Soviet commentators have closely followed theperformance of US artillery in Vietnam. Writers inboth the open and classified press have observed thatthe US adapted well to the rough terrain and jungleof Vietnam, which hampered artillery mobility, byestablishing fixed bases for fire support and devel-oping new types of long-range ammunition. Both openand classified sources have also cited the use ofhelicopters to transport light-weight artillery spe-cifically developed by the US for use in Vietnam. Aclassified article said that artillery was moved byhelicopter to "almost impossible locales," whileothers expressed respect for the frequency and rapidity

with which artillery could be shifted by helicopter.

_______ ISoviet commentators were generally impressed bythe performance of the 105mm M102 howitzer in Vietnam,though some have pointed out deficiencies. A Red Starwriter cited the M102 as an example of an improvedartillery system which maintained its firing rangeand operational reliability despite a significant re-duction in weight. This author noted that itis light-and small, and therefore helicopter-transportable, andthat it can be easily turned 360 degrees, making itpossibl-e to shift fire quickly in any direction. AMilitary Herald writer has called attention to itslow-pressure tires, which enhance cross-country maneu-verability, and to the rapidity with which it canbe readied for firing. This author also claimed,however, that the sight of the M102 often malfunctions,its carriage float plate is weak, and its tube muzzle

- face rapidly breaks down. A classified article hasnoted that the US continues to distribute this weaponto its ground forces for use in airmobile operations.

Writers in the open press have reported in generalterms Western efforts to improve fire control systems.A Red Star commentator has noted the existence of-computers which can calculate optimum firing positionsfrom coded data provided by forward spotters. Classi-fied articles have cited the ability of the US Tacfireautomated field artillery control system to acceleratethe processing of target information, reducing thetime required to execute a combat mission.

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Antitank Capabilities

Tanks and Artillery. Soviet commentators haveshown great respect for both the quality and effectivedeployment of NATO antitank capabilities, a substantialportion of which are US-developed weapon systems. Theauthor of a 1973 Military Herald article cited the"excellent armor-piercing capability" and the "goodrange of effective fire" of most systems in the NATOinventory.distress within the Soviet military over preliminaryreports from Arab countries attesting to the effec-tiveness of US-supplied Israeli antitank equipmentduring the October 1973 war.

The Military Herald article cited above also- described the placement of NATO antitank weapons as

providing "a sufficiently effective barrier in thepath of advancing troops." Classified articles alsohave given attention to the positioning of NATO'santitank systems. One author noted the ease withwhich individual commanders could maneuver and rein-force antitank defenses in threatened areas. -Another

---- stressed the "serious ressistance" which Soviet unitswould be likely to encounter from NATO antitank sys-tems, even after a nuclear strike on Western defen-sive positions. Classified writings have stated thatthe effectiveness of Soviet forces depends to a greatextent on an accurate perception of the threat fromhostile antitank weapons. It is clear from thesesources that military commentators are closely moni-toring qualitative and quantitative improvements toNATO antitank weapons.

Antitank Guided Missiles. Most Soviet militarycommentators have been impressed b Western antitanguided missiles (ATGM).instructors at the Military- ip omatic Academy inMoscow evaluated as "very good" the Shillelagh ATGMwhich is fired from the dual-purpose 152mm gun carried

-- by the M60A2 and the Sheridan tanks. A classifiedarticle reiterated this assessment, naming theShellelagh in a discussion which noted that missileswere "good antitank weapons." This author assertedthat the Shillelagh was ineffective at distances of

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TOPECLT

less than 600 meters but concluded that this defi-12 ciency did not seriously compromise its utility as an

antitank weapon because the 152mm cannon can alsofire a conventional round. Unclassified monographshave also noted that missiles are potent antitankweapons when used against targets at ranges greaterthan 600 meters. However, a Military Herald writeradded that their low speed and the requirement forcontinuous guidance to the target seriously compro-mised the usefulness of these missiles. A 1972 RedStar commentary was critical of the Shillelagh be-cause of its limited rate of fire and the absence ofa fully automatic guidance system, although the guid-ance systems of Soviet antitank missiles are even lessautomatic.

Numerous open-press articles have expressedrespect for the -TOW wire-guided ATGM. One commenta-tor in a 1971 Military Herald article, while referringonly to its ground launch capabilities, called ita "powerful meansof combating tanks." A 1973 RedStar discussion referred to.US.tests which demon-strated the greatly improved accuracy and range ofthe TOW in comparison with first-generation ATGMs.

-It is clear from other open-source material thatthe Soviets believe the West will develop an ATGMwith a fully automatic guidance system. They appar-ently anticipate that this missile will surpass theTOW in accuracy, firepower, and range.

-- Other Antitank Ordnance. Writers in the openpress have fully acknowledged the effectiveness ofprecision-guided aerial munitions in combat andhave noted US developments in this field. However,no comment has appeared in either the open or clas-sified press which would convey the Soviet evaluationof these weapons, 'including the Walleye and Mavericktelevision-guided bombs, as antitank weapons. Pre-liminary US data from the October 1973 Middle Eastwar indicate that the Israelis had success with boththe Walleye and Maverick against Soviet tanks. (Sovietcommentary on US precision-guided munitions is dis-cussed-in greater detail in the section on TacticalAir Forces and Air Transport, page 53.)

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Soviet military commentators believe that mine-fields "continue to be effective weapons on the bat-tlefield." Authors in Red Star and Military Heraldhave mentioned US and FRG efforts to improve the easeand speed with which mines can be laid and USefforts to improve remote-control detonation. Concernfor the problems of minefields is also reflected inSoviet efforts to improve mine-clearing equipmentand in the greater deployment of such equipment inSoviet forces than in NATO forces.

Helicopter Gunships in Antitank Role. Sovietmilitary officers and commentators have clearly beenimpressed by the US capability to combine helicoptersand missiles into an antitank system. This abilityhas been attributed in the open military press toimprovements in both the characteristics of second-generation antitank missiles and the combat capabili-ties of helicopter gunships. Classified articleshave indicated that this capability "complicates" theSoviet ability to destroy enemy antitank forces duringan offensive. These sources note that US helicoptershave demonstrated their ability to take advantage ofterrain cover, lie in wait, and attack by surprise.Open.sources have noted the effectiveness of the AH-lGHuey Cobra helicopter armed with 20mm guns and 70mmrockets against Soviet medium and amphibious tanksin Laos. A classified article, in a highly favorableevaluation of operations by Iroquois helicopter gun=ships in Vietnam, noted that they were armed with

__- missiles. Both open and classified sources observethat the effectiveness of US antitank helicoptershas been greatly improved by modifying them to carrythe TOW missile.

Soviet military planners are clearly interestedin ascertaining the ways in.which helicopter-borneantitank weapons could be used against their armoredforces in. Europe. A.Red Star commentator has calledattention to US tests in which TOW missiles fired

- from helicopters demonstrated great accuracy. Openand classified sources have noted that helicoptersare more maneuverable than tanks, and one MilitaryHerald article cited the success of US helicopteractivity against tanks in Laos as evidence that air-

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mobile forces could be used successfully for thatpurpose. Colonel M. Belov, a prolific Soviet writeron US experience with airmobile operations, has citedUS and FRG computer simulations portraying the effec-tiveness of helicopters against tanks. Belov haseven asserted that helicopters were superior to tanksas combat vehicles. Other commentators have notedthe modernization of US helicopter gunships in Europeto use TOWs and US efforts to organize and train air-mobile ant itank__unitinEuronae.

Soviet general officers informally expressed conster-nation with the successes of US helicopter-launchedguided missiles in Vietnam.

Armored Personnel Carriers

Open and classified Soviet military publicationshave rated the Mll3 armored personnel carrier favor-ably. An older classified -article called att-en-tionto its size and weight and listed the Mll3 as one of

-- the "more successful" foreign APCs. In the openpress, Rotmistrov has cited its successful use inVietnam, especially for combat operations -in swampyand mountainous terrain, and has referred to its"comparatively good combat qualities." Rotmistrovalso noted that several modifications were made inthe vehicle for use in Vietnam, including the instal-lation of two additional 7.62mm machine guns, im-provements in its off-road traveling capability, andstrengthening of armor along the bottom and sides ofthe body. A more recent classified article hasnoted, however, that the Mll3's design does not per-mit infantrymen traveling within the vehicle to fireon enemy forces.

Nuclear Weapons

Commentators in both classified and open militarypublications have consistently claimed that the UnitedStates has approximately 7,000 nuclear warheads stored

__ in Western Europe, with the bulk of them located in

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West Germany. Other classified Soviet material con-cedes to NATO a substantial advantage in numbers oftactical nuclear weapons available for use in CentralEurope. Soviet writers have claimed that the US iscurrently engaged in efforts both to increase thequantity and to improve the quality of its tacticalnuclear weapons and their delivery systems. USefforts to design smaller and lighter tactical nuclearwarheads have been stressed. One classified articlehas stated that the US already has the nuclear materialneeded to do this and is currently directing its re-search efforts to development of new 155mm and .175mmatomic shells.

Warsaw Pact critiques of NATO exercises indicatethat the Pact expects NATO's earliest use of nuclearweapons to be selective. It is also noted however,that these strikes would be insufficient and thatNATO would soon be forced to shift to massive nuclearstrikes to stem a Pact breakthrough.

(Soviet commentary on the capabilities of UStactical nuclear delivery systems is reviewed in the

---- sections on Artillery, page 26, Tactical Surface-to-Surface Missiles, below, and Fighter Aircraft,page 55.)

Tactical Surface-to-Surface Missiles

Soviet commentators have closely followed USwork on tactical surface-to-surface missiles. Openand classified articles have cited the obsolescenceof the Honest John and Sergeant missiles and havecalled attention to plans to replace them with theLance missile. Military writers have been impressedby the lighter weight and greater mobility of theLance, and have noted that it can be transported byairplane and helicopter and be delivered by parachute.

Soviet authors have also been impressed by themobility of the Pershing lA. They have indicatedthat the placement of its components on wheeled,rather than tracked, vehicles increases its cross-country mobility. A classified source claimed that

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the Pershing could undertake a significant portionof the missions now assigned to tactical air forces.

General assessments of US missiles in the openpress have been favorable. A Red Star commentatorin 1970, for example, noted that "the combat capa-bilities of (US) guided missiles have been consider-ably improved in recent years." A more critical,classified article noted that US tactical missilesdid "not meet modern requirements," an assessmentwhich suggests that the Soviets had evaluated somesystems against an implied model of satisfactoryperformance.

Classified military commentaries have examinedUS procedures and reaction times associated with thefiring of tactical nuclear missiles. In 1970, Sovietwriters claimed that the high state of combat readi-ness continually maintained for these weapons wouldhamper Soviet discovery of US launch preparations.Nevertheless, these military authors argued thatbecause of the time-consuming nature of the NATOrelease process, Soviet intelligence would probablyreceive timely warning of a decision to employ nuclearweapons.

Military writers have carefully studied thelaunch preparation times required for Pershing,Pershing lA, and Sergeant missiles. Using these toestablish norms, they have outlined new launch pro-cedures for Soviet tactical missile units which could,if accepted, reduce launch preparation times belowthose of the US and "significantly" increase thechances of destroying US tactical missiles beforethey are launched.

Other recent classifed Soviet material indicatesthat both the military and military-industrial compo-nents of the national security community have demon-strated great interest in discovering US safety pro-cedures and the capabilities of safety equipmentassociated with the prevention of unauthorized oraccidental use of nuclear weapons. In spite of redun-dancy and automation, Soviet commentators in theclassified press have described their own command and

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TDP&ERT

'I

control systems as subject to breakdown, and some4 writers have expressed concern about the possibilityof unauthorized firings of nuclear systems.

Reconnaissance and ECM Equipment-4 Both open and classified Soviet military writings

have shown respect for US reconnaissance capabilities.Classified sources have cited the excellent ability-of the US to discover both troop locations .and opera-tional objectives by monitoring communications fromSoviet command posts. Writers in Starshina-Sershantand Red Star have rated highly the performance ofthe AN/PPS-4 ground radar *set in Vietnam and the

___ effectiveness of-the AN/MPQ-4A forgquickly detectingenemy firing positions. A classified article hasnoted that the latter device cannot scan in alldirections. Nevertheless, .a Red Star commentatorhas observed that without adequate radar deceptionmeasures, it is impossible to conceal troop andequipment movements -from these systems.

--- Soviet commentators in both the open and classifiedmilitary press have carefully reviewed the capabilitiesof US sensor systems' developed during the Vietnam war.They have noted that the jungle conditions of Vietnamseverely compromised .the usefulness of infraredreconnaissance systems and stimulated the development

-~ of new equipment to remedy .this-deficiency. Writersin Starshina-Serzhant and Red Star have describedthe White Igloo system of seismic -sensors and trans-mitters in Vietnam as-a new effort of the US to gainadequate warning of the presence of enemy forces .These commentators claimed that the effectiveness ofthe system was inhibited by the inability of theseismic sensors to distinguish between legitimateand illegitimate targets, a deficiency which can.lead to the .successful use of false targets by enemy

_forces. The system was also criticized for its reli-ance on :airborne relay stations,.which were vulnerableto anti-aircraft weapons.

Classified writings have acknowledged' the capa-bility of US ECM equipment to jam both Soviet communi-

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-wts ve e

cation networks and radar stations used for reconnais-sance. They have stressed US efforts to prepare itsforces for electronic warfare and have claimed thatWarsaw Pact forces have not reached a comparablelevel of competence.

Air Mobility

Soviet writers in both the classified and openmilitary press have reviewed the technical capabili-ties and performance of US helicopter gunships andtransport helicopters and the tactics of US airmobileoperations. Although some authors have noted defi-ciencies in equipment and problems in the US air-mobile experience, other writers, including ColonelM. Belov, have written highly favorable evaluations.In classified military writings, some commentatorshave cited successful US helicopter operations inVietnam to support arguments for increased develop-ment and use of helicopters by the Soviet Armed Forces.Soviet military authors have _clearly been impressedby the rapid development, technical characteristics,

---- and combat performance of airmobile systems, as wellas by the new tactics which they permit ground forcesto adopt.

Helicopter Gunships. Soviet military writershave been greatly impressed with the performance ofUS helicopter gunships. Three classified articleshave cited US Vietnam experience as evidence thatsuitably armed helicopters can provide adequate firesupport for ground forces-. In open publications,Soviet commentators have closely followed US develop-ment of helicopter gunships and have shown definiteinterest in ascertaining the extent to which theseaircraft would improve the performance of Americanground forces.

Colonel M. Belov, for example, in numerousarticles in Red Star and Military Herald between1967 and 1973 called attention to the mobility andthe quick concentration of accurate and dense fire-power which the employment of helicopter gunshipsgave to US forces on Indochina battlefields. He has

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specifically cited the heavy firepower of the UH-1BIroquois, the "rapid development" of the AH-lG HueyCobra with its improved armament, and the fact thatthe Cobra's capacity to carry missiles, its "mosteffective weapon," has been increased. Writers inthe open and classified press have repeatedly citedthe high speed, good maneuverability, powerful anddiversified weapons, and increased armor protectionagainst ground fire as characteristics which makecurrent.US helicopter gunships a formidable weaponsystem. To Belov, commenting in a 1973 MilitaryHerald on aircraft employed by foreign infantry,"it is clear that combat helicopters excel tanks interms of maneuverability and effective fire."

Transport and Reconnaissance Helicopters. Sovietmilitary writers have followed US work on militarytransport and reconnaissance helicopters. Both openand classified commentaries have repeatedly acknowl-edged the effectiveness of their performance inVietnam. One classified article suggested, however,that their relative invulnerability resulted fromoperation in a low-intensity combat environment. Inthe open press, several commentators have stressedthe vulnerability of transport helicopters to groundfire, but a Red Star writer in 1970 noted that theSN-46 and SN-47 helicopters were playing a "significant"role in the US Vietnam war effort, citing the 1968evacuation of 1,500 men from a Vietnamese air basewhich had been surrounded by insurgent forces.Colonel Belov has noted the vulnerability of theCH-47 Chinook, but has tempered.his criticism bycalling attention to the strengthening of defensivearmament on the CH-47C. In a 1972 discussion of USexercises in transporting troops and materials fromthe US to combat areas (Reforger III, Freedom Vault)Belov stated that Chinooks were "widely used-" andcould transport all standard US cargo.

It is apparent that the Soviets have been mostinterested in US efforts to improve helicopter liftand cargo-carrying capacity. A recent classifiedarticle has cited the frequent shifting of 105mmartillery by helicopter in Vietnam (though elsewhere,writers have noted that these weapons were specially

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designed to be small and light), and a 1970 Red Starcommentary cited artillery raids in Vietnam in which155mm howitzers were frequently and quickly trans-ported between combat areas on transport helicopters.Colonel Belov has noted the installation of a morepowerful engine on some Chinooks to increase theircargo-carrying capacity and has cited the use ofCH-54A Skycranes, with their greater strength, inVietnam to move freight and heavy military equipment.He has also commented on US plans to develop trans-port helicopters with a capability to carry evenheavier armor and weapon systems for ground and air-mobile forces. Authors in both the open and classi-fied military press have stated that US accomplish-ments in the field of transport helicopters havesignificantly altered ground force combat tactics.

Colonel Belov has commented in Red Star on USdevelopment of small helicopters as reconnaissancevehicles to fill the gap between ground-based andaircraft reconnaissance. Although noting their highvulnerabiLity to ground fire, Belbv has cited the"extreme effectiveness" of the OH-6A Pawnee and theOH-58A Kiowa in performing numerous functions undercombat conditions in Vietnam. He referred to attemptsto improve the armor protection on the Kiowa overthat of the earlier Pawnee and wrote in a 1972 RedStar article that the Kiowa met "modern requirements"for a reconnaissance helicopter.

Tactics and Organization. Soviet military plannersand writers have been impressed by US airmobile andfire support helicopter operations.

Soviet general offi-cers have repeatedly acknowledged the very satisfactoryperformance of these units in Vietnam. In classifiedarticles, military commentators have suggested thatthis experience with "qualitatively new units" hasbegun to cause "definite changes in traditional tech-niques of warfare." Many references have been madein the classified press to the ease with which UStroops and helicopter gunships could be quickly concen-trated to carry out a task behind enemy lines and thendispersed. Attention has been given to the frequency

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and rapidity with which artillery and gun crews inVietnam could be shifted. Colonel Belov and otherwriters in the open press have frequently noted boththe "qualitatively.new tactical mobility" and -theincreased offensive capability which helicopters havegiven to US ground forces. Some open press articleshave referred to US helicopters as exceptionallymobile airborne armored personnel carriers, and oneclassified article has claimed that their existence

may preclude the need for development of new APCsor trucks, which could offer only marginal improve-ments in mobility. Soviet respect for the US air-mobile experience is reflected in Colonel Belov'ssuggestion that changes in tactics and strategy maybe coming that will transcend those brought aboutby the motorization and mechanization of the groundforces in the Thirties.

Soviet commentators have frequently noted thatthe success of US airmobile operations in Vietnamresulted primarily from the success with which thethreat from ground fire was overcome and the easewith which units were structured and trained to take

-- full advantage of helicopter capabilities.

a Soviet general suggested that helicopteroperations in a more hostile environment--with sub-stantially more enemy aircraft, surface-to-airmissiles, and antiaircraft artillery--would produceresults significantly more unfavorable to the US thanthose observed in a "jungle war." Similar sentimentshave been echoed b Soviet general officers

In articles which commented on the effects ofheavy ground fire on helicopters, military writershave noted that when US planning in advance of opera-tions was meticulous and when tactical air cover forhelicopter units was adequate, airmobile and firesupport.units effectively carried out their assignedtasks.. A 1970 Red Star. article referred to thecareful planning which preceded attacks by helicopter-transported artillery in Vietnam and to the successfulevacuation of personnel from a besieged air base byhelicopters with tactical-fighter cover. A 1973-

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Military Herald article cited the US raid against.-- the Son Tay prisoner-of-war camp as an impressive

-- example of a coordinated helicopter - tactical aircombined operation for a deep-penetration raid.

When coordination between army air and tacticalair units was poor or tactical air cover was inade-quate, according to two 1973 Red Star articles on USArmy air operations in Laos, US helicopter losses inthe face of intense ground fire were severe. A re-cent classified commentary has reiterated the point

___ that US Army helicopters could maintain "relativeinvulnerability" if they would operate at low alti-tudes at night and with adequate air cover. One ofthe 1973 Red Star articles cited above called atten-tion to new tactical maneuvers employed by US heli-copters in Laos to overcome insurgent antiaircraftfire.

Many articles have noted US attempts to organize- troop units to make the most effective use of heli-copters. Colonel Belov believesthat the most signif-icant aspect of the US experience in Vietnam has beenthe formation of airmobile divisions, units uniquelyadapted for movement by helicopter into combat areas.He has also cited US computer simulations whichshowed that the Vietnam airmobile experience couldbe applied to any difficult theater of combat.

Some classified commentaries, however, havenoted that the units employed in combat in Vietnamdid not carry adequate firepower, especially anti-tank weapons, to engage in a successful positiondefense. These articles have questioned whether theairmobile concept could be transferred in its currentstate to Europe. General officers have informallysuggested that such units would be decimated iflanded behind enemy lines in Central Europe. Arecent classified article claimed that US airmobiledivisions were "not adapted for conducting combatagainst a strong enemy in Central Europe."

Nevertheless, several open and classified articleshave noted that conditions of nuclear war would bearsome similarities to those of the Vietnam war (no

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arrmorile _onc---- HR70-14

F

clear battle lines, forces dispersed, swift and fre-quent troop shifts over difficult terrain, battles

-- to destroy enemy strength rather than to seize terri-tory) and have called attention to continuing US andNATO experiments in airmobile troop organization.

Training.and Professionalism

The Soviet military press has frequently allegedthat social injustices in the. US are reflected inthe Armed Forces, citing racial tensions and incidentsbetween black and white soldiers; protests and deser-tions among officers and enlisted men during the.Vietnam war; and drug abuse, low morale, and poordiscipline among US troops stationed overseas. These

-- themes have been stressd_inS_ovie tArmer Forc..s,'indoc trinaiofletures|

suc assertions tend:to be discountd -by Soviet soldiers either becausethe supporting evidence, when offered, does.notappear credible, or because Soviet soldiers realizethat they, too, are often guilty of indiscipline.

Soviet military sources have commented respectfullyon the trainin and professional expertise offmanvlUSunits.|

Soviet general officersseeed mprsse bvUSairborne forces to such a de-gree that the officers over-

the Soviets had a hi h opinion of US Special Forces,

the Soviet military gaveGreen Beret units - gh evaluations and establishedspecial self-defense training for their own paratroopspatterned after US Special Forces training.

Both the open and classified military press havenoted the creditable performance of US airmobile divi-sions in Vietnam. Colonel M. Belov observed thatorganization and training problems compromised theeffectiveness of certain units when they were firstused, but in both his open-source and classified com-mentaries he expressed admiration for the way in which

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these units developed and employed tactics prompted- by the unique jungle conditions. Writers have also

been impressed by the ability of these units to adoptnew tactics in response to the improvements in insur-gent combat capabilities.

__ _Soviet

general oticers expressed respect tor the training andprofessionalism of US forces and were impressed by theircombat experience in Vietnam.Marshal Malinovskiy carefully noted that he did notimply a low opinion of the competence of the US Armywhen he criticized the US for waging a "limited war"in Vietnam.

the general feelingwas that statements about low morale in the US Armyby Soviet officials were good propaganda weapons, butthe US Army had shown by its performance in Vietnamthat "it could be an effective weapon of the US rulingcircles."

Soviet commentary on the US volunteer army concepthas been limited and inconclusive, although some evalu-ations can be discerned. Soviet writers have beenespecially alert to the efforts of the Defense Depart-ment to make long-term careers in the volunteer armymore attractive to highly qualified noncommissionedspecialists. In 1973, Military Herald called atten-tion to US problems of "replenishing human reserves"while a classified military publication noted DefenseDepartment expectations that the volunteer army wouldraise the "technical and professional level of enlistedpersonnel and noncommissioned officers."

Some Soviet commentators have examined DefenseDepartment arguments that the reorganized units of avolunteer army would greatly increase the combat effi-ciency and the flexibility of US military forces. Aclassified article noted that although the size of thearmy .and the number of divisions would be reduced, the

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quality of US armaments and the army's combat effi-ciency would "sharply improve." In a 1972 book pub-lished by the Institute of World Economics and Inter-national Relations, retired Major General NestorSolodovnik asserted erroneously that reductions inmanpower associated with the all-volunteer army wouldresult in savings that could be used for equipment.He added that small, well-equipped volunteer forceswould greatly improve the US capability to respondto rapidly changing situations throughout the world.

Negative Soviet assessments of the volunteer armyhave noted that recruitment quotas have not been ful-filled, that the quality of recruits joining the Armyhas fallen, and that the presence of a disproportion-ately high number of black enlisted men has increasedsocial tensions within the Army. A 1974 article inRed Star presented a highly critical picture of theUS Army's operation since the transition to an all-volunteer force. An author in a 1973 issue of themonthly Journal of Military History cited Representa-tive F. Edward Hebert's doubts-that the US Army-couldbe adequately staffed on a voluntary basis.

Naval Forces

Soviet military commentators have shown greatrespect for the sophisticated technology of new USships and weapon systems. They have monitored USresearch and development efforts and have stressedthe improvements in systems brought about by the USexperience in Vietnam. |instructors at the Military Uiplomati-cAcademy inMoscow have described the Soviet Navy as lagging theUS Navy in many classes of ships, particularly air-craft carriers.

Military press articles generally reflect admira-tion for the Vietnam combat experience of the US Navy.Writers have noted that for almost all attack carriers,many other surface combatants, and a large portion of

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the US amphibious forces Vietnam was a trainingground. They have cited the opportunities afforded

--.- by the war for testing equipment under combat condi-tions, gaining experience in logistical resupply overlong distances, and developing tactics.

Soviet military authors have recognized theaccomplishments of well trained units.. They havecited the meticulous preparation of US amphibiousforces and the success of vertical envelopment tech-niques during the Vietnam war.

- Ships and Equipment

__ Aircraft Carriers. Soviet military commentatorshave frequently asserted that attack carriers -consti-tute the most formidable component of US general pur-pose forces. In Red Star, the monthly NavaZ Digest,and various monographs writers have often cited thetimely deployment of US carrier strike forces duringmilitary or political drises, even observing thatcrises are rarely resolved without the appearance of

- - these forces. They have admired the ability of attackcarriers to carry out global police functions.

Soviet commentators clearly have been impressedby the operational flexibility of attack carriers.Classified articles have noted their capability to

-- deliver attacks with both conventional and nuclearweapons. Unclassified writings have cited theirmaneuverability and their ability to concentratelarge numbers of aircraft anywhere on the seas. Somearticles have noted the saving in transit time whichthe US achieves by keeping carriers permanently onstation.

Unclassified writings have cited the enduranceof these ships. The ability of attack carriers toundertake sustained operations off the coast ofVietnam for periods of 25 to 30 days, at great dis-tances from their bases, has been cited with respect.The endurance record of the nuclear-powered Enter-prise has been specifically noted.

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Military writers have referred to the great fire-power wielded by these carriers, one author notingthe many combat sorties flown against North Vietnamby aircraft operating from carriers on Yankee Station.

Commentators have noted the steady increase inthe size and displacement of attack carriers. Thehigh speeds and longer, range provided by nuclear pro-pulsion plants have frequently been cited as theirbest defense against submarine attack. The Nimitzis expected by Soviet writers to be a "highly potent,"though extremely costly, ship when completed. Its

-- size is seen as straining the capacity of the ship-yard building it.

Soviet authors have noted US efforts to improve- the capability of attack carriers to withstand attack

and damage. A.classified article noted both the dif-ficulty of destroying attack carriers without the useof nuclear weapons and the relatively large number ofconventionally armed missiles that would be requiredto destroy carrier escorts. Nevertheless, a Red Starcommentator has reiterated the traditional Sovietclaim regarding the vulnerability of these ships andsuggested that they may soon become as obsolete asbattleships. A recent monograph noted the suscepti-bility of carriers to attack, especially when con-strained from maneuvering because of damage or flightoperations.

In balancing the pros and cons, the Soviets havechosen not to follow the Western example of buildinga naval force centered on large attack carriers.They are, however, currently outfitting their first"aircraft carrier"--the Kiev--which is expected tobe operational by 1976, but Soviet naval spokesmenhave consistently stated that this new ship is notsimilar to Western carriers in either appearance ormission. They have stressed that its primary missionwill be antisubmarine warfare. Although the Kievis as large as early Western carriers, it has neitherthe catapults nor the arresting gear necessary forflight operations by conventional aircraft. Instead,the ship is expected to carry 10 to 15 V/STOL air.-craft and 20 to 25 helictopers. In terms of its

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likely capabilities and missions, the Kiev appears tobe an evolutionary product of the concepts which led

- to the earlier Moskva class helicopter cruisers ratherthan a portent of a revolutionary change in Sovietnaval strategy.

(Soviet assessments of the US naval air arm are-- reviewed in the section on Tactical Air Forces and

Air Transport, page 53.)

Frigates, Destroyers, Destroyer Escorts. Commen-tators in both the open and classified military presshave shown respect for the structural strength andtechnology built into new US surface ships. A classi-fied commentary has claimed that major US combatantsmight withstand up to four direct hits by convention-ally armed guided missiles before sinking. Thesewriters have also referred to improvements in arma-ment and maneuverability, increases in range and en-durance, and advances in propulsion technology.

A classified commentary-states that the US surfacefleet adequately maintains its capability to performa broad range of combat missions. Other Sovietwritings have noted that most US destroyers date fromWorld War II and have been modernized through thefleet rehabilitation and modernization program (FRAM).An author in Naval Digest, however, has cited fre-quent accidents and equipment failures in the SixthFleet and claimed that these mishaps were causedprimarily by the age of the ships and the low stan-dard of repair work.

Regarding new destroyers, one author has observedthat the Charles Francis Adams class embodies moderncombat characteristics, specifically citing its anti-aircraft and antisubmarine missile armament. A RedStar commentator was less generous in his evaluationof the newer Spruance class. According to this author,its speed is no greater than contemporary warshipsand its armaments are not substantially advanced. Helabeled its sonar "ineffective" and its antisubmarinewarfare weapons "obsolete."

. A writer in Naval Digest has cited the "powerfulantisubmarine warfare armament" of the Knox class of

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destroyer escorts. He criticized, however,. the largedisplacement and poor staying power of this class, andits single screw, which limits the ability to maneuver.

Soviet commentators have referred to the exten-sive antiaircraft and antisubmarine armament on USnuclear-powered frigates. A Red Star writer hasnoted that this weaponry has brought about "a substan-tial increase" in their displacement. A commentator*in Naval Digest noted their high cost and claimed thatsmall multipurpose, nonnuclear escort ships wouldfulfill the mission of attack carrier defense moreefficiently. On the other hand, a 1974 Red Star arti-cle noted that the cost of equipping surface vesselswith nuclear power plants has declined significantlyin the last few years. The writer then cited thegreater ability of nuclear frigates to protect nuclearattack carriers because of their improved mobility,speed, and range. There is presently no evidence,however, that the Soviet Navy is planning to buildnuclear-powered surface ships.

Small Combatants. Commentators have noted thatthe US used gunboats in Vietnam extensively to block-ade the coast, to patrol inland waterways, and todisembark landing parties. They have cited the useof three air-cushion vehicles in Vietnam and notedwith favor that they could transport up to 20 soldierswhere deep-draft boats could not operate. This reac-tion, however, has not been reflected in Soviet air-cushion vehicle programs. The USSR has produced

- --- approximately 20 air-cushion vehicles of severaltypes for military use, but none has been widely em-ployed.

Logistic Support Ships. Writers in both theopen and classified press have shown respect for theability of the US to move supplies during the Vietnamwar. Classified material has cited the movement of95 percent of supplies and 65 percent of personnelto Vietnam by sea, and both classified and unclassi-fied articles have said that the extensive US searesupply effort has shown the continuing significanceof maritime shipping during hostilities. One classi-fied article cites developments in containerization

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techniques and anticipates great increases in thecarrying capacity of containers and improvements intransshipping and unloading from them.

Amphibious Ships. Soviet military authors havebeen critical of the technical capabilities of USamphibious ships employed during the Vietnam war.A classified article has claimed that the majorityof these ships were obsolete. Both open and classi-fied commentaries *have called attention to their in-adequate speed, their poor maneuverability, the con-straints imposed by the need to transship supplies-and troops, and the relatively long time requiredfor unloading troops and equipment from these ships.

Soviet commentators have noted, however, thatthe US is developing an entire range of new amphibiouscombatants to correct these deficiencies. They havecited the work under way on the LHA general purposeassault ship and have noted that it will be an im-provemen't over "narrowly specialized" amphibiousassault ships and landing docks., which, according toone author, have proved inadequate to support evensmall, mobile marine units.

Soviet writers have called attention to developmentwork on the LFS, a special inshore fire support ship.They have claimed that US cruisers and destroyers didnot serve well as of fshore fire support ships duringthe Vietnam war, citing their lack of missile launchersfor fire against shore targets, their comparativelylow firepower in guns, and the deep draft of cruisers,preventing them from approaching close to shore. Theseauthors have noted that 127mm rocket launchers mountedon medium landing ships (LSM) proved "most effective"in providing close fire support for amphibious landingforces in Vietnam.

Authors in the open and classified press havefollowed the research and development work on theSK-10 air-cushion landing vehicle. They have notedthe low speed and poor maneuverability of the LCU,LCM, LCPL, *and LCVP landing craft and have reported-that the speed and technical capabilities of the newvessel will "substantially reduce" its vulnerability

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to attack. Its greater speed, they observe, willpermit transports to off-load troops and supplieseven farther from the coast, reducing their vulnera-bility to discovery and attack. The US desire,according to a Naval Digest commentator, is to givethis vessel more than sufficient speed to pushthrough an enemy shore-defense firing zone.

Submarines. Soviet military commentators havefollowed with interest the efforts of the US tocreate a class of submarines capable of combatingother submarines. They have noted that the US isspecializing in the building of nuclear-poweredattack submarines and is leaving the constructionof diesel submarines to its NATO allies. A classi-fied article has termed US efforts in nuclear sub-marine construction "intensive," and a Red Starwriter in 1974 has cited the almost completed Sturgeonclass construction program, the newly begun Los Angelesclass building program, and plans for constructionof yet another class of nuclear attack submarines asexamples of the great effort undertaken by the US inthis area.

Soviet authors have emphasized US efforts toincrease the speed of attack submarines. A classi-fied article stressed that the US goal is to designa combatant fast enough to engage both ballisticmissile submarines and surface ships. A militarycommentator in a 1972 issue of the monthly Scienceand Life claimed erroneously that the 35-knot speed

- of current US attack submarines permits them "easily"to overtake slower missile-carrying submarines. Amore recent commentary in Red Star has noted withrespect the announced submerged speed and depth capa-bilities of the Los Angeles class.

Soviet writers have also cited the great cruisingrange, endurance, and relative noiselessness of USattack submarines. One commentator has claimed thatthis last factor permits attack submarines to usetheir hydroacoustical devices with greater accuracy,though he also noted that current systems can stillbe seriously compromised by false targets and signals.Another commentator reported that improved detection

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devices are installed on the Los Angeles class, buta classified article has claimed that despite suchchanges Soviet submarines will remain basically in-vulnerable to these devices.

Recent Soviet submarine construction programsreflect the same interest in high speed.and deepdiving capabilities as has been noted in Soviet state-ments about US submarines. Soviet submarines, however,are relatively noisy and there are no indications thatthe Soviets have undertaken a submarine quieting pro-gram.

Ordnance

-- Mines. Soviet writers have asserted that minewarfare permits "prolonged and continuous actionagainst an enemy." They appear to respect the sophis-tication of influence mines such as the MK-52 and theMK-56 and have noted that these weapons are difficultto sweep.

Torpedoes. Commentators in Naval Digest haveasserted in general terms that some older US torpe-does are deficient in tactical characteristics. Theyhave claimed that the shortness of US torpedo tubeslimits the capabilities of the weapons and havecriticized US designs for not attaining greater depthand higher speed. A writer in the monthly MilitaryKnowledge.has noted that the low speed of conventionaltorpedoes precludes their use against modern submarinesand the existence of modern cruise missiles obviatesthe need for their use against surface ships.

Writers have nevertheless noted US efforts toincrease the target-closing speed, accuracy, and war-head charge of current torpedoes. The MK-45 hasbeen cited as a weapon whose atomic warhead more thancompensates for any deficiencies in accuracy causedby the lack of homing devices. The MK-46 has beennoted as the "basic armament" of US ASW aircraft andsurface ships. Its homing devices are said to aidsignificantly in ASW warfare, although one commentatorhas labeled it "obsolete."

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An author in Military Knowledge has cited the- -combat capabilities of the MK-48 torpedo, calling- -"attention to its "significantly higher speed,"

greater depth of operation, and increased range overthat of the MK-46. The writer especially respectedits wire guidance system for permitting both immediatefiring when a target was detected and course correctionwhile sthe torpedo was .en route. A commentator inNaval Digest, however, has alleged that its relativelysmall warhead lowers its effectiveness against surfacetargets.

Cruise Missiles. A Soviet commentator in theclassified military press, noting that cruise missilesenhance the capability of warships to fight hostilevessels, suggested that the US Navy might be interestedi-_n such an improvement for its surface fleet.

A 1974 Red Star commentary cited plans by theUS for its extensive deployment.

Antisubmarine Warfare

Soviet commentators generally recognize thatdespite the rapid development in recent years ofASW forces and weapons, modern nuclear submarinesretain much of their ability to operate undetected.Nevertheless, they have called attention to theincreasing sophistication of US ASW systems asevidence that research in the field has been markedby "a rather high rate of progress."

The Soviets have commented only rarely on thecapabilities of US nuclear-powered torpedo attacksubmarines to conduct ASW activities such as tracingor open search. The scarcity of comment probablyreflects the sensitivity of such information withinthe USSR.

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Military writers have noted the major ASW roleplayed by aircraft. They have claimed, however, that

4the US carrier-based S-2 is ineffective in searchingfor submarines because it cannot carry heavy, moderndetection gear. They have also noted that an ASWaircraft with improved capabilities, the S-3, isunder development. A 1974 Red Star commentary re-ported that the S-3 will be able to monitor an areasubstantially larger than that covered by the S-2.The writer-deferred judgment on the P-3 shore-basedaircraft, stating that it was a "relatively new"addition to the US Navy.

Military authors have stressed the increasingrole of helicopters as a component of ASW forces,observing that they have extended the range and im-proved the effectiveness of shipboard ASW.techniques.ASW helicopters, according to these authors, havegood speed and maneuverability, especially in com-parison with submarines, and can quickly search"considerable" areas. The SH-3-D Sea King has been

r-ated highly in Naval Digest for its flight charac--teristics and its electronic equipment. Military

--- writers have noted, however, that such helicoptersare vulnerable to antiaircraft fire and their opera-tions limited by their dependence on shipborne navi-gational equipment.

The Subroc missile has been called a "veryeffective" antisubmarine weapon by a military com-mentator in Science and Life. He emphasized that itsrange exceeds that of other ASW weapons. However, aNaval Digest writer alleged that the lack of a conven-tional warhead is a serious deficiency of the system.

The Asroc antisubmarine missile-torpedo systemhas been compared unfavorably with the AustralianIkara by a writer in Naval Digest who claimed thatthe missile cannot be controlled in its flight phaseand that it cannot cope with the speed of contem-porary submarines. A commentator in Military Knowl-edge, however, cited the Asroc system, in a discus-sion of the development of missiles with torpedowarheads, as a successful means of countering- modernhigh-speed submarines.

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Soviet commentators have said that the speedof attack carriers remains their best protectionagainst submarines, but they have noted continuingUS efforts to strengthen ASW capabilities by pro-viding carriers with specially equipped aircraft andhelicopters.

Soviet commentators have noted the capabilitiesof US seabed antisubmarine reconnaissance systems.A military writer in Science and Life cited their"rather great reliability" and V. M. Kulish, formerlya General Staff officer and recently a member ofthe Institute of World Economics and InternationalRelations, has noted in a recent monograph the"considerable success" which the US has achievedwith them. Informal comments made in 1973 byGeorgiy Arbatov, the director of the USA Institutein Moscow, have suggested some concern for the vul-nerability of Soviet submarines in the North Atlanticarea where these detection systems are deployed. TheSoviets have not, however, attempted to deploy aSOSUS-type undersea surveillance system of their own.

Tactics

Amphibious Operations. Numerous articles in boththe open and classified military press have noted theemphasis placed on the development of US amphibiousforces. Unclassified commentaries have stressed theutility of these forces for limited war and militaryinterventions. A classified article implied theirusefulness for a European war by suggesting thatflank and rear assaults by amphibious forces couldbe used to ensure a high rate of advance for opera-tions in coastal areas.

Commentators have referred to the "meticuloustraining" of US amphibious forces to compensate forthe deficiencies of current vessels. They have citedboth annual training exercises involving all aspectsof landings and the practical combat experience whichUS amphibious forces have gained since World War II.A Red Star commentator has claimed that in two impor-tant characteristics, speed of transfer and speed

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of debarkation, US amphibious operations lag present-day requirements.

Military authors have admired US techniques ofvertical envelopment, citing the advantages of sur-prise, swiftness, and applicability to hard-to-reachareas and a nuclear environment.

Mine Warfare. aSoviet admiral evalua-tedi-hly the-MIyT972i-mining of Haiphong and other North Vietnamese ports.From a naval point of view, the admiral reportedly

-- said, the operation was "masterfully done." Anarticle in Naval Digest referred to rehearsals forthis operation conducted by the Navy off the coastof San Diego.

Commentators in Red Star and Naval Digest havenoted deployment of the Sikorsky RH-53-D, the firsthelicopter designed specifically. for minesweeping.One Naval Digest writer cited the transfer of four-helicopters in four days by C--5A transpor-t-from -_-Charleston, South Carolina to the Sixth Fleet, con-trasting this with the 14 days required to deploysurface minesweepers. Commentators have observed,however, that this helicopter cannot sweep deepwatermines and cannot operate in poor weather. Militaryauthors have also noted the use of the SH-3-D SeaKing ASW helicopter for minelaying and minesweeping.

Tactical Air Forces and Air Transport

Commentary in the open and restricted militarypress indicate a

- high Soviet regard for US tactical air forces andair transport. Several articles in the monthlyAviation and Cosmonautics, Red Star, and classifiedmilitary publications have noted extensive US pro-grams to modernize its aircraft and associated equip-ment. The Soviets have repeatedly cited these devel-opment efforts, the substantial accomplishments of US

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aviation during the Vietnam war, and the criticalrole assigned to tactical air forces in US militarydoctrine as evidence of the prowess of Americantactical air power.

Soviet pilots believe that US aviationis clearly he best in NATO and that American air-craft are on balance superior to their Soviet counter-

parts.however,

that Soviet military intelligence personnel weretaught that US and Soviet aviation were "on a par."

detailed comparison of the capabilities of Soviet andUS tactical aircraft. these evalu-ations are based upon personal experience withSoviet aircraft and careful study of information onAmerican planes available in Soviet intelliqence

_ publications.

jcharac-terized US tactical aircraft as generally superiorto those of the.Soviets in armament-carrying capacity,range, engine power, missile weaponry, and especiallyelectronic equipment. praised the skillsof US pilots, linking their high competence both tothe experience provided by combat in Vietnam and toflight training programs

"more realistic" than those of the Soviets.characterized Soviet and American

aircraft as largely equal in speed and altitudecapabilities, but gave Soviet aircraft an edge incannon armaments and maneuverability.

Articles in the classified and open militarypress have frequently stated this last point,claiming distinct maneuvering advantages for Sovietfighters. Although not drawing explicit comparisonswith Soviet aircraft, they have also praised theall-weather capabilities of US tactical aircraft buthave criticized the vulnerability to enemy fire whichthey exhibited during the Vietnam war.

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TOPSEGRE

The Soviets appear to be impressed by US long-and short-haul air transport capabilities. Articlesin the classified and open military press have citedpeacetime airlift exercises--such as Big Lift, Re-forger, Bold Shot, Focus Retina, and Brass Strike--and quick-reaction movements during internationalcrises as demonstrations of logistic lift capabili-ties.

US transport activity in support of the Vietnamwar has been frequently discussed. A 1970 articlein Aviation and Cosmonautics noted the rapid airmovement of the 101st Airborne Division with all ofits associated equipment from. the US to Vietnam andthe air evacuation of wounded American personnel tostateside hospitals aboard C-141s in 17 hours. Openand restricted press accounts of various US tacticalairlift operations in the Indochina theater conveya similar impression of Soviet respect for US airtransport capabilities.

Weapon Systems

Fighter Aircraft. The American aircraft mostfrequently discussed by the Soviets has been theF-4 Phantom. the F-4has been described within the Ministry of Defenseas the "world's most perfect aircraft." Towardsthe close of the Vietnam war the KGB and GRU engagedin extensive, and joint, efforts to gather allavailable technical data on the F-4.

unanimously ratedthe F-4 as "exceptional" and superior to any Sovietfighter, although noting that it had shortcomingsin horizontal maneuverability. Such assessments,however, probably reflect comparisons with Sovietaircraft, up through the MIG-21,

The most modern Sovietignter, the MIG-23, although first displayed in1967, has been deployed in large numbers only sincemid-1972.

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Soviet commentators in the open press havepointed out deficiencies of the F-4. In 1972,Aviation and Cosmonautics reprinted an Americanarticle discussing undesirable spin characteristicsdisplayed by the Phantom. Other articles in thesame journal have stated that the F-4's performancein Vietnam revealed its poor horizontal maneuver-ability when fully loaded.

Articles in the Soviet restricted and open presshave praised the all-weather, day-night, and radartargeting capabilities of the F-105 fighter-bomberand the A-"6 carrier-based attack aircraft. The A-6has been complimented for its endurance, maneuver-ability, and excellent close air support capabilitiesin press accounts of its performance in Vietnam.These same sources have rated the F-105 highly forits payload capacity but criticized it as vulnerableand having poor maneuverability, particularly at lowaltitude. The F-5 fighter bomber, which is similarto the widely deployed MIG-21, has been praised forits survivability, high acceleration, maneuverability,and low cost but rated poor in endurance and range.The Soviets have written little about the F-111, be-yond noting that "serious design defects" were re-vealed during its use in Vietnam, or about the A-7,which has been said to have "proved out well incombat."

The British-developed Harrier vertical takeoffand landing (VTOL) aircraft being procured by theUS Marine Corps has drawn varied Soviet comments.In December 1971, Admiral Gorshkov commander inchief of the Soviet Navy, told __

that the Soviets were monitoring theWestern VTOL program and noted that "both the Amer-icans and British are ahead of the Soviet Union inthis area." the USas "more success u "in acquiring a VTOL capability.A classified Soviet article on American naval tacticspraised the flexibility of VTOL aircraft as per-mitting air support for limited US naval opertionswithout the presence of a large attack carrier. Thisevaluation has been disputed, however, in a Sovietpamphlet on US aircraft carriers which asserts that

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the Harrier's combat radius and payload are "extremelylimited ."

Some criticism of US fighters is accompanied* by descriptions of measures taken to correct the

- deficiencies. A recent article in Aviation andCosmonautics reported F-4 losses in Vietnam causedby the rupture of hydraulic lines to the aircraft'scontrol surfaces. It noted the replacement of thehydraulic system with the less vulnerable SFCS elec-tronic control mechanism. Similarly, a 1968 Aviationand Cosmonautics account of the Vietnam war said thatthe. absence of conventional cannon armament had madethe F-4 vulnerable to close-in attack. The articlestated that this defisciency had been corrected bythe addition of a six-barrel Gatling gun, the Vulcan.

Airborne Missiles. Soviet accounts have beenhighly critical of the performance of US air-launchedtactical missiles. |the military

-press,_ and other sources have described the perfor-mance of the Sidewinder and Sparrow air-to-air mis-siles in Vietnam as "ineffective" and "below Americanexpectations." A 1968 article in Aviation andCosmnonautics faulted both missiles for unreliability,lack of an IFF capability, and ineffectiveness inaerial combat involving violent maneuvers. Notwith-standing such criticisms, the Soviets have a widely

___ deployed airborne missile system, the AA-2 Atoll,with virtually the same capabilities and deficienciesas the Sidewinder.

The Soviets have followed US ef forts both toremedy these deficiencies and to develop the newPhoenix missile as a follow-on system. A 1972 Sovietreport said that modified Sparrows and Sidewinders,to be fully deployed- by the late Seventies, wouldhave increased range, improved reliability, bettermaneuverability, higher antijamming resistance, andgreater destructive power. The Phoenix was reportedto be a long-range missile with excellent all-weathercapabilities at all altitudes.

Soviet military authors have commented criticallyon the combat performance of US air-to-surface missiles.

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The Bullpup, for example, was reported to havedemonstrated only "satisfactory" combat qualities.It has been criticized for its ineffective warheadand short range and for requiring continuous guid-ance to its target, prolonging the exposure of thelaunching aircraft to enemy air defenses.

Classified and open press articles have beenparticularly critical of the antiradar Shrike. Theyidentify its "serious shortcomings" as limited range,an ineffective fragmentation warhead, insufficientflight speed, and the ease with which it can beevaded. A classified article admitted, however,that Soviet evasion tactics were advantageous to the,attacker, since these precluded the continual opera-tion of SAM radars and thus compromised the effec-tiveness of the air defense system.

The Soviets have also commented upon newer USantiradar missiles. Recent open press articleshave discussed the Standard ARM, noting its improvedactive and passive guidance system. They note thatthe Standard's high cost, estimated to be ten timesthat of the Shrike, has prompted US development ofthe NARM, a lower cost antiradar missile.

Precision-Guided Munitions. Soviet writers havecommented. favorably in Red Star, Aviation and Cosmo-nautics, and the restricted military press about thenew generation of US precision-guided munitions, suchas the Walleye, Hobo, Maverick, and Paveway. Laser-guided and electro-optical weapons have been praisedfor the exceptional accuracy which makes them highlycost-effective in comparison with conventional bombs.Their accuracy has also been said to bring a decreasein aircraft losses because fewer sorties are requiredto destroy an assigned target. A classified articledescribed the Walleye, a television-guided glidebomb, as the "most successful weapon for the de-struction of well defended targets." Strong interestin these weapons was reflected in repeated Sovietvisits to an American display of the Laser AidedRocket System (LARS) and an unsuccessful attempt

- to steal a laser rangefinder designed by the Frenchduring the 1973 Paris Air Show.

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Airborne Electronic Countermeasures. Open andclassified press accounts of the US air campaignagainst North Vietnam have noted the effectivenessof American airborne ECM capabilities. These com-mentaries have cited the protection provided for USforces both by the B-66 and A-6 specialized counter-measures aircraft and the ECM pods attached to indi-vidualstrike aircraft._

the success of the US ECM effort inVietnam prompted the Soviets to initiate a programin the late Sixties to develop ECM modules for theirown assault aircraft. Such equipment is now appearingon Soviet aircraft. deployed in Eastern Europe.

Pilotless Vehicles. US development and use ofpilotless vehicles have drawn comment in the Sovietopen press. Several articles in Red Star andAviation and Cosmonautics have discussed the US useof drones for reconnaissance in Southeast Asia anddescribed US programs to improve the capabilitiesofi unmanned aircraft.

- A recent article in Red Star criticized thefirst-generation AN/MQM57A pilotless reconnaissancesystem forits-'inability. to operate effectively atnight-or -in' bad' weather. The~ same source cited thelarger AN/MGM58A for its improved all-weather per-formance but still judged the system essentiallyobsolete because of its short range, relatively lowflight speed, vulnerability, and inability to exe-cute unprogramed maneuvers. Soviet authors haveobserved that American interest in the developmentof unmanned fighter aircraft is based on a desireto build a simple, reliable, and inexpensive meansfor aerial combat which does not risk the lives ofpilots. Noting the complexities of the controlsystems required for such vehicles and their vulner-ability to ECM, one author recently predicted inRed Star that, despite vigorous US efforts, thedevelopment of effective, maneuverable pilotlessaircraft is still some ten years away.

Transport Aircraft. Soviet writers have infre-quently discussed the capabilities of specific UStransport aircraft. A 1971 article in the monthly

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Wings of the Homeland described the C-5A and C-141-- -as "heavy- and fast aircraft" whose capabilities for-- quick reaction and long-distance operations had

been demonstrated in the movement of US Army unitsfrom the. US to West Germany during Reforger exercisesand in the Vietnam war. The same source cited the-long time required to load and unload the C-5A and

- noted the cost overrun problems associated with itsdevelopment. A 1970 item in Red Star and a recentclassified article cited the large carrying capacity*of the C-5A. The latter article noted its abilityto carry an M60Al tank, a 175mm gun, and an M577armored personnel carrier all on a single flight.At the 1971 Paris air show, the chief of the Ilyushindesign bureau described his new IL-76 transportaircraft as a small-scale version of the C-5A ratherthan a scaled-up version of the C-141. Many of thedesign features and technical characteristics ofthe IL-76, such as its high flotation landing gearand its short takeoff and landing potential, arepatterned-after the C-5A's capa-bilities. -

A classified article cited the fact that theC-130 and C-141 transports carry radio-navigationaland ECM equipment. It noted the absence of defensive

* . .armaments on either.of these aircraft, but did notsuggest that this compromised their mission. Theauthor explained that these airplanes were designedprimarily for operations behind friendly linesrather -than in a hostile environment, and impliedthat they were fully capable of performing in theintended environment.

Tactics

The Soviets have closely studied the performanceof US tactical air forces- during the Vietnam war.

___________Soviet operational airunits were provided with a variety of briefings andstudy materials which described US aerial tacticsover Indochina in great detail. In addition, theopen and restricted military press have carried manyarticles on the evolution of US air operations in thecourse of the bombing campaign against North Vietnam.

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__ Soviet military commentators have noted that theUS was able to adapt quickly and successfully to theincremental modernization of the North Vietnamese airdefense system. These authors state that Americanattack units were able to penetrate these defensesthrough a combination of measures including evasivemaneuvers, closely coordinated tactics, effectiveair defense suppression, and intensive electroniccountermeasures. The Soviets have cited this successas evidence of a US commitment "to constantly perfectits methods for overcoming air defenses." One classi-fied article explicitly warned that these and othersophisticated measures were likely to be employedagainst the Soviets themselves in any future military

_ conflict with the US.

- Tactical Air Defense-- -

Soviet commentaries on.US tactical.air defensecapabilities have generally appeared in the contextof discussions of the NATO air defense system. Sev-eral articles in limited-circulation and open mili-tary publications have described the NATO air de-fense effort as a well integrated and modern systemwhich successfully combines radar detection andtracking equipment, tactical aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and conventional antiaircraft artillery.Classified military writings have noted that highlosses of Soviet aircraft can be anticipated unlessthey can neutralize NATO's fighter-interceptor forceand successfully overcome its SAM defenses. Diffi-culties in combating aircraft flying at "low andvery low level" have been cited as the primary weak-ness of the Western air defense system.

Classified Soviet writings have identified theHawk SAM and American fighter-interceptors, especiallythe F-4 Phantom, as the most potent air defense weaponsin NATO. Respect for the Hawk has been reflected in

__ both its identification as a first-priority targetin Soviet theater warfare scenarios and in the variety

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of measures (active ECM jamming, direct suppression,avoidance of major Hawk concentrations, and low-levelapproach tactics) prescribed for overcoming it. TheNike Hercules SAM, although credited with significantcapabilities at medium and high altitudes, has beenaccorded secondary importance because of its inabilityto engage low-flying targets.

The Soviets have displayed concern over thethreat posed by US air defense fighters. Classifiedcommentaries have identified their particularstrengths as all-weather, day-night capabilities,high combat readiness, and potential for flexibleemployment throughout the European combat theater.Classified discussions have repeatedly proposed thatplanning envisage the destruction or neutralizationof US fighter-interceptors, preferably by a surpriseattack which would catch them on the ground. If thistactic should fail--and the discussions admit itsdifficulty because of the high combat readiness ofUS air forces--then the Soviets have spoken of win-ning the battle for air superiority in aerial combat.Their high regard for the capabilities of Americanfighter-interceptors suggests that they realizethat prospects for success in this task also are notgood.

Soviet military writers have frequently discussedUS efforts to improve air defense capabilities againstlow-altitude targets. Articles in Red Star and Mili-tary Herald on the Chaparral and Red Eye tacticalSAMs have criticized both systems for their lack ofan identification friend or foe (IFF) capability andfor limitations inherent in their heat-seeking infra-red guidance system. The Soviets have claimed thatthese guidance shortcomings limit operations toclear weather, preclude firings toward the sun, andallow the missiles to. be launched only against air-craft which have already passed overhead.

Despite these criticisms of US SAM capabilities,-a 1971 Military Herald article stated that a combi-nation of these tactical SAMs and antiaircraft artil-lery offers "maximum promise" against aircraftattacking at low altitude, and the Soviets have in

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fact deployed a similar system of their own--the SA-7.This counterpart to the Red Eye also lacks IFF and hasa less sophisticated infrared homing system than thatof the Red Eye. A new Soviet system, the SA-8, whichmay have capabilities similar to those of the Chaparral,is still undergoing testing.

Soviet military authors have noted renewed USinterest in the procurement of antiaircraft artilleryand have linked this development to the demonstratedeffectiveness of North Vietnamese AAA against USaircraft. The Soviets themselves have traditionallybeen enthusiastic about the utility of AAA and theyfrequently praise its capabilities against low-flyingaircraft. Soviet commentators have pointed to theprocurement of the 20mm Vulcan system and reactiva-tion of the 40mm M42A1 Duster as evidence of a UScommitment to acquire a mobile,. reliable, and low-cost AAA capability.

The Vulcan has drawn mixed evaluations from theSoviets. Articles in Military Herald and Red Starhave praised its accuracy and rapid fire capability.

however,the Vulcan was criticize by Soviet

aviators as too small in caliber and having an in-adequate explosive charge.

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