source: brewer, saez and shephard (mirrlees review)
DESCRIPTION
Source: Brewer, Saez and Shephard (Mirrlees Review). Pareto distribution as an approximation to the income distribution. Source: Brewer, Saez and Shephard (Mirrlees Review). Source: Brewer, Saez and Shephard (Mirrlees Review). Table: Taxable Income Elasticities at the Top. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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Source: Brewer, Saez and Shephard (Mirrlees Review)
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0.0000
0.0000
0.0001
0.0010
0.0100
£100,000 £150,000 £200,000 £250,000 £300,000 £350,000 £400,000 £450,000 £500,000
Prob
abili
ty d
ensi
ty (l
og s
cale
)
Pareto distribution
Actual income distribution
Pareto distribution as an approximation to the income distribution
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A. Top 1% Income Share and MTR, 1962-2003
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
1962
1966
1970
1974
1978
1982
1986
1990
1994
1998
2002
Mar
gina
l Tax
Rat
e
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
Inco
me
Shar
eTop 1% MTRTop 1% income share
Source: Brewer, Saez and Shephard (Mirrlees Review)
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B. Top 5-1% Income and MTR, 1962-2003
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
1962
1966
1970
1974
1978
1982
1986
1990
1994
1998
2002
Mar
gina
l Tax
Rat
e
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
Inco
me
Shar
e
Top 5-1% MTR
Top 5-1% income share
Source: Brewer, Saez and Shephard (Mirrlees Review)
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Table: Taxable Income Elasticities at the Top
Simple Difference (top 1%) DD using top 5-1% as control
1978 vs 1981 0.32 0.081986 vs 1989 0.38 0.411978 vs 1962 0.63 0.862003 vs 1978 0.89 0.64
Full time series 0.69 0.46 (0.12) (0.13)
With updated data the estimate remains in the .35 - .55 range with a central estimate of .46, but remain quite fragile
Note also the key relationship between the size of elasticity and the tax base (Slemrod and Kopczuk, 2002)
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EITC Schedule in US – Single Parent Families, 2004
Larger credit, covering higher earners for families with two or more children.
$0
$1,000
$2,000
$3,000
$4,000
$5,000
$0 $5,000 $10,000 $15,000 $20,000 $25,000 $30,000 $35,000 $40,000Earnings
EIT
C C
redi
t
Two or more children One Child
Phase In Region
Flat Region
Phase-out Region
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EITC Benefit for Selected Tax Years(A) Schedule for Family with 1 Child
$0
$1,000
$2,000
$3,000
$4,000
$0 $5,000 $10,000 $15,000 $20,000 $25,000 $30,000
Earnings (1996 $)
EITC
Cre
dit (
1996
$) 1996 EITC
1993 EITC
1990 EITC
1984 EITC
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(B) Schedule for Family with 2+ Children
$0
$500
$1,000
$1,500
$2,000
$2,500
$3,000
$3,500
$4,000
$0 $5,000 $10,000 $15,000 $20,000 $25,000 $30,000
Earnings (1996 $)
EITC
Cre
dit (
1996
$)
1996 EITC
1993 EITC
1990 EITC
1984 EITC
EITC Benefit for Selected Tax Years
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Number of EITC Recipient Families (Millions)
Source: Green Book, 2004, Joint Committee on Taxation, Ways and Means Committee
0
5
10
15
20
25
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000Year
EITC
Rec
ipie
nts
(Mill
ions
)
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In-work Credits in OECD Countries in 2001
Target group
Approximate Maximum
Income Increase (Euros)
Phase-in
Phase-out
Hours criterion
Belgium1 Individual 440 Yes Yes No Canada, Quebec 2 Families 3,150 Yes Yes No Finland Individual 290 Yes Yes No France3 Individual 230 Yes Yes No Ireland4 Families 2,260 or more No Yes Yes Netherlands Individual 920 Yes No No New Zealand5a Families 7,800 No Yes Yes New Zealand5b Families 780 per child No Yes Yes UK 6 Families 6,150 or more No Yes Yes United States Families 4,000 Yes Yes No Source: Owens (2005), Table 3.
Central position in the OECD labour market policy debate
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The EITC and marginal tax rates more broadlyMarginal Tax Rates for Families with One Child, 2004
Source: NBER's TAXSIM model tabulation by Hoynes (2006)
-50%
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
$0 $25,000 $50,000 $75,000 $100,000 $125,000 $150,000
Earnings
Mar
gina
l Tax
Rat
e
Single 1-child
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The Tax Credit Expansion in the UK: 2000 Reform
00 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Hours worked per week
WFT
C
Family Credit WFTC
70%
55%
£120 -transfers per week for a min. wage lone parent
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Expenditure on in-work programmes in the UK
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The US Earned Income Tax Credit
£0
£1,000
£2,000
£3,000
£4,000
£5,000
£6,000
£0 £5,000 £10,000 £15,000 £20,000 £25,000
Gross income (£/year)
EITC
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The UK Working Families Tax Credit
£0
£1,000
£2,000
£3,000
£4,000
£5,000
£6,000
£0 £5,000 £10,000 £15,000 £20,000 £25,000
Gross income (£/year)
WFTC
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£0
£1,000
£2,000
£3,000
£4,000
£5,000
£6,000
£0 £5,000 £10,000 £15,000 £20,000 £25,000
Gross income (£/year)
EITC
WFTC
The UK and US tax credit systems compared
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0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Weekly Hours of Work
Inco
me
per
Mon
th ($
1995
)
Income Assistance Self Sufficiency Program
Budget Constraint for a Single Parent on Minimum Wage
IA
SSP
Canadian Self Sufficiency Program
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Monthly Employment Rate for a Single Parent with One Child BC
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Months from Random Assignment
Mon
thly
Em
ploy
men
t Rat
e
Controls Experimentals
Canadian Self Sufficiency Program
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Estimating the impact of a tax credit – with no experiment.
In 1984 the US EITC system looked like:
0500
1000150020002500300035004000
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000
Family Earnings
EIT
C ($
1995
)
one kid two kids
Phase-in at11%
Phase-out at12.2%
Maximum credit $550
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The EITC in 1990
0500
1000150020002500300035004000
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000
Family Earnings
EIT
C ($
1995
)
one kid two kids
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The EITC in 1993
0500
1000150020002500300035004000
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000
Family Earnings
EIT
C ($
1995
)
one kid two kids
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The EITC in 1996
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000
Family Earnings
EIT
C ($
1995
)
one kid two kids
Phase-in increasedto 40%
Maximum credit now $3556
Phase-out at 21%
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00 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Hours worked per week
WFT
C
Family Credit WFTC
70%
55%
£120 -
transfers per week for a min. wage lone parent pre and post 2000
Evaluating the UK Tax Credit Reforms
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1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002No Work 0.753 0.762 0.769 0.770 0.774 0.767 0.775child
Age 26.789 26.906 26.799 26.957 27.104 27.317 27.450Non-white 0.073 0.077 0.080 0.084 0.091 0.098 0.102Left education before 16 0.078 0.072 0.062 0.057 0.052 0.047 0.043Left education at 16 or 17 0.394 0.381 0.375 0.375 0.363 0.353 0.356London and South-East 0.341 0.350 0.349 0.347 0.354 0.360 0.352Rented accommodation 0.343 0.353 0.358 0.340 0.339 0.350 0.346
Observations 26243 24463 24410 23987 22558 23517 22846
Child Work 0.417 0.425 0.444 0.464 0.477 0.487 0.496
Age 32.330 32.580 32.655 32.863 33.181 33.280 33.288Non-white 0.100 0.099 0.091 0.098 0.106 0.112 0.111Left education before 16 0.209 0.196 0.189 0.169 0.154 0.161 0.155Left education at 16 or 17 0.632 0.627 0.633 0.635 0.646 0.641 0.637London and South-East 0.285 0.285 0.285 0.293 0.294 0.303 0.301Rented accommodation 0.686 0.704 0.708 0.696 0.697 0.694 0.676Number of kids 1.783 1.785 1.791 1.784 1.778 1.776 1.794Age of youngest child 6.187 6.249 6.272 6.414 6.592 6.612 6.676Observations 14613 14172 14550 14343 13572 14097 13996
Table 1: Sample Descriptives for Single Women
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Employment rates
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Difference-in-Differences: Lone Mothers Employment
Single Women
Marginal Effect
Standard Error
Sample Size
Family Resources Survey
3.57 0.81 74,959
Labour Force Survey
3.81 0.33 233,208
Data: Spring 1996 – Spring 2003.
Drop: Summer 1999 – Spring 2000 inclusive; individuals aged over 45.
Outcome: employment. Average impact x 100, employment percentage.
Matching Covariates: age, education, region, ethnicity,..
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£0.00
£50.00
£100.00
£150.00
£200.00
£250.00
£300.00
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48
hours of work
WFTCNet earningsOther income
WFTC interactions with other taxes and benefits in the UK
single parent on minimum wage
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£0.00
£50.00
£100.00
£150.00
£200.00
£250.00
£300.00
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
hours of work
WFTCIncome SupportNet earningsOther income
WFTC interactions with other taxes and benefits in the UK
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£0.00
£50.00
£100.00
£150.00
£200.00
£250.00
£300.00
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
hours of work
Local tax rebateRent rebateWFTCIncome SupportNet earningsOther income
WFTC interactions with other taxes and benefits in the UK
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Hours’ distribution for lone parents, 1990
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Hours’ distribution for lone parents, 1993
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Fra
ctio
n
tothours16 30 40 50
.05
.1
.15
Weekly Hours WorkedLow Education Single Mothers (aged 18-45)
Lower hours limit
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Fra
ctio
n
tothours16 30 40 50
.05
.1
.15
Weekly Hours WorkedLow Education Single Childless Women (aged 18-45)
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Reform impacts on budget constraints for lone parent
£0
£50
£100
£150
£200
£250
£300
£350
£0 £50 £100 £150 £200 £250 £300 £350
Income before taxes and benefits
Inco
me
afte
r tax
es a
nd
bene
fits April 97
April 00
Assumes 2 children < 11, hourly wage of £5/hour, no childcare costs, no rent, no child support
change in in-work support only
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£0
£50
£100
£150
£200
£250
£300
£350
£0 £50 £100 £150 £200 £250 £300 £350
Income before taxes and benefits
Inco
me
afte
r tax
es a
nd
bene
fits April 97
April 00
Assumes 2 children < 11, hourly wage of £5/hour, no childcare costs, no rent, no child support
Reform impacts on budget constraints for lone parent
Adding in the change in income support
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Take-up and WFTCVariation in take-up probability with entitlement to FC/WFTC
0.2
.4.6
.81
Pro
babi
lity
of ta
ke-u
p
0 50 100 150 200FC/WFTC entitlement (£/week, 2002 prices)
Lone parents Couples
FRS
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Estimation Results, Full Sample
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Structural Model Elasticities
Earnings Density Extensive Intensive0 0.3966
80 0.1240 0.5029 0.5029140 0.1453 0.7709 0.3944220 0.1723 0.7137 0.2344300 0.1618 0.4920 0.0829Participation elasticity 1.1295
(a) Youngest Child Aged 11-18
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Structural Model Elasticities
Earnings Density Extensive Intensive0 0.5942
80 0.1694 0.2615 0.2615140 0.0984 0.6534 0.1570220 0.0767 0.5865 0.1078300 0.0613 0.4984 0.0834Participation elasticity 0.6352
(c) Youngest Child Aged 0-4
• Check the robustness of the structural model by the ability to simulate the impact of the WFTC reform
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Structural Evaluation Simulation Results: WFTC Expansion
Notes: Simulated on FRS data; Standard errors in italics.
All: 5.12 without change in take-up – key impact effect
All y-child y-child y-child y-child0 to 2 3 to 4 5 to 10 11 to 18
Change in employment rate: 5.95 3.09 7.56 7.54 4.960.74 0.59 0.91 0.85 0.68
Average change in hours: 1.79 0.71 2.09 2.35 1.650.2 0.14 0.23 0.34 0.2
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Structural Evaluation Simulation Results: All Reforms
Notes: Simulated on FRS data; Standard errors in italics.
All y-child y-child y-child y-child0 to 2 3 to 4 5 to 10 11 to 18
Change in employment rate: 3.68 0.65 4.53 4.83 4.030.84 0.6 0.99 0.94 0.71
Average change in hours: 1.02 0.01 1.15 1.41 1.240.23 0.21 0.28 0.28 0.22
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Difference-in-Differences: Impact on Employment
Single Women Marginal Effect Standard Error Sample Size
Family Resources Survey
3.57 0.81 74,959
Labour Force Survey
3.81 0.33 233,208
Data: Spring 1996 – Spring 2003.
Drop: Summer 1999 – Spring 2000 inclusive; individuals aged over 45.
Outcome: employment. Average impact x 100, employment percentage.
Matching Covariates: age, education, region, ethnicity,..
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• The diff-in-diff parameter can be identified from the structural evaluation model
• Simulated diff-in-diff parameter• The structural model then defines the average impact of the
policy on the treated as:
• Compare simulated diff-in-diff moment with diff-in-diff
Evaluation of the ‘ex-ante’ structural model
SEMDD
X
fX, ,D 1dF
T 1,t 1dFX X
fX, ,D 0dF
T 1,t 0dFX
X
fX, ,D 0dF
T 0,t 1dFX X
fX, ,D 0dF
T 0,t 0dFX
SEMX Prh 0|X, D 1 Prh 0|X, D 0
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All reforms, 1999-2002
Change in participation (ppt)
WFTC All reforms
Lone Parents 5.11 3.66
Married Women -0.57 -0.49
Partner working -0.64 -0.52
Partner not working 0.06 -0.26
Married Men 0.75 -0.40
Partner working 0.19 -0.55
Partner not working 2.11 -0.01
WFTC impact
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Employment Trends for Women:1978-2005
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003
singlenokids singlekids couplenokids couplekids
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00
After Tax Income
Earnings
An Optimal Schedule
EITC ‘bubble’ region
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00
After Tax Income
Earnings
break even point
subsidy or‘phase-in’region
‘phase-out’region
Some ‘IncomeSupport’ – but what form?
A ‘Typical’ ‘Integrated’ Optimal Schedule
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The Optimal Schedule, Youngest Child Aged 0-4
100.00
150.00
200.00
250.00
300.00
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
No hours rule 16 hours rule
Weekly earningsMarch 2002 prices£6 per hour
Blundell and Shephard (2006)
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An Optimal Schedule, Youngest Child Aged 5-10
100.00
150.00
200.00
250.00
300.00
350.00
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
No hours rule 16 hours ruleWeekly earningsMarch 2002 prices
Blundell and Shephard (2006)
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An Optimal Schedule, Youngest Child Aged 11-18
100.00
150.00
200.00
250.00
300.00
350.00
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
No hours rule 16 hours rule
Weekly earningsMarch 2002 prices
Blundell and Shephard (2006)
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An Optimal Schedule, Youngest Child Aged 11-18
100.00
150.00
200.00
250.00
300.00
350.00
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
No hours rule 16 hours rule Optimal hours rule
Blundell and Shephard (2006)
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Effect of child age revenue neutral reforms on average PTRs across the earnings distribution, by age of youngest child
Notes: Non-par
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200
Gross earnings (£/week)
Youngest child 0-4, before reform Youngest child 0-4, after reformYoungest child 5-18, before reform Youngest child 5-18, after reform
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Effect of early retirement revenue neutral reforms on average PTRs across the earnings distribution, by age
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200
Gross earnings (£/week)
Under 55, before reform Under 55, after reform55-70, before reform 55-70, after reform
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WFTC Reform budget constraint for mother in couple
Notes: Two children under 5. Assumes hourly wage of £4.10, no housing costs or council tax liability and no childcare costs.The first earner in the couple is assumed to earn £300 per week in 2002 prices.
260
280
300
320
340
360
380
400
420
440
460
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Hours worked
Net
inco
me
(£ p
.w.,
2002
pric
es)
1999 2002
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Budget constraints for a 2nd earner in a couple
£200
£250
£300
£350
£400
£450
£500
£550
£0 £50 £100 £150 £200 £250 £300 £350
2nd earner's income before taxes and benefits
Fam
ily in
com
e af
ter t
axes
and
be
nefit
s
April 97
April 00
April 04
Assumes 2 children < 11, hourly wage of £5/hour, no childcare costs, no rent, no child support, partner earns £300/wk
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Monthly Employment Rate for a Single Parent with One Child BC
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Months from Random Assignment
Mon
thly
Em
ploy
men
t Rat
e
Controls Experimentals
Canadian Self Sufficiency Program
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.1.1
5.2
.25
.3E
mpl
oym
ent r
ate
0 10 20 30 40 50 60Months after random assignment
control experimental
But …dynamic effects on employment rates?
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66.
57
7.5
88.
5H
ourly
real
wag
es
0 10 20 30 40 50 60Months after random assignment
control experimental
and dynamic effects on wages and productivity?
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100
200
300
400
Mon
thly
ear
ning
s
0 10 20 30 40 50 60Months after random assignment
control experimental
SSP: Monthly earnings by months after RA
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Percentage receiving income assistance.6
.7.8
.91
Per
cent
0 10 20 30 40 50 60Months after random assignment
control experimental
Percentage receiving income assistance by month after RA
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Can the reforms explain weekly hours worked?Single Women (aged 18-45) - 2002