Soviet Armored Division Late 1960s v.1.0 June 7, 2006 Ravi Rikhye Notes

Source lost, may have been NATO’s 15 Nations. In the first part of the 1970s, the manpower increased to 11,000 and more tanks

and artillery were added to the division. For example, MR companies were added to each tank battalion.

Divisions in the first echelon of an army (NATO corps) had breakthrough sectors of 4 km. One hour of fire from 50-75 guns/kilometer was provided.

For the division, in conventional operations, the immediate objective was 30 km distant; for regiments 8-15 km distant; for battalions 4 km distant.

1/3rd of the first echelon went to form the 2nd echelon; 1/9th of the first echelon formed the reserve.

Because in a command economy material was cheap, and because due to the quality of Soviet conscripts and the training system specialists were expensive, little maintenance support existed. Formations were considered expendable. A tank division might fight for 10 days and then be replaced by another division. The system probably reached an extreme with the Syrian Army, which in its 1973 offensive against the Golan Heights abandoned hundreds of tanks that could have been returned to running status with relatively minor repair such as provided within a western or South Asian tank battalion. The US armored division maintenance battalion was 4+ times larger than its Soviet counterpart; and every battalion had extensive maintenance capability. A US tank battalion of 54 tanks, for example, had a maintenance platoon of over 80 men.

The Soviet organization permitted them to field formations that were mostly teeth with little tail, instead of the other way around for western divisions. Conversely, because it could stay in combat indefinitely, with equipment losses systematically replaced during combat, a US armored division was the equal of 3 Soviet armored divisions. The Soviet model emphasized shock; the western emphasized staying power.

Since the Soviets believed any war would quickly become nuclear, they also believed that creating divisions designed to fight for months at a time was wasteful of resources. They preferred to create a large number of second and third echelon divisions that would replace destroyed formations.

A critical difference between Soviet doctrine and that of most other armies is the Soviets reinforced success, not failure.

TOE 8415 troops (approximately 990 officers) 320 MBT 12 light tanks 190 APC

157 in combat regiments 17 in supply 16 in support 36 122mm howitzers 1300 trucks HQ Motorized Infantry Defense Company Reconnaissance Bn Light Aircraft Group (5-6 helicopters) Transport Bn Supply Bn Chemical Bn Medical Bn Engineer Bn Maint Bn (200+ troops) Signal Bn Signal Artillery Bn 3 x tank regiments, each 95 MBT (2 with regt HQ) 21 APC 3 amphib 3 x tank battalions each 175 officers and men Supply Squad

Light Aid Detachment Medical Squad

31 MBT 2 APC 1ARV (armored recovery vehicle) 12 trucks 1 x Motorized Rifle Regiment 1 tank battalion 3 MR battalions each including Supply Platoon Medical Platoon Repair Platoon Division Artillery Observation Bn

1 Frog Bn (3 launchers) 1 Rocket Launcher Bn 1 x battery (8 x 240mm) 2 x batteries (each 8 x 200 mm) 1 ADA Bn 4 x ADA batteries (each 6 x 57mm) 3 x 122mm Bns, each with 2 x batteries (each 6 x 122mm) The US armored division (6 tank, 5 mechanized battalions) had the same number of MBTs, but had twice the manpower and ~ 2.5 times the number of trucks. Conversely, it had twice as many artillery tubes, twice as many AD weapons, 15-20 times as many helicopters, and the reconnaissance battalion was much larger and more powerful than the Soviet equivalent.1

1 These figures are from memory as the author no longer has access to his manuals and notes from the period.