SOVIETADVOCACYAND THEu.S. MEDIA

A Report of theUnited States

Advisory Commissionon Public Diplomacy

TO THE CONGRESSAND TO THE PRESIDENTOF THE UNITED STATES

In accordance with Section 8, Reorganization Plan No.2 of 1977 and Public Law96-60, the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy submits herewitha report on Soviet Advocacy and the U.S. Media.

Respectfully submitted,

:tiJ4rfEdwin J. Feulner, jr., ChairmanPresident, The Heritage FoundationVirginia (R)

e. robert (bob) wallachVice ChairmanLawyer-CounselorDean, Hastings Law SchoolCenter for Trial andAppellate AdvocacyCalifornia (D)

Tom C. KorologosPresidentTimmons and Company, Inc.Virginia (R)

Priscilla L. BuckleySenior EditorNational ReviewNew York (R)

\d~ \'(\~Richard M. ScaifePublisher, The Tribune ReviewPublishing Co.Pennsylvania (R)

/~~~Hershey GoldChairman of the BoardSuper Yarn MartCalifornia (D)

Herbert SchmertzVice President, Public AffairsMobil Oil CorporationNew York (D)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Transmittal Letter 1

Message from the Chairman 3

Summary of Recommendations 4

Introduction 5

Soviet Journalists and Officialsas Advocates 5

The Nature of Soviet Journalismand lnformation 6

Soviet Journalists in the u.S ,; 8

u.S. Journalists in the USSR 9

Voice of America (VOA) Reportersin the USSR 10

Appendix A:

CSeEFinal Act, 1975 (Excerpts) 12

Appendix B:

Table 1:Total Significant U.S.-SovietOfficial Appearances inOpposite-Country Print Media 13

Table 2:Survey of Significant SovietOfficial Appearances onU.S. Networks, 1983-85 14

A MESSAGE FROM THE CHAIRMAN

Democracies are built on the principle of the free flow ofinformation, and we have come to enjoy the benefitsgenerated: the free exchange of ideas, technological

achievement, full enfranchisement of the citizenry, and intellectualexcellence, to name just a few.

Yet we are confronted on a daily basis by an antitheticalphilosophy, promoted by the Soviet Union, which uses information as acontrollable and malleable tool. Besides restricting the access of theirown citizens to the full range of information and opinion, the Sovietsexploit the openness of our system to promote their global agenda.

The United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacysupports openness and full freedom of information as a fundamentalcomponent of democracy. At the same time, we do not believe that thepresent asymmetry in the exchange of information between the U.S.and the Soviet Union should be accepted by this country. Just as weshould permit Vladimir Pozner, properly identified as a spokesman ofthe Soviet Government, to speak to the American people, the UnitedStates in turn should be permitted to bring its perspectives to the Sovietpeople on a regular and continuing basis. With few exceptions, that isnot happening. We must pursue reciprocal access.

Americans must be more fully aware of the degree to whichSoviet official spokesmen, many of them ostensibly "journalists," areable to expound their policies to our media and our public as thoughthey were personal opinions. Although some of our recommendationsrelate to the U.S. news media and journalists' organizations, it is notour intention to undercut the fine reporting of Soviet-American issuesthat they accomplish under difficult circumstances, with limitedresources, and under tight deadlines. It is simply to offer theCommission's long-range perspective on this critical issue.

Commissioner Priscilla Buckley and Deputy Staff DirectorMichael Morgan have prepared the following report, which gives timelyfocus to this issue. We appreciate the insights of officials of the U.S.Information Agency's Office of Research, Programs Bureau, the ForeignPress Center, the Office of European Affairs and the Voice of America.Theirviews have been invaluable in shaping the Commission's findings.

Our recommendations are normally presented in annual reportsto the Congress and to the President. The Commission's enablinglegislation, however, provides that it also submit "such other reports tothe Congress as it deems appropriate." The challenge of intensifiedSoviet use of public diplomacy warrants our doing so at this time.

:£j~vI-Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.Chairman

October 1986

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-- ---------(3) The U.S. Embassy in Moscow, theState Department. and USIA should bereceptive to U.s. journalists'complaints about the numbers. easeof entry. and treatment of U.S.journalists in the USSRand overallSoviet compliance with the relevantsections of the CSCEFinal Act so thatwhen deemed advisable andproductive, appropriate actions canbe taken with the SovietGovernment.

(4) At the next U.S.-Soviet summit.and in the next round of educationaland cultural exchanges negotiations.the United States should press foraccess to the Soviet media for officialU.S. spokesmen. both through ageneral agreement for binationalexchanges of such appearances, andthrough greater openness to case-by-case proposals.

(5) At the next summit. the Presidentshould suggest the creation of a "jointU.S.-Soviet Task Force on MediaReciprocity" to examine means of

ENHANCING U.S.·SOVIET MEDIA COVERAGE

(11) U.S. networks that frequentlyhost and interview Soviet journalistsshould make available to Sovietofficials, if asked, a list of Americancorrespondents who are fluent inRussian and who could serve ascommentators on American affairsand Soviet-American relations forSoviet media.

(12) In light of the accessibility ofU.S. media to official Sovietspokesmen. and their increasing useof it to propound their views, the U.s.Government should make grants toprivate sector organizations forseminars on Soviet informationstrategy, the nature, role andobjectives of the Soviet journalist,and related subjects.

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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS-------------------- --------------

increasing access of U.S.spokesmen, journalists and mediaproducts to the Soviet people. TheU.S. also should examine newfeasible, forceful reciprocal actionagainst continued Sovietintransigence on the free flow ofinformation.

(6) The United States should pursueas a higher priority more frequententry by VOA reporters into the

. Soviet Union and the opening of a VOAbureau in Moscow. Soviet visarefusals should merit appropriate U.S.responses, such as reciprocaltreatment of Radio Moscowcorrespondents in the United States.

(7) So long as the normal avenues ofcommunication with the Sovietpeople remain obstructed, theUnited States should maximize otheravailable opportunities such ascultural exchanges, exhibits, andcontinued intensive radiobroadcasting through the Voice ofAmerica and Radio Liberty. TheUnited States should continue to placepressure on the USSR to endjamming of U.S. and Western radiobroadcasts.

(13) Private organizations such asthe World Press Freedom Committeeshould undertake workshopsconducted by U.S. journalists forSoviet correspondents resident in orcovering the U.S. to explain thecomplexities of U.S. polities,economics, foreign policy, society andculture, in the hopes this would yieldmore accurate, objective andbalanced reporting on the U.S. forSoviet audiences and readers.

(14) U.S. journalists' organizationssuch as the Standing Committee ofCorrespondents of the Congressshould be aware that when theydiscriminate against Voice ofAmerica, USIA-TV, or USIA WirelessFile reporters for being U.S.Government employees, this givescredibility to hypocritical SovietGovernment discrimination againstthese reporters as well.

U.S•.SOVIET MEDIA RECIPROCITY

(I) The United States, in concert withother signatory nations, shouldcontinue to press the Soviet Union tohonor Article 19 of the United NationsUniversal Declaration of HumanRights, which states:

"Everyone has the right to freedomof opinion and expression; this rightincludes freedom to hold opinionswithout interference and to seek, receive,and impart information and ideasthrough any media and regardless of "frontiers. "

(2) The United States and theWestern European signatories shouldcontinue to press the USSR to abideby its treaty commitment made in the1975 Final Act of the Conference onSecurity and Cooperation in Europe(Helsinki Accords) to:

"...facilitate the freer and widerdissemination of information of allkinds. to encourage cooperation in thefield of information and the exchange ofinformation with other countries, andto improve the conditions under whichjournalists from one participatingState exercise their profession inanother participating State."

(8) U.S. news organizations andtelevision networks operating inMoscow should continue to pushaggressively in concert for greateraccess to Soviet society and sources.

(9) Soviet spokesmen and journalistsappearing on U.S. radio and televisionshould be identified as spokesmenor as employees of the SovietGovernment, and if known, theirmembership and position in theSoviet Communist Party mentioned.Their arguments. misstatements,evasions, and omissions should bechallenged and refuted.

(10) The United States should give toSoviet Government radio, television,and print media authorities a list ofAmerican officials who are fluent inRussian and available to articulateAmerican policies for Soviet mediaaudiences.

INTRODUCTION

Inthe year since MikhailGorbachev came to power, it hasbecome apparent that the Soviet

Union is using public diplomacy asnever before. The Soviets havedemonstrated a new sophistication inthe way they deal with the Westernmedia. The counterproductive tacticsof the past-stonewalling, denial ofundeniable fact, crude distortion oftruth, and use of inept spokesmen-have in part given way to Western-style massaging of the media,skillful advocacy, and a new corps ofSoviet spokesmen. They may becalled "diplomats," "journalists" or"concerned physicians," but they areall increasingly wise in the ways ofAmerican television.

Why has this happened? It is theresult of new Soviet leadership.Additionally, the Soviet Union is nolonger an "information island." Itsfrontiers are ever more porous-whether from VOA or Radio Libertybroadcasts, clandestine video-cassettes, broader access tocomputer data, or samizdat reportingof suppressed news. The Soviets alsohave been forced to become morecompetent in the information fieldbecause the United States has putincreasing emphasis on informationand public diplomacy. Moreover,Soviet signing of the HelsinkiAccords in 1975put them on record asfavoring the free flow of information,and obliges them to respond toWestern criticism of their failure toadhere to the Accords. And finally, asthis Commission noted in its 1986Report to the President, .....there ishardly a police state left that canignore foreign public opinion ...Putsimply, instant global communicationsare breaking down rigidities andisolation, and public opinion isincreasingly influential in shapingforeign policy."

This report will focus on threethemes: 1) the role of Sovietjournalists and other state represen-tatives in advocating Soviet goals; 2)the virtually unlimited access thatSoviet advocates and journalistshave to the U.S. system, and the lackof corresponding access in the USSRby the U.S.; and 3) how reciprocitycould be extended. In light of recentSoviet progress in public diplomacy,

the Commission finds it imperativethat a more balanced U.S.-Sovietinformation relationship be achievedas soon as possible.

The indictment in Moscow ofU.S. reporter Nicholas Daniloff hasbeen a sobering reminder of thevulnerability of Western correspond-ents to the power of the Soviet state.Mr. Daniloff's arrest is graphicevidence of the difference betweenU.S.and Soviet concepts of journalism.The Commission abhors this affrontto the norms of civilized behavior.

We hope that this report willbetter inform American reporters,elected officials and private citizensabout Soviet objectives, andurtderscore the need to continuepressing the Soviet Union to honor itsHelsinki commitments. .

TheCommission fully understandsmedia concerns about U.S.govern-mental interference. And nothing inthis report should be read as seekingto undermine the role of a free andindependent press in Americansociety, and the guarantees of theFirst Amendment to the Constitution.We wish only to suggest ways theU.S.Government, U.S.journalists, andthe American people might addressthe growing and one-sided presenceof official Soviet spokesmen in theAmerican media.

commentator Vladimir Pozner andAleksandr Palladin of Izvestia. Mr.Palladin dresses in "preppy" fashionand has a boyish charm; Mr. Poznergrew up in Brooklyn and speaksEnglish like a native American. AsCharles Lichtenstein, former DeputyU.S. Representative to the UnitedNations, has said:"There is no question the Soviets arewaking up to the fact they can takeadvantage of the Western media. Theyare more and more sophisticated inusing the media. Five years ago, I don'tremember seeing a Soviet spokesman onU.S. television, but now there are fouror five on regularly. They are highlyconversant with the West, they speakvirtually flawless English, use anecdotesand analysis with just a bit of self-criticism to make themselves credible.It's all done with an extraordinaryamount of skill. I'mjust astonished ittook them so long. " I

Charles William Maynes, Editor ofForeign Policy magazine, recentlystated:"When I served in the U.S. Embassy inMoscow in the late 1960s, the Sovietswould never expose themselves to theunpredictability of television. Theywould use it and exploit it, but theywould not take risks. Now they are takingrisks. The change is due to a newgeneration of Soviet diplomats. Many ofthem are very sophisticated. Theyunderstand that if the Soviet Unionwants to make headway in the world,they have to use the media. Compared to1965, they've come many light years." 2

According to some USIA officials,the arrival of these commentators inthe West should be seen as part of alarger Soviet strategy to promote the"perception of equivalence" betweenthe USSRand the United States.Articulate representatives of the USSRseek to tell Western audiences thatthe "new" Soviet Union is not muchdifferent from the West. This hasspecial implications in WesternEurope, where if successful itpromotes neutralism (anddetachment from the U.S.) bysuggesting to Europeans they arecaught between two identicalsuperpowers, rather than one whichwishes to defend their democraticfreedoms and the other which wouldseek to dominate them. In the U.S.,the Soviet intent is to underminepopular support for defense

SOVIET .IOURNALISTSAN 0 0f'FI CIALS ASADVOCATES

Observant Americans arenow aware that some Sovietjournalists, particularly

those assigned to the U.S., and otherSoviet spokesmen are appearing inthe U.S.media as advocates for thepolicies of their government. Thisdevelopment, while recent in the U.S.,has been underway in WesternEurope for some time, and Soviet"commentators" have achieved afairly respectable status with WesternEuropean audiences. U.S.attentionto this phenomenon has beenattracted by a new generation ofSoviet journalist-advocates fl uent inEnglish, such as Radio Moscow

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I Nationaljournal, 12/14/85, p. 286\.2 NationalJournal. 12114/85. p. 2861

enhancement policies and tostrengthen the peace movement.

Although Soviet advocates seekmost often to use television to shapeU.S. public opinion, they also authorguest editorials; they write letters tothe editor; if they are articulate theyare sought out for newspaper ormagazine interviews; and failing allof the above, they can take out full-page advertisements in papers likeThe New York Times. None of theseavenues is routinely open to U.S.spokesmen in the USSR,of course.During the last two years there havebeen dozens of such Sovietappearances in the U.S. media.'Thesejournalists and spokesmen areuncritical of their government onsubstantive policy matters. There hasbeen some recent superficialcriticism of Soviet policies, particularlyby Vladimir Pozner (in his "personalview" the USSRshould allow Jews andothers to emigrate so long as theyare not "security risks," etc.) whichseems to be intended to enhance hiscredibility with skeptical Americanaudiences. Other non-journalistSoviet officials have had no troubleachieving easy access to U.S.media,ranging from Mikhail Gorbachevhimself in his famous pre-summitTime magazine interview, to Sovietcardiologist Yevgeniy Chazov, a fullmember of the CPSUCentralCommittee, 1985 Nobel PeacePrizeWinner, and co-chairman of theInternational Physicians for thePrevention of Nuclear War. Sovietspokesmen also engage in publicspeaking at U.S. universities andother fora.

American television viewers areusually unaware of the official andparty links of the individuals who areintroduced by their apparentprofession, such as "commentator"Vladimir Pozner or "concernedphysician" Chazov. Americanaudiences are ill-served by the factthat U.S. television anchors andreporters are not Sovietologists andseem less aggressive in pursuingmisstatements, distortions, orfalsehoods by Soviet advocates thanthey are with American officials,whose every statement is closelyscrutinized.

Soviet journalists in the "frontline" of the ideological strugglewith capitalism are virtually all

Communist Party members. Manyleading Soviet editors and directorsare full or candidate members of theCPSUCentral Committee. Althoughthis does not necessarily reflectheartfelt ideological zeal, it doesmeana rigid conformity to Party views as ameans to career advancement, whichcarries with it important perquisites:foreign imports, state-provideddachas, foreign travel and the bestschools for their offspring. They areexpected to adhere to well-knownstandards of "Party-mindedness."

Americans may be surprised tolearn that the Soviet journalists andspokesmen they see on U.S. tele-'Vision are so tightly integrated intothe Communist Party leadershipstructure. Novelist Yulian 'Sernyonov,whom Marvin Kalb hosted on aNovember 17, 1985NBC"Meet thePress," also reportedly served asghostwriter for his father-in-law S.K.Tsvigun, who was First DeputyChairman of the KGBfrom 1967-19824

Additionally, Gennadii Gerasimov,who, when Editor-in-Chief of MoscowNews appeared as a guest commen-tator on ABC"World News Tonight"(I II 18/85), has also served a two-yearstint on the Communist Party CentralCommittee. He is now chief of theInformation Department of theMinistry of Foreign Affairs. Sovietdiplomat defector Arkady Shevchenkocharged that Mr. Gerasimov is a KGBagent. Significantly, none of thesegovernment-party affiliations werementioned to American televisionviewers.

U.S. spokesmen and journalistshave no parallel access to Sovietmedia. Soviet officials reply thatSoviet spokesmen appearing on U.S.television are sought out by the U.S.networks, not vice versa, so if Sovietmedia choose not to invite Americanspokesmen, that is their right.Furthermore, coming from the U.S.with its tradition of an adversarialpress, few U.S.journalists wouldwish to appear in the Soviet media asadvocates for U.S. policies or values,since they see their role as narrow andspecific: that of newsgatherers alone.SomeU.S."journalists" do appear inSovietmedia, but either they are fromsuch publications as the U.S.Commu-nist PartyPeople's World or they aremainstream American journalistsopposed to specific U.S.policies.

During negotiations for theCultural Agreement signed at the

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GenevaSummit, the U.S. sideproposed language calling for sixtelevision appearances each bySoviet and U.S. officials on the othercountry's TV screens, but theproposition got nowhere. The Sovietswill consider such appearances on acase-by-case basis only. TheCommission recommends that at thenext U.S.-Soviet summit, and in thenext round of educational andcultural exchanges negotiations, theUnited States should press for accessto the Soviet media for official U.S.spokesmen, both through a generalagreement for binational exchangesofsuch appearances, and throughgreater openness to case-by-case·proposals.

THE NATURE OFSOVIET JOURNALISMAND INtORMATIONSTATE OWNERSHIP/IDEOLOGICAL CONTROLS

Soviet journalists areemployed in a nominal senseby thousands of organizations,

ranging from well-known ones likeTass (the international SovietGovernment wire service), Novosti(the Soviet international featureservice), Pravda (the daily newspaperof the Communist Party of the SovietUnion), and Izvestia (the SovietGovernment daily newspaper), tolesser publications in trade andprofessional fields. But Sovietjournalists are all employees of theSoviet state. All press organs fallunder the policy guidance of theCommunist Party of the Soviet Union(CPSU),the single "legal" politicalparty. Supervision of the media beginsat the highest levels of the CPSUCentral Committee on which siteditors and directors of all the majorSovietmedia organs. It rangesdown tothe editorial and working level of allSoviet publications. And within themedia organs themselves, each layerof production is further infused"} USIA's Research Division undertook a survey covering {heperiod 1983-85; see Appendix B.

4 TV Guide. 4/26/86. p. 3.

with ideological supervision, foreach has its own Communist Partycells which further shape the product.

NO PRESS FREEDOM

State ownership of mediaoutlets does not necessarilymean the media will be the

mouthpiece of government insocieties where freedom of speechand the press is constitutionally andtraditionally respected (the BBC, forexample). In the case of the SovietUnion, however, where the conceptof an independent press does not existeither in practice or in law,journalists are required to advocatepolicies decided by higher partyauthorities, and be supportive ofMarxist-Leninist theory, incl udingbelief in the class struggle and theinevitable victory of communismover capitalism. Article 25 of theSoviet Constitution guaranteesfreedom of the press only to theextent that it is used "in conformitywith the interests of the workingpeople, and in order to strengthen thesocialist system." Whereas a Westernjournalist strives towards objectivity,and tries to describe reality in all itsambiguity and complexity, the Sovietjournalist consciously seeks, throughthe selective use of information ofvarying degrees of truthfulness, tomanipulate the reader into supportof policies or objectives decided by ahigher authority: the CommunistParty.

E. P. Prokhorov says of Sovietjournalism, "The Marxist-Leninisttheory of journalism proceeds upon thepremise that a truly objective picture ofreality that can give reliable socialinformationfor the masses ...can beprovided only by ajournalism thatadheres to a communist party point ofview ...Under the leadership of thecommunist and workers' parties,Marxist journalism carries on propa-ganda, agitation, and organizationalactivity corresponding to the funda-mental interests of the workingpeople ... " 5

More recently, Egor Ligachev,the second most powerful CommunistParty leader after General SecretaryGorbachev who has oversight overpropaganda and information, said"All television and radio programs mustbe subordinated to one aim-explaining and implementing[Communist] Party policy." 6

DIFFERING U.S. AND SOVIETMEDIA ROLES

The differing roles of U.S. andSoviet journalists wererecently discussed at the

New York University Center for War,Peace,and the News Media, whichbrought Soviet officials and journaliststogether with U.S. and Europeanjournalists and editors. The groupquickly demonstrated how differentare Soviet and Western media.Participants quickly discovered theessential incompatibility of the twosystems. NBCNews PresidentLawrence Grossman noted that U.S.and Soviet "definitions" ofjournalism are different. He said thatthe Soviet press is the "spokesmanfor the government," and that it is"impossible" to get at the truth whengovernment controls the press. TheSoviet participants, on the otherhand, looked upon journalists asactivists. Journalists should"strengthen the spirit of Geneva" and"create a climate of trust so summitscan succeed" (Leonid Kravchenko,First Deputy Chairman ofGosteleradio, the Soviet StateCommittee for Television andRadio). They should show theirreaders how "the creation of nuclearweapons has betrayed our world"(Alexander Bovin, commentator forIzvestia and Gosteleradio). Theyshould "stop fanning the flames of'Star Wars' " (Mikhail Bruk, SpecialCorrespondent for Novosti). They are"like tailors ... they can embellish aman, or make him uglier" (VladimirMolchanov, Special Correspondent forNovosti).

Participating U.S.journalistsrefused to assume any such role. AsDavid Ignatius, Associate Editor ofThe Washington Post said, "Our role isnot to control or shape opinion; it issimply to inform." Or in the words ofGerd Ruge, Editor-in-Chief of West-deutscher Rundfunk (the WestGerman Television Network), the

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purpose of journalism is to "give thepublic as much information aspossible" about a subject.

SIGNS OF SOVIET CHANGE

During the past year, someWesterners have been heart-ened by calls for a new

spirit of glasnost' (candor, openness,publicity) by General SecretaryGorbachev. The Chernobyl nucleardisaster has shown the uncertaintyand unevenness with which the "newopenness" is being implemented.First Soviet official and journalisticreactions to the disaster weretradltional. They tried to suppress thestory to avoid internationalembarrassment, then to divert blameand hide behind stale accounts ofthe U.S. Three Mile Island accident;they accused the Western press ofusing the accident as a pretext for"whipping up anti-Soviet hysteria,"and domestically, suppressed thenews to "prevent panic."

Yet there followed domesticSoviet coverage of Chernobyl that wasunprecedented for a state thattraditionally hides natural and man-made disasters. That a post-Chernobyl press conference was givenat all, no matter how restricted, andthat the General Secretary gave atelevised speech on the matter, nomatter how delayed and incomplete,showed that worldwide informationtrends are having an impact on Sovietsociety.

There are other signs of change.The USSRis experimenting with new"Nightline-style and audience-response programs, which do allowfor some criticism of domesticmatters. One program is a journalistroundtable that permits occasionaldiffering viewpoints. The other is acall-in program resembling a much-publicized program in Hungary thattakes officials to task forbureaucratic failures. Sovietjournalist"raiders" (given a higher Party levelgo-ahead) sometimes descend oninstitutions and organizationsseeking to rectify mismanagement.Soviet publications carry "Letters tothe Editor" from Soviet citizenscomplaining about specific domesticproblems. While this avenue has longbeen off-limits to U.S. spokesmen5 Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Third Edition, p. 298.6 US. News and World Report. 6/9/86. p. 35

in Moscow, in early June, Pravdacarried a letter from U.S. ChargeRichard E. Combs, Jr. criticizing theSoviet reprinting of unverified chargesthat the CIA had been involved in thebombing of the West Berlindiscotheque earlier this year. To besure, Pravda followed the text of theletter with a vigorous anti-U.S.rebuttal. Two weeks earlier Pravdahad carried another letter from aWest German diplomat. The SovietGovernment uses this means ofadvocacy in the U.S. quite routinely,whether it be in The New York Timesor The Washington Post, or any otherorgan it chooses.

The press conference is anotherrecent Soviet innovation. WhereasSoviet press conferences usually relyon written questions and frequentlydo not take questions from foreignjournalists, nonetheless they are notabsolutely controllable, especially inforeign settings. Soviet viewers sawFrench journalists asking GeneralSecretary Gorbachev taboo questionsabout political prisoners in the USSRduring Gorbachev's pre-summit visitto France. Former Foreign Ministryspokesman Leonid Zamiatin was sounsettled at a pre-summit pressconference in Geneva by harshquestions from a Soviet dissident-exile that he reflexively called for the"militia" to take her away.

Soviet television is the mosttightly-controlled medium, probablybecause it is the most influentialshaper of opinions and its two nationalnetworks are easy to control. Sovietprint media is possibly less so. Attimes new ideas, always sanctionedby a Party authority, can be floated inprint. Analysts are waiting to seewhether glasnost' seeps into thesacrosanct coverage of foreign affairs,where any divergence from the Partyline is forbidden. For example, a RadioMoscow announcer who earlier thisdecade called the Soviet action inAfghanistan an "invasion" wassummarily removed and sent away forpsychiatric observation. Surprisingly,Pravda complained in a Maycommentary that "Information aboutthe capitalist world is monotonous ...journalistic cliches migrate frombroadcast to broadcast." 7 Andfinally, the pre-summit interview withPresident Reagan in Izvestia last year,the President's New Year's Dayappearance on Soviet television, andthe fact that several frequencies

of the Voice of America carryingPresident Reagan's pre-summitspeech to the Soviet people were notjammed, do indicate at least someliberalization of information.

One cannot underrate theimpact of Western broadcasts to theUSSR,such as Voice of America andRadio Liberty, in compelling a newSoviet openness. Chernobyl is onlythe most recent demonstration of thisinfluence. Soviet exiles VladimirSolovyov and Elena Klepikova claimthat not only do many Soviet citizensdepend on Western broadcasts to findout the truth; so too does the Sovietelite. According to Solovyov, theMoscow suburb of Zavidovo, wheremany officials maintain dachas, is notjammed so the leadership can keep'abreast of world affairs, and even ofpolitical events within the USSRthatare not reported.'

SOVIET COVERAGE OF THEU.S.

Soviet journalists must writestories that support or confirmofficially-decreed Communist

Party and Soviet Governmentperceptions of the U.S., its society andforeign policy. Almost withoutexception, those decreed perceptionsare negative.

American policies executed bythe "elite" are characterized as"militaristic," "imperialistic,""rapacious," "anti-democratic,""racist," "genocidal" and so on. Sovietarticles and television features aboutthe U.S. are written both by writersin the USSRand correspondentsassigned to the United States.CurrentSoviet media preoccupationsinclude the Strategic DefenseInitiative (SOl) and arms control ingeneral, the summit process, theplight of the U.S. homeless andethnic minorities, and U.S."militarism" in Central America andLibya. Many of the topics are gleanedfrom domestic American newssources. But Soviet reporters are notabove fabricating or embellishingstories that criticize the United States.Soviet media have depictedAmerican Indian activist andconvicted murderer Leonard Peltieras an American "political prisoner."

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To defuse Chernobyl criticism,commentaries were run on allegedrisks of continued U.S. nucleartesting in Nevada.

Appearances by Americans arenot unknown in the Soviet media.However, these individuals, rangingfrom American radicals like AngelaDavis to well-known Americans likeDr. Billy Graham to touristsinterviewed on the streets ofMoscow, are always quoted either tocondemn some aspect of the UnitedStates or its policies, or to espousepositions in tune with Sovietpositions. American criticism ofaspects of Soviet society or of SovietGovernment policies or institutionsnever appears in the Soviet press.Soviet coverage of the U.S. has beenno more favorable since the GenevaSummit than before, according toUSIAofficials who monitor Sovietpronouncements. The only changehas been a diminution of personalattacks on President Reagan. Butrhetoric and invective against theU.S.by such organs as Radio Moscow,Tass and Pravda have been asprofuse and harsh as ever. To thestandard stable of anti-Americancharges has been added a new one:the United Stateswith its assortedpolicies is "violating the Spirit ofGeneva."

SOVIET JOURNALISTSIN THE U.S.

Soviet journalists arepresently located inWashington, New York and

San Francisco; by choice, U.S.journalists are resident only inMoscow. In Washington, Tass,Pravda,Izvestia, and Soviet Radio andTelevision (Gosteleradio) arerepresented by 12 correspondents.In New York, six reporters representIzvestia, Komsomolskaya Pravda,Literaturnaia Gazeta, Moscow News,New Times, and Novosti. Tass has twocorrespondents in San Francisco.

Washington-based Sovietreporters, as might be expected, areprimarily interested in politico-military issues. New York coveragetends to be more cultural, with focuson "Americana." Science andtechnology are also of interest,7 us. News and World Report. 6/9/86. p. 36.8Christian Science Moniter, 6/\9/86, p. 15.

whereas economics get surprisinglylittle coverage.

The numbers of Soviet reportersin the u.s. are held to specific limitsby the Department of State throughissuance of visas to correspond tolimits set by Soviet authorities onU.S.journalists entering the USSR.Similar limits are not imposed onreporters from other Soviet bloccountries or Cuba, however. Sovietjournalists must request permissionfrom the State Department to travelmore than 25 miles from the center oftheir city of residence only becausethe USSRhas imposed those samelimits on American reporters. TheU.S. Embassy in Moscow is advised ifa Soviet journalist requests to cover astory beyond those limits, and if itapproves, the request is granted.That instance is then used by the U.S.Embassy in Moscow to requestsimilar treatment for U.S. journalistsby Soviet authorities.

The principle of numerical andgeographical reciprocity is closelyfollowed. The U.S. Embassy inMoscow closely tracks the treatmentof U.S.journalists in the USSR.WhenU.S.journalists are harassed or theirrights abridged, the U.S. Governmentmay retaliate against Sovietjournalists based in the U.S. But alltoo often, the U.S. media organizationwhose representative was attackedby Soviet authorities may urge theU.S. Government not to retaliate forfear of jeopardizing its own access inMoscow and falling behind itsAmerican competitors. InWashington, Soviet journalists findthemselves in the heart of what isprobably the most open worldcapital in terms of information,especially on sensitive subjects likedefense, foreign policy and politics.While American journalists inMoscow contend with nearlyinaccessible officialdom as well asall the other limitations of a closedsociety, Soviet journalists inWashington are flooded withinformation. They have WhiteHouse, State Department andCongressional press passes. Theycan attend the twice-daily WhiteHouse briefings, the daily noonbriefing at the State Department or aweekly briefing at the USIA ForeignPressCenter. They can attend openCongressional hearings on any issue,including the Strategic DefenseInitiative, the B-1 bomber or

security assistance to Israel. Theycan read our technical and specializedjournals. They can simply pick upthe phone and request an interviewwith anyone they wish. They are thebeneficiaries of a free and opensociety. If a Soviet correspondentwishes to find credible and factualcritiques of current U.S. Governmentpolicy in fields like foreign affairs ordefense, he or she need go no furtherthan any of the thousands of U.S.publications that, exercising theirfreedom of speech, deal with thoseissues. He can simply quote frominsightful editorials in mainstream orpartisan U.S. publications. This is acommon Soviet journalistictechnique, a skillful use of theopenness of U.S. society to condemnU.S. society.

Soviet journalists also haveaccess to such unprecedented tools asthe Freedom of Information Act(FOIA) which can provide them withunclassified details of U.S.Govern-ment operations. This law has noparallel in the USSR,nor even in manyWestern democracies. There are nodata presently available to show howheavily FOIA is actually used bySoviet journalists or third partiesworking on their behalf.

U.S. officials are not agreedwhether the presence of Sovietjournalists, with such dubious rolesand orientations, is a net loss or gainfor the United States. The downsideis obvious. But there is another side.Some USIAofficials believe havingSoviet journalists in the U.S. foreignpress corps exposes some of the bestnon-Soviet bloc young foreignjournalists to the Soviets early on,and shows how they work. They pointto the Tasscorrespondent whocovered the 1984 Los AngelesOlympics. The Tass reporter,following ideological guidance fromMoscow (which of course boycottedthe Olympics), wrote lengthy andturgid polemics about allegedsnafus in the Gamesand the "dangers"of Los Angeles. Biased andinaccurate, they became a comicrelief to the foreign press corpscovering the Olympics. "It was,"remarked an American observer onthe scene, "as if he were reportingother games in another city."

9

Having Soviet journalists in theU.S. is also an educational experiencefor the Soviets, exposing them toideas and experiences they wouldnot have otherwise. For the youngerones, the experience of being in anopen, democratic society can certainlynot be underrated, nor can theopportunity to measure forthemselves the divergence betweenthe reality of the U.S. and what theyhave been told about the U.S. by theSoviet Government.

U.S.IOURNALISTSIN THE USSR.u- ..S.journalists in the Soviet. Union confront the omni-

potent state at every turn.Aside from travel restrictions, thereare other tools of harassment if theystep out of line, from the withholdingof access to expulsion to, as in theDaniloff case, spurious charges ofespionage. Topics such as militarymatters are taboo; others such aspolitical machinations among theParty leadership must be divined byanalyzing seating arrangements atpublic ceremonies. The Americanjournalist is further challenged bythe fact that very few Soviet citizenswill risk losing whatever privilegesthey may have by speaking forth-rightly about sensitive matters,particularly to an American reporter.Whether they be scientists, govern-ment officials or factory workers, anySoviet citizen knows criticism of his orher society to a foreign journalistcould result in loss of Party member-ship, loss of job and privileges, lossof access by his or her children toeducational opportunities andemployment, possible commitment topsychiatric care, and even criminalcharges. Those willing to speak forth-rightly are those who have nothing tolose, such asdissidents and refuseniks.American reporters have little hopeof gleaning objective insights intoSoviet society by following the totallycontrolled Soviet press; theunderground samizdat press is analternative, but its clandestine andsporadic nature limits its usefulness.

American news organizationscovering the USSRare placed at afurther disadvantage vis-a-vis theSoviet Government by the intramuralcompetition. Network ratings

.------------------ ----------------- -- -~----~~ ----------------

depend in part on "scoops" and"exclusives" which in the USSRalmostinvariably originate from an officialsource. This makes it important forindividual U.S. media organizationsto stay on the good side of Sovietofficialdom, and consequently theyare reluctant to urge the U.S.Government to seek a hard tit-for-tatin maintaining reciprocity.

American journalists in theUSSRalso face a normal impedimentthat faces all foreign correspondents:working with a foreign language.Many~particularly U.S. televisioncorrespondents-do not speakRussian because their tenure inMoscow is limited and preparation torthe assignment is often not asrigorous or as long as the training ofprint journalists. Those Americanswho don't speak Russian must rely oninterpreters supplied by the SovietGovernment, whose presence willcertainly inhibit statements byinterviewees. Additionally, Americancorrespondents are usually assignedhousing in a compound reserved forforeigners, so they will be furtherisolated from Soviet citizens. Newly-arrived journalists, and veterans forthat matter, may find it difficult tobreak out of the limits of pressconferences and requests forinterviews that must be cleared bythe relevant organization with whomthe prospective interviewee isaffiliated.

According to a journalist whoserved in Moscow. U.S. reportersnormally go through several phasesduring their Moscow tenure. Uponarrival, they are generally well-treated, and are granted high-levelinterviews, but as time passes, thejournalist's access diminishes,particularly as the SovietGovernment becomes aware of theunfavorable stories. Outgoingstories, be it noted, are not censoredby the Soviet Government. In thefinal months in the USSRtheAmerican journalist, if he or she hasbeen perceived as obstreperous, runsthe risks of being entrapped in acontrived illegal situation such aspublic drunkenness, an allegedblack market transaction or beingsmeared in the local press, whichcould serve as the pretext for hisexpulsion if that is the way Sovietauthorities want to play it.

VOICE OF AMERICA(yOA) REPORTERSIN THE USSR

The Voice of America has hada particularly difficult time inrecent years getting accredited

VOA News Division and languageservice correspondents into the SovietUnion. (There are no Radio Moscowcorrespondents permanently stationedin the U.S., but Radio Moscow is partof Gosteleradio, which has four U.S.-based correspondents.) The BBChaslong maintained a bureau in MoscoW,but apparently the United States has'never pursued opening a VOAbureauthere. The Commission believes theU.S.Government should considerseeking to open such a bureau.

Although there has never been apermanent VOA bureau in MoscoW,VOA officials say that in \973- \ 978Soviet visas for traveling VOAcorrespondents were more easilyobtained. During this period there wasno jamming of VOA signals into theUSSR.But by \980, with the deterior-ation in relations brought on by theinvasion of Afghanistan, visa requestswere turned down routinely. VOAcorrespondents were given accredita-tion for the \980 Olympics, but novisas were issued in time to cover theevent.

In \986, some News Divisioncorrespondents have been able to getvisas for "familiarization visits" butnot for journalistic assignments to theUSSR.Others have been admitted,but only when accompanying a U.S.cabinet-level official (Vice PresidentBush, Secretary of State Shultz,Agriculture Secretary Block) on visitsto the USSR.Turndown for coverageofthe Communist Party congressesappears to be longstanding, and wasrepeated in \986.

Following State Departmentpressure, the Soviets approved visarequests by one VOA News Divisionand three language service (Russian,Czechoslovak, Arabic) correspond-ents to cover the 1986GoodwillGames,organized in large part by U.S.media executive Ted Turner. TheSoviets subsequently approved a visarequest for one VOARussian languageservice reporter to cover theTchaikovsky Competition. Whetherthis representsa liberalization of entry

10

policy for VOA cannot yet bedetermined. VOAofficials seek to havea protest made each time a VOA visarequest is turned down; the StateDepartment determines how best tolodge this protest. State Departmentcontrol overvisas for SovietCommunistPartymembers has been sharplycurtailed by the McGovernAmendmentto the Immigration and NaturalizationAct which makes U.S.Governmentaction against Soviet spokesmen (asopposed to resident correspondents)more difficult. This legislationrequires visa denials for Soviet (andall other non-l.l.S, Communist Partymembers) to be based on nationalsecurity grounds alone.

Ironically, another obstaclefacing VOAcorrespondents exists herein the United States. The StandingCommittee of Correspondents in theU.S.Congress is currently pressuringits members not to accept honorariafor appearing as moderators or asparticipants on VOA and USIA'sWORLDNETsatellite TV programs.This narrow-minded approachis especially perplexing to thisCommission, which campaignedsuccessfully to have VOA corre-spondents accredited to cover theU.S.Congress, an accreditation thatcame many years too late. It islikewise puzzling in view of the VOACharter, signed into law in 1976,which says, "VOAwill serve as aconsistently reliable andauthoritative source of news. VOAnews will be accurate, objective, andcomprehensive. VOAwill representAmerica, not any single segment ofAmerican society, and will thereforepresent a balanced andcomprehensive projection ofsignificant American thought andinstitutions."

Unfortunately, the fact thatsome U.S.journalists and mediaorganizations perceive VOA and byextension USIA'sWireless File andWORLDNETService, to be tainted byits government ownership hasbeen hypocritically exploited by theSoviet Government. This happened inlate April 1986,when the SovietEmbassy in Washington excludedseveral USIA reporters from a pressconference on those grounds. On theoccasion it is satisfactory to note, theWashington press corps did protestSoviet high-handedness.

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CSCE FINAL ACT, 1975

The Soviet Union, together with theother signatory nations of the CSCE(Helsinki Accords), is specificallyobliged to:

"... facilitate the dissemination of oralinformation through the encouragementof lectures and lecture tours bypersonalities and specialists from theother participating States, as well asexchanges of opinions at round tablemeetings, seminars, symposia, summerschools, congresses and other bilateraland multilateral meetings" (part 2,section a, para. i);

"... facilitate the improvement of thedissemination, on their territory, ofnewspapers and printed publications,periodical and non-periodical, from theother participating States" (Part 2,section a, para. ii);

"... improve the possibilities foracquaintance with bulletins of officialinformation issued by diplomaticmissions and distributed by thosemissions ... "(Part 2, section a, para. ii);

"... grant to permanently accreditedjournalists of the participatingstates ...multiple entry and exit visas

u•.• note the expansion in the .. for specified periods" (Part 2, section c);dissemination of information broadcastby radio, and express the hope for thecontinuation of this process" (Part 2,section a, para. iii),

"... examine in afavourable spirit andwithin a suitable and reasonable timescale requests from journalists forvisas" (Part 2, section c);

"... ease, on a basis of reciprocity,procedures for arranging travel byjournalists of the participating Statesin the country where they are exercisingtheir profession, and to provideprogressively greater opportunities forsuch travel.:" (Part 2, section c);

"...reaffirm that the legitimate pursuitof their professional activity will neitherrender journalists liable to expulsionnor otherwise penalize them. If anaccredited journalist is expelled, he willbe informed of the reasons for this actand may submit an application forre-examination of his case" (Part 2,section c)

u... encourage the wider showing andbroadcasting of a greater variety ofrecorded and filmed informationfromthe other participating States,illustrating the various aspects of lifein their countries ... "(Part 2, section a,.• ..,para. 111);

"... favor cooperation among public orprivate, national or international radioand television organizations, inparticular through the exchange of bothlive and recorded radio and televisionprogrammes, and through the jointproduction and the broadcasting anddistribution of such programmes" (Part2, section b);

"... view favorably the possibilities ofarrangements between periodicalpublications as well as between news-papers from the participating States,for the purpose of exchanging andpublishing articles" (Part 2, section b);

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-----~" ---

•IITABLE 1

TOTAL SIGNIFICANT U.S.·SOVIET OFFICIAL APPEARANCESIN OPPOSITE·COUNTRY PRINT MEDIA, 1984·85*

Soviets in the American Press, October 1984 - September 1985

VVashington Post , 109New York Times 80 . -Christian Science Monitor • 15Time , _7

Totals 211

Americans in the Soviet Press, September 1984 - August 1985-------------------- - -

Pravda 8Izvestia 13Trud 26Literaturnaia Gazeta 20

Totals 67

*Explanation of USIA Methodology: 1) an "appearance" comprised "an article, an interview, a letter to the editor. an 'op-ed' piece.or a paid advertisement;" 2) "appearances" had to be at least four column inches in length; 3) for purposes of qualitative analysis,four publications from each country were deemed "representative examples of each country's press;" and 4) articles on allsubjects, rather than overtly "political" subjects were included, since in the Soviet context it was "often difficult, if not impossible,to draw the line" berween the rwo.

Source. u.s. Information Agency. Office of Research. October 16. 1985

13

14

-- --

[I--

TABLE 2

SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT SOVIET OFFICIAL APPEARANCES ON U.S. NETWORKS, 1983·85

Name and Position Number of Appearances on Networks Total Number*ABC CBS NBC CNN PBS of Appearances

Alekseev, Vladimir ,Novosti journalist 1 .. 1

Dobrynin, Anatolii F.Ambassador to U.s. I 1 2

Karpov, ViktorChief Arms Negotiator 1 1 2

Arbatov, Georgii A.Director. U.S.A. Institute 3 3 3 3 12

Gromyko, Andrei A.Former Foreign Minister 2 2

Bogachev, VladimirTass 1 1

Afanas'ev, Viktor G.Pravda 2 2

Vasil'ev, GennadiiPravda 2 2

Larionova, NatashaPravda 2 2

Palladin, AleksandrIzvestia 3 3

Ovinnikov, RichardDeputy Representative to the U.N. I 3 4

Shalnev, AleksandrTass I 1

Adamov, JosephRadio Moscow 3 1 10 14

Gerasimov, GennadiiSoviet TV anchormanDeputy Chairman, Novosti 6 2 8

TABLE 2 (continued)--- - --

Total NumberName and Position ABC CBS NBC CNN PBS of Appearances

Zamiatin. Leonid M.Chief. CPSUInternational Information Department 4 2 7

Mil'shtein, MikhailSoviet General (Retired)U.S.A. Institute 3

Gramov, MaratChairman, Sports Committee 2Kulagin, Vladimir M.Soviet Diplomat in U.S.

Linnik, Viktor ,CPSUCC Consultant, Pravda I ,

Gvishiani, DzhermenDeputy Chairman,State Committee forScience and Technology

Isakov, ViktorSoviet Diplomat in U.S.

Manakov, AnatoliiJournalist

Kornienko, GeorgiiDeputy Foreign Minister 2 4

Pozner. VladimirRadio Moscow 15 3 2 21

Troianovskii, OlegSoviet Ambassador to the U.N. 2 2Ogarkov, NikolaiFormer Chief of Staffof Soviet Armed Forces 2 2 4

Crigor'ev. AleksandrSoviet Peace Commission

Trofimenko, GenrikhU.S.A. Institute

Menshikov, StanislavCPSU International Department 4 2 2 8

Kochetkov, EvgeniiSoviet Diplomat in U.S.

Yushkiavichius, GenrikhVice-Chairman, Gosteleradio

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TABLE 2 (continued)

CNN PBSTotal Numberof AppearancesCBS NBCName and Position ABC

Setunskii, NikolaiN.Y. Bureau Chief, Tass 2 2

Kobysh, VitalySection Chief, CPSUInternational Information Department 2 4

Zarubina, ZoiaSoviet Women's Committee 2

Kapitsa, SergeiScientist, TV show host 3

Kukushkin, VsevolodSoviet sports commentator 2

Liutyi, AleksandrTass

Beglov, MikhailTass 3 3

Kelis-Berok, VladimirSeismologist

Sagdeev, RoaldDirector, Space Research InstituteMoscow

Kuzin. Mikhail I.Director, Moscow Surgery Institute

Velikhov, Evgenii P.Vice-President, Soviet Academyof Sciences

Il'in, Leonid A.Director, Biophysics Institute

TOTAL 138

* ABC appearances cover 1981-85

Source: U.S. Information Agency, April 4, 1986

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For additional information. please write:

United States Advisory Commissionon Public Diplomacy

Room 6003014th SI . SWWashington ') C. 20547

Bruce Gregory. Staff DirectorMichael Morgan. Deputy Staff Director(202) 485-24'>7