This d issertation has been 64—6895 m icrofilm ed exactly as received

EFRAN, Jay Steven, 1936- SOME PERSONALITY DETERMINANTS OF MEMORY FOR SUCCESS AND FAILURE.

The Ohio State U niversity, Ph.D ., 1963 Psychology, c lin ica l

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan

SOME PERSONALITY DETERMINANTS OP MEMORY FOR SUCCESS AND FAILURE

DISSERTATIONPresented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

ByJay Steven Efran, B. A., M. S.

The Ohio State University 1963

Approved by

/ P i d v i s e r D^^artment of Psychology

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful to my adviser, Dr* Julian B* Rotter, vho provided guidelines when necessary and freedom when necessary*

Classmates and members of my research team contributed many useful suggestions* Lane K* Conn and James E* Marcia vere particularly helpful "listeners•" Richard MeFall prepared some of the preliminary task materials*

Arrangements for the use of high school students as subjects vere made through the kind cooperation of Dr* L* 0. Andrews of The Ohio State University; Messrs* E* R* Relchelderfer and Clayton E* Ferrell of the Columbus, Ohio school system; and the principals of the schools, Messrs* Michael Lover and H* Delbert Svaln*

John R* Rizzo has been Invaluable as a critic and friend* Helping In multiple capacities, he provided encouragement at critical times, acted as trial subject for each new task devised, served as sounding board for emerging Ideas, and proofread each page of the study except this one*

11

CONTENTS

TABLESFIGURESChapter

I.II.

III.

Pagev

vii

INTRODUCTION............................. ' 1BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM................. 4Emotion and Memory ....... 6Zelgamik's Experiment .................... 16The Experiment of Rosenzveig and Mason 17Ego- and Task-Orientation ................. 19The Age Factor................... 25Ego-Strength and Recall ..••••......... •••• 26Need Achievement and Recall........ 32Child-Rearing and Recall ............... 35The MMPI Scales ................ 35Completlon-Incompletion vs. Success-Failure ••••• •••• 30

Summary of the Relevant Research..... ••••• 38Some Social Learning Theory............. 40Selective Recall and Social Learning ..... 43Two Studies of Special Relevance ........ 48Internal vs. External Control ......... 51The Rypotheses Restated... ...... 54

METHODOLOGY.......................... 56Over-Viev ..................... 50Subjects ..... 58Measuring Need Value and Freedom ofMovement........ 59

Composition of the Groups ............ 63Measuring Internal vs. External Control .... 65The Experimental Tasks ............ 65Expectancy Estimates ...••........ 68The Bogus Scores ................. 68The Filler Task........................ 71The Recall Test ................. 71

ill

Chapter FageOrder of the Tasks ...... 72Administration of the QuestionnaireMaterials .... 73

Al ministration of the IndividualSessions ..... 74

Ex peri inenter Bias ••••••••••••••.......... 81The Dependent Variables and StatisticalProcedures ..................... 81

The Experimental Design ••••........ 82IV. RESULTS........ 84

Need Value and Selective Recall.......... 84Freedom of Movement and Selective Recall ... 89The Direction of Distortion ••••••••..... 99Reliability of the Memory Scores • .... 105I-E and Recall ................ 107Abbreviated Taylor Scale and Recall ...... Ill

V. DISCUSSION.......... 115Recall Accuracy ........... 117Need Value and Freedom of Movement ...••«.•• 119I-E ............. 124Abbreviated Taylor Scale........ 125

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS................ 127APPENDIX A ........................... 133APPENDIX B ........................ 138APPENDIX C ................................. 142APPENDIX D ........ 153APPENDIX E ...................................... 156APPENDIX F ........... 159APPENDIX G ........................ l6lAPPENDIX H ............. 163APPENDIX I .............. 166BIBLIOGRAPHY................... 177AUTOBIOGRAPHY........... 186

iv

TABLESTable Page1. Association Value Means and Standard Deviations

for the Bogus Score Numbers .......... 702. Summary of the Experimental Design 833. Means and Standard Deviations of the Memory

Scores for Each Group ....... ............ 854* Means, Standard Deviations, and t Tests of

Intelligence Quotients and Grade Point Averages, Groups A and B • •••...... 86

5* Summary of Analysis of Variance for AbsoluteMemory-Error Scores, Groups A and B* ..... 88

6. Summary of Analysis of Variance for Memory-HitScores, Groups A and B .......... 89

7* Means, Standard Deviations and t Tests ofIntelligence Quotients and Grade Point Averages, Groups C and D ............ 91

8. Summary of Analysis of Variance for AbsoluteMemory-Error Scores, Groups C and D .... 92

9. Frequency of Success and Failure Memory-Hitb,Groups C and D ........ 93

10. Means, Standard Deviations, and t Tests ofIntelligence Quotients and Grade PointAverages, Groups E and F .......... 94

11. Summary of Analysis of Variance for AbsoluteMemory-Error Scores, Groups E and F .......... 96

12. Frequency of Success and Failure Memory-Hits,Groups E and F 96

13. Correlations between Intelligence Quotient andGrade Point Average and (lj Memory-Hits,(2) Absolute Memory-Error Scores ....... 97

Table Page14. Correlations betveen Task Expectancies and

(l) Memory-Hits, (2) Absolute Memory-ErrorScores .............. 98

15. Summary of Analysis of Variance for SignedMemory-Error Scores, Groups A and B ••••••••.. 100

16. Summary of Analysis of Variance for SignedMemory-Error Scores, Groups C and D ........ 101

17. Summary of Analysis of Variance for SignedMemory-Error Scores, Groups E and ? ....... 102

18. Means, Standard Deviations and t Tests for theSigned Memory-Error Scores of Each Groupafter the Omission of Extreme Scores... 103

19. Mean Signed Memory-Error Scores for Success andFailure Conditions, Groups A and B ........ 105

20. Correlations betveen First and Second SuccessMemory Scores and betveen First and Second Failure Memory Scores, Groups C and D .. 107

21. Means, Standard Deviations and t Tests for I-EScale Scores, Groups A and B, C and D,E and F ........................... 108

*

22. Correlations betveen I-E Scale Scores and (l)Memory-Hit Scores, and (2) Memory-ErrorScores .................... 110

23. Means, Standard Deviations and t Tests ofAbbreviated Taylor Scores. Groups A and B,C and D, E and F ................. 112

24. Correlations betveen Abbreviated Taylor ScaleScores, and (l) Failure Error Per Cent, (2) Memory-Hit Scores, (3) Memory-Error Scores ... 113

23. Distributions of Scholastic and Art Need Value and Freedom of Movement Scores, Groups A and B ............................... 139

26. Distributions of Scholastic Need Value andFreedom of Movement Scores, Groups C and D ... 140

27. Distributions of Scholastic Need Value andFreedom of Movement Scores, Groups E and F ... l4l

vi

FIGURESFigure Page

1. Visual Memory Teat, First Series ..... 1542. Visual Memory Test, Second Series ...... 1553. Hidden Figures Test, First Series.......... 1574. Hidden Figures Test, Second Series..... 158

vil

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Social learning theory is an approach to the prediction of complex human behavior which utilizes an expectancy concept as well as a concept of goal prefer­ence or motivation (Rotter, 195*0. To predict what an individual will do in a given situation, the theory assumes that it is necessary to know not only his goals, but his expectations that particular behaviors will lead to these goals. The theory also holds that an individual's ex­pectations are based upon his past experience. Since events which an individual construes mainly in terms of "success" or *failure" should theoretically exert strong influence on expectation, the registration and retention of these events becomes a matter of special Interest to proponents of this point of view.

The psychoanalytic concept of "repression" has also generated Interest in the processes by which success and failure experiences are perceived and remembered. Psychologists have wanted to experimentally test the

1

2notion that at least some individuals selectively eliminate from avareness the unpleasant or unacceptable* By assuming that failure experiences are unpleasant, they have been able to use a modification of the completed-lncompleted task paradigm that Zeigaraik (1938) had UBed earlier to study task tensions* In this modification, subjects are allowed to successfully complete some tasks and not others, and the situation is structured so that incompletion implies failure* Recall for the completed tasks is then contrasted with recall for the interrupted tasks*

Recent work with this technique has emphasized the existence of Important individual differences— some subjects tend to remember their successes, others tend to remember their failures (e*g*, Alper, 1937; Atkinson, 1953; Caron & Wallach, 1959; Erlksen, 195*0 • Attempts have been made to predict recall direction with various personality measures, including measures of "ego-strength," "n Achievement," and "represslon-sensltization*" This study hypothesizes that two major social learning theory constructs— need value and freedom of movement— can be effectively used in combination to predict the direction of selective recall* While expectation is thought to be influenced by one's past history of sucoess and failure events, it is hypothesized that at the same time, selective memory for success and failure is a function

of currently held expectancies and reinforcement prefer­ences.

This study can also be thought of as an explora** tory attempt to develop some hypotheses concerning memory from a social learning theory framework. While social learning constructs have proven useful In under­standing and predicting behavior In a variety of situations, these constructs have thus far been applied to memory phenomena in only one study (Bluraenkrantz,1953).

The enumeration of specific hypotheses and their rationale will be postponed until the literature on the relationship between memory and emotion has been reviewed and the basic constructs of the theory have been presented.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

Theory in the fields of memory and perceptionhas moved in the direction of placing increasing emphasison the effect of emotion and personality. This is theconcern that distinguishes the "new look" in perceptualresearch, and characterizes what Rapaport refers to as thesecond revolution in memory theory:

Memory theory has already experienced one revolution wrought by Gestalt theory. This replaced the laws of "frequency of repetition" and "time decrement" by explaining strength of retention and loss of retention in terms of "meaningfulness" «and "organi­zation," and by explaining the dependence of remembering on the logical relevance and structural properties of the memorized material. If we have read well the bearing of the material surveyed, it is safe to assert that a new revolution of the theory of memory is In the offing. . . . fche thesis of the new memory theory may be formulated thus: the memory laws based on logical "meaning" and "organization" of the memory material refer only to special cases of memory organization; the more general theory of memory is the theory based on "emotional organiza­tion" of memories— in other words, on the organiza­tion of memories by strivings (Rapaport, 1950, pp. 267-268).

This new emphasis constitutes the broad framework from which the specific problems under study were drawn. In

4

this chapter, the memory research relevant to the methods and hypotheses of this study will be reviewed, and then the social learning theory constructs to be used will be described and discussed. Finally, the hypotheses will be presented.

Before continuing, It Is Important to note that the "new" trend In conceptualizing thought processes Involves eliminating the sharp boundaries formerly drawn between perception, thought, and memory, not to mention the boundary between thought and feeling. For purposes of convenience our discussion will emphasize the research that has been cast In a "memory" framework, but the very same developments can be found In perceptual research and the omission of this work Is not meant to Imply Irrelevance. Differences In selective recall may be due to differences in any of the processes that precede recall. Caron and Wallach (1957)* for example, have presented some evidence that selective recall is due to differences in the original learning of the material. It should be obvious that outside of the psychological laboratory these processes are continuous and do not divide themselves neatly Into various entities. While the term "memory" Is used here, the data bears only on the appearance or non-appearance of particular verbal responses when recall is requested.

Emotion and memoryThe research Impetus in this area has been mainly

the desire to prove or disprove aspects of the psycho­analytic theory of forgetting. Rapaport (1950), Zeller (1950a), and Alper (1952) have pointed out that most research designs have failed to meet one or more of the conditions necessary for a test of psychoanalytic theory, and they claim, in fact, that many investigators have misinterpreted components of the theory. So there is still no widely accepted critical test of “repression," or even of the less stringent hypothesis that some individuals do not remember unpleasantries. Instead, there is a large body of literature on the relationship of memory to hedonic tone, affective intensity, attitude, and personal relevance.

Early workers used unsophisticated techniques such as simply asking subjects whether they remembered more pleasant or unpleasant experiences. Or they required sub­jects to fill out questionnaires, which contained equally unsophisticated questions. In reviewing the literature in 1930, Meltzer took the view that serious methodological flaws in the work prior to 1929 made it impossible to reach satisfactory conclusions concerning the substantive prob­lems. A later review by Gilbert (1938) noted methodological improvements, and after eliminating from consideration

those studies still weak In design, Gilbert felt that It was possible to arrive at the following general conclusions:(1) pleasant experiences are remembered slightly better than unpleasant experiences, when tested by delayed recall;(2) "vividness" or "affective potency" is an important factor, but more so in Immediate than delayed recall; (3) with children, there is a less pronounced or totally absent relationship between hedonistic tone and memory, even when delayed recall measures are used; (4) unpleasant experiences become neutral or pleasant faster than pleasant experiences become neutral or unpleasant. Gilbert further states that eleven of the better executed studies support the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between hedonic tone and memory, while none opposes it.

In 1942, Rapaport (1950) reached somewhat the same set of conclusions after an extensive summary of the litera­ture. But in his concluding statements he emphasized the positive relationship between intensity of affect and memory. He points out that evidence for the relationship between hedonistic tone and memory was less consistent and less potent.

The research literature Was again reviewed in 1950, this time by Zeller. Although Zeller was dissatisfied with all of the studies as tests of "repression," he noted support for the relationship between intensity and memory,

support for the hypothesis that material congruent with belief is better remembered, and some support for the memory advantage of the pleasant.

In addition to questionnaire methods, the studies which provided these results used pleasant and unpleasant colors, odors, and musical chords; subject's childhood recollections and recall of vacation experiences; their learning of words and nonsense syllables; and their recall of favorable and unfavorable statements, bogus trait ratings, and quiz grades (Zeller, 1950a).

Since Zeller's review, several new techniques have been introduced, but basically the conclusions have remained the same. Concerning the recall of pleasant and unpleasant experiences, a critical article by Turner and Barlow (1951) points out that although many early methodological errors have since been eliminated, some have not been given adequate attention. They list fifteen different weaknesses and report a study which attempted to tighten methodology in two of the most neglected areas; namely, recall order, and Intensity scaling. With the introduction of better methods, they report that pleasant experiences have no memory advantage, and only "intensity" produces a significant effect.

Some recent studies have utilized hypnosis. Clemes (1961) selected "troublesome" and "neutral" words for each

subject by means of a word association technique. He taught these words to subjects under hypnosis and then suggested partial amnesia. Subjects were found to be amnesic for more "troublesome" words than "neutral" words. Hllgard and Hommel (1961) found greater amnesia for tasks not successfully carried out under hypnosis. Bobbitt (1958) demonstrated that hypnotic "repression" of a conflict reduces anxiety. This series of studies is difficult to evaluate because hypnosis, itself, is still something of an unknown.

A series of investigations have required subjects to learn shock-associated and neutral nonsense syllables. Poorer recall for Bhock-associated syllables was reported ' by Conrad (1959), and Lowenfeld (1961). Belmont and Birch (1951) reported that while some subjects remember distinctly more shock-associated syllables, others remember distinctly fewer. This result must be considered invalid, however, since Lomont (1961) has discovered a basic flaw in their statistical procedures. They violated the statistical assumption of randomness in forming their experimental groups.

The technique of identifying "traumatic" words for each subject by means of a word association method has produced negative results for Levin (1955)# Laffal (1952),

10*

Truax (1957), Merrill (1952), and Oruramon and Butler (1953). Positive results with this technique were reported by Worchel (1955). Truax (1957), who equated the "traumatic" and "neutral" words by Thomdike-Lorge count as well as reaction time, feels that earlier studies that reported a "repressive" effect may have introduced an artifact by selecting the "traumatic" words on the basis of reaction time— that is, reaction time may be related

J . ..to association value.Following a model proposed by Zeller (1950b), a

large series of studies have attempted to show that an interpolated failure-threat experience can cause the "repression" of material previously learned (nonsense syllables), and that an interpolated success experience can cause an increase in recall for this "forgotten" material. This effect has been produced repeatedly (Flavell, 1955; Merrill, 1953; Rollins, 1955; Truax, 1957; Wilke, 1961; Zeller, 1950b; 1951)* but it is agreed by most of these investigators that the results are explain- able in terms of a theory of anxiety and/or motivation— no repression hypothesis is needed (Wilke, 1961). An exception to this is the study by Truax (1957). Because he compared the recall of neutral and failure-associated words, using each subject as his own control, Truax feels

that he has demonstrated a repressive process rather than just the general deteriorating effect of anxiety. A study designed within a social learning theory framework, employ­ing a methodology similar to Zeller's, was conducted by Blumenkrantz (1953). Blumenkrantz found a recall decrement following interpolated failure and an increase in recall following success. His results further suggest that an interpolated success experience which is not closely related to the need system under which the failure took place is not effective in increasing recall.

The older literature rather strongly supports the finding that material congruent with a person's attitude is learned faster and remembered better (Alper & Korchin, 1952). A well known early demonstration of this phenomenon is the study of Levine and Murphy (1943) on the learning of pro-communist and anti-communist statements. Alper and Korchin (1952) more recently found various retention differ­ences between males and females, using meaningful material,

4and Taft (1954) found that Negro subjects remembered more items both favorable and unfavorable to Negroes than white subjects. In delayed recall, however, only the favorable statements were better remembered. Unfortunately these studies cannot be considered conclusive because they failed to control for the familiarity of the material.

In one study where this kind of control was instituted (Watson & Hartman, 1939)> significant results were not obtained. (Watson and Hartman were studying the retention of arguments for and against the existence of God.) Recently, Buss and Brock (1963) demonstrated that subjects who oppose the administration of shock, but who are placed in a situation where they think they are administering shock to other human beings, tend to "repress" statements which emphasize the harmful effects of. shock. While this material is in accord with their initial attitudes, it is incongruent with their actions.

Wallen (1942) investigated the phenomenon of congruency in regard to personal beliefs. He had subjects describe themselves by checking adjectives. He then showed them bogus composite descriptions, supposedly made by people who knew the subject, but actually created by changing some of the subject’s own ratings in a predeter­mined manner. The results indicated that individuals remember better descriptive ratings that agree with their own, and distort other ratings in the direction of their beliefs about themselves. Similar studies by Shaw (1944) and Shaw and Spooner (1945), have shown that subjects remember ratings congruent with their personal opinions regardless of whether these ratings are favorable or

13unfavorable* However, favorable congruent; ratings arebetter remembered than unfavorable congruent ratings*When a subject is not ego-involved— that is, when he israting another individual instead of himself— the favorable-unfavorable dimension drops out* Two telling criticisms ofthese three studies (Wallen, Shaw, and Shaw & Spooner) havebeen made by Lomont (1961). First, he correctly points outthat these authors used the Chi-square statistic improperly

*

because the frequencies Involved were not all independent*Second, Lomont notes that

the / “memory test consisted in presenting the original list of traits to the Ss and having them indicate what rating they had received on each trait* In this procedure it is likely that whenever an S was unsure as to what rating he had received, he thought his own rating of himself was the one he had probably received and so indicated* This response would have artef actually J_ sic/ produced the apparent superior recall of self-congruent ratings that was obtained (Lomont, 1961, p* 76)*

The studies by Wallen, Shaw, and Shaw and Spooner were carried out prior to Zeller's review, but they are mentioned here so that the reader can contrast them with a somewhat similar study more recently reported by Candee (1955)* Candee had subjects rate themselves on nine-point scales defined by adjectives. Hie then presented the sub­jects with bogus ratings in a manner similar to Wallen.In this study the recall task was to remember the adjectives — not the actual ratings. He found no evidence of a

14relationship between the favorable-unfavorable dimension and adjective recall, nor did he find evidence of a relationship between congruency and recall. Candee acknowledged, however, that there was no good reason to suppose that the adjectives and the ratings were psychologically linked in the minds of the subjects.

The "congruency" hypothesis was again studied by Lomont (1961), who was unable to demonstrate that people "repress" that which is inconsistent with their self- concepts. Each subject was given a series of bogus test scores which differed in varying degrees from their evaluations of their own ability. Recall of the test titles showed no relation to self-evaiuative congruency.

Another study using "ratings" duplicated Wallen's finding that individual's distort personal ratings in the direction of their beliefs. Harvey, Kelley, and Shapiro (1957) had subjects rate themselves and rate others. They were then shown bogus ratings which varied in degree of unfavorableness. Unfavorable ratings were defined as ratings lower than those the subject himself had made. The bogus ratings tended to be recalled as more favorable than they actually were. In other words, the recalled ratings were distorted in the direction of the self-ratings. Except for the most extreme negative rating, the distortion varied positively with the negativeness of

15the ratings. Since no ratings more positive than those the subject made were included, it is not possible to determine whether the memory distortion was due to "unfavor­ableness" or "incongruity.’'

The dimension of ego-involvement which was in­cluded in the Shaw and Spooner study, has also been investigated by Alper (19^b), who found that "ego-involve­ment" favors Increased memory (when tested by delayed re­call). More recently, however, Russell (1952) found that "ego-involvement" had no effect on delayed recall. Both these studies had subjects learn nonsense syllables and created "ego-involvement" by presenting this task to some subjects as an "intelligence test."

Karaano and Drew (1961) gave subjects passages to read that were (supposedly) their personality evaluations. The subjects, in both immediate and delayed recall tests, remembered more unfavorable statements than control group subjects. The control subjects had read the same state­ments, but were not told that they represented their own personality evaluations.

It is indeed difficult to arrive at satisfactory generalizations from the preceding series of studies. Congruency has in the past emerged as an Important dimen­sion, and although the experiment by Harvey, Kelley, and

Shapiro (1957) is least in accord with this finding, the recent studies of Candee (1955) and Lomont (1961) failed to demonstrate a congruency effect. Ego-involvement (also called "relevance” or "intensity" ^"Taft, 19547 )» increased recall in Alper's (1946) study, but not in Russell's (1952). The pleasant-unpleasant dimension has once again yielded inconsistent findings (Kamano & Drew, 196I5 Taft, 1954).

The above survey, while by no means exhaustive, serves to illustrate the range of methods being employed in the study of memory and emotion, and the kinds of findings that have been emerging. The reader who is familiar with this area of research will recognize that studies which use the completed-incompleted task paradigm have thus far been omitted. They will be presented next. The classic work of Zeigamik and Rosenzweig will be described first, and then the work which has grown from these studies will be reviewed.

Zeigamik's experimentZeigamik's original 1927 experiment has been

well summarized by Alper (1952, p. 72):Working within the general framework of

Lewln's tension theory, Zeigamik designed an experiment to measure the relative effectiveness for recall of incompleted as compared with completed tasks. The experimental tasks were heterogeneous, some easy (e.g.,. stringing beads),

17others more difficult (e.g., solving jigsaw puzzles), the experimental setting informal and, presumably, non-ego-threatening• The inter­ruption of half of the tasks vas accomplished in such a manner that S vas not avare that inter­ruption qua interruption vas methodologically important. The experimental session vas in no sense a test of S. This vas made clear to S in the instructions and in the atmosphere of the sessions.

Zeigamik1 s recall measure vas the ratio of the number of incompleted tasks recalled to the number of completed tasks recalled. This ratio, known now as "the Zeigamik ratio," is, of course, an intrasession measure of recall*. If S recalls ,an equal nuriber of both types of tasks, the value of the ratio, P, is 1. If more lhoompleted tasks are recalled, ? is greater than 1; if more com­pleted tasks are recalled, P is less than 1.Zeigamik found that the average P value for a group of* college students vas 1.9* For a group of adolesoent children, aged thirteen and fourteen, the average P value vas 2.1. In other words, most Ss recalled a preponderance of . incompleted tasks.

Although the setting which Zeigamik used vas not Intended to be evaluative, she "did not preserve a fixed mien and method with all subjects." Some vere allowed "to see the experimenter's pleasure when a task vas veil done," others had their work "inspected vlth the air of an examiner," and still others "vere allowed to work unmolested, the experi­menter in this case remaining passive" (Zeigamik, 1938, p. 303).

The experiment of Rosenzvejg and, MSSPBIt was Rosenzvelg and Hasan (1934) vho first

adopted the Interrupted task method to study Freud1s

18repression hypothesis. They substituted jigsaw puzzles for Zeigamik'B tasks, and they made the experimental atmosphere distinctly evaluative rather than relaxed.The tasks were Introduced as a contest, and a prize was offered for the best performance. Their aim, of course, was to cause subjects to experience completion as personal success, and Incompletion as personal failure. Crippled children, ranging In age from five years, six months to fourteen years, eight months, were used as subjects. The puzzles used were all of common objects, and before working on each, the children were shown a picture of how It would look when completed. The recall task consisted of naming the puzzles they had worked on. Rosenzweig and Mason found results considerably different from those of Zeigamik. No general recall tendency emerged. Instead, four patterns of recall were observed: of the forty subjects, sixteen recalled more completed tasks, thirteen recalled more incompleted tasks, nine recalled an equal number of both types, and two recalled no tasks at all. A second finding related to ratings of "pride" that the children's teachers had made. "Pride" was defined by Rosenzweig and Mason as the "desire to stand well with the group and take pleasure in one's own achievement" (Rosenzweig & Mason, 193*b P. 257). Of twenty-seven subjects rated high in "pride," twelve

19recalled more completed tasks, nine recalled more incom­pleted tasks, and six recalled equal numbers of each. Of the twelve children rated low in "pride," three recalled more completed tasks, four recalled more incompleted tasks, and five recalled equal numbers of each. The authors’ interpretation of these results follows:

It would seem to be that, given an individual of sufficient intellectual maturity and a commensurate measure of pride, experiences that are unpleasant because they wound self-respect— perhaps it should be added in a social situation— are, other things being equal, leBS apt to be remembered than are experiences that are gratify­ing to the ego. This is in keeping with the Freudian theory of repression (p. 258).

The authors assume that the low pride group did notexperience the situation as threatening. Although theseresults have triggered a whole series of investigations,Lomont (1961) has recently pointed out that they are, infact, not statistically significant.

Ego- and task-orientatlonPursuing the lead of the above study, Rosenzweig

(1943) designed a second experiment. The purpose of this second experiment was to create by instructional set the recall patterns he had earlier observed in the proud and not-so-proud children. For this second study he used college students aB subjects. One group was told that the puzzles were an "intelligence" test. Stress was heightened by the unsubtle use of a stop watch, etc. Another group

was told that the puzzles were materials which the experi­menter was constructing for a future experiment, and which he wanted to “try out," The emphasis for this latter group was placed on the puzzles rather than on their performance. The subjects in this "task-oriented” group were also informed that they might be interrupted on any puzzle as soon as the experimenter got the information he needed. In line with his hypotheses, Rosenzweig found that an ego-oriented group remembers more completed tasks, while a task-oriented group recalls more incompleted tasks.

An important weakness of this study is that one group of subjects consisted of volunteers, while the sub­jects of the other group were paid. Atkinson (1955) has pointed out that volunteer groupB may be higher in nAchievement, and n Achievement differences have been shownto relate to recall. The differences found by Rosenzweig may have been due to personality differences between the subjects of each group, rather than the effects of stress,per se• In this context it is interesting to note thatMarrow (1938), who used all volunteers, found incompletions (when regarded as failures) better remembered than com­pletions. This is Just the reverse of Rosenzweig*s find­ing. Furthermore, he demonstrated that when completions signified "failure," completions were better remembered.

21Gllxman (1949) repeated Rosenzweig's experiment

with several modifications; he used paper and pencil tasks instead of jigsaw puzzles, conducted the experiment In classrooms on a group basis, and used three degrees of "stress" in place of Rosenzweig's two orientations. His major finding was: subjects in more stressful conditionsremember significantly fewer incompleted tasks. There is no change in the number of completed tasks remembered.Alper (1946a) used a scrambled sentence task and had each subject perform in both an ego-oriented and a task-oriented session, thus serving as his own control. Before discussing her findings, several comments need to be made concerning her methodology. First, only ten subjects were used. Alper attempts to justify her small sample on the basis of the time consuming personality evaluations that were obtained for each Individual, but the fact remains that her statis­tics were based on a sample of ten! Second, it is not clear how her subjects were given the same tasks on two occasions under different and contradictory instructions without the arousal of suspicion. This is an especially troublesome point because the stated purpose of the experi­ment is the measurement of incidental recall. In summariz­ing her procedure, Alper writes:

The atmosphere and instructions in Session I,Task Orientation, were Informal and objectively non-self-esteem threatening since ostensibly S was merely helping E find out whether the

22materials would be suitable for a later experiment. The atmosphere and instructions in Session II, Ego Orientation, a week later, were formal and objectively threatening to self-esteem, sentence solution now being presented as "a brief intelligence test which the Clinic had devised for UBe by the Army in selecting officer training school candidates" (Alper, 1957* P. 153).

There is no explanation of how she kept these Harvardstudents naive about the second recall test. Some criticshave also pointed out that since her scrambled sentencespermitted more than one solution— and subjects knew this—the achievement of one successful solution may not havebeen equivalent to "completion" as defined in other studies.In any event, her results indicate an increased memoryadvantage for completions (compared with incompletions)as stress increases.

The authors of the studies Just described (Alper, 1946a; Rosenzweig, 1943; and Glixman, 1949) have been engaged in a round-robin debate through a series of subsequent articles. The debate concerns the proper statistical analysis and interpretation of their findings. Rosenzweig and Alper used intrasession ratio scores, comparing the memory for completions and lncompletlons within each group. Glixman made separate intersession comparisons of comple­tion recall and incompletion recall. He has argued:

So long as recall of lncompleted and completed tasks are compared with each other, there is no way of telling whether the change in ratios ^from one condition to another/ . . . is

ii

attributable to change in recall of Incompleted tasks, recall of completed tasks, or botb (Glixman, 1948, p. W ) .

On the other hand, Alper and Rosenzveig have argued that to consider the memory for completion and Incompletion separ­ately does an injustice to the nature of the psychological situation, which, for the subject, consists of completions vithin the setting of Incompletions and vice versa.

For our purposes, both intersesslon comparisons and ratio measures have important Implications, and vlll be presented below. (Intersesslon scores for Alper's and Rosenzweig's data have fortunately been computed by Glixman, and intrasesslon scores for Glixman* s data have fortunately been computed by Alper.) Glixman summarizes the intersesslon data as followB (19 9* P* 292)1

Recall of incompleted activities as stress Increases Rosenzwelgs Non-significant decrease (t*0.23;

P*0.82)Alperi Near-significant decrease (t*2.04j P«0.07) Glixman! Significant decrease (Fs4.38; P*0.05)

Recall of completed activities as stress increases Rosenzweig! Near-significant increase (tsl«90;

P*0.06).Alper! Significant decrease (t=2.84; P-O.Ol)Glixman! Non-significant decrease (F=o.17j P*0.05)

From this summary chart it can be seen that the generaleffect of stress is to produce a decrease in the memory forincompleted tasks, and (Alper* s data notwithstanding), nochange in the memory for completed tasks. The followingexpansion of Glixman*s chart indicates that the results ofmore recent studies follow the same pattern.

24Recall of Incompleted activities as stress Increases Erlksen (1952b); Significant decrease Smock (1957); Significant decrease

Recall of completed activities as stress Increases Erlksen: Non-signlfleant decrease Smock: Non-slgnlficant Increase

It Is the memory for Incompleted tasks that changes understress, and the direction of this change is negative.

A look at the intrasession data for all threestudies reveals no significant differences within groups.With unselected subjects, neither completed nor Incompletedtasks dominate recall. To quote Alper:

It is interesting to note that when Rosenzweig*s data are analyzed by means of the t test, as were Alper*s data, the difference In recall of completed and Incompleted tasks within each session is not statistically significant. The t value for the Informal session is 1.84; the P value, ,10-.05« The t value for the formal ego-threat7 session is OJ52; the P, .70-.60.

. . . /"Eor Glixman*s data/, intrasession compari­sons of the mean percentage of Incomplete tasks recalled within a given session with the mean percentage of completed tasks recalled In that same session. • • yield P values for each of Glixman*s three situations which do not approach the 5 per cent level of confidence (Alper,3952, p. 81).

The direction of the difference between intrasession ratios for recall under task-oriented and ego-oriented con­ditions has almost invariably indicated relative favoring of completed tasks under stress (Alper, 1946a; 1952;Erlksen, 1952b; Gilmore, 1954; Glixman, 1949; Green, 1963; Hays, 1952; Lewis & Franklin, 1944; Rosenzweig, 1943; Smock,

1957). In addition to this general finding, Erlksen (1952a) notes Increased variability under ego-threat conditions. Marrow's (1938) finding that subjects recall more Incompletions (when lncompletlons signify failure), is at odds with the general trend. Differences in in­structions, tasks, and subjects make direct comparison between his study and the others difficult, and some writers have argued that the situation he utilized did not really equate incompletion with failure (Lomont, 1961).

The age factorRosenzweig's work sparked another controversy* the

relationship of age to selective recall. In their ori­ginal study, Rosenzweig and Mason (1934) noted that children of higher mental age tend to recall more comple­tions. Sanford (1946) repeated this study with forty-nine normal children, finding, instead, that the tendency to remember incompletions increases with chronological age from seven to fifteen and Increases with mental age from ten to twenty-one. Also, Sanford observed that those subjects who recalled a large number of failures, far from being immature or unproud, "were critical of their performance, . . . blamed themselves for their failures or at least . . • took a certain responsibility for them" (p. 238). Sanford's observation is congruent with a comment made by Zelgamlk

(1938) that "ambitious” subjects remember more failures. While the age of Rosenzweig*s subjects was four to fourteen there was little overlap in mental age between his sample and Sanford's. The fact that the mental age's of Rosenz­weig 's subjects were lower coupled with the assumption that crippled children might have inferior ego-development, enables Sanford to argue for the greater generality of his finding. A study by Ralph (1958) investigated selective recall with six- and nine-year-olds. She used Jigsaw puzzles for the tasks, and each subject served as his own control. The hypothesis that nine-year-olds, as a group, would show a Zelgamik effect was confirmed at the .02 level of significance. Six-year-olds, however, did not recall more imcompletions. Thus, Sanford's results are given some additional support.

Ego-strength and recallThe large individual differences found by every

investigator have prompted numerous attempts to predict individual recall direction on the basis of personality variables. The most popular of these variables has been "ego-strength," although this terra has remained loosely defined and measurement methods have varied greatly.

Alper (1948) identified two patterns of recall, and by syndrome analysis of the personality data on her

27ten subjects, she identified a constellation of personality traits to go with each recall pattern. In accordance with the major traits identified, she labeled one pattern the "Weak Ego" pattern, and the other, the "Strong Ego" pattern. Individuals with a "Weak Ego" obtain a ratio favoring recall of completed tasks in the task-oriented situation, and a ratio favoring recall of Incompleted tasks in the ego- oriented situation. The "Strong Ego" pattern is Just the reverse. While this differs from what common-sense would lead one to expect, and also differs from Zeigarnik's ob­servations of "ambitious" subjects (1938), Alper's theorizing about the dynamics of these patterns runs as follows:

Since it is the S with high tolerance for failure who recalls more incompleted tasks in the informal session, recall of such tasks was equated with the Zeigarnik effect, i.e., with task tensions. Such tensions can function readily if S is not under constant need to defend his self-esteem. When the situation is objectively threatening, however, this S does defend his self-esteem. To recall completed tasks under these circumstances is to focus on one's successes at the expense of one's failures.The weak ego S, on the other hand, needs to defend self-esteem even when the objective situation is not threatening. This he does in the informal session by recalling completed tasks, which are for him in this context dynamically equivalent to successes. When the objective stress is high, however, his defenses no longer operate efficiently. Overwhelmed by the failure experience, he seema to need to admit his failures before others accuse him of failing. This can be termed an ego- offensive mechanism and is essentially the defense of a weak, insecure individual. Thus

28the recall of Incompleted tasks In an informal setting is not psychologically equivalent to the recall of incompleted tasks in a stressful setting. Only the former corresponds to the Zeigarnik effect (Alper, 1952> P» 80).

The Strong and Weak Ego patterns were, of course, derived post hoc, and so Alper set up a second study (1957) to demonstrate predictive validity for the patterns. On the basis of a specially constructed Psychological Insight Test and clinical interviews, nine Weak and nine Strong Ego subjects were selected. The subjects were run through the same two session design as in her earlier study. Alper was able to predict ego type beyond chance (P*.0 5), by observing whether an Individual showed a Weak or Strong Ego recall pattern. The classification into recall pattern was based on the sign of the number resulting from the following formula (Alper, 1957, P» 153)*

(lni-Ci)-(Xn2-c2)This formula can be read, "The difference between

the number of incompletions and completions remembered in the first session, minus the difference between Incompletions and completions remembered in the second session." If the resulting score is positive, we ,have a Strong Ego; if the score is negative, we have a Weak Ego. It should be obvious that the use of this scoring procedure obscures the location of recall changes. Since Alper's theoretical statement im­plies that some individuals tend to recall lncompletlons in

29one situation and completions In another, It Is of import­ance to see If this was actually the case. An examination of the data upon which the ratios were based, reveals that for all subjects, regardless of session (ego- or task- orientation) or ego group (Strong or Weak), a higher per­centage of completed tasks was - remembered. Under task- orlentatlon (session I), the Strong and Weak ego subjects did not differ significantly in the recall of incompleted tasks, completed tasks, or the difference between the two.

- J .

Under ego-orientation (session II), the Strong and Weak Ego subjects again did not differ significantly in the recall of incompleted tasks or completed tasks, although the difference between the difference is significant at the .01 level. This significant difference indicates that under ego-orientation, the recall ratio for Strong Ego subjects more strongly favors recall of completions than does the equivalent ratio for Weak Ego subjects. Thus, while Alper claims support for her theory on the basis of these findings, their interpretation seems somewhat more dubious than it would appear at first glance. Only one difference is significant, and this difference does not imply an absolute advantage of incompletions in one group and the reverse for that group in a second situation or for another group, as Alper's theory suggests.

30While the criticism just voiced concerns the "fit"

of Alper*s recall data to her theory, Lomont has raisedanother, and perhaps more basic objection to her Weak andStrong Ego classification. His critique follows:

In the first place, the clinical ratings of her subjects really fell into five different clusters, or syndromes, and three of these syndromes were correlated with differences in recall of completed and Incompleted tasks in one or both experimental conditions. Alper evidently generalized about the personality traits of her subjects on the basis of the ones who showed the last syndrome of traits and associated recall pattern. It is hot really clear, however, how she did abstract two personality syndromes out of five, or three, if she bases the two only on the original syndromes that were correlated with recall. . . . Careful scrutiny of her . . . personality data reveals that two , of her Ss were at ends of the original syndromes that were associated with superior recall of completed tasks under both experimental conditions.On the basis of his standing in one syndrome, one S should have shown superior recall of completed tasks under the ego-threatening conditions, but on the basis of his standing in another syndrome, he should have shown the opposite. The data indi­cate that only two of the Ss were rated high in ego strength and showed the strong ego recall pattern. Evidently only one S who showed the weak ego pattern was rated low on any of the traits which Alper listed in her 1957 study as characteristic of the weak ego Ss (Lomont, 1961, pp. 63-64).

There is some stronger support for the existence of Strong and Weak Ego recall patterns in a study by Erlksen (1954), who used the McReynolds Concept Evalua­tion technique to measure ego-strength. Using a scrambled sentence task, and separate subjects for each group, he

31found that ego-strength relates directly to the tendency to recall incompletions in a task-oriented group (r“.38), and inversely in ego-oriented group (r»-.60). It must again be noted, however, that these findings are based on ratio scores and not absolute figures. As expected, the stress group shows a decrease in memory for incompleted tasks and no change in memory for completed tasks.

Caron and Wallach (1959)* using the same McReynolds technique, failed to replicate Erlksen1s or Alper's find­ings. They suggest that Alper*s ego-strength variable may be multidimensional and only partially related to more traditional conceptions of ego-strength.

Ta|kin (1957) finds no relation between ego-strength and recall. His measure of ego-strength was the Scott-Duke questionnaire, and his subjects were schizophrenic patients and matched controls. Jourard (195*0 finds no relationship between ego strength and recall using a variety of Rorschach scales and Indices. Three of the Rorschach scores showed slight dorrelations, but one of these was in the wrong direction. Coopersmlth (i960) reports negative results with a Belf-esteem inventory and teacher ratings of self-esteem. Rosenzweig (1952), while having no new data on this issue,comments that Alper would do better to think of ego-

/■

strength as a continuum rather than a dichotomy, and that

32this continuum would be better labeled "degrees of frustration tolerance." He also states that while Alper avoids the term "repression," her theorizing does not avoid the implication that the person with a Strong Ego uses repression while the person with a Weak Ego does not. This implication is obviously at odds with our thinking about "strength" and/or "repression."

Need achievement and recallNeed achievement has perhaps been the second most

popular variable to be related to selective recall (Atkinson, 1953; 1955; Atkinson & Raphelson, 1956; McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, Lowell, 1953; Reitman, 1961). The major finding is that "when instructions clearly signify that completion means success and incompletion means failure, Ss high in n Achievement recall more in- completed tasks . . . than Ss low in n Achievement." (Atkinson, 1955, p. 504). In terms of percentage scores, high n Achievement subjects react to stress by an Increase in the memory for incompleted tasks. Low n Achievement subjects react with a decrease in the memory for incompleted tasks. As expected, there is no difference in the memory for completed tasks. The n Achievement findings are quite congruent with Zeigarnik'8 observation about "ambitious" subjects, and some of Caron and Wallach's (1959) results.

33The findings run exactly counter to Alper* s Strong and Weak Ego conceptualization unless one regards high n Achievement subjects as weak In ego strength* Alper (1957) Investi­gated just this possibility In a further study. The purpose of the study was to determine the relationship, If any, between the Strong-Weak Ego classification scheme and n Achievement* Obtaining measurements of each variable for a group of female college "leaders," Alper states that those "whose self-ratings fit the Strong Ego pattern more often score below the group mean on n Achievement than above It" (Alper, 1957, p. l6l).

While the relationship between high n Achievement and the Weak Ego self-rating pattern could not be adequately tested • • • because so few Ss In the leader group fitted the Weak Ego pattern, the Inverse relationship between the Strong Ego self-rating pattern and n Achievement permits at least a partial relnterpretatlon of the role n Achievement plays In selective recall* The results • • • do not support Atkinson's • • • proposition that "lower n Achievement scores Imply relatively greater anxiety about failure"If low n Achievement Is combined with the personality structure of a Strong Ego S*On the contrary, these Ss are able.to counter­act the objective failure threat* • • • Counter­action suggests positive, constructive forces at work rather than a mechanism of "anxlety- avoldance*" In other words, It may.be the high n Achievers as well as Zeigarnik's • • •"ambitious" Ss, not the low n Achievers, who 1 have the relatively greater anxiety about failure (Alper, 1957, PP* l6l-l62).

What Alper's analysis suggests Is that subjects who score low In n Achievement have more anxiety about academic failure* Becent work on n Achievement, however,

has Identified those with moderate n Achievement scores (as opposed to high and low scores) as fearing failure (Reitman, 1961). Reitman (1961) Is able to demonstrate that under stress conditions those with moderate n Achievement scores show superior memory for success and neutral stories, but poor memory for failure stories.Under conditions of relaxation, this same group shows superior memory for failure stories. Thus it is the moderate n Achievement group that exhibits a recall pattern similar to what Alper has called the Strong Ego pattern, although it is exactly this group that is most closely identified with anxiety over failure. Taken as a whole the findings again cast doubt on the usefulness of Alper's syndrome "types."

It has already been noted that Atkinson (1955) attempted to reconcile some conflicting results in the literature by alluding to the differing ways in which subjects have been selected (i.e., the volunteer vs. draftee dimension). He suggests that samples of volunteers and higher in n Achievement, and thus would be expected to react differently to stress. Green's (1963) study on selective recall and volunteering supports this inter­pretation.

Child-rearing and recallThere has been little attempt to relate selective

recall patterns to cultural differences or differences in childhood training. A beginning attempt in this area has been made by Miller and Swanson (i960). They report that the favoring of completions in memory is associated with coercive toilet training, explained rather than arbitrary requests for obedience, membership in the middle class, and parental use of psychological rather than physical discipline. Harsher and more arbitrary childhood training methods, in their view, leads to the use of "denial" mechanisms rather than "repressive" mechanisms.

The MMPI scalesA number of scales derived from the Minnesota^

Multiphasic Personality Inventory have been utilised to predict recall pattern with some success. High scores on the repre83lon-sensltlzatlon scale developed by Byrne (1961), and the hysterla-psychasthenla index (Erlksen, 1954; Erlksen & Davids, 1955; Truax, 1957) correlate with "repressive" recall patterns— that is, the tendency to forget incompletions. Clements (1959) reported that individuals with high scores on the Taylor Manifest Anxiety scale recall an increased number of completed tasks, but Truax (1957) found that subjects with low Taylor scores recalled more completed tasks. Since Taylor

scores have been found to correlate highly with scores on the psychasthenia scale (Deese, Lazarus, & Keenan, 1953; Erlksen & Davids, 1955), and since low psychasthenia scale scores Imply "repression," Truax's finding seems the more general.

Completlon-incompletlon vs. aucceBS-fallure'

It should now be clear to the reader that while the Interrupted task method has provided an experimental inroad to the study of complex memory phenomena, studies with this method have not yielded a set of consistent, unambiguous findings. The previous pages offer a sample of some of the controversy that has ensued concerning statistical treatment and Interpretation of findings.Some critics feel that part of the reason for the contro­versy is inherent in the method Itself, which confounds completion-incompletion with success-fallure. Since many of the investigations have been interested in the memory for "painful" experience (e.g., failure), it has been argued (Sears, 1950) that it is inappropriate to use the interrupted task method. Sear's criticism does not apply to studies which have as their goal the investigation of completion, per se— such as in Zeigarnik's original experiment. Several studies have attempted to separate the effects of success-fallure and completlon-incompletlon.

37J. W. Taylor (1953), for example, finds that while com­pletions are recalled more frequently than incompletions, successes are recalled only "slightly” more frequently than failures. He does not state whether the "slight" differ­ence is statistically significant, but the absence of this information implies that it isn't. Furthermore, subjects whose total recall is poor, recall more successes, while those whose total recall is good, recall more failures. (Taylor claims that Alper1b 1946^“a7 experiment and Glixman's 1949 experiment could both be re-evaluated in terms of the significant decrease in total recall under stressful conditions.) In a rather complex study, Steininger (1957) manipulated success-failure, completion-lncompletion, and overall success and failure. She found that when all tasks were completed, subjects who experienced overall success recalled their individual successes and failures equally, but subjects who experienced overall failure, focused on their individual successes. When "failure" was achieved through interruption, exactly the opposite results were ob­tained. It is interesting to note that In this study^ ,-the more difficult and challenging problems were better recalled, regardless of the condition. Kendler (1949) using a success-failure procedure Instead of a completlon-incom- pletion manipulation, found successes better remembered.The tasks had been presented as part of an "intelligence test."

38Since the present study is concerned with the

effect of success and failure per se, bogus scores rather than interruption will be used to create the necessary success and failure experiences.

Summary of the relevant research

This brings to a close the survey of the relevant literature on the relationship of memory and emotion.A summary of the findings reported thus far would seem necessary and therefore follows:

1. The research that has been reviewed attempts to answer three basic questions:

a. Is there a relationship between hedonic tone and memory?

b. Is material that is more personally relevant better remembered?

c. Is material which is congruent with an individual's beliefs better remembered?

2. To answer the above questions, a variety of experimental designs have been employed,but one Of the most frequently used has been the interrupted task technique introduced by Zeigarnik.

3. Using this technique, it has been quite well established that with the increasing probability of lncompletlon equaling personal failure, the memory for lncompletlon decreases.. If lncompletlon can truly be

39identified with "pain" or "unpleasantness," there is evi­dence that hedonic tone relates to memory and that it is the pleasant that enjoys a memory advantage in many situations.

4. Other factors being equal, subjects who are older (chronologically and mentally), more "ambitious," or Who attain higher n Achievement scores, remember a larger percentage of incompletions.

5. Studies using ego-strength measures have yielded inconsistent findings, partly because of the diversity of operations for this concept.

6. Low scores on the Hy-Pt index, the repression- sensitization scale, and the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale tend to identify individuals who will remember a greater percentage of incompletions.

7* Since completlon-incompletlon is not synonymous with success-failure or pleasure-pain, studies of selective memory which wish to focus specifically on either of the latter dimensions should utilize more direct methods of creating the appropriate experiences.

8. Nearly all investigators have commented on the marked individual differences in selective recall pattern, and these differences have not been predicted with more than slight to moderate success.

4°9* Examining task and situational factors, It

seems likely that "defensive forgetting will occur /"in a situation where7 • . • self-respect damage is maximal and possibilities of regaining self respect by constructive striving are minimal" (Sanford & Risser, 1948).

10. Personal relevance seems to Increase memory in some situations and decrease it in other situations. The difference is possibly related to the degree that "rele­vance" implies "stress." In some situations, the relevance dimension has proven a more potent variable than the hedonistic dimension.

11. There is some evidehce that material is dis­torted in recall so that it becomes more congruent with an individual’s beliefs. There is little solid evidence that congruent material is better remembered, unless it is also more familiar.

Some social learning theoryThe purpose of this section is to acquaint the

reader who is not familiar with social learning theory with some of the basic concepts to be utilized in this study. Detailed exposition of the theory can be found elsewhere (Rotter, 1954).

Social learning theory has a number of distinguish­ing characteristics which the writer believes make its use by students of personality advantageous. Its focus of

convenience 1b . human behavior, and thus the constructs employed are— appropriately— more molar than those employed by theories of learning developed on sub-human species. The theory can be categorized as an expectancy learning theory which utilizes an empirical law of effect, and, as such, it attempts to overcome some of the difficulties that drive theories and theories which utilize only an expectancy con­cept have encountered. It focuses on the social interaction of humans and pays attention to the Importance of the psychological situation, a concern which many other approaches largely neglect. Finally, considerable effort has been devoted to the problem of translating theoretical notions into practical measurement operations and there is thus a growing body of methodological information to facilitate application.

In addition to the psychological situation, social learning theory utilizes three basic variables in analyzing behavior:

Behavior potential may be defined as the potentiality of any behavior’s occuring in any given situation or situations as calculated in relation to any single reinforcement of set of reinforcements (Rotter, 1954, p. 105). ’Expectancy may be defined as the probability held by the individual that a particular reinforcement will occur as a function of a specific behavior on his part in a specific situation or situations. Eaqpectancy is independent of the value or Importance of the reinforcement (p. 107).

*2The reinforcement value of any external reinforcement may be Ideally defined as the degree of preference for any reinforcement to occur If the possibilities of their occurring vere all equal (p. 107)*

The concepts of behavior potential, expectancy, and rein­forcement value are of more theoretical than practical importance, since they refer to the occurrence of a single behavior, vhlle measurement In life situations usually Involves the study of sets of behaviors. In practice, therefore, it is usual to use the somewhat broader, corres­ponding concepts of need potential, freedom of movement. and need value. These three concepts can be set In relation to each other by the following formula*

need potential = f (freedom of movement & need, value)The formula Indicates that "the potentiality of

occurrence of a set of behaviors that lead to the satis­faction of some need (need potential) is a function of the expectancies that these behaviors will lead to these rein­forcements (freedom of movement) and the strength or value of these reinforcements (need value)" (Rotter, 195 , p* 110).

A concrete example will make the above theoretic exposition clearer for those not familiar with the terminol­ogy: Let us suppose that a child has learned that rewardfollows bringing home good grades. Hie can be said to have a high need value for academic recognition. However, because he places a premium on being considered a "scholar"

by his parents, does not enable us to predict that he will often be seen working on his homework, reading, etc. He may have also learned through a series of failure experi­ences that he is not very bright. His freedom of movement in this area is low. That is, he does not expect that even diligent attention to schoolwork will lead to the reinforcement he seeks. If both need value and freedom of movement were high, academic activity would be predicted.If, on the other hand, he had learned that he is academically capable, but no one at home cared about grades (high free­dom of movement, low need value), little academic activity would have to be predicted. If need value were high and freedom of movement low, he might try to gain fantasy re­inforcement or engage in behaviors best described asavoidant and irreal(Rotter, 195 i PP. 196-197).

* *Selective recall and social -learning

Each investigator who has used the interrupted task method has found individual differences in recall pattern. Attempts to predict these patterns via single personality variables have not proven remarkably successful, although some prediction has been obtained. It has already been indicated that social learning theory analyzes behavior in terms of four variables, and while the theory has only once been applied to memory phenomena, there is reason to believe

that two of the prominent constructs— need value and free­dom of movement— can be effectively used In combination to predict selective recall patterns. This assumption Is based partly on the fact that these two constructs seem related In some ways to the concepts of "Intensity” and "congruity" discussed In the literature. However, there is another, more general reason for supposing that social learning theory constructs have applicability to selective recall phenomena: the theory makes systematic predictions concern­ing the potential occurrence of behaviors. Why should It not be possible to develop predictions concerning the kind of verbal behavior which would follow the question, "What do you remember?" Unless responses to this question are considered the result of an entirely different class of events, a theory which attempts to predict behavior should have something to say about this situation. It must be quickly added that as soon as one begins trying to formulate specific hypotheses regarding selective recall, the explora­tory nature of this project becomes apparent. Several alternative hypotheses can be formulated, which, on the basis of theoretic logic and common sense, seem equally plausible. Thus the questions asked of the data In this study are more empirical in nature than is often the case.

In order to arrive at a series of tentative hypo­theses, some of the past findings will now be examined from

a social learning theory viewpoint. First, examining the overlap between the concepts of "personal relevance," need value and freedom of movement, it can be noted that in some instances the term "personally relevant" implies that a situation tends to evoke high need value. However, in other studies, the term: is used to identify situations that evoke high need value and low freedom of movement. Naturally a social learning theory analysis would lead to the expectation of different results from thdse studies since psychologically different situations have been similarly labeled. In the attitude studies, for example, where "threat" implications have been minimal, it is quite reasonable to hypothesize that people will attend to and remember material more closely related to important rein­forcements. However, in evaluative, potentially punishing situations, more variability of behavior would be anticipated and avoidant behaviors would become probable. Talking more in terms of individuals, where a situation arouses important e needs, people with high freedom of movement would be ex­pected to pay close attention (the vigilant reaction), and people with low freedom of movement would be expected to "leave the field" through fantasy or other defensive behavior. Thus, it is predicted that when freedom of movement is held constant, need value will show a positive relationship to total recall. In the case where freedom

of movement is low, high need value will result In defen­sive distortion.

The inconsistent results of the ego-strength research seems partially related to looseness of definition as well as a confounding of reinforcement value and expectancy. In some studies "low ego strength" and "low frustration tolerance" seem to be equivalent to the high need value,low freedom of movement situation. Avoidant behaviors would be expected. But, "ego strength" or "high frustration tolerance" might imply either low need value (the subject doesn't care) or high freedom of movement (the subject is self-assured). Either way, he' isn't worried!

Viewing the n Achievement findings, a similar interpretation appears possible. The workers in this area (Atkinson, 1953) have noted that n Achievement measures do not seem to bear linear relationships to other variables. This has led to the conceptualization of separate "fear of failure" and "hope of success" components. It has already been mentioned that those with moderate n Achievement scores show the greatest "fear of failure." Re-conceptualizing this in social learning theory terms leads to the conclusion that moderate scores indicate high need value for academic recognition and low freedom of movement in this area. High n Achievement scores

47may be associated with high need value, high freedom of movement; low scores with low need value, high or low freedom of movement. With this view In mind, the prominent finding of the n Achievement research on selective recall fits our earlier hypothesis— that Is, Individuals with high need value and high freedom of movement (the high n Achievement group) do not show as great a decrease In failure recall under conditions which tend to evoke stress. For these Individuals the situations are less stressful, and they can remain vigilant rather than becoming defensive.

The term "congruency," as used in the literature on recall, seenis to bear some relationship to the concept of expectancy. The statement that Individuals will remember what is congruent with their beliefs sometimes implies that they will remember better what they anticipate or expect. However, in many studies (such as the studies on attitude), what an individual believes and what he expects to see or have happen may be quite independent. Very few studies have explicitly measured, manipulated, or controlled expectation. There is some broadly related research that suggests that individuals will remember better the expected. Work in the area of perception, as interpreted by Bruner and Pobtman (1949), would seem to favor this hypothesiss

48Perceptual organization Is powerfully determined by expectations built upon past commerce with the environment. When such expectations are violated by the environment, the pereeiver's behavior can be described as resistance to the recognition of the unexpected or Incongruous (Bruner & Postman, 1949, P* 222).

There are also reasons to believe that Individuals willremember better the unexpected. There is the notion of"salience11 and portions of Gestalt theory suggest that wewill attend to and remember what is figure against ground;what is surprising, what contributes new information. Inline with this hypothesis, the individual with a longhistory of successes should remember a failure, and theperennial failure should remember a success. The perceptualstudies of Holzman and Gardner (1959, I960) suggestthat there may be individual differences— some peopleconsistently sharpen differences and others level them out.It would seem that the effect of expectancy on recall mustbe left an empirical question. For formal purposes, thehypothesis that individuals distort in the direction oftheir expectations and remember material more congruentwith their beliefs will be adopted.

Two studies of special relevance

While the past research provides some leads concerning the relationship of need value and freedom of movement to recall, the difficulty is that these variables have been

49confounded In most designs, A partial exception to thisis a study by Coopersmith (i960). He investigated therelationship of various self-esteem types to selectiverecall by dividing his subjects, who were middle-classfifth- and sixth-grade children, into four groups,defined as follows:

High-High— above average performance commensurate with goals; High-Low— low achievers with high goals; Low-Low— low achievers who have accepted their inferior performance and position; and Low-High— high achievers with extremely high goals DUt with low self-esteem (Coopersmith, i960,P. 311).

The classification of subjects into these groups was made on the basis of a Self-Esteem Inventory, and a teacher's rating of self-esteem behavior. The validity of the groupings was established by referring to significant differences between the groups on a constellation of variables (achievement, sociometric status, ideal self, and n Achievement). This classification of subjects bears some resemblance to a need value and freedom of movement breakdown. However, the similarity is a rough one since achievement measures would not correlate precisely with subjective expectation, and "goals" are generally a function of both need value and expectancy. Coopersmith found, as expected, a general tendency for all groups to remember a greater percentage of successes than failures. However, he failed to find any significant

50differences in recall pattern between the four groups. He was also unable to find a relationship between n Achievement and recall, or between Taylor Anxiety and recall. Cooper­smith feels ttiat the most likely explanation for his negative results was the youth of his subjects.

A study by Lomont (1961) also bears similarities to the approach being proposed here. Working from Roger's theory that people repress experiences inconsistent with their self-concepts, Lomont asked engineering students to rate themselves in quantitative reasoning ability. He then gave each student thirty quantitative story problems. After the test, the students reread the problems three times, and while they "familiarized" themselves with each problem, they were told that they had rated "above," "below," or the "same" as their stated proficiency level on the basis of speed scores. During this presentation of scores and problems, each problem was associated with a one- or two- word title. Following a fifteen minute filler activity, each subject was asked to recall the titles of the problems. Lomont had also varied the level of "threat" by telling one group that their scores were being recorded and would affect Job recommendations upon graduation. The results of this study were negative. Neither threat level nor consistency with expectation had a significant effect on selective recall, either separately or in interaction.

51While these negative results are not the most

auspicious note on which to begin a study, the present study differs from those just quoted and other past re­search in a number of important ways:

1. Previous studies have placed different groups of subjects under different conditions of "ego-involvement," or used the same subjects more than once. This study uses each subject as his own control, subjecting him to several conditions, but all while he is still naive.

2. Since the tasks used are interchangeable, memory differences cannot be attributed to task differences.

3. Success-failure is manipulated by* giving bogus scores following each task, and it is arranged that each subject experience both success and failure in two areas of differing need value.

4. Subjects are asked to recall the (bogus) scores rather than task items or titles. This has several advan­tages: the association value for the numbers is known and can be controlled, and a measure of the direction of memory distortion becomes possible.

Internal vs. external controlIn addition to the hypotheses concerning need value

and freedom of movement, the present study tests some subsidiary hypotheses concerning the dimension of internal vs. external control, a construct that has been developed

52within the framework of social learning theory (Rotter, Seeman, & Liverant, 1963). The construct was derived from the observation that some psychotherapy patients readily change their expectancies in the face of new experience, while others tend to discredit new experiences as being due to "luck," "fate," or powers beyond their control. Following the lead provided by this observation, studies with laboratory tasks were performed which demonstrated that the growth and extinction of expectancies for reward varied in accordance with whether the tasks were viewed as skill or chance activities (James, 1957; James & Rotter, 1958; Phares, 1957; 1962; Rotter, Liverant & Crowne, 1961). Since it seemed possible to order individuals according to the degree to which they felt in control of their lives, a scale of internal vs. external control was devised (Phares, 1957), and revised (James, 1957; Rotter, Seeman,& Liverant, 1962). The most recent form of this scale consists of twenty-three forced choice items with six •filler items. It is referred to as the I-E scale.

Studies with the scale have demonstrated that "internally-oriented" subjects choose more intermediate risks and are generally less impulsive in a risk-taking situation (Liverant & Scodel, i960). They also perform less erratically on the level of aspiration board (Simmons, 1959). They are more often non-smokers (Straits &

53Sechrest, 1963). A study of Negro students (Gore &Rotter, 1963) demonstrates that the internally-oriented are more willing to participate in social action (anti- segregation protests), Seeman and Evans (in press) refer to the internal vs, external control concept as a dimension of "powerlessness" and "alienation," Using one form of the I-E scale, they have demonstrated that among hospi­talized tubercular patients, the internally-oriented possess more information about their illness,and are regarded by the medical staff as more knowledgeable about their condi­tion. (This result is not due to differences in intelli­gence.) In another study, Seeman (in press) was able to show that reformatory inmates who are more internally- oriented retain more information about parole, and especially those informational items dealing most directly with what they could do to better their position. There were no recall dif­ferences on items of general information with little functional value.

These last two studies have indicated that people who feel powerless to change their circumstances remember less information relevant to creating changes. It can thus be hypothesized that subjects who score low on the I-E scale (internally-oriented), will not forget as many failures as high-scoring subjects (externally-oriented). Since the internally-oriented may consider that there is something to

be learned from past failures, these events may be better retained. On the other hand, a second, and contradictory hypothesis can be formulated. The studies by Seeman have taken place under relatively non-stressful conditions. It is necessary to make the same distinction here that was made in connection with the work on "relevance." In a distinctly evaluative situation, mobilizing low freedom of movement, it is possible that the externally-oriented will remember more failures. The reasoning here is that the externally-oriented individual has a built-in defense against failure. He can feel that it was due to forces beyond his controls luck, fate, the complexity or non- , predictability of the world. There is thus less need for defensive forgetting. While successes are not as glorious, neither are failures as gloomyl For the internally- oriented, failure is seen as personal, and the need for avoidant behavior, including fantasy response, may be greater. Thus, in the success-failure situation, the pre­diction is that externals will remember more failures, but again the question is empirical.

The hypotheses restatedAlthough the hypotheses of the study have already

been informally stated in the past several pages, they will be restated here more formallys

551. Need value Is related to recall. In a

situation where two need values of different strength have a chance to operate (and freedom of movement Is held constant), events related to the stronger need value will be better remembered.

2. In the special case where freedom of movement Is low and need value high, there will be an Increase In positive memory distortion for failures.

3. Freedom of movement Is related to recall. An Individual whose freedom of movement is high will remember his successes, and an Individual whose freedom of movement is low will tend to remember his failures.. Memory dis­tortion will be in the direction of freedom of movement, except for the special case noted above.

4. Individual task expectancies will relate to recall. An individual will remember better task outcomes that agree with his expectancies. Memory distortion will be in the direction of task expectation.

5. I-E scale scores will be positively related to the recall of failures in an evaluative situation.

In the following chapter the methodology will be described.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Over-viewA test of the hypotheses outlined in the previous

chapter requires: (l) measuring need value and freedomof movement for each subject in two different areas of achievement; (2) placing each subject in an experimental situation which he perceives as involving evaluation in both areas; (3) causing him to experience success and failure in each area; (4) measuring his recall for these success and failure experiences; and (5) providing appro­priate controls for task and order. The following design was devised to meet these requirements:

Scholastic and artistic achievement were chosen as the two areas for study, and four tasks were developed which have face validity both as "Scholastic Aptitude Tests" and "Artistic Aptitude Tests." To study the effects of need value on memory, subjects who differed in need value for scholastic and artistic achievement (but did not differ in freedom of movement for these two areas) were

56

seen individually and given all four tasks. They were told that two of the tasks were "Scholastic Aptitude Tests" and that two were "Artistic Aptitude Tests." (Each task was presented to half the subjects as a "Scholastic" test and to the other half of the subjects as an "Art" test.) After each task, subjects were given bogus scores indicating success or failure. They were made to feel that they had succeeded on one scholastic and one art test, and that they had failed one scholastic and one art test. Following the completion of the tasks, subjects filled out a brief questionnaire and were then asked "as a test of memory" to recall their scores.

To study the effects of freedom of movement on memory, other subjects, matched in need value for scholas­tics, were given all four tasks. The same procedure was followed except that now all the tasks were called "Scholas­tic Aptitude Tests." The bogus scores signified success on two tasks, and failure on the other two.

Two additional groups were studied. A group of subjects with high need value and high freedom of movement for scholastics, and a group with high need value, but moderate and low freedom of movement.

How that ah over-view of the procedure has been given, the methodology can be presented in detail.

58Subjects

Questionnaires vere administered to 293 high school students— the entire male population of a Columbus, Ohio senior high school (excluding those students vho vere absent on both administration days)* On the basis of their questionnaire responses, 114 male tenth-, eleventh-, and tvelfth-grade students vere selected to participate In this study* Five other subjects vere run through the experimental procedures, but their protocols vere discarded before data analysis either because they performed too poorly to be given believable success scores (tvo subjects), or because the tasks had been administered in the vrong order (three subjects)* One subject vho vas originally selected refused to participate*

Officials of the Board of Education described the high school from vhlch the subjects vere dravn as a "typical" Columbus school, located In a mlddle-income community*

The use of high school students In preference to the usual college Introductory psychology students had several advantages* Pretesting revealed that the high school student8 vere more heterogeneous vith regard to need value and freedom of movement for soholastio and artistic achievement, making it possible to select enough subjects vlth the neoessary character!sties* Also, the

59use of high school students gave more assurance that the experimenter*s motives and the experimental tasks would be accepted at face value.

Measuring need value and freeaom ot movement

Rotter defines need value as the "mean preference value of a set of functionally related reinforcements" (1954, p. 189) and In discussing the measurement of need value by paper and pencil ranking methods he Indicates that an attempt must be made to hold expectancy constant by means of verbal instructions, such as, "‘If you could have any one,1 ‘If the chances of getting them are all equal,1" etc. (p. 193). Following this ranking model, a questionnaire measure of need value for seven areas of achievement was designed (Appendix A). The respondent is asked to indicate the Importance he placesi on being good in each of the seven areas by ranking them in order of importance. He Is requested to disregard his present skills and abilities, and, Instead, to imagine that he could be very talented in any of the areas listed. The areas covered ares musical aptitude, clerical aptitude, artistic aptitude, mechanical aptitude, athletic aptitude, scholastic aptitude, and dramatic aptitude. Only the ranks of scholastic and artistic aptitude were relevant to this

60study, but, the other areas were needed to permit greater differentatlon In ranking.

While It Is widely recognized that paper and pencil measurements are subject to various kinds of bias, such as the Influence of social desirability (Crowne & Marlowe, in press), the measurement of relative need value by paper and pencil ranking Is less precarious than might at first be supposed. This Is because the operation of a social desirability set does not necessarily invalidate these rankings. Let us assume, for example, that a subject ranks scholastic aptitude as the most valued attribute because he feels that this would be the socially acceptable thing to do. His ranking Indicates that he knows others regard scholastic ability as a highly desirable trait, and, furthermore, it indicates that the reinforcement of these other people is sufficiently important to cause him to respond in a way calculated to please them. By the same reasoning, a student who devalues athletic ability because he thinks the people who will read his answers wouldn’t approve, may prize athletic achievement in situations with peers, but with authority adults, he recognizes that athletic ability does not lead to the desired rewards.The experimental session and the questionnaire-taking session were alike in two important respects: they bothtook place "in school," and they were both administered

by the same person. Thus the factors which might determine the questionnaire rankings could reasonably be expected to operate in the experimental situation as well. The validity of the rankings would be reduced if the measurement situation and the experimental situation evoked different need values.A study by Phares (1953) Indicated that the ranked values for academic and athletic recognition reinforcements changed depending on whether the students made the rankings for a Gym teacher while sitting on the Gym floor, or for an English teacher in an English class.

Rotter defines freedom of movement as "the mean expectancy of obtaining positive satisfaction as a result of a set of related behaviors directed toward the accomplishment of a group of functionally related rein­forcements" (p. 194). In this study the basic measurement of freedom of movement for scholastics and art was accom­plished by asking subjects (on the second portion of the questionnaire mentioned above) to rate their present abilities in each of the seven areas on a series of seven- point rating scales. The students were requested to compare themselves to others in their grade. The points of the scale were labeled; very good, good, above average, average, below average, poor, and very poor. The instructions attempted to minimize over and underestimation by placing the emphasis on a person's "being able to Judge his own

62abilities realistically," and by indicating that some students would be given a chance to compare their estimates with their actual aptitude scores in the near future. It was hoped that the possibility of having the accuracy of their ratings checked (coupled with the emphasis on "know­ing oneself") would minimize the motivation for modest or extravagant evaluation. Again, only the ratings for scholastics and art were germane to the study.

The reader will recall that the hypotheses concern­ing freedom of movement and recall (unlike those concerning need value), were investigated using only the area of scholastic achievement. Thus it was fortunate that in the area of scholastic achievement several additional indices of freedom of movement were available. An academic grade point average was computed for each subject from grades appearing on that subject's permanent school record. Also, each subject's IQ was obtained from the records. While subjective and objective expectancies are not equivalent, they are related. It would be reasonable to assume that a student with a low grade point average and a low IQ, who had met with many failures in academic situations, would not have developed a high expectancy for success in academic pursuits. At the other end of the continuum the relation­ship is probably more tenuous, Students who have met with much objective success may also have developed high minimal

63

goals (Rotter, 195 , p* 213), and vhat would be "success" for others may be unsatisfactory for them.

Academic grade point average was computed by assigning numerical values to each grade: A*4, B*3,C**2, D*l, and E*0. Only grades In academic courses were averaged. Grades In Music, Art, Industrial Art, Typing, Business courses, Physical Education, Driver Education, and Health Education were not Included•

In almost all cases, the IQ utilized was the latest Hienmon-Nelson group Intelligence test score. For a fey students (who had transferred from other school systems)IQ's from other group tests had to be utilized.

Composition of the groupsSubjects were selected and assigned to groups on the

basis of their responses to the questionnaire measures of need value and freedom of movement just described. The first two groups (A and B), were set up to test the hypothesis relating to need value and memory. Each of these groups con­tained twenty-four subjects. Group C and group D were set up to test the hypotheses relating to freedom of movement. Each of these groups contained twenty subjects. Groups E and F were additional groups, composed partly of subjects drawn from groups C and D. Group E was a scholastic high need value, high freedom of movement group, with twenty

64subjects. Group F was a scholastic high need value, moder­ate to low freedom of .movement group, with twenty subjects. The criterion for a subject's inclusion in each group is given below:

Group A (High Scholastic Need Value)—Need value for scholastics higher than need value for art by at least three (rank) points.Need value for scholastics not lower than the third rank position. Need value for art not higher than the fourth rank position. Freedom of movement for scholastics and art equal or not different by more than one point on the rating scales.

Group B (High Art Need Value)— Need value for art higher than need value for scholastics by at least three (rank) points. Need value for art not lower than the third rank position. Need value for scholastics not higher than the fourth rank position. Freedom of movement for scholastics and art equal or not different by more than one rating scale point.

Group C (High Freedom of Movement)— Freedom of movement for scholastics rate one, two, or three. Matched for scholastic need value with a subject in group D.

Group D (Low Freedom of Movement)--Freedom of movement for scholastics rated five, six, or seven. Matched in scholastic need value with a subject in group C.

Group E (High Need Value, High Freedom of Movement)— Freedom of movement for scholastics rated one or two; need value for scholastics ranked first or Second.

Group F (Need Value-Freedom of Movement Discrepancy)— Need value for scholastics ranked first, second, or third; freedom of movement for scholastics rated four or lower.

The exact composition of each group on need value and freedom of movement can be found in Appendix B. Groups

A and B were clearly different In need value for scholas­tics and art; groups C and D were matched in scholastic need value, but clearly different In freedom of movement composition; and groups E and P differed In the degree of discrepancy between need value and freedom of movement for scholastics.

Measuring Internal vs. external corTErol

The measure of Internal vs. external control em­ployed In this study was a modification of the I-E Scale developed by Liverant, Rotter, Seeman, and Crowne, 1962 (Gore & Rotter, 1963). The scale was modified by deleting Items that might have been objectionable In the school setting, Items that might have been difficult for high school students to comprehend, and Items that were not appropriate to a high school population. Appendix C contains a copy of the scale used*tand the original scale for comparison. High scores represent "external" orientation.

The experimental tasksA wide variety of tasks were pretested. Pour

tasks were selected from this group because they met the following criteria:

1. They had face validity both as tests of

"Scholastic Aptitude" and "Artistic Aptitude."66

2. They were sufficiently novel and ambiguous to permit bogus scores to be given without arousing suspicion.

3. They could be administered in about three minutes each.

4. They engaged the interest of most subjects and yet none seemed strikingly more salient than the rest.

The four tasks were:1. Color Naming— The materials for this task

consisted of an illustration board chart, 9“xll", contain­ing forty color samples labeled "A" through "Z" and "AA" through "NN". The color samples were paint chips of the kind supplied by paint dealers, and each chip was about’ 3/4Mxl/2”. While a subject looked at the chart he was read a list of objects, one at a time. For each object he was asked to indicate the letter that would correspond to the color of the object. The objects named were: a robin's egg, butter, the blue of the American flag, a piece of Jade, a red brick, a deer, a copper sulphate crystal, a tangerine, an emerald, asparagus, the green of a dollar bill, and a lime. The objects were read in two series to Justify giving two (bogus) scores. The task took approxi-

" mately three minutes to administer.2. Visual Memory~The materials for this task

consisted of two illustration board charts, 8 l/2Mxll" (Appendix D). Each chart was black except for several

67geometric designs mounted on It* The first chart contained seven designs, and the second chart contained six designs* The subject vould be shovn each chart for twenty seconds and then asked to drav as many of the designs from memory as he could* The tvo (bogus) scores presumably represented his performance on the first and second series* The task took approximately three minutes to administer*

3* Hidden Figures— For this task some of the Items of Thurstone'a Concealed Figures Test (Thurstone & Jeffrey, 1936) vere utilized (Appendix S)* As In the original test, the subject vas asked to place a check under each design vhich. contained the stimulus figure, and a cross under those designs vhlch did not contain the figure*The Thurstone test is similar to other embedded figure

x

tests* Each page vas considered a series, and, ajgaln, tvo (bogus) scores vere given* The task took approximately three minutes to administer* A stopvatch vas visible to

fthe subject during the .test*4* Imagination Test— The materials for this task

consisted of cards VIII and X of the Rorschach* The subject vas asked to look at each card and come up vlth as many Ideas as possible concerning vhat the card looked like* Each card vas considered a separate series, and tvo (bogus) scores vere given* A stopvatch vas visible to the subject during this test, but the relationship betveen

score and time was left ambiguous. Card X was always• r

administered first.

Expectancy estimatesAfter each test, prior to receiving the bogus

scores, the subject was asked to put a check along a fifteen-point scale (Appendix F) to indicate how well or poorly he felt he had done on that test (compared with others in his grade). Before the testing began subjects were told that they would be asked to make such estimates "because we are interested in finding out how well people can estimate their own abilities." The ends of the scale were labeled "0" and "ldo," and the middle was labeled, "50." Subjects were told that a score of "5Q" was average. The difference between this scoring system (where "50" was average) and "school'tests" (where "65" or "75" might be average) was emphasized. Ratings after each test yielded an estimate of the subject's specific score expectancy for that particular task.

The bogus scoresEach subject received eight bogus scores— two

following each task. The scores were the same for all subjects, although the order in which they were given was systematically varied. Two sets of scores (86,81; 80,72) were chosen to signify success, and two sets of

scores (29,26; 23,17) vere chosen to signify failure.All eight numbers vere carefully ohosen to be as equivalent as possible In association value (Battlg & Spera, 1962). Numbers closer than about fifteen points from zero or from one hundred vere considered unsuitable because they vould provide little room for memory distortion in the extreme direction. The failure and success scores vere chosen to be about equally extreme, and In each set there vere three numbers from one decile and one number from a second decile.

Table 1 gives the association values of the numbers employed in this study. The higher the association value of a number, the more easily the number can be remembered.It can be seen that the association values for the nuniberB selected are quite close, and the total of mean association values for the success numbers (86, 81, 80, 72) Is only one-hundredth of a point greater than the total for the failure numbers (29, 26, 23, 17). A memory advantage for success or failure vould therefore not be attributable to differences In the memorizabillty of the numbers.

i t

70TABLE 1

ASSOCIATION VALUE MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR THE BOQUS SCORE NUMBERS^

Number Mean S.D.

Success Scores Set One

86 1.23 1.2181 1.61 1.34Mean total 2.84

Set Two80 1.74 1.3072 1.36 1.28

Mean total 3.10Success, mean

total 5.94 >Failure Scores '

Set One29 1.18 1.2626 1.55 1.25Mean total 2.73

Set Two23 1.2317 1.85 1.38

Mean total 3.20Failure, mean

total 5.93aAdapted from Battig & Spera (1962).

.ffiUgy SME,Twelve questions from the Taylor Manifest

Anxiety Soale (Appendix 0) vere utilized as an inter- vening task (J* A# Taylor, 1953)* The purpose of this task vas primarily to fill time between the last experimental task and the recall test* While these questions vere not Intended to be a main focus of the study, scores for the twelve questions have been analyzed* The questions vere typed on a sheet of paper, 8 l/2"xll", and each subject responded on an IBM answer sheet*

The, recall teatFollowing the intervening task, subjects vere

asked "as a test of memory" to recall the scores they had received on the other "tests• " The experimenter vent through the tasks in the same order they had been given, naming each vhile shoving the subject some of the materials from that task, so that there could be no confusion about vhlch task vas being discussed* For each task the subject vas asked to state both scores* If he stated that he did not know exactly what they vere, or that he could not recall them at all, he vas asked to guess* In every case a definite number vas elicited* Subjects vere not required to

72remember which of the two scores for each task came first, although they sometimes volunteered this in­formation. The presentation of the recall procedure as a "test of memory" was intended to increase the motivation for reporting scores accurately if indeed they had been accurately perceived and remembered. Subjects did not know at this point that the scores were bogus.

Order of the tasksThe four experimental tasks were always pre­

sented in the same order (i.e., color naming, visual memory, hidden figures, and imagination). Half the subjects in each group "failed" the first and third- task, while the other subjects "failed"the second and fourth tasks. The sequence of the four sets of bogus scores (86, 8lj 80, 72; 29, 26; 23, 17) was varied so that each appeared with every task an equal number of times. Finally, in groups A and B, one-half of the subjects were told that the first two tests were tests of "Scholastic Aptitude" and the last two were tests of "Artistic Aptitude." The other half of the subjects in these groups were told that the first two tests were "Artistic" tests and the last two "Scholastic" tests.

73In brief, the order of the tasks was constant,

but the varying sequence of labels and scores assured that task and score variables would not contaminate the tests of the hypotheses.

Administration of the questionnaire materials

The questionnaires were administered on two different days. On the first day, the principal intro­duced the experimenter to each auditorium study hall group. The experimenter addressed each group as follows:

You are being asked to participate in an Ohio State University survey. As you may already know, this country has recently become very concerned with the development of all kinds of skills and abilities.One purpose of this survey is to find out how students would feel about being good at various skills. The United States Government, which is supporting this survey, regards this information as very important in planning future programs.These brief questionnaires call for your attitudes on a number of things. Since only accurate information will be useful, please be sure to answer the questions thoughtfully and honestly. Naturally, we will consider your replies confidential.Your opinions will not affect you per­sonally in any way. In fact, no names will be mentioned in any of our results and no one connected with this school will see your replies.

Because it is important that you fill out these questionnaires correctly, do not write on them until I give you further directions.

74Copies of the need value-freedora of movement questionnaire and the I-E scale were distributed to the male students, the instructions printed on the sheets were read aloud, and questions from the students were answered.

An additional questionnaire consisting of a short series of rather direct questions pertaining to academic anxiety, academic confidence, and low need value for academic achievement, was administered along with the need value-freedom of movement questionnaire and the I-E scale (Appendix H). This questionnaire was included with­out pretesting and since a preliminary inspection of the responses revealed little consistency, these data were not further analyzed.

The questionnaire materials were collected by the experimenter from each student as soon as he finished and the experimenter checked for name* clasB, etc. Despite spot checking, thirty-five of the 293 protocols contained omissions or were incorrectly filled out.

Two days later, those students who had not yet participated in the "survey" were asked to report to the school's cafeteria during a prescribed period. The same administrative procedure was followed.

Administration of the Individual sessions

Each of the 114 subjects was seen Individually and privately by the experimenter during one of each student's

75regular study hall periods. The subjects vere sent for by an office meBsenter or vere summoned by official note to report to the office. The subjects vere escorted by the experimenter from the office to the vacant nurse's office, vhere the experiment vas carried out. The nurse's office is regularly used by the school as spare office space, and students are routinely summoned to the office by messenger or note for a variety of reasons— good, bad, and trivial. Thus there vas nothing particularly suspicious about this procedure and subjects did not know beforehand that they had been selected to participate In the study.

After a subject vas seated, the experimenter said:"I guess you are vondering vhat you're doing here?" Theanswer vas alvays In the affirmative. Then the experimentercontinued: "Do you remember filling out some questionnairesfor me a short vhlle back?" Again, the ansver vas alvaysin the affirmative.

Well, I picked your name on the basis of chance to help vith the second part of that survey. What I vant you to do Is take a fev aptitude tests that vlll not go on your record or affect you personally in any vay. Is that all right vith you?

It has already been noted that only one subject refused toparticipate at this point. After receiving an affirmativereply, the experimenter checked the subject's name, officialclass, and grade. He continued:

76As you nay know, an aptitude test Is a test that measures some kind of Skill or ability*I am going to give you four aptitude tests*Two of them measure Scholastic aptitude and two measure Artistio aptitude*

(For groups C through F the last two sentences were omitted,and, Instead, the experimenter said, "I am going to giveyou four aptitude tests that measure various aspects ofScholastic aptitude*")

After each test I'm going to ask you to guess how you did compared with other students In your grade, because we are also Interested In how well people can estimate their own abilities*(E showed S a copy of the Scale.) On all of these tests, 50 Is average, zero Is the worst you can do, and 100 is the best* These aren't like school tests, where 65 might be average* On these tests, 65 would be well above average* After each test I'll ask you to put a mark on a scale like this to Indicate how you think you did* (E put the sample scale aside*)Okay* I'll explain each test as we come to It*(For Groups A and B): These first two testsmeasure Scholastic (AzftlBtlc) aptitude* That is, hew good you might be at school work, problem-solving and general Intellectual ability* (That Is, how good you might be at creative art; creative painting, drawing, and so on*)This first test is called "color naming*" Take a look at this chart* I'm going to name some common objects and some that are not so common* I want you to tell me what letter Indicates their, color*For example, If I were to say, "Lemon," what letter would you say? (Regardless of color chosen, as long as It was In 'the yellow family, the experimenter said, "Good* Any misunderstanding was clarified at this?point*)Now, let's try these* A robin's egg? (E records the response*) Butter? (Etc.)

tOkay, let's try this series* A copper sulphate crystal? (Etc*).

(E took the color chart from the subject and handed him a pencil and a copy of the expectancy scale*) Nov, put a check somewhere along the line to Indicate how you think you did compared with others in your grade* (While the subject rated himself, E pretended to be scoring the "test*" He then took the scale from the subject.)You got an on the first series and an onthe second series (86,81; 80,72; 26,29; 23,17). Both of which are very good* (Both of which are not very good*)The second test of Scholastic (Artistic) aptitude Is called Visual Memory* I'm going to show you a chart with some designs on It* When I take It away I want you to draw as many of the designs as you can remember* Okay, take a good look at these* (Subject was Shown the first card for 20"). Now draw as many as you can remember*

Subjects were'stopped If necessary after 1 l/2', andshown the second card*

Let's try these. (After 20" E removed the chart.) Okay. (S vas given paper and pencil* E stopped S after 1' If necessary.)

A second rating scale was given to the subject and therating procedure vas repeated*

You got a __ on the first card, and a on thesecond card* Which is not very good. IWhich is very good*)(For groups A and B): Nov* (Some materials aremoved aside*) These next two.tests have to do with Artistic aptitude (Scholastic aptitude).That is, how good you might be at creative art; creative painting, drawing, and so an* (That Is, how good you might be at school work, problem- solving, and general Intellectual ability.)Now this first test of Artistic (Scholastic) aptitude is called Hidden Figures* Take a look at this sheet* (The first page of figures was placed before the subject.) You notice that you

can find this figure hidden In here • You can also find 11; In here and In here, but; you can't find It here* (The experimenter Illustrated*)I want you to put a check underneath every figure on the right where you can find the figure on the left, and an X where you can't find It* like this* (The experimenter filled out the first row correctly*) Bemember--it has to be the same size* It can't be turned around, but It can be moved up or down* Okay? Do as many as you can* (After 1') Okay, now let's try these* (Second page of figures was placed before the subject*After 1') Okay*

The rating scale prooedure vas again repeated and scoresannounced*

This second test of Artistic aptitude (Scholastic aptitude) Is a test of creative Imagination ;(imagination)* I'm going to show you a card with ' some paint splashed on It* It doesn't look like anything In particular, but 1 want you to look at it and tell me anything It looks like to you or might remind someone or* You can look at the whole thing together or parts of It at a time*Okay, take a look at this one* (Card X was shown* After 1 l/2') Okay, let's try this one* (Card VIII was shown* After 1 l/2') Okay*

The rating procedure vas repeated and scores announoed*Now I'd like you to answer these few questions* They.are all "true and false*" Put the "true's"In this column and the "false” In this column* .(B pointed to the appropriate .columns of the IBM answer sheet*)

After the subject finished the Taylor questions, theexperimenter said:

Now, as a short test of memory, I vould like you to try and remember the scores you got on the other tests* I'll go through them one at a time for you*Do you remember what you got on the color naming test? (B showed the color chart*)

79If the subject answered In the negative, or stated thathe did hot remember exactly what he had gotten, theexperimenter said, "Take a guess*" If the subjectsasked If the scores were to be remembered exactly, theexperimenter said, "As close as you can come*" If thesubject gave one score, the experimenter said, "Whatwas your other score on that test?"

What did you get on the visual memory test? (The subject Is shown the second card of designs*)- What did you get on the hidden figures test?(The subject was shown a copy of the second 'Sheet of designs*) What did you get on the Imagination test? (The subject was shown Card VIII*)Fine*'

If there was time, the experimenter then asked a fewquestions about the subject's Interests* The purpose ofthis conversation was not primarily to elicit Informationfrom the subject, but to establish Increased rapportprior to making the final appeal for secrecy* At theclose of the session the experimenter said:

I want you to do me an important favor* Yourealize that If you had known that I was going to ask you to remember your scores, you would have paid special attention to them, and that wouldn't have been fair* Also, since these tests are new to everybody, we have found that people who know something about them In advance can do differently on them* For both these reasons I'm asking you not to tell-anyone what we did today for the next three Weeks* We'll be testing some other people— probably some people you know* If someone asks you a lot of questions and you. feel you have to say something, you might tell them you took some tests but that

80you don’t remember much about them. Of course, it would be better If you didn’t have to say anything. If people start to do differently we’ll have to throw everything out, and you can see how much work would be wasted. Can I count on you to do this for me? Okay. I want to thank you for helping out. I enjoyed talking with you. (The subject was given a pass to return to class and dismissed.)

The data collection took approximately four weeks. During this period of time many staff members and students knew that the experimenter was in the school working on some kind of project connect with The Ohio State University. Only the school principal knew explicitly what was being investigated and what procedures were being utilized. The security measures followed seemed to have worked remarkably well. No subject seemed to expect the memory test nor indicated suspicion concerning any of the procedures. ? During the last few days of testing two subjects indicated that they knew "some tests" were being given, but they appeared as naive as the other subjects concerning the nature of the tests and they stated they knew nothing about the memory test. The office secretaries reported that their student monitors had expressed curiousity about the study, but these monitors also seemed to have no informa­tion about the procedures. After the data had been collected, the subjects were seen by the experimenter in small groups. The bogus nature of the scores and the true nature of the experiment were revealed to them. They

81seemed genuinely surprised when told of the deception and most of them reacted heartily to having been "taken in* "

To avoid the possibility of experimenter bias, the group membership of the subjects was unknown to the experimenter until after the data had been collected.He did, of course, know whether a subject was a member of the two need value groups (A and B) or the other four groups. The experimenter was Ignorant of each subject’s IQ, grade point average, I-E score, need value ranking, and freedom of movement scores.

The dependent variables and statistical procedures

The dependent variables of this study wereof course, derived from the recall data. Three different kinds of scores were computed:

1. If a subject guessed a (bogus) score exactly, this was considered a "memory hit." The number of success and failure "hits" was computed for each subject In all groups. Also, for the subjects of the two need value groups (A and B), "scholastic" and "art" hits were computed. This data was analyzed by analyses of variance.

2. The two bogus scores comprising each set (e.g., 86 and 8l) were summed, and the sum of the two recalled scores was subtracted from that sum. In formula form,

82the procedure was as follows: (1st score given + 2ndscore given) - (1st score recalled + 2nd score recalled) - memory error score. The algebraic result of this computa­tion yielded a measure of the direction of memory distor­tion. A positive number indicates that the scores were remembered as larger than they actually were. A negative number indicates just the opposite. These data were also analyzed by analyses of variance.

3. By using the formula given above, but disregard ing the sign of the resulting memory error score, a measure of the degree of memory error or inaccuracy was obtained. This score will be referred to as the "absolute memory- error" score to indicate that it is a measure of accuracy, not the direction of distortion. These data were analyzed by analyses of variance.

Correlational analyses between the memory data and I-E scores, grade point averages, IQ's, and abbreviated Taylor Scale scores were performed.

The experimental designA summary of the experimental design appears in

the Table 2.

83TABLE 2

SUMMARY OP THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

Group NSchol­astic Art

TaskScholastic Art

NV PM NV PM Succ Pail l ucc Pail

A (High Scho. 24 + + + X X X XNV)

B (High Art 24 + + + X X X XNV)

C (High PM) 20 + + + + X XD (Low PM) 20 + - + + X XE (High NV, 20 + + + + X X

High PM)F (High NV, 20 + 0 + + X X

Moderate toLow PM)

Explanation of symbols:NV a Need valuePM * Freedom of movement+ • High - “ Low 0 - Moderate+ = Varies from high to low X " Administered

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

The presentation of results has been organised in terms of the various hypotheses* First, the effect of need value and freedom of movement on recall accuracy will he examined* Then, the relationships of need value and freedom of movement to the direction of recall distortion will he considered* Finally, data relevant to secondary hypotheses and matters of methodological interest will he presented* The raw data of this study caii he found in Appendix I, and Table 3» below, gives the means and standard deviations of the memory scores for each group*

Need value and selective

It was hypothesised that in a situation where two need values of different strength have a chance to operate (and freedom of movement is held constant), the events re­lated to the stronger need value will he better remembered. The subjects of Group A assigned high ranks to the importance of possessing scholastic ability, and low ranks to the Importance of possessing artistic ability* The subjects of

84

85TABLE 3

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE HENDRY SCORES FOR EACH GROUP

Absolute SignedMemory Memory Memory

Group Hits Error ErrorM SD M SD M SD

Group A(HI Scho NV) 2.21, 1.38 90.12 75.84 -10.96 65.08

Group B(HI Art NV) 1*96 1.52 55.83 40.08 1.34 52.37

Group C (HI FM) 1.45 1.00 63.60 60.48 -1.95 43.60

Group D (Lo FM) 1.75 1.12 45.75 33.91 8.85 35.40

Group E (HL NV HI FM)

2.05 1.57 64.70 77.41 6.40 27.95

Group F (HI NV Mod FM)

2.05 1.47 50.05 42.85 -1.85 47.50

group B did the reverse* The subjects of both groups claimedequal, or nearly equal, proficiency In scholastics and art* These two groups thus possess need values for two areas that are different In strength, while freedom of movement for these areas Is the same. Table 4 Indicates that the groups differ significantly In grade point average (p<*02), but not In Intelligence*

86TABIE 4

MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND t TESTS OF INTEUJGSNCB QUOTIENTS AND GRADE POINT

AVERAGES, GROUPS A AND B

Measure N Mean SD Diff t aP

IntelligenceQuotientGroup A......Group B«..«••

101.62100.62

14.0113.61

1.00 - nsb

Grade Point AverageGroup A......Group B......

1.871.4-3

.70

.47.44 2.47 .02

aTvo-tailed tests.^By inspection.

The small hut significant grade point difference Is an Indirect validation of the need value ranking since It Indicates that subjects vho expressed a high need value for scholastics made a better shoving In their schoolvork, although their basic ability level vas not higher than average•

Each subject In groups A (High Scho NV) and B (High Art NV) vas given four tasks, and by the use of appropriate bogus scores and labels, the follovlng four conditions vere created: one success on an "art" test,

one failure on an "art" test, one success on a "scholastic" test, and one failure on a "scholastic" test* The need value hypothesis vas tested hy comparing each subject's memory for scores under these four conditions. If the hypothesis is correct, the subjects of group A should have remembered "scholastic" test scores better than "art" test scores. The subjects of group B should have remembered "art" test scores better than "scholastic" test scores.

There vere tvo measures of memory accuracy: thenumber of scores remembered perfectly (memory-hits), and the point difference betveen the recalled scores and the given scores (absolute memory-error) • Table 5 summarizes the analysis of variance for the absolute memory-error scores, and Table 6 summarizes the analysis of "memory-hits." Both analyses vere in terms of group, success versus failure, and scholastic versus art tests. It can be seen that none of the main effects or Interactions in either analysis vas significant. The subjects of group A did not remember more (or less) "scholastic" scores, and group B subjects did not remember more (or less) "art" scores. Therefore, the null hypothesis that need value has no effect on selective recall could not be rejected.

88TABLE 5

SUMMARY OP ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR ABSOLUTEMEMORY-ERROR SCORES, GROUPS A AND B

Source SS df MS F

BetweenGroups(G)G X Subjects

3$l4 1 3614 3.94(SB) 42121 .46 916

WithinSucc X Fail

( s )Art X Scho- lastic(A)

119 1 H9 ^ 1.0021 1 21 < 1.00

S X A 135 1 135 1.00S X G 101 1 101 < 1.00A X G 206 1 206 < 1.00S X A X G 2.3 1 2.3 < 1.00S X Ss 38038 46 827A X Ss 33029 46 718S, A X Ss Total

53050170436

46191

1153

Freedom of movement and selective recall

It was hypothesized that with need value held constant, high freedom of movement would be associated with better memory of successes, and low freedom of movement would be associated with better memory of

89TABLE 6

SUMMARY OP ANALYSIS OP VARIANCE FOR MEMORY-HITSCORES, GROUPS A AND B

Source SS d f MS P

BetweenGroups(G) .19 1 .19 C 1 .0 0G X Subjects (Ss) 2 4 .2 3 46 .53

WithinSucc X Pail 0 .0 0 1 .00 1 .0 0

( s )Scho X Art .02 1 .02 < 1 . 0 0(A)

S X A .19 1 .19 < 1 . 0 0S X G .02 1 .02 < 1 .0 0A X G .33 1 .33 < 1 .0 0S X A X G .75 1 • 75 < 1 . 6 7S X Ss 18 .48 46 .4 0A X Ss 17 .1 5 46 .37S, A X Ss 2 0 .56 46 .45

Total 8 1 .9 2 191

failures. To test this hypothesis, the results obtained with groups C (High FM)and D (Low PM) were examined. Group C subjects claimed above-average proficiency in scholastic ability, while group D subjects rated them­selves below-average. The groups were matched for

need value In scholastic8* Table 7 Indicates that the two groups did not differ significantly In Intelli­gence, but they did differ significantly in grade point average (p <.001). The large difference In grade point is In line with expectations and lends validity to the freedom of movement rating procedure* Those subjects who stated that they vere below-average in academics had below-average grade point averages*

Bach student In these tvo groups vas given four tasks, each presented as a test of "scholastic'1 ability* Bogus scores created tvo "successes" and tvo "failures" for each subject* The hypothesis concerning freedom of movement and recall vas tested by comparing success and failure recall for these tvo groups, If the hypothesis vas correct, group C subjects should have remembered successes better and group D subjects should have remembered failures better* As before, there vere tvo measures of recall accuracy* The analysis of variance for the absolute memory-error scores, vhlch . vas In terms of success vs* failure and groups, Is summarized In Table 8* The main effects and Interactions are all Insignificant* In Table 9, the frequency of memory-hits for the success and failure conditions for each group Is given* Inspection makes further computa­tion unnecessary* The results are Insignificant* Thus,

91TABLE 7

MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND t TESTS 0? INTELLIGENCE QUOTIENTS AND

GRADE POINT AVERAGES,GROUPS C AND D

Measure N Mean SD Diff • t Pa

IntelligenceQuotientGroup C....,Group D.....

2020

101.2095.35

13.1512.44 5.85 1.41 ns

Grade Point AverageGroup C.....Group D.....

2020

2.101.27

.77

.46 .83 4.04 .001

aTvo-tailed tests.

It appears that subjects vith high scholastic freedom of movement did not remeniber scholastic test successes (or failures) better, nor did subjects vith lav scholastic freedom of movement shov a distinctive selective recall pattern. The null hypothesis that freedom of movement is unrelated to selective recall could not be rejected.

92TABLE 8

SUMMARY OP ANALYSIS OP VARIANCE FOR ABSOLUTEMEMORY-ERROR SCORES, GROUPS C AND D

Source SS df MS P

BetweenGroups(G)G X Subjects

(Ss) 456381

381593 1.30 1201

WithinSucc-Fails

(s )S X G S X Ss

324

3325473

11

38

324 < 1 .00

33 1.00 670

Total 73060 79

TABLE 9 ■ •FREQUENCY OP SUCCESS AND FAILURE

MEMORY-HITS, GROUPS C AND D

Group SuccessHits

Failure Total Hits Hits

Group C (N=20)

' 14 15 29

Group D (N=20)

18 17 35

We have yet to consider the special case where need value is high and freedom of movement is low.This condition is approximated by the subjects of group F(Hi NV, Mod. PM). Unfortunately group F subjects only approxi­mated rather than represented this special case because many of them had only moderate, instead of low, freedom of movement. There were very few subjects in the sample that actually possessed high need value in combination with low freedom of movement. . In any event, group P did contain subjects with a need value-freedom of move­ment discrepancy in the right direction, and the recall performance of these subjects was contrasted with the subjects of group E, who possessed high need value and high freedom of movement for scholastics. Table 10 indicates that the groups differed significantly, in both intelligence and grade point (p<.001). Group P subjects are of average intelligence, but had belowraverage grades, as their self-evaluations would imply. Group E was obviously a superior group, objectively as well as subjectively.

Groups E and P received the same treatment conditions as groups C and D— that is, they "failed" on two "scholastics" tests and "succeeded" on two "scholastic" tests. It was hypothesized that an

94TABUS 10

MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND t TESTS 07 INTELLIGENCE QUOTIENTS AND GRADE POINT

AVERAGES, GROUPS E AND 7

Measure N Mean SD Diff . t P

IntelligenceQuotient ,

Group E.....Group 7......

2020

112.75101.10

8.7110.72

11.65 3.68 .001

Grade Point AverageGroup E....Group 7.....,

2020

2.801.60

.69

.491.20 6.17 ‘ .001

aTwo-tailed tests.

Individual with high .need value and low freedom of move­ment would give evidence of avoidant or lrreal behaviors, which In this situation might he expected to Involve a decrease In the recall of failures or a decrease In total recall. The subjects of group 7, who approximated the necessary condition, would therefore be expected to show less total recall and/or less recall of failures.The analysis of variance presented In Table 11 of the

95TABLE 11

SUMMARY OP ANALYSIS OP VARIANCE FOR ABSOLUTEMEMORY-ERROR SCORES, GROUPS E AND P

Source SS df MS F

BetweenGroups(G) 451 1 451 < 1.00G X Subjects

(SB)62007 38 1632

WithinSucc-Fail(S) 244 1 244 < 1.00S X G 530 1 530 < 1.00S X Ss 35051 38 922 < 1.00Total 98264 79

absolute memory-error scores reveals no significant main effects or interactions. The number of, memory- hits for each group and each condition is presented in Table 12. The frequency of failure condition "hits" in group E was not significantly different from the number expected on a chance basis (t= 1.01, tat). The deviation in Group P was even smaller, and was thus obviously insignificant. The null hypothesis that a need value-freedom of movement discrepancy is unrelated

TABLE 12FREQUENCY OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE MEMORY-HITS, GROUPS E AND F

GroupSuccessHits

FailureHits

TotalHits t P*

Group E (N-20) 17 24 41 1.01 ns

Group F (N-20) 19 22 41 mm

bns

aTwo-tailed tests.U

By Inspection.

to defensive memory performance (in regard to accuracy) could not be rejected. It must be emphasized that this hypothesis was not adequately tested since group F subjects did not fully meet the necessary requirements. Defensive behavior may occur only where the discrepancy is more extreme, with freedom of movement being lower.

Several additional measures of freedom of movement were utilized in this study— namely, IQ and grade point average. Correlations between these variables and the memory scores were computed for the 88 subjects of groups A

97through D. (Since groups E and F contained many of the same subjects as C and D, they vere not included in the correlational analyses.) Table 13 shows that the correla­tions were not significant. Correlations were also computed separately for each group, but these were also insignificant. A few extreme scoreB inflated two or three group correlations to the .05 level, but recomputation without the extreme scores reduced these correlations to

CORRELATIONS EE WEEN INTELLIGENCE QUOTIENT AND GRADETABLE 13

POINT AVERAGE AND (1) MEMORY-HITS (2) MEMORY-ERROR SCORES (GROUPS A-D, N=88)

Memory Score Grade Point rr

Memory-HitsSuccess Condition 03 -.11Failure Condition -.02 -.01

-.06Total 02Absolute Memory-Error

Success Condition Failure Condition

-.0003

0103

Total .01 .00

98below accepted levels of significance. The null hypothesis that Intelligence and grade point are not significantly related to selective recall could not be rejected.

Closely related to the hypotheses concerning freedom of movement, are the parallel hypotheses concerning the more specific Individual task expectancies. While freedom of movement for scholastics Is a rather general expectancy, a series of specific expectancies vere obtained from each subject after each task. Each subject vas asked to rate hov well he thought he performed on each task by checking a rating scale. Do these more specific expectancies relate to selective recall? Table 14 gives the correlations

TABLE 14CORRELATIONS BETWEEN TASK EXPECTANCIES AND (l) MEMORY-HITS,

(2) ABSOLUTE MEMORY-ERROR SCORES (GROUPS A-D, N=88)

ConditionMemoryHitsr

Absolute Memory- Error r

1st success CO0 .1 i . o o

1st failure HH.1 .122nd success .18 ***CVJ.i

2nd failure . o N> .05

*p .05.

between expectation and recall* Again, only the subjects of groups A-D were used in the analysis. The one correlation which reached significance was inflated due to the location of extreme scores, and the equivalent correlation for the memory-hits data (which is not affected by extremes) did not reach significance. Thus, the general finding was again negative. Whether a subject thinks he did well or poorly on a task was unrelated to his memory for scores on that task.

The direction of distortion

The technique of asking subjects to remember scores (as opposed to task names, etc.) had the advantage of permitting a measure of the direction of memory distortion. The measure used here was called the "signed memory-error score" and was obtained by finding the algebraic difference between recalled scores and the scores actually given. A positive memory-error score thus indicated overestimation and a negative score indicated underestimation. If a person is told that he got an "80" and a "72," but he remembers these scores as an "85" and a "74," then his signed memory-error score would be "4* 7#" indicating overestimation of the actual score. A constant of 200 was added to all signed memory-error scores prior to the analysis of variance to eliminate negative numbers.

100Three analyses of variance were performed for the

memory direction data* one each for groups A and B, G and D, and E and F. The results of these analyses appear In Tables 15, 16, and 17* For groups A and B, the analysis vas In terms of group, success vs* failure, and scholastics vs* art* The other tvo analyses vere In terms of group and

TABLE 15SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR SIGNED

MEMORY-ERROR SCORES, GROUPS A AND B

Source SS df MS F

Between.

Groups (G) 453 1 453 <1.00G X Subjects (Ssj 43503 46 945

WithinSuccess X

Failure (S) 24593 1 24593 20.75***Art X Scholas­tics (A) 34 1 34 < 1.00

S X A 1.88 1 1.88 <1.00S X G 5136 1 5136 4.34*A X G 22 1 22 ^1.00S X A X G 863 1 863 <1.00S X Ss 54500 . 46 1185A X Ss 61206 46 1331S, A X Ss of 44131 46 959Total 234443 191

*p< .05****p< .001.

101TABLE 16

SUMMARY CP ANALYSIS CP VARIANCE FOR SIGNEDMEMORY-ERROR SCORES, GROUPS C AND D

Source SS df MS F

BetveenGroups (G)G X Subjects (Ss) 58331100 1

38 5838181.00

WithinSuccess X

Failure (S) S X G S X Ss

15848 1620 . 60694

1138

15848162011597

9.78**<1.00

Total 109846 79

**p <.01.

success vs. failure. In all three analyses, the success vs. failure effect vas significant. Successes vere more subject to underestimation than overestimation and failure scores vere more subject to overestimation than underestimation.

Inspection of the data revealed that this positive finding vas mainly due to the large error scores obtained by some subjects. Many of these subjects remembered five or six of their eight scores as successes, or as failures, although they had actually received four success scores and four failure scores. The absence of significant Interactions

102TABLE 17

SUMMARY 07 ANALYSIS 07 VARIANCE FOR SIGNEDMEMORY-ERROR SCORES, GROUPS E AND 7

Source SS df MS 7

BetweenGroups (G) 340 1 340 <-1.00G X Sb 30319 38 798

WithinSuccess X

Failure (S) 22680 1 22680 10.07**S X G 1133 1 1133 <1.00S X Ss 85540 38 2251Total 140011 79 1772

"ST**p<.01.

between suecess-failure and group In the analyses for groups C & D, and E & 7 Indicates that this tendency of some subjects to recall successes as failures and vice versa was unrelated to freedom of movement* It was probably due to the effects of retroaction and proactlon rather than personal memory styles*

Table 18 gives the means, standard deviations, and t test values for each group's signed memory-error scores, after the removal of extreme scores* If a subject remembered any success scores as below "50," or any failure

103TABLE 18MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS; AND t TESTS FOR THE SIGNED

MEMORY-ERROR SCORES OF EACH GROUP AFTER THE OMISSION OF EXTREME SCORES

Group N Mean SD Diff. t Pa

Group A , *Success 15 395*8 11.47

8.07 1.57 nsFailure 15 403.9 15.33

Group BSuccess 17 399.7 14.71 1.64 b- naFailure 17 401.3 11.94 y

Group CSuccess 15 391.8 12.13

406.514.73 2.38 .05Failure 15 18.53

Group DSuccess 17 402.3 11.35

406.54.18 1.00 ns

Failure 17 17.41Group E

Success 16 397.9 12.75 . j

16 401.6 3.75 1.09 nsFailure 12.75Group F

Success 15 401.0 10.67 h1 1.13 - nsFailure 15 402.1 13.73

8Two-tailed tests.•uBy inspection.

104boore as above "50," his protocol vas omitted from this analysis* After these omissions only the difference betveen success and failure memory-error scores for group C vas significant (p< .05), although the means are In the same direction for groups A, B, and E. The results In group C and the general direction of the means gave slight support to the hypothesis that Individuals remember scores In accordance ylth their geneeal expectations. That Is, since all scores vere more extreme than subjects anticipated, the tendency to "level" extreme scores can be interpreted to Indicate distortion In the direction of expectation.Hovever, the same result could have been obtained If subjects had merely been guessing scores at random, since the average of random guesses vould be less extreme than any extreme score. This fact rendered the finding ambiguous.

The analysis of variance for groups A and B (Table 15) revealed a significant Interaction betveen groups and success-fallure (p<.05). The means Of the relevant cells are given In Table 19* Group A subjects overestimated failures more than group B subjects, and the reverse vas true concerning success underestimation. Hovever, since this Interaction vas due to the placement of several extreme scores rather than a representative group trend, Its psychological significance vould appear to be negligible.

A hypothesis had been formulated concerning the direction of failure score distortion for high need value,

105TABLE 19

MEAN SIGNED MEMORY-ERROR SCORES FOR SUCCESS AND FAILURE CONDITIONS, GROUPS A AND B

Success Condition . Failure ConditionGroup Mamory-Error® Memory-Error

Group A 361 427Group B 388 412

A constant of 400 vas added to each "’pair of signed memory-error scores to eliminate negative numbers. Means higher than.400 represent overestimation, means below 400 represent underestimation.

low freedom of movement subjects. In line with a notion of defensive behavior, these subjects would be expected to distort failures In a positive direction. The analysis of variance Involving group F (Table 17) did not, of course, lend support to this hypothesis. Again It Is necessary to add that the group F subjects did not fulfill the conditions necessary to a clear test of the hypothesis.

Shememory scores

Most studies have asked subjects to recall the titles of tests or test Items. In this study subjects were asked to recall their test scores. Since this Is a relatively novel procedure, It is Important to note whether

the memory for these scores vas a reliable phenomenon. Did an Individual vho accurately remembered his first success score also accurately remember his second success score? To ansver this kind of question correlations vere computed betveen memory scores for the two success conditions, and memory scores for the tvo failure conditions. Only the subjects of groups C and D vere used In this analysis, since the A and B groups underwent four different conditions. The correlations are reported in Table 20, along vlth Spearman- Brown reliability coefficients where appropriate. Only one correlation (group C, memory-error, failure scores) reached significance (p<.05). It vould appear that memory for one success or one failure score vas little related to the memory for a second success or failure score. This probably vas not because the suocess-failure manipulation vas not sufficiently potent. Observations of subjects' reactions suggest that these conditions vere seen as realistic and meaningful. Disappointment and anxiety often followed "failure," and pleasure often followed the announcement of a "success" score. The low reliabilities can probably best be Interpreted as a function of the operation of retroactive and proactive Inhibition. In retrospect, these factors seemed stronger than vas anticipated because of the homogeneity of the memory material and the protracted time range of the experiment.

107TABLE 20

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND SUCCESS MEMORY SCORES, AND BETWEEN FIRST AND

SECOND FAILURE MEMORY SCORES,GROUPS C AND D

ConditionAbsoluteMemory-Error

Memory-Hits

SignedMemory-Error

SuccessGroup C (N=20) -.07 1 . TO OS -.34Group D (N=20) -.05 00H.1 -.20

FailureGroup C (N=20) .47*® -.09 .4obGroup D (N=20) COCM•1 .07° 1 . 0

*p< .05.aSpearman-Brovn reliability coefficient = .64. ^Spearman-Brown reliability coefficient = .57* cSpearman-Brown reliability coefficient - .13.

Table 21 Indicates that the mean I-E 8001*68 of groups C and D vere significantly different at the .10 level. The differences between groups A and B, E and F vere not significant. A comparison of groups C and F means yielded a t value of 2.09, which is significant at the .05 level.

108This tendency for the low expectancy groups (D and P) to have higher mean I-E scores suggests that subjects who place ' a high value on an attainment they fall to achieve, tend to view the situation as being due to fate, chance, or powers beyond their control.

TABLE 21MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND t TESTS FOR

I-E SCAUS SCORES, GROUPS A AND B,C AND D, B AND F .

Group N Mean SD Diff. t Pa

Group A 24 11.29 2.63 b1.04 - nsGroup B 24 10.25 2.93

Group C 20 10.20 3.07 1.80 1.85 .10Group D 20 12.00 2.92

Group E 20 10.50 3.72 I.65 1.57 nsGroup F 20 12.15 2.67

aTwo-tailed tests. ^By inspection.

It was hypothesized the I-E scores would relate positively to the recall of failure scores. Externally oriented subjects would be expected to show greater memory accuracy for failures. Correlational data bearing on this

hypothesis Is presented In Table 22. Because It vas found that the location of extreme scores In the memory-error data produced Inflated correlations somevhat capriciously, an additional memory score vas Included In this analysis* This Is a unit score, called "failure error per cent," and It consists of the percentage of error points attributable to the failure condition* If an Individual remembered failures and successes equally veil or equally poorly, his failure error per cent score vould be 50. The reader vlll note that this score Is less influenced by extremes, and that It compares failure and success memory for each subject relative to his own level of recall* Nov, turning first to the more stable correlations based on the entire group A-D sample, it can be seen that all three memory scores (memory-hits, memory-error, and failure error per cent), yielded significant correlations In the predicted direction. Subjects vho vere more externally oriented (high scores on the I-E scale) shoved less memory-error attributable to failure scores, more perfect memories of failure scores, and fever error-polnts on failure scores. These relationships vere significant at the *01 level* The analysis by group Indicates that It vas In group A that these relationships reached their highest value* Group B also shoved high relationships when the absolute memory-error score vas used as the criterion, but these correlations vere subject to Inflation by extreme scores and vere less reliable than

110TABLE 22

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN I-E SCALE SCORES AND (1) MEMORY-HIT SCORES, AND (2) MEMORY-ERROR SCORES

Grout)Measure

N =A24

B24 ro

o0

D20

A-D88

Failure Error Per Cent -.57** -.21 -.11 1 . •pr H -.30**

Memory-HitsSuccess .04 .10 -.02 -.32 -.01Failure .40 .21 •33 •33 .31**Total .36 .20 .23 .03 .22*

AbsoluteMemory-ErrorSuccess .12 -.18 .13 .36 .07Failure -.55** -.55** .02 -.18 -.31**Total -.29 -.57** .08 .16 -.16

*p< .05.**p<.01.

the others* The subjects of group A vere subjected to a different experimental procedure than group C and D subjects, and, In addition, their scholastic and artistic freedom of movement ratings tended to lie In the middle

Illrange. Therefore it vas not clear which of a number of factors might; have produced the stronger relationship In this group, If the difference In strength vas not merely due to chance factors.

Because of the low correlations found betveen the first and second failure scores, It vas vondered whether the I-E scale correlation vas based on just one failure score. For groups A-D, the correlation betveen I-E and memory-hlts for the first failure condition vas .24 (p<.05), and for the second failure condition the correlation Is .23 (p<.05). Therefore, although the failure conditions yielded little memory reliability, the I-E scale correlated equally veil vlth both of the separate failure conditions.It must be pointed out that although the I-E findings vere significant and relatively consistent, the magnitude of these correlations vas quite small and accounts for very little of the variance. Thus, the findings can only be considered suggestive.

Abbreviated Taylor scale and recall

Twelve questions taken from the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Soale vere given to subjects betveen the experimental tasks and the recall test. These questions served mainly to occupy the subject for a short period of time, but since Taylor Scale scores have shown relationships to recall in

112other studies (e.g., Clements, 19595 Truax, 1957)# It; Is of some interest to note vhether these twelve questions correlated significantly with the recall measures. Table 23 Indicates that the differences between mean abbreviated Taylor Scale scores vas not significant at the .05 level for groups A and B, C and D, or E and F. Table 24 lists the correlations betveen this variable and the memory scores. Failure error per cent has again been Included to provide a more stable measure of recall. There vas a small, but significant, negative correlation betveen memory for

TABLE 23MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND t TESTS

OF ABBREVIATED TAYLOR SCORES, GROUPS A AND B, C AND D,

E AND F

Group N Mean SD Diff . t P*

Group A 24 3.62 2.08 v,.12 - ns13Group B 24 3.50 1.82

Group C 20 ^.55 1.60 . ,

. 00 VJ1 1.78 nsGroup D 20 3.70 1.34

Group E 20 4.50 1.96.70 I.25 ns

Group F 20 3.80 1.47

aTwo-tailed tests. bBy Inspection.

113TABLE 24

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ABBREVIATED TAYLOR SCALE SCORES,AND (1) FAILURE ERROR PER CENT, (2) MEMORY-HIT

SCORES, (3) MEMORY-ERROR SCORES

GrouoMeasure

N =A2k

B24

C20

D20

A-D88

FailureError -.49* -.35 .12 -.23 -.28**Per Cent

Memory-HitsSuccess -.11 -.21 -.23 -.03 COH•1

Failure .34 -.07 •°3, -.33 .02Total .18 -.18 -.13 -.26 -.09

AbsoluteMemory-ErrorSuccess .32 .40* .21 .26 .•28**Failure -.17 : .06 .21 -.09 -.02Total .09 .35 . .25 .13 .16

SignedMemory-ErrorSuccess -.33 -.35 -.33 -.05 -.28**Failure -.13 .13 .14 -.05 -.00

*p<.05.**p< .01.

Ilk

successes and abbreviated Taylor scores* Individuals vho reported more anxiety symptoms tended to recall fever successes perfectly, they tended to make larger recall errors on successes, and the percentage of error attributable to success vas larger. The signed memory-error data Included In Table 24 Indicates that Individuals vho admitted to anxiety symptoms shoved an Increased tendency to underestimate successes. It Is possible that they remembered successes less veil because of this depreciating tendency.

For groups A-D, the separate correlations betveen Taylor scores and first and second success condition memory-hits vere *05 and -.18 respectively. It Is evidently the second success experience that related to the Taylor score. Perhaps this vas because the second success followed at least one failure for all subjects, and

i

differences In anxiety arousal had thus already come Into play. In any event, these correlations vere at best suggestive and prolonged Inquiry Into their meaning vould seem uncalled for.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

Recall performance for the two success conditions did not produce high correlations, and the same vas true for the tvo failure conditions. This Indicated the instability of Individual recall performance as measured in this study. Since subjects reacted vith appropriate disappointment and pleasure, It Is unlikely that the suceess-fallure manipulation vas Ineffective. There vere several factors vhlch may account for the Instability of individual memory performance:

1. Almost all previous studies have required subjects to remember task titles or Items. In this study subjects vere required to recall their scores. There is little research precedent to indicate vhether stable memory patterns for scores can be expected. On the one hand, there Is no theoretical reason to suppose that memory for scores vould be less sensitive to systematic distortion effects. In fact, It might be hypothesized that scores, vhlch are In some vays the most central

115

aspect of the test situation, vould he especially sensi­tive to the effect of any defensive processes, unless, of course, they vere so Important that all vere remembered perfectly. Hovever, practically speaking, the use of a series of scores as the memory material (especially during a short experimental session) maximizes the potential for retroactive and proactive Inhibition, and this limits the degree of reliability that can be expected. Host selective recall studies have requested the recall of sixteen or more separate Items. It Is possible that only vlth a large number of Items vould reliable Individual recall patterns emerge•

2. In previous studies little attention has been devoted to the conditions tinder vhlch recall vas requested. Some authors (e.g., Alper, 1946a) have deliberately made the recall procedure Informal and non-threatening. Others (e.g., Stelnlnger, 195*0 allowed subjects to perceive the task as a "test." For the most part, subjects have been Instructed to simply vrlte dovn vhat they remember and they have not been given an explanation of the purpose of the procedure (e.g., Hosenzvelg, 1943)• Zelgamlk (1938) not only utilized an Informal recall procedure, but she did not score memories that vere given after a first "pause."In other vords, tasks that subjects remembered after a hesitation vere not counted. Considering this Important

but rarely noted difference In procedure, It Is not surprising that Zeigaraik's large recall ratios have not been duplicated by later Investigators. In tbls study the recall procedure vas presented as a "memory test."This vas done so that "suppression" vould be minimized and the subjects vould be motivated to state their "bad11 scores as veil as the good ones, If the "bad” scores had been remembered. At least a guess vas elicited for each score. It is Interesting to note that In some Instances a subject claimed that he could not remember his score, but then vent on to "guess" that score exactly. Nov, It Is possible that this procedure obscured subtle differ­ences In response tendency, but If these differences are the substance =of previous "selective recall" findings, there Is no justification for considering these past findings evidence of memory differences or repression.

Recall accuracyA group tendency to recall successes or failures

more accurately vas not anticipated., and not obtained.Alper hypothesized (1952), and provided evidence that Individual recall patterns vlll cancel each other out In group results vhen subjects are not selected In terms of personality variables. As she has noted, the discussion of differences In the literature on selective recall

118(trader evaluative conditions) refers almost exclusively to differences between groups or conditions, or between subjects selected on personality variables* The past research and the present findings are thus In accord*

This Is perhaps a good place to note that It has been implicitly assumed legitimate to compare this study with past completed-incompleted task studies* While it is instructive to make such comparisons, it is important to recognize that this study is actually more comparable to those investigations which manipulated success-fallure directly, rather than through an interruption technique*On the issue of a group recall tendency, the studies using a more direct success-failure manipulation have produced inconsistent findings* J* W. Taylor (1953) found only a slight (probably insignificant) memory advantage for successes* Steininger (1957) found a complex pattern! when the overall situation was perceived as a "success,11 individual successes and failures were remembered equally well, but in a setting of "failure," successes were better remembered* To complicate matters further, this result was only true when subjects completed all the tasks*When they were interrupted on all tasks, opposite results were found* Lomont (1961) found no significant recall pattern* Only a study by Kendler (19 9) using puzzles as the tasks, revealed a simple preference for success memory.

119These studies would not warrant the prediction of a group recall pattern.

Need value and freedom of movement

The failure to find a relationship between recall and the two major variables— need value and freedom of movement— Is of central concern. There Is evidence, formal and informal, that some elements of the procedure were effective and valid. The ranking and rating procedures used to measure need value and freedom of movement were patterned after methods successfully used In other studies (Rotter, 195*0 • Furthermore, the obtained differences In Intelligence and grade point average were meaningful and thus provide partial validation for these procedvires. Subjects who stated on a rating form that they were poor In schoolwork, were objectively poor In schoolwork. Those who placed a premium on academics, did achieve somewhat higher grades despite a lack of superior ability. All the subjects seemed quite involved In the tasks and It Is unlikely that they considered the tests Invalid.Their surprise when told they had been "duped” was spontaneous and seemed genuine. The potency of the success- failure manipulation has already been discussed. Since many other selective recall studies have used high school students as subjects, it cannot be said that these subjects

120■were too young or represented an unusual sample. The tasks employed In the study did differ from some of those more commonly used, but positive results have been ob­tained with a wide variety of tasks. There is evidence that the kind of task used can influence results (Sanford & Risser, 1948), but this evidence is more relevant to studies using the eompletion-lncompletion design*

In attempting to decide whether the negative results are due to the actual non-existence of the hypothesized relationships, or to difficulties in the demonstration of these relationships, the following factors need to be considered*

1. The instability of success and failure memory scores probably worked against the appearance of signifi­cant results, and the type of recall procedure used may have obscured the kind of "recall" finding that others have reported.

2. Mother procedural device which may have worked agdinst the hypotheses, although it was originally construed as advantageous, was the utilization of a single session. It will be remembered that in Alper's study (1946a) each subject served as his own control by parti­cipating in two separate sessions. In the present study, each subject served as his own control by undergoing several conditions during one session. The close proximity

121of these conditions (with failures Immediately following, successes, etc*), may have facilitated subjects gaining a "gestalt" of the situation, rendering the Individual successes and failures psychologically unimportant* In the study by Steininger (1957)* the overall tone of the situation was a prime determiner of outcome* A "success" tone produced equal memory of Individual successes and failures. In the present study, the tone of the situation should Ideally have been perceived as "neutral" since each subject failed twice and succeeded twice* Steininger1s study does not tell us whether Individual successes and failures will be equally remembered If the general tone Is "neutral." The only data concerning subject's overall Impression of the situation comes from the Informal post** session conversations* It was noted that most subjects were not terribly disappointed nor ecstatic about their performance, and most agreed that they had "done about as well as they expected." In Lomont’s study (1961), wheresubjects also received an equal number of plus and minus

. } '

ratings, no memory effects were obtained*3* A general "set" may have Interfered with the

effectiveness of the art-scholastic need value manipula­tion. If the subjects of groups A and B approached the situation with a general "test-taking" set, their behavior would have been basically governed by the need to please

122the examiner and make a good shoving. Under such circum­stances, more specific differences in need value for "art" and "scholastic" ability would be very much beside the point. This is not to say that no^differences existed on these variables, but rather that these differences may not have been operative in the situation. Informally, it was noted that subjects appeared very involved on all tasks, and seemed to be trying their best throughout.The experimenter would be hard pressed to indicate differences in motivation or behavior as a subject moved from the "scholastic" to the "art" tests. It is possible that memory and perceptual differences between specific need values would show up only under more relaxed conditions, or when the situations involving each need value were more differentiated.

4. It Is possible that need value and freedom of movement relate to recall through the operation of a "rehearsal” effect. Events which stimulate continued

Ithought, for example, may be better remembered. The rapid time sequence and immediate recall test of the present study would minimize any "rehearsal" effect. If positive findings were obtained in a future experiment which was similar in design but which utilized a delayed recall test, there would be evidence that need value and freedom of movement affect recall mainly through a "rehearsal"

123process. The time between performance and recall probably should not be longer than twenty-four hours, because long periods of time (e.g., two weeks) have been shown to lessen the selective recall effect, at least in studies using completed-incompleted tasks (Sanford & Risser, 19^8). The individual should be given a chance to ruminate, but not long enough to put the entire matter out of mindI

Although the foregoing discussion Implies that the results do not deal a death blow the the major hypo­theses, there are considerations that mitigate their being dismissed on solely methodological grounds. The findings reported here are congruous with those of several other studies of similar purpose. Lomont (1961) was unable to demonstrate a relationship between recall and expectation. Coopersmith (i960) obtained entirely negative results with his grouping of subjects. While his subjects were younger, and his grouping was not exactly the same, there were the following similarities: his high achievement, high goalsubjects were similar to the subjects of group E; his high goal, low achievement group resembled group F; his low achievement, low goal group was similar to part of group D. Besides these negative results, there is the failure of the studies dealing with "congruence" to establish solid positive findings, which has been documented in an earlier chapter.

124It Is not too early, therefore, to entertain

the possibility that the hypothesized relationships do not hold, or at least that they don’t have great generality or are not very strong. The failure to obtain stable Indices of memory performance for success or failure conditions obviates a conclusive dismissal of the hypotheses. However, if need value and freedom of movement could not predict recall patterns when these patterns were clearly present, the negative evidence would be substantially more conclusive. Future research should address itself to this goal. In this study, there was some slight evidence that memory distortion occurs in the direction of generalized expectation. However, since the result might also have been obtained if subjects were guessing randomly, it remains for future research to clarify the interpretation of the finding.

IdLThe tendency for subjects with a low scholastic

expectancy to score higher on the I-E scale, suggests that individuals who value an unobtainable achievement tend to view the situation in terms of the operation of luck, chance, or powers beyond their control. The external orientation may provide a built-in rationalization for failure. This seems to be further indicated by the

125relationship between the recall of failures and I-E, which was consistently positive# Although the correlations were significant, and in the predicted direction, they were all of low magnitude. The finding suggests that failures are better remembered by individuals who are more externally oriented. Since the experimental situation was evaluative, internally oriented subjects would be apt to find failure threatening. If the threat were great enough, defensive distortion might be expected. However, in the "external" style of life failure is seen as due to chance or external forces. Therefore, blame is not implied and defensive or avoidant behavior need not be employed.

Abbreviated Taylor ScaleThe negative relationship between abbreviated

Taylor Scale scores and success recall is not entirely congruous with past findings. High Taylor scores have usually been associated with increased memory for failures (Truax, 1957)» but here higher Taylor scores are associated with decreasing memory accuracy for successes. Eriksen (1954) reports a similarly low and significant correlation (.28) between the psyehasthenia scale (Pt) and recall of incompletions under stress. Because he uses a ratio measure, it is not possible to say whether his high Pt subjects remembered more incompletions or

fever completions* In the latter case, his findings vould he In agreement vlth the present findings, since the Pt and Taylor scales have been found to be nearly Identical (Deese, Lazarus, & Keenan, 1953; Eriksen & Davids, 1955)* Once again, the magnitude of the-finding Is low, and must be regarded as suggestive*

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The psychoanalytic concept of "repression" has generated interest in the processes by which success and failure experiences are perceived and remembered. This interest is shared by some proponents of personality theories that utilize an expectancy concept. One method of studying these processes has been to use a modification of Zeigamik’s completed-incompleted task paradigm.This modification involves structuring the experimental situation so that incompletion is seen as personal failure and completion is seen as personal success. In general, studies using this technique have demonstrated that with increasing stress individuals recall fewer Incompleted tasks. Recent work has emphasized the existence of individual differences— some subjects tend to recall relatively more successes, otherB tend to recall relatively more failures. Attempts have been made to predict these recall patterns with various personality variables, such as "ego-strength," "n Achievement," and "repression- sensltlzatlon." This study attempted to predict recall

127

128patterns from two major social learning theory constructs— need value and freedom of movement* These constructs have proven useful In understanding and predicting behavior In a variety of situations, but have only once been applied to the prediction of memory phenomena.

Need value refers to the strength or value of a related group of reinforcements, and freedom of movement refers to the subjective expectancy that a given set of behaviors will lead to a given set of reinforcements.The concept of "internal vs. external control of rein­forcement" (I-E), which was developed within social learning theory, was also utilized in this study. It refers to the fact that some individuals view what happens to them in terms of the operation of chance, luck, or forces beyond their control, while other individuals perceive the locus of control as internal. In this study a modified form of the I-E Scale has been used to measure the degree to which an individual sees himself as internally or externally controlled.

The hypotheses of the study are as follows:1. Need value is related to recall. In a situation

where two need values of different strength have a chance to operate (and freedom of movement is held constant), events related to the stronger need value will be better remembered •

1292. in the special case where freedom of movement

Is low and need value high, there will be an Increase In positive memory distortion for failures*

3* Freedom of movement Is related to recall* .An Individual whose freedom of movement Is high will remember his successes, and an Individual whose freedom of movement Is low will tend to remember his failures* Memory distortion will be in the direction of freedom of movement, except for the special case noted above*

4* Individual task expectancies are related to recall. An Individual will better remember task outcomes that agree with his expectancies* Memory distortion will be In the direction of task expectation*

5* I-E Scale scores are positively related to failure recall In an evaluative situation.

In order to test these hypotheses, the following methodology was employed:

One hundred fourteen male high school students were selected from a larger population on the basis of questionnaire Indications of need value and freedom of movement for two areas of achievement: scholastic andartistic* Six groups of subjects were formed* One group (A) placed high value on scholastic ability and less value on artistic ability. Another group (B) placed high value on artistic ability and little on scholastic ability.

130The ratings of the subjects in both these groups revealed equal freedom of movement for both areas* Two other groups (C and D) were matched In need value for scholastics, but differed In scholastic freedom of movement. Subjects having both high scholastic need value and high scholastic freedom of movement were placed In group E. Subjects having high scholastic need value but moderate to low scholastic freedom of movement were placed In group F.

All subjects were seen individually and given four tasks* For the subjects of groups A and B, two of the tasks were presented as tests of "scholastic aptitude” and the other two tasks were presented as tests of "artistic aptitude." The same tasks were presented to all other subjects (groups C-F) as "scholastic aptitude" tests* Following each task, subjects rated their performance, and then, bogus scores (which had been matched In association value) were announced* Each subject was made to feel that he had succeeded on two tasks and failed on two tasks*(The subjects of groups A and B "failed" and "succeeded" on one test lh each area.) The tasks were always presented In the same order, although the order of success and failure scores, and "art" and "scholastic" labels were systematically varied. After a short filler task (which consisted of answering twelve questions from the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale), subjects were asked "as a test

131of memory" to recall their (bogus) scores* In addition to various measures of recall accuracy and the direction of memory distortion, the following scores were available for each subject: I-E Scale score, IQ, grade pointaverage, ratings of expectancy for each task, and abbreviated Taylor Scale scores*

The findings relevant to the need value and freedom of movement hypotheses were negative* There was slight evidence that memory distortion occurs in the direction of general expectation, but this evidence was ambiguous because random guessing could have produced the same result* The failure to find significant recall predictions for different combinations of need value and freedom of move­ment was discussed in terms of the instability of the memory scores, the nature of the particular recall procedure employed, the possible existence of certain general "test- taking" sets in the experimental situation and the lack of opportunity for "rehearsal" processes to operate. However, the negative results are congruent with findings from some studies of similar purpose, and thus cannot be entirely dismissed on methodological grounds.

There was a tendency, significant at the .10 level in one comparison and the .05 level in another comparison, for low expectancy subjects to score higher on the I-E

scale. This suggests that Individuals who do not obtain a desired achievement tend to vlev the situation In terms of luck, fate, or chance factors. In other vords, the external orientation provides a rationalization for failure. The relationship between I-E scale score and memory for failures was consistently positive. The correlations, while significant, were of small magnitude. This finding was tentatively Interpreted as follows: externally-oriented subjects are less threatened by failure (which they attribute to luck or fate) and they thus do not need to resort to other kinds of defensive behavior, such as memory distortion.

Abbreviated Taylor Scale scores showed a small, but significant, negative relationship to success recall. This Is the opposite of a "repressive" tendency, but It Is not entirely congruent with some of the past findings, which reveal a positive relationship between Taylor scores and recall of failures.

i

APPENDIX A

133

NEED VALUE — FREEDOM OP MOVEMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

NAME:______________________ GRADE:________________ ,__I. We are Interested In the Importance yon personally place on being good at different things* For the moment, disregard yonr present skills and abilities, and, Instead, imftcrine that you could be very talented In any of the skills listed below* In which skill would you most like to excel? Indicate your order of preference by placing the number "I" opposite the skill (aptitude) that you would most value having* Place the number “711 opposite the skill that you would care least about* Now assign the number "2" to the skill you consider second most Important, and the number "6“ to the skill that you consider of next to least Importance. In the same way, assign the numbers "3," "5," and finally, "4." If you have done this correctly,each skill will have a number* These numbers shouldIndicate the order In which you would like to have these skills, assuming that you could be good at any of them you wished.

MuBlcal aptitude (playing a musical Instrument, singing)Clerical aptitude (typing, stenography)Artistic aptitude (creative drawing and painting)

Mechanical aptitude (craftsmanship, repair work) Athletic aptitude (sports ability, coordination) Scholastic aptitude (intelligence, school work)

Dramatic aptitude (acting, directing plays)

II. Now consider your present talents and skills. Here we are interested In how well you can judge your own abilities. For each question below, check the box that Indicates where you think you stand In comparison with the students In your grade. If you are talented in an area, do not hesitate to say so, and If you feel that you

134

135

are very unskilled In an area, do not be ashamed to admit It, What counts Is your ability to make a realistic evaluation of yourself. Avoid overestimation and under - estimation* In a later part of this study, some of you will have a chance to compare your estimates vlth your actual aptitude scores*

(Check only one box for each question.)

1* In Musical ability (playing a musical Instrument, singing), compared with students In my own grade, I ama very good.n good.a above averagea average •a below averageo poor.a very poor.

2. In Clerical ability (typing, stenography), compared with students In my own grade, I ama very good./~7 good.a above average.n average•n below average.a poor.r~7 very poor.

In Artistic ability (creative drawing and painting),compared with students In my own grade, I amn very good.a good.a above averagen average•a below average£7 poor.n very poor.

In Mechanical ability (craftsmanship', repair work), compared with students In my own grade, I ama very good.n good.a above averagen average•n below averageCJ poor.n very poor.

In Athletic ability (sports ability, coordination), compared with students In my own grade, I amn very good.n good.a above averagea average•£ 7 below averagen poor.a very poor.

In Scholastic ability (intelligence, BChool work),compared with students in my own grade, I amn very good•r 7 good*a above average.a average•/“I below average.o poor.n very poor.

In Dramatic ability (acting, directing plays), compared with students In my own grade, I amo very good.a good.n above averagen average•n below averagea poor.n very poor.

APPENDIX B

139

TABLE 25DISTRIBUTIONS 0? SCHOLASTIC AND ART NEED VALUE AND

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT SCORES, GROUPS A AND B

Need Value Freedom of MovementScholastic Artistic Scholastic Artistic

Group A B A B A B A B

Score®1 15 4 1 22 8 6 2 7 63 1 14 4 4 12 124 3 3 17 16 3 35 7 9 1 4 1 16 7 97 6 3

N 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24

®The lower the score, the higher the need value orfreedom of movement*

140

TABLE 26DISTRIBUTIONS OF SCHOLASTIC NEED VALUE AND FREEDOM

OF MOVEMENT SCORES, GROUPS C AND D

GroupNeed Value C D

Freedom of C

MovementD

Scorea1 1 1 52 2 2 123 8 8 34 5 55 1 1 96 2 2 67 1 1. 5

N 2° 20 20 20

aThe lower the score, the higher the need value orfreedom of movement.

141

TABUS 27DISTRIBUTIONS 07 SCHOLASTIC NEED VALUE AND FREEDOM

OF MOVEMENT SCORES, GROUPS E AND F

GroupNeedE

ValueF

Freedom of Movement E F

Score® '

1 16 10 112 4 2 93 84 85 96 07 3

N 20 20 20 20

aThe lower the score, the higher the need value orfreedom of movement.

APPENDIX C

MODIFIED I-E SCALE

SOCIAL REACTION INVENTORY

This is a questionnaire to find out the way in which certain important events affect different people.Each item consists of a pair of choices lettered a, or b. Please select the one statement of each pair (and only one) which you more strongly believe to be the case as far as you're concerned. Be sure to select the one you actually believe to be more true rather than the one you think you should choose or the one you would like to be true.This is a measure of personal belief; obviously there are no right or wrong answers.

Please answer these items carefully but do not spend too much time on any one item. Be sure to find an answer for every choice. In some instances you may discover that you believe both statements or neither one. In such cases, be sure to select the one you more strongly believe to be the case as far as you're concerned. Also try to respond to each item by itself. Do not be influenced by your previous choices.

REMEMBERSelect that alternative which you personally believe

to be more true.1^3

144I more strongly believe that:1 a. Many of the unhappy things In people1s lives are

partly due to bad luck.b. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes

they make.2 a. In the long run people get the respect they

deserve In this vorld.b. Unfortunately, an Individual's vorth often passes

unrecognized no matter how hard he tries.3 a. The Idea that teachers are unfair to students

Is nonsense.b. Most students don't realize the extent to which

their grades are Influenced by accidental happenings.

4 a. No matter how hard you try some people just don'tlike you.

b. People who can't get others to like them, don't understand how to get along with others.

5 a. I have often found that what is going to happenwill happen.

b. Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as making a decision to take a definite course of action.

6 a. In the case of the well prepared student thereIs rarely If ever such a thing as an unfair test.

b. Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work, that studying Is really useless.

7 a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luckhas little or nothing to do with It.

b. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right time.

8 a. When I make plans, I am almost certain that Ican make them work.

I mo i a8 b.

9 a«

b.

10 a.

b.

II a.

b«12 a.

b.

13 a.

b.

14 a.

b.

15 a.

b.

145strongly believe that:It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune anyhow.In my case getting what I want lias little or nothing to do with luck.Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin.Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky enough to be In the right place first.Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability, luck has little or nothing to do with it.Most people don’t realize the extent to which their live8 are controlled by accidental happenings.There really is no such thing as "luck."It Is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you.How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person you are.In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by the good ones.Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, Ignorance, laziness, or all three.Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the grades they give.There Is a direct connection between how hard I study and the grades I get.Many times I feel that I have little Influence over the things that happen to me.It is Impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an Important role In my life.

I more * 16 a.

b.

17 a. b.

1^strongly believe that;:People are lonely because they don’t try to be friendly.There’s not much use In trying too hard to please people, If they like you, they like you.What happens Is my own doing.Sometimes I feel that I don’t have enough control over the direction my life Is taking.

THE I-E SCALE, WITHOUT MODIFICATIONS

SOCIAL REACTION INVENTORY

This 1b a questionnaire to find out the way in vhich certain important events in our society affect different people. Each item consists of a pair of alternatives lettered a or b. Please select the one statement of each pair (and only one) vhich you more strongly believe to be the case as far as you're concerned. Be sure to select the one you actually believe to be more true rather than the one you think you should chooBe or the one you vould like to be true. This is a measure of personal belief; obviously there are no right or vrong answers.

Your answers to the items on this inventory are to be recorded on a separate answer sheet which is loosely inserted in the booklet. Remove THIS ANSWER SHEET NCW. Print your name and any other information requested by the examiner cm the answer sheet, then finish reading these directions. Do not open the booklet until you are told to do so.

Please answer these items carefully but do notspend too much time on any one item. Be sure to find ananswer for every choice. Find the number of the item onthe answer sheet and black-in the space under the number ior 2 vhich you choose as the statement most true•

147

In some Instances you may discover that you believe both statements or neither one. In such cases, be sure to select the one you more strongly believe to be the case as far as you're concerned. Also try to respond to each item independently when making your choice; do not be influenced by your previous choices.

REMEMBER

Select that alternative which you personally believe to be more true.

149I more strongly believe that:1 a. Children get Into trouble because their parents

punish them too much*b. The trouble with most children nowadays is that

their parents are too easy with them.2 a. Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are

partly due to bad luck.b. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes

they make.3 a. One of the major reasons why we have wars Is because

people don't take enough Interest In politics.b. There will always be wars, no matter how hard

people try to prevent them.4 a. In the long run people get the respect they

deserve In this world.b. Unfortunately, an Individual's worth often passes

unrecognized no matter how hard he tries.3 a. The Idea that teachers are unfair to students Is

nonsense•b. Most students don't realize the extent to which

their grades are Influenced by accidental happenings.

6 a. Without the right breaks one cannot be an effectiveleader.

b. Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage of their opportunities.

7 a. No matter how hard you try some people just don'tlike you.

b. People who can't get others to like them, don't understand how to get along with others.

8 a. Heredity plays the major role in determining one'spersonality.

b. It is one's experiences in life, which determine what they're like.

\

I more 9 a.

b.

10 a.

b.

II a.

b.

12 a.

b.

13 a.

b.

1^ a. b.

15 a.

b.

16 a.

b.

150strongly believe that:I have often found that vhat is going to happen will happen.Trusting to fate has never turned out as veil for me as making a decision to take a definite course of action.In the case of the veil prepared student there is rarely If ever such a thing as an unfair test.Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course vork, that studying Is really useless.Becoming a success Is a matter of hard vork, luck has little or nothing to do vith it.Getting a good job depends mainly on being In the right place at the right time.The average citizen can have an Influence In government decisions.This vorld is run by the fev people in paver, and there is not much the little guy can do about it.When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them vork.It is not alvays vise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune anyhov.There are certain people vho are just no good.There is some good In everybody.In my case getting vhat I vant has little or nothing to do vith luck.Many times ve might just as veil decide vhat to do by flipping a coin.Who gets to be the boss often depends on vho vas lucky enough to be in the right place first.Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability, luck has little or nothing to do vith it.

I more17 a.

b.

18 a.

b.19 a.

b.20 a.

b.

21 a.

b.

22 a.

b.

23 a.

b.

24 a.

b.

151strongly believe that:As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of forces ve can neither understand, nor control.By taking an active part In political and social affairs the people can control vorld events.Most people don't realize the extent to vhich their lives are controlled by accidental happenings.There really is no such thing as "luck."One should alvays be willing to admit his mistakes.It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes.It Is hard to know whether or not a person really like 8 you.How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person you are •In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by the good ones.Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, Ignorance, laziness, or all three.With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption.It is difficult for people to have much control over the things politicians do in office.Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the grades they give.There is a direct connection between how hard I study and the grades I get.A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what they should do.A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their jobs are.

I more25 a.

b.

26 a.

b.

27 a.

b.28 a.

b.

29 a.

b.

152strongly believe that:Many times I feel tbat I have little Influence over the things that happen to me.It Is Impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an Important role In my life.People are lonely because they don't try to be friendly.There *8 not much use In trying too hard to please people, If they like you, they like you.There Is too much emphasis on athletics In high school.Team sports are an excellent vay to build character.What happens to me is my own doing.Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the direction my life Is taking.Most of the time I can't understand vhy politicians behave the vay they do.In the long run the people are responsible for bad government on a national as veil as on a local level.

APPENDIX D

Figure 1.— Visual Memory Test, First Series

Figure 2.— Visual Memory Test, Second Series

APPENDIX E

Figure 3.— Hidden Figures Test, First Series (Adapted from Thurstone & Jeffries, 1956)

I ) I 1 ( ) ( )

I ) I ) ( )

Figure 4.— Hidden Figures Test, Second Series (Adapted from Thurstone & Jeffries, 1956)

APPENDIX F

159

160

EXPECTANCY RATING SCALE

I II III IV

APPENDIX G

161

ABBREVIATED TAYLOR MANIFEST ANXIETY SCALE

BIOGRAPHICAL INVENTORY

1. I am often sick to my stomach*2. I am about as nervous as other people*3* I vork under a great deal of strain*4* I blush as often as others.5* I vorry quite a bit over possible troubles*6. MY feelings are hurt easier than most people.7* I vish I could be as happy as others.8* I feel anxious about something or someone almost

all of the time.9* I do not have as many fears as my friends.10. I am more self-conscious than most people.11. I am the kind of person vho takes things hard.12. I am not at all confident of myself.

162

APPENDIX H

ACADEMIC CONFIDENCE AND NEED VALUE SCAIE

Name:___________________ ■____ Grade:

Read each of the following statements very carefully. and place a check In front of every statement that Is true of you. Check only those statements where the whole statement Is true of you* If only a part of a statement applies to you, do not check that statement.£7 i. People consider me a good student, but I often wish

I were good at other things instead.£7 2. I worry about not being smart enough.£7 3. People consider me a good student, but I never feel

that I'm doing as well as I should be.£7 4. People consider me a good student, but I still

worry more than others about my grades.£7 5. I enjoy speaking up In class discussions.£7 6. People consider me a good student, but I still

worry more than others about exams.£7 7. I am worried about getting into college.£7 8. I am planning to go to college, and don't anticipate

any trouble getting in.£7 9. People consider me a good student, but I wouldn't

even care if my grades dropped.£7 H O . I get below average grades, but I don't worry

about it much.£7 11. I get below average grades, but my interests and

talents lie in other areas.£7 12. People consider me a good student, but I never

think of myself as doing well.£7 13. I get below average grades and I'd do almost

anything to improve them.164

cj ci ci ci o ti

16514. I am afraid to apeak up In claas discussions.15. I take schoolvork In a very relaxed way.16. I get great pleasure from being good in schoolvork.17# People consider me a good student, but I don't get

much pleasure from this fact.\

18. Schoolvork comes very easily to me.19* I balov average grades, and I worry about it a

great deal.

APPENDIX I

<3 <3

h3 CO

W iO

Og

MH

WO

^W

OO

SO

RAW DATA

Letter ExplanationArt Need Value RankScholastic Need Value RankArt Freedom of Movement RatingScholastic Freedom of Movement RatingI-E Scale ScoreAbbreviated Taylor Scale Score

Order of Conditions:S=Scholastic Aptitude Tests (A=ArtIstic Aptitude Tests

Order of Bogus Scores:86 = 86,81; 23,175 80,72; 29,26. 80 - 80,72; 29,26; 86,81; 23,17. 23 = 23,175 86,815 29,265 80,72. 29 = 29,265 80,72; 23,17; 86,81.

Expectancy Rating, Task I Expectancy Rating, Task II Expectancy Rating, Task III Expectancy Rating, Task IV Group Assignment

Grade Point AverageIQJLNP

Score Recall, Task I Score Recall, Task II Score Recall, Task III Score Recall, Task IV

167

168

Subject No. A B C D E F G H1 4 1 4 4 13 6 97 1.672 4 1 4 4 11 3 108 1.633 7 1 6 4 8 2 104 2.384 7 1 4 2 15 1 118 3.385 7 1 6 4 9 4 104 1.386 3 1 4 4 13 6 88 1.457 3 1 2 2 14 7 91 2.438 3 1 2 2 ,6 8 101 2.679 3 1 4 2 11 3 114 2.3310 7 1 5 2 13 5 118 3.0011 5 1 7 2 17 8 113 2.6712 5 1 4 1 12 5 114 2.7713 6 1 4 2 13 4 108 2.7814 4 1 4 4 9 6 106 1.4315 5 1 5 1 8 2 120 3.4016 2 1 2 13 4 111 3.6917 4 1 2 1 12 6 114 2.7518 4 2 1 3 4 113 2.8519 2 1 4 2 9 2 117 3.0020 5 6 1 8 3 118 1.0821 7 1 7 1 11 3 128 2.4622 2 1 4 5 14 3 98 1.3323 4 1 4 4 14 3 95 2.6724 4 1 4 7 10 2 103 1.6725 2 6 2 3 10 4 93 1.6726 1 6 6 2 15 5 118 2.3827 2 7 3 3 12 4 117 2.2928 6 5 5 3 10 6 116 1.6729 7 4 2 2 10 8 79 1.3330 3 4 4 2 8 5 86 1.3331 7 4 5 2 9 3 98 2.2932 5 4 3 2 10 3 119 3.2533 3 4 4 1 7 4 113 3.3834 1 3 2 1 7 6 113 2.0035 1 3 3 2 8 6 83 1.2536 4 3 2 2 14 3 94 1.5037 2 3 1 2 15 2 90 1.6738 ■5 3 2 2 8 " 2 109 2.0839 6 3 3 2 14 3 91 1.2540 2 3 2 2 10 4 95 2.33

C-COVOCO.=f- H H C U ^ - C 7 \ 0 0 COVO OvOv CO HVO i n t — H C M O C M lH CM C—CM VO CM C—CM OVC—CM tH O t - V Q C '-H C —(OC—C— CM CO H CO CM 0 0 CM CO CM C— CM CO CM H CO CO CO CM t— .=*• H fr-CM t — CM CO CM 0 0 CO C M C M H C O rt

ct\vo i n cm cm v o o c —vocm jM -t-o^M -cM t —v o cjvcm c o vo o m m - 4 - VO co v o t—VO C O t-m c O O V C O t-C O H CMCVJ 0 0 -=^ 0 0 CO CM CO r-1 CO CM OOHCOCOCO H CO CM 0 0 CM CO CO CO H CO .=1-CM CO CM C— H 0 0 CM 00 C— CM H CM GO CM

CM t —CM (OCO OlCVC—O C O COVO t —VO ■=*• HOOOVCMOV t—t~ -t—OVCM O HVO CM CM (O t— O M T lO H LTV t —VO OC— H c-ro C M CO CM LOCO t — CM C— i- I j M'CM CO CM C-—C—D— C—CO OQC—GO V O H t - l O H COVO C—J**C0

o o c o o o - c o in c -c M O C M i t v c o o j M-c- cm o v h ^ vd irv o v c o c —lcv l o o o h o v j n i n i n o t - o o r n w o vC— CM 0 0 CM CM CO H i n CO CO CM CO OOtACM . C 0 H l> * t - G 0 CM H CM CM CM Cr~CO^tCOCX) COCMC—i n H C O m O O -sh t—

C—O t —0 0 H O O i n t — CO OVCM t — ON V O C M H V O t- HCMOOVCM .=*■ fr-CM fr-OV COCOH IT \H CJVVO CM CM H,—) t— •—I C ~00 CM C—CM CM I—I f r -C M ^ -H E — CM E—CM COCO t— E— D—CM CO CMCM-=J-HC0 COE—CM 00 E— CM H CM t — CM

OvOOVO t - v o inO C -JM -V O ■=!* COCO C O O HVO CTvCM CO O V O O t —i n VO COVO OVO E—.^O V E —CM C O O O M O C -CM VO CM COCO CM 0 0 H CM CM CO CM CO CM CO COCO H CO.=i* CO t-C O HVO CM CM CO CM CO CM VO CM CM CO CM CM CM VO CM

H C —H O C 7 V O E—CM CO CM CM VO E— LT\CM O CO COE—CM HVO CM HVO j *-H H C M V O CM lA lA C —C— VO VO H CJVVOCO CM CO CO CM E—H CO CM CO CM E— H E—CO 0 0 CM CO H E— CM CM C—COCM E—COCOCDCM IC-COC—HCM C—C 0 C 0 H C 0

VO HVO E—VO O O ON VO VO VO O VO VO E— CM CJWOVOVQ OOOOlTVVO H VOVQC7\COO\ VOE—C7\E—CM r j o v o ov oCO CM CO CM CM CO CM CO CM CO CM t — CM CO CM CO CM 0 0 CM CO CM CM 00 CO CM CO 0 0 CM CD CM CO CM 00 CM CM CO CO CO CM CO

H CM CO-sf- ITV VOC—COO VO HCM C O J + in VO E—COOVO H CM lO«M* lA VO E—CO O V O HCM c o f f i n VO E—CO OVOH H H H H H H H H H C M CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CO CO COCO CO CO CO CO CO CO

Subject

NoO EbC—

f cP u f c W f c R H W H W H W M t f c W W W W W W W Q f c . & , 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O

> o o w - ^ t - o o o o .=j*cm J t o n t - o c - c— o 4 - i r » r o c o m c o . 4 - c — o o o o m v o i n m i n e — m m c—o c o c o c -H H H H H H H H

t> o \ t - .= i - o \ E — o j t —h v o c o o o o \ ct\ cm t - o H H t r i n c o m c o c v i o o n c o c o o c t v o o o o o o o o o t o c o o n H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H

E-t c o v o v o m v o . s M n f r - m v o o n o c o o o \ o \ c o h o o m c— tn cT v ^ j-co m n t — o \ c — o v o c o c —v o o v o c o o v t —H H H H H

CO C— COCVI OVt— C O H C O O C — m 0 0 O H OO OVCMCOt—00 0 0 0 0 00 O ON 4 - O t > H O O i n OVCM CJVC— VO H C 0 OVCOH H H H H H H H H H H

a s vo o v v o m o o o o i o o v o c o o o w o c o o ovvq o n o o v o v o v o o n v o o ov v g o n o o v o c n o v o o v o o v o00 CM 00 CM CM 0 0 CM 0 0 CM 0 0 CM00CM00CM C0CMC0CM00 CM CM CM CO CM COCO CM 0 0 CVI 0 0 CM 0 0 CM CM CO 0 0 CO CM CO

<y M CO CO CQ 03 M CO CO CQ W CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CQ CO C 0C 0C 0C 0C 0 c o c o c o c o c o C 0C0C 0C 0C 0

H w r o ^ t i n v o c —c o o \ o H C M o n -= i-m v o c —c o o v o H o i m ^ i - m v o t —c o o v o h c u m m i n v o c —o o o v oH H H H H H H H H H C U <M<MCVJCM<M <M<MCM<M0O COOOOOOOOO COOOOOOOjM-

Subject No. A B41 7 342 3 243 7 244 3 145 2 146 7 147 5 148 1 649 1 650 2 751 3 552 3 453 5 454 1 455 5 456 1 457 7 358 5 359 4 36o 7 36 l 4 362 7 363 5 364 6 365 7 266 4 267 6 168 5 169 7 170 4 171 5 272 6 173 4 174 5 275 4 176 5 277 6 278 5 179 5 280 5 2

171D E P G H2 13 6 91 .2.141 3 6 99 1.441 9 5 119 4.001 12 6 101 2.751' 13 3 117 3.671 8 5 120 2.934 11 2 112 1.866 10 1 71 1.007 14 4 89 0.716 7 5 91 1.716 14 3 92 0.716 11 2 100 1.336 9 6 93 1.005 12 3 87 0.836 11 4 83 0.837 7 4 96 1.337 8 4 103 1.337 12 3 86 0.675 11 4 84 1.675 17 4 110 0.835 16 5 130 2.135 13 5 100 1.005 12 5 102 2.005 16 5 100 1.505 11 1 107 2.005 15 3 85 1.504 10 4 109 1.383 17 1 106 1.853 12 4 112 3.334 12 1 99 2.504 10 6 84 1.334 13 7 93 1.294 11 7 99 2.004 10 4 98 1.335 10 5 103 1.334 10 1 99 1.674 12 4 71 . 1.002 6 2 112 3.002 10 1 85 2.114 9 6 94 1.00

c

43414

I4144151547743444i24443453i43234

Su

bje

ct

No

gL Q, C\VO H O J i n K O O H O \ H C -O N COVO O N C U O C T O O r j t - 4 r j j n H h cu •=!• <0 >-VD CO t - - H £ '« 7 j ' p HH t-C U t-C O O O H CVI COOI r t CO H t —CU CO H t - C O H C l COCO H O I r l COCOOOt—C— C O r i W H r l OJ CVI CO t —CO

o o cvi ca lam i- co v o h t - c u c o oo la cu h o v o h c o t — c o c u c u o m o o cjnc—crvcu o c —c o o i o iCO CU COCO f— C U H t - H C U C O C U C O H C O CVI CO tr—CU CVI CVI CO CVJ CVI cvi COCO C— COCO cvi CVI CVI CVI CVI H CO CO CO

ts l O O t - H H CVI LAIACU H c—CO (OVO CVI C U H l A H H V O r l H t - H COCVJ t —COVO V O«=4*H 0OH rHVQ^i- t— ONH CO H 00 CO COCO COCO CO H C—-=4-00 CO CO CVI COCOCO t ~ CO 00 CVI C— CU E— HCVl OJ CVI C—C O O -t— 0 3 OOVQ H C—

s c n i n v o c o c u v o ONE--VO c o o n h c o c u o 01—0 0 0 0 c u c o o n v o h vo o cu c tnon o o e—i a v o o i i o h o o hOJ C=-04 0 0 t~ - t-C -C V IC O ^ - H t-C U C O C O CO cvi c o c o c o 0 0 CVJ C-— CVJ CO CVI C-CVI COCVI CVI VO 0 0 0 0 CO COCO C—CVI CO

•O O t— /H CO CO Jshfc—LA0OCU C U C O H O V O CVI H O iH LA c o o j E— H C— H t - t —c u c o COVO ONCJNt-- lAC—COCVIC—c o CVI t—CVI t - CVIHC—CVIOO COCVJ 0 0 -=f C— CVICOCOCOCU C O O O H O O H C O H H V O V O H C U 'C U O JH r l r l N t - H

M O ONVO C—VO VO ■=*• IAVO t — VO C—VO CVI CM C—t—O C O ON C—b-OOONVO C O V O L A LA H t-V O L A O O H H O t - C O-=J- CU CO H t— CVI CVJ CO CVi CVI COCUOOC— C~- I-I CO C— C—CVI CVI 0 0 CVJ t-C U COCVJiHt— C— CVJ rH CO CO CVJ CVI CVJ CO CO H

ha c o LA 0 0 E— t — V O O l A H H VO H COVO LA CVI H O COCO OOt— ONlACU OOVOVO ON ON COCVJ O 1ACVI H H H C V IC OCVJ VO CVJ CVJ H CO CO (O ON t - CU CO OO H E'-CUOOVOCO t —H t ' - O J t - H CU CU CU CU CU C—t— C— C— C~-t-CV| j^-CU

* .L_I C—LA COCO CO CUIAlAOOE— C O V O V Q O t— 0 1 - 0 t—H LA-at ONON-st'VO t— HVQVOVO CU CU CO CO LA ON

CU C—CU^J-CU CO C—.aJ'COCO CU C—CU CO H CO CU -aJ'VO CO 00 CU 00 CU CO CU CU CU CU CU CUTO t-CO CO c o v o CU COCU

H C U C O J+ IA v b t —COC7NO HCU 0O-=M A VO t-C O CJNO HCU 0O-=t- LA V O t—CO O N O H C U C O f t lA v p t-C O O NO- J . L A LA l a LA la LA LA la la la VO VOVOVOVOVO v o v o v o v o t - t - t - t —t - c — c— c—c—t - c o

COfc*"*r-i H H H f c P=< Cti ISc, !&♦ |3t4 It, pc ft,

** O o ' O o ' w Q f l f l Q Q A O f l A f l f l d f l f i o Q < «aj < <i «aj *aj «JJ <J <J

> \ n H r o ^ - o t — ir \c —v o i n ■=?■=?\ o \ o •**- o n c o c o v o o v o o N O N t—c o c u v o c o o n v o h v o 0000or-i t-i H H1

& VQ O COCO CU CO-=*-VQ O ON CO t-CX3 CM C— CU ONt-ONCU C— H H lfV V O O ON O C O ON. H C — t — O G OH H H H H H H H H H H H H

E-i c o m e —o o c o L T kO \ir\co v o v o c —c o m v o o v o c o m m c o v o on on o o m m v o C N c o c - h o c j nH H H H H

CO CO O N O H O N ONCO CO VO IXN j J*COCT\C—VO ONCOVO C—O C—C—O C —C— O [—00 C—VO IAC— H O O OH H H H H H H

CJVVO on o n c o o v o co v o o o \v o t o o on VO OOONO O VOOQOONVQ CO ON ON CO CO COVOVQVOOpcj OJ CO CU CU cu c o c o cu c o c o cu c o c u COCU OOCU CU COCO CO CU CO CU CO CU 0J CU CU CU c u c o o o c o c o

&< ; <5 <J «qj <3} CO GQ CO CO

n •* %CO CO CO CO co (O CO CO co co CO CO CO CO CO co COCO c o c o COCOCOCOCO COCOCOCOCO CO<JJ<15<5 <5

oa •po H c u c o j ^ t n v o t - c o o N O H C J < r y = f i f \ v o t - c o o n o h c v j co«=J* i n v o c —c o o n o h o j 00«=t" i n0 i n i n i n i n i n i n i n t n i n i n v o v o v o v o v o v o v o v o v o v o ^ v

1

<* <5 <q «jj < ;

o o ju - m v o c -

0 0 0 0 H ONCO H

H COVO H j 4-

COVO 0 0 ONCO

O O CJ\ ON CT\0 0 OOCU cu cu

CO 03 CO CO CO•v •» •* •»<; «IJ «JJ <j Cjj

VO C—0 0 O N O C—C - t - t - C O

174Subject No. A B C D E F G H

81 6 1 3 3 16 3 102 2.2582 6 1 4 4 10 5 97 1.3383 7 1 4 4 14 8 87 2.0084 6 1 3 4 11 3 121 3.1485 6 1 4 4 16 4 123 2.7586 6 1 4 4 13 3 84 0.7587 1 4 3 4 9 1 106 0.8388 3 7 6 5 8 4 88 1.6789 2 6 4 5 13 3 83 1.839° 3 5 4 3 9 4 86 1.3391 3 6 .5 4 10 2 112 1.7592 3 7 3 4 12 2 97 0.7593 3 6 4 4 11 1 130 0.7194 3 6 4 4 7 4 87 0.6795 3 7 3 4 10 3 82 1.5096 2 6 4 4 16 5 93 1.6797 2 5 4 4 13 2 87 I.5098 2 5 4 4 10 3 127 1.0099 3 5 5 4 10 1 85 1.50100 1 7 4 5 8 8 108 2.17101 3 5 4 4 10 6 106 1.33102 3 5 4 4 12 4 106 1.78103 2 6 4 4 7 2 111 1.14104 3 7 3 4 3 4 76 1.67105 3 7 5 5 10 2 105 1.33106 3 6 4 4 8 6 105 1.33107 3 5 3 3 15 6 119 2.75108 5 1 3 3 8 2 103 1.67109 7 3 4 4 12 2 115 2.25110 6 2 5 4 8 2 131 1.69111 5 2 4 4 11 2 112 1.86112 1 4 2 3 13 5 92 1.33113 1 4 2 3 8 3 94 1.33114 2 6 3 4 14 3 110_ 1.50

Subject No. I J K L M N 0175P

81 84 81 32 27 81 88 17 2382 85 82 20 17 20 20 17 2083 83 75 17 23 23 27 29 2784 80 72 17 29 92 81 17 2385 72 69 26 28 86 82 20 1786 84 83 29 17 76 78 29 1787 27 21 85 79 29 17 85 8188 23 21 78 72 70 78 82 7889 27 21 79 81 30 34 83 8090 27 24 84 87 21 23 81 8791 26 29 96 82 27 25 80 8792 29 38 81 80 29 32 80 7093 82 85 2i 16 87 81 16 25

. 95 87 89 27 21 70 72 22 7095 82 86 26 27 87 85 25 2796 81 72 17 26 81 77 17 2097 83 86 20 17 6l 45 17 2098 86 81 21 26 65 70 21 2399 86 81 29 27 76 70 27 17100 78 82 29 23 29 26 28 26101 86 81 22 17 72 62 20 23102 23 17 86 81 28 26 80 71103 23 26 84 87 23 26 80 70104 21 33 88 80 85 82 81 83105 80 72 29 27 70 80 19 17106 47 76 46 35 81 94 26 36107 84 76 27 25 76 84 17108 40 40. 85 80 23 17 81' 85109 38 86 83 56 51 29 23110 76 81 71 56 76 81 81 71111 28 26 81 73 28 17 86 81112 17 27 84 87 27 17 60 62113 29 26 16 17 17 16 80 87114 29 21 .. 81 65 29 21 81 86

Subject No. Q81 s , A82 s , A83 S, A84 s , A85 s , A86 s , A87 s , A88 s , A89 s , A90 s , A91 S, A92 s, A93 s , A94 s , A95 s , A96 s , A97 s , A98 s , A99 A, S100 A, S101 A, S102 A, S103 A, S104 A, S105 A, S106 A, S107 A, S108 A, S109 A, S110 A, S111 s , A112 A, S113 A, S114 A, S

176S T U V W9 9 12 7 A5 4 4 5 A3 3 4 8 A7 9 7 4 A8 8 9 7 A12 13 9 10 A4 4 5 3 B10 7 6 6 B7 4 4 3 B6 8 6 5 B8 8 8 3 B13 8 9 11 B8 6 9 6 B7 4 7 4 B8 6 11 8 B8 6 13 6 B8 9 8 5 B8 10 8 6 B8 2 8 8 B9 9 8 7 B8 9 7 8 B8 8 8 6 B6 6 6 4 B9 3 6 8 B6 10 8 6 B7 8 10 4 B6 7 9 4 B8 8 6 3 A9 8 5 7 A8 5 8 5 A8 9 7 8 A7 8 7 7 B9 2 12 6 B6 8 5 6 B

R86868680808029292923232380808086868686868623232380808023232329292929

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AUTOBIOGRAPHY

I, Jay Steven Efran, vas born in Nev York,Nev York, October 10, 1936. I received my secondary- school education In the public schools of Nev York City.The City College of Nev York granted me the Bachelor of Arts degree In 1958, and the Master of Science degree In 1959. During the last year of my residence there I held the rank of Fellow In the Department of Education. I entered The Ohio State University In the fall of 1959, and received clinical training at the Chi111cothe Veterans Administration Hospital from September through December of that year. In I960, I vas appointed United States Public Health Fellow, and in 1961 I served as Besearch Assistant to Dr. Pauline N. Pepinsky. During the 1961-1962 academic year I Interned as a United States Public Health Fellow at the Duke University Medical Center. A United States Public Health Fellowship for the academic year 1962-1963 enabled me to complete the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree.

I have accepted a position aB assistant professor In Psychology at The University of Rochester.

186