solvency ii: equivalence decisions
TRANSCRIPT
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Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Introduction
1 On5June2015theEuropeanCommissionpublisheditsfirstsetofthirdcountryequivalencedecisionsmade
under Directive 2009138EU1 (ldquoSolvency IIrdquo) These decisions relate to Switzerland Australia Bermuda
BrazilCanadaMexicoandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica(ldquoUSrdquo) This legal update considers what the
decisionsmeanandtheirpotentialeffectoninsurersandreinsurersinthesethirdcountryjurisdictions
TheupdatefirstoutlinesthescopeofSolvencyIIgenerallyandthenfocusesonitsextraterritorialimpact
particularlythemeaningofthirdcountrylsquoequivalencersquoundertheSolvencyIIregimeandtheeffectofan
lsquoequivalencedecisionrsquoFinallytheupdatelooksatthedecisionsmadethusfarbytheCommissionandthe
practicaleffectthesedecisionswillhaveonthebusinessof(re)insurersbothwithinandoutsidetheEuropean
Economic Area (ldquoEEArdquo)2
The scope of Solvency II
2 SolvencyIIestablishesanewsolvencyandsupervisoryregimefortheEEAinsurancemarketItwillenter
intoforceon1January2016andwillreplace14insuranceandreinsurancedirectives(previouslyknown
collectively as ldquoSolvency Irdquo)Thisnewprudentialregulatoryregimeisaimedatdevelopingasinglemarket
fortheEEAinsurancesectorwhichisoneofthelargestsectorsintheEEAaccountingforaroundathirdof
worldwide insurance business3
3 SolvencyIIprimarilyappliestodirectlifeandnon-lifeinsuranceandreinsuranceundertakingswhichare
established in or which wish to become established in the EEA4 and which are not small (re)insurance
undertakings5Thenatureofsomeofitsprovisionsandrequirementshowevermeansthatitwillalsohave
animpactonnon-EEA(re)insurersincertainsituations
TheextraterritorialeffectofSolvencyII
4 TheextraterritorialeffectofSolvencyIIissignificantInadditiontoitsapplicationwithintheEEAthereare
threeareasinwhichSolvencyIIhasextraterritorialeffectSolvencyIImayaffect
(a) non-EEAreinsurerswheninvolvedinEEAreinsurancecontracts
(b) non-EEAsubsidiariesofEEA(re)insurersand
(c) non-EEA(re)insurerswithEEAsubsidiariesbutwhichdonothaveanEEAsub-groupwithanEEA
parent
Theaimoftheseextraterritorialprovisionsistopreventdistortionsofcompetitionandregulatoryarbitrage
bycreatingalevelplayingfieldamongstall(re)insurersactiveintheEEAregardlessofwhetherthe(re)
insurance group is based inside or outside the EEA
1 As amended by Directive 2014 51EU (ldquoOmnibus IIrdquo)2 At the time of writing the EEA consists of the 28 Member States of the European Union plus Iceland Lichtenstein and Norway3 Insurance Europe Key Facts report found at http wwwinsuranceeuropeeuuploads Modules Publications european -insurance - - - key-
facts-2014 pdf Accessed 1720154 See Article 2(1) Solvency II5 See Article 4 Solvency II
Legal UpdateSeptember 2015
2 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
5 Inrespectofcategory(a)intheaboveparagraphnon-EEAreinsurerswritingreinsurancecontractswith
EEAentitiesmaybeaffectedbecauseSolvencyIIdoesnotpreventEEAregulatorsimposingadditional
regulatoryrequirementsoncontractsofreinsurancewrittenbyreinsurersfromacountryoutsidetheEEA
whichhasnotbeendeemedtohaveasolvencyregimeequivalenttoSolvencyIIArticles172(3)and173of
SolvencyIIpreventMemberStatesfromtreatingreinsurancecontractswrittenbyreinsurersfromoutside
theEEAlessfavourablythanthosewrittenbyEEAinsurersbutonlywhereanequivalencedecisionhasbeen
adoptedforthethirdcountryinwhichthenon-EEAreinsurerisbasedSointheabsenceofanequivalence
decisionMemberStatesmayimposeadditionalrequirementsonnon-EEAreinsurersThemostcommonly
imposedadditionalrequirementsrelatetocollateralanon-EEAreinsurercanbesubjecttoincreased
collateralrequirementswithintheEEAthusplacingthenon-EEAreinsureratacompetitivedisadvantageto
EEAreinsurers(andthosenon-EEAreinsurerswhosehomejurisdictionhasbeendeemedequivalent)who
areprotectedfromsuchextrarequirementsbySolvencyII
6 Inrelationtocategory(b)aboveArticle227ofSolvencyIIprimafacierequiresEEA(re)insurerstocalculate
consolidated group solvency across their global insurance business Where the EEA (re)insurer has a
subsidiary(orsubsidiaries)basedinanon-EEAjurisdictionthereislikelytobeadiscrepancybetweenthe
methodsofcalculationofsolvencyusedbythatsubsidiaryandthoseusedbytheEEApartsofthebusiness
thesubsidiarywilltypicallyusethelocallyacceptedmethodofitshomejurisdictionandtheEEA-based
entitieswillusethemethodsofSolvencyIIToavoidthisdiscrepancySolvencyIIrequiresthesubsidiaryto
useSolvencyIIformulaeforEuropeanreportingpurposesThiscreatesconsistencyacrossthegroupbutis
likelytocreateanadditionalandduplicativeburdenasthesubsidiarymayberequiredtocalculateandreport
solvency data on two bases
7 Ifthesubsidiaryisrequiredtousetwodifferentmethodsforcalculationofsolvencyitispossiblethatthe
resultsofthecalculationswilldifferbetweenthelocalregimeandtheSolvencyIIregimeForexamplea
subsidiarymightbegivencreditunderitslocalsystemforanticipatedincomeorcreditbutSolvencyIIis
basedonmarket-consistentprinciplesandsoitsformulaedonotgivecreditforanythingbasedonfuture
performanceTheliabilityandassetrequirementsforthesubsidiarycouldbethereforehigherunder
SolvencyIIthantheyhavebeenwhilethesubsidiarywassolelysubjecttothelocalsystemsuddenlyrequiring
thesubsidiarytofindormaintainmoreassetsandfewerliabilities
8 Ifthehomejurisdictionofthenon-EEAsubsidiaryhasbeendeemedequivalentthegroupmaytakeaccount
ofthatjurisdictionrsquossolvencycapitalrequirementandthecapitaleligibletomeetthatrequirementinthe
calculationofgroupsolvencyIfanequivalencedecisionhasnotbeentakenbytheCommissiontheEEA
group supervisor in collaboration with the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority
(ldquoEIOPArdquo)andcollegemembersmayundertakeanequivalenceassessment6 on its own initiative or at the
requestofthe(re)insurerconcerned
9 Anon-EEA(re)insurancegroupwithanEEAsubsidiarybutnotanEEAsub-group(asmentionedin
paragraph 4(c)above)couldencounterdifferentproblemsunderSolvencyIISolvencyIIcontainsprovisions
regardingthesupervisionof(re)insurersthatarepartofagroupTheseprovisionspotentiallyapplytonon-
EEAgroupswithasubsidiaryintheEEAwhoseparentundertakingisheadquarteredoutsidetheEEAIn
theabsenceofanequivalencedeterminationinrespectofthenon-EEAjurisdictioninwhichthegroupis
headquartered an EEA supervisor may decide to apply the group provisions set out in Articles 218 to 235 and
Articles244to258totheworldwidegroupasifitwerebasedintheEEAAlternativelyEEAMemberStates
have a discretion to permit their supervisors to use ldquoother methodsrdquo which ensure appropriate supervision
6 See Article 227(2) Solvency II
mayer brown 3
ofthenon-EEAgroupSolvencyIIandEIOPAenvisagesanldquoothermethodrdquoofsupervisiontobethe
requirement to establish an EEA holding company7 so that supervision can be exercised at that level This
isbecausethereisspecificprovisioninSolvencyIIfornon-EEAgroupsthathaveanEEAsub-groupwith
anEEAparentundertakingthatisitselfa(re)insurerorinsuranceholdingcompanyWhenthereissucha
groupstructureArticle215providesthatSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionshouldonlybeappliedatthelevelof
the ultimate EEA parent
10 Whereanon-EEAgroupdoesnothaveanEEAsub-groupthenitispossiblethatSolvencyIIgroup
supervisionwillbeappliedtotheworldwidegroupThisisnotthedefaultpositionastherearethreeother
options
(a) ACommissiondecisionthatthenon-EEAgroupissubjecttoequivalentgroupsupervisionenables
reliancetobeplacedonthatsupervisionasopposedtotheimpositionofSolvencyIIrequirements
(b) AswiththesolvencyassessmentifanequivalencedecisionhasnotbeentakenbytheCommissionthe
acting EEA group supervisor8incollaborationwithEIOPAandcollegemembersmayundertakean
equivalenceassessmentattherequestofthenon-EEAparentundertakingtheEEAsubsidiariesoronits
own initiative9AdeterminationbytheEEAsupervisorthatthenon-EEAgroupissubjecttoequivalent
group supervision enables reliance to be placed on that supervision in the same way as a Commission
equivalence decision
(c) Member States have a discretion to permit their national supervisors to apply other methods to ensure
appropriatesupervisionThosemethodsmustbeagreedbythegroupsupervisorafterconsultingthe
other relevant supervisors
Intheabsenceofbothanequivalencedeterminationandadecisiontoapplyldquoothermethodsrdquotothenon-EEA
groupthatgroupisrequiredtoapplytherelevantSolvencyIIrequirementstotheworldwidegroupasifit
were based in the EEA
11 Thegroupprovisionsreferredtoaboveincludethegroupsolvencyassessmentsummarisedatparagraphs
6ndash8ofthisupdatethepossibleimpositionofagroupcapitaladd-onsupervisionofriskconcentrationand
intra-grouptransactionssupervisionofthesystemofgovernancearequirementforagroupsolvencyand
financialconditionreportandarequirementthatthepersonsrunningtheinsuranceholdingcompanyare
fitandproperTheserequirementsifimposedcouldbeonerousAnEEAsubsidiaryofanon-EEA(re)
insurancegroupforexampleisrequiredtoreportonitsindividualfinancialconditionaspartofareport
onthefinancialconditionofitsgroup10ThiscouldrequirethirdcountrygroupsofinsurerswithanEEA
elementtoproducefullSolvencyIIfinancialconditionreportssimplybyvirtueofone(potentiallyquite
small)partofthegrouprsquosbusinessbeingcaughtbythegroupsupervisionregime
12 The UK regulator the Prudential Regulation Authority (ldquoPRArdquo) has explained that an application may be
madetothePRAforawaiverfromtherequirementtoapplytherelevantSolvencyIIrequirementstoanon-
EEAworldwidegroupasifitwereagroupbasedintheEEATheapplicationshouldstateothermethodsof
supervisionforthePRAtoconsiderThePRAwillassesssuchapplicationsonacase-by-casebasistaking
intoaccounttheobjectivesofgroupsupervisionasspecifiedbySolvencyIIAnapplicationmaybesubmitted
beforearelevantequivalencedecisionismadebutthePRAmayrefrainfrommakingadecisionuntilan
equivalencedecisionhasbeenfinalised11
7 Article 262(2) Solvency II and Guideline 5 of Guidelines on group solvency EIOPA-BoS-141818 The EEA supervisor who would be the group supervisor if the Solvency II criteria (set out in Article 272(2)) were applied9 See Article 260(1) Solvency II10 It isagroupsupervisionrequirementunderArticle256thatthesolvencyof individualsubsidiariesis includedinagroupfinancialcondition report11 See Supervisory Statement | SS915 Solvency II group supervision March 2015 Section 9
4 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
What is equivalence
13 Totemperitsextraterritorialeffectandasindicatedabovecertainprovisions12ofSolvencyIIallow
thedeterminationofwhetherparticularelementsoftheprudentialregimesofnon-EEAcountriesare
equivalenttotheprudentialregimelaiddowninSolvencyIIWhereoneoftheseparticularelementsmeets
relevantcriteriatheCommissionwilladoptanequivalencedecisioninrespectofthatelementWherethe
Commissiondoesnotadoptanequivalencedecisionanationalsupervisormayinrespectofcertainelements
onlyundertakeanequivalenceassessmentbaseduponthesamecriteria
14 Therearethreeelementsofanon-EEAprudentialregimewhichmaybedeemedequivalentbythe
Commission They are
(a) reinsurancesupervisionunderArticle172(seeparagraph5above)
(b) solvencyassessmentunderArticle227(seeparagraphs6to8above)and
(c) groupsupervisionunderArticle260(seeparagraphs9to12above)
Nationalsupervisorsmayundertakeanequivalenceassessmentinrespectofsolvencyassessmentandgroup
supervision only
15 Afullequivalencedecisioninrespectofoneoftheseelementslastsforanunlimitedperiodsubjecttoregular
reviewTheCommissionalsohasthepowertomakeadecisionofprovisionalequivalenceinrespectof
solvencyassessment(underArticle227(5))andtemporaryequivalenceinrespectofreinsuranceandgroup
supervision(underArticles172(4)and260(5))whereathirdcountryisworkingtowardsequivalenceand
it is an ongoing process A temporary equivalence decision lasts up until 31 December 2020 under Articles
172(5)and260(6)Decisionsofprovisionalequivalencelastforaten-yearperiodrenewableforfurtherten-
yearperiodsunderArticle227(6)Inadditionandasnotedaboveintheabsenceofanequivalencedecision
adoptedbytheCommissionandinrelationtocategories(b)and(c)ofparagraph14EEAgroupsupervisors
incollaborationwithEIOPAandcollegemembersmayundertakeanequivalenceassessment
16 Theeffectofanequivalencedecisionorapositiveequivalenceassessmentdiffersbetweenthethree
potentially equivalent elements
Potentially equivalent element Effect of equivalence decision
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172)
Reinsurancecontractsconcludedwiththeequivalentnon-EEAcountryrsquos
reinsurers shall be treated in the same manner as contracts concluded with
reinsurers governed by Solvency II (ie EEA reinsurers) (Article 172)(3))
Nopossibilityofequivalenceassessment
Solvency assessment
(Article 227)
MemberStatesmayprovidethatthecalculationofsolvencyforanon-EEA
subsidiaryofanEEAgroupcanbedoneusingthecalculationmethodslaid
downbytheequivalentthirdcountrywherethesubsidiaryisestablished(if
theEEAgroupusesthedeductionandaggregationmethodfromArticle233)
(Article 227)(1))
Equivalenceassessmenthassameeffect
Group supervision
(Article260)
(Re)insurancegroupsthataresubjecttosupervisionbyanon-EEAsupervisory
authoritywhichisequivalenttothesupervisionprovidedforbySolvencyII
areexemptfromcertainSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionrequirements(Articles
260(1)and261)
Equivalenceassessmenthassameeffect
12 See Articles 172(2) 227(4) and 260( 3) Solvency II
mayer brown 5
The equivalence decision process
17 ThereareseveralstepstomakinganequivalencedecisionFirstatechnicalassessmentofthethirdcountryrsquos
prudentialregimeisundertakenbyEIOPAThenEIOPAdeliversitsfindingstotheCommissionEIOPA
maypublishareportonitsfindingsandoccasionallyundertakespublicconsultation13 The Commission is
requiredtoconsultwithEIOPAaboutitstechnicalassessmentbutitistheCommissionrsquosdecisionwhetherto
adoptanequivalencedecisioninrelationtoanyofthethreeelementsofthethirdcountryregimewhichhave
been assessed by EIOPA The Commission decision can be vetoed by the European Parliament or Council
18 ThecriteriatobemetforafullequivalencedecisioncanbefoundinArticles378379and380respectively
ofCommissionDelegatedRegulation20153514TheyarealsolaidoutinAnnex1ofthisupdateSome
examplesofthecriteriawhichareappliedtonon-EEAregimesincludethatthesupervisoryauthoritiesin
thecountryaresufficientlyresourcedtoprotectpolicyholdersandbeneficiariesthatthenon-EEAcountry
imposesadequatecapitalrequirementson(re)insurersandthatthenon-EEAcountryrequires(re)insurers
tohaveeffectivesystemsofgovernanceinplace
19 ForatemporaryorprovisionaldecisionthecriteriaarelessonerousTheyaresummarisedinAnnex2andcan
befoundinfullatArticles172(4)227(5)and260(5)Theyincluderequirementsforthenon-EEAcountryto
haveagreedtosetuparegimewhichwilleventuallybefoundequivalentunderSolvencyIIandforittohaveset
asideresourcesforthispurposeThereisalsoarequirementfortheexistingregimetoberisk-basedandforthe
non-EEAcountrytohaveanindependentsupervisionsystemalreadyinplaceTheseconditionsensurethat
provisionalequivalenceisonlygiventocountrieswhicharealreadyontheirwaytobeingfullyequivalent
20AnequivalencedecisiontakestheformofaCommissionDelegatedDecisionADecisionismadethrough
the procedure laid down in Article 301(2) Solvency II This procedure allows the Commission to adopt the
DecisionunlesstheEuropeanParliamentorCouncilexpressanobjectionwithinthreemonthsorifthethree-
monthperiodisextendedsixmonthsThefinaltextoftheDecisionisthenpublishedintheOfficialJournal
oftheEUandcomesintoeffectwithin20daysofpublication
21 ThefirstsetofDecisions(alludedtoaboveanddetailedbelow)iscurrentlyunderscrutinyfromtheEuropean
Parliament and Council15havingbeenproposedbytheCommissionAccordinglytheseDecisionsarenotyetfinal
What has the Commission done thus far
22AsmentionedabovetheCommissionreleaseditsfirstsetofSolvencyIIequivalencedecisionson5June
2015 The two decisions relate to Switzerland16 and Australia Bermuda Brazil Canada Mexico and the US17
23 Switzerlandhasbeengrantedfullequivalenceinallthreeareasmeaningthatitslocalprudentialregime
canbesubstitutedforSolvencyIIinrespectofreinsurancesupervisionsolvencyassessmentandgroup
supervision Australia Bermuda Brazil Canada Mexico and the US however have only been granted
provisionalequivalenceintheareaofsolvencyassessmentForthesesixcountriesthismeansfirstthat
theirequivalenceisnotindefiniteitwillexpireaftertenyears(on1January2026)subjecttorenewalor
anyfurtherequivalencedecisionsbeingtakenSecondthatthereisnofindingofequivalenceintheareasof
reinsurancesupervisionandgroupsupervisiononlyequivalenceinrespectofreinsurancesupervisionisthe
objectofthepresentDecisiononthesixcountriesotherthanSwitzerlandFurtherdetailontheprocessand
resultsofthetwoDecisionscanbefoundbelow
13 As in the case of the 19 December 2014 consultation on the approach to Switzerland Bermuda and Japan14 This supplemented the original Solvency II Directive and is now par t of the Solvency II package15 On 14 July 2015 the Council indicated that it will not object to the adoption of the two equivalence decisions but the European Parliament has
extended the period for consideration of the second equivalence decision (on Australia Bermuda Brazil Canada Mexico and the US) to six months The period for objection to the second equivalence decision will thus expire on 7 December 2015
16 CommissionDelegatedDecisionC(2015)3754final17 CommissionDelegatedDecisionC(2015)3740final
6 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
SWITZERLAND
24 TheCommissiondraftDecisiononSwitzerlandisafullequivalencedecisionmeaningthatSwitzerlandhas
beendeemedequivalentforthethreepurposesofSolvencyIIdescribedaboveforanindefiniteperiodThis
meansthattheCommissionconsiderstheSwissregimetoprovidealevelofpolicyholderandbeneficiary
protection18 comparable to that provided by Solvency II The advice given by EIOPA to the Commission on
SwissequivalencecanbefoundonEIOPArsquoswebsiteandhelpsexplainthebasisoftheCommissionDecision
The legislation which EIOPA considered in Switzerland and which the Commission views as equivalent
includestheSwissFinancialMarketsSupervisoryAct2007(ldquoFINASMArdquo) the Insurance Supervision Act
(ldquoISArdquo) and the Insurance Supervision Ordinance (ldquoISOrdquo)whichenteredintoforceon1July2015
25 TheDecisionexplainstheapplicationoftheequivalencecriteriatotheSwissregimeForexamplerecital10
statesthattheSwissfinancialmarketsupervisorhasthepowereffectivelytosupervise(re)insuranceactivities
andimposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessaryrecital11explainsthattheSwissSolvency
Testisbasedonsoundeconomicprinciplesandrecital12statesthattheSwissregimerequires(re)insurersto
haveaneffectivesystemofgovernanceinplace19 The equivalence criteria is set out at Annex 1 to this update
26TheDecisionisperhapsunsurprisinggiventhatSwitzerlandandtheEUhaveenteredintoanumberof
bilateraltreatiesandthattheEUhasldquoclosertieswithSwitzerlandthananyothernon-EEAcountryrdquo20 The
DecisionputsparticularweightonMemorandaofUnderstanding(ldquoMoUsrdquo) signed between Switzerland and
theMemberStatesoftheEUtofacilitateinternationalco-operation21
27 Practicallythisfullequivalencedecisionmeansthat
(a) ASwissreinsurerdoingbusinessintheEEAcannotbesubjectedtocollateralrequirementsorany
otheradditionalrequirementsontopofthosetowhichEEAreinsurersaresubjectunderSolvency
II Reinsurance with a Swiss reinsurer is to be treated in the same way as reinsurance with EEA
counterparties
(b) AEEA(re)insurercancompletealloftherequiredprudentialreportingforitsSwisssubsidiaryin
Switzerland under Swiss capital requirement rules and still comply with Solvency II
(c) ASwiss(re)insurancegroupwithEEAsubsidiariesisexemptfromtheotherwiseextraterritorialaspects
ofSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionTheEEAsupervisormustrelyonthegroupsupervisionoftheSwiss
regulator(FINMA)ratherthanconductgroupsupervisionitselfunderSolvencyII
AUSTRALIA BERMUDA BRAZIL CANADA MEXICO AND THE US
28 IntheExplanatoryMemorandumtotheCommissionrsquosdraftDecisiononAustraliaBermudaBrazilCanada
MexicoandtheUSitismadeclearthatArticle227equivalenceistheonlytypeofequivalencewhichis
thesubjectoftheDecisionAsmentionedabovetheDecisionisalsoonlyofprovisionalequivalencewhich
meansitlastsfortenyears22asopposedtoafullequivalencedecisionwhichisunlimitedindurationThe
provisionalnatureoftheequivalencedecisionhoweverisnotcommerciallyaslimitingasthelackofan
equivalencedecisionunderArticles172and260
18 Seerecital6CommissionDelegatedDecision(EU)C(2015)3754(final)19 ThefinalreportonthisadvicecanbefoundathttpseiopaeuropaeuPagesConsultationsCP-14041aspx20 European Union External Action Service webpage EU relations with Switzerland http eeas europa euswitzerland index _ enhtm21 Seerecital16CommissionDelegatedDecision(EU)C(2015)3754(final)22 See Article 227(6) Solvency II
mayer brown 7
29EIOPAassessedandanalysedtheregimesofallsixofthesejurisdictionsbuthasnotmadeallofitsfindings
publicly available23TheCommissiondecidedthatallofthejurisdictionsmetthecriteriaunderArticle
227(5)forprovisionalequivalenceinrespectofsolvencyassessmentbutitdidnotconsiderthatanyof
thejurisdictionsmetthefullequivalencecriteriaunderArticle379ofRegulation201535Furtherthe
CommissiondidnotconsiderwhetheranyofthejurisdictionsmetthecriteriaforequivalenceunderArticles
172(4)and260(5)inrespectofreinsuranceandgroupsupervision24
30Itisnotablethattheonlyareainwhichthesesixjurisdictionshavebeenfoundequivalentistheareainwhich
equivalenceismostbeneficialtoEEA(re)insurersEquivalenceinrespectofsolvencyassessment(under
Article 227) means that EEA (re)insurers can allow their subsidiaries in Australia Bermuda25 Brazil Canada
Mexico and the US to continue to calculate their standalone solvency based on locally accepted methods
ratherthanhavingtoconverttothemethodsprescribedbySolvencyII(foratleastthenexttenyears)
provided that they use the deduction and aggregation method26(seeparagraphs6to8and17formoredetail)
31 Lackofequivalenceinrespectofreinsurance(underArticle172)adverselyaffectsmainlynon-EEAreinsurers
makingtheEEAmarketlessaccessibleforthem(seeparagraphs5and16 above) although it may also have
consequencesforEEAinsurerswhowanttohavetheoptionofreinsuringriskwithinsurersoutsidetheEEA
Lackofequivalenceinrespectofgroupsupervision(underArticle260)predominantlyimpactsnon-EEA
groupsof(re)insurerswithEEA-basedactivity(seeparagraphs9to12and16formoredetail)
32 TheeffectoftheDecisionifadoptedissignificantfornon-EEA(re)insurersAnEEAregulatorcan
(continueto)imposeadditionalrequirementssuchastheimpositionofcollateralrequirementsoncontracts
ofreinsurancewhichoriginateinanycountryoutsidetheEEAsaveforSwitzerlandFurtherallnon-EEA
(re)insurancegroupsapartfromSwiss(re)insurancegroupswhichhaveEEAsubsidiariesbutnotEEA
sub-groupscouldbesubjecttoSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionrequirementsaswellasthegroupsupervision
exercisedbyitshomejurisdictionThefactthatanequivalencedecisionhasnotbeenmadeinrespectof
group supervision however enables national supervisors to carry out an equivalence assessment In the
absenceofbothanequivalencedecisionandanequivalenceassessmentEEAsupervisorsmayapplyldquoother
methodsrdquotogroupsupervisioninsteadofsupervisingthenon-EEAgroupunderSolvencyII27 As explained
atparagraph12abovethePRAwilltakeacase-by-caseapproachandrequiresanon-EEA(re)insurance
grouptosubmitawaiverapplicationrequestingtheuseofldquoothermethodsrdquoTherearenosuchoptionsin
relation to reinsurance supervision
33 SomemayconsideritsurprisingthattheCommissionfoundtheUSinsuranceregime(thelargestinsurance
marketintheworld)wantingintheareasofreinsuranceandgroupsupervisionbutthisresultwascertainly
foreseeablewhenconsiderationisgiventothefactthattheEUndashUSinsurancedialogueprojectwhich
aimstoachieveimprovedmutualunderstandingoftherespectiveinsuranceregulatoryandsupervisory
regimesstartedin2012buthasstilltoreachanagreedconclusionaboutmutualrecognitionForexample
negotiationsoverreductionofcollateralrequirementsintheUSforEEAreinsurershavebeenongoing
foryearsbutprogresshasbeenslowinsteadSolvencyIIdoesnotpreventtheEEAimposingcollateral
requirements on US reinsurers
23 The full text of the report on Bermuda is available online here ht tps eiopa europa eu Pages News EIOPA- publishes-the- Final- Reports-on-full- equivalence -assessments-of- Bermuda -Japan -and-Switzerland a spx Thefulltextreportsontheotherfivejurisdictionswhicharethesubject of this decision are not publicly available
24 See Annexes 1 and 225 Captive insurers regulated in Bermuda are excluded from the equivalency decision26 See Article 233 Solvency II27 See paragraphs 9 to 12 above
8 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
34TheUSinsuranceindustrythroughtheACLI28 RAA29 and other trade associations has been pushing the
federalgovernmenttonegotiateacoveredagreementwiththeEUtopreventtheabovereferencedpotentially
adversecompetitivelydisadvantageousoutcomesfromalackofequivalencedecisionsbytheEUThose
negotiationscontinuetobemiredinpoliticalpositioningwithinthefederalgovernment(atTreasuryandthe
US Trade Representative) with the US state regulators and with the EU regulators and time is running short
SolvencyIIisscheduledtotakeeffecton1January2016andatpresentitappearsunlikelythattheUSwillbe
grantedequivalencebytheCommissioninrespectofreinsuranceandgroupsupervisionInrespectofgroup
supervisionmuchisthereforeinthehandsoftheEEAsupervisors
The equivalence assessment process
35 AsSolvencyIIhasnotcomeintoforceitisnotyetpossibleforanequivalenceassessmenttobecarried
outItwillasdescribedabovebepossibleforEEAsupervisorstomakeanequivalenceassessmentofthe
groupsupervisoryregimeofAustraliaBermudaBrazilCanadaMexicoandtheUSafter1January2016
but EIOPA guidelines30makeclearthatalaterequivalencedecisionbytheCommissionwouldsupersedeany
equivalenceassessmentTheEEAsupervisorscanalsomakeequivalenceassessments(inrespectofboth
solvencyassessmentandgroupsupervision)ofthemanynon-EEAcountrieswhichareunlikelytoeverbethe
subjectofaCommissionequivalencedecision
36TheEIOPAguidelinessetoutthemethodologyforequivalenceassessmentsbynationalsupervisorsThey
stresstheimportanceoftheactivecooperationofthethirdcountryintheequivalenceassessmentprocess
itisdeterminativeinthecaseofgroupsupervisionandlackofcooperationwouldleadtoanon-equivalent
outcome An equivalence assessment is based on the same criteria as an equivalence decision which are set
out in Annex 1 to this update National supervisors can conduct the assessment themselves with assistance
fromEIOPAandinconsultationwithotherEEAsupervisorsorrequestEIOPAtocarryouttheassessment
Unlikeanequivalencedecisionthereisnopossibilityofatemporaryorprovisionalequivalenceassessment
37 Positive equivalence assessments require regular review they must be reviewed at least every three years or
followingsignificantdevelopmentsinthejurisdictionassessedNegativeequivalenceassessmentsmayberevisited
attherequestoftherelevant(re)insureroratthenationalsupervisorrsquosowninitiativewheretherehavebeen
significantchangestothesupervisoryregimelaiddownSolvencyIIortothesupervisoryregimeofthenon-
EEAcountryconcernedUnlesstherehavebeensuchchangesitisnotpossiblefornationalsupervisorstotake
divergentequivalencedecisionsregardingthesamenon-EEAcountryEquivalenceassessmentswillhaveeffect
morebroadlythanjustfortherequesting(re)insurerorgroupAccordinglywhencarryingoutanequivalence
assessmentnationalsupervisorsmustassesstheentirenon-EEAregimenotjusttheregimeasitappliestothe(re)
insurerorgroupconcernedForexampleevenifagroupconductsonlylifeinsurancebusinessitwouldstillbe
necessaryforthenationalsupervisortoassessthethirdcountryregimefornon-lifebusiness
EEA sub-groups
38 As noted at paragraph 9 abovewhereanon-EEAgroupdoesnothaveanEEAparentundertakingandis
notsubjecttoanequivalencedeterminationbyeithertheCommissionoranationalsupervisorEIOPAhas
suggestedthatnationalsupervisorsshouldconsiderrequiringsuchanon-EEAgrouptoestablishanEEAsub-
group Such a requirement will understandably be regarded as onerous but doing so would mean that only the
EEAsub-groupwouldbesubjectedtoSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionandthegroupsolvencycalculation
28 The American Council of Life Insurers29 The Reinsurance Association of America30 See Final Report on Public Consultation No14015 on Guidelines on the methodology for equivalence assessments by national supervisory
authorities under Solvency II EIOPA-BoS-14182 27 November 2014
mayer brown 9
39WhereanequivalencedeterminationhasbeenmadethereisnoneedtocreateanEEAsub-groupbutnon-
EEAgroupswithsuchastructurewillfindthemselvessubjecttodualregulationwhilsttheircompetitors
withoutanEEAparentundertakingwillbeabletorelysolelyonthegroupsupervisionexercisedbytheir
homesupervisorEIOPAifnotSolvencyIIhasconsideredthisdichotomy
40InitsguidanceEIOPAsuggeststhatwherethewidernon-EEAgroupissubjecttoequivalentthirdcountry
group supervision the acting EEA group supervisor should rely on the group supervision exercised by the
third-countrysupervisoryauthoritiesandexempttheEEAsub-groupfromSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionson
acase-by-casebasisbutonlywherethiswouldresultinamoreefficientsupervisionofthegroupandwould
not impair its supervision EIOPA sets out criteria that the acting group supervisor should consider when
deciding whether such an exemption should be granted They are
(a) theworldwidegroupsupervisionallowsforarobustassessmentoftheriskstowhichtheEEAsubgroup
anditsentitiesareexposedconsideringthestructureofthegroupthenaturescaleandcomplexityof
therisksandthecapitalallocationwithinthegroup
(b) thecooperationcurrentlyinplacebetweenthenon-EEAgroupsupervisorandtheEEAsupervisors
forthegroupconcernedisstructuredandwell-managedthroughregularmeetingsandappropriate
exchangeofinformationwithinacollegeofsupervisorstowhichtheEEAsupervisorsandEIOPAare
invitedand
(c) anannualworkplanincludingjointon-siteexaminationsisagreeduponintheseregularmeetingsby
thesupervisoryauthoritiesinvolvedinthesupervisionofthegroup31
41 EIOPAguidanceisnotbindingonthenationalsupervisorsbutthesupervisorshaveinformedEIOPAwhether
or not they intend to comply with it Only Germany has stated that it will not comply with the relevant
guidancebecauseitexplainsGermanlawdoesnotpermitacase-by-caseapproachItappearstherefore
thattheeffectofanequivalencedeterminationbyeithertheCommissionoranationalsupervisorcouldbe
toexemptanEEAsub-groupfromSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionandsolvencycalculationThispossibility
alreadyexistsforSwiss(re)insurancegroups
What happens next
42TheCommissionhasindicated32thatthereareassessmentsofotherthirdcountryjurisdictionscurrently
inprogressandthatsomejurisdictionsaremodifyingtheirinsuranceframeworksinordertofacilitate
equivalencedecisionsInthelightofthisasecondpackageofdecisionsisexpectedintheautumnof
2015ApositivedecisiononreinsuranceequivalenceforJapanalreadythesubjectofanEIOPAreport33 is
expectedtobeincludedinthenextpackageFurthergivenEIOPArsquosfindingsitwouldnotbesurprisingifthe
CommissionmakesapositivedecisionregardinggroupsupervisoryandreinsuranceequivalenceforBermuda
butthefutureislessclearfortheUSAustraliaBrazilCanadaandMexicoInthemeantimenon-EEA(re)
insurance groups will want to consider their group structure in order to ascertain how the extraterritorial
provisionsofSolvencyIImayaffectthem
31 Guideline 5 of Guidelines on group solvency EIOPA-BoS-1418132 Draft minutes of a meeting of the Commissionrsquos expert group on banking payments and insurance ( in its insurance formation) 5 March 201533 See fn 23
10 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Ifyouhaveanyquestionsaboutanyoftheissuesraisedinthisalertpleasecontactyourusualcontactoroneof
the lawyers listed below
LONDON
Alexandria Carr
OfCounsel(EmployedBarrister)
E acarrmayerbrowncom T+442031303398
Mark Compton Partner
E mcomptonmayerbrowncom T+442031303388
Colin Scagell Partner
E cscagellmayerbrowncom T+442031303315
US
David W Alberts
Partner(NewYork)
dalbertsmayerbrowncom T+12125062611
Lawrence R Hamilton
Partner (Chicago)
lhamiltonmayerbrowncom
T +1 312 701 7055
mayer brown 11
Annex 1
Potentially-equivalent element
(Directive 2009138EU)
Criteria to determine equivalence
(Commission Delegated Regulation 201535)
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusthavethepower(by
laworregulation)toeffectivelysupervisedomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ingsandtoimposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessary
(Article 378(a))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusthavethenecessary
meansandresourcesrelevantexpertiseandthemandatetoeffectively
protectpolicyholdersandbeneficiarieswhereverlocated (Article 378(b))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryshouldalwaysduly
considerthepotentialimpactoftheirdecisionsontheglobalstabilityof
financialsystemsparticularlyduringanemergency(Article 378(c))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepotentialpro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmove-
mentsinthefinancialmarketsoccur(Article 378(d))
bull Theremustbearequirementforreinsurerstobeauthorisedtoprovide
businessinthethirdcountryandtheremustbeaclearobjectiveand
publiclyavailablesetofwrittenauthorisationstandards(Article 378(e))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingstohaveaneffectivesystemofgovernancewhich
provides sound and prudent business management including
ndash an adequate transparent organisational structure with clear alloca-
tionandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementsforensuringthatpersonswhoeffectivelyrunthe
undertakingarelsquofitandproperrsquo
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothinternallyandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthoritiesand
ndash requirementsforensuringthatoutsourcedfunctionsactivitiesare
effectivelysupervised(Article 378(f))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticrein-
suranceundertakingstohaveaneffectiveriskmanagementsystem
comprising
ndash strategiesprocessesandinternalreportingprocedurestoidentify
measuremonitormanageandreportriskstowhichtheundertaking
iscould be exposed at an individual and an aggregated level and on a
continuousbasisand
ndash effectiveinternalcontrols(Article 378(g))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
ancetoestablishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcompliance
internalauditandactuarialfunctions(Article 378(h))
12 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingsto
ndash providethirdcountryauthoritieswithanyinformationnecessaryfor
supervisionand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on their solvency and
financialcondition(Article 378(i))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthatproposedchanges
tothebusinesspolicyormanagementofdomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ingsortoqualifyingholdingsinsuchundertakingsbeconsistentwith
maintaining sound and prudent management (Article 378(j))
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofdomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ings should rely on sound economic principles and solvency requirements
shouldbebasedonaneconomicvaluationofassetsorliabilities(Article
378(k))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingstoholdadequatefinancialresourcesincluding
requirements to
ndash establish technical provisions with respect to all reinsurance obliga-
tionstowardspolicyholdersandbeneficiariesofreinsurance
contracts
ndash investassetsheldtocovertechnicalprovisionsinthebestinterestsof
allpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccountanydisclosed
policyobjective)
ndash investonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoseriskstheundertakingcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash meet capital requirements set at a level equivalent to that under
SolvencyIIwhichensuresthatbeneficiariesandpolicyholdersare
adequatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsintheeventof
significantlosses
ndash maintainaminimumlevelofcapital(orsufferimmediatesupervisory
intervention)and
ndash meetcapitalrequirementsreferredtoabovewithownfundsof
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesbothinagoing
concernandinacaseofwindingup(Article 378(l))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsofthesolvencyregimeinthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiableriskandanysignificant
non-quantifiableriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanothersupervisory
mechanism (Article 378(m))
mayer brown 13
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustensuretimelyintervention
by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements are
not complied with (Article 378(n))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 378(o))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonswhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallother
personsandauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhich
doesnotallowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 378(p))
bull Whereareinsuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingsshouldbe
able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 378(q)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesmustonlyusethatinformationin
thecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 378(r))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustbepermittedto
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreaches
ofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersonswherethat
authoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofessional
secrecyinthethirdcountryandsuchinformationshouldonlybedis-
closedoncetheexpressagreementoftheoriginatorhasbeenobtained
andsolelyforthepurposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission
(Article 378(s))
14 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Solvency assessment
(Article 227)
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofdomestic(re)insuranceundertakings
should rely on sound economic principles and solvency requirements should
bebasedonaneconomicvaluationofassetsorliabilities(Article379(a))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomestic(re)insurance
undertakingstoholdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingrequirements
to
ndash establish technical provisions with respect to all (re)insurance obliga-
tionstowardspolicyholdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insurancecontracts
ndash investassetsheldtocovertechnicalprovisionsinthebestinterestsof
allpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccountanydisclosed
policyobjective)
ndash investonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoseriskstheundertakingcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash meet capital requirements set at a level equivalent to that under
SolvencyIIwhichensuresthatbeneficiariesandpolicyholdersare
adequatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsintheeventof
significantlosses
ndash maintainaminimumlevelofcapital(orsufferimmediatesupervisory
intervention)and
ndash meetcapitalrequirementsreferredtoabovewithownfundsof
sufficientqualitywhichareabletoabsorbsignificantlossesbothina
goingconcernandinacaseofwindingup(Article379(b))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsofthesolvencyregimeinthethirdcountrymust
berisk-basedtocapturequantifiableriskandanysignificantnon-quan-
tifiableriskmustbeaddressedthroughanothersupervisorymechanism
(Article 379(c))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tion by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements
are not complied with (Article 379(d))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 379(e))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article379(f))
mayer brown 15
bull Wherea(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptoris
beingcompulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnot
concernthirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakings
should be able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article
379(g))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesshouldonlyusethatinformation
inthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 379(h))
bull Arethesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrypermittedtoexchange
informationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthedischargeof
theirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreachesofcompanylaw
with other authorities bodies or persons where that authority body or
personissubjecttoanobligationofprofessionalsecrecyinthethirdcoun-
tryandissuchinformationonlydisclosedoncetheexpressagreementof
theoriginator(s)hasbeenobtainedandwhereappropriatesolelyforthe
purposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission(Article379(i))
Group supervision
(Article 260)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryhavethenecessarymeans
andresourcesrelevantexpertiseandthemandatetoeffectivelyprotect
policyholdersandbeneficiarieswhereverlocated(Article 380(a))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareempoweredbylawor
regulation to
ndash determinewhichundertakingsfallunderthescopeofsupervisionat
grouplevel
ndash supervise(re)insurerswhicharepartofagroup and
ndash imposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessary
(Article 380(b))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareabletoeffectively
assesstheriskprofileandsolvencyfinancialpositionof(re)insurers
whicharepartofagroupandthegrouprsquosbusinessstrategy(Article
380(c))
bull Supervisionatgrouplevelincludesallundertakingsoverwhichapartici-
patingundertakingexercisesdominantorsignificantinfluence(unless
notappropriateforgroupsupervisionobjectives)(Article 380(d))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustdulyconsiderthe
potentialimpactoftheirdecisionsonthestabilityoffinancialsystems
globally particularly during emergency situations (Article 380(e))
16 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmovementsin
financialmarketsoccur(Article 380(f))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectivesystemof
governanceatgrouplevelwhichprovidesforsoundandprudentbusiness
management and prescribes
ndash that there must be an adequate transparent organisational structure
withclearallocationandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementstoensurethatpersonswhoeffectivelyruntheundertak-
ingarefitandproper
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothwithinthegroupandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthorities and
ndash requirementsforensuringthattheoutsourcedfunctionsoractivities
areeffectivelysupervised(Article 380(g))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectiverisk
management system at group level comprising at least
ndash the strategies processes and internal reporting procedures necessary
toidentifymeasuremonitormanageandreportrisksonacontinu-
ousbasistowhichthegroupiscouldbeexposedand
ndash aneffectiveinternalcontrolsystem(Article 380(h))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
have sound reporting and accounting procedures to monitor and manage
intra-grouptransactionsandriskconcentrations(Article 380(i))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
establishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcomplianceinternal
auditandactuarialfunctions(Article 380(j))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthegroupto
ndash providethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswithanyinformation
thattheyneed
ndash reportsignificantriskconcentrationatthelevelofthegroupand
significantintra-grouptransactionsonatleastanannualbasisand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on the solvency and
financialconditionofthegroup(Article 380(k))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequirethatproposed
changestothebusinesspolicyormanagementofthegroup(orqualifying
holdings in the group) are consistent with the sound and prudent man-
agementofthegroup(Article 380(l))
mayer brown 17
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofthegroupshouldrelyonsound
economicprinciplesandassessmentofsolvencyshouldbebasedonan
economicvaluationofallassetsandliabilities(Article 380(m))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
holdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingarequirementfor
ndash technical provisions with respect to all obligations towards policy-
holdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insuranceundertakingsinthegroup
ndash assets held to cover technical provisions to be invested in the best
interestsofallpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccount
anydisclosedpolicyobjective)
ndash thegrouptoinvestonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoserisksitcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash the group to meet capital requirements at a level which ensures that in
theeventofsignificantlossespolicyholdersandbeneficiariesareade-
quatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsastheybecomedue
ndash (re)insuranceundertakingswhicharepartofthegrouptomaintaina
minimumlevelofcapitalnon-compliancewithwhichtriggers
immediatesupervisoryinterventionand
ndash groupcapitalrequirementstobemetwithownfundsthatareofa
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesinbothagoing
concernandacaseofwindingup(Article 380(n))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsoftheprudentialregimeofthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiablerisksandwhereasignificant
riskisnotquantifiablethatriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanother
supervisory mechanism (Article 380(o))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tionbythesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryintheeventthat
capital requirements are not complied with (Article 380(p))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryrestricttheuseofown-fund
itemsofarelated(re)insuranceundertakingwheretheitemscannoteffec-
tivelybemadeavailabletocoverthecapitalrequirementoftheparticipating
undertakingforwhichgroupsolvencyiscalculated(Article 380(q))
bull Thecalculationofgroupsolvencyinthethirdcountryrsquosprudentialregime
should produce a result that is at least equivalent to the result produced
byeitheroneoforacombinationofthecalculationmethodsinSolvency
II and the calculation method used should ensure that there is no double
useofownfundstomeetthegroupcapitalrequirementandthatthe
intra-groupcreationofcapitalthroughreciprocalfinancingiseliminated
(Article 380(r))
18 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatallpersons
whoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethird
countryaswellasauditorsandexpertsactingonbehalfoftheauthorities
areboundbyobligationsofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinforma-
tionreceivedfromallsupervisoryauthorities(Article 380(s))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 380(t))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatwhere
a(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingmaybe
divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 380(u))
bull Thethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswhichreceiveconfidential
informationfromothersupervisoryauthoritiesmustonlyusethat
informationinthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 380(v))
bull The third country supervisory authorities should be permitted to
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirsupervisoryfunctionsorthedetectionorinvestigation
ofbreachesofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersons
wherethatauthoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofes-
sionalsecrecyintherelevantthirdcountryprovidedthattheinformation
isonlydisclosedwiththeexpressagreementoftheoriginatorandonlyfor
thepurposesforwhichsuchauthoritywasgiven(Article 380(w))
19 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Annex 2
Potentially temporarily
provisionally equivalent area
Criteria to determine temporaryprovisional equivalence
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172(4))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities(particularly
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities)
Solvency assessment
(Article 227(5))
(a) The third country either already has an equivalent solvency regime in
place or one may be adopted or applied
(b)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(c)Thethirdcountryrsquoslawinprincipleallowscooperationandexchange
ofconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities
(d)Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(e)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider advising many of the worldrsquos largest companies including a significant portion of the Fortune 100 FTSE 100 DAX and Hang Seng Index companies and more than half of the worldrsquos largest banks Our legal services include banking and finance corporate and securities litigation and dispute resolution antitrust and competition US Supreme Court and appellate matters employment and benefits environmental financial services regulatory and enforcement government and global trade intellectual property real estate tax restructuring bankruptcy and insolvency and wealth management
Please visit wwwmayerbrowncom for comprehensive contact information for all Mayer Brown offices
This Mayer Brown publication provides information and comments on legal issues and developments of interest to our clients and friends The foregoing is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject matter covered and is not intended to provide legal advice Readers should seek legal advice before taking any action with respect to the matters discussed herein
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider comprising legal practices that are separate entities (the ldquoMayer Brown Practicesrdquo) The Mayer Brown Practices are Mayer Brown LLP and Mayer Brown Europe-Brussels LLP both limited liability partnerships established in Illinois USA Mayer Brown International LLP a limited liability partnership incorporated in England and Wales (authorized and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered in England and Wales number OC 303359) Mayer Brown a SELAS established in France Mayer Brown Mexico SC a sociedad civil formed under the laws of the State of Durango Mexico Mayer Brown JSM a Hong Kong partnership and its associated legal practices in Asia and Tauil amp Chequer Advogados a Brazilian law partnership with which Mayer Brown is associated Mayer Brown Consulting (Singapore) Pte Ltd and its subsidiary which are affiliated with Mayer Brown provide customs and trade advisory and consultancy services not legal services ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
copy 2015 The Mayer Brown Practices All rights reserved
0822fin
Group supervision
(Article 260(5))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasaprudentialregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting transparency and group
solvency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
other supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthoritiesinparticular
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandothersupervisory
authorities
![Page 2: Solvency II: Equivalence Decisions](https://reader030.vdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022012812/61c3bd04e721fa32777b3bfb/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
2 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
5 Inrespectofcategory(a)intheaboveparagraphnon-EEAreinsurerswritingreinsurancecontractswith
EEAentitiesmaybeaffectedbecauseSolvencyIIdoesnotpreventEEAregulatorsimposingadditional
regulatoryrequirementsoncontractsofreinsurancewrittenbyreinsurersfromacountryoutsidetheEEA
whichhasnotbeendeemedtohaveasolvencyregimeequivalenttoSolvencyIIArticles172(3)and173of
SolvencyIIpreventMemberStatesfromtreatingreinsurancecontractswrittenbyreinsurersfromoutside
theEEAlessfavourablythanthosewrittenbyEEAinsurersbutonlywhereanequivalencedecisionhasbeen
adoptedforthethirdcountryinwhichthenon-EEAreinsurerisbasedSointheabsenceofanequivalence
decisionMemberStatesmayimposeadditionalrequirementsonnon-EEAreinsurersThemostcommonly
imposedadditionalrequirementsrelatetocollateralanon-EEAreinsurercanbesubjecttoincreased
collateralrequirementswithintheEEAthusplacingthenon-EEAreinsureratacompetitivedisadvantageto
EEAreinsurers(andthosenon-EEAreinsurerswhosehomejurisdictionhasbeendeemedequivalent)who
areprotectedfromsuchextrarequirementsbySolvencyII
6 Inrelationtocategory(b)aboveArticle227ofSolvencyIIprimafacierequiresEEA(re)insurerstocalculate
consolidated group solvency across their global insurance business Where the EEA (re)insurer has a
subsidiary(orsubsidiaries)basedinanon-EEAjurisdictionthereislikelytobeadiscrepancybetweenthe
methodsofcalculationofsolvencyusedbythatsubsidiaryandthoseusedbytheEEApartsofthebusiness
thesubsidiarywilltypicallyusethelocallyacceptedmethodofitshomejurisdictionandtheEEA-based
entitieswillusethemethodsofSolvencyIIToavoidthisdiscrepancySolvencyIIrequiresthesubsidiaryto
useSolvencyIIformulaeforEuropeanreportingpurposesThiscreatesconsistencyacrossthegroupbutis
likelytocreateanadditionalandduplicativeburdenasthesubsidiarymayberequiredtocalculateandreport
solvency data on two bases
7 Ifthesubsidiaryisrequiredtousetwodifferentmethodsforcalculationofsolvencyitispossiblethatthe
resultsofthecalculationswilldifferbetweenthelocalregimeandtheSolvencyIIregimeForexamplea
subsidiarymightbegivencreditunderitslocalsystemforanticipatedincomeorcreditbutSolvencyIIis
basedonmarket-consistentprinciplesandsoitsformulaedonotgivecreditforanythingbasedonfuture
performanceTheliabilityandassetrequirementsforthesubsidiarycouldbethereforehigherunder
SolvencyIIthantheyhavebeenwhilethesubsidiarywassolelysubjecttothelocalsystemsuddenlyrequiring
thesubsidiarytofindormaintainmoreassetsandfewerliabilities
8 Ifthehomejurisdictionofthenon-EEAsubsidiaryhasbeendeemedequivalentthegroupmaytakeaccount
ofthatjurisdictionrsquossolvencycapitalrequirementandthecapitaleligibletomeetthatrequirementinthe
calculationofgroupsolvencyIfanequivalencedecisionhasnotbeentakenbytheCommissiontheEEA
group supervisor in collaboration with the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority
(ldquoEIOPArdquo)andcollegemembersmayundertakeanequivalenceassessment6 on its own initiative or at the
requestofthe(re)insurerconcerned
9 Anon-EEA(re)insurancegroupwithanEEAsubsidiarybutnotanEEAsub-group(asmentionedin
paragraph 4(c)above)couldencounterdifferentproblemsunderSolvencyIISolvencyIIcontainsprovisions
regardingthesupervisionof(re)insurersthatarepartofagroupTheseprovisionspotentiallyapplytonon-
EEAgroupswithasubsidiaryintheEEAwhoseparentundertakingisheadquarteredoutsidetheEEAIn
theabsenceofanequivalencedeterminationinrespectofthenon-EEAjurisdictioninwhichthegroupis
headquartered an EEA supervisor may decide to apply the group provisions set out in Articles 218 to 235 and
Articles244to258totheworldwidegroupasifitwerebasedintheEEAAlternativelyEEAMemberStates
have a discretion to permit their supervisors to use ldquoother methodsrdquo which ensure appropriate supervision
6 See Article 227(2) Solvency II
mayer brown 3
ofthenon-EEAgroupSolvencyIIandEIOPAenvisagesanldquoothermethodrdquoofsupervisiontobethe
requirement to establish an EEA holding company7 so that supervision can be exercised at that level This
isbecausethereisspecificprovisioninSolvencyIIfornon-EEAgroupsthathaveanEEAsub-groupwith
anEEAparentundertakingthatisitselfa(re)insurerorinsuranceholdingcompanyWhenthereissucha
groupstructureArticle215providesthatSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionshouldonlybeappliedatthelevelof
the ultimate EEA parent
10 Whereanon-EEAgroupdoesnothaveanEEAsub-groupthenitispossiblethatSolvencyIIgroup
supervisionwillbeappliedtotheworldwidegroupThisisnotthedefaultpositionastherearethreeother
options
(a) ACommissiondecisionthatthenon-EEAgroupissubjecttoequivalentgroupsupervisionenables
reliancetobeplacedonthatsupervisionasopposedtotheimpositionofSolvencyIIrequirements
(b) AswiththesolvencyassessmentifanequivalencedecisionhasnotbeentakenbytheCommissionthe
acting EEA group supervisor8incollaborationwithEIOPAandcollegemembersmayundertakean
equivalenceassessmentattherequestofthenon-EEAparentundertakingtheEEAsubsidiariesoronits
own initiative9AdeterminationbytheEEAsupervisorthatthenon-EEAgroupissubjecttoequivalent
group supervision enables reliance to be placed on that supervision in the same way as a Commission
equivalence decision
(c) Member States have a discretion to permit their national supervisors to apply other methods to ensure
appropriatesupervisionThosemethodsmustbeagreedbythegroupsupervisorafterconsultingthe
other relevant supervisors
Intheabsenceofbothanequivalencedeterminationandadecisiontoapplyldquoothermethodsrdquotothenon-EEA
groupthatgroupisrequiredtoapplytherelevantSolvencyIIrequirementstotheworldwidegroupasifit
were based in the EEA
11 Thegroupprovisionsreferredtoaboveincludethegroupsolvencyassessmentsummarisedatparagraphs
6ndash8ofthisupdatethepossibleimpositionofagroupcapitaladd-onsupervisionofriskconcentrationand
intra-grouptransactionssupervisionofthesystemofgovernancearequirementforagroupsolvencyand
financialconditionreportandarequirementthatthepersonsrunningtheinsuranceholdingcompanyare
fitandproperTheserequirementsifimposedcouldbeonerousAnEEAsubsidiaryofanon-EEA(re)
insurancegroupforexampleisrequiredtoreportonitsindividualfinancialconditionaspartofareport
onthefinancialconditionofitsgroup10ThiscouldrequirethirdcountrygroupsofinsurerswithanEEA
elementtoproducefullSolvencyIIfinancialconditionreportssimplybyvirtueofone(potentiallyquite
small)partofthegrouprsquosbusinessbeingcaughtbythegroupsupervisionregime
12 The UK regulator the Prudential Regulation Authority (ldquoPRArdquo) has explained that an application may be
madetothePRAforawaiverfromtherequirementtoapplytherelevantSolvencyIIrequirementstoanon-
EEAworldwidegroupasifitwereagroupbasedintheEEATheapplicationshouldstateothermethodsof
supervisionforthePRAtoconsiderThePRAwillassesssuchapplicationsonacase-by-casebasistaking
intoaccounttheobjectivesofgroupsupervisionasspecifiedbySolvencyIIAnapplicationmaybesubmitted
beforearelevantequivalencedecisionismadebutthePRAmayrefrainfrommakingadecisionuntilan
equivalencedecisionhasbeenfinalised11
7 Article 262(2) Solvency II and Guideline 5 of Guidelines on group solvency EIOPA-BoS-141818 The EEA supervisor who would be the group supervisor if the Solvency II criteria (set out in Article 272(2)) were applied9 See Article 260(1) Solvency II10 It isagroupsupervisionrequirementunderArticle256thatthesolvencyof individualsubsidiariesis includedinagroupfinancialcondition report11 See Supervisory Statement | SS915 Solvency II group supervision March 2015 Section 9
4 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
What is equivalence
13 Totemperitsextraterritorialeffectandasindicatedabovecertainprovisions12ofSolvencyIIallow
thedeterminationofwhetherparticularelementsoftheprudentialregimesofnon-EEAcountriesare
equivalenttotheprudentialregimelaiddowninSolvencyIIWhereoneoftheseparticularelementsmeets
relevantcriteriatheCommissionwilladoptanequivalencedecisioninrespectofthatelementWherethe
Commissiondoesnotadoptanequivalencedecisionanationalsupervisormayinrespectofcertainelements
onlyundertakeanequivalenceassessmentbaseduponthesamecriteria
14 Therearethreeelementsofanon-EEAprudentialregimewhichmaybedeemedequivalentbythe
Commission They are
(a) reinsurancesupervisionunderArticle172(seeparagraph5above)
(b) solvencyassessmentunderArticle227(seeparagraphs6to8above)and
(c) groupsupervisionunderArticle260(seeparagraphs9to12above)
Nationalsupervisorsmayundertakeanequivalenceassessmentinrespectofsolvencyassessmentandgroup
supervision only
15 Afullequivalencedecisioninrespectofoneoftheseelementslastsforanunlimitedperiodsubjecttoregular
reviewTheCommissionalsohasthepowertomakeadecisionofprovisionalequivalenceinrespectof
solvencyassessment(underArticle227(5))andtemporaryequivalenceinrespectofreinsuranceandgroup
supervision(underArticles172(4)and260(5))whereathirdcountryisworkingtowardsequivalenceand
it is an ongoing process A temporary equivalence decision lasts up until 31 December 2020 under Articles
172(5)and260(6)Decisionsofprovisionalequivalencelastforaten-yearperiodrenewableforfurtherten-
yearperiodsunderArticle227(6)Inadditionandasnotedaboveintheabsenceofanequivalencedecision
adoptedbytheCommissionandinrelationtocategories(b)and(c)ofparagraph14EEAgroupsupervisors
incollaborationwithEIOPAandcollegemembersmayundertakeanequivalenceassessment
16 Theeffectofanequivalencedecisionorapositiveequivalenceassessmentdiffersbetweenthethree
potentially equivalent elements
Potentially equivalent element Effect of equivalence decision
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172)
Reinsurancecontractsconcludedwiththeequivalentnon-EEAcountryrsquos
reinsurers shall be treated in the same manner as contracts concluded with
reinsurers governed by Solvency II (ie EEA reinsurers) (Article 172)(3))
Nopossibilityofequivalenceassessment
Solvency assessment
(Article 227)
MemberStatesmayprovidethatthecalculationofsolvencyforanon-EEA
subsidiaryofanEEAgroupcanbedoneusingthecalculationmethodslaid
downbytheequivalentthirdcountrywherethesubsidiaryisestablished(if
theEEAgroupusesthedeductionandaggregationmethodfromArticle233)
(Article 227)(1))
Equivalenceassessmenthassameeffect
Group supervision
(Article260)
(Re)insurancegroupsthataresubjecttosupervisionbyanon-EEAsupervisory
authoritywhichisequivalenttothesupervisionprovidedforbySolvencyII
areexemptfromcertainSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionrequirements(Articles
260(1)and261)
Equivalenceassessmenthassameeffect
12 See Articles 172(2) 227(4) and 260( 3) Solvency II
mayer brown 5
The equivalence decision process
17 ThereareseveralstepstomakinganequivalencedecisionFirstatechnicalassessmentofthethirdcountryrsquos
prudentialregimeisundertakenbyEIOPAThenEIOPAdeliversitsfindingstotheCommissionEIOPA
maypublishareportonitsfindingsandoccasionallyundertakespublicconsultation13 The Commission is
requiredtoconsultwithEIOPAaboutitstechnicalassessmentbutitistheCommissionrsquosdecisionwhetherto
adoptanequivalencedecisioninrelationtoanyofthethreeelementsofthethirdcountryregimewhichhave
been assessed by EIOPA The Commission decision can be vetoed by the European Parliament or Council
18 ThecriteriatobemetforafullequivalencedecisioncanbefoundinArticles378379and380respectively
ofCommissionDelegatedRegulation20153514TheyarealsolaidoutinAnnex1ofthisupdateSome
examplesofthecriteriawhichareappliedtonon-EEAregimesincludethatthesupervisoryauthoritiesin
thecountryaresufficientlyresourcedtoprotectpolicyholdersandbeneficiariesthatthenon-EEAcountry
imposesadequatecapitalrequirementson(re)insurersandthatthenon-EEAcountryrequires(re)insurers
tohaveeffectivesystemsofgovernanceinplace
19 ForatemporaryorprovisionaldecisionthecriteriaarelessonerousTheyaresummarisedinAnnex2andcan
befoundinfullatArticles172(4)227(5)and260(5)Theyincluderequirementsforthenon-EEAcountryto
haveagreedtosetuparegimewhichwilleventuallybefoundequivalentunderSolvencyIIandforittohaveset
asideresourcesforthispurposeThereisalsoarequirementfortheexistingregimetoberisk-basedandforthe
non-EEAcountrytohaveanindependentsupervisionsystemalreadyinplaceTheseconditionsensurethat
provisionalequivalenceisonlygiventocountrieswhicharealreadyontheirwaytobeingfullyequivalent
20AnequivalencedecisiontakestheformofaCommissionDelegatedDecisionADecisionismadethrough
the procedure laid down in Article 301(2) Solvency II This procedure allows the Commission to adopt the
DecisionunlesstheEuropeanParliamentorCouncilexpressanobjectionwithinthreemonthsorifthethree-
monthperiodisextendedsixmonthsThefinaltextoftheDecisionisthenpublishedintheOfficialJournal
oftheEUandcomesintoeffectwithin20daysofpublication
21 ThefirstsetofDecisions(alludedtoaboveanddetailedbelow)iscurrentlyunderscrutinyfromtheEuropean
Parliament and Council15havingbeenproposedbytheCommissionAccordinglytheseDecisionsarenotyetfinal
What has the Commission done thus far
22AsmentionedabovetheCommissionreleaseditsfirstsetofSolvencyIIequivalencedecisionson5June
2015 The two decisions relate to Switzerland16 and Australia Bermuda Brazil Canada Mexico and the US17
23 Switzerlandhasbeengrantedfullequivalenceinallthreeareasmeaningthatitslocalprudentialregime
canbesubstitutedforSolvencyIIinrespectofreinsurancesupervisionsolvencyassessmentandgroup
supervision Australia Bermuda Brazil Canada Mexico and the US however have only been granted
provisionalequivalenceintheareaofsolvencyassessmentForthesesixcountriesthismeansfirstthat
theirequivalenceisnotindefiniteitwillexpireaftertenyears(on1January2026)subjecttorenewalor
anyfurtherequivalencedecisionsbeingtakenSecondthatthereisnofindingofequivalenceintheareasof
reinsurancesupervisionandgroupsupervisiononlyequivalenceinrespectofreinsurancesupervisionisthe
objectofthepresentDecisiononthesixcountriesotherthanSwitzerlandFurtherdetailontheprocessand
resultsofthetwoDecisionscanbefoundbelow
13 As in the case of the 19 December 2014 consultation on the approach to Switzerland Bermuda and Japan14 This supplemented the original Solvency II Directive and is now par t of the Solvency II package15 On 14 July 2015 the Council indicated that it will not object to the adoption of the two equivalence decisions but the European Parliament has
extended the period for consideration of the second equivalence decision (on Australia Bermuda Brazil Canada Mexico and the US) to six months The period for objection to the second equivalence decision will thus expire on 7 December 2015
16 CommissionDelegatedDecisionC(2015)3754final17 CommissionDelegatedDecisionC(2015)3740final
6 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
SWITZERLAND
24 TheCommissiondraftDecisiononSwitzerlandisafullequivalencedecisionmeaningthatSwitzerlandhas
beendeemedequivalentforthethreepurposesofSolvencyIIdescribedaboveforanindefiniteperiodThis
meansthattheCommissionconsiderstheSwissregimetoprovidealevelofpolicyholderandbeneficiary
protection18 comparable to that provided by Solvency II The advice given by EIOPA to the Commission on
SwissequivalencecanbefoundonEIOPArsquoswebsiteandhelpsexplainthebasisoftheCommissionDecision
The legislation which EIOPA considered in Switzerland and which the Commission views as equivalent
includestheSwissFinancialMarketsSupervisoryAct2007(ldquoFINASMArdquo) the Insurance Supervision Act
(ldquoISArdquo) and the Insurance Supervision Ordinance (ldquoISOrdquo)whichenteredintoforceon1July2015
25 TheDecisionexplainstheapplicationoftheequivalencecriteriatotheSwissregimeForexamplerecital10
statesthattheSwissfinancialmarketsupervisorhasthepowereffectivelytosupervise(re)insuranceactivities
andimposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessaryrecital11explainsthattheSwissSolvency
Testisbasedonsoundeconomicprinciplesandrecital12statesthattheSwissregimerequires(re)insurersto
haveaneffectivesystemofgovernanceinplace19 The equivalence criteria is set out at Annex 1 to this update
26TheDecisionisperhapsunsurprisinggiventhatSwitzerlandandtheEUhaveenteredintoanumberof
bilateraltreatiesandthattheEUhasldquoclosertieswithSwitzerlandthananyothernon-EEAcountryrdquo20 The
DecisionputsparticularweightonMemorandaofUnderstanding(ldquoMoUsrdquo) signed between Switzerland and
theMemberStatesoftheEUtofacilitateinternationalco-operation21
27 Practicallythisfullequivalencedecisionmeansthat
(a) ASwissreinsurerdoingbusinessintheEEAcannotbesubjectedtocollateralrequirementsorany
otheradditionalrequirementsontopofthosetowhichEEAreinsurersaresubjectunderSolvency
II Reinsurance with a Swiss reinsurer is to be treated in the same way as reinsurance with EEA
counterparties
(b) AEEA(re)insurercancompletealloftherequiredprudentialreportingforitsSwisssubsidiaryin
Switzerland under Swiss capital requirement rules and still comply with Solvency II
(c) ASwiss(re)insurancegroupwithEEAsubsidiariesisexemptfromtheotherwiseextraterritorialaspects
ofSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionTheEEAsupervisormustrelyonthegroupsupervisionoftheSwiss
regulator(FINMA)ratherthanconductgroupsupervisionitselfunderSolvencyII
AUSTRALIA BERMUDA BRAZIL CANADA MEXICO AND THE US
28 IntheExplanatoryMemorandumtotheCommissionrsquosdraftDecisiononAustraliaBermudaBrazilCanada
MexicoandtheUSitismadeclearthatArticle227equivalenceistheonlytypeofequivalencewhichis
thesubjectoftheDecisionAsmentionedabovetheDecisionisalsoonlyofprovisionalequivalencewhich
meansitlastsfortenyears22asopposedtoafullequivalencedecisionwhichisunlimitedindurationThe
provisionalnatureoftheequivalencedecisionhoweverisnotcommerciallyaslimitingasthelackofan
equivalencedecisionunderArticles172and260
18 Seerecital6CommissionDelegatedDecision(EU)C(2015)3754(final)19 ThefinalreportonthisadvicecanbefoundathttpseiopaeuropaeuPagesConsultationsCP-14041aspx20 European Union External Action Service webpage EU relations with Switzerland http eeas europa euswitzerland index _ enhtm21 Seerecital16CommissionDelegatedDecision(EU)C(2015)3754(final)22 See Article 227(6) Solvency II
mayer brown 7
29EIOPAassessedandanalysedtheregimesofallsixofthesejurisdictionsbuthasnotmadeallofitsfindings
publicly available23TheCommissiondecidedthatallofthejurisdictionsmetthecriteriaunderArticle
227(5)forprovisionalequivalenceinrespectofsolvencyassessmentbutitdidnotconsiderthatanyof
thejurisdictionsmetthefullequivalencecriteriaunderArticle379ofRegulation201535Furtherthe
CommissiondidnotconsiderwhetheranyofthejurisdictionsmetthecriteriaforequivalenceunderArticles
172(4)and260(5)inrespectofreinsuranceandgroupsupervision24
30Itisnotablethattheonlyareainwhichthesesixjurisdictionshavebeenfoundequivalentistheareainwhich
equivalenceismostbeneficialtoEEA(re)insurersEquivalenceinrespectofsolvencyassessment(under
Article 227) means that EEA (re)insurers can allow their subsidiaries in Australia Bermuda25 Brazil Canada
Mexico and the US to continue to calculate their standalone solvency based on locally accepted methods
ratherthanhavingtoconverttothemethodsprescribedbySolvencyII(foratleastthenexttenyears)
provided that they use the deduction and aggregation method26(seeparagraphs6to8and17formoredetail)
31 Lackofequivalenceinrespectofreinsurance(underArticle172)adverselyaffectsmainlynon-EEAreinsurers
makingtheEEAmarketlessaccessibleforthem(seeparagraphs5and16 above) although it may also have
consequencesforEEAinsurerswhowanttohavetheoptionofreinsuringriskwithinsurersoutsidetheEEA
Lackofequivalenceinrespectofgroupsupervision(underArticle260)predominantlyimpactsnon-EEA
groupsof(re)insurerswithEEA-basedactivity(seeparagraphs9to12and16formoredetail)
32 TheeffectoftheDecisionifadoptedissignificantfornon-EEA(re)insurersAnEEAregulatorcan
(continueto)imposeadditionalrequirementssuchastheimpositionofcollateralrequirementsoncontracts
ofreinsurancewhichoriginateinanycountryoutsidetheEEAsaveforSwitzerlandFurtherallnon-EEA
(re)insurancegroupsapartfromSwiss(re)insurancegroupswhichhaveEEAsubsidiariesbutnotEEA
sub-groupscouldbesubjecttoSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionrequirementsaswellasthegroupsupervision
exercisedbyitshomejurisdictionThefactthatanequivalencedecisionhasnotbeenmadeinrespectof
group supervision however enables national supervisors to carry out an equivalence assessment In the
absenceofbothanequivalencedecisionandanequivalenceassessmentEEAsupervisorsmayapplyldquoother
methodsrdquotogroupsupervisioninsteadofsupervisingthenon-EEAgroupunderSolvencyII27 As explained
atparagraph12abovethePRAwilltakeacase-by-caseapproachandrequiresanon-EEA(re)insurance
grouptosubmitawaiverapplicationrequestingtheuseofldquoothermethodsrdquoTherearenosuchoptionsin
relation to reinsurance supervision
33 SomemayconsideritsurprisingthattheCommissionfoundtheUSinsuranceregime(thelargestinsurance
marketintheworld)wantingintheareasofreinsuranceandgroupsupervisionbutthisresultwascertainly
foreseeablewhenconsiderationisgiventothefactthattheEUndashUSinsurancedialogueprojectwhich
aimstoachieveimprovedmutualunderstandingoftherespectiveinsuranceregulatoryandsupervisory
regimesstartedin2012buthasstilltoreachanagreedconclusionaboutmutualrecognitionForexample
negotiationsoverreductionofcollateralrequirementsintheUSforEEAreinsurershavebeenongoing
foryearsbutprogresshasbeenslowinsteadSolvencyIIdoesnotpreventtheEEAimposingcollateral
requirements on US reinsurers
23 The full text of the report on Bermuda is available online here ht tps eiopa europa eu Pages News EIOPA- publishes-the- Final- Reports-on-full- equivalence -assessments-of- Bermuda -Japan -and-Switzerland a spx Thefulltextreportsontheotherfivejurisdictionswhicharethesubject of this decision are not publicly available
24 See Annexes 1 and 225 Captive insurers regulated in Bermuda are excluded from the equivalency decision26 See Article 233 Solvency II27 See paragraphs 9 to 12 above
8 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
34TheUSinsuranceindustrythroughtheACLI28 RAA29 and other trade associations has been pushing the
federalgovernmenttonegotiateacoveredagreementwiththeEUtopreventtheabovereferencedpotentially
adversecompetitivelydisadvantageousoutcomesfromalackofequivalencedecisionsbytheEUThose
negotiationscontinuetobemiredinpoliticalpositioningwithinthefederalgovernment(atTreasuryandthe
US Trade Representative) with the US state regulators and with the EU regulators and time is running short
SolvencyIIisscheduledtotakeeffecton1January2016andatpresentitappearsunlikelythattheUSwillbe
grantedequivalencebytheCommissioninrespectofreinsuranceandgroupsupervisionInrespectofgroup
supervisionmuchisthereforeinthehandsoftheEEAsupervisors
The equivalence assessment process
35 AsSolvencyIIhasnotcomeintoforceitisnotyetpossibleforanequivalenceassessmenttobecarried
outItwillasdescribedabovebepossibleforEEAsupervisorstomakeanequivalenceassessmentofthe
groupsupervisoryregimeofAustraliaBermudaBrazilCanadaMexicoandtheUSafter1January2016
but EIOPA guidelines30makeclearthatalaterequivalencedecisionbytheCommissionwouldsupersedeany
equivalenceassessmentTheEEAsupervisorscanalsomakeequivalenceassessments(inrespectofboth
solvencyassessmentandgroupsupervision)ofthemanynon-EEAcountrieswhichareunlikelytoeverbethe
subjectofaCommissionequivalencedecision
36TheEIOPAguidelinessetoutthemethodologyforequivalenceassessmentsbynationalsupervisorsThey
stresstheimportanceoftheactivecooperationofthethirdcountryintheequivalenceassessmentprocess
itisdeterminativeinthecaseofgroupsupervisionandlackofcooperationwouldleadtoanon-equivalent
outcome An equivalence assessment is based on the same criteria as an equivalence decision which are set
out in Annex 1 to this update National supervisors can conduct the assessment themselves with assistance
fromEIOPAandinconsultationwithotherEEAsupervisorsorrequestEIOPAtocarryouttheassessment
Unlikeanequivalencedecisionthereisnopossibilityofatemporaryorprovisionalequivalenceassessment
37 Positive equivalence assessments require regular review they must be reviewed at least every three years or
followingsignificantdevelopmentsinthejurisdictionassessedNegativeequivalenceassessmentsmayberevisited
attherequestoftherelevant(re)insureroratthenationalsupervisorrsquosowninitiativewheretherehavebeen
significantchangestothesupervisoryregimelaiddownSolvencyIIortothesupervisoryregimeofthenon-
EEAcountryconcernedUnlesstherehavebeensuchchangesitisnotpossiblefornationalsupervisorstotake
divergentequivalencedecisionsregardingthesamenon-EEAcountryEquivalenceassessmentswillhaveeffect
morebroadlythanjustfortherequesting(re)insurerorgroupAccordinglywhencarryingoutanequivalence
assessmentnationalsupervisorsmustassesstheentirenon-EEAregimenotjusttheregimeasitappliestothe(re)
insurerorgroupconcernedForexampleevenifagroupconductsonlylifeinsurancebusinessitwouldstillbe
necessaryforthenationalsupervisortoassessthethirdcountryregimefornon-lifebusiness
EEA sub-groups
38 As noted at paragraph 9 abovewhereanon-EEAgroupdoesnothaveanEEAparentundertakingandis
notsubjecttoanequivalencedeterminationbyeithertheCommissionoranationalsupervisorEIOPAhas
suggestedthatnationalsupervisorsshouldconsiderrequiringsuchanon-EEAgrouptoestablishanEEAsub-
group Such a requirement will understandably be regarded as onerous but doing so would mean that only the
EEAsub-groupwouldbesubjectedtoSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionandthegroupsolvencycalculation
28 The American Council of Life Insurers29 The Reinsurance Association of America30 See Final Report on Public Consultation No14015 on Guidelines on the methodology for equivalence assessments by national supervisory
authorities under Solvency II EIOPA-BoS-14182 27 November 2014
mayer brown 9
39WhereanequivalencedeterminationhasbeenmadethereisnoneedtocreateanEEAsub-groupbutnon-
EEAgroupswithsuchastructurewillfindthemselvessubjecttodualregulationwhilsttheircompetitors
withoutanEEAparentundertakingwillbeabletorelysolelyonthegroupsupervisionexercisedbytheir
homesupervisorEIOPAifnotSolvencyIIhasconsideredthisdichotomy
40InitsguidanceEIOPAsuggeststhatwherethewidernon-EEAgroupissubjecttoequivalentthirdcountry
group supervision the acting EEA group supervisor should rely on the group supervision exercised by the
third-countrysupervisoryauthoritiesandexempttheEEAsub-groupfromSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionson
acase-by-casebasisbutonlywherethiswouldresultinamoreefficientsupervisionofthegroupandwould
not impair its supervision EIOPA sets out criteria that the acting group supervisor should consider when
deciding whether such an exemption should be granted They are
(a) theworldwidegroupsupervisionallowsforarobustassessmentoftheriskstowhichtheEEAsubgroup
anditsentitiesareexposedconsideringthestructureofthegroupthenaturescaleandcomplexityof
therisksandthecapitalallocationwithinthegroup
(b) thecooperationcurrentlyinplacebetweenthenon-EEAgroupsupervisorandtheEEAsupervisors
forthegroupconcernedisstructuredandwell-managedthroughregularmeetingsandappropriate
exchangeofinformationwithinacollegeofsupervisorstowhichtheEEAsupervisorsandEIOPAare
invitedand
(c) anannualworkplanincludingjointon-siteexaminationsisagreeduponintheseregularmeetingsby
thesupervisoryauthoritiesinvolvedinthesupervisionofthegroup31
41 EIOPAguidanceisnotbindingonthenationalsupervisorsbutthesupervisorshaveinformedEIOPAwhether
or not they intend to comply with it Only Germany has stated that it will not comply with the relevant
guidancebecauseitexplainsGermanlawdoesnotpermitacase-by-caseapproachItappearstherefore
thattheeffectofanequivalencedeterminationbyeithertheCommissionoranationalsupervisorcouldbe
toexemptanEEAsub-groupfromSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionandsolvencycalculationThispossibility
alreadyexistsforSwiss(re)insurancegroups
What happens next
42TheCommissionhasindicated32thatthereareassessmentsofotherthirdcountryjurisdictionscurrently
inprogressandthatsomejurisdictionsaremodifyingtheirinsuranceframeworksinordertofacilitate
equivalencedecisionsInthelightofthisasecondpackageofdecisionsisexpectedintheautumnof
2015ApositivedecisiononreinsuranceequivalenceforJapanalreadythesubjectofanEIOPAreport33 is
expectedtobeincludedinthenextpackageFurthergivenEIOPArsquosfindingsitwouldnotbesurprisingifthe
CommissionmakesapositivedecisionregardinggroupsupervisoryandreinsuranceequivalenceforBermuda
butthefutureislessclearfortheUSAustraliaBrazilCanadaandMexicoInthemeantimenon-EEA(re)
insurance groups will want to consider their group structure in order to ascertain how the extraterritorial
provisionsofSolvencyIImayaffectthem
31 Guideline 5 of Guidelines on group solvency EIOPA-BoS-1418132 Draft minutes of a meeting of the Commissionrsquos expert group on banking payments and insurance ( in its insurance formation) 5 March 201533 See fn 23
10 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Ifyouhaveanyquestionsaboutanyoftheissuesraisedinthisalertpleasecontactyourusualcontactoroneof
the lawyers listed below
LONDON
Alexandria Carr
OfCounsel(EmployedBarrister)
E acarrmayerbrowncom T+442031303398
Mark Compton Partner
E mcomptonmayerbrowncom T+442031303388
Colin Scagell Partner
E cscagellmayerbrowncom T+442031303315
US
David W Alberts
Partner(NewYork)
dalbertsmayerbrowncom T+12125062611
Lawrence R Hamilton
Partner (Chicago)
lhamiltonmayerbrowncom
T +1 312 701 7055
mayer brown 11
Annex 1
Potentially-equivalent element
(Directive 2009138EU)
Criteria to determine equivalence
(Commission Delegated Regulation 201535)
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusthavethepower(by
laworregulation)toeffectivelysupervisedomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ingsandtoimposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessary
(Article 378(a))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusthavethenecessary
meansandresourcesrelevantexpertiseandthemandatetoeffectively
protectpolicyholdersandbeneficiarieswhereverlocated (Article 378(b))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryshouldalwaysduly
considerthepotentialimpactoftheirdecisionsontheglobalstabilityof
financialsystemsparticularlyduringanemergency(Article 378(c))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepotentialpro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmove-
mentsinthefinancialmarketsoccur(Article 378(d))
bull Theremustbearequirementforreinsurerstobeauthorisedtoprovide
businessinthethirdcountryandtheremustbeaclearobjectiveand
publiclyavailablesetofwrittenauthorisationstandards(Article 378(e))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingstohaveaneffectivesystemofgovernancewhich
provides sound and prudent business management including
ndash an adequate transparent organisational structure with clear alloca-
tionandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementsforensuringthatpersonswhoeffectivelyrunthe
undertakingarelsquofitandproperrsquo
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothinternallyandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthoritiesand
ndash requirementsforensuringthatoutsourcedfunctionsactivitiesare
effectivelysupervised(Article 378(f))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticrein-
suranceundertakingstohaveaneffectiveriskmanagementsystem
comprising
ndash strategiesprocessesandinternalreportingprocedurestoidentify
measuremonitormanageandreportriskstowhichtheundertaking
iscould be exposed at an individual and an aggregated level and on a
continuousbasisand
ndash effectiveinternalcontrols(Article 378(g))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
ancetoestablishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcompliance
internalauditandactuarialfunctions(Article 378(h))
12 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingsto
ndash providethirdcountryauthoritieswithanyinformationnecessaryfor
supervisionand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on their solvency and
financialcondition(Article 378(i))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthatproposedchanges
tothebusinesspolicyormanagementofdomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ingsortoqualifyingholdingsinsuchundertakingsbeconsistentwith
maintaining sound and prudent management (Article 378(j))
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofdomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ings should rely on sound economic principles and solvency requirements
shouldbebasedonaneconomicvaluationofassetsorliabilities(Article
378(k))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingstoholdadequatefinancialresourcesincluding
requirements to
ndash establish technical provisions with respect to all reinsurance obliga-
tionstowardspolicyholdersandbeneficiariesofreinsurance
contracts
ndash investassetsheldtocovertechnicalprovisionsinthebestinterestsof
allpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccountanydisclosed
policyobjective)
ndash investonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoseriskstheundertakingcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash meet capital requirements set at a level equivalent to that under
SolvencyIIwhichensuresthatbeneficiariesandpolicyholdersare
adequatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsintheeventof
significantlosses
ndash maintainaminimumlevelofcapital(orsufferimmediatesupervisory
intervention)and
ndash meetcapitalrequirementsreferredtoabovewithownfundsof
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesbothinagoing
concernandinacaseofwindingup(Article 378(l))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsofthesolvencyregimeinthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiableriskandanysignificant
non-quantifiableriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanothersupervisory
mechanism (Article 378(m))
mayer brown 13
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustensuretimelyintervention
by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements are
not complied with (Article 378(n))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 378(o))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonswhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallother
personsandauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhich
doesnotallowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 378(p))
bull Whereareinsuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingsshouldbe
able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 378(q)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesmustonlyusethatinformationin
thecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 378(r))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustbepermittedto
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreaches
ofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersonswherethat
authoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofessional
secrecyinthethirdcountryandsuchinformationshouldonlybedis-
closedoncetheexpressagreementoftheoriginatorhasbeenobtained
andsolelyforthepurposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission
(Article 378(s))
14 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Solvency assessment
(Article 227)
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofdomestic(re)insuranceundertakings
should rely on sound economic principles and solvency requirements should
bebasedonaneconomicvaluationofassetsorliabilities(Article379(a))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomestic(re)insurance
undertakingstoholdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingrequirements
to
ndash establish technical provisions with respect to all (re)insurance obliga-
tionstowardspolicyholdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insurancecontracts
ndash investassetsheldtocovertechnicalprovisionsinthebestinterestsof
allpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccountanydisclosed
policyobjective)
ndash investonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoseriskstheundertakingcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash meet capital requirements set at a level equivalent to that under
SolvencyIIwhichensuresthatbeneficiariesandpolicyholdersare
adequatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsintheeventof
significantlosses
ndash maintainaminimumlevelofcapital(orsufferimmediatesupervisory
intervention)and
ndash meetcapitalrequirementsreferredtoabovewithownfundsof
sufficientqualitywhichareabletoabsorbsignificantlossesbothina
goingconcernandinacaseofwindingup(Article379(b))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsofthesolvencyregimeinthethirdcountrymust
berisk-basedtocapturequantifiableriskandanysignificantnon-quan-
tifiableriskmustbeaddressedthroughanothersupervisorymechanism
(Article 379(c))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tion by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements
are not complied with (Article 379(d))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 379(e))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article379(f))
mayer brown 15
bull Wherea(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptoris
beingcompulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnot
concernthirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakings
should be able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article
379(g))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesshouldonlyusethatinformation
inthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 379(h))
bull Arethesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrypermittedtoexchange
informationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthedischargeof
theirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreachesofcompanylaw
with other authorities bodies or persons where that authority body or
personissubjecttoanobligationofprofessionalsecrecyinthethirdcoun-
tryandissuchinformationonlydisclosedoncetheexpressagreementof
theoriginator(s)hasbeenobtainedandwhereappropriatesolelyforthe
purposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission(Article379(i))
Group supervision
(Article 260)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryhavethenecessarymeans
andresourcesrelevantexpertiseandthemandatetoeffectivelyprotect
policyholdersandbeneficiarieswhereverlocated(Article 380(a))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareempoweredbylawor
regulation to
ndash determinewhichundertakingsfallunderthescopeofsupervisionat
grouplevel
ndash supervise(re)insurerswhicharepartofagroup and
ndash imposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessary
(Article 380(b))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareabletoeffectively
assesstheriskprofileandsolvencyfinancialpositionof(re)insurers
whicharepartofagroupandthegrouprsquosbusinessstrategy(Article
380(c))
bull Supervisionatgrouplevelincludesallundertakingsoverwhichapartici-
patingundertakingexercisesdominantorsignificantinfluence(unless
notappropriateforgroupsupervisionobjectives)(Article 380(d))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustdulyconsiderthe
potentialimpactoftheirdecisionsonthestabilityoffinancialsystems
globally particularly during emergency situations (Article 380(e))
16 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmovementsin
financialmarketsoccur(Article 380(f))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectivesystemof
governanceatgrouplevelwhichprovidesforsoundandprudentbusiness
management and prescribes
ndash that there must be an adequate transparent organisational structure
withclearallocationandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementstoensurethatpersonswhoeffectivelyruntheundertak-
ingarefitandproper
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothwithinthegroupandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthorities and
ndash requirementsforensuringthattheoutsourcedfunctionsoractivities
areeffectivelysupervised(Article 380(g))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectiverisk
management system at group level comprising at least
ndash the strategies processes and internal reporting procedures necessary
toidentifymeasuremonitormanageandreportrisksonacontinu-
ousbasistowhichthegroupiscouldbeexposedand
ndash aneffectiveinternalcontrolsystem(Article 380(h))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
have sound reporting and accounting procedures to monitor and manage
intra-grouptransactionsandriskconcentrations(Article 380(i))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
establishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcomplianceinternal
auditandactuarialfunctions(Article 380(j))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthegroupto
ndash providethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswithanyinformation
thattheyneed
ndash reportsignificantriskconcentrationatthelevelofthegroupand
significantintra-grouptransactionsonatleastanannualbasisand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on the solvency and
financialconditionofthegroup(Article 380(k))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequirethatproposed
changestothebusinesspolicyormanagementofthegroup(orqualifying
holdings in the group) are consistent with the sound and prudent man-
agementofthegroup(Article 380(l))
mayer brown 17
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofthegroupshouldrelyonsound
economicprinciplesandassessmentofsolvencyshouldbebasedonan
economicvaluationofallassetsandliabilities(Article 380(m))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
holdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingarequirementfor
ndash technical provisions with respect to all obligations towards policy-
holdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insuranceundertakingsinthegroup
ndash assets held to cover technical provisions to be invested in the best
interestsofallpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccount
anydisclosedpolicyobjective)
ndash thegrouptoinvestonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoserisksitcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash the group to meet capital requirements at a level which ensures that in
theeventofsignificantlossespolicyholdersandbeneficiariesareade-
quatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsastheybecomedue
ndash (re)insuranceundertakingswhicharepartofthegrouptomaintaina
minimumlevelofcapitalnon-compliancewithwhichtriggers
immediatesupervisoryinterventionand
ndash groupcapitalrequirementstobemetwithownfundsthatareofa
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesinbothagoing
concernandacaseofwindingup(Article 380(n))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsoftheprudentialregimeofthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiablerisksandwhereasignificant
riskisnotquantifiablethatriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanother
supervisory mechanism (Article 380(o))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tionbythesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryintheeventthat
capital requirements are not complied with (Article 380(p))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryrestricttheuseofown-fund
itemsofarelated(re)insuranceundertakingwheretheitemscannoteffec-
tivelybemadeavailabletocoverthecapitalrequirementoftheparticipating
undertakingforwhichgroupsolvencyiscalculated(Article 380(q))
bull Thecalculationofgroupsolvencyinthethirdcountryrsquosprudentialregime
should produce a result that is at least equivalent to the result produced
byeitheroneoforacombinationofthecalculationmethodsinSolvency
II and the calculation method used should ensure that there is no double
useofownfundstomeetthegroupcapitalrequirementandthatthe
intra-groupcreationofcapitalthroughreciprocalfinancingiseliminated
(Article 380(r))
18 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatallpersons
whoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethird
countryaswellasauditorsandexpertsactingonbehalfoftheauthorities
areboundbyobligationsofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinforma-
tionreceivedfromallsupervisoryauthorities(Article 380(s))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 380(t))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatwhere
a(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingmaybe
divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 380(u))
bull Thethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswhichreceiveconfidential
informationfromothersupervisoryauthoritiesmustonlyusethat
informationinthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 380(v))
bull The third country supervisory authorities should be permitted to
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirsupervisoryfunctionsorthedetectionorinvestigation
ofbreachesofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersons
wherethatauthoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofes-
sionalsecrecyintherelevantthirdcountryprovidedthattheinformation
isonlydisclosedwiththeexpressagreementoftheoriginatorandonlyfor
thepurposesforwhichsuchauthoritywasgiven(Article 380(w))
19 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Annex 2
Potentially temporarily
provisionally equivalent area
Criteria to determine temporaryprovisional equivalence
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172(4))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities(particularly
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities)
Solvency assessment
(Article 227(5))
(a) The third country either already has an equivalent solvency regime in
place or one may be adopted or applied
(b)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(c)Thethirdcountryrsquoslawinprincipleallowscooperationandexchange
ofconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities
(d)Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(e)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider advising many of the worldrsquos largest companies including a significant portion of the Fortune 100 FTSE 100 DAX and Hang Seng Index companies and more than half of the worldrsquos largest banks Our legal services include banking and finance corporate and securities litigation and dispute resolution antitrust and competition US Supreme Court and appellate matters employment and benefits environmental financial services regulatory and enforcement government and global trade intellectual property real estate tax restructuring bankruptcy and insolvency and wealth management
Please visit wwwmayerbrowncom for comprehensive contact information for all Mayer Brown offices
This Mayer Brown publication provides information and comments on legal issues and developments of interest to our clients and friends The foregoing is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject matter covered and is not intended to provide legal advice Readers should seek legal advice before taking any action with respect to the matters discussed herein
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider comprising legal practices that are separate entities (the ldquoMayer Brown Practicesrdquo) The Mayer Brown Practices are Mayer Brown LLP and Mayer Brown Europe-Brussels LLP both limited liability partnerships established in Illinois USA Mayer Brown International LLP a limited liability partnership incorporated in England and Wales (authorized and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered in England and Wales number OC 303359) Mayer Brown a SELAS established in France Mayer Brown Mexico SC a sociedad civil formed under the laws of the State of Durango Mexico Mayer Brown JSM a Hong Kong partnership and its associated legal practices in Asia and Tauil amp Chequer Advogados a Brazilian law partnership with which Mayer Brown is associated Mayer Brown Consulting (Singapore) Pte Ltd and its subsidiary which are affiliated with Mayer Brown provide customs and trade advisory and consultancy services not legal services ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
copy 2015 The Mayer Brown Practices All rights reserved
0822fin
Group supervision
(Article 260(5))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasaprudentialregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting transparency and group
solvency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
other supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthoritiesinparticular
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandothersupervisory
authorities
![Page 3: Solvency II: Equivalence Decisions](https://reader030.vdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022012812/61c3bd04e721fa32777b3bfb/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
mayer brown 3
ofthenon-EEAgroupSolvencyIIandEIOPAenvisagesanldquoothermethodrdquoofsupervisiontobethe
requirement to establish an EEA holding company7 so that supervision can be exercised at that level This
isbecausethereisspecificprovisioninSolvencyIIfornon-EEAgroupsthathaveanEEAsub-groupwith
anEEAparentundertakingthatisitselfa(re)insurerorinsuranceholdingcompanyWhenthereissucha
groupstructureArticle215providesthatSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionshouldonlybeappliedatthelevelof
the ultimate EEA parent
10 Whereanon-EEAgroupdoesnothaveanEEAsub-groupthenitispossiblethatSolvencyIIgroup
supervisionwillbeappliedtotheworldwidegroupThisisnotthedefaultpositionastherearethreeother
options
(a) ACommissiondecisionthatthenon-EEAgroupissubjecttoequivalentgroupsupervisionenables
reliancetobeplacedonthatsupervisionasopposedtotheimpositionofSolvencyIIrequirements
(b) AswiththesolvencyassessmentifanequivalencedecisionhasnotbeentakenbytheCommissionthe
acting EEA group supervisor8incollaborationwithEIOPAandcollegemembersmayundertakean
equivalenceassessmentattherequestofthenon-EEAparentundertakingtheEEAsubsidiariesoronits
own initiative9AdeterminationbytheEEAsupervisorthatthenon-EEAgroupissubjecttoequivalent
group supervision enables reliance to be placed on that supervision in the same way as a Commission
equivalence decision
(c) Member States have a discretion to permit their national supervisors to apply other methods to ensure
appropriatesupervisionThosemethodsmustbeagreedbythegroupsupervisorafterconsultingthe
other relevant supervisors
Intheabsenceofbothanequivalencedeterminationandadecisiontoapplyldquoothermethodsrdquotothenon-EEA
groupthatgroupisrequiredtoapplytherelevantSolvencyIIrequirementstotheworldwidegroupasifit
were based in the EEA
11 Thegroupprovisionsreferredtoaboveincludethegroupsolvencyassessmentsummarisedatparagraphs
6ndash8ofthisupdatethepossibleimpositionofagroupcapitaladd-onsupervisionofriskconcentrationand
intra-grouptransactionssupervisionofthesystemofgovernancearequirementforagroupsolvencyand
financialconditionreportandarequirementthatthepersonsrunningtheinsuranceholdingcompanyare
fitandproperTheserequirementsifimposedcouldbeonerousAnEEAsubsidiaryofanon-EEA(re)
insurancegroupforexampleisrequiredtoreportonitsindividualfinancialconditionaspartofareport
onthefinancialconditionofitsgroup10ThiscouldrequirethirdcountrygroupsofinsurerswithanEEA
elementtoproducefullSolvencyIIfinancialconditionreportssimplybyvirtueofone(potentiallyquite
small)partofthegrouprsquosbusinessbeingcaughtbythegroupsupervisionregime
12 The UK regulator the Prudential Regulation Authority (ldquoPRArdquo) has explained that an application may be
madetothePRAforawaiverfromtherequirementtoapplytherelevantSolvencyIIrequirementstoanon-
EEAworldwidegroupasifitwereagroupbasedintheEEATheapplicationshouldstateothermethodsof
supervisionforthePRAtoconsiderThePRAwillassesssuchapplicationsonacase-by-casebasistaking
intoaccounttheobjectivesofgroupsupervisionasspecifiedbySolvencyIIAnapplicationmaybesubmitted
beforearelevantequivalencedecisionismadebutthePRAmayrefrainfrommakingadecisionuntilan
equivalencedecisionhasbeenfinalised11
7 Article 262(2) Solvency II and Guideline 5 of Guidelines on group solvency EIOPA-BoS-141818 The EEA supervisor who would be the group supervisor if the Solvency II criteria (set out in Article 272(2)) were applied9 See Article 260(1) Solvency II10 It isagroupsupervisionrequirementunderArticle256thatthesolvencyof individualsubsidiariesis includedinagroupfinancialcondition report11 See Supervisory Statement | SS915 Solvency II group supervision March 2015 Section 9
4 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
What is equivalence
13 Totemperitsextraterritorialeffectandasindicatedabovecertainprovisions12ofSolvencyIIallow
thedeterminationofwhetherparticularelementsoftheprudentialregimesofnon-EEAcountriesare
equivalenttotheprudentialregimelaiddowninSolvencyIIWhereoneoftheseparticularelementsmeets
relevantcriteriatheCommissionwilladoptanequivalencedecisioninrespectofthatelementWherethe
Commissiondoesnotadoptanequivalencedecisionanationalsupervisormayinrespectofcertainelements
onlyundertakeanequivalenceassessmentbaseduponthesamecriteria
14 Therearethreeelementsofanon-EEAprudentialregimewhichmaybedeemedequivalentbythe
Commission They are
(a) reinsurancesupervisionunderArticle172(seeparagraph5above)
(b) solvencyassessmentunderArticle227(seeparagraphs6to8above)and
(c) groupsupervisionunderArticle260(seeparagraphs9to12above)
Nationalsupervisorsmayundertakeanequivalenceassessmentinrespectofsolvencyassessmentandgroup
supervision only
15 Afullequivalencedecisioninrespectofoneoftheseelementslastsforanunlimitedperiodsubjecttoregular
reviewTheCommissionalsohasthepowertomakeadecisionofprovisionalequivalenceinrespectof
solvencyassessment(underArticle227(5))andtemporaryequivalenceinrespectofreinsuranceandgroup
supervision(underArticles172(4)and260(5))whereathirdcountryisworkingtowardsequivalenceand
it is an ongoing process A temporary equivalence decision lasts up until 31 December 2020 under Articles
172(5)and260(6)Decisionsofprovisionalequivalencelastforaten-yearperiodrenewableforfurtherten-
yearperiodsunderArticle227(6)Inadditionandasnotedaboveintheabsenceofanequivalencedecision
adoptedbytheCommissionandinrelationtocategories(b)and(c)ofparagraph14EEAgroupsupervisors
incollaborationwithEIOPAandcollegemembersmayundertakeanequivalenceassessment
16 Theeffectofanequivalencedecisionorapositiveequivalenceassessmentdiffersbetweenthethree
potentially equivalent elements
Potentially equivalent element Effect of equivalence decision
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172)
Reinsurancecontractsconcludedwiththeequivalentnon-EEAcountryrsquos
reinsurers shall be treated in the same manner as contracts concluded with
reinsurers governed by Solvency II (ie EEA reinsurers) (Article 172)(3))
Nopossibilityofequivalenceassessment
Solvency assessment
(Article 227)
MemberStatesmayprovidethatthecalculationofsolvencyforanon-EEA
subsidiaryofanEEAgroupcanbedoneusingthecalculationmethodslaid
downbytheequivalentthirdcountrywherethesubsidiaryisestablished(if
theEEAgroupusesthedeductionandaggregationmethodfromArticle233)
(Article 227)(1))
Equivalenceassessmenthassameeffect
Group supervision
(Article260)
(Re)insurancegroupsthataresubjecttosupervisionbyanon-EEAsupervisory
authoritywhichisequivalenttothesupervisionprovidedforbySolvencyII
areexemptfromcertainSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionrequirements(Articles
260(1)and261)
Equivalenceassessmenthassameeffect
12 See Articles 172(2) 227(4) and 260( 3) Solvency II
mayer brown 5
The equivalence decision process
17 ThereareseveralstepstomakinganequivalencedecisionFirstatechnicalassessmentofthethirdcountryrsquos
prudentialregimeisundertakenbyEIOPAThenEIOPAdeliversitsfindingstotheCommissionEIOPA
maypublishareportonitsfindingsandoccasionallyundertakespublicconsultation13 The Commission is
requiredtoconsultwithEIOPAaboutitstechnicalassessmentbutitistheCommissionrsquosdecisionwhetherto
adoptanequivalencedecisioninrelationtoanyofthethreeelementsofthethirdcountryregimewhichhave
been assessed by EIOPA The Commission decision can be vetoed by the European Parliament or Council
18 ThecriteriatobemetforafullequivalencedecisioncanbefoundinArticles378379and380respectively
ofCommissionDelegatedRegulation20153514TheyarealsolaidoutinAnnex1ofthisupdateSome
examplesofthecriteriawhichareappliedtonon-EEAregimesincludethatthesupervisoryauthoritiesin
thecountryaresufficientlyresourcedtoprotectpolicyholdersandbeneficiariesthatthenon-EEAcountry
imposesadequatecapitalrequirementson(re)insurersandthatthenon-EEAcountryrequires(re)insurers
tohaveeffectivesystemsofgovernanceinplace
19 ForatemporaryorprovisionaldecisionthecriteriaarelessonerousTheyaresummarisedinAnnex2andcan
befoundinfullatArticles172(4)227(5)and260(5)Theyincluderequirementsforthenon-EEAcountryto
haveagreedtosetuparegimewhichwilleventuallybefoundequivalentunderSolvencyIIandforittohaveset
asideresourcesforthispurposeThereisalsoarequirementfortheexistingregimetoberisk-basedandforthe
non-EEAcountrytohaveanindependentsupervisionsystemalreadyinplaceTheseconditionsensurethat
provisionalequivalenceisonlygiventocountrieswhicharealreadyontheirwaytobeingfullyequivalent
20AnequivalencedecisiontakestheformofaCommissionDelegatedDecisionADecisionismadethrough
the procedure laid down in Article 301(2) Solvency II This procedure allows the Commission to adopt the
DecisionunlesstheEuropeanParliamentorCouncilexpressanobjectionwithinthreemonthsorifthethree-
monthperiodisextendedsixmonthsThefinaltextoftheDecisionisthenpublishedintheOfficialJournal
oftheEUandcomesintoeffectwithin20daysofpublication
21 ThefirstsetofDecisions(alludedtoaboveanddetailedbelow)iscurrentlyunderscrutinyfromtheEuropean
Parliament and Council15havingbeenproposedbytheCommissionAccordinglytheseDecisionsarenotyetfinal
What has the Commission done thus far
22AsmentionedabovetheCommissionreleaseditsfirstsetofSolvencyIIequivalencedecisionson5June
2015 The two decisions relate to Switzerland16 and Australia Bermuda Brazil Canada Mexico and the US17
23 Switzerlandhasbeengrantedfullequivalenceinallthreeareasmeaningthatitslocalprudentialregime
canbesubstitutedforSolvencyIIinrespectofreinsurancesupervisionsolvencyassessmentandgroup
supervision Australia Bermuda Brazil Canada Mexico and the US however have only been granted
provisionalequivalenceintheareaofsolvencyassessmentForthesesixcountriesthismeansfirstthat
theirequivalenceisnotindefiniteitwillexpireaftertenyears(on1January2026)subjecttorenewalor
anyfurtherequivalencedecisionsbeingtakenSecondthatthereisnofindingofequivalenceintheareasof
reinsurancesupervisionandgroupsupervisiononlyequivalenceinrespectofreinsurancesupervisionisthe
objectofthepresentDecisiononthesixcountriesotherthanSwitzerlandFurtherdetailontheprocessand
resultsofthetwoDecisionscanbefoundbelow
13 As in the case of the 19 December 2014 consultation on the approach to Switzerland Bermuda and Japan14 This supplemented the original Solvency II Directive and is now par t of the Solvency II package15 On 14 July 2015 the Council indicated that it will not object to the adoption of the two equivalence decisions but the European Parliament has
extended the period for consideration of the second equivalence decision (on Australia Bermuda Brazil Canada Mexico and the US) to six months The period for objection to the second equivalence decision will thus expire on 7 December 2015
16 CommissionDelegatedDecisionC(2015)3754final17 CommissionDelegatedDecisionC(2015)3740final
6 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
SWITZERLAND
24 TheCommissiondraftDecisiononSwitzerlandisafullequivalencedecisionmeaningthatSwitzerlandhas
beendeemedequivalentforthethreepurposesofSolvencyIIdescribedaboveforanindefiniteperiodThis
meansthattheCommissionconsiderstheSwissregimetoprovidealevelofpolicyholderandbeneficiary
protection18 comparable to that provided by Solvency II The advice given by EIOPA to the Commission on
SwissequivalencecanbefoundonEIOPArsquoswebsiteandhelpsexplainthebasisoftheCommissionDecision
The legislation which EIOPA considered in Switzerland and which the Commission views as equivalent
includestheSwissFinancialMarketsSupervisoryAct2007(ldquoFINASMArdquo) the Insurance Supervision Act
(ldquoISArdquo) and the Insurance Supervision Ordinance (ldquoISOrdquo)whichenteredintoforceon1July2015
25 TheDecisionexplainstheapplicationoftheequivalencecriteriatotheSwissregimeForexamplerecital10
statesthattheSwissfinancialmarketsupervisorhasthepowereffectivelytosupervise(re)insuranceactivities
andimposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessaryrecital11explainsthattheSwissSolvency
Testisbasedonsoundeconomicprinciplesandrecital12statesthattheSwissregimerequires(re)insurersto
haveaneffectivesystemofgovernanceinplace19 The equivalence criteria is set out at Annex 1 to this update
26TheDecisionisperhapsunsurprisinggiventhatSwitzerlandandtheEUhaveenteredintoanumberof
bilateraltreatiesandthattheEUhasldquoclosertieswithSwitzerlandthananyothernon-EEAcountryrdquo20 The
DecisionputsparticularweightonMemorandaofUnderstanding(ldquoMoUsrdquo) signed between Switzerland and
theMemberStatesoftheEUtofacilitateinternationalco-operation21
27 Practicallythisfullequivalencedecisionmeansthat
(a) ASwissreinsurerdoingbusinessintheEEAcannotbesubjectedtocollateralrequirementsorany
otheradditionalrequirementsontopofthosetowhichEEAreinsurersaresubjectunderSolvency
II Reinsurance with a Swiss reinsurer is to be treated in the same way as reinsurance with EEA
counterparties
(b) AEEA(re)insurercancompletealloftherequiredprudentialreportingforitsSwisssubsidiaryin
Switzerland under Swiss capital requirement rules and still comply with Solvency II
(c) ASwiss(re)insurancegroupwithEEAsubsidiariesisexemptfromtheotherwiseextraterritorialaspects
ofSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionTheEEAsupervisormustrelyonthegroupsupervisionoftheSwiss
regulator(FINMA)ratherthanconductgroupsupervisionitselfunderSolvencyII
AUSTRALIA BERMUDA BRAZIL CANADA MEXICO AND THE US
28 IntheExplanatoryMemorandumtotheCommissionrsquosdraftDecisiononAustraliaBermudaBrazilCanada
MexicoandtheUSitismadeclearthatArticle227equivalenceistheonlytypeofequivalencewhichis
thesubjectoftheDecisionAsmentionedabovetheDecisionisalsoonlyofprovisionalequivalencewhich
meansitlastsfortenyears22asopposedtoafullequivalencedecisionwhichisunlimitedindurationThe
provisionalnatureoftheequivalencedecisionhoweverisnotcommerciallyaslimitingasthelackofan
equivalencedecisionunderArticles172and260
18 Seerecital6CommissionDelegatedDecision(EU)C(2015)3754(final)19 ThefinalreportonthisadvicecanbefoundathttpseiopaeuropaeuPagesConsultationsCP-14041aspx20 European Union External Action Service webpage EU relations with Switzerland http eeas europa euswitzerland index _ enhtm21 Seerecital16CommissionDelegatedDecision(EU)C(2015)3754(final)22 See Article 227(6) Solvency II
mayer brown 7
29EIOPAassessedandanalysedtheregimesofallsixofthesejurisdictionsbuthasnotmadeallofitsfindings
publicly available23TheCommissiondecidedthatallofthejurisdictionsmetthecriteriaunderArticle
227(5)forprovisionalequivalenceinrespectofsolvencyassessmentbutitdidnotconsiderthatanyof
thejurisdictionsmetthefullequivalencecriteriaunderArticle379ofRegulation201535Furtherthe
CommissiondidnotconsiderwhetheranyofthejurisdictionsmetthecriteriaforequivalenceunderArticles
172(4)and260(5)inrespectofreinsuranceandgroupsupervision24
30Itisnotablethattheonlyareainwhichthesesixjurisdictionshavebeenfoundequivalentistheareainwhich
equivalenceismostbeneficialtoEEA(re)insurersEquivalenceinrespectofsolvencyassessment(under
Article 227) means that EEA (re)insurers can allow their subsidiaries in Australia Bermuda25 Brazil Canada
Mexico and the US to continue to calculate their standalone solvency based on locally accepted methods
ratherthanhavingtoconverttothemethodsprescribedbySolvencyII(foratleastthenexttenyears)
provided that they use the deduction and aggregation method26(seeparagraphs6to8and17formoredetail)
31 Lackofequivalenceinrespectofreinsurance(underArticle172)adverselyaffectsmainlynon-EEAreinsurers
makingtheEEAmarketlessaccessibleforthem(seeparagraphs5and16 above) although it may also have
consequencesforEEAinsurerswhowanttohavetheoptionofreinsuringriskwithinsurersoutsidetheEEA
Lackofequivalenceinrespectofgroupsupervision(underArticle260)predominantlyimpactsnon-EEA
groupsof(re)insurerswithEEA-basedactivity(seeparagraphs9to12and16formoredetail)
32 TheeffectoftheDecisionifadoptedissignificantfornon-EEA(re)insurersAnEEAregulatorcan
(continueto)imposeadditionalrequirementssuchastheimpositionofcollateralrequirementsoncontracts
ofreinsurancewhichoriginateinanycountryoutsidetheEEAsaveforSwitzerlandFurtherallnon-EEA
(re)insurancegroupsapartfromSwiss(re)insurancegroupswhichhaveEEAsubsidiariesbutnotEEA
sub-groupscouldbesubjecttoSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionrequirementsaswellasthegroupsupervision
exercisedbyitshomejurisdictionThefactthatanequivalencedecisionhasnotbeenmadeinrespectof
group supervision however enables national supervisors to carry out an equivalence assessment In the
absenceofbothanequivalencedecisionandanequivalenceassessmentEEAsupervisorsmayapplyldquoother
methodsrdquotogroupsupervisioninsteadofsupervisingthenon-EEAgroupunderSolvencyII27 As explained
atparagraph12abovethePRAwilltakeacase-by-caseapproachandrequiresanon-EEA(re)insurance
grouptosubmitawaiverapplicationrequestingtheuseofldquoothermethodsrdquoTherearenosuchoptionsin
relation to reinsurance supervision
33 SomemayconsideritsurprisingthattheCommissionfoundtheUSinsuranceregime(thelargestinsurance
marketintheworld)wantingintheareasofreinsuranceandgroupsupervisionbutthisresultwascertainly
foreseeablewhenconsiderationisgiventothefactthattheEUndashUSinsurancedialogueprojectwhich
aimstoachieveimprovedmutualunderstandingoftherespectiveinsuranceregulatoryandsupervisory
regimesstartedin2012buthasstilltoreachanagreedconclusionaboutmutualrecognitionForexample
negotiationsoverreductionofcollateralrequirementsintheUSforEEAreinsurershavebeenongoing
foryearsbutprogresshasbeenslowinsteadSolvencyIIdoesnotpreventtheEEAimposingcollateral
requirements on US reinsurers
23 The full text of the report on Bermuda is available online here ht tps eiopa europa eu Pages News EIOPA- publishes-the- Final- Reports-on-full- equivalence -assessments-of- Bermuda -Japan -and-Switzerland a spx Thefulltextreportsontheotherfivejurisdictionswhicharethesubject of this decision are not publicly available
24 See Annexes 1 and 225 Captive insurers regulated in Bermuda are excluded from the equivalency decision26 See Article 233 Solvency II27 See paragraphs 9 to 12 above
8 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
34TheUSinsuranceindustrythroughtheACLI28 RAA29 and other trade associations has been pushing the
federalgovernmenttonegotiateacoveredagreementwiththeEUtopreventtheabovereferencedpotentially
adversecompetitivelydisadvantageousoutcomesfromalackofequivalencedecisionsbytheEUThose
negotiationscontinuetobemiredinpoliticalpositioningwithinthefederalgovernment(atTreasuryandthe
US Trade Representative) with the US state regulators and with the EU regulators and time is running short
SolvencyIIisscheduledtotakeeffecton1January2016andatpresentitappearsunlikelythattheUSwillbe
grantedequivalencebytheCommissioninrespectofreinsuranceandgroupsupervisionInrespectofgroup
supervisionmuchisthereforeinthehandsoftheEEAsupervisors
The equivalence assessment process
35 AsSolvencyIIhasnotcomeintoforceitisnotyetpossibleforanequivalenceassessmenttobecarried
outItwillasdescribedabovebepossibleforEEAsupervisorstomakeanequivalenceassessmentofthe
groupsupervisoryregimeofAustraliaBermudaBrazilCanadaMexicoandtheUSafter1January2016
but EIOPA guidelines30makeclearthatalaterequivalencedecisionbytheCommissionwouldsupersedeany
equivalenceassessmentTheEEAsupervisorscanalsomakeequivalenceassessments(inrespectofboth
solvencyassessmentandgroupsupervision)ofthemanynon-EEAcountrieswhichareunlikelytoeverbethe
subjectofaCommissionequivalencedecision
36TheEIOPAguidelinessetoutthemethodologyforequivalenceassessmentsbynationalsupervisorsThey
stresstheimportanceoftheactivecooperationofthethirdcountryintheequivalenceassessmentprocess
itisdeterminativeinthecaseofgroupsupervisionandlackofcooperationwouldleadtoanon-equivalent
outcome An equivalence assessment is based on the same criteria as an equivalence decision which are set
out in Annex 1 to this update National supervisors can conduct the assessment themselves with assistance
fromEIOPAandinconsultationwithotherEEAsupervisorsorrequestEIOPAtocarryouttheassessment
Unlikeanequivalencedecisionthereisnopossibilityofatemporaryorprovisionalequivalenceassessment
37 Positive equivalence assessments require regular review they must be reviewed at least every three years or
followingsignificantdevelopmentsinthejurisdictionassessedNegativeequivalenceassessmentsmayberevisited
attherequestoftherelevant(re)insureroratthenationalsupervisorrsquosowninitiativewheretherehavebeen
significantchangestothesupervisoryregimelaiddownSolvencyIIortothesupervisoryregimeofthenon-
EEAcountryconcernedUnlesstherehavebeensuchchangesitisnotpossiblefornationalsupervisorstotake
divergentequivalencedecisionsregardingthesamenon-EEAcountryEquivalenceassessmentswillhaveeffect
morebroadlythanjustfortherequesting(re)insurerorgroupAccordinglywhencarryingoutanequivalence
assessmentnationalsupervisorsmustassesstheentirenon-EEAregimenotjusttheregimeasitappliestothe(re)
insurerorgroupconcernedForexampleevenifagroupconductsonlylifeinsurancebusinessitwouldstillbe
necessaryforthenationalsupervisortoassessthethirdcountryregimefornon-lifebusiness
EEA sub-groups
38 As noted at paragraph 9 abovewhereanon-EEAgroupdoesnothaveanEEAparentundertakingandis
notsubjecttoanequivalencedeterminationbyeithertheCommissionoranationalsupervisorEIOPAhas
suggestedthatnationalsupervisorsshouldconsiderrequiringsuchanon-EEAgrouptoestablishanEEAsub-
group Such a requirement will understandably be regarded as onerous but doing so would mean that only the
EEAsub-groupwouldbesubjectedtoSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionandthegroupsolvencycalculation
28 The American Council of Life Insurers29 The Reinsurance Association of America30 See Final Report on Public Consultation No14015 on Guidelines on the methodology for equivalence assessments by national supervisory
authorities under Solvency II EIOPA-BoS-14182 27 November 2014
mayer brown 9
39WhereanequivalencedeterminationhasbeenmadethereisnoneedtocreateanEEAsub-groupbutnon-
EEAgroupswithsuchastructurewillfindthemselvessubjecttodualregulationwhilsttheircompetitors
withoutanEEAparentundertakingwillbeabletorelysolelyonthegroupsupervisionexercisedbytheir
homesupervisorEIOPAifnotSolvencyIIhasconsideredthisdichotomy
40InitsguidanceEIOPAsuggeststhatwherethewidernon-EEAgroupissubjecttoequivalentthirdcountry
group supervision the acting EEA group supervisor should rely on the group supervision exercised by the
third-countrysupervisoryauthoritiesandexempttheEEAsub-groupfromSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionson
acase-by-casebasisbutonlywherethiswouldresultinamoreefficientsupervisionofthegroupandwould
not impair its supervision EIOPA sets out criteria that the acting group supervisor should consider when
deciding whether such an exemption should be granted They are
(a) theworldwidegroupsupervisionallowsforarobustassessmentoftheriskstowhichtheEEAsubgroup
anditsentitiesareexposedconsideringthestructureofthegroupthenaturescaleandcomplexityof
therisksandthecapitalallocationwithinthegroup
(b) thecooperationcurrentlyinplacebetweenthenon-EEAgroupsupervisorandtheEEAsupervisors
forthegroupconcernedisstructuredandwell-managedthroughregularmeetingsandappropriate
exchangeofinformationwithinacollegeofsupervisorstowhichtheEEAsupervisorsandEIOPAare
invitedand
(c) anannualworkplanincludingjointon-siteexaminationsisagreeduponintheseregularmeetingsby
thesupervisoryauthoritiesinvolvedinthesupervisionofthegroup31
41 EIOPAguidanceisnotbindingonthenationalsupervisorsbutthesupervisorshaveinformedEIOPAwhether
or not they intend to comply with it Only Germany has stated that it will not comply with the relevant
guidancebecauseitexplainsGermanlawdoesnotpermitacase-by-caseapproachItappearstherefore
thattheeffectofanequivalencedeterminationbyeithertheCommissionoranationalsupervisorcouldbe
toexemptanEEAsub-groupfromSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionandsolvencycalculationThispossibility
alreadyexistsforSwiss(re)insurancegroups
What happens next
42TheCommissionhasindicated32thatthereareassessmentsofotherthirdcountryjurisdictionscurrently
inprogressandthatsomejurisdictionsaremodifyingtheirinsuranceframeworksinordertofacilitate
equivalencedecisionsInthelightofthisasecondpackageofdecisionsisexpectedintheautumnof
2015ApositivedecisiononreinsuranceequivalenceforJapanalreadythesubjectofanEIOPAreport33 is
expectedtobeincludedinthenextpackageFurthergivenEIOPArsquosfindingsitwouldnotbesurprisingifthe
CommissionmakesapositivedecisionregardinggroupsupervisoryandreinsuranceequivalenceforBermuda
butthefutureislessclearfortheUSAustraliaBrazilCanadaandMexicoInthemeantimenon-EEA(re)
insurance groups will want to consider their group structure in order to ascertain how the extraterritorial
provisionsofSolvencyIImayaffectthem
31 Guideline 5 of Guidelines on group solvency EIOPA-BoS-1418132 Draft minutes of a meeting of the Commissionrsquos expert group on banking payments and insurance ( in its insurance formation) 5 March 201533 See fn 23
10 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Ifyouhaveanyquestionsaboutanyoftheissuesraisedinthisalertpleasecontactyourusualcontactoroneof
the lawyers listed below
LONDON
Alexandria Carr
OfCounsel(EmployedBarrister)
E acarrmayerbrowncom T+442031303398
Mark Compton Partner
E mcomptonmayerbrowncom T+442031303388
Colin Scagell Partner
E cscagellmayerbrowncom T+442031303315
US
David W Alberts
Partner(NewYork)
dalbertsmayerbrowncom T+12125062611
Lawrence R Hamilton
Partner (Chicago)
lhamiltonmayerbrowncom
T +1 312 701 7055
mayer brown 11
Annex 1
Potentially-equivalent element
(Directive 2009138EU)
Criteria to determine equivalence
(Commission Delegated Regulation 201535)
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusthavethepower(by
laworregulation)toeffectivelysupervisedomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ingsandtoimposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessary
(Article 378(a))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusthavethenecessary
meansandresourcesrelevantexpertiseandthemandatetoeffectively
protectpolicyholdersandbeneficiarieswhereverlocated (Article 378(b))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryshouldalwaysduly
considerthepotentialimpactoftheirdecisionsontheglobalstabilityof
financialsystemsparticularlyduringanemergency(Article 378(c))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepotentialpro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmove-
mentsinthefinancialmarketsoccur(Article 378(d))
bull Theremustbearequirementforreinsurerstobeauthorisedtoprovide
businessinthethirdcountryandtheremustbeaclearobjectiveand
publiclyavailablesetofwrittenauthorisationstandards(Article 378(e))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingstohaveaneffectivesystemofgovernancewhich
provides sound and prudent business management including
ndash an adequate transparent organisational structure with clear alloca-
tionandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementsforensuringthatpersonswhoeffectivelyrunthe
undertakingarelsquofitandproperrsquo
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothinternallyandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthoritiesand
ndash requirementsforensuringthatoutsourcedfunctionsactivitiesare
effectivelysupervised(Article 378(f))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticrein-
suranceundertakingstohaveaneffectiveriskmanagementsystem
comprising
ndash strategiesprocessesandinternalreportingprocedurestoidentify
measuremonitormanageandreportriskstowhichtheundertaking
iscould be exposed at an individual and an aggregated level and on a
continuousbasisand
ndash effectiveinternalcontrols(Article 378(g))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
ancetoestablishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcompliance
internalauditandactuarialfunctions(Article 378(h))
12 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingsto
ndash providethirdcountryauthoritieswithanyinformationnecessaryfor
supervisionand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on their solvency and
financialcondition(Article 378(i))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthatproposedchanges
tothebusinesspolicyormanagementofdomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ingsortoqualifyingholdingsinsuchundertakingsbeconsistentwith
maintaining sound and prudent management (Article 378(j))
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofdomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ings should rely on sound economic principles and solvency requirements
shouldbebasedonaneconomicvaluationofassetsorliabilities(Article
378(k))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingstoholdadequatefinancialresourcesincluding
requirements to
ndash establish technical provisions with respect to all reinsurance obliga-
tionstowardspolicyholdersandbeneficiariesofreinsurance
contracts
ndash investassetsheldtocovertechnicalprovisionsinthebestinterestsof
allpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccountanydisclosed
policyobjective)
ndash investonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoseriskstheundertakingcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash meet capital requirements set at a level equivalent to that under
SolvencyIIwhichensuresthatbeneficiariesandpolicyholdersare
adequatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsintheeventof
significantlosses
ndash maintainaminimumlevelofcapital(orsufferimmediatesupervisory
intervention)and
ndash meetcapitalrequirementsreferredtoabovewithownfundsof
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesbothinagoing
concernandinacaseofwindingup(Article 378(l))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsofthesolvencyregimeinthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiableriskandanysignificant
non-quantifiableriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanothersupervisory
mechanism (Article 378(m))
mayer brown 13
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustensuretimelyintervention
by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements are
not complied with (Article 378(n))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 378(o))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonswhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallother
personsandauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhich
doesnotallowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 378(p))
bull Whereareinsuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingsshouldbe
able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 378(q)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesmustonlyusethatinformationin
thecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 378(r))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustbepermittedto
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreaches
ofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersonswherethat
authoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofessional
secrecyinthethirdcountryandsuchinformationshouldonlybedis-
closedoncetheexpressagreementoftheoriginatorhasbeenobtained
andsolelyforthepurposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission
(Article 378(s))
14 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Solvency assessment
(Article 227)
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofdomestic(re)insuranceundertakings
should rely on sound economic principles and solvency requirements should
bebasedonaneconomicvaluationofassetsorliabilities(Article379(a))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomestic(re)insurance
undertakingstoholdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingrequirements
to
ndash establish technical provisions with respect to all (re)insurance obliga-
tionstowardspolicyholdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insurancecontracts
ndash investassetsheldtocovertechnicalprovisionsinthebestinterestsof
allpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccountanydisclosed
policyobjective)
ndash investonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoseriskstheundertakingcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash meet capital requirements set at a level equivalent to that under
SolvencyIIwhichensuresthatbeneficiariesandpolicyholdersare
adequatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsintheeventof
significantlosses
ndash maintainaminimumlevelofcapital(orsufferimmediatesupervisory
intervention)and
ndash meetcapitalrequirementsreferredtoabovewithownfundsof
sufficientqualitywhichareabletoabsorbsignificantlossesbothina
goingconcernandinacaseofwindingup(Article379(b))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsofthesolvencyregimeinthethirdcountrymust
berisk-basedtocapturequantifiableriskandanysignificantnon-quan-
tifiableriskmustbeaddressedthroughanothersupervisorymechanism
(Article 379(c))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tion by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements
are not complied with (Article 379(d))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 379(e))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article379(f))
mayer brown 15
bull Wherea(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptoris
beingcompulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnot
concernthirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakings
should be able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article
379(g))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesshouldonlyusethatinformation
inthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 379(h))
bull Arethesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrypermittedtoexchange
informationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthedischargeof
theirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreachesofcompanylaw
with other authorities bodies or persons where that authority body or
personissubjecttoanobligationofprofessionalsecrecyinthethirdcoun-
tryandissuchinformationonlydisclosedoncetheexpressagreementof
theoriginator(s)hasbeenobtainedandwhereappropriatesolelyforthe
purposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission(Article379(i))
Group supervision
(Article 260)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryhavethenecessarymeans
andresourcesrelevantexpertiseandthemandatetoeffectivelyprotect
policyholdersandbeneficiarieswhereverlocated(Article 380(a))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareempoweredbylawor
regulation to
ndash determinewhichundertakingsfallunderthescopeofsupervisionat
grouplevel
ndash supervise(re)insurerswhicharepartofagroup and
ndash imposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessary
(Article 380(b))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareabletoeffectively
assesstheriskprofileandsolvencyfinancialpositionof(re)insurers
whicharepartofagroupandthegrouprsquosbusinessstrategy(Article
380(c))
bull Supervisionatgrouplevelincludesallundertakingsoverwhichapartici-
patingundertakingexercisesdominantorsignificantinfluence(unless
notappropriateforgroupsupervisionobjectives)(Article 380(d))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustdulyconsiderthe
potentialimpactoftheirdecisionsonthestabilityoffinancialsystems
globally particularly during emergency situations (Article 380(e))
16 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmovementsin
financialmarketsoccur(Article 380(f))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectivesystemof
governanceatgrouplevelwhichprovidesforsoundandprudentbusiness
management and prescribes
ndash that there must be an adequate transparent organisational structure
withclearallocationandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementstoensurethatpersonswhoeffectivelyruntheundertak-
ingarefitandproper
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothwithinthegroupandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthorities and
ndash requirementsforensuringthattheoutsourcedfunctionsoractivities
areeffectivelysupervised(Article 380(g))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectiverisk
management system at group level comprising at least
ndash the strategies processes and internal reporting procedures necessary
toidentifymeasuremonitormanageandreportrisksonacontinu-
ousbasistowhichthegroupiscouldbeexposedand
ndash aneffectiveinternalcontrolsystem(Article 380(h))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
have sound reporting and accounting procedures to monitor and manage
intra-grouptransactionsandriskconcentrations(Article 380(i))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
establishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcomplianceinternal
auditandactuarialfunctions(Article 380(j))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthegroupto
ndash providethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswithanyinformation
thattheyneed
ndash reportsignificantriskconcentrationatthelevelofthegroupand
significantintra-grouptransactionsonatleastanannualbasisand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on the solvency and
financialconditionofthegroup(Article 380(k))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequirethatproposed
changestothebusinesspolicyormanagementofthegroup(orqualifying
holdings in the group) are consistent with the sound and prudent man-
agementofthegroup(Article 380(l))
mayer brown 17
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofthegroupshouldrelyonsound
economicprinciplesandassessmentofsolvencyshouldbebasedonan
economicvaluationofallassetsandliabilities(Article 380(m))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
holdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingarequirementfor
ndash technical provisions with respect to all obligations towards policy-
holdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insuranceundertakingsinthegroup
ndash assets held to cover technical provisions to be invested in the best
interestsofallpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccount
anydisclosedpolicyobjective)
ndash thegrouptoinvestonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoserisksitcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash the group to meet capital requirements at a level which ensures that in
theeventofsignificantlossespolicyholdersandbeneficiariesareade-
quatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsastheybecomedue
ndash (re)insuranceundertakingswhicharepartofthegrouptomaintaina
minimumlevelofcapitalnon-compliancewithwhichtriggers
immediatesupervisoryinterventionand
ndash groupcapitalrequirementstobemetwithownfundsthatareofa
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesinbothagoing
concernandacaseofwindingup(Article 380(n))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsoftheprudentialregimeofthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiablerisksandwhereasignificant
riskisnotquantifiablethatriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanother
supervisory mechanism (Article 380(o))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tionbythesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryintheeventthat
capital requirements are not complied with (Article 380(p))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryrestricttheuseofown-fund
itemsofarelated(re)insuranceundertakingwheretheitemscannoteffec-
tivelybemadeavailabletocoverthecapitalrequirementoftheparticipating
undertakingforwhichgroupsolvencyiscalculated(Article 380(q))
bull Thecalculationofgroupsolvencyinthethirdcountryrsquosprudentialregime
should produce a result that is at least equivalent to the result produced
byeitheroneoforacombinationofthecalculationmethodsinSolvency
II and the calculation method used should ensure that there is no double
useofownfundstomeetthegroupcapitalrequirementandthatthe
intra-groupcreationofcapitalthroughreciprocalfinancingiseliminated
(Article 380(r))
18 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatallpersons
whoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethird
countryaswellasauditorsandexpertsactingonbehalfoftheauthorities
areboundbyobligationsofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinforma-
tionreceivedfromallsupervisoryauthorities(Article 380(s))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 380(t))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatwhere
a(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingmaybe
divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 380(u))
bull Thethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswhichreceiveconfidential
informationfromothersupervisoryauthoritiesmustonlyusethat
informationinthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 380(v))
bull The third country supervisory authorities should be permitted to
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirsupervisoryfunctionsorthedetectionorinvestigation
ofbreachesofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersons
wherethatauthoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofes-
sionalsecrecyintherelevantthirdcountryprovidedthattheinformation
isonlydisclosedwiththeexpressagreementoftheoriginatorandonlyfor
thepurposesforwhichsuchauthoritywasgiven(Article 380(w))
19 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Annex 2
Potentially temporarily
provisionally equivalent area
Criteria to determine temporaryprovisional equivalence
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172(4))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities(particularly
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities)
Solvency assessment
(Article 227(5))
(a) The third country either already has an equivalent solvency regime in
place or one may be adopted or applied
(b)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(c)Thethirdcountryrsquoslawinprincipleallowscooperationandexchange
ofconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities
(d)Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(e)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider advising many of the worldrsquos largest companies including a significant portion of the Fortune 100 FTSE 100 DAX and Hang Seng Index companies and more than half of the worldrsquos largest banks Our legal services include banking and finance corporate and securities litigation and dispute resolution antitrust and competition US Supreme Court and appellate matters employment and benefits environmental financial services regulatory and enforcement government and global trade intellectual property real estate tax restructuring bankruptcy and insolvency and wealth management
Please visit wwwmayerbrowncom for comprehensive contact information for all Mayer Brown offices
This Mayer Brown publication provides information and comments on legal issues and developments of interest to our clients and friends The foregoing is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject matter covered and is not intended to provide legal advice Readers should seek legal advice before taking any action with respect to the matters discussed herein
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider comprising legal practices that are separate entities (the ldquoMayer Brown Practicesrdquo) The Mayer Brown Practices are Mayer Brown LLP and Mayer Brown Europe-Brussels LLP both limited liability partnerships established in Illinois USA Mayer Brown International LLP a limited liability partnership incorporated in England and Wales (authorized and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered in England and Wales number OC 303359) Mayer Brown a SELAS established in France Mayer Brown Mexico SC a sociedad civil formed under the laws of the State of Durango Mexico Mayer Brown JSM a Hong Kong partnership and its associated legal practices in Asia and Tauil amp Chequer Advogados a Brazilian law partnership with which Mayer Brown is associated Mayer Brown Consulting (Singapore) Pte Ltd and its subsidiary which are affiliated with Mayer Brown provide customs and trade advisory and consultancy services not legal services ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
copy 2015 The Mayer Brown Practices All rights reserved
0822fin
Group supervision
(Article 260(5))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasaprudentialregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting transparency and group
solvency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
other supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthoritiesinparticular
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandothersupervisory
authorities
![Page 4: Solvency II: Equivalence Decisions](https://reader030.vdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022012812/61c3bd04e721fa32777b3bfb/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
4 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
What is equivalence
13 Totemperitsextraterritorialeffectandasindicatedabovecertainprovisions12ofSolvencyIIallow
thedeterminationofwhetherparticularelementsoftheprudentialregimesofnon-EEAcountriesare
equivalenttotheprudentialregimelaiddowninSolvencyIIWhereoneoftheseparticularelementsmeets
relevantcriteriatheCommissionwilladoptanequivalencedecisioninrespectofthatelementWherethe
Commissiondoesnotadoptanequivalencedecisionanationalsupervisormayinrespectofcertainelements
onlyundertakeanequivalenceassessmentbaseduponthesamecriteria
14 Therearethreeelementsofanon-EEAprudentialregimewhichmaybedeemedequivalentbythe
Commission They are
(a) reinsurancesupervisionunderArticle172(seeparagraph5above)
(b) solvencyassessmentunderArticle227(seeparagraphs6to8above)and
(c) groupsupervisionunderArticle260(seeparagraphs9to12above)
Nationalsupervisorsmayundertakeanequivalenceassessmentinrespectofsolvencyassessmentandgroup
supervision only
15 Afullequivalencedecisioninrespectofoneoftheseelementslastsforanunlimitedperiodsubjecttoregular
reviewTheCommissionalsohasthepowertomakeadecisionofprovisionalequivalenceinrespectof
solvencyassessment(underArticle227(5))andtemporaryequivalenceinrespectofreinsuranceandgroup
supervision(underArticles172(4)and260(5))whereathirdcountryisworkingtowardsequivalenceand
it is an ongoing process A temporary equivalence decision lasts up until 31 December 2020 under Articles
172(5)and260(6)Decisionsofprovisionalequivalencelastforaten-yearperiodrenewableforfurtherten-
yearperiodsunderArticle227(6)Inadditionandasnotedaboveintheabsenceofanequivalencedecision
adoptedbytheCommissionandinrelationtocategories(b)and(c)ofparagraph14EEAgroupsupervisors
incollaborationwithEIOPAandcollegemembersmayundertakeanequivalenceassessment
16 Theeffectofanequivalencedecisionorapositiveequivalenceassessmentdiffersbetweenthethree
potentially equivalent elements
Potentially equivalent element Effect of equivalence decision
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172)
Reinsurancecontractsconcludedwiththeequivalentnon-EEAcountryrsquos
reinsurers shall be treated in the same manner as contracts concluded with
reinsurers governed by Solvency II (ie EEA reinsurers) (Article 172)(3))
Nopossibilityofequivalenceassessment
Solvency assessment
(Article 227)
MemberStatesmayprovidethatthecalculationofsolvencyforanon-EEA
subsidiaryofanEEAgroupcanbedoneusingthecalculationmethodslaid
downbytheequivalentthirdcountrywherethesubsidiaryisestablished(if
theEEAgroupusesthedeductionandaggregationmethodfromArticle233)
(Article 227)(1))
Equivalenceassessmenthassameeffect
Group supervision
(Article260)
(Re)insurancegroupsthataresubjecttosupervisionbyanon-EEAsupervisory
authoritywhichisequivalenttothesupervisionprovidedforbySolvencyII
areexemptfromcertainSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionrequirements(Articles
260(1)and261)
Equivalenceassessmenthassameeffect
12 See Articles 172(2) 227(4) and 260( 3) Solvency II
mayer brown 5
The equivalence decision process
17 ThereareseveralstepstomakinganequivalencedecisionFirstatechnicalassessmentofthethirdcountryrsquos
prudentialregimeisundertakenbyEIOPAThenEIOPAdeliversitsfindingstotheCommissionEIOPA
maypublishareportonitsfindingsandoccasionallyundertakespublicconsultation13 The Commission is
requiredtoconsultwithEIOPAaboutitstechnicalassessmentbutitistheCommissionrsquosdecisionwhetherto
adoptanequivalencedecisioninrelationtoanyofthethreeelementsofthethirdcountryregimewhichhave
been assessed by EIOPA The Commission decision can be vetoed by the European Parliament or Council
18 ThecriteriatobemetforafullequivalencedecisioncanbefoundinArticles378379and380respectively
ofCommissionDelegatedRegulation20153514TheyarealsolaidoutinAnnex1ofthisupdateSome
examplesofthecriteriawhichareappliedtonon-EEAregimesincludethatthesupervisoryauthoritiesin
thecountryaresufficientlyresourcedtoprotectpolicyholdersandbeneficiariesthatthenon-EEAcountry
imposesadequatecapitalrequirementson(re)insurersandthatthenon-EEAcountryrequires(re)insurers
tohaveeffectivesystemsofgovernanceinplace
19 ForatemporaryorprovisionaldecisionthecriteriaarelessonerousTheyaresummarisedinAnnex2andcan
befoundinfullatArticles172(4)227(5)and260(5)Theyincluderequirementsforthenon-EEAcountryto
haveagreedtosetuparegimewhichwilleventuallybefoundequivalentunderSolvencyIIandforittohaveset
asideresourcesforthispurposeThereisalsoarequirementfortheexistingregimetoberisk-basedandforthe
non-EEAcountrytohaveanindependentsupervisionsystemalreadyinplaceTheseconditionsensurethat
provisionalequivalenceisonlygiventocountrieswhicharealreadyontheirwaytobeingfullyequivalent
20AnequivalencedecisiontakestheformofaCommissionDelegatedDecisionADecisionismadethrough
the procedure laid down in Article 301(2) Solvency II This procedure allows the Commission to adopt the
DecisionunlesstheEuropeanParliamentorCouncilexpressanobjectionwithinthreemonthsorifthethree-
monthperiodisextendedsixmonthsThefinaltextoftheDecisionisthenpublishedintheOfficialJournal
oftheEUandcomesintoeffectwithin20daysofpublication
21 ThefirstsetofDecisions(alludedtoaboveanddetailedbelow)iscurrentlyunderscrutinyfromtheEuropean
Parliament and Council15havingbeenproposedbytheCommissionAccordinglytheseDecisionsarenotyetfinal
What has the Commission done thus far
22AsmentionedabovetheCommissionreleaseditsfirstsetofSolvencyIIequivalencedecisionson5June
2015 The two decisions relate to Switzerland16 and Australia Bermuda Brazil Canada Mexico and the US17
23 Switzerlandhasbeengrantedfullequivalenceinallthreeareasmeaningthatitslocalprudentialregime
canbesubstitutedforSolvencyIIinrespectofreinsurancesupervisionsolvencyassessmentandgroup
supervision Australia Bermuda Brazil Canada Mexico and the US however have only been granted
provisionalequivalenceintheareaofsolvencyassessmentForthesesixcountriesthismeansfirstthat
theirequivalenceisnotindefiniteitwillexpireaftertenyears(on1January2026)subjecttorenewalor
anyfurtherequivalencedecisionsbeingtakenSecondthatthereisnofindingofequivalenceintheareasof
reinsurancesupervisionandgroupsupervisiononlyequivalenceinrespectofreinsurancesupervisionisthe
objectofthepresentDecisiononthesixcountriesotherthanSwitzerlandFurtherdetailontheprocessand
resultsofthetwoDecisionscanbefoundbelow
13 As in the case of the 19 December 2014 consultation on the approach to Switzerland Bermuda and Japan14 This supplemented the original Solvency II Directive and is now par t of the Solvency II package15 On 14 July 2015 the Council indicated that it will not object to the adoption of the two equivalence decisions but the European Parliament has
extended the period for consideration of the second equivalence decision (on Australia Bermuda Brazil Canada Mexico and the US) to six months The period for objection to the second equivalence decision will thus expire on 7 December 2015
16 CommissionDelegatedDecisionC(2015)3754final17 CommissionDelegatedDecisionC(2015)3740final
6 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
SWITZERLAND
24 TheCommissiondraftDecisiononSwitzerlandisafullequivalencedecisionmeaningthatSwitzerlandhas
beendeemedequivalentforthethreepurposesofSolvencyIIdescribedaboveforanindefiniteperiodThis
meansthattheCommissionconsiderstheSwissregimetoprovidealevelofpolicyholderandbeneficiary
protection18 comparable to that provided by Solvency II The advice given by EIOPA to the Commission on
SwissequivalencecanbefoundonEIOPArsquoswebsiteandhelpsexplainthebasisoftheCommissionDecision
The legislation which EIOPA considered in Switzerland and which the Commission views as equivalent
includestheSwissFinancialMarketsSupervisoryAct2007(ldquoFINASMArdquo) the Insurance Supervision Act
(ldquoISArdquo) and the Insurance Supervision Ordinance (ldquoISOrdquo)whichenteredintoforceon1July2015
25 TheDecisionexplainstheapplicationoftheequivalencecriteriatotheSwissregimeForexamplerecital10
statesthattheSwissfinancialmarketsupervisorhasthepowereffectivelytosupervise(re)insuranceactivities
andimposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessaryrecital11explainsthattheSwissSolvency
Testisbasedonsoundeconomicprinciplesandrecital12statesthattheSwissregimerequires(re)insurersto
haveaneffectivesystemofgovernanceinplace19 The equivalence criteria is set out at Annex 1 to this update
26TheDecisionisperhapsunsurprisinggiventhatSwitzerlandandtheEUhaveenteredintoanumberof
bilateraltreatiesandthattheEUhasldquoclosertieswithSwitzerlandthananyothernon-EEAcountryrdquo20 The
DecisionputsparticularweightonMemorandaofUnderstanding(ldquoMoUsrdquo) signed between Switzerland and
theMemberStatesoftheEUtofacilitateinternationalco-operation21
27 Practicallythisfullequivalencedecisionmeansthat
(a) ASwissreinsurerdoingbusinessintheEEAcannotbesubjectedtocollateralrequirementsorany
otheradditionalrequirementsontopofthosetowhichEEAreinsurersaresubjectunderSolvency
II Reinsurance with a Swiss reinsurer is to be treated in the same way as reinsurance with EEA
counterparties
(b) AEEA(re)insurercancompletealloftherequiredprudentialreportingforitsSwisssubsidiaryin
Switzerland under Swiss capital requirement rules and still comply with Solvency II
(c) ASwiss(re)insurancegroupwithEEAsubsidiariesisexemptfromtheotherwiseextraterritorialaspects
ofSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionTheEEAsupervisormustrelyonthegroupsupervisionoftheSwiss
regulator(FINMA)ratherthanconductgroupsupervisionitselfunderSolvencyII
AUSTRALIA BERMUDA BRAZIL CANADA MEXICO AND THE US
28 IntheExplanatoryMemorandumtotheCommissionrsquosdraftDecisiononAustraliaBermudaBrazilCanada
MexicoandtheUSitismadeclearthatArticle227equivalenceistheonlytypeofequivalencewhichis
thesubjectoftheDecisionAsmentionedabovetheDecisionisalsoonlyofprovisionalequivalencewhich
meansitlastsfortenyears22asopposedtoafullequivalencedecisionwhichisunlimitedindurationThe
provisionalnatureoftheequivalencedecisionhoweverisnotcommerciallyaslimitingasthelackofan
equivalencedecisionunderArticles172and260
18 Seerecital6CommissionDelegatedDecision(EU)C(2015)3754(final)19 ThefinalreportonthisadvicecanbefoundathttpseiopaeuropaeuPagesConsultationsCP-14041aspx20 European Union External Action Service webpage EU relations with Switzerland http eeas europa euswitzerland index _ enhtm21 Seerecital16CommissionDelegatedDecision(EU)C(2015)3754(final)22 See Article 227(6) Solvency II
mayer brown 7
29EIOPAassessedandanalysedtheregimesofallsixofthesejurisdictionsbuthasnotmadeallofitsfindings
publicly available23TheCommissiondecidedthatallofthejurisdictionsmetthecriteriaunderArticle
227(5)forprovisionalequivalenceinrespectofsolvencyassessmentbutitdidnotconsiderthatanyof
thejurisdictionsmetthefullequivalencecriteriaunderArticle379ofRegulation201535Furtherthe
CommissiondidnotconsiderwhetheranyofthejurisdictionsmetthecriteriaforequivalenceunderArticles
172(4)and260(5)inrespectofreinsuranceandgroupsupervision24
30Itisnotablethattheonlyareainwhichthesesixjurisdictionshavebeenfoundequivalentistheareainwhich
equivalenceismostbeneficialtoEEA(re)insurersEquivalenceinrespectofsolvencyassessment(under
Article 227) means that EEA (re)insurers can allow their subsidiaries in Australia Bermuda25 Brazil Canada
Mexico and the US to continue to calculate their standalone solvency based on locally accepted methods
ratherthanhavingtoconverttothemethodsprescribedbySolvencyII(foratleastthenexttenyears)
provided that they use the deduction and aggregation method26(seeparagraphs6to8and17formoredetail)
31 Lackofequivalenceinrespectofreinsurance(underArticle172)adverselyaffectsmainlynon-EEAreinsurers
makingtheEEAmarketlessaccessibleforthem(seeparagraphs5and16 above) although it may also have
consequencesforEEAinsurerswhowanttohavetheoptionofreinsuringriskwithinsurersoutsidetheEEA
Lackofequivalenceinrespectofgroupsupervision(underArticle260)predominantlyimpactsnon-EEA
groupsof(re)insurerswithEEA-basedactivity(seeparagraphs9to12and16formoredetail)
32 TheeffectoftheDecisionifadoptedissignificantfornon-EEA(re)insurersAnEEAregulatorcan
(continueto)imposeadditionalrequirementssuchastheimpositionofcollateralrequirementsoncontracts
ofreinsurancewhichoriginateinanycountryoutsidetheEEAsaveforSwitzerlandFurtherallnon-EEA
(re)insurancegroupsapartfromSwiss(re)insurancegroupswhichhaveEEAsubsidiariesbutnotEEA
sub-groupscouldbesubjecttoSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionrequirementsaswellasthegroupsupervision
exercisedbyitshomejurisdictionThefactthatanequivalencedecisionhasnotbeenmadeinrespectof
group supervision however enables national supervisors to carry out an equivalence assessment In the
absenceofbothanequivalencedecisionandanequivalenceassessmentEEAsupervisorsmayapplyldquoother
methodsrdquotogroupsupervisioninsteadofsupervisingthenon-EEAgroupunderSolvencyII27 As explained
atparagraph12abovethePRAwilltakeacase-by-caseapproachandrequiresanon-EEA(re)insurance
grouptosubmitawaiverapplicationrequestingtheuseofldquoothermethodsrdquoTherearenosuchoptionsin
relation to reinsurance supervision
33 SomemayconsideritsurprisingthattheCommissionfoundtheUSinsuranceregime(thelargestinsurance
marketintheworld)wantingintheareasofreinsuranceandgroupsupervisionbutthisresultwascertainly
foreseeablewhenconsiderationisgiventothefactthattheEUndashUSinsurancedialogueprojectwhich
aimstoachieveimprovedmutualunderstandingoftherespectiveinsuranceregulatoryandsupervisory
regimesstartedin2012buthasstilltoreachanagreedconclusionaboutmutualrecognitionForexample
negotiationsoverreductionofcollateralrequirementsintheUSforEEAreinsurershavebeenongoing
foryearsbutprogresshasbeenslowinsteadSolvencyIIdoesnotpreventtheEEAimposingcollateral
requirements on US reinsurers
23 The full text of the report on Bermuda is available online here ht tps eiopa europa eu Pages News EIOPA- publishes-the- Final- Reports-on-full- equivalence -assessments-of- Bermuda -Japan -and-Switzerland a spx Thefulltextreportsontheotherfivejurisdictionswhicharethesubject of this decision are not publicly available
24 See Annexes 1 and 225 Captive insurers regulated in Bermuda are excluded from the equivalency decision26 See Article 233 Solvency II27 See paragraphs 9 to 12 above
8 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
34TheUSinsuranceindustrythroughtheACLI28 RAA29 and other trade associations has been pushing the
federalgovernmenttonegotiateacoveredagreementwiththeEUtopreventtheabovereferencedpotentially
adversecompetitivelydisadvantageousoutcomesfromalackofequivalencedecisionsbytheEUThose
negotiationscontinuetobemiredinpoliticalpositioningwithinthefederalgovernment(atTreasuryandthe
US Trade Representative) with the US state regulators and with the EU regulators and time is running short
SolvencyIIisscheduledtotakeeffecton1January2016andatpresentitappearsunlikelythattheUSwillbe
grantedequivalencebytheCommissioninrespectofreinsuranceandgroupsupervisionInrespectofgroup
supervisionmuchisthereforeinthehandsoftheEEAsupervisors
The equivalence assessment process
35 AsSolvencyIIhasnotcomeintoforceitisnotyetpossibleforanequivalenceassessmenttobecarried
outItwillasdescribedabovebepossibleforEEAsupervisorstomakeanequivalenceassessmentofthe
groupsupervisoryregimeofAustraliaBermudaBrazilCanadaMexicoandtheUSafter1January2016
but EIOPA guidelines30makeclearthatalaterequivalencedecisionbytheCommissionwouldsupersedeany
equivalenceassessmentTheEEAsupervisorscanalsomakeequivalenceassessments(inrespectofboth
solvencyassessmentandgroupsupervision)ofthemanynon-EEAcountrieswhichareunlikelytoeverbethe
subjectofaCommissionequivalencedecision
36TheEIOPAguidelinessetoutthemethodologyforequivalenceassessmentsbynationalsupervisorsThey
stresstheimportanceoftheactivecooperationofthethirdcountryintheequivalenceassessmentprocess
itisdeterminativeinthecaseofgroupsupervisionandlackofcooperationwouldleadtoanon-equivalent
outcome An equivalence assessment is based on the same criteria as an equivalence decision which are set
out in Annex 1 to this update National supervisors can conduct the assessment themselves with assistance
fromEIOPAandinconsultationwithotherEEAsupervisorsorrequestEIOPAtocarryouttheassessment
Unlikeanequivalencedecisionthereisnopossibilityofatemporaryorprovisionalequivalenceassessment
37 Positive equivalence assessments require regular review they must be reviewed at least every three years or
followingsignificantdevelopmentsinthejurisdictionassessedNegativeequivalenceassessmentsmayberevisited
attherequestoftherelevant(re)insureroratthenationalsupervisorrsquosowninitiativewheretherehavebeen
significantchangestothesupervisoryregimelaiddownSolvencyIIortothesupervisoryregimeofthenon-
EEAcountryconcernedUnlesstherehavebeensuchchangesitisnotpossiblefornationalsupervisorstotake
divergentequivalencedecisionsregardingthesamenon-EEAcountryEquivalenceassessmentswillhaveeffect
morebroadlythanjustfortherequesting(re)insurerorgroupAccordinglywhencarryingoutanequivalence
assessmentnationalsupervisorsmustassesstheentirenon-EEAregimenotjusttheregimeasitappliestothe(re)
insurerorgroupconcernedForexampleevenifagroupconductsonlylifeinsurancebusinessitwouldstillbe
necessaryforthenationalsupervisortoassessthethirdcountryregimefornon-lifebusiness
EEA sub-groups
38 As noted at paragraph 9 abovewhereanon-EEAgroupdoesnothaveanEEAparentundertakingandis
notsubjecttoanequivalencedeterminationbyeithertheCommissionoranationalsupervisorEIOPAhas
suggestedthatnationalsupervisorsshouldconsiderrequiringsuchanon-EEAgrouptoestablishanEEAsub-
group Such a requirement will understandably be regarded as onerous but doing so would mean that only the
EEAsub-groupwouldbesubjectedtoSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionandthegroupsolvencycalculation
28 The American Council of Life Insurers29 The Reinsurance Association of America30 See Final Report on Public Consultation No14015 on Guidelines on the methodology for equivalence assessments by national supervisory
authorities under Solvency II EIOPA-BoS-14182 27 November 2014
mayer brown 9
39WhereanequivalencedeterminationhasbeenmadethereisnoneedtocreateanEEAsub-groupbutnon-
EEAgroupswithsuchastructurewillfindthemselvessubjecttodualregulationwhilsttheircompetitors
withoutanEEAparentundertakingwillbeabletorelysolelyonthegroupsupervisionexercisedbytheir
homesupervisorEIOPAifnotSolvencyIIhasconsideredthisdichotomy
40InitsguidanceEIOPAsuggeststhatwherethewidernon-EEAgroupissubjecttoequivalentthirdcountry
group supervision the acting EEA group supervisor should rely on the group supervision exercised by the
third-countrysupervisoryauthoritiesandexempttheEEAsub-groupfromSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionson
acase-by-casebasisbutonlywherethiswouldresultinamoreefficientsupervisionofthegroupandwould
not impair its supervision EIOPA sets out criteria that the acting group supervisor should consider when
deciding whether such an exemption should be granted They are
(a) theworldwidegroupsupervisionallowsforarobustassessmentoftheriskstowhichtheEEAsubgroup
anditsentitiesareexposedconsideringthestructureofthegroupthenaturescaleandcomplexityof
therisksandthecapitalallocationwithinthegroup
(b) thecooperationcurrentlyinplacebetweenthenon-EEAgroupsupervisorandtheEEAsupervisors
forthegroupconcernedisstructuredandwell-managedthroughregularmeetingsandappropriate
exchangeofinformationwithinacollegeofsupervisorstowhichtheEEAsupervisorsandEIOPAare
invitedand
(c) anannualworkplanincludingjointon-siteexaminationsisagreeduponintheseregularmeetingsby
thesupervisoryauthoritiesinvolvedinthesupervisionofthegroup31
41 EIOPAguidanceisnotbindingonthenationalsupervisorsbutthesupervisorshaveinformedEIOPAwhether
or not they intend to comply with it Only Germany has stated that it will not comply with the relevant
guidancebecauseitexplainsGermanlawdoesnotpermitacase-by-caseapproachItappearstherefore
thattheeffectofanequivalencedeterminationbyeithertheCommissionoranationalsupervisorcouldbe
toexemptanEEAsub-groupfromSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionandsolvencycalculationThispossibility
alreadyexistsforSwiss(re)insurancegroups
What happens next
42TheCommissionhasindicated32thatthereareassessmentsofotherthirdcountryjurisdictionscurrently
inprogressandthatsomejurisdictionsaremodifyingtheirinsuranceframeworksinordertofacilitate
equivalencedecisionsInthelightofthisasecondpackageofdecisionsisexpectedintheautumnof
2015ApositivedecisiononreinsuranceequivalenceforJapanalreadythesubjectofanEIOPAreport33 is
expectedtobeincludedinthenextpackageFurthergivenEIOPArsquosfindingsitwouldnotbesurprisingifthe
CommissionmakesapositivedecisionregardinggroupsupervisoryandreinsuranceequivalenceforBermuda
butthefutureislessclearfortheUSAustraliaBrazilCanadaandMexicoInthemeantimenon-EEA(re)
insurance groups will want to consider their group structure in order to ascertain how the extraterritorial
provisionsofSolvencyIImayaffectthem
31 Guideline 5 of Guidelines on group solvency EIOPA-BoS-1418132 Draft minutes of a meeting of the Commissionrsquos expert group on banking payments and insurance ( in its insurance formation) 5 March 201533 See fn 23
10 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Ifyouhaveanyquestionsaboutanyoftheissuesraisedinthisalertpleasecontactyourusualcontactoroneof
the lawyers listed below
LONDON
Alexandria Carr
OfCounsel(EmployedBarrister)
E acarrmayerbrowncom T+442031303398
Mark Compton Partner
E mcomptonmayerbrowncom T+442031303388
Colin Scagell Partner
E cscagellmayerbrowncom T+442031303315
US
David W Alberts
Partner(NewYork)
dalbertsmayerbrowncom T+12125062611
Lawrence R Hamilton
Partner (Chicago)
lhamiltonmayerbrowncom
T +1 312 701 7055
mayer brown 11
Annex 1
Potentially-equivalent element
(Directive 2009138EU)
Criteria to determine equivalence
(Commission Delegated Regulation 201535)
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusthavethepower(by
laworregulation)toeffectivelysupervisedomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ingsandtoimposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessary
(Article 378(a))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusthavethenecessary
meansandresourcesrelevantexpertiseandthemandatetoeffectively
protectpolicyholdersandbeneficiarieswhereverlocated (Article 378(b))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryshouldalwaysduly
considerthepotentialimpactoftheirdecisionsontheglobalstabilityof
financialsystemsparticularlyduringanemergency(Article 378(c))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepotentialpro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmove-
mentsinthefinancialmarketsoccur(Article 378(d))
bull Theremustbearequirementforreinsurerstobeauthorisedtoprovide
businessinthethirdcountryandtheremustbeaclearobjectiveand
publiclyavailablesetofwrittenauthorisationstandards(Article 378(e))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingstohaveaneffectivesystemofgovernancewhich
provides sound and prudent business management including
ndash an adequate transparent organisational structure with clear alloca-
tionandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementsforensuringthatpersonswhoeffectivelyrunthe
undertakingarelsquofitandproperrsquo
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothinternallyandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthoritiesand
ndash requirementsforensuringthatoutsourcedfunctionsactivitiesare
effectivelysupervised(Article 378(f))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticrein-
suranceundertakingstohaveaneffectiveriskmanagementsystem
comprising
ndash strategiesprocessesandinternalreportingprocedurestoidentify
measuremonitormanageandreportriskstowhichtheundertaking
iscould be exposed at an individual and an aggregated level and on a
continuousbasisand
ndash effectiveinternalcontrols(Article 378(g))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
ancetoestablishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcompliance
internalauditandactuarialfunctions(Article 378(h))
12 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingsto
ndash providethirdcountryauthoritieswithanyinformationnecessaryfor
supervisionand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on their solvency and
financialcondition(Article 378(i))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthatproposedchanges
tothebusinesspolicyormanagementofdomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ingsortoqualifyingholdingsinsuchundertakingsbeconsistentwith
maintaining sound and prudent management (Article 378(j))
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofdomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ings should rely on sound economic principles and solvency requirements
shouldbebasedonaneconomicvaluationofassetsorliabilities(Article
378(k))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingstoholdadequatefinancialresourcesincluding
requirements to
ndash establish technical provisions with respect to all reinsurance obliga-
tionstowardspolicyholdersandbeneficiariesofreinsurance
contracts
ndash investassetsheldtocovertechnicalprovisionsinthebestinterestsof
allpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccountanydisclosed
policyobjective)
ndash investonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoseriskstheundertakingcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash meet capital requirements set at a level equivalent to that under
SolvencyIIwhichensuresthatbeneficiariesandpolicyholdersare
adequatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsintheeventof
significantlosses
ndash maintainaminimumlevelofcapital(orsufferimmediatesupervisory
intervention)and
ndash meetcapitalrequirementsreferredtoabovewithownfundsof
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesbothinagoing
concernandinacaseofwindingup(Article 378(l))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsofthesolvencyregimeinthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiableriskandanysignificant
non-quantifiableriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanothersupervisory
mechanism (Article 378(m))
mayer brown 13
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustensuretimelyintervention
by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements are
not complied with (Article 378(n))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 378(o))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonswhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallother
personsandauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhich
doesnotallowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 378(p))
bull Whereareinsuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingsshouldbe
able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 378(q)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesmustonlyusethatinformationin
thecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 378(r))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustbepermittedto
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreaches
ofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersonswherethat
authoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofessional
secrecyinthethirdcountryandsuchinformationshouldonlybedis-
closedoncetheexpressagreementoftheoriginatorhasbeenobtained
andsolelyforthepurposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission
(Article 378(s))
14 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Solvency assessment
(Article 227)
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofdomestic(re)insuranceundertakings
should rely on sound economic principles and solvency requirements should
bebasedonaneconomicvaluationofassetsorliabilities(Article379(a))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomestic(re)insurance
undertakingstoholdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingrequirements
to
ndash establish technical provisions with respect to all (re)insurance obliga-
tionstowardspolicyholdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insurancecontracts
ndash investassetsheldtocovertechnicalprovisionsinthebestinterestsof
allpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccountanydisclosed
policyobjective)
ndash investonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoseriskstheundertakingcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash meet capital requirements set at a level equivalent to that under
SolvencyIIwhichensuresthatbeneficiariesandpolicyholdersare
adequatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsintheeventof
significantlosses
ndash maintainaminimumlevelofcapital(orsufferimmediatesupervisory
intervention)and
ndash meetcapitalrequirementsreferredtoabovewithownfundsof
sufficientqualitywhichareabletoabsorbsignificantlossesbothina
goingconcernandinacaseofwindingup(Article379(b))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsofthesolvencyregimeinthethirdcountrymust
berisk-basedtocapturequantifiableriskandanysignificantnon-quan-
tifiableriskmustbeaddressedthroughanothersupervisorymechanism
(Article 379(c))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tion by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements
are not complied with (Article 379(d))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 379(e))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article379(f))
mayer brown 15
bull Wherea(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptoris
beingcompulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnot
concernthirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakings
should be able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article
379(g))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesshouldonlyusethatinformation
inthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 379(h))
bull Arethesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrypermittedtoexchange
informationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthedischargeof
theirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreachesofcompanylaw
with other authorities bodies or persons where that authority body or
personissubjecttoanobligationofprofessionalsecrecyinthethirdcoun-
tryandissuchinformationonlydisclosedoncetheexpressagreementof
theoriginator(s)hasbeenobtainedandwhereappropriatesolelyforthe
purposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission(Article379(i))
Group supervision
(Article 260)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryhavethenecessarymeans
andresourcesrelevantexpertiseandthemandatetoeffectivelyprotect
policyholdersandbeneficiarieswhereverlocated(Article 380(a))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareempoweredbylawor
regulation to
ndash determinewhichundertakingsfallunderthescopeofsupervisionat
grouplevel
ndash supervise(re)insurerswhicharepartofagroup and
ndash imposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessary
(Article 380(b))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareabletoeffectively
assesstheriskprofileandsolvencyfinancialpositionof(re)insurers
whicharepartofagroupandthegrouprsquosbusinessstrategy(Article
380(c))
bull Supervisionatgrouplevelincludesallundertakingsoverwhichapartici-
patingundertakingexercisesdominantorsignificantinfluence(unless
notappropriateforgroupsupervisionobjectives)(Article 380(d))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustdulyconsiderthe
potentialimpactoftheirdecisionsonthestabilityoffinancialsystems
globally particularly during emergency situations (Article 380(e))
16 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmovementsin
financialmarketsoccur(Article 380(f))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectivesystemof
governanceatgrouplevelwhichprovidesforsoundandprudentbusiness
management and prescribes
ndash that there must be an adequate transparent organisational structure
withclearallocationandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementstoensurethatpersonswhoeffectivelyruntheundertak-
ingarefitandproper
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothwithinthegroupandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthorities and
ndash requirementsforensuringthattheoutsourcedfunctionsoractivities
areeffectivelysupervised(Article 380(g))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectiverisk
management system at group level comprising at least
ndash the strategies processes and internal reporting procedures necessary
toidentifymeasuremonitormanageandreportrisksonacontinu-
ousbasistowhichthegroupiscouldbeexposedand
ndash aneffectiveinternalcontrolsystem(Article 380(h))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
have sound reporting and accounting procedures to monitor and manage
intra-grouptransactionsandriskconcentrations(Article 380(i))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
establishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcomplianceinternal
auditandactuarialfunctions(Article 380(j))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthegroupto
ndash providethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswithanyinformation
thattheyneed
ndash reportsignificantriskconcentrationatthelevelofthegroupand
significantintra-grouptransactionsonatleastanannualbasisand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on the solvency and
financialconditionofthegroup(Article 380(k))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequirethatproposed
changestothebusinesspolicyormanagementofthegroup(orqualifying
holdings in the group) are consistent with the sound and prudent man-
agementofthegroup(Article 380(l))
mayer brown 17
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofthegroupshouldrelyonsound
economicprinciplesandassessmentofsolvencyshouldbebasedonan
economicvaluationofallassetsandliabilities(Article 380(m))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
holdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingarequirementfor
ndash technical provisions with respect to all obligations towards policy-
holdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insuranceundertakingsinthegroup
ndash assets held to cover technical provisions to be invested in the best
interestsofallpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccount
anydisclosedpolicyobjective)
ndash thegrouptoinvestonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoserisksitcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash the group to meet capital requirements at a level which ensures that in
theeventofsignificantlossespolicyholdersandbeneficiariesareade-
quatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsastheybecomedue
ndash (re)insuranceundertakingswhicharepartofthegrouptomaintaina
minimumlevelofcapitalnon-compliancewithwhichtriggers
immediatesupervisoryinterventionand
ndash groupcapitalrequirementstobemetwithownfundsthatareofa
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesinbothagoing
concernandacaseofwindingup(Article 380(n))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsoftheprudentialregimeofthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiablerisksandwhereasignificant
riskisnotquantifiablethatriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanother
supervisory mechanism (Article 380(o))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tionbythesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryintheeventthat
capital requirements are not complied with (Article 380(p))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryrestricttheuseofown-fund
itemsofarelated(re)insuranceundertakingwheretheitemscannoteffec-
tivelybemadeavailabletocoverthecapitalrequirementoftheparticipating
undertakingforwhichgroupsolvencyiscalculated(Article 380(q))
bull Thecalculationofgroupsolvencyinthethirdcountryrsquosprudentialregime
should produce a result that is at least equivalent to the result produced
byeitheroneoforacombinationofthecalculationmethodsinSolvency
II and the calculation method used should ensure that there is no double
useofownfundstomeetthegroupcapitalrequirementandthatthe
intra-groupcreationofcapitalthroughreciprocalfinancingiseliminated
(Article 380(r))
18 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatallpersons
whoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethird
countryaswellasauditorsandexpertsactingonbehalfoftheauthorities
areboundbyobligationsofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinforma-
tionreceivedfromallsupervisoryauthorities(Article 380(s))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 380(t))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatwhere
a(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingmaybe
divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 380(u))
bull Thethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswhichreceiveconfidential
informationfromothersupervisoryauthoritiesmustonlyusethat
informationinthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 380(v))
bull The third country supervisory authorities should be permitted to
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirsupervisoryfunctionsorthedetectionorinvestigation
ofbreachesofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersons
wherethatauthoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofes-
sionalsecrecyintherelevantthirdcountryprovidedthattheinformation
isonlydisclosedwiththeexpressagreementoftheoriginatorandonlyfor
thepurposesforwhichsuchauthoritywasgiven(Article 380(w))
19 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Annex 2
Potentially temporarily
provisionally equivalent area
Criteria to determine temporaryprovisional equivalence
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172(4))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities(particularly
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities)
Solvency assessment
(Article 227(5))
(a) The third country either already has an equivalent solvency regime in
place or one may be adopted or applied
(b)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(c)Thethirdcountryrsquoslawinprincipleallowscooperationandexchange
ofconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities
(d)Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(e)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider advising many of the worldrsquos largest companies including a significant portion of the Fortune 100 FTSE 100 DAX and Hang Seng Index companies and more than half of the worldrsquos largest banks Our legal services include banking and finance corporate and securities litigation and dispute resolution antitrust and competition US Supreme Court and appellate matters employment and benefits environmental financial services regulatory and enforcement government and global trade intellectual property real estate tax restructuring bankruptcy and insolvency and wealth management
Please visit wwwmayerbrowncom for comprehensive contact information for all Mayer Brown offices
This Mayer Brown publication provides information and comments on legal issues and developments of interest to our clients and friends The foregoing is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject matter covered and is not intended to provide legal advice Readers should seek legal advice before taking any action with respect to the matters discussed herein
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider comprising legal practices that are separate entities (the ldquoMayer Brown Practicesrdquo) The Mayer Brown Practices are Mayer Brown LLP and Mayer Brown Europe-Brussels LLP both limited liability partnerships established in Illinois USA Mayer Brown International LLP a limited liability partnership incorporated in England and Wales (authorized and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered in England and Wales number OC 303359) Mayer Brown a SELAS established in France Mayer Brown Mexico SC a sociedad civil formed under the laws of the State of Durango Mexico Mayer Brown JSM a Hong Kong partnership and its associated legal practices in Asia and Tauil amp Chequer Advogados a Brazilian law partnership with which Mayer Brown is associated Mayer Brown Consulting (Singapore) Pte Ltd and its subsidiary which are affiliated with Mayer Brown provide customs and trade advisory and consultancy services not legal services ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
copy 2015 The Mayer Brown Practices All rights reserved
0822fin
Group supervision
(Article 260(5))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasaprudentialregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting transparency and group
solvency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
other supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthoritiesinparticular
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandothersupervisory
authorities
![Page 5: Solvency II: Equivalence Decisions](https://reader030.vdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022012812/61c3bd04e721fa32777b3bfb/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
mayer brown 5
The equivalence decision process
17 ThereareseveralstepstomakinganequivalencedecisionFirstatechnicalassessmentofthethirdcountryrsquos
prudentialregimeisundertakenbyEIOPAThenEIOPAdeliversitsfindingstotheCommissionEIOPA
maypublishareportonitsfindingsandoccasionallyundertakespublicconsultation13 The Commission is
requiredtoconsultwithEIOPAaboutitstechnicalassessmentbutitistheCommissionrsquosdecisionwhetherto
adoptanequivalencedecisioninrelationtoanyofthethreeelementsofthethirdcountryregimewhichhave
been assessed by EIOPA The Commission decision can be vetoed by the European Parliament or Council
18 ThecriteriatobemetforafullequivalencedecisioncanbefoundinArticles378379and380respectively
ofCommissionDelegatedRegulation20153514TheyarealsolaidoutinAnnex1ofthisupdateSome
examplesofthecriteriawhichareappliedtonon-EEAregimesincludethatthesupervisoryauthoritiesin
thecountryaresufficientlyresourcedtoprotectpolicyholdersandbeneficiariesthatthenon-EEAcountry
imposesadequatecapitalrequirementson(re)insurersandthatthenon-EEAcountryrequires(re)insurers
tohaveeffectivesystemsofgovernanceinplace
19 ForatemporaryorprovisionaldecisionthecriteriaarelessonerousTheyaresummarisedinAnnex2andcan
befoundinfullatArticles172(4)227(5)and260(5)Theyincluderequirementsforthenon-EEAcountryto
haveagreedtosetuparegimewhichwilleventuallybefoundequivalentunderSolvencyIIandforittohaveset
asideresourcesforthispurposeThereisalsoarequirementfortheexistingregimetoberisk-basedandforthe
non-EEAcountrytohaveanindependentsupervisionsystemalreadyinplaceTheseconditionsensurethat
provisionalequivalenceisonlygiventocountrieswhicharealreadyontheirwaytobeingfullyequivalent
20AnequivalencedecisiontakestheformofaCommissionDelegatedDecisionADecisionismadethrough
the procedure laid down in Article 301(2) Solvency II This procedure allows the Commission to adopt the
DecisionunlesstheEuropeanParliamentorCouncilexpressanobjectionwithinthreemonthsorifthethree-
monthperiodisextendedsixmonthsThefinaltextoftheDecisionisthenpublishedintheOfficialJournal
oftheEUandcomesintoeffectwithin20daysofpublication
21 ThefirstsetofDecisions(alludedtoaboveanddetailedbelow)iscurrentlyunderscrutinyfromtheEuropean
Parliament and Council15havingbeenproposedbytheCommissionAccordinglytheseDecisionsarenotyetfinal
What has the Commission done thus far
22AsmentionedabovetheCommissionreleaseditsfirstsetofSolvencyIIequivalencedecisionson5June
2015 The two decisions relate to Switzerland16 and Australia Bermuda Brazil Canada Mexico and the US17
23 Switzerlandhasbeengrantedfullequivalenceinallthreeareasmeaningthatitslocalprudentialregime
canbesubstitutedforSolvencyIIinrespectofreinsurancesupervisionsolvencyassessmentandgroup
supervision Australia Bermuda Brazil Canada Mexico and the US however have only been granted
provisionalequivalenceintheareaofsolvencyassessmentForthesesixcountriesthismeansfirstthat
theirequivalenceisnotindefiniteitwillexpireaftertenyears(on1January2026)subjecttorenewalor
anyfurtherequivalencedecisionsbeingtakenSecondthatthereisnofindingofequivalenceintheareasof
reinsurancesupervisionandgroupsupervisiononlyequivalenceinrespectofreinsurancesupervisionisthe
objectofthepresentDecisiononthesixcountriesotherthanSwitzerlandFurtherdetailontheprocessand
resultsofthetwoDecisionscanbefoundbelow
13 As in the case of the 19 December 2014 consultation on the approach to Switzerland Bermuda and Japan14 This supplemented the original Solvency II Directive and is now par t of the Solvency II package15 On 14 July 2015 the Council indicated that it will not object to the adoption of the two equivalence decisions but the European Parliament has
extended the period for consideration of the second equivalence decision (on Australia Bermuda Brazil Canada Mexico and the US) to six months The period for objection to the second equivalence decision will thus expire on 7 December 2015
16 CommissionDelegatedDecisionC(2015)3754final17 CommissionDelegatedDecisionC(2015)3740final
6 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
SWITZERLAND
24 TheCommissiondraftDecisiononSwitzerlandisafullequivalencedecisionmeaningthatSwitzerlandhas
beendeemedequivalentforthethreepurposesofSolvencyIIdescribedaboveforanindefiniteperiodThis
meansthattheCommissionconsiderstheSwissregimetoprovidealevelofpolicyholderandbeneficiary
protection18 comparable to that provided by Solvency II The advice given by EIOPA to the Commission on
SwissequivalencecanbefoundonEIOPArsquoswebsiteandhelpsexplainthebasisoftheCommissionDecision
The legislation which EIOPA considered in Switzerland and which the Commission views as equivalent
includestheSwissFinancialMarketsSupervisoryAct2007(ldquoFINASMArdquo) the Insurance Supervision Act
(ldquoISArdquo) and the Insurance Supervision Ordinance (ldquoISOrdquo)whichenteredintoforceon1July2015
25 TheDecisionexplainstheapplicationoftheequivalencecriteriatotheSwissregimeForexamplerecital10
statesthattheSwissfinancialmarketsupervisorhasthepowereffectivelytosupervise(re)insuranceactivities
andimposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessaryrecital11explainsthattheSwissSolvency
Testisbasedonsoundeconomicprinciplesandrecital12statesthattheSwissregimerequires(re)insurersto
haveaneffectivesystemofgovernanceinplace19 The equivalence criteria is set out at Annex 1 to this update
26TheDecisionisperhapsunsurprisinggiventhatSwitzerlandandtheEUhaveenteredintoanumberof
bilateraltreatiesandthattheEUhasldquoclosertieswithSwitzerlandthananyothernon-EEAcountryrdquo20 The
DecisionputsparticularweightonMemorandaofUnderstanding(ldquoMoUsrdquo) signed between Switzerland and
theMemberStatesoftheEUtofacilitateinternationalco-operation21
27 Practicallythisfullequivalencedecisionmeansthat
(a) ASwissreinsurerdoingbusinessintheEEAcannotbesubjectedtocollateralrequirementsorany
otheradditionalrequirementsontopofthosetowhichEEAreinsurersaresubjectunderSolvency
II Reinsurance with a Swiss reinsurer is to be treated in the same way as reinsurance with EEA
counterparties
(b) AEEA(re)insurercancompletealloftherequiredprudentialreportingforitsSwisssubsidiaryin
Switzerland under Swiss capital requirement rules and still comply with Solvency II
(c) ASwiss(re)insurancegroupwithEEAsubsidiariesisexemptfromtheotherwiseextraterritorialaspects
ofSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionTheEEAsupervisormustrelyonthegroupsupervisionoftheSwiss
regulator(FINMA)ratherthanconductgroupsupervisionitselfunderSolvencyII
AUSTRALIA BERMUDA BRAZIL CANADA MEXICO AND THE US
28 IntheExplanatoryMemorandumtotheCommissionrsquosdraftDecisiononAustraliaBermudaBrazilCanada
MexicoandtheUSitismadeclearthatArticle227equivalenceistheonlytypeofequivalencewhichis
thesubjectoftheDecisionAsmentionedabovetheDecisionisalsoonlyofprovisionalequivalencewhich
meansitlastsfortenyears22asopposedtoafullequivalencedecisionwhichisunlimitedindurationThe
provisionalnatureoftheequivalencedecisionhoweverisnotcommerciallyaslimitingasthelackofan
equivalencedecisionunderArticles172and260
18 Seerecital6CommissionDelegatedDecision(EU)C(2015)3754(final)19 ThefinalreportonthisadvicecanbefoundathttpseiopaeuropaeuPagesConsultationsCP-14041aspx20 European Union External Action Service webpage EU relations with Switzerland http eeas europa euswitzerland index _ enhtm21 Seerecital16CommissionDelegatedDecision(EU)C(2015)3754(final)22 See Article 227(6) Solvency II
mayer brown 7
29EIOPAassessedandanalysedtheregimesofallsixofthesejurisdictionsbuthasnotmadeallofitsfindings
publicly available23TheCommissiondecidedthatallofthejurisdictionsmetthecriteriaunderArticle
227(5)forprovisionalequivalenceinrespectofsolvencyassessmentbutitdidnotconsiderthatanyof
thejurisdictionsmetthefullequivalencecriteriaunderArticle379ofRegulation201535Furtherthe
CommissiondidnotconsiderwhetheranyofthejurisdictionsmetthecriteriaforequivalenceunderArticles
172(4)and260(5)inrespectofreinsuranceandgroupsupervision24
30Itisnotablethattheonlyareainwhichthesesixjurisdictionshavebeenfoundequivalentistheareainwhich
equivalenceismostbeneficialtoEEA(re)insurersEquivalenceinrespectofsolvencyassessment(under
Article 227) means that EEA (re)insurers can allow their subsidiaries in Australia Bermuda25 Brazil Canada
Mexico and the US to continue to calculate their standalone solvency based on locally accepted methods
ratherthanhavingtoconverttothemethodsprescribedbySolvencyII(foratleastthenexttenyears)
provided that they use the deduction and aggregation method26(seeparagraphs6to8and17formoredetail)
31 Lackofequivalenceinrespectofreinsurance(underArticle172)adverselyaffectsmainlynon-EEAreinsurers
makingtheEEAmarketlessaccessibleforthem(seeparagraphs5and16 above) although it may also have
consequencesforEEAinsurerswhowanttohavetheoptionofreinsuringriskwithinsurersoutsidetheEEA
Lackofequivalenceinrespectofgroupsupervision(underArticle260)predominantlyimpactsnon-EEA
groupsof(re)insurerswithEEA-basedactivity(seeparagraphs9to12and16formoredetail)
32 TheeffectoftheDecisionifadoptedissignificantfornon-EEA(re)insurersAnEEAregulatorcan
(continueto)imposeadditionalrequirementssuchastheimpositionofcollateralrequirementsoncontracts
ofreinsurancewhichoriginateinanycountryoutsidetheEEAsaveforSwitzerlandFurtherallnon-EEA
(re)insurancegroupsapartfromSwiss(re)insurancegroupswhichhaveEEAsubsidiariesbutnotEEA
sub-groupscouldbesubjecttoSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionrequirementsaswellasthegroupsupervision
exercisedbyitshomejurisdictionThefactthatanequivalencedecisionhasnotbeenmadeinrespectof
group supervision however enables national supervisors to carry out an equivalence assessment In the
absenceofbothanequivalencedecisionandanequivalenceassessmentEEAsupervisorsmayapplyldquoother
methodsrdquotogroupsupervisioninsteadofsupervisingthenon-EEAgroupunderSolvencyII27 As explained
atparagraph12abovethePRAwilltakeacase-by-caseapproachandrequiresanon-EEA(re)insurance
grouptosubmitawaiverapplicationrequestingtheuseofldquoothermethodsrdquoTherearenosuchoptionsin
relation to reinsurance supervision
33 SomemayconsideritsurprisingthattheCommissionfoundtheUSinsuranceregime(thelargestinsurance
marketintheworld)wantingintheareasofreinsuranceandgroupsupervisionbutthisresultwascertainly
foreseeablewhenconsiderationisgiventothefactthattheEUndashUSinsurancedialogueprojectwhich
aimstoachieveimprovedmutualunderstandingoftherespectiveinsuranceregulatoryandsupervisory
regimesstartedin2012buthasstilltoreachanagreedconclusionaboutmutualrecognitionForexample
negotiationsoverreductionofcollateralrequirementsintheUSforEEAreinsurershavebeenongoing
foryearsbutprogresshasbeenslowinsteadSolvencyIIdoesnotpreventtheEEAimposingcollateral
requirements on US reinsurers
23 The full text of the report on Bermuda is available online here ht tps eiopa europa eu Pages News EIOPA- publishes-the- Final- Reports-on-full- equivalence -assessments-of- Bermuda -Japan -and-Switzerland a spx Thefulltextreportsontheotherfivejurisdictionswhicharethesubject of this decision are not publicly available
24 See Annexes 1 and 225 Captive insurers regulated in Bermuda are excluded from the equivalency decision26 See Article 233 Solvency II27 See paragraphs 9 to 12 above
8 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
34TheUSinsuranceindustrythroughtheACLI28 RAA29 and other trade associations has been pushing the
federalgovernmenttonegotiateacoveredagreementwiththeEUtopreventtheabovereferencedpotentially
adversecompetitivelydisadvantageousoutcomesfromalackofequivalencedecisionsbytheEUThose
negotiationscontinuetobemiredinpoliticalpositioningwithinthefederalgovernment(atTreasuryandthe
US Trade Representative) with the US state regulators and with the EU regulators and time is running short
SolvencyIIisscheduledtotakeeffecton1January2016andatpresentitappearsunlikelythattheUSwillbe
grantedequivalencebytheCommissioninrespectofreinsuranceandgroupsupervisionInrespectofgroup
supervisionmuchisthereforeinthehandsoftheEEAsupervisors
The equivalence assessment process
35 AsSolvencyIIhasnotcomeintoforceitisnotyetpossibleforanequivalenceassessmenttobecarried
outItwillasdescribedabovebepossibleforEEAsupervisorstomakeanequivalenceassessmentofthe
groupsupervisoryregimeofAustraliaBermudaBrazilCanadaMexicoandtheUSafter1January2016
but EIOPA guidelines30makeclearthatalaterequivalencedecisionbytheCommissionwouldsupersedeany
equivalenceassessmentTheEEAsupervisorscanalsomakeequivalenceassessments(inrespectofboth
solvencyassessmentandgroupsupervision)ofthemanynon-EEAcountrieswhichareunlikelytoeverbethe
subjectofaCommissionequivalencedecision
36TheEIOPAguidelinessetoutthemethodologyforequivalenceassessmentsbynationalsupervisorsThey
stresstheimportanceoftheactivecooperationofthethirdcountryintheequivalenceassessmentprocess
itisdeterminativeinthecaseofgroupsupervisionandlackofcooperationwouldleadtoanon-equivalent
outcome An equivalence assessment is based on the same criteria as an equivalence decision which are set
out in Annex 1 to this update National supervisors can conduct the assessment themselves with assistance
fromEIOPAandinconsultationwithotherEEAsupervisorsorrequestEIOPAtocarryouttheassessment
Unlikeanequivalencedecisionthereisnopossibilityofatemporaryorprovisionalequivalenceassessment
37 Positive equivalence assessments require regular review they must be reviewed at least every three years or
followingsignificantdevelopmentsinthejurisdictionassessedNegativeequivalenceassessmentsmayberevisited
attherequestoftherelevant(re)insureroratthenationalsupervisorrsquosowninitiativewheretherehavebeen
significantchangestothesupervisoryregimelaiddownSolvencyIIortothesupervisoryregimeofthenon-
EEAcountryconcernedUnlesstherehavebeensuchchangesitisnotpossiblefornationalsupervisorstotake
divergentequivalencedecisionsregardingthesamenon-EEAcountryEquivalenceassessmentswillhaveeffect
morebroadlythanjustfortherequesting(re)insurerorgroupAccordinglywhencarryingoutanequivalence
assessmentnationalsupervisorsmustassesstheentirenon-EEAregimenotjusttheregimeasitappliestothe(re)
insurerorgroupconcernedForexampleevenifagroupconductsonlylifeinsurancebusinessitwouldstillbe
necessaryforthenationalsupervisortoassessthethirdcountryregimefornon-lifebusiness
EEA sub-groups
38 As noted at paragraph 9 abovewhereanon-EEAgroupdoesnothaveanEEAparentundertakingandis
notsubjecttoanequivalencedeterminationbyeithertheCommissionoranationalsupervisorEIOPAhas
suggestedthatnationalsupervisorsshouldconsiderrequiringsuchanon-EEAgrouptoestablishanEEAsub-
group Such a requirement will understandably be regarded as onerous but doing so would mean that only the
EEAsub-groupwouldbesubjectedtoSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionandthegroupsolvencycalculation
28 The American Council of Life Insurers29 The Reinsurance Association of America30 See Final Report on Public Consultation No14015 on Guidelines on the methodology for equivalence assessments by national supervisory
authorities under Solvency II EIOPA-BoS-14182 27 November 2014
mayer brown 9
39WhereanequivalencedeterminationhasbeenmadethereisnoneedtocreateanEEAsub-groupbutnon-
EEAgroupswithsuchastructurewillfindthemselvessubjecttodualregulationwhilsttheircompetitors
withoutanEEAparentundertakingwillbeabletorelysolelyonthegroupsupervisionexercisedbytheir
homesupervisorEIOPAifnotSolvencyIIhasconsideredthisdichotomy
40InitsguidanceEIOPAsuggeststhatwherethewidernon-EEAgroupissubjecttoequivalentthirdcountry
group supervision the acting EEA group supervisor should rely on the group supervision exercised by the
third-countrysupervisoryauthoritiesandexempttheEEAsub-groupfromSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionson
acase-by-casebasisbutonlywherethiswouldresultinamoreefficientsupervisionofthegroupandwould
not impair its supervision EIOPA sets out criteria that the acting group supervisor should consider when
deciding whether such an exemption should be granted They are
(a) theworldwidegroupsupervisionallowsforarobustassessmentoftheriskstowhichtheEEAsubgroup
anditsentitiesareexposedconsideringthestructureofthegroupthenaturescaleandcomplexityof
therisksandthecapitalallocationwithinthegroup
(b) thecooperationcurrentlyinplacebetweenthenon-EEAgroupsupervisorandtheEEAsupervisors
forthegroupconcernedisstructuredandwell-managedthroughregularmeetingsandappropriate
exchangeofinformationwithinacollegeofsupervisorstowhichtheEEAsupervisorsandEIOPAare
invitedand
(c) anannualworkplanincludingjointon-siteexaminationsisagreeduponintheseregularmeetingsby
thesupervisoryauthoritiesinvolvedinthesupervisionofthegroup31
41 EIOPAguidanceisnotbindingonthenationalsupervisorsbutthesupervisorshaveinformedEIOPAwhether
or not they intend to comply with it Only Germany has stated that it will not comply with the relevant
guidancebecauseitexplainsGermanlawdoesnotpermitacase-by-caseapproachItappearstherefore
thattheeffectofanequivalencedeterminationbyeithertheCommissionoranationalsupervisorcouldbe
toexemptanEEAsub-groupfromSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionandsolvencycalculationThispossibility
alreadyexistsforSwiss(re)insurancegroups
What happens next
42TheCommissionhasindicated32thatthereareassessmentsofotherthirdcountryjurisdictionscurrently
inprogressandthatsomejurisdictionsaremodifyingtheirinsuranceframeworksinordertofacilitate
equivalencedecisionsInthelightofthisasecondpackageofdecisionsisexpectedintheautumnof
2015ApositivedecisiononreinsuranceequivalenceforJapanalreadythesubjectofanEIOPAreport33 is
expectedtobeincludedinthenextpackageFurthergivenEIOPArsquosfindingsitwouldnotbesurprisingifthe
CommissionmakesapositivedecisionregardinggroupsupervisoryandreinsuranceequivalenceforBermuda
butthefutureislessclearfortheUSAustraliaBrazilCanadaandMexicoInthemeantimenon-EEA(re)
insurance groups will want to consider their group structure in order to ascertain how the extraterritorial
provisionsofSolvencyIImayaffectthem
31 Guideline 5 of Guidelines on group solvency EIOPA-BoS-1418132 Draft minutes of a meeting of the Commissionrsquos expert group on banking payments and insurance ( in its insurance formation) 5 March 201533 See fn 23
10 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Ifyouhaveanyquestionsaboutanyoftheissuesraisedinthisalertpleasecontactyourusualcontactoroneof
the lawyers listed below
LONDON
Alexandria Carr
OfCounsel(EmployedBarrister)
E acarrmayerbrowncom T+442031303398
Mark Compton Partner
E mcomptonmayerbrowncom T+442031303388
Colin Scagell Partner
E cscagellmayerbrowncom T+442031303315
US
David W Alberts
Partner(NewYork)
dalbertsmayerbrowncom T+12125062611
Lawrence R Hamilton
Partner (Chicago)
lhamiltonmayerbrowncom
T +1 312 701 7055
mayer brown 11
Annex 1
Potentially-equivalent element
(Directive 2009138EU)
Criteria to determine equivalence
(Commission Delegated Regulation 201535)
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusthavethepower(by
laworregulation)toeffectivelysupervisedomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ingsandtoimposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessary
(Article 378(a))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusthavethenecessary
meansandresourcesrelevantexpertiseandthemandatetoeffectively
protectpolicyholdersandbeneficiarieswhereverlocated (Article 378(b))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryshouldalwaysduly
considerthepotentialimpactoftheirdecisionsontheglobalstabilityof
financialsystemsparticularlyduringanemergency(Article 378(c))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepotentialpro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmove-
mentsinthefinancialmarketsoccur(Article 378(d))
bull Theremustbearequirementforreinsurerstobeauthorisedtoprovide
businessinthethirdcountryandtheremustbeaclearobjectiveand
publiclyavailablesetofwrittenauthorisationstandards(Article 378(e))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingstohaveaneffectivesystemofgovernancewhich
provides sound and prudent business management including
ndash an adequate transparent organisational structure with clear alloca-
tionandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementsforensuringthatpersonswhoeffectivelyrunthe
undertakingarelsquofitandproperrsquo
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothinternallyandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthoritiesand
ndash requirementsforensuringthatoutsourcedfunctionsactivitiesare
effectivelysupervised(Article 378(f))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticrein-
suranceundertakingstohaveaneffectiveriskmanagementsystem
comprising
ndash strategiesprocessesandinternalreportingprocedurestoidentify
measuremonitormanageandreportriskstowhichtheundertaking
iscould be exposed at an individual and an aggregated level and on a
continuousbasisand
ndash effectiveinternalcontrols(Article 378(g))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
ancetoestablishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcompliance
internalauditandactuarialfunctions(Article 378(h))
12 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingsto
ndash providethirdcountryauthoritieswithanyinformationnecessaryfor
supervisionand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on their solvency and
financialcondition(Article 378(i))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthatproposedchanges
tothebusinesspolicyormanagementofdomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ingsortoqualifyingholdingsinsuchundertakingsbeconsistentwith
maintaining sound and prudent management (Article 378(j))
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofdomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ings should rely on sound economic principles and solvency requirements
shouldbebasedonaneconomicvaluationofassetsorliabilities(Article
378(k))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingstoholdadequatefinancialresourcesincluding
requirements to
ndash establish technical provisions with respect to all reinsurance obliga-
tionstowardspolicyholdersandbeneficiariesofreinsurance
contracts
ndash investassetsheldtocovertechnicalprovisionsinthebestinterestsof
allpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccountanydisclosed
policyobjective)
ndash investonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoseriskstheundertakingcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash meet capital requirements set at a level equivalent to that under
SolvencyIIwhichensuresthatbeneficiariesandpolicyholdersare
adequatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsintheeventof
significantlosses
ndash maintainaminimumlevelofcapital(orsufferimmediatesupervisory
intervention)and
ndash meetcapitalrequirementsreferredtoabovewithownfundsof
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesbothinagoing
concernandinacaseofwindingup(Article 378(l))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsofthesolvencyregimeinthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiableriskandanysignificant
non-quantifiableriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanothersupervisory
mechanism (Article 378(m))
mayer brown 13
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustensuretimelyintervention
by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements are
not complied with (Article 378(n))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 378(o))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonswhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallother
personsandauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhich
doesnotallowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 378(p))
bull Whereareinsuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingsshouldbe
able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 378(q)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesmustonlyusethatinformationin
thecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 378(r))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustbepermittedto
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreaches
ofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersonswherethat
authoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofessional
secrecyinthethirdcountryandsuchinformationshouldonlybedis-
closedoncetheexpressagreementoftheoriginatorhasbeenobtained
andsolelyforthepurposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission
(Article 378(s))
14 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Solvency assessment
(Article 227)
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofdomestic(re)insuranceundertakings
should rely on sound economic principles and solvency requirements should
bebasedonaneconomicvaluationofassetsorliabilities(Article379(a))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomestic(re)insurance
undertakingstoholdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingrequirements
to
ndash establish technical provisions with respect to all (re)insurance obliga-
tionstowardspolicyholdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insurancecontracts
ndash investassetsheldtocovertechnicalprovisionsinthebestinterestsof
allpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccountanydisclosed
policyobjective)
ndash investonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoseriskstheundertakingcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash meet capital requirements set at a level equivalent to that under
SolvencyIIwhichensuresthatbeneficiariesandpolicyholdersare
adequatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsintheeventof
significantlosses
ndash maintainaminimumlevelofcapital(orsufferimmediatesupervisory
intervention)and
ndash meetcapitalrequirementsreferredtoabovewithownfundsof
sufficientqualitywhichareabletoabsorbsignificantlossesbothina
goingconcernandinacaseofwindingup(Article379(b))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsofthesolvencyregimeinthethirdcountrymust
berisk-basedtocapturequantifiableriskandanysignificantnon-quan-
tifiableriskmustbeaddressedthroughanothersupervisorymechanism
(Article 379(c))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tion by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements
are not complied with (Article 379(d))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 379(e))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article379(f))
mayer brown 15
bull Wherea(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptoris
beingcompulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnot
concernthirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakings
should be able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article
379(g))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesshouldonlyusethatinformation
inthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 379(h))
bull Arethesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrypermittedtoexchange
informationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthedischargeof
theirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreachesofcompanylaw
with other authorities bodies or persons where that authority body or
personissubjecttoanobligationofprofessionalsecrecyinthethirdcoun-
tryandissuchinformationonlydisclosedoncetheexpressagreementof
theoriginator(s)hasbeenobtainedandwhereappropriatesolelyforthe
purposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission(Article379(i))
Group supervision
(Article 260)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryhavethenecessarymeans
andresourcesrelevantexpertiseandthemandatetoeffectivelyprotect
policyholdersandbeneficiarieswhereverlocated(Article 380(a))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareempoweredbylawor
regulation to
ndash determinewhichundertakingsfallunderthescopeofsupervisionat
grouplevel
ndash supervise(re)insurerswhicharepartofagroup and
ndash imposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessary
(Article 380(b))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareabletoeffectively
assesstheriskprofileandsolvencyfinancialpositionof(re)insurers
whicharepartofagroupandthegrouprsquosbusinessstrategy(Article
380(c))
bull Supervisionatgrouplevelincludesallundertakingsoverwhichapartici-
patingundertakingexercisesdominantorsignificantinfluence(unless
notappropriateforgroupsupervisionobjectives)(Article 380(d))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustdulyconsiderthe
potentialimpactoftheirdecisionsonthestabilityoffinancialsystems
globally particularly during emergency situations (Article 380(e))
16 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmovementsin
financialmarketsoccur(Article 380(f))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectivesystemof
governanceatgrouplevelwhichprovidesforsoundandprudentbusiness
management and prescribes
ndash that there must be an adequate transparent organisational structure
withclearallocationandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementstoensurethatpersonswhoeffectivelyruntheundertak-
ingarefitandproper
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothwithinthegroupandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthorities and
ndash requirementsforensuringthattheoutsourcedfunctionsoractivities
areeffectivelysupervised(Article 380(g))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectiverisk
management system at group level comprising at least
ndash the strategies processes and internal reporting procedures necessary
toidentifymeasuremonitormanageandreportrisksonacontinu-
ousbasistowhichthegroupiscouldbeexposedand
ndash aneffectiveinternalcontrolsystem(Article 380(h))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
have sound reporting and accounting procedures to monitor and manage
intra-grouptransactionsandriskconcentrations(Article 380(i))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
establishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcomplianceinternal
auditandactuarialfunctions(Article 380(j))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthegroupto
ndash providethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswithanyinformation
thattheyneed
ndash reportsignificantriskconcentrationatthelevelofthegroupand
significantintra-grouptransactionsonatleastanannualbasisand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on the solvency and
financialconditionofthegroup(Article 380(k))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequirethatproposed
changestothebusinesspolicyormanagementofthegroup(orqualifying
holdings in the group) are consistent with the sound and prudent man-
agementofthegroup(Article 380(l))
mayer brown 17
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofthegroupshouldrelyonsound
economicprinciplesandassessmentofsolvencyshouldbebasedonan
economicvaluationofallassetsandliabilities(Article 380(m))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
holdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingarequirementfor
ndash technical provisions with respect to all obligations towards policy-
holdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insuranceundertakingsinthegroup
ndash assets held to cover technical provisions to be invested in the best
interestsofallpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccount
anydisclosedpolicyobjective)
ndash thegrouptoinvestonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoserisksitcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash the group to meet capital requirements at a level which ensures that in
theeventofsignificantlossespolicyholdersandbeneficiariesareade-
quatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsastheybecomedue
ndash (re)insuranceundertakingswhicharepartofthegrouptomaintaina
minimumlevelofcapitalnon-compliancewithwhichtriggers
immediatesupervisoryinterventionand
ndash groupcapitalrequirementstobemetwithownfundsthatareofa
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesinbothagoing
concernandacaseofwindingup(Article 380(n))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsoftheprudentialregimeofthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiablerisksandwhereasignificant
riskisnotquantifiablethatriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanother
supervisory mechanism (Article 380(o))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tionbythesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryintheeventthat
capital requirements are not complied with (Article 380(p))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryrestricttheuseofown-fund
itemsofarelated(re)insuranceundertakingwheretheitemscannoteffec-
tivelybemadeavailabletocoverthecapitalrequirementoftheparticipating
undertakingforwhichgroupsolvencyiscalculated(Article 380(q))
bull Thecalculationofgroupsolvencyinthethirdcountryrsquosprudentialregime
should produce a result that is at least equivalent to the result produced
byeitheroneoforacombinationofthecalculationmethodsinSolvency
II and the calculation method used should ensure that there is no double
useofownfundstomeetthegroupcapitalrequirementandthatthe
intra-groupcreationofcapitalthroughreciprocalfinancingiseliminated
(Article 380(r))
18 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatallpersons
whoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethird
countryaswellasauditorsandexpertsactingonbehalfoftheauthorities
areboundbyobligationsofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinforma-
tionreceivedfromallsupervisoryauthorities(Article 380(s))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 380(t))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatwhere
a(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingmaybe
divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 380(u))
bull Thethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswhichreceiveconfidential
informationfromothersupervisoryauthoritiesmustonlyusethat
informationinthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 380(v))
bull The third country supervisory authorities should be permitted to
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirsupervisoryfunctionsorthedetectionorinvestigation
ofbreachesofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersons
wherethatauthoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofes-
sionalsecrecyintherelevantthirdcountryprovidedthattheinformation
isonlydisclosedwiththeexpressagreementoftheoriginatorandonlyfor
thepurposesforwhichsuchauthoritywasgiven(Article 380(w))
19 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Annex 2
Potentially temporarily
provisionally equivalent area
Criteria to determine temporaryprovisional equivalence
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172(4))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities(particularly
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities)
Solvency assessment
(Article 227(5))
(a) The third country either already has an equivalent solvency regime in
place or one may be adopted or applied
(b)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(c)Thethirdcountryrsquoslawinprincipleallowscooperationandexchange
ofconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities
(d)Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(e)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider advising many of the worldrsquos largest companies including a significant portion of the Fortune 100 FTSE 100 DAX and Hang Seng Index companies and more than half of the worldrsquos largest banks Our legal services include banking and finance corporate and securities litigation and dispute resolution antitrust and competition US Supreme Court and appellate matters employment and benefits environmental financial services regulatory and enforcement government and global trade intellectual property real estate tax restructuring bankruptcy and insolvency and wealth management
Please visit wwwmayerbrowncom for comprehensive contact information for all Mayer Brown offices
This Mayer Brown publication provides information and comments on legal issues and developments of interest to our clients and friends The foregoing is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject matter covered and is not intended to provide legal advice Readers should seek legal advice before taking any action with respect to the matters discussed herein
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider comprising legal practices that are separate entities (the ldquoMayer Brown Practicesrdquo) The Mayer Brown Practices are Mayer Brown LLP and Mayer Brown Europe-Brussels LLP both limited liability partnerships established in Illinois USA Mayer Brown International LLP a limited liability partnership incorporated in England and Wales (authorized and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered in England and Wales number OC 303359) Mayer Brown a SELAS established in France Mayer Brown Mexico SC a sociedad civil formed under the laws of the State of Durango Mexico Mayer Brown JSM a Hong Kong partnership and its associated legal practices in Asia and Tauil amp Chequer Advogados a Brazilian law partnership with which Mayer Brown is associated Mayer Brown Consulting (Singapore) Pte Ltd and its subsidiary which are affiliated with Mayer Brown provide customs and trade advisory and consultancy services not legal services ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
copy 2015 The Mayer Brown Practices All rights reserved
0822fin
Group supervision
(Article 260(5))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasaprudentialregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting transparency and group
solvency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
other supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthoritiesinparticular
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandothersupervisory
authorities
![Page 6: Solvency II: Equivalence Decisions](https://reader030.vdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022012812/61c3bd04e721fa32777b3bfb/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
6 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
SWITZERLAND
24 TheCommissiondraftDecisiononSwitzerlandisafullequivalencedecisionmeaningthatSwitzerlandhas
beendeemedequivalentforthethreepurposesofSolvencyIIdescribedaboveforanindefiniteperiodThis
meansthattheCommissionconsiderstheSwissregimetoprovidealevelofpolicyholderandbeneficiary
protection18 comparable to that provided by Solvency II The advice given by EIOPA to the Commission on
SwissequivalencecanbefoundonEIOPArsquoswebsiteandhelpsexplainthebasisoftheCommissionDecision
The legislation which EIOPA considered in Switzerland and which the Commission views as equivalent
includestheSwissFinancialMarketsSupervisoryAct2007(ldquoFINASMArdquo) the Insurance Supervision Act
(ldquoISArdquo) and the Insurance Supervision Ordinance (ldquoISOrdquo)whichenteredintoforceon1July2015
25 TheDecisionexplainstheapplicationoftheequivalencecriteriatotheSwissregimeForexamplerecital10
statesthattheSwissfinancialmarketsupervisorhasthepowereffectivelytosupervise(re)insuranceactivities
andimposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessaryrecital11explainsthattheSwissSolvency
Testisbasedonsoundeconomicprinciplesandrecital12statesthattheSwissregimerequires(re)insurersto
haveaneffectivesystemofgovernanceinplace19 The equivalence criteria is set out at Annex 1 to this update
26TheDecisionisperhapsunsurprisinggiventhatSwitzerlandandtheEUhaveenteredintoanumberof
bilateraltreatiesandthattheEUhasldquoclosertieswithSwitzerlandthananyothernon-EEAcountryrdquo20 The
DecisionputsparticularweightonMemorandaofUnderstanding(ldquoMoUsrdquo) signed between Switzerland and
theMemberStatesoftheEUtofacilitateinternationalco-operation21
27 Practicallythisfullequivalencedecisionmeansthat
(a) ASwissreinsurerdoingbusinessintheEEAcannotbesubjectedtocollateralrequirementsorany
otheradditionalrequirementsontopofthosetowhichEEAreinsurersaresubjectunderSolvency
II Reinsurance with a Swiss reinsurer is to be treated in the same way as reinsurance with EEA
counterparties
(b) AEEA(re)insurercancompletealloftherequiredprudentialreportingforitsSwisssubsidiaryin
Switzerland under Swiss capital requirement rules and still comply with Solvency II
(c) ASwiss(re)insurancegroupwithEEAsubsidiariesisexemptfromtheotherwiseextraterritorialaspects
ofSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionTheEEAsupervisormustrelyonthegroupsupervisionoftheSwiss
regulator(FINMA)ratherthanconductgroupsupervisionitselfunderSolvencyII
AUSTRALIA BERMUDA BRAZIL CANADA MEXICO AND THE US
28 IntheExplanatoryMemorandumtotheCommissionrsquosdraftDecisiononAustraliaBermudaBrazilCanada
MexicoandtheUSitismadeclearthatArticle227equivalenceistheonlytypeofequivalencewhichis
thesubjectoftheDecisionAsmentionedabovetheDecisionisalsoonlyofprovisionalequivalencewhich
meansitlastsfortenyears22asopposedtoafullequivalencedecisionwhichisunlimitedindurationThe
provisionalnatureoftheequivalencedecisionhoweverisnotcommerciallyaslimitingasthelackofan
equivalencedecisionunderArticles172and260
18 Seerecital6CommissionDelegatedDecision(EU)C(2015)3754(final)19 ThefinalreportonthisadvicecanbefoundathttpseiopaeuropaeuPagesConsultationsCP-14041aspx20 European Union External Action Service webpage EU relations with Switzerland http eeas europa euswitzerland index _ enhtm21 Seerecital16CommissionDelegatedDecision(EU)C(2015)3754(final)22 See Article 227(6) Solvency II
mayer brown 7
29EIOPAassessedandanalysedtheregimesofallsixofthesejurisdictionsbuthasnotmadeallofitsfindings
publicly available23TheCommissiondecidedthatallofthejurisdictionsmetthecriteriaunderArticle
227(5)forprovisionalequivalenceinrespectofsolvencyassessmentbutitdidnotconsiderthatanyof
thejurisdictionsmetthefullequivalencecriteriaunderArticle379ofRegulation201535Furtherthe
CommissiondidnotconsiderwhetheranyofthejurisdictionsmetthecriteriaforequivalenceunderArticles
172(4)and260(5)inrespectofreinsuranceandgroupsupervision24
30Itisnotablethattheonlyareainwhichthesesixjurisdictionshavebeenfoundequivalentistheareainwhich
equivalenceismostbeneficialtoEEA(re)insurersEquivalenceinrespectofsolvencyassessment(under
Article 227) means that EEA (re)insurers can allow their subsidiaries in Australia Bermuda25 Brazil Canada
Mexico and the US to continue to calculate their standalone solvency based on locally accepted methods
ratherthanhavingtoconverttothemethodsprescribedbySolvencyII(foratleastthenexttenyears)
provided that they use the deduction and aggregation method26(seeparagraphs6to8and17formoredetail)
31 Lackofequivalenceinrespectofreinsurance(underArticle172)adverselyaffectsmainlynon-EEAreinsurers
makingtheEEAmarketlessaccessibleforthem(seeparagraphs5and16 above) although it may also have
consequencesforEEAinsurerswhowanttohavetheoptionofreinsuringriskwithinsurersoutsidetheEEA
Lackofequivalenceinrespectofgroupsupervision(underArticle260)predominantlyimpactsnon-EEA
groupsof(re)insurerswithEEA-basedactivity(seeparagraphs9to12and16formoredetail)
32 TheeffectoftheDecisionifadoptedissignificantfornon-EEA(re)insurersAnEEAregulatorcan
(continueto)imposeadditionalrequirementssuchastheimpositionofcollateralrequirementsoncontracts
ofreinsurancewhichoriginateinanycountryoutsidetheEEAsaveforSwitzerlandFurtherallnon-EEA
(re)insurancegroupsapartfromSwiss(re)insurancegroupswhichhaveEEAsubsidiariesbutnotEEA
sub-groupscouldbesubjecttoSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionrequirementsaswellasthegroupsupervision
exercisedbyitshomejurisdictionThefactthatanequivalencedecisionhasnotbeenmadeinrespectof
group supervision however enables national supervisors to carry out an equivalence assessment In the
absenceofbothanequivalencedecisionandanequivalenceassessmentEEAsupervisorsmayapplyldquoother
methodsrdquotogroupsupervisioninsteadofsupervisingthenon-EEAgroupunderSolvencyII27 As explained
atparagraph12abovethePRAwilltakeacase-by-caseapproachandrequiresanon-EEA(re)insurance
grouptosubmitawaiverapplicationrequestingtheuseofldquoothermethodsrdquoTherearenosuchoptionsin
relation to reinsurance supervision
33 SomemayconsideritsurprisingthattheCommissionfoundtheUSinsuranceregime(thelargestinsurance
marketintheworld)wantingintheareasofreinsuranceandgroupsupervisionbutthisresultwascertainly
foreseeablewhenconsiderationisgiventothefactthattheEUndashUSinsurancedialogueprojectwhich
aimstoachieveimprovedmutualunderstandingoftherespectiveinsuranceregulatoryandsupervisory
regimesstartedin2012buthasstilltoreachanagreedconclusionaboutmutualrecognitionForexample
negotiationsoverreductionofcollateralrequirementsintheUSforEEAreinsurershavebeenongoing
foryearsbutprogresshasbeenslowinsteadSolvencyIIdoesnotpreventtheEEAimposingcollateral
requirements on US reinsurers
23 The full text of the report on Bermuda is available online here ht tps eiopa europa eu Pages News EIOPA- publishes-the- Final- Reports-on-full- equivalence -assessments-of- Bermuda -Japan -and-Switzerland a spx Thefulltextreportsontheotherfivejurisdictionswhicharethesubject of this decision are not publicly available
24 See Annexes 1 and 225 Captive insurers regulated in Bermuda are excluded from the equivalency decision26 See Article 233 Solvency II27 See paragraphs 9 to 12 above
8 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
34TheUSinsuranceindustrythroughtheACLI28 RAA29 and other trade associations has been pushing the
federalgovernmenttonegotiateacoveredagreementwiththeEUtopreventtheabovereferencedpotentially
adversecompetitivelydisadvantageousoutcomesfromalackofequivalencedecisionsbytheEUThose
negotiationscontinuetobemiredinpoliticalpositioningwithinthefederalgovernment(atTreasuryandthe
US Trade Representative) with the US state regulators and with the EU regulators and time is running short
SolvencyIIisscheduledtotakeeffecton1January2016andatpresentitappearsunlikelythattheUSwillbe
grantedequivalencebytheCommissioninrespectofreinsuranceandgroupsupervisionInrespectofgroup
supervisionmuchisthereforeinthehandsoftheEEAsupervisors
The equivalence assessment process
35 AsSolvencyIIhasnotcomeintoforceitisnotyetpossibleforanequivalenceassessmenttobecarried
outItwillasdescribedabovebepossibleforEEAsupervisorstomakeanequivalenceassessmentofthe
groupsupervisoryregimeofAustraliaBermudaBrazilCanadaMexicoandtheUSafter1January2016
but EIOPA guidelines30makeclearthatalaterequivalencedecisionbytheCommissionwouldsupersedeany
equivalenceassessmentTheEEAsupervisorscanalsomakeequivalenceassessments(inrespectofboth
solvencyassessmentandgroupsupervision)ofthemanynon-EEAcountrieswhichareunlikelytoeverbethe
subjectofaCommissionequivalencedecision
36TheEIOPAguidelinessetoutthemethodologyforequivalenceassessmentsbynationalsupervisorsThey
stresstheimportanceoftheactivecooperationofthethirdcountryintheequivalenceassessmentprocess
itisdeterminativeinthecaseofgroupsupervisionandlackofcooperationwouldleadtoanon-equivalent
outcome An equivalence assessment is based on the same criteria as an equivalence decision which are set
out in Annex 1 to this update National supervisors can conduct the assessment themselves with assistance
fromEIOPAandinconsultationwithotherEEAsupervisorsorrequestEIOPAtocarryouttheassessment
Unlikeanequivalencedecisionthereisnopossibilityofatemporaryorprovisionalequivalenceassessment
37 Positive equivalence assessments require regular review they must be reviewed at least every three years or
followingsignificantdevelopmentsinthejurisdictionassessedNegativeequivalenceassessmentsmayberevisited
attherequestoftherelevant(re)insureroratthenationalsupervisorrsquosowninitiativewheretherehavebeen
significantchangestothesupervisoryregimelaiddownSolvencyIIortothesupervisoryregimeofthenon-
EEAcountryconcernedUnlesstherehavebeensuchchangesitisnotpossiblefornationalsupervisorstotake
divergentequivalencedecisionsregardingthesamenon-EEAcountryEquivalenceassessmentswillhaveeffect
morebroadlythanjustfortherequesting(re)insurerorgroupAccordinglywhencarryingoutanequivalence
assessmentnationalsupervisorsmustassesstheentirenon-EEAregimenotjusttheregimeasitappliestothe(re)
insurerorgroupconcernedForexampleevenifagroupconductsonlylifeinsurancebusinessitwouldstillbe
necessaryforthenationalsupervisortoassessthethirdcountryregimefornon-lifebusiness
EEA sub-groups
38 As noted at paragraph 9 abovewhereanon-EEAgroupdoesnothaveanEEAparentundertakingandis
notsubjecttoanequivalencedeterminationbyeithertheCommissionoranationalsupervisorEIOPAhas
suggestedthatnationalsupervisorsshouldconsiderrequiringsuchanon-EEAgrouptoestablishanEEAsub-
group Such a requirement will understandably be regarded as onerous but doing so would mean that only the
EEAsub-groupwouldbesubjectedtoSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionandthegroupsolvencycalculation
28 The American Council of Life Insurers29 The Reinsurance Association of America30 See Final Report on Public Consultation No14015 on Guidelines on the methodology for equivalence assessments by national supervisory
authorities under Solvency II EIOPA-BoS-14182 27 November 2014
mayer brown 9
39WhereanequivalencedeterminationhasbeenmadethereisnoneedtocreateanEEAsub-groupbutnon-
EEAgroupswithsuchastructurewillfindthemselvessubjecttodualregulationwhilsttheircompetitors
withoutanEEAparentundertakingwillbeabletorelysolelyonthegroupsupervisionexercisedbytheir
homesupervisorEIOPAifnotSolvencyIIhasconsideredthisdichotomy
40InitsguidanceEIOPAsuggeststhatwherethewidernon-EEAgroupissubjecttoequivalentthirdcountry
group supervision the acting EEA group supervisor should rely on the group supervision exercised by the
third-countrysupervisoryauthoritiesandexempttheEEAsub-groupfromSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionson
acase-by-casebasisbutonlywherethiswouldresultinamoreefficientsupervisionofthegroupandwould
not impair its supervision EIOPA sets out criteria that the acting group supervisor should consider when
deciding whether such an exemption should be granted They are
(a) theworldwidegroupsupervisionallowsforarobustassessmentoftheriskstowhichtheEEAsubgroup
anditsentitiesareexposedconsideringthestructureofthegroupthenaturescaleandcomplexityof
therisksandthecapitalallocationwithinthegroup
(b) thecooperationcurrentlyinplacebetweenthenon-EEAgroupsupervisorandtheEEAsupervisors
forthegroupconcernedisstructuredandwell-managedthroughregularmeetingsandappropriate
exchangeofinformationwithinacollegeofsupervisorstowhichtheEEAsupervisorsandEIOPAare
invitedand
(c) anannualworkplanincludingjointon-siteexaminationsisagreeduponintheseregularmeetingsby
thesupervisoryauthoritiesinvolvedinthesupervisionofthegroup31
41 EIOPAguidanceisnotbindingonthenationalsupervisorsbutthesupervisorshaveinformedEIOPAwhether
or not they intend to comply with it Only Germany has stated that it will not comply with the relevant
guidancebecauseitexplainsGermanlawdoesnotpermitacase-by-caseapproachItappearstherefore
thattheeffectofanequivalencedeterminationbyeithertheCommissionoranationalsupervisorcouldbe
toexemptanEEAsub-groupfromSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionandsolvencycalculationThispossibility
alreadyexistsforSwiss(re)insurancegroups
What happens next
42TheCommissionhasindicated32thatthereareassessmentsofotherthirdcountryjurisdictionscurrently
inprogressandthatsomejurisdictionsaremodifyingtheirinsuranceframeworksinordertofacilitate
equivalencedecisionsInthelightofthisasecondpackageofdecisionsisexpectedintheautumnof
2015ApositivedecisiononreinsuranceequivalenceforJapanalreadythesubjectofanEIOPAreport33 is
expectedtobeincludedinthenextpackageFurthergivenEIOPArsquosfindingsitwouldnotbesurprisingifthe
CommissionmakesapositivedecisionregardinggroupsupervisoryandreinsuranceequivalenceforBermuda
butthefutureislessclearfortheUSAustraliaBrazilCanadaandMexicoInthemeantimenon-EEA(re)
insurance groups will want to consider their group structure in order to ascertain how the extraterritorial
provisionsofSolvencyIImayaffectthem
31 Guideline 5 of Guidelines on group solvency EIOPA-BoS-1418132 Draft minutes of a meeting of the Commissionrsquos expert group on banking payments and insurance ( in its insurance formation) 5 March 201533 See fn 23
10 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Ifyouhaveanyquestionsaboutanyoftheissuesraisedinthisalertpleasecontactyourusualcontactoroneof
the lawyers listed below
LONDON
Alexandria Carr
OfCounsel(EmployedBarrister)
E acarrmayerbrowncom T+442031303398
Mark Compton Partner
E mcomptonmayerbrowncom T+442031303388
Colin Scagell Partner
E cscagellmayerbrowncom T+442031303315
US
David W Alberts
Partner(NewYork)
dalbertsmayerbrowncom T+12125062611
Lawrence R Hamilton
Partner (Chicago)
lhamiltonmayerbrowncom
T +1 312 701 7055
mayer brown 11
Annex 1
Potentially-equivalent element
(Directive 2009138EU)
Criteria to determine equivalence
(Commission Delegated Regulation 201535)
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusthavethepower(by
laworregulation)toeffectivelysupervisedomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ingsandtoimposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessary
(Article 378(a))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusthavethenecessary
meansandresourcesrelevantexpertiseandthemandatetoeffectively
protectpolicyholdersandbeneficiarieswhereverlocated (Article 378(b))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryshouldalwaysduly
considerthepotentialimpactoftheirdecisionsontheglobalstabilityof
financialsystemsparticularlyduringanemergency(Article 378(c))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepotentialpro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmove-
mentsinthefinancialmarketsoccur(Article 378(d))
bull Theremustbearequirementforreinsurerstobeauthorisedtoprovide
businessinthethirdcountryandtheremustbeaclearobjectiveand
publiclyavailablesetofwrittenauthorisationstandards(Article 378(e))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingstohaveaneffectivesystemofgovernancewhich
provides sound and prudent business management including
ndash an adequate transparent organisational structure with clear alloca-
tionandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementsforensuringthatpersonswhoeffectivelyrunthe
undertakingarelsquofitandproperrsquo
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothinternallyandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthoritiesand
ndash requirementsforensuringthatoutsourcedfunctionsactivitiesare
effectivelysupervised(Article 378(f))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticrein-
suranceundertakingstohaveaneffectiveriskmanagementsystem
comprising
ndash strategiesprocessesandinternalreportingprocedurestoidentify
measuremonitormanageandreportriskstowhichtheundertaking
iscould be exposed at an individual and an aggregated level and on a
continuousbasisand
ndash effectiveinternalcontrols(Article 378(g))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
ancetoestablishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcompliance
internalauditandactuarialfunctions(Article 378(h))
12 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingsto
ndash providethirdcountryauthoritieswithanyinformationnecessaryfor
supervisionand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on their solvency and
financialcondition(Article 378(i))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthatproposedchanges
tothebusinesspolicyormanagementofdomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ingsortoqualifyingholdingsinsuchundertakingsbeconsistentwith
maintaining sound and prudent management (Article 378(j))
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofdomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ings should rely on sound economic principles and solvency requirements
shouldbebasedonaneconomicvaluationofassetsorliabilities(Article
378(k))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingstoholdadequatefinancialresourcesincluding
requirements to
ndash establish technical provisions with respect to all reinsurance obliga-
tionstowardspolicyholdersandbeneficiariesofreinsurance
contracts
ndash investassetsheldtocovertechnicalprovisionsinthebestinterestsof
allpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccountanydisclosed
policyobjective)
ndash investonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoseriskstheundertakingcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash meet capital requirements set at a level equivalent to that under
SolvencyIIwhichensuresthatbeneficiariesandpolicyholdersare
adequatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsintheeventof
significantlosses
ndash maintainaminimumlevelofcapital(orsufferimmediatesupervisory
intervention)and
ndash meetcapitalrequirementsreferredtoabovewithownfundsof
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesbothinagoing
concernandinacaseofwindingup(Article 378(l))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsofthesolvencyregimeinthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiableriskandanysignificant
non-quantifiableriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanothersupervisory
mechanism (Article 378(m))
mayer brown 13
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustensuretimelyintervention
by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements are
not complied with (Article 378(n))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 378(o))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonswhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallother
personsandauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhich
doesnotallowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 378(p))
bull Whereareinsuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingsshouldbe
able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 378(q)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesmustonlyusethatinformationin
thecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 378(r))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustbepermittedto
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreaches
ofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersonswherethat
authoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofessional
secrecyinthethirdcountryandsuchinformationshouldonlybedis-
closedoncetheexpressagreementoftheoriginatorhasbeenobtained
andsolelyforthepurposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission
(Article 378(s))
14 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Solvency assessment
(Article 227)
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofdomestic(re)insuranceundertakings
should rely on sound economic principles and solvency requirements should
bebasedonaneconomicvaluationofassetsorliabilities(Article379(a))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomestic(re)insurance
undertakingstoholdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingrequirements
to
ndash establish technical provisions with respect to all (re)insurance obliga-
tionstowardspolicyholdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insurancecontracts
ndash investassetsheldtocovertechnicalprovisionsinthebestinterestsof
allpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccountanydisclosed
policyobjective)
ndash investonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoseriskstheundertakingcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash meet capital requirements set at a level equivalent to that under
SolvencyIIwhichensuresthatbeneficiariesandpolicyholdersare
adequatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsintheeventof
significantlosses
ndash maintainaminimumlevelofcapital(orsufferimmediatesupervisory
intervention)and
ndash meetcapitalrequirementsreferredtoabovewithownfundsof
sufficientqualitywhichareabletoabsorbsignificantlossesbothina
goingconcernandinacaseofwindingup(Article379(b))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsofthesolvencyregimeinthethirdcountrymust
berisk-basedtocapturequantifiableriskandanysignificantnon-quan-
tifiableriskmustbeaddressedthroughanothersupervisorymechanism
(Article 379(c))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tion by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements
are not complied with (Article 379(d))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 379(e))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article379(f))
mayer brown 15
bull Wherea(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptoris
beingcompulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnot
concernthirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakings
should be able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article
379(g))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesshouldonlyusethatinformation
inthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 379(h))
bull Arethesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrypermittedtoexchange
informationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthedischargeof
theirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreachesofcompanylaw
with other authorities bodies or persons where that authority body or
personissubjecttoanobligationofprofessionalsecrecyinthethirdcoun-
tryandissuchinformationonlydisclosedoncetheexpressagreementof
theoriginator(s)hasbeenobtainedandwhereappropriatesolelyforthe
purposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission(Article379(i))
Group supervision
(Article 260)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryhavethenecessarymeans
andresourcesrelevantexpertiseandthemandatetoeffectivelyprotect
policyholdersandbeneficiarieswhereverlocated(Article 380(a))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareempoweredbylawor
regulation to
ndash determinewhichundertakingsfallunderthescopeofsupervisionat
grouplevel
ndash supervise(re)insurerswhicharepartofagroup and
ndash imposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessary
(Article 380(b))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareabletoeffectively
assesstheriskprofileandsolvencyfinancialpositionof(re)insurers
whicharepartofagroupandthegrouprsquosbusinessstrategy(Article
380(c))
bull Supervisionatgrouplevelincludesallundertakingsoverwhichapartici-
patingundertakingexercisesdominantorsignificantinfluence(unless
notappropriateforgroupsupervisionobjectives)(Article 380(d))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustdulyconsiderthe
potentialimpactoftheirdecisionsonthestabilityoffinancialsystems
globally particularly during emergency situations (Article 380(e))
16 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmovementsin
financialmarketsoccur(Article 380(f))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectivesystemof
governanceatgrouplevelwhichprovidesforsoundandprudentbusiness
management and prescribes
ndash that there must be an adequate transparent organisational structure
withclearallocationandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementstoensurethatpersonswhoeffectivelyruntheundertak-
ingarefitandproper
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothwithinthegroupandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthorities and
ndash requirementsforensuringthattheoutsourcedfunctionsoractivities
areeffectivelysupervised(Article 380(g))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectiverisk
management system at group level comprising at least
ndash the strategies processes and internal reporting procedures necessary
toidentifymeasuremonitormanageandreportrisksonacontinu-
ousbasistowhichthegroupiscouldbeexposedand
ndash aneffectiveinternalcontrolsystem(Article 380(h))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
have sound reporting and accounting procedures to monitor and manage
intra-grouptransactionsandriskconcentrations(Article 380(i))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
establishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcomplianceinternal
auditandactuarialfunctions(Article 380(j))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthegroupto
ndash providethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswithanyinformation
thattheyneed
ndash reportsignificantriskconcentrationatthelevelofthegroupand
significantintra-grouptransactionsonatleastanannualbasisand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on the solvency and
financialconditionofthegroup(Article 380(k))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequirethatproposed
changestothebusinesspolicyormanagementofthegroup(orqualifying
holdings in the group) are consistent with the sound and prudent man-
agementofthegroup(Article 380(l))
mayer brown 17
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofthegroupshouldrelyonsound
economicprinciplesandassessmentofsolvencyshouldbebasedonan
economicvaluationofallassetsandliabilities(Article 380(m))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
holdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingarequirementfor
ndash technical provisions with respect to all obligations towards policy-
holdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insuranceundertakingsinthegroup
ndash assets held to cover technical provisions to be invested in the best
interestsofallpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccount
anydisclosedpolicyobjective)
ndash thegrouptoinvestonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoserisksitcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash the group to meet capital requirements at a level which ensures that in
theeventofsignificantlossespolicyholdersandbeneficiariesareade-
quatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsastheybecomedue
ndash (re)insuranceundertakingswhicharepartofthegrouptomaintaina
minimumlevelofcapitalnon-compliancewithwhichtriggers
immediatesupervisoryinterventionand
ndash groupcapitalrequirementstobemetwithownfundsthatareofa
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesinbothagoing
concernandacaseofwindingup(Article 380(n))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsoftheprudentialregimeofthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiablerisksandwhereasignificant
riskisnotquantifiablethatriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanother
supervisory mechanism (Article 380(o))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tionbythesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryintheeventthat
capital requirements are not complied with (Article 380(p))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryrestricttheuseofown-fund
itemsofarelated(re)insuranceundertakingwheretheitemscannoteffec-
tivelybemadeavailabletocoverthecapitalrequirementoftheparticipating
undertakingforwhichgroupsolvencyiscalculated(Article 380(q))
bull Thecalculationofgroupsolvencyinthethirdcountryrsquosprudentialregime
should produce a result that is at least equivalent to the result produced
byeitheroneoforacombinationofthecalculationmethodsinSolvency
II and the calculation method used should ensure that there is no double
useofownfundstomeetthegroupcapitalrequirementandthatthe
intra-groupcreationofcapitalthroughreciprocalfinancingiseliminated
(Article 380(r))
18 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatallpersons
whoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethird
countryaswellasauditorsandexpertsactingonbehalfoftheauthorities
areboundbyobligationsofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinforma-
tionreceivedfromallsupervisoryauthorities(Article 380(s))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 380(t))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatwhere
a(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingmaybe
divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 380(u))
bull Thethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswhichreceiveconfidential
informationfromothersupervisoryauthoritiesmustonlyusethat
informationinthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 380(v))
bull The third country supervisory authorities should be permitted to
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirsupervisoryfunctionsorthedetectionorinvestigation
ofbreachesofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersons
wherethatauthoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofes-
sionalsecrecyintherelevantthirdcountryprovidedthattheinformation
isonlydisclosedwiththeexpressagreementoftheoriginatorandonlyfor
thepurposesforwhichsuchauthoritywasgiven(Article 380(w))
19 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Annex 2
Potentially temporarily
provisionally equivalent area
Criteria to determine temporaryprovisional equivalence
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172(4))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities(particularly
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities)
Solvency assessment
(Article 227(5))
(a) The third country either already has an equivalent solvency regime in
place or one may be adopted or applied
(b)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(c)Thethirdcountryrsquoslawinprincipleallowscooperationandexchange
ofconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities
(d)Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(e)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider advising many of the worldrsquos largest companies including a significant portion of the Fortune 100 FTSE 100 DAX and Hang Seng Index companies and more than half of the worldrsquos largest banks Our legal services include banking and finance corporate and securities litigation and dispute resolution antitrust and competition US Supreme Court and appellate matters employment and benefits environmental financial services regulatory and enforcement government and global trade intellectual property real estate tax restructuring bankruptcy and insolvency and wealth management
Please visit wwwmayerbrowncom for comprehensive contact information for all Mayer Brown offices
This Mayer Brown publication provides information and comments on legal issues and developments of interest to our clients and friends The foregoing is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject matter covered and is not intended to provide legal advice Readers should seek legal advice before taking any action with respect to the matters discussed herein
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider comprising legal practices that are separate entities (the ldquoMayer Brown Practicesrdquo) The Mayer Brown Practices are Mayer Brown LLP and Mayer Brown Europe-Brussels LLP both limited liability partnerships established in Illinois USA Mayer Brown International LLP a limited liability partnership incorporated in England and Wales (authorized and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered in England and Wales number OC 303359) Mayer Brown a SELAS established in France Mayer Brown Mexico SC a sociedad civil formed under the laws of the State of Durango Mexico Mayer Brown JSM a Hong Kong partnership and its associated legal practices in Asia and Tauil amp Chequer Advogados a Brazilian law partnership with which Mayer Brown is associated Mayer Brown Consulting (Singapore) Pte Ltd and its subsidiary which are affiliated with Mayer Brown provide customs and trade advisory and consultancy services not legal services ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
copy 2015 The Mayer Brown Practices All rights reserved
0822fin
Group supervision
(Article 260(5))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasaprudentialregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting transparency and group
solvency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
other supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthoritiesinparticular
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandothersupervisory
authorities
![Page 7: Solvency II: Equivalence Decisions](https://reader030.vdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022012812/61c3bd04e721fa32777b3bfb/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
mayer brown 7
29EIOPAassessedandanalysedtheregimesofallsixofthesejurisdictionsbuthasnotmadeallofitsfindings
publicly available23TheCommissiondecidedthatallofthejurisdictionsmetthecriteriaunderArticle
227(5)forprovisionalequivalenceinrespectofsolvencyassessmentbutitdidnotconsiderthatanyof
thejurisdictionsmetthefullequivalencecriteriaunderArticle379ofRegulation201535Furtherthe
CommissiondidnotconsiderwhetheranyofthejurisdictionsmetthecriteriaforequivalenceunderArticles
172(4)and260(5)inrespectofreinsuranceandgroupsupervision24
30Itisnotablethattheonlyareainwhichthesesixjurisdictionshavebeenfoundequivalentistheareainwhich
equivalenceismostbeneficialtoEEA(re)insurersEquivalenceinrespectofsolvencyassessment(under
Article 227) means that EEA (re)insurers can allow their subsidiaries in Australia Bermuda25 Brazil Canada
Mexico and the US to continue to calculate their standalone solvency based on locally accepted methods
ratherthanhavingtoconverttothemethodsprescribedbySolvencyII(foratleastthenexttenyears)
provided that they use the deduction and aggregation method26(seeparagraphs6to8and17formoredetail)
31 Lackofequivalenceinrespectofreinsurance(underArticle172)adverselyaffectsmainlynon-EEAreinsurers
makingtheEEAmarketlessaccessibleforthem(seeparagraphs5and16 above) although it may also have
consequencesforEEAinsurerswhowanttohavetheoptionofreinsuringriskwithinsurersoutsidetheEEA
Lackofequivalenceinrespectofgroupsupervision(underArticle260)predominantlyimpactsnon-EEA
groupsof(re)insurerswithEEA-basedactivity(seeparagraphs9to12and16formoredetail)
32 TheeffectoftheDecisionifadoptedissignificantfornon-EEA(re)insurersAnEEAregulatorcan
(continueto)imposeadditionalrequirementssuchastheimpositionofcollateralrequirementsoncontracts
ofreinsurancewhichoriginateinanycountryoutsidetheEEAsaveforSwitzerlandFurtherallnon-EEA
(re)insurancegroupsapartfromSwiss(re)insurancegroupswhichhaveEEAsubsidiariesbutnotEEA
sub-groupscouldbesubjecttoSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionrequirementsaswellasthegroupsupervision
exercisedbyitshomejurisdictionThefactthatanequivalencedecisionhasnotbeenmadeinrespectof
group supervision however enables national supervisors to carry out an equivalence assessment In the
absenceofbothanequivalencedecisionandanequivalenceassessmentEEAsupervisorsmayapplyldquoother
methodsrdquotogroupsupervisioninsteadofsupervisingthenon-EEAgroupunderSolvencyII27 As explained
atparagraph12abovethePRAwilltakeacase-by-caseapproachandrequiresanon-EEA(re)insurance
grouptosubmitawaiverapplicationrequestingtheuseofldquoothermethodsrdquoTherearenosuchoptionsin
relation to reinsurance supervision
33 SomemayconsideritsurprisingthattheCommissionfoundtheUSinsuranceregime(thelargestinsurance
marketintheworld)wantingintheareasofreinsuranceandgroupsupervisionbutthisresultwascertainly
foreseeablewhenconsiderationisgiventothefactthattheEUndashUSinsurancedialogueprojectwhich
aimstoachieveimprovedmutualunderstandingoftherespectiveinsuranceregulatoryandsupervisory
regimesstartedin2012buthasstilltoreachanagreedconclusionaboutmutualrecognitionForexample
negotiationsoverreductionofcollateralrequirementsintheUSforEEAreinsurershavebeenongoing
foryearsbutprogresshasbeenslowinsteadSolvencyIIdoesnotpreventtheEEAimposingcollateral
requirements on US reinsurers
23 The full text of the report on Bermuda is available online here ht tps eiopa europa eu Pages News EIOPA- publishes-the- Final- Reports-on-full- equivalence -assessments-of- Bermuda -Japan -and-Switzerland a spx Thefulltextreportsontheotherfivejurisdictionswhicharethesubject of this decision are not publicly available
24 See Annexes 1 and 225 Captive insurers regulated in Bermuda are excluded from the equivalency decision26 See Article 233 Solvency II27 See paragraphs 9 to 12 above
8 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
34TheUSinsuranceindustrythroughtheACLI28 RAA29 and other trade associations has been pushing the
federalgovernmenttonegotiateacoveredagreementwiththeEUtopreventtheabovereferencedpotentially
adversecompetitivelydisadvantageousoutcomesfromalackofequivalencedecisionsbytheEUThose
negotiationscontinuetobemiredinpoliticalpositioningwithinthefederalgovernment(atTreasuryandthe
US Trade Representative) with the US state regulators and with the EU regulators and time is running short
SolvencyIIisscheduledtotakeeffecton1January2016andatpresentitappearsunlikelythattheUSwillbe
grantedequivalencebytheCommissioninrespectofreinsuranceandgroupsupervisionInrespectofgroup
supervisionmuchisthereforeinthehandsoftheEEAsupervisors
The equivalence assessment process
35 AsSolvencyIIhasnotcomeintoforceitisnotyetpossibleforanequivalenceassessmenttobecarried
outItwillasdescribedabovebepossibleforEEAsupervisorstomakeanequivalenceassessmentofthe
groupsupervisoryregimeofAustraliaBermudaBrazilCanadaMexicoandtheUSafter1January2016
but EIOPA guidelines30makeclearthatalaterequivalencedecisionbytheCommissionwouldsupersedeany
equivalenceassessmentTheEEAsupervisorscanalsomakeequivalenceassessments(inrespectofboth
solvencyassessmentandgroupsupervision)ofthemanynon-EEAcountrieswhichareunlikelytoeverbethe
subjectofaCommissionequivalencedecision
36TheEIOPAguidelinessetoutthemethodologyforequivalenceassessmentsbynationalsupervisorsThey
stresstheimportanceoftheactivecooperationofthethirdcountryintheequivalenceassessmentprocess
itisdeterminativeinthecaseofgroupsupervisionandlackofcooperationwouldleadtoanon-equivalent
outcome An equivalence assessment is based on the same criteria as an equivalence decision which are set
out in Annex 1 to this update National supervisors can conduct the assessment themselves with assistance
fromEIOPAandinconsultationwithotherEEAsupervisorsorrequestEIOPAtocarryouttheassessment
Unlikeanequivalencedecisionthereisnopossibilityofatemporaryorprovisionalequivalenceassessment
37 Positive equivalence assessments require regular review they must be reviewed at least every three years or
followingsignificantdevelopmentsinthejurisdictionassessedNegativeequivalenceassessmentsmayberevisited
attherequestoftherelevant(re)insureroratthenationalsupervisorrsquosowninitiativewheretherehavebeen
significantchangestothesupervisoryregimelaiddownSolvencyIIortothesupervisoryregimeofthenon-
EEAcountryconcernedUnlesstherehavebeensuchchangesitisnotpossiblefornationalsupervisorstotake
divergentequivalencedecisionsregardingthesamenon-EEAcountryEquivalenceassessmentswillhaveeffect
morebroadlythanjustfortherequesting(re)insurerorgroupAccordinglywhencarryingoutanequivalence
assessmentnationalsupervisorsmustassesstheentirenon-EEAregimenotjusttheregimeasitappliestothe(re)
insurerorgroupconcernedForexampleevenifagroupconductsonlylifeinsurancebusinessitwouldstillbe
necessaryforthenationalsupervisortoassessthethirdcountryregimefornon-lifebusiness
EEA sub-groups
38 As noted at paragraph 9 abovewhereanon-EEAgroupdoesnothaveanEEAparentundertakingandis
notsubjecttoanequivalencedeterminationbyeithertheCommissionoranationalsupervisorEIOPAhas
suggestedthatnationalsupervisorsshouldconsiderrequiringsuchanon-EEAgrouptoestablishanEEAsub-
group Such a requirement will understandably be regarded as onerous but doing so would mean that only the
EEAsub-groupwouldbesubjectedtoSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionandthegroupsolvencycalculation
28 The American Council of Life Insurers29 The Reinsurance Association of America30 See Final Report on Public Consultation No14015 on Guidelines on the methodology for equivalence assessments by national supervisory
authorities under Solvency II EIOPA-BoS-14182 27 November 2014
mayer brown 9
39WhereanequivalencedeterminationhasbeenmadethereisnoneedtocreateanEEAsub-groupbutnon-
EEAgroupswithsuchastructurewillfindthemselvessubjecttodualregulationwhilsttheircompetitors
withoutanEEAparentundertakingwillbeabletorelysolelyonthegroupsupervisionexercisedbytheir
homesupervisorEIOPAifnotSolvencyIIhasconsideredthisdichotomy
40InitsguidanceEIOPAsuggeststhatwherethewidernon-EEAgroupissubjecttoequivalentthirdcountry
group supervision the acting EEA group supervisor should rely on the group supervision exercised by the
third-countrysupervisoryauthoritiesandexempttheEEAsub-groupfromSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionson
acase-by-casebasisbutonlywherethiswouldresultinamoreefficientsupervisionofthegroupandwould
not impair its supervision EIOPA sets out criteria that the acting group supervisor should consider when
deciding whether such an exemption should be granted They are
(a) theworldwidegroupsupervisionallowsforarobustassessmentoftheriskstowhichtheEEAsubgroup
anditsentitiesareexposedconsideringthestructureofthegroupthenaturescaleandcomplexityof
therisksandthecapitalallocationwithinthegroup
(b) thecooperationcurrentlyinplacebetweenthenon-EEAgroupsupervisorandtheEEAsupervisors
forthegroupconcernedisstructuredandwell-managedthroughregularmeetingsandappropriate
exchangeofinformationwithinacollegeofsupervisorstowhichtheEEAsupervisorsandEIOPAare
invitedand
(c) anannualworkplanincludingjointon-siteexaminationsisagreeduponintheseregularmeetingsby
thesupervisoryauthoritiesinvolvedinthesupervisionofthegroup31
41 EIOPAguidanceisnotbindingonthenationalsupervisorsbutthesupervisorshaveinformedEIOPAwhether
or not they intend to comply with it Only Germany has stated that it will not comply with the relevant
guidancebecauseitexplainsGermanlawdoesnotpermitacase-by-caseapproachItappearstherefore
thattheeffectofanequivalencedeterminationbyeithertheCommissionoranationalsupervisorcouldbe
toexemptanEEAsub-groupfromSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionandsolvencycalculationThispossibility
alreadyexistsforSwiss(re)insurancegroups
What happens next
42TheCommissionhasindicated32thatthereareassessmentsofotherthirdcountryjurisdictionscurrently
inprogressandthatsomejurisdictionsaremodifyingtheirinsuranceframeworksinordertofacilitate
equivalencedecisionsInthelightofthisasecondpackageofdecisionsisexpectedintheautumnof
2015ApositivedecisiononreinsuranceequivalenceforJapanalreadythesubjectofanEIOPAreport33 is
expectedtobeincludedinthenextpackageFurthergivenEIOPArsquosfindingsitwouldnotbesurprisingifthe
CommissionmakesapositivedecisionregardinggroupsupervisoryandreinsuranceequivalenceforBermuda
butthefutureislessclearfortheUSAustraliaBrazilCanadaandMexicoInthemeantimenon-EEA(re)
insurance groups will want to consider their group structure in order to ascertain how the extraterritorial
provisionsofSolvencyIImayaffectthem
31 Guideline 5 of Guidelines on group solvency EIOPA-BoS-1418132 Draft minutes of a meeting of the Commissionrsquos expert group on banking payments and insurance ( in its insurance formation) 5 March 201533 See fn 23
10 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Ifyouhaveanyquestionsaboutanyoftheissuesraisedinthisalertpleasecontactyourusualcontactoroneof
the lawyers listed below
LONDON
Alexandria Carr
OfCounsel(EmployedBarrister)
E acarrmayerbrowncom T+442031303398
Mark Compton Partner
E mcomptonmayerbrowncom T+442031303388
Colin Scagell Partner
E cscagellmayerbrowncom T+442031303315
US
David W Alberts
Partner(NewYork)
dalbertsmayerbrowncom T+12125062611
Lawrence R Hamilton
Partner (Chicago)
lhamiltonmayerbrowncom
T +1 312 701 7055
mayer brown 11
Annex 1
Potentially-equivalent element
(Directive 2009138EU)
Criteria to determine equivalence
(Commission Delegated Regulation 201535)
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusthavethepower(by
laworregulation)toeffectivelysupervisedomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ingsandtoimposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessary
(Article 378(a))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusthavethenecessary
meansandresourcesrelevantexpertiseandthemandatetoeffectively
protectpolicyholdersandbeneficiarieswhereverlocated (Article 378(b))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryshouldalwaysduly
considerthepotentialimpactoftheirdecisionsontheglobalstabilityof
financialsystemsparticularlyduringanemergency(Article 378(c))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepotentialpro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmove-
mentsinthefinancialmarketsoccur(Article 378(d))
bull Theremustbearequirementforreinsurerstobeauthorisedtoprovide
businessinthethirdcountryandtheremustbeaclearobjectiveand
publiclyavailablesetofwrittenauthorisationstandards(Article 378(e))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingstohaveaneffectivesystemofgovernancewhich
provides sound and prudent business management including
ndash an adequate transparent organisational structure with clear alloca-
tionandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementsforensuringthatpersonswhoeffectivelyrunthe
undertakingarelsquofitandproperrsquo
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothinternallyandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthoritiesand
ndash requirementsforensuringthatoutsourcedfunctionsactivitiesare
effectivelysupervised(Article 378(f))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticrein-
suranceundertakingstohaveaneffectiveriskmanagementsystem
comprising
ndash strategiesprocessesandinternalreportingprocedurestoidentify
measuremonitormanageandreportriskstowhichtheundertaking
iscould be exposed at an individual and an aggregated level and on a
continuousbasisand
ndash effectiveinternalcontrols(Article 378(g))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
ancetoestablishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcompliance
internalauditandactuarialfunctions(Article 378(h))
12 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingsto
ndash providethirdcountryauthoritieswithanyinformationnecessaryfor
supervisionand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on their solvency and
financialcondition(Article 378(i))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthatproposedchanges
tothebusinesspolicyormanagementofdomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ingsortoqualifyingholdingsinsuchundertakingsbeconsistentwith
maintaining sound and prudent management (Article 378(j))
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofdomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ings should rely on sound economic principles and solvency requirements
shouldbebasedonaneconomicvaluationofassetsorliabilities(Article
378(k))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingstoholdadequatefinancialresourcesincluding
requirements to
ndash establish technical provisions with respect to all reinsurance obliga-
tionstowardspolicyholdersandbeneficiariesofreinsurance
contracts
ndash investassetsheldtocovertechnicalprovisionsinthebestinterestsof
allpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccountanydisclosed
policyobjective)
ndash investonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoseriskstheundertakingcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash meet capital requirements set at a level equivalent to that under
SolvencyIIwhichensuresthatbeneficiariesandpolicyholdersare
adequatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsintheeventof
significantlosses
ndash maintainaminimumlevelofcapital(orsufferimmediatesupervisory
intervention)and
ndash meetcapitalrequirementsreferredtoabovewithownfundsof
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesbothinagoing
concernandinacaseofwindingup(Article 378(l))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsofthesolvencyregimeinthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiableriskandanysignificant
non-quantifiableriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanothersupervisory
mechanism (Article 378(m))
mayer brown 13
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustensuretimelyintervention
by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements are
not complied with (Article 378(n))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 378(o))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonswhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallother
personsandauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhich
doesnotallowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 378(p))
bull Whereareinsuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingsshouldbe
able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 378(q)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesmustonlyusethatinformationin
thecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 378(r))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustbepermittedto
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreaches
ofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersonswherethat
authoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofessional
secrecyinthethirdcountryandsuchinformationshouldonlybedis-
closedoncetheexpressagreementoftheoriginatorhasbeenobtained
andsolelyforthepurposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission
(Article 378(s))
14 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Solvency assessment
(Article 227)
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofdomestic(re)insuranceundertakings
should rely on sound economic principles and solvency requirements should
bebasedonaneconomicvaluationofassetsorliabilities(Article379(a))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomestic(re)insurance
undertakingstoholdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingrequirements
to
ndash establish technical provisions with respect to all (re)insurance obliga-
tionstowardspolicyholdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insurancecontracts
ndash investassetsheldtocovertechnicalprovisionsinthebestinterestsof
allpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccountanydisclosed
policyobjective)
ndash investonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoseriskstheundertakingcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash meet capital requirements set at a level equivalent to that under
SolvencyIIwhichensuresthatbeneficiariesandpolicyholdersare
adequatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsintheeventof
significantlosses
ndash maintainaminimumlevelofcapital(orsufferimmediatesupervisory
intervention)and
ndash meetcapitalrequirementsreferredtoabovewithownfundsof
sufficientqualitywhichareabletoabsorbsignificantlossesbothina
goingconcernandinacaseofwindingup(Article379(b))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsofthesolvencyregimeinthethirdcountrymust
berisk-basedtocapturequantifiableriskandanysignificantnon-quan-
tifiableriskmustbeaddressedthroughanothersupervisorymechanism
(Article 379(c))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tion by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements
are not complied with (Article 379(d))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 379(e))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article379(f))
mayer brown 15
bull Wherea(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptoris
beingcompulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnot
concernthirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakings
should be able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article
379(g))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesshouldonlyusethatinformation
inthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 379(h))
bull Arethesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrypermittedtoexchange
informationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthedischargeof
theirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreachesofcompanylaw
with other authorities bodies or persons where that authority body or
personissubjecttoanobligationofprofessionalsecrecyinthethirdcoun-
tryandissuchinformationonlydisclosedoncetheexpressagreementof
theoriginator(s)hasbeenobtainedandwhereappropriatesolelyforthe
purposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission(Article379(i))
Group supervision
(Article 260)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryhavethenecessarymeans
andresourcesrelevantexpertiseandthemandatetoeffectivelyprotect
policyholdersandbeneficiarieswhereverlocated(Article 380(a))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareempoweredbylawor
regulation to
ndash determinewhichundertakingsfallunderthescopeofsupervisionat
grouplevel
ndash supervise(re)insurerswhicharepartofagroup and
ndash imposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessary
(Article 380(b))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareabletoeffectively
assesstheriskprofileandsolvencyfinancialpositionof(re)insurers
whicharepartofagroupandthegrouprsquosbusinessstrategy(Article
380(c))
bull Supervisionatgrouplevelincludesallundertakingsoverwhichapartici-
patingundertakingexercisesdominantorsignificantinfluence(unless
notappropriateforgroupsupervisionobjectives)(Article 380(d))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustdulyconsiderthe
potentialimpactoftheirdecisionsonthestabilityoffinancialsystems
globally particularly during emergency situations (Article 380(e))
16 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmovementsin
financialmarketsoccur(Article 380(f))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectivesystemof
governanceatgrouplevelwhichprovidesforsoundandprudentbusiness
management and prescribes
ndash that there must be an adequate transparent organisational structure
withclearallocationandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementstoensurethatpersonswhoeffectivelyruntheundertak-
ingarefitandproper
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothwithinthegroupandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthorities and
ndash requirementsforensuringthattheoutsourcedfunctionsoractivities
areeffectivelysupervised(Article 380(g))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectiverisk
management system at group level comprising at least
ndash the strategies processes and internal reporting procedures necessary
toidentifymeasuremonitormanageandreportrisksonacontinu-
ousbasistowhichthegroupiscouldbeexposedand
ndash aneffectiveinternalcontrolsystem(Article 380(h))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
have sound reporting and accounting procedures to monitor and manage
intra-grouptransactionsandriskconcentrations(Article 380(i))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
establishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcomplianceinternal
auditandactuarialfunctions(Article 380(j))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthegroupto
ndash providethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswithanyinformation
thattheyneed
ndash reportsignificantriskconcentrationatthelevelofthegroupand
significantintra-grouptransactionsonatleastanannualbasisand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on the solvency and
financialconditionofthegroup(Article 380(k))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequirethatproposed
changestothebusinesspolicyormanagementofthegroup(orqualifying
holdings in the group) are consistent with the sound and prudent man-
agementofthegroup(Article 380(l))
mayer brown 17
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofthegroupshouldrelyonsound
economicprinciplesandassessmentofsolvencyshouldbebasedonan
economicvaluationofallassetsandliabilities(Article 380(m))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
holdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingarequirementfor
ndash technical provisions with respect to all obligations towards policy-
holdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insuranceundertakingsinthegroup
ndash assets held to cover technical provisions to be invested in the best
interestsofallpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccount
anydisclosedpolicyobjective)
ndash thegrouptoinvestonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoserisksitcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash the group to meet capital requirements at a level which ensures that in
theeventofsignificantlossespolicyholdersandbeneficiariesareade-
quatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsastheybecomedue
ndash (re)insuranceundertakingswhicharepartofthegrouptomaintaina
minimumlevelofcapitalnon-compliancewithwhichtriggers
immediatesupervisoryinterventionand
ndash groupcapitalrequirementstobemetwithownfundsthatareofa
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesinbothagoing
concernandacaseofwindingup(Article 380(n))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsoftheprudentialregimeofthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiablerisksandwhereasignificant
riskisnotquantifiablethatriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanother
supervisory mechanism (Article 380(o))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tionbythesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryintheeventthat
capital requirements are not complied with (Article 380(p))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryrestricttheuseofown-fund
itemsofarelated(re)insuranceundertakingwheretheitemscannoteffec-
tivelybemadeavailabletocoverthecapitalrequirementoftheparticipating
undertakingforwhichgroupsolvencyiscalculated(Article 380(q))
bull Thecalculationofgroupsolvencyinthethirdcountryrsquosprudentialregime
should produce a result that is at least equivalent to the result produced
byeitheroneoforacombinationofthecalculationmethodsinSolvency
II and the calculation method used should ensure that there is no double
useofownfundstomeetthegroupcapitalrequirementandthatthe
intra-groupcreationofcapitalthroughreciprocalfinancingiseliminated
(Article 380(r))
18 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatallpersons
whoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethird
countryaswellasauditorsandexpertsactingonbehalfoftheauthorities
areboundbyobligationsofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinforma-
tionreceivedfromallsupervisoryauthorities(Article 380(s))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 380(t))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatwhere
a(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingmaybe
divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 380(u))
bull Thethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswhichreceiveconfidential
informationfromothersupervisoryauthoritiesmustonlyusethat
informationinthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 380(v))
bull The third country supervisory authorities should be permitted to
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirsupervisoryfunctionsorthedetectionorinvestigation
ofbreachesofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersons
wherethatauthoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofes-
sionalsecrecyintherelevantthirdcountryprovidedthattheinformation
isonlydisclosedwiththeexpressagreementoftheoriginatorandonlyfor
thepurposesforwhichsuchauthoritywasgiven(Article 380(w))
19 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Annex 2
Potentially temporarily
provisionally equivalent area
Criteria to determine temporaryprovisional equivalence
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172(4))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities(particularly
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities)
Solvency assessment
(Article 227(5))
(a) The third country either already has an equivalent solvency regime in
place or one may be adopted or applied
(b)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(c)Thethirdcountryrsquoslawinprincipleallowscooperationandexchange
ofconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities
(d)Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(e)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider advising many of the worldrsquos largest companies including a significant portion of the Fortune 100 FTSE 100 DAX and Hang Seng Index companies and more than half of the worldrsquos largest banks Our legal services include banking and finance corporate and securities litigation and dispute resolution antitrust and competition US Supreme Court and appellate matters employment and benefits environmental financial services regulatory and enforcement government and global trade intellectual property real estate tax restructuring bankruptcy and insolvency and wealth management
Please visit wwwmayerbrowncom for comprehensive contact information for all Mayer Brown offices
This Mayer Brown publication provides information and comments on legal issues and developments of interest to our clients and friends The foregoing is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject matter covered and is not intended to provide legal advice Readers should seek legal advice before taking any action with respect to the matters discussed herein
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider comprising legal practices that are separate entities (the ldquoMayer Brown Practicesrdquo) The Mayer Brown Practices are Mayer Brown LLP and Mayer Brown Europe-Brussels LLP both limited liability partnerships established in Illinois USA Mayer Brown International LLP a limited liability partnership incorporated in England and Wales (authorized and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered in England and Wales number OC 303359) Mayer Brown a SELAS established in France Mayer Brown Mexico SC a sociedad civil formed under the laws of the State of Durango Mexico Mayer Brown JSM a Hong Kong partnership and its associated legal practices in Asia and Tauil amp Chequer Advogados a Brazilian law partnership with which Mayer Brown is associated Mayer Brown Consulting (Singapore) Pte Ltd and its subsidiary which are affiliated with Mayer Brown provide customs and trade advisory and consultancy services not legal services ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
copy 2015 The Mayer Brown Practices All rights reserved
0822fin
Group supervision
(Article 260(5))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasaprudentialregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting transparency and group
solvency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
other supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthoritiesinparticular
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandothersupervisory
authorities
![Page 8: Solvency II: Equivalence Decisions](https://reader030.vdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022012812/61c3bd04e721fa32777b3bfb/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
8 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
34TheUSinsuranceindustrythroughtheACLI28 RAA29 and other trade associations has been pushing the
federalgovernmenttonegotiateacoveredagreementwiththeEUtopreventtheabovereferencedpotentially
adversecompetitivelydisadvantageousoutcomesfromalackofequivalencedecisionsbytheEUThose
negotiationscontinuetobemiredinpoliticalpositioningwithinthefederalgovernment(atTreasuryandthe
US Trade Representative) with the US state regulators and with the EU regulators and time is running short
SolvencyIIisscheduledtotakeeffecton1January2016andatpresentitappearsunlikelythattheUSwillbe
grantedequivalencebytheCommissioninrespectofreinsuranceandgroupsupervisionInrespectofgroup
supervisionmuchisthereforeinthehandsoftheEEAsupervisors
The equivalence assessment process
35 AsSolvencyIIhasnotcomeintoforceitisnotyetpossibleforanequivalenceassessmenttobecarried
outItwillasdescribedabovebepossibleforEEAsupervisorstomakeanequivalenceassessmentofthe
groupsupervisoryregimeofAustraliaBermudaBrazilCanadaMexicoandtheUSafter1January2016
but EIOPA guidelines30makeclearthatalaterequivalencedecisionbytheCommissionwouldsupersedeany
equivalenceassessmentTheEEAsupervisorscanalsomakeequivalenceassessments(inrespectofboth
solvencyassessmentandgroupsupervision)ofthemanynon-EEAcountrieswhichareunlikelytoeverbethe
subjectofaCommissionequivalencedecision
36TheEIOPAguidelinessetoutthemethodologyforequivalenceassessmentsbynationalsupervisorsThey
stresstheimportanceoftheactivecooperationofthethirdcountryintheequivalenceassessmentprocess
itisdeterminativeinthecaseofgroupsupervisionandlackofcooperationwouldleadtoanon-equivalent
outcome An equivalence assessment is based on the same criteria as an equivalence decision which are set
out in Annex 1 to this update National supervisors can conduct the assessment themselves with assistance
fromEIOPAandinconsultationwithotherEEAsupervisorsorrequestEIOPAtocarryouttheassessment
Unlikeanequivalencedecisionthereisnopossibilityofatemporaryorprovisionalequivalenceassessment
37 Positive equivalence assessments require regular review they must be reviewed at least every three years or
followingsignificantdevelopmentsinthejurisdictionassessedNegativeequivalenceassessmentsmayberevisited
attherequestoftherelevant(re)insureroratthenationalsupervisorrsquosowninitiativewheretherehavebeen
significantchangestothesupervisoryregimelaiddownSolvencyIIortothesupervisoryregimeofthenon-
EEAcountryconcernedUnlesstherehavebeensuchchangesitisnotpossiblefornationalsupervisorstotake
divergentequivalencedecisionsregardingthesamenon-EEAcountryEquivalenceassessmentswillhaveeffect
morebroadlythanjustfortherequesting(re)insurerorgroupAccordinglywhencarryingoutanequivalence
assessmentnationalsupervisorsmustassesstheentirenon-EEAregimenotjusttheregimeasitappliestothe(re)
insurerorgroupconcernedForexampleevenifagroupconductsonlylifeinsurancebusinessitwouldstillbe
necessaryforthenationalsupervisortoassessthethirdcountryregimefornon-lifebusiness
EEA sub-groups
38 As noted at paragraph 9 abovewhereanon-EEAgroupdoesnothaveanEEAparentundertakingandis
notsubjecttoanequivalencedeterminationbyeithertheCommissionoranationalsupervisorEIOPAhas
suggestedthatnationalsupervisorsshouldconsiderrequiringsuchanon-EEAgrouptoestablishanEEAsub-
group Such a requirement will understandably be regarded as onerous but doing so would mean that only the
EEAsub-groupwouldbesubjectedtoSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionandthegroupsolvencycalculation
28 The American Council of Life Insurers29 The Reinsurance Association of America30 See Final Report on Public Consultation No14015 on Guidelines on the methodology for equivalence assessments by national supervisory
authorities under Solvency II EIOPA-BoS-14182 27 November 2014
mayer brown 9
39WhereanequivalencedeterminationhasbeenmadethereisnoneedtocreateanEEAsub-groupbutnon-
EEAgroupswithsuchastructurewillfindthemselvessubjecttodualregulationwhilsttheircompetitors
withoutanEEAparentundertakingwillbeabletorelysolelyonthegroupsupervisionexercisedbytheir
homesupervisorEIOPAifnotSolvencyIIhasconsideredthisdichotomy
40InitsguidanceEIOPAsuggeststhatwherethewidernon-EEAgroupissubjecttoequivalentthirdcountry
group supervision the acting EEA group supervisor should rely on the group supervision exercised by the
third-countrysupervisoryauthoritiesandexempttheEEAsub-groupfromSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionson
acase-by-casebasisbutonlywherethiswouldresultinamoreefficientsupervisionofthegroupandwould
not impair its supervision EIOPA sets out criteria that the acting group supervisor should consider when
deciding whether such an exemption should be granted They are
(a) theworldwidegroupsupervisionallowsforarobustassessmentoftheriskstowhichtheEEAsubgroup
anditsentitiesareexposedconsideringthestructureofthegroupthenaturescaleandcomplexityof
therisksandthecapitalallocationwithinthegroup
(b) thecooperationcurrentlyinplacebetweenthenon-EEAgroupsupervisorandtheEEAsupervisors
forthegroupconcernedisstructuredandwell-managedthroughregularmeetingsandappropriate
exchangeofinformationwithinacollegeofsupervisorstowhichtheEEAsupervisorsandEIOPAare
invitedand
(c) anannualworkplanincludingjointon-siteexaminationsisagreeduponintheseregularmeetingsby
thesupervisoryauthoritiesinvolvedinthesupervisionofthegroup31
41 EIOPAguidanceisnotbindingonthenationalsupervisorsbutthesupervisorshaveinformedEIOPAwhether
or not they intend to comply with it Only Germany has stated that it will not comply with the relevant
guidancebecauseitexplainsGermanlawdoesnotpermitacase-by-caseapproachItappearstherefore
thattheeffectofanequivalencedeterminationbyeithertheCommissionoranationalsupervisorcouldbe
toexemptanEEAsub-groupfromSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionandsolvencycalculationThispossibility
alreadyexistsforSwiss(re)insurancegroups
What happens next
42TheCommissionhasindicated32thatthereareassessmentsofotherthirdcountryjurisdictionscurrently
inprogressandthatsomejurisdictionsaremodifyingtheirinsuranceframeworksinordertofacilitate
equivalencedecisionsInthelightofthisasecondpackageofdecisionsisexpectedintheautumnof
2015ApositivedecisiononreinsuranceequivalenceforJapanalreadythesubjectofanEIOPAreport33 is
expectedtobeincludedinthenextpackageFurthergivenEIOPArsquosfindingsitwouldnotbesurprisingifthe
CommissionmakesapositivedecisionregardinggroupsupervisoryandreinsuranceequivalenceforBermuda
butthefutureislessclearfortheUSAustraliaBrazilCanadaandMexicoInthemeantimenon-EEA(re)
insurance groups will want to consider their group structure in order to ascertain how the extraterritorial
provisionsofSolvencyIImayaffectthem
31 Guideline 5 of Guidelines on group solvency EIOPA-BoS-1418132 Draft minutes of a meeting of the Commissionrsquos expert group on banking payments and insurance ( in its insurance formation) 5 March 201533 See fn 23
10 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Ifyouhaveanyquestionsaboutanyoftheissuesraisedinthisalertpleasecontactyourusualcontactoroneof
the lawyers listed below
LONDON
Alexandria Carr
OfCounsel(EmployedBarrister)
E acarrmayerbrowncom T+442031303398
Mark Compton Partner
E mcomptonmayerbrowncom T+442031303388
Colin Scagell Partner
E cscagellmayerbrowncom T+442031303315
US
David W Alberts
Partner(NewYork)
dalbertsmayerbrowncom T+12125062611
Lawrence R Hamilton
Partner (Chicago)
lhamiltonmayerbrowncom
T +1 312 701 7055
mayer brown 11
Annex 1
Potentially-equivalent element
(Directive 2009138EU)
Criteria to determine equivalence
(Commission Delegated Regulation 201535)
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusthavethepower(by
laworregulation)toeffectivelysupervisedomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ingsandtoimposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessary
(Article 378(a))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusthavethenecessary
meansandresourcesrelevantexpertiseandthemandatetoeffectively
protectpolicyholdersandbeneficiarieswhereverlocated (Article 378(b))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryshouldalwaysduly
considerthepotentialimpactoftheirdecisionsontheglobalstabilityof
financialsystemsparticularlyduringanemergency(Article 378(c))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepotentialpro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmove-
mentsinthefinancialmarketsoccur(Article 378(d))
bull Theremustbearequirementforreinsurerstobeauthorisedtoprovide
businessinthethirdcountryandtheremustbeaclearobjectiveand
publiclyavailablesetofwrittenauthorisationstandards(Article 378(e))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingstohaveaneffectivesystemofgovernancewhich
provides sound and prudent business management including
ndash an adequate transparent organisational structure with clear alloca-
tionandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementsforensuringthatpersonswhoeffectivelyrunthe
undertakingarelsquofitandproperrsquo
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothinternallyandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthoritiesand
ndash requirementsforensuringthatoutsourcedfunctionsactivitiesare
effectivelysupervised(Article 378(f))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticrein-
suranceundertakingstohaveaneffectiveriskmanagementsystem
comprising
ndash strategiesprocessesandinternalreportingprocedurestoidentify
measuremonitormanageandreportriskstowhichtheundertaking
iscould be exposed at an individual and an aggregated level and on a
continuousbasisand
ndash effectiveinternalcontrols(Article 378(g))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
ancetoestablishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcompliance
internalauditandactuarialfunctions(Article 378(h))
12 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingsto
ndash providethirdcountryauthoritieswithanyinformationnecessaryfor
supervisionand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on their solvency and
financialcondition(Article 378(i))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthatproposedchanges
tothebusinesspolicyormanagementofdomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ingsortoqualifyingholdingsinsuchundertakingsbeconsistentwith
maintaining sound and prudent management (Article 378(j))
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofdomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ings should rely on sound economic principles and solvency requirements
shouldbebasedonaneconomicvaluationofassetsorliabilities(Article
378(k))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingstoholdadequatefinancialresourcesincluding
requirements to
ndash establish technical provisions with respect to all reinsurance obliga-
tionstowardspolicyholdersandbeneficiariesofreinsurance
contracts
ndash investassetsheldtocovertechnicalprovisionsinthebestinterestsof
allpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccountanydisclosed
policyobjective)
ndash investonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoseriskstheundertakingcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash meet capital requirements set at a level equivalent to that under
SolvencyIIwhichensuresthatbeneficiariesandpolicyholdersare
adequatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsintheeventof
significantlosses
ndash maintainaminimumlevelofcapital(orsufferimmediatesupervisory
intervention)and
ndash meetcapitalrequirementsreferredtoabovewithownfundsof
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesbothinagoing
concernandinacaseofwindingup(Article 378(l))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsofthesolvencyregimeinthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiableriskandanysignificant
non-quantifiableriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanothersupervisory
mechanism (Article 378(m))
mayer brown 13
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustensuretimelyintervention
by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements are
not complied with (Article 378(n))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 378(o))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonswhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallother
personsandauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhich
doesnotallowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 378(p))
bull Whereareinsuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingsshouldbe
able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 378(q)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesmustonlyusethatinformationin
thecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 378(r))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustbepermittedto
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreaches
ofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersonswherethat
authoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofessional
secrecyinthethirdcountryandsuchinformationshouldonlybedis-
closedoncetheexpressagreementoftheoriginatorhasbeenobtained
andsolelyforthepurposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission
(Article 378(s))
14 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Solvency assessment
(Article 227)
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofdomestic(re)insuranceundertakings
should rely on sound economic principles and solvency requirements should
bebasedonaneconomicvaluationofassetsorliabilities(Article379(a))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomestic(re)insurance
undertakingstoholdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingrequirements
to
ndash establish technical provisions with respect to all (re)insurance obliga-
tionstowardspolicyholdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insurancecontracts
ndash investassetsheldtocovertechnicalprovisionsinthebestinterestsof
allpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccountanydisclosed
policyobjective)
ndash investonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoseriskstheundertakingcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash meet capital requirements set at a level equivalent to that under
SolvencyIIwhichensuresthatbeneficiariesandpolicyholdersare
adequatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsintheeventof
significantlosses
ndash maintainaminimumlevelofcapital(orsufferimmediatesupervisory
intervention)and
ndash meetcapitalrequirementsreferredtoabovewithownfundsof
sufficientqualitywhichareabletoabsorbsignificantlossesbothina
goingconcernandinacaseofwindingup(Article379(b))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsofthesolvencyregimeinthethirdcountrymust
berisk-basedtocapturequantifiableriskandanysignificantnon-quan-
tifiableriskmustbeaddressedthroughanothersupervisorymechanism
(Article 379(c))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tion by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements
are not complied with (Article 379(d))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 379(e))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article379(f))
mayer brown 15
bull Wherea(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptoris
beingcompulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnot
concernthirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakings
should be able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article
379(g))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesshouldonlyusethatinformation
inthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 379(h))
bull Arethesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrypermittedtoexchange
informationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthedischargeof
theirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreachesofcompanylaw
with other authorities bodies or persons where that authority body or
personissubjecttoanobligationofprofessionalsecrecyinthethirdcoun-
tryandissuchinformationonlydisclosedoncetheexpressagreementof
theoriginator(s)hasbeenobtainedandwhereappropriatesolelyforthe
purposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission(Article379(i))
Group supervision
(Article 260)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryhavethenecessarymeans
andresourcesrelevantexpertiseandthemandatetoeffectivelyprotect
policyholdersandbeneficiarieswhereverlocated(Article 380(a))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareempoweredbylawor
regulation to
ndash determinewhichundertakingsfallunderthescopeofsupervisionat
grouplevel
ndash supervise(re)insurerswhicharepartofagroup and
ndash imposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessary
(Article 380(b))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareabletoeffectively
assesstheriskprofileandsolvencyfinancialpositionof(re)insurers
whicharepartofagroupandthegrouprsquosbusinessstrategy(Article
380(c))
bull Supervisionatgrouplevelincludesallundertakingsoverwhichapartici-
patingundertakingexercisesdominantorsignificantinfluence(unless
notappropriateforgroupsupervisionobjectives)(Article 380(d))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustdulyconsiderthe
potentialimpactoftheirdecisionsonthestabilityoffinancialsystems
globally particularly during emergency situations (Article 380(e))
16 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmovementsin
financialmarketsoccur(Article 380(f))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectivesystemof
governanceatgrouplevelwhichprovidesforsoundandprudentbusiness
management and prescribes
ndash that there must be an adequate transparent organisational structure
withclearallocationandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementstoensurethatpersonswhoeffectivelyruntheundertak-
ingarefitandproper
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothwithinthegroupandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthorities and
ndash requirementsforensuringthattheoutsourcedfunctionsoractivities
areeffectivelysupervised(Article 380(g))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectiverisk
management system at group level comprising at least
ndash the strategies processes and internal reporting procedures necessary
toidentifymeasuremonitormanageandreportrisksonacontinu-
ousbasistowhichthegroupiscouldbeexposedand
ndash aneffectiveinternalcontrolsystem(Article 380(h))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
have sound reporting and accounting procedures to monitor and manage
intra-grouptransactionsandriskconcentrations(Article 380(i))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
establishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcomplianceinternal
auditandactuarialfunctions(Article 380(j))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthegroupto
ndash providethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswithanyinformation
thattheyneed
ndash reportsignificantriskconcentrationatthelevelofthegroupand
significantintra-grouptransactionsonatleastanannualbasisand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on the solvency and
financialconditionofthegroup(Article 380(k))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequirethatproposed
changestothebusinesspolicyormanagementofthegroup(orqualifying
holdings in the group) are consistent with the sound and prudent man-
agementofthegroup(Article 380(l))
mayer brown 17
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofthegroupshouldrelyonsound
economicprinciplesandassessmentofsolvencyshouldbebasedonan
economicvaluationofallassetsandliabilities(Article 380(m))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
holdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingarequirementfor
ndash technical provisions with respect to all obligations towards policy-
holdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insuranceundertakingsinthegroup
ndash assets held to cover technical provisions to be invested in the best
interestsofallpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccount
anydisclosedpolicyobjective)
ndash thegrouptoinvestonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoserisksitcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash the group to meet capital requirements at a level which ensures that in
theeventofsignificantlossespolicyholdersandbeneficiariesareade-
quatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsastheybecomedue
ndash (re)insuranceundertakingswhicharepartofthegrouptomaintaina
minimumlevelofcapitalnon-compliancewithwhichtriggers
immediatesupervisoryinterventionand
ndash groupcapitalrequirementstobemetwithownfundsthatareofa
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesinbothagoing
concernandacaseofwindingup(Article 380(n))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsoftheprudentialregimeofthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiablerisksandwhereasignificant
riskisnotquantifiablethatriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanother
supervisory mechanism (Article 380(o))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tionbythesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryintheeventthat
capital requirements are not complied with (Article 380(p))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryrestricttheuseofown-fund
itemsofarelated(re)insuranceundertakingwheretheitemscannoteffec-
tivelybemadeavailabletocoverthecapitalrequirementoftheparticipating
undertakingforwhichgroupsolvencyiscalculated(Article 380(q))
bull Thecalculationofgroupsolvencyinthethirdcountryrsquosprudentialregime
should produce a result that is at least equivalent to the result produced
byeitheroneoforacombinationofthecalculationmethodsinSolvency
II and the calculation method used should ensure that there is no double
useofownfundstomeetthegroupcapitalrequirementandthatthe
intra-groupcreationofcapitalthroughreciprocalfinancingiseliminated
(Article 380(r))
18 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatallpersons
whoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethird
countryaswellasauditorsandexpertsactingonbehalfoftheauthorities
areboundbyobligationsofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinforma-
tionreceivedfromallsupervisoryauthorities(Article 380(s))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 380(t))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatwhere
a(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingmaybe
divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 380(u))
bull Thethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswhichreceiveconfidential
informationfromothersupervisoryauthoritiesmustonlyusethat
informationinthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 380(v))
bull The third country supervisory authorities should be permitted to
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirsupervisoryfunctionsorthedetectionorinvestigation
ofbreachesofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersons
wherethatauthoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofes-
sionalsecrecyintherelevantthirdcountryprovidedthattheinformation
isonlydisclosedwiththeexpressagreementoftheoriginatorandonlyfor
thepurposesforwhichsuchauthoritywasgiven(Article 380(w))
19 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Annex 2
Potentially temporarily
provisionally equivalent area
Criteria to determine temporaryprovisional equivalence
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172(4))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities(particularly
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities)
Solvency assessment
(Article 227(5))
(a) The third country either already has an equivalent solvency regime in
place or one may be adopted or applied
(b)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(c)Thethirdcountryrsquoslawinprincipleallowscooperationandexchange
ofconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities
(d)Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(e)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider advising many of the worldrsquos largest companies including a significant portion of the Fortune 100 FTSE 100 DAX and Hang Seng Index companies and more than half of the worldrsquos largest banks Our legal services include banking and finance corporate and securities litigation and dispute resolution antitrust and competition US Supreme Court and appellate matters employment and benefits environmental financial services regulatory and enforcement government and global trade intellectual property real estate tax restructuring bankruptcy and insolvency and wealth management
Please visit wwwmayerbrowncom for comprehensive contact information for all Mayer Brown offices
This Mayer Brown publication provides information and comments on legal issues and developments of interest to our clients and friends The foregoing is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject matter covered and is not intended to provide legal advice Readers should seek legal advice before taking any action with respect to the matters discussed herein
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider comprising legal practices that are separate entities (the ldquoMayer Brown Practicesrdquo) The Mayer Brown Practices are Mayer Brown LLP and Mayer Brown Europe-Brussels LLP both limited liability partnerships established in Illinois USA Mayer Brown International LLP a limited liability partnership incorporated in England and Wales (authorized and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered in England and Wales number OC 303359) Mayer Brown a SELAS established in France Mayer Brown Mexico SC a sociedad civil formed under the laws of the State of Durango Mexico Mayer Brown JSM a Hong Kong partnership and its associated legal practices in Asia and Tauil amp Chequer Advogados a Brazilian law partnership with which Mayer Brown is associated Mayer Brown Consulting (Singapore) Pte Ltd and its subsidiary which are affiliated with Mayer Brown provide customs and trade advisory and consultancy services not legal services ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
copy 2015 The Mayer Brown Practices All rights reserved
0822fin
Group supervision
(Article 260(5))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasaprudentialregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting transparency and group
solvency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
other supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthoritiesinparticular
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandothersupervisory
authorities
![Page 9: Solvency II: Equivalence Decisions](https://reader030.vdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022012812/61c3bd04e721fa32777b3bfb/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
mayer brown 9
39WhereanequivalencedeterminationhasbeenmadethereisnoneedtocreateanEEAsub-groupbutnon-
EEAgroupswithsuchastructurewillfindthemselvessubjecttodualregulationwhilsttheircompetitors
withoutanEEAparentundertakingwillbeabletorelysolelyonthegroupsupervisionexercisedbytheir
homesupervisorEIOPAifnotSolvencyIIhasconsideredthisdichotomy
40InitsguidanceEIOPAsuggeststhatwherethewidernon-EEAgroupissubjecttoequivalentthirdcountry
group supervision the acting EEA group supervisor should rely on the group supervision exercised by the
third-countrysupervisoryauthoritiesandexempttheEEAsub-groupfromSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionson
acase-by-casebasisbutonlywherethiswouldresultinamoreefficientsupervisionofthegroupandwould
not impair its supervision EIOPA sets out criteria that the acting group supervisor should consider when
deciding whether such an exemption should be granted They are
(a) theworldwidegroupsupervisionallowsforarobustassessmentoftheriskstowhichtheEEAsubgroup
anditsentitiesareexposedconsideringthestructureofthegroupthenaturescaleandcomplexityof
therisksandthecapitalallocationwithinthegroup
(b) thecooperationcurrentlyinplacebetweenthenon-EEAgroupsupervisorandtheEEAsupervisors
forthegroupconcernedisstructuredandwell-managedthroughregularmeetingsandappropriate
exchangeofinformationwithinacollegeofsupervisorstowhichtheEEAsupervisorsandEIOPAare
invitedand
(c) anannualworkplanincludingjointon-siteexaminationsisagreeduponintheseregularmeetingsby
thesupervisoryauthoritiesinvolvedinthesupervisionofthegroup31
41 EIOPAguidanceisnotbindingonthenationalsupervisorsbutthesupervisorshaveinformedEIOPAwhether
or not they intend to comply with it Only Germany has stated that it will not comply with the relevant
guidancebecauseitexplainsGermanlawdoesnotpermitacase-by-caseapproachItappearstherefore
thattheeffectofanequivalencedeterminationbyeithertheCommissionoranationalsupervisorcouldbe
toexemptanEEAsub-groupfromSolvencyIIgroupsupervisionandsolvencycalculationThispossibility
alreadyexistsforSwiss(re)insurancegroups
What happens next
42TheCommissionhasindicated32thatthereareassessmentsofotherthirdcountryjurisdictionscurrently
inprogressandthatsomejurisdictionsaremodifyingtheirinsuranceframeworksinordertofacilitate
equivalencedecisionsInthelightofthisasecondpackageofdecisionsisexpectedintheautumnof
2015ApositivedecisiononreinsuranceequivalenceforJapanalreadythesubjectofanEIOPAreport33 is
expectedtobeincludedinthenextpackageFurthergivenEIOPArsquosfindingsitwouldnotbesurprisingifthe
CommissionmakesapositivedecisionregardinggroupsupervisoryandreinsuranceequivalenceforBermuda
butthefutureislessclearfortheUSAustraliaBrazilCanadaandMexicoInthemeantimenon-EEA(re)
insurance groups will want to consider their group structure in order to ascertain how the extraterritorial
provisionsofSolvencyIImayaffectthem
31 Guideline 5 of Guidelines on group solvency EIOPA-BoS-1418132 Draft minutes of a meeting of the Commissionrsquos expert group on banking payments and insurance ( in its insurance formation) 5 March 201533 See fn 23
10 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Ifyouhaveanyquestionsaboutanyoftheissuesraisedinthisalertpleasecontactyourusualcontactoroneof
the lawyers listed below
LONDON
Alexandria Carr
OfCounsel(EmployedBarrister)
E acarrmayerbrowncom T+442031303398
Mark Compton Partner
E mcomptonmayerbrowncom T+442031303388
Colin Scagell Partner
E cscagellmayerbrowncom T+442031303315
US
David W Alberts
Partner(NewYork)
dalbertsmayerbrowncom T+12125062611
Lawrence R Hamilton
Partner (Chicago)
lhamiltonmayerbrowncom
T +1 312 701 7055
mayer brown 11
Annex 1
Potentially-equivalent element
(Directive 2009138EU)
Criteria to determine equivalence
(Commission Delegated Regulation 201535)
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusthavethepower(by
laworregulation)toeffectivelysupervisedomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ingsandtoimposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessary
(Article 378(a))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusthavethenecessary
meansandresourcesrelevantexpertiseandthemandatetoeffectively
protectpolicyholdersandbeneficiarieswhereverlocated (Article 378(b))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryshouldalwaysduly
considerthepotentialimpactoftheirdecisionsontheglobalstabilityof
financialsystemsparticularlyduringanemergency(Article 378(c))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepotentialpro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmove-
mentsinthefinancialmarketsoccur(Article 378(d))
bull Theremustbearequirementforreinsurerstobeauthorisedtoprovide
businessinthethirdcountryandtheremustbeaclearobjectiveand
publiclyavailablesetofwrittenauthorisationstandards(Article 378(e))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingstohaveaneffectivesystemofgovernancewhich
provides sound and prudent business management including
ndash an adequate transparent organisational structure with clear alloca-
tionandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementsforensuringthatpersonswhoeffectivelyrunthe
undertakingarelsquofitandproperrsquo
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothinternallyandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthoritiesand
ndash requirementsforensuringthatoutsourcedfunctionsactivitiesare
effectivelysupervised(Article 378(f))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticrein-
suranceundertakingstohaveaneffectiveriskmanagementsystem
comprising
ndash strategiesprocessesandinternalreportingprocedurestoidentify
measuremonitormanageandreportriskstowhichtheundertaking
iscould be exposed at an individual and an aggregated level and on a
continuousbasisand
ndash effectiveinternalcontrols(Article 378(g))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
ancetoestablishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcompliance
internalauditandactuarialfunctions(Article 378(h))
12 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingsto
ndash providethirdcountryauthoritieswithanyinformationnecessaryfor
supervisionand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on their solvency and
financialcondition(Article 378(i))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthatproposedchanges
tothebusinesspolicyormanagementofdomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ingsortoqualifyingholdingsinsuchundertakingsbeconsistentwith
maintaining sound and prudent management (Article 378(j))
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofdomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ings should rely on sound economic principles and solvency requirements
shouldbebasedonaneconomicvaluationofassetsorliabilities(Article
378(k))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingstoholdadequatefinancialresourcesincluding
requirements to
ndash establish technical provisions with respect to all reinsurance obliga-
tionstowardspolicyholdersandbeneficiariesofreinsurance
contracts
ndash investassetsheldtocovertechnicalprovisionsinthebestinterestsof
allpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccountanydisclosed
policyobjective)
ndash investonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoseriskstheundertakingcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash meet capital requirements set at a level equivalent to that under
SolvencyIIwhichensuresthatbeneficiariesandpolicyholdersare
adequatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsintheeventof
significantlosses
ndash maintainaminimumlevelofcapital(orsufferimmediatesupervisory
intervention)and
ndash meetcapitalrequirementsreferredtoabovewithownfundsof
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesbothinagoing
concernandinacaseofwindingup(Article 378(l))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsofthesolvencyregimeinthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiableriskandanysignificant
non-quantifiableriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanothersupervisory
mechanism (Article 378(m))
mayer brown 13
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustensuretimelyintervention
by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements are
not complied with (Article 378(n))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 378(o))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonswhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallother
personsandauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhich
doesnotallowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 378(p))
bull Whereareinsuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingsshouldbe
able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 378(q)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesmustonlyusethatinformationin
thecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 378(r))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustbepermittedto
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreaches
ofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersonswherethat
authoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofessional
secrecyinthethirdcountryandsuchinformationshouldonlybedis-
closedoncetheexpressagreementoftheoriginatorhasbeenobtained
andsolelyforthepurposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission
(Article 378(s))
14 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Solvency assessment
(Article 227)
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofdomestic(re)insuranceundertakings
should rely on sound economic principles and solvency requirements should
bebasedonaneconomicvaluationofassetsorliabilities(Article379(a))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomestic(re)insurance
undertakingstoholdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingrequirements
to
ndash establish technical provisions with respect to all (re)insurance obliga-
tionstowardspolicyholdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insurancecontracts
ndash investassetsheldtocovertechnicalprovisionsinthebestinterestsof
allpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccountanydisclosed
policyobjective)
ndash investonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoseriskstheundertakingcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash meet capital requirements set at a level equivalent to that under
SolvencyIIwhichensuresthatbeneficiariesandpolicyholdersare
adequatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsintheeventof
significantlosses
ndash maintainaminimumlevelofcapital(orsufferimmediatesupervisory
intervention)and
ndash meetcapitalrequirementsreferredtoabovewithownfundsof
sufficientqualitywhichareabletoabsorbsignificantlossesbothina
goingconcernandinacaseofwindingup(Article379(b))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsofthesolvencyregimeinthethirdcountrymust
berisk-basedtocapturequantifiableriskandanysignificantnon-quan-
tifiableriskmustbeaddressedthroughanothersupervisorymechanism
(Article 379(c))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tion by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements
are not complied with (Article 379(d))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 379(e))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article379(f))
mayer brown 15
bull Wherea(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptoris
beingcompulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnot
concernthirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakings
should be able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article
379(g))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesshouldonlyusethatinformation
inthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 379(h))
bull Arethesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrypermittedtoexchange
informationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthedischargeof
theirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreachesofcompanylaw
with other authorities bodies or persons where that authority body or
personissubjecttoanobligationofprofessionalsecrecyinthethirdcoun-
tryandissuchinformationonlydisclosedoncetheexpressagreementof
theoriginator(s)hasbeenobtainedandwhereappropriatesolelyforthe
purposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission(Article379(i))
Group supervision
(Article 260)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryhavethenecessarymeans
andresourcesrelevantexpertiseandthemandatetoeffectivelyprotect
policyholdersandbeneficiarieswhereverlocated(Article 380(a))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareempoweredbylawor
regulation to
ndash determinewhichundertakingsfallunderthescopeofsupervisionat
grouplevel
ndash supervise(re)insurerswhicharepartofagroup and
ndash imposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessary
(Article 380(b))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareabletoeffectively
assesstheriskprofileandsolvencyfinancialpositionof(re)insurers
whicharepartofagroupandthegrouprsquosbusinessstrategy(Article
380(c))
bull Supervisionatgrouplevelincludesallundertakingsoverwhichapartici-
patingundertakingexercisesdominantorsignificantinfluence(unless
notappropriateforgroupsupervisionobjectives)(Article 380(d))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustdulyconsiderthe
potentialimpactoftheirdecisionsonthestabilityoffinancialsystems
globally particularly during emergency situations (Article 380(e))
16 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmovementsin
financialmarketsoccur(Article 380(f))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectivesystemof
governanceatgrouplevelwhichprovidesforsoundandprudentbusiness
management and prescribes
ndash that there must be an adequate transparent organisational structure
withclearallocationandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementstoensurethatpersonswhoeffectivelyruntheundertak-
ingarefitandproper
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothwithinthegroupandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthorities and
ndash requirementsforensuringthattheoutsourcedfunctionsoractivities
areeffectivelysupervised(Article 380(g))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectiverisk
management system at group level comprising at least
ndash the strategies processes and internal reporting procedures necessary
toidentifymeasuremonitormanageandreportrisksonacontinu-
ousbasistowhichthegroupiscouldbeexposedand
ndash aneffectiveinternalcontrolsystem(Article 380(h))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
have sound reporting and accounting procedures to monitor and manage
intra-grouptransactionsandriskconcentrations(Article 380(i))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
establishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcomplianceinternal
auditandactuarialfunctions(Article 380(j))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthegroupto
ndash providethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswithanyinformation
thattheyneed
ndash reportsignificantriskconcentrationatthelevelofthegroupand
significantintra-grouptransactionsonatleastanannualbasisand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on the solvency and
financialconditionofthegroup(Article 380(k))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequirethatproposed
changestothebusinesspolicyormanagementofthegroup(orqualifying
holdings in the group) are consistent with the sound and prudent man-
agementofthegroup(Article 380(l))
mayer brown 17
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofthegroupshouldrelyonsound
economicprinciplesandassessmentofsolvencyshouldbebasedonan
economicvaluationofallassetsandliabilities(Article 380(m))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
holdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingarequirementfor
ndash technical provisions with respect to all obligations towards policy-
holdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insuranceundertakingsinthegroup
ndash assets held to cover technical provisions to be invested in the best
interestsofallpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccount
anydisclosedpolicyobjective)
ndash thegrouptoinvestonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoserisksitcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash the group to meet capital requirements at a level which ensures that in
theeventofsignificantlossespolicyholdersandbeneficiariesareade-
quatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsastheybecomedue
ndash (re)insuranceundertakingswhicharepartofthegrouptomaintaina
minimumlevelofcapitalnon-compliancewithwhichtriggers
immediatesupervisoryinterventionand
ndash groupcapitalrequirementstobemetwithownfundsthatareofa
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesinbothagoing
concernandacaseofwindingup(Article 380(n))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsoftheprudentialregimeofthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiablerisksandwhereasignificant
riskisnotquantifiablethatriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanother
supervisory mechanism (Article 380(o))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tionbythesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryintheeventthat
capital requirements are not complied with (Article 380(p))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryrestricttheuseofown-fund
itemsofarelated(re)insuranceundertakingwheretheitemscannoteffec-
tivelybemadeavailabletocoverthecapitalrequirementoftheparticipating
undertakingforwhichgroupsolvencyiscalculated(Article 380(q))
bull Thecalculationofgroupsolvencyinthethirdcountryrsquosprudentialregime
should produce a result that is at least equivalent to the result produced
byeitheroneoforacombinationofthecalculationmethodsinSolvency
II and the calculation method used should ensure that there is no double
useofownfundstomeetthegroupcapitalrequirementandthatthe
intra-groupcreationofcapitalthroughreciprocalfinancingiseliminated
(Article 380(r))
18 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatallpersons
whoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethird
countryaswellasauditorsandexpertsactingonbehalfoftheauthorities
areboundbyobligationsofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinforma-
tionreceivedfromallsupervisoryauthorities(Article 380(s))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 380(t))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatwhere
a(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingmaybe
divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 380(u))
bull Thethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswhichreceiveconfidential
informationfromothersupervisoryauthoritiesmustonlyusethat
informationinthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 380(v))
bull The third country supervisory authorities should be permitted to
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirsupervisoryfunctionsorthedetectionorinvestigation
ofbreachesofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersons
wherethatauthoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofes-
sionalsecrecyintherelevantthirdcountryprovidedthattheinformation
isonlydisclosedwiththeexpressagreementoftheoriginatorandonlyfor
thepurposesforwhichsuchauthoritywasgiven(Article 380(w))
19 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Annex 2
Potentially temporarily
provisionally equivalent area
Criteria to determine temporaryprovisional equivalence
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172(4))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities(particularly
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities)
Solvency assessment
(Article 227(5))
(a) The third country either already has an equivalent solvency regime in
place or one may be adopted or applied
(b)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(c)Thethirdcountryrsquoslawinprincipleallowscooperationandexchange
ofconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities
(d)Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(e)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider advising many of the worldrsquos largest companies including a significant portion of the Fortune 100 FTSE 100 DAX and Hang Seng Index companies and more than half of the worldrsquos largest banks Our legal services include banking and finance corporate and securities litigation and dispute resolution antitrust and competition US Supreme Court and appellate matters employment and benefits environmental financial services regulatory and enforcement government and global trade intellectual property real estate tax restructuring bankruptcy and insolvency and wealth management
Please visit wwwmayerbrowncom for comprehensive contact information for all Mayer Brown offices
This Mayer Brown publication provides information and comments on legal issues and developments of interest to our clients and friends The foregoing is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject matter covered and is not intended to provide legal advice Readers should seek legal advice before taking any action with respect to the matters discussed herein
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider comprising legal practices that are separate entities (the ldquoMayer Brown Practicesrdquo) The Mayer Brown Practices are Mayer Brown LLP and Mayer Brown Europe-Brussels LLP both limited liability partnerships established in Illinois USA Mayer Brown International LLP a limited liability partnership incorporated in England and Wales (authorized and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered in England and Wales number OC 303359) Mayer Brown a SELAS established in France Mayer Brown Mexico SC a sociedad civil formed under the laws of the State of Durango Mexico Mayer Brown JSM a Hong Kong partnership and its associated legal practices in Asia and Tauil amp Chequer Advogados a Brazilian law partnership with which Mayer Brown is associated Mayer Brown Consulting (Singapore) Pte Ltd and its subsidiary which are affiliated with Mayer Brown provide customs and trade advisory and consultancy services not legal services ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
copy 2015 The Mayer Brown Practices All rights reserved
0822fin
Group supervision
(Article 260(5))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasaprudentialregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting transparency and group
solvency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
other supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthoritiesinparticular
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandothersupervisory
authorities
![Page 10: Solvency II: Equivalence Decisions](https://reader030.vdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022012812/61c3bd04e721fa32777b3bfb/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
10 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Ifyouhaveanyquestionsaboutanyoftheissuesraisedinthisalertpleasecontactyourusualcontactoroneof
the lawyers listed below
LONDON
Alexandria Carr
OfCounsel(EmployedBarrister)
E acarrmayerbrowncom T+442031303398
Mark Compton Partner
E mcomptonmayerbrowncom T+442031303388
Colin Scagell Partner
E cscagellmayerbrowncom T+442031303315
US
David W Alberts
Partner(NewYork)
dalbertsmayerbrowncom T+12125062611
Lawrence R Hamilton
Partner (Chicago)
lhamiltonmayerbrowncom
T +1 312 701 7055
mayer brown 11
Annex 1
Potentially-equivalent element
(Directive 2009138EU)
Criteria to determine equivalence
(Commission Delegated Regulation 201535)
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusthavethepower(by
laworregulation)toeffectivelysupervisedomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ingsandtoimposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessary
(Article 378(a))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusthavethenecessary
meansandresourcesrelevantexpertiseandthemandatetoeffectively
protectpolicyholdersandbeneficiarieswhereverlocated (Article 378(b))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryshouldalwaysduly
considerthepotentialimpactoftheirdecisionsontheglobalstabilityof
financialsystemsparticularlyduringanemergency(Article 378(c))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepotentialpro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmove-
mentsinthefinancialmarketsoccur(Article 378(d))
bull Theremustbearequirementforreinsurerstobeauthorisedtoprovide
businessinthethirdcountryandtheremustbeaclearobjectiveand
publiclyavailablesetofwrittenauthorisationstandards(Article 378(e))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingstohaveaneffectivesystemofgovernancewhich
provides sound and prudent business management including
ndash an adequate transparent organisational structure with clear alloca-
tionandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementsforensuringthatpersonswhoeffectivelyrunthe
undertakingarelsquofitandproperrsquo
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothinternallyandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthoritiesand
ndash requirementsforensuringthatoutsourcedfunctionsactivitiesare
effectivelysupervised(Article 378(f))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticrein-
suranceundertakingstohaveaneffectiveriskmanagementsystem
comprising
ndash strategiesprocessesandinternalreportingprocedurestoidentify
measuremonitormanageandreportriskstowhichtheundertaking
iscould be exposed at an individual and an aggregated level and on a
continuousbasisand
ndash effectiveinternalcontrols(Article 378(g))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
ancetoestablishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcompliance
internalauditandactuarialfunctions(Article 378(h))
12 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingsto
ndash providethirdcountryauthoritieswithanyinformationnecessaryfor
supervisionand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on their solvency and
financialcondition(Article 378(i))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthatproposedchanges
tothebusinesspolicyormanagementofdomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ingsortoqualifyingholdingsinsuchundertakingsbeconsistentwith
maintaining sound and prudent management (Article 378(j))
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofdomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ings should rely on sound economic principles and solvency requirements
shouldbebasedonaneconomicvaluationofassetsorliabilities(Article
378(k))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingstoholdadequatefinancialresourcesincluding
requirements to
ndash establish technical provisions with respect to all reinsurance obliga-
tionstowardspolicyholdersandbeneficiariesofreinsurance
contracts
ndash investassetsheldtocovertechnicalprovisionsinthebestinterestsof
allpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccountanydisclosed
policyobjective)
ndash investonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoseriskstheundertakingcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash meet capital requirements set at a level equivalent to that under
SolvencyIIwhichensuresthatbeneficiariesandpolicyholdersare
adequatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsintheeventof
significantlosses
ndash maintainaminimumlevelofcapital(orsufferimmediatesupervisory
intervention)and
ndash meetcapitalrequirementsreferredtoabovewithownfundsof
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesbothinagoing
concernandinacaseofwindingup(Article 378(l))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsofthesolvencyregimeinthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiableriskandanysignificant
non-quantifiableriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanothersupervisory
mechanism (Article 378(m))
mayer brown 13
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustensuretimelyintervention
by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements are
not complied with (Article 378(n))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 378(o))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonswhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallother
personsandauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhich
doesnotallowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 378(p))
bull Whereareinsuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingsshouldbe
able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 378(q)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesmustonlyusethatinformationin
thecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 378(r))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustbepermittedto
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreaches
ofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersonswherethat
authoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofessional
secrecyinthethirdcountryandsuchinformationshouldonlybedis-
closedoncetheexpressagreementoftheoriginatorhasbeenobtained
andsolelyforthepurposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission
(Article 378(s))
14 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Solvency assessment
(Article 227)
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofdomestic(re)insuranceundertakings
should rely on sound economic principles and solvency requirements should
bebasedonaneconomicvaluationofassetsorliabilities(Article379(a))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomestic(re)insurance
undertakingstoholdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingrequirements
to
ndash establish technical provisions with respect to all (re)insurance obliga-
tionstowardspolicyholdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insurancecontracts
ndash investassetsheldtocovertechnicalprovisionsinthebestinterestsof
allpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccountanydisclosed
policyobjective)
ndash investonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoseriskstheundertakingcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash meet capital requirements set at a level equivalent to that under
SolvencyIIwhichensuresthatbeneficiariesandpolicyholdersare
adequatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsintheeventof
significantlosses
ndash maintainaminimumlevelofcapital(orsufferimmediatesupervisory
intervention)and
ndash meetcapitalrequirementsreferredtoabovewithownfundsof
sufficientqualitywhichareabletoabsorbsignificantlossesbothina
goingconcernandinacaseofwindingup(Article379(b))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsofthesolvencyregimeinthethirdcountrymust
berisk-basedtocapturequantifiableriskandanysignificantnon-quan-
tifiableriskmustbeaddressedthroughanothersupervisorymechanism
(Article 379(c))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tion by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements
are not complied with (Article 379(d))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 379(e))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article379(f))
mayer brown 15
bull Wherea(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptoris
beingcompulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnot
concernthirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakings
should be able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article
379(g))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesshouldonlyusethatinformation
inthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 379(h))
bull Arethesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrypermittedtoexchange
informationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthedischargeof
theirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreachesofcompanylaw
with other authorities bodies or persons where that authority body or
personissubjecttoanobligationofprofessionalsecrecyinthethirdcoun-
tryandissuchinformationonlydisclosedoncetheexpressagreementof
theoriginator(s)hasbeenobtainedandwhereappropriatesolelyforthe
purposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission(Article379(i))
Group supervision
(Article 260)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryhavethenecessarymeans
andresourcesrelevantexpertiseandthemandatetoeffectivelyprotect
policyholdersandbeneficiarieswhereverlocated(Article 380(a))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareempoweredbylawor
regulation to
ndash determinewhichundertakingsfallunderthescopeofsupervisionat
grouplevel
ndash supervise(re)insurerswhicharepartofagroup and
ndash imposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessary
(Article 380(b))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareabletoeffectively
assesstheriskprofileandsolvencyfinancialpositionof(re)insurers
whicharepartofagroupandthegrouprsquosbusinessstrategy(Article
380(c))
bull Supervisionatgrouplevelincludesallundertakingsoverwhichapartici-
patingundertakingexercisesdominantorsignificantinfluence(unless
notappropriateforgroupsupervisionobjectives)(Article 380(d))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustdulyconsiderthe
potentialimpactoftheirdecisionsonthestabilityoffinancialsystems
globally particularly during emergency situations (Article 380(e))
16 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmovementsin
financialmarketsoccur(Article 380(f))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectivesystemof
governanceatgrouplevelwhichprovidesforsoundandprudentbusiness
management and prescribes
ndash that there must be an adequate transparent organisational structure
withclearallocationandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementstoensurethatpersonswhoeffectivelyruntheundertak-
ingarefitandproper
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothwithinthegroupandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthorities and
ndash requirementsforensuringthattheoutsourcedfunctionsoractivities
areeffectivelysupervised(Article 380(g))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectiverisk
management system at group level comprising at least
ndash the strategies processes and internal reporting procedures necessary
toidentifymeasuremonitormanageandreportrisksonacontinu-
ousbasistowhichthegroupiscouldbeexposedand
ndash aneffectiveinternalcontrolsystem(Article 380(h))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
have sound reporting and accounting procedures to monitor and manage
intra-grouptransactionsandriskconcentrations(Article 380(i))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
establishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcomplianceinternal
auditandactuarialfunctions(Article 380(j))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthegroupto
ndash providethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswithanyinformation
thattheyneed
ndash reportsignificantriskconcentrationatthelevelofthegroupand
significantintra-grouptransactionsonatleastanannualbasisand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on the solvency and
financialconditionofthegroup(Article 380(k))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequirethatproposed
changestothebusinesspolicyormanagementofthegroup(orqualifying
holdings in the group) are consistent with the sound and prudent man-
agementofthegroup(Article 380(l))
mayer brown 17
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofthegroupshouldrelyonsound
economicprinciplesandassessmentofsolvencyshouldbebasedonan
economicvaluationofallassetsandliabilities(Article 380(m))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
holdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingarequirementfor
ndash technical provisions with respect to all obligations towards policy-
holdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insuranceundertakingsinthegroup
ndash assets held to cover technical provisions to be invested in the best
interestsofallpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccount
anydisclosedpolicyobjective)
ndash thegrouptoinvestonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoserisksitcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash the group to meet capital requirements at a level which ensures that in
theeventofsignificantlossespolicyholdersandbeneficiariesareade-
quatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsastheybecomedue
ndash (re)insuranceundertakingswhicharepartofthegrouptomaintaina
minimumlevelofcapitalnon-compliancewithwhichtriggers
immediatesupervisoryinterventionand
ndash groupcapitalrequirementstobemetwithownfundsthatareofa
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesinbothagoing
concernandacaseofwindingup(Article 380(n))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsoftheprudentialregimeofthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiablerisksandwhereasignificant
riskisnotquantifiablethatriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanother
supervisory mechanism (Article 380(o))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tionbythesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryintheeventthat
capital requirements are not complied with (Article 380(p))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryrestricttheuseofown-fund
itemsofarelated(re)insuranceundertakingwheretheitemscannoteffec-
tivelybemadeavailabletocoverthecapitalrequirementoftheparticipating
undertakingforwhichgroupsolvencyiscalculated(Article 380(q))
bull Thecalculationofgroupsolvencyinthethirdcountryrsquosprudentialregime
should produce a result that is at least equivalent to the result produced
byeitheroneoforacombinationofthecalculationmethodsinSolvency
II and the calculation method used should ensure that there is no double
useofownfundstomeetthegroupcapitalrequirementandthatthe
intra-groupcreationofcapitalthroughreciprocalfinancingiseliminated
(Article 380(r))
18 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatallpersons
whoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethird
countryaswellasauditorsandexpertsactingonbehalfoftheauthorities
areboundbyobligationsofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinforma-
tionreceivedfromallsupervisoryauthorities(Article 380(s))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 380(t))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatwhere
a(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingmaybe
divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 380(u))
bull Thethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswhichreceiveconfidential
informationfromothersupervisoryauthoritiesmustonlyusethat
informationinthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 380(v))
bull The third country supervisory authorities should be permitted to
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirsupervisoryfunctionsorthedetectionorinvestigation
ofbreachesofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersons
wherethatauthoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofes-
sionalsecrecyintherelevantthirdcountryprovidedthattheinformation
isonlydisclosedwiththeexpressagreementoftheoriginatorandonlyfor
thepurposesforwhichsuchauthoritywasgiven(Article 380(w))
19 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Annex 2
Potentially temporarily
provisionally equivalent area
Criteria to determine temporaryprovisional equivalence
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172(4))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities(particularly
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities)
Solvency assessment
(Article 227(5))
(a) The third country either already has an equivalent solvency regime in
place or one may be adopted or applied
(b)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(c)Thethirdcountryrsquoslawinprincipleallowscooperationandexchange
ofconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities
(d)Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(e)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider advising many of the worldrsquos largest companies including a significant portion of the Fortune 100 FTSE 100 DAX and Hang Seng Index companies and more than half of the worldrsquos largest banks Our legal services include banking and finance corporate and securities litigation and dispute resolution antitrust and competition US Supreme Court and appellate matters employment and benefits environmental financial services regulatory and enforcement government and global trade intellectual property real estate tax restructuring bankruptcy and insolvency and wealth management
Please visit wwwmayerbrowncom for comprehensive contact information for all Mayer Brown offices
This Mayer Brown publication provides information and comments on legal issues and developments of interest to our clients and friends The foregoing is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject matter covered and is not intended to provide legal advice Readers should seek legal advice before taking any action with respect to the matters discussed herein
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider comprising legal practices that are separate entities (the ldquoMayer Brown Practicesrdquo) The Mayer Brown Practices are Mayer Brown LLP and Mayer Brown Europe-Brussels LLP both limited liability partnerships established in Illinois USA Mayer Brown International LLP a limited liability partnership incorporated in England and Wales (authorized and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered in England and Wales number OC 303359) Mayer Brown a SELAS established in France Mayer Brown Mexico SC a sociedad civil formed under the laws of the State of Durango Mexico Mayer Brown JSM a Hong Kong partnership and its associated legal practices in Asia and Tauil amp Chequer Advogados a Brazilian law partnership with which Mayer Brown is associated Mayer Brown Consulting (Singapore) Pte Ltd and its subsidiary which are affiliated with Mayer Brown provide customs and trade advisory and consultancy services not legal services ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
copy 2015 The Mayer Brown Practices All rights reserved
0822fin
Group supervision
(Article 260(5))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasaprudentialregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting transparency and group
solvency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
other supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthoritiesinparticular
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandothersupervisory
authorities
![Page 11: Solvency II: Equivalence Decisions](https://reader030.vdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022012812/61c3bd04e721fa32777b3bfb/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
mayer brown 11
Annex 1
Potentially-equivalent element
(Directive 2009138EU)
Criteria to determine equivalence
(Commission Delegated Regulation 201535)
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusthavethepower(by
laworregulation)toeffectivelysupervisedomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ingsandtoimposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessary
(Article 378(a))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusthavethenecessary
meansandresourcesrelevantexpertiseandthemandatetoeffectively
protectpolicyholdersandbeneficiarieswhereverlocated (Article 378(b))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryshouldalwaysduly
considerthepotentialimpactoftheirdecisionsontheglobalstabilityof
financialsystemsparticularlyduringanemergency(Article 378(c))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepotentialpro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmove-
mentsinthefinancialmarketsoccur(Article 378(d))
bull Theremustbearequirementforreinsurerstobeauthorisedtoprovide
businessinthethirdcountryandtheremustbeaclearobjectiveand
publiclyavailablesetofwrittenauthorisationstandards(Article 378(e))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingstohaveaneffectivesystemofgovernancewhich
provides sound and prudent business management including
ndash an adequate transparent organisational structure with clear alloca-
tionandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementsforensuringthatpersonswhoeffectivelyrunthe
undertakingarelsquofitandproperrsquo
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothinternallyandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthoritiesand
ndash requirementsforensuringthatoutsourcedfunctionsactivitiesare
effectivelysupervised(Article 378(f))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticrein-
suranceundertakingstohaveaneffectiveriskmanagementsystem
comprising
ndash strategiesprocessesandinternalreportingprocedurestoidentify
measuremonitormanageandreportriskstowhichtheundertaking
iscould be exposed at an individual and an aggregated level and on a
continuousbasisand
ndash effectiveinternalcontrols(Article 378(g))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
ancetoestablishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcompliance
internalauditandactuarialfunctions(Article 378(h))
12 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingsto
ndash providethirdcountryauthoritieswithanyinformationnecessaryfor
supervisionand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on their solvency and
financialcondition(Article 378(i))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthatproposedchanges
tothebusinesspolicyormanagementofdomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ingsortoqualifyingholdingsinsuchundertakingsbeconsistentwith
maintaining sound and prudent management (Article 378(j))
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofdomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ings should rely on sound economic principles and solvency requirements
shouldbebasedonaneconomicvaluationofassetsorliabilities(Article
378(k))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingstoholdadequatefinancialresourcesincluding
requirements to
ndash establish technical provisions with respect to all reinsurance obliga-
tionstowardspolicyholdersandbeneficiariesofreinsurance
contracts
ndash investassetsheldtocovertechnicalprovisionsinthebestinterestsof
allpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccountanydisclosed
policyobjective)
ndash investonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoseriskstheundertakingcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash meet capital requirements set at a level equivalent to that under
SolvencyIIwhichensuresthatbeneficiariesandpolicyholdersare
adequatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsintheeventof
significantlosses
ndash maintainaminimumlevelofcapital(orsufferimmediatesupervisory
intervention)and
ndash meetcapitalrequirementsreferredtoabovewithownfundsof
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesbothinagoing
concernandinacaseofwindingup(Article 378(l))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsofthesolvencyregimeinthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiableriskandanysignificant
non-quantifiableriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanothersupervisory
mechanism (Article 378(m))
mayer brown 13
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustensuretimelyintervention
by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements are
not complied with (Article 378(n))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 378(o))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonswhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallother
personsandauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhich
doesnotallowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 378(p))
bull Whereareinsuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingsshouldbe
able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 378(q)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesmustonlyusethatinformationin
thecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 378(r))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustbepermittedto
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreaches
ofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersonswherethat
authoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofessional
secrecyinthethirdcountryandsuchinformationshouldonlybedis-
closedoncetheexpressagreementoftheoriginatorhasbeenobtained
andsolelyforthepurposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission
(Article 378(s))
14 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Solvency assessment
(Article 227)
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofdomestic(re)insuranceundertakings
should rely on sound economic principles and solvency requirements should
bebasedonaneconomicvaluationofassetsorliabilities(Article379(a))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomestic(re)insurance
undertakingstoholdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingrequirements
to
ndash establish technical provisions with respect to all (re)insurance obliga-
tionstowardspolicyholdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insurancecontracts
ndash investassetsheldtocovertechnicalprovisionsinthebestinterestsof
allpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccountanydisclosed
policyobjective)
ndash investonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoseriskstheundertakingcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash meet capital requirements set at a level equivalent to that under
SolvencyIIwhichensuresthatbeneficiariesandpolicyholdersare
adequatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsintheeventof
significantlosses
ndash maintainaminimumlevelofcapital(orsufferimmediatesupervisory
intervention)and
ndash meetcapitalrequirementsreferredtoabovewithownfundsof
sufficientqualitywhichareabletoabsorbsignificantlossesbothina
goingconcernandinacaseofwindingup(Article379(b))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsofthesolvencyregimeinthethirdcountrymust
berisk-basedtocapturequantifiableriskandanysignificantnon-quan-
tifiableriskmustbeaddressedthroughanothersupervisorymechanism
(Article 379(c))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tion by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements
are not complied with (Article 379(d))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 379(e))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article379(f))
mayer brown 15
bull Wherea(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptoris
beingcompulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnot
concernthirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakings
should be able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article
379(g))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesshouldonlyusethatinformation
inthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 379(h))
bull Arethesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrypermittedtoexchange
informationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthedischargeof
theirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreachesofcompanylaw
with other authorities bodies or persons where that authority body or
personissubjecttoanobligationofprofessionalsecrecyinthethirdcoun-
tryandissuchinformationonlydisclosedoncetheexpressagreementof
theoriginator(s)hasbeenobtainedandwhereappropriatesolelyforthe
purposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission(Article379(i))
Group supervision
(Article 260)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryhavethenecessarymeans
andresourcesrelevantexpertiseandthemandatetoeffectivelyprotect
policyholdersandbeneficiarieswhereverlocated(Article 380(a))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareempoweredbylawor
regulation to
ndash determinewhichundertakingsfallunderthescopeofsupervisionat
grouplevel
ndash supervise(re)insurerswhicharepartofagroup and
ndash imposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessary
(Article 380(b))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareabletoeffectively
assesstheriskprofileandsolvencyfinancialpositionof(re)insurers
whicharepartofagroupandthegrouprsquosbusinessstrategy(Article
380(c))
bull Supervisionatgrouplevelincludesallundertakingsoverwhichapartici-
patingundertakingexercisesdominantorsignificantinfluence(unless
notappropriateforgroupsupervisionobjectives)(Article 380(d))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustdulyconsiderthe
potentialimpactoftheirdecisionsonthestabilityoffinancialsystems
globally particularly during emergency situations (Article 380(e))
16 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmovementsin
financialmarketsoccur(Article 380(f))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectivesystemof
governanceatgrouplevelwhichprovidesforsoundandprudentbusiness
management and prescribes
ndash that there must be an adequate transparent organisational structure
withclearallocationandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementstoensurethatpersonswhoeffectivelyruntheundertak-
ingarefitandproper
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothwithinthegroupandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthorities and
ndash requirementsforensuringthattheoutsourcedfunctionsoractivities
areeffectivelysupervised(Article 380(g))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectiverisk
management system at group level comprising at least
ndash the strategies processes and internal reporting procedures necessary
toidentifymeasuremonitormanageandreportrisksonacontinu-
ousbasistowhichthegroupiscouldbeexposedand
ndash aneffectiveinternalcontrolsystem(Article 380(h))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
have sound reporting and accounting procedures to monitor and manage
intra-grouptransactionsandriskconcentrations(Article 380(i))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
establishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcomplianceinternal
auditandactuarialfunctions(Article 380(j))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthegroupto
ndash providethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswithanyinformation
thattheyneed
ndash reportsignificantriskconcentrationatthelevelofthegroupand
significantintra-grouptransactionsonatleastanannualbasisand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on the solvency and
financialconditionofthegroup(Article 380(k))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequirethatproposed
changestothebusinesspolicyormanagementofthegroup(orqualifying
holdings in the group) are consistent with the sound and prudent man-
agementofthegroup(Article 380(l))
mayer brown 17
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofthegroupshouldrelyonsound
economicprinciplesandassessmentofsolvencyshouldbebasedonan
economicvaluationofallassetsandliabilities(Article 380(m))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
holdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingarequirementfor
ndash technical provisions with respect to all obligations towards policy-
holdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insuranceundertakingsinthegroup
ndash assets held to cover technical provisions to be invested in the best
interestsofallpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccount
anydisclosedpolicyobjective)
ndash thegrouptoinvestonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoserisksitcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash the group to meet capital requirements at a level which ensures that in
theeventofsignificantlossespolicyholdersandbeneficiariesareade-
quatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsastheybecomedue
ndash (re)insuranceundertakingswhicharepartofthegrouptomaintaina
minimumlevelofcapitalnon-compliancewithwhichtriggers
immediatesupervisoryinterventionand
ndash groupcapitalrequirementstobemetwithownfundsthatareofa
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesinbothagoing
concernandacaseofwindingup(Article 380(n))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsoftheprudentialregimeofthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiablerisksandwhereasignificant
riskisnotquantifiablethatriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanother
supervisory mechanism (Article 380(o))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tionbythesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryintheeventthat
capital requirements are not complied with (Article 380(p))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryrestricttheuseofown-fund
itemsofarelated(re)insuranceundertakingwheretheitemscannoteffec-
tivelybemadeavailabletocoverthecapitalrequirementoftheparticipating
undertakingforwhichgroupsolvencyiscalculated(Article 380(q))
bull Thecalculationofgroupsolvencyinthethirdcountryrsquosprudentialregime
should produce a result that is at least equivalent to the result produced
byeitheroneoforacombinationofthecalculationmethodsinSolvency
II and the calculation method used should ensure that there is no double
useofownfundstomeetthegroupcapitalrequirementandthatthe
intra-groupcreationofcapitalthroughreciprocalfinancingiseliminated
(Article 380(r))
18 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatallpersons
whoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethird
countryaswellasauditorsandexpertsactingonbehalfoftheauthorities
areboundbyobligationsofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinforma-
tionreceivedfromallsupervisoryauthorities(Article 380(s))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 380(t))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatwhere
a(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingmaybe
divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 380(u))
bull Thethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswhichreceiveconfidential
informationfromothersupervisoryauthoritiesmustonlyusethat
informationinthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 380(v))
bull The third country supervisory authorities should be permitted to
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirsupervisoryfunctionsorthedetectionorinvestigation
ofbreachesofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersons
wherethatauthoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofes-
sionalsecrecyintherelevantthirdcountryprovidedthattheinformation
isonlydisclosedwiththeexpressagreementoftheoriginatorandonlyfor
thepurposesforwhichsuchauthoritywasgiven(Article 380(w))
19 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Annex 2
Potentially temporarily
provisionally equivalent area
Criteria to determine temporaryprovisional equivalence
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172(4))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities(particularly
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities)
Solvency assessment
(Article 227(5))
(a) The third country either already has an equivalent solvency regime in
place or one may be adopted or applied
(b)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(c)Thethirdcountryrsquoslawinprincipleallowscooperationandexchange
ofconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities
(d)Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(e)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider advising many of the worldrsquos largest companies including a significant portion of the Fortune 100 FTSE 100 DAX and Hang Seng Index companies and more than half of the worldrsquos largest banks Our legal services include banking and finance corporate and securities litigation and dispute resolution antitrust and competition US Supreme Court and appellate matters employment and benefits environmental financial services regulatory and enforcement government and global trade intellectual property real estate tax restructuring bankruptcy and insolvency and wealth management
Please visit wwwmayerbrowncom for comprehensive contact information for all Mayer Brown offices
This Mayer Brown publication provides information and comments on legal issues and developments of interest to our clients and friends The foregoing is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject matter covered and is not intended to provide legal advice Readers should seek legal advice before taking any action with respect to the matters discussed herein
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider comprising legal practices that are separate entities (the ldquoMayer Brown Practicesrdquo) The Mayer Brown Practices are Mayer Brown LLP and Mayer Brown Europe-Brussels LLP both limited liability partnerships established in Illinois USA Mayer Brown International LLP a limited liability partnership incorporated in England and Wales (authorized and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered in England and Wales number OC 303359) Mayer Brown a SELAS established in France Mayer Brown Mexico SC a sociedad civil formed under the laws of the State of Durango Mexico Mayer Brown JSM a Hong Kong partnership and its associated legal practices in Asia and Tauil amp Chequer Advogados a Brazilian law partnership with which Mayer Brown is associated Mayer Brown Consulting (Singapore) Pte Ltd and its subsidiary which are affiliated with Mayer Brown provide customs and trade advisory and consultancy services not legal services ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
copy 2015 The Mayer Brown Practices All rights reserved
0822fin
Group supervision
(Article 260(5))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasaprudentialregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting transparency and group
solvency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
other supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthoritiesinparticular
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandothersupervisory
authorities
![Page 12: Solvency II: Equivalence Decisions](https://reader030.vdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022012812/61c3bd04e721fa32777b3bfb/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
12 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingsto
ndash providethirdcountryauthoritieswithanyinformationnecessaryfor
supervisionand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on their solvency and
financialcondition(Article 378(i))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthatproposedchanges
tothebusinesspolicyormanagementofdomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ingsortoqualifyingholdingsinsuchundertakingsbeconsistentwith
maintaining sound and prudent management (Article 378(j))
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofdomesticreinsuranceundertak-
ings should rely on sound economic principles and solvency requirements
shouldbebasedonaneconomicvaluationofassetsorliabilities(Article
378(k))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomesticreinsur-
anceundertakingstoholdadequatefinancialresourcesincluding
requirements to
ndash establish technical provisions with respect to all reinsurance obliga-
tionstowardspolicyholdersandbeneficiariesofreinsurance
contracts
ndash investassetsheldtocovertechnicalprovisionsinthebestinterestsof
allpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccountanydisclosed
policyobjective)
ndash investonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoseriskstheundertakingcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash meet capital requirements set at a level equivalent to that under
SolvencyIIwhichensuresthatbeneficiariesandpolicyholdersare
adequatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsintheeventof
significantlosses
ndash maintainaminimumlevelofcapital(orsufferimmediatesupervisory
intervention)and
ndash meetcapitalrequirementsreferredtoabovewithownfundsof
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesbothinagoing
concernandinacaseofwindingup(Article 378(l))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsofthesolvencyregimeinthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiableriskandanysignificant
non-quantifiableriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanothersupervisory
mechanism (Article 378(m))
mayer brown 13
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustensuretimelyintervention
by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements are
not complied with (Article 378(n))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 378(o))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonswhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallother
personsandauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhich
doesnotallowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 378(p))
bull Whereareinsuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingsshouldbe
able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 378(q)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesmustonlyusethatinformationin
thecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 378(r))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustbepermittedto
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreaches
ofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersonswherethat
authoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofessional
secrecyinthethirdcountryandsuchinformationshouldonlybedis-
closedoncetheexpressagreementoftheoriginatorhasbeenobtained
andsolelyforthepurposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission
(Article 378(s))
14 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Solvency assessment
(Article 227)
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofdomestic(re)insuranceundertakings
should rely on sound economic principles and solvency requirements should
bebasedonaneconomicvaluationofassetsorliabilities(Article379(a))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomestic(re)insurance
undertakingstoholdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingrequirements
to
ndash establish technical provisions with respect to all (re)insurance obliga-
tionstowardspolicyholdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insurancecontracts
ndash investassetsheldtocovertechnicalprovisionsinthebestinterestsof
allpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccountanydisclosed
policyobjective)
ndash investonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoseriskstheundertakingcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash meet capital requirements set at a level equivalent to that under
SolvencyIIwhichensuresthatbeneficiariesandpolicyholdersare
adequatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsintheeventof
significantlosses
ndash maintainaminimumlevelofcapital(orsufferimmediatesupervisory
intervention)and
ndash meetcapitalrequirementsreferredtoabovewithownfundsof
sufficientqualitywhichareabletoabsorbsignificantlossesbothina
goingconcernandinacaseofwindingup(Article379(b))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsofthesolvencyregimeinthethirdcountrymust
berisk-basedtocapturequantifiableriskandanysignificantnon-quan-
tifiableriskmustbeaddressedthroughanothersupervisorymechanism
(Article 379(c))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tion by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements
are not complied with (Article 379(d))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 379(e))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article379(f))
mayer brown 15
bull Wherea(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptoris
beingcompulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnot
concernthirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakings
should be able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article
379(g))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesshouldonlyusethatinformation
inthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 379(h))
bull Arethesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrypermittedtoexchange
informationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthedischargeof
theirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreachesofcompanylaw
with other authorities bodies or persons where that authority body or
personissubjecttoanobligationofprofessionalsecrecyinthethirdcoun-
tryandissuchinformationonlydisclosedoncetheexpressagreementof
theoriginator(s)hasbeenobtainedandwhereappropriatesolelyforthe
purposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission(Article379(i))
Group supervision
(Article 260)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryhavethenecessarymeans
andresourcesrelevantexpertiseandthemandatetoeffectivelyprotect
policyholdersandbeneficiarieswhereverlocated(Article 380(a))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareempoweredbylawor
regulation to
ndash determinewhichundertakingsfallunderthescopeofsupervisionat
grouplevel
ndash supervise(re)insurerswhicharepartofagroup and
ndash imposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessary
(Article 380(b))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareabletoeffectively
assesstheriskprofileandsolvencyfinancialpositionof(re)insurers
whicharepartofagroupandthegrouprsquosbusinessstrategy(Article
380(c))
bull Supervisionatgrouplevelincludesallundertakingsoverwhichapartici-
patingundertakingexercisesdominantorsignificantinfluence(unless
notappropriateforgroupsupervisionobjectives)(Article 380(d))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustdulyconsiderthe
potentialimpactoftheirdecisionsonthestabilityoffinancialsystems
globally particularly during emergency situations (Article 380(e))
16 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmovementsin
financialmarketsoccur(Article 380(f))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectivesystemof
governanceatgrouplevelwhichprovidesforsoundandprudentbusiness
management and prescribes
ndash that there must be an adequate transparent organisational structure
withclearallocationandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementstoensurethatpersonswhoeffectivelyruntheundertak-
ingarefitandproper
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothwithinthegroupandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthorities and
ndash requirementsforensuringthattheoutsourcedfunctionsoractivities
areeffectivelysupervised(Article 380(g))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectiverisk
management system at group level comprising at least
ndash the strategies processes and internal reporting procedures necessary
toidentifymeasuremonitormanageandreportrisksonacontinu-
ousbasistowhichthegroupiscouldbeexposedand
ndash aneffectiveinternalcontrolsystem(Article 380(h))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
have sound reporting and accounting procedures to monitor and manage
intra-grouptransactionsandriskconcentrations(Article 380(i))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
establishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcomplianceinternal
auditandactuarialfunctions(Article 380(j))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthegroupto
ndash providethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswithanyinformation
thattheyneed
ndash reportsignificantriskconcentrationatthelevelofthegroupand
significantintra-grouptransactionsonatleastanannualbasisand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on the solvency and
financialconditionofthegroup(Article 380(k))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequirethatproposed
changestothebusinesspolicyormanagementofthegroup(orqualifying
holdings in the group) are consistent with the sound and prudent man-
agementofthegroup(Article 380(l))
mayer brown 17
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofthegroupshouldrelyonsound
economicprinciplesandassessmentofsolvencyshouldbebasedonan
economicvaluationofallassetsandliabilities(Article 380(m))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
holdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingarequirementfor
ndash technical provisions with respect to all obligations towards policy-
holdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insuranceundertakingsinthegroup
ndash assets held to cover technical provisions to be invested in the best
interestsofallpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccount
anydisclosedpolicyobjective)
ndash thegrouptoinvestonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoserisksitcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash the group to meet capital requirements at a level which ensures that in
theeventofsignificantlossespolicyholdersandbeneficiariesareade-
quatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsastheybecomedue
ndash (re)insuranceundertakingswhicharepartofthegrouptomaintaina
minimumlevelofcapitalnon-compliancewithwhichtriggers
immediatesupervisoryinterventionand
ndash groupcapitalrequirementstobemetwithownfundsthatareofa
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesinbothagoing
concernandacaseofwindingup(Article 380(n))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsoftheprudentialregimeofthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiablerisksandwhereasignificant
riskisnotquantifiablethatriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanother
supervisory mechanism (Article 380(o))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tionbythesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryintheeventthat
capital requirements are not complied with (Article 380(p))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryrestricttheuseofown-fund
itemsofarelated(re)insuranceundertakingwheretheitemscannoteffec-
tivelybemadeavailabletocoverthecapitalrequirementoftheparticipating
undertakingforwhichgroupsolvencyiscalculated(Article 380(q))
bull Thecalculationofgroupsolvencyinthethirdcountryrsquosprudentialregime
should produce a result that is at least equivalent to the result produced
byeitheroneoforacombinationofthecalculationmethodsinSolvency
II and the calculation method used should ensure that there is no double
useofownfundstomeetthegroupcapitalrequirementandthatthe
intra-groupcreationofcapitalthroughreciprocalfinancingiseliminated
(Article 380(r))
18 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatallpersons
whoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethird
countryaswellasauditorsandexpertsactingonbehalfoftheauthorities
areboundbyobligationsofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinforma-
tionreceivedfromallsupervisoryauthorities(Article 380(s))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 380(t))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatwhere
a(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingmaybe
divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 380(u))
bull Thethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswhichreceiveconfidential
informationfromothersupervisoryauthoritiesmustonlyusethat
informationinthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 380(v))
bull The third country supervisory authorities should be permitted to
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirsupervisoryfunctionsorthedetectionorinvestigation
ofbreachesofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersons
wherethatauthoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofes-
sionalsecrecyintherelevantthirdcountryprovidedthattheinformation
isonlydisclosedwiththeexpressagreementoftheoriginatorandonlyfor
thepurposesforwhichsuchauthoritywasgiven(Article 380(w))
19 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Annex 2
Potentially temporarily
provisionally equivalent area
Criteria to determine temporaryprovisional equivalence
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172(4))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities(particularly
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities)
Solvency assessment
(Article 227(5))
(a) The third country either already has an equivalent solvency regime in
place or one may be adopted or applied
(b)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(c)Thethirdcountryrsquoslawinprincipleallowscooperationandexchange
ofconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities
(d)Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(e)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider advising many of the worldrsquos largest companies including a significant portion of the Fortune 100 FTSE 100 DAX and Hang Seng Index companies and more than half of the worldrsquos largest banks Our legal services include banking and finance corporate and securities litigation and dispute resolution antitrust and competition US Supreme Court and appellate matters employment and benefits environmental financial services regulatory and enforcement government and global trade intellectual property real estate tax restructuring bankruptcy and insolvency and wealth management
Please visit wwwmayerbrowncom for comprehensive contact information for all Mayer Brown offices
This Mayer Brown publication provides information and comments on legal issues and developments of interest to our clients and friends The foregoing is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject matter covered and is not intended to provide legal advice Readers should seek legal advice before taking any action with respect to the matters discussed herein
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider comprising legal practices that are separate entities (the ldquoMayer Brown Practicesrdquo) The Mayer Brown Practices are Mayer Brown LLP and Mayer Brown Europe-Brussels LLP both limited liability partnerships established in Illinois USA Mayer Brown International LLP a limited liability partnership incorporated in England and Wales (authorized and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered in England and Wales number OC 303359) Mayer Brown a SELAS established in France Mayer Brown Mexico SC a sociedad civil formed under the laws of the State of Durango Mexico Mayer Brown JSM a Hong Kong partnership and its associated legal practices in Asia and Tauil amp Chequer Advogados a Brazilian law partnership with which Mayer Brown is associated Mayer Brown Consulting (Singapore) Pte Ltd and its subsidiary which are affiliated with Mayer Brown provide customs and trade advisory and consultancy services not legal services ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
copy 2015 The Mayer Brown Practices All rights reserved
0822fin
Group supervision
(Article 260(5))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasaprudentialregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting transparency and group
solvency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
other supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthoritiesinparticular
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandothersupervisory
authorities
![Page 13: Solvency II: Equivalence Decisions](https://reader030.vdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022012812/61c3bd04e721fa32777b3bfb/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
mayer brown 13
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustensuretimelyintervention
by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements are
not complied with (Article 378(n))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 378(o))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonswhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallother
personsandauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhich
doesnotallowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 378(p))
bull Whereareinsuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingsshouldbe
able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 378(q)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesmustonlyusethatinformationin
thecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 378(r))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustbepermittedto
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreaches
ofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersonswherethat
authoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofessional
secrecyinthethirdcountryandsuchinformationshouldonlybedis-
closedoncetheexpressagreementoftheoriginatorhasbeenobtained
andsolelyforthepurposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission
(Article 378(s))
14 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Solvency assessment
(Article 227)
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofdomestic(re)insuranceundertakings
should rely on sound economic principles and solvency requirements should
bebasedonaneconomicvaluationofassetsorliabilities(Article379(a))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomestic(re)insurance
undertakingstoholdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingrequirements
to
ndash establish technical provisions with respect to all (re)insurance obliga-
tionstowardspolicyholdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insurancecontracts
ndash investassetsheldtocovertechnicalprovisionsinthebestinterestsof
allpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccountanydisclosed
policyobjective)
ndash investonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoseriskstheundertakingcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash meet capital requirements set at a level equivalent to that under
SolvencyIIwhichensuresthatbeneficiariesandpolicyholdersare
adequatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsintheeventof
significantlosses
ndash maintainaminimumlevelofcapital(orsufferimmediatesupervisory
intervention)and
ndash meetcapitalrequirementsreferredtoabovewithownfundsof
sufficientqualitywhichareabletoabsorbsignificantlossesbothina
goingconcernandinacaseofwindingup(Article379(b))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsofthesolvencyregimeinthethirdcountrymust
berisk-basedtocapturequantifiableriskandanysignificantnon-quan-
tifiableriskmustbeaddressedthroughanothersupervisorymechanism
(Article 379(c))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tion by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements
are not complied with (Article 379(d))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 379(e))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article379(f))
mayer brown 15
bull Wherea(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptoris
beingcompulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnot
concernthirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakings
should be able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article
379(g))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesshouldonlyusethatinformation
inthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 379(h))
bull Arethesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrypermittedtoexchange
informationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthedischargeof
theirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreachesofcompanylaw
with other authorities bodies or persons where that authority body or
personissubjecttoanobligationofprofessionalsecrecyinthethirdcoun-
tryandissuchinformationonlydisclosedoncetheexpressagreementof
theoriginator(s)hasbeenobtainedandwhereappropriatesolelyforthe
purposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission(Article379(i))
Group supervision
(Article 260)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryhavethenecessarymeans
andresourcesrelevantexpertiseandthemandatetoeffectivelyprotect
policyholdersandbeneficiarieswhereverlocated(Article 380(a))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareempoweredbylawor
regulation to
ndash determinewhichundertakingsfallunderthescopeofsupervisionat
grouplevel
ndash supervise(re)insurerswhicharepartofagroup and
ndash imposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessary
(Article 380(b))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareabletoeffectively
assesstheriskprofileandsolvencyfinancialpositionof(re)insurers
whicharepartofagroupandthegrouprsquosbusinessstrategy(Article
380(c))
bull Supervisionatgrouplevelincludesallundertakingsoverwhichapartici-
patingundertakingexercisesdominantorsignificantinfluence(unless
notappropriateforgroupsupervisionobjectives)(Article 380(d))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustdulyconsiderthe
potentialimpactoftheirdecisionsonthestabilityoffinancialsystems
globally particularly during emergency situations (Article 380(e))
16 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmovementsin
financialmarketsoccur(Article 380(f))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectivesystemof
governanceatgrouplevelwhichprovidesforsoundandprudentbusiness
management and prescribes
ndash that there must be an adequate transparent organisational structure
withclearallocationandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementstoensurethatpersonswhoeffectivelyruntheundertak-
ingarefitandproper
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothwithinthegroupandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthorities and
ndash requirementsforensuringthattheoutsourcedfunctionsoractivities
areeffectivelysupervised(Article 380(g))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectiverisk
management system at group level comprising at least
ndash the strategies processes and internal reporting procedures necessary
toidentifymeasuremonitormanageandreportrisksonacontinu-
ousbasistowhichthegroupiscouldbeexposedand
ndash aneffectiveinternalcontrolsystem(Article 380(h))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
have sound reporting and accounting procedures to monitor and manage
intra-grouptransactionsandriskconcentrations(Article 380(i))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
establishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcomplianceinternal
auditandactuarialfunctions(Article 380(j))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthegroupto
ndash providethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswithanyinformation
thattheyneed
ndash reportsignificantriskconcentrationatthelevelofthegroupand
significantintra-grouptransactionsonatleastanannualbasisand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on the solvency and
financialconditionofthegroup(Article 380(k))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequirethatproposed
changestothebusinesspolicyormanagementofthegroup(orqualifying
holdings in the group) are consistent with the sound and prudent man-
agementofthegroup(Article 380(l))
mayer brown 17
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofthegroupshouldrelyonsound
economicprinciplesandassessmentofsolvencyshouldbebasedonan
economicvaluationofallassetsandliabilities(Article 380(m))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
holdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingarequirementfor
ndash technical provisions with respect to all obligations towards policy-
holdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insuranceundertakingsinthegroup
ndash assets held to cover technical provisions to be invested in the best
interestsofallpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccount
anydisclosedpolicyobjective)
ndash thegrouptoinvestonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoserisksitcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash the group to meet capital requirements at a level which ensures that in
theeventofsignificantlossespolicyholdersandbeneficiariesareade-
quatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsastheybecomedue
ndash (re)insuranceundertakingswhicharepartofthegrouptomaintaina
minimumlevelofcapitalnon-compliancewithwhichtriggers
immediatesupervisoryinterventionand
ndash groupcapitalrequirementstobemetwithownfundsthatareofa
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesinbothagoing
concernandacaseofwindingup(Article 380(n))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsoftheprudentialregimeofthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiablerisksandwhereasignificant
riskisnotquantifiablethatriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanother
supervisory mechanism (Article 380(o))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tionbythesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryintheeventthat
capital requirements are not complied with (Article 380(p))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryrestricttheuseofown-fund
itemsofarelated(re)insuranceundertakingwheretheitemscannoteffec-
tivelybemadeavailabletocoverthecapitalrequirementoftheparticipating
undertakingforwhichgroupsolvencyiscalculated(Article 380(q))
bull Thecalculationofgroupsolvencyinthethirdcountryrsquosprudentialregime
should produce a result that is at least equivalent to the result produced
byeitheroneoforacombinationofthecalculationmethodsinSolvency
II and the calculation method used should ensure that there is no double
useofownfundstomeetthegroupcapitalrequirementandthatthe
intra-groupcreationofcapitalthroughreciprocalfinancingiseliminated
(Article 380(r))
18 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatallpersons
whoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethird
countryaswellasauditorsandexpertsactingonbehalfoftheauthorities
areboundbyobligationsofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinforma-
tionreceivedfromallsupervisoryauthorities(Article 380(s))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 380(t))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatwhere
a(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingmaybe
divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 380(u))
bull Thethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswhichreceiveconfidential
informationfromothersupervisoryauthoritiesmustonlyusethat
informationinthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 380(v))
bull The third country supervisory authorities should be permitted to
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirsupervisoryfunctionsorthedetectionorinvestigation
ofbreachesofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersons
wherethatauthoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofes-
sionalsecrecyintherelevantthirdcountryprovidedthattheinformation
isonlydisclosedwiththeexpressagreementoftheoriginatorandonlyfor
thepurposesforwhichsuchauthoritywasgiven(Article 380(w))
19 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Annex 2
Potentially temporarily
provisionally equivalent area
Criteria to determine temporaryprovisional equivalence
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172(4))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities(particularly
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities)
Solvency assessment
(Article 227(5))
(a) The third country either already has an equivalent solvency regime in
place or one may be adopted or applied
(b)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(c)Thethirdcountryrsquoslawinprincipleallowscooperationandexchange
ofconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities
(d)Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(e)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider advising many of the worldrsquos largest companies including a significant portion of the Fortune 100 FTSE 100 DAX and Hang Seng Index companies and more than half of the worldrsquos largest banks Our legal services include banking and finance corporate and securities litigation and dispute resolution antitrust and competition US Supreme Court and appellate matters employment and benefits environmental financial services regulatory and enforcement government and global trade intellectual property real estate tax restructuring bankruptcy and insolvency and wealth management
Please visit wwwmayerbrowncom for comprehensive contact information for all Mayer Brown offices
This Mayer Brown publication provides information and comments on legal issues and developments of interest to our clients and friends The foregoing is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject matter covered and is not intended to provide legal advice Readers should seek legal advice before taking any action with respect to the matters discussed herein
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider comprising legal practices that are separate entities (the ldquoMayer Brown Practicesrdquo) The Mayer Brown Practices are Mayer Brown LLP and Mayer Brown Europe-Brussels LLP both limited liability partnerships established in Illinois USA Mayer Brown International LLP a limited liability partnership incorporated in England and Wales (authorized and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered in England and Wales number OC 303359) Mayer Brown a SELAS established in France Mayer Brown Mexico SC a sociedad civil formed under the laws of the State of Durango Mexico Mayer Brown JSM a Hong Kong partnership and its associated legal practices in Asia and Tauil amp Chequer Advogados a Brazilian law partnership with which Mayer Brown is associated Mayer Brown Consulting (Singapore) Pte Ltd and its subsidiary which are affiliated with Mayer Brown provide customs and trade advisory and consultancy services not legal services ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
copy 2015 The Mayer Brown Practices All rights reserved
0822fin
Group supervision
(Article 260(5))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasaprudentialregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting transparency and group
solvency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
other supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthoritiesinparticular
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandothersupervisory
authorities
![Page 14: Solvency II: Equivalence Decisions](https://reader030.vdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022012812/61c3bd04e721fa32777b3bfb/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
14 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Solvency assessment
(Article 227)
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofdomestic(re)insuranceundertakings
should rely on sound economic principles and solvency requirements should
bebasedonaneconomicvaluationofassetsorliabilities(Article379(a))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequiredomestic(re)insurance
undertakingstoholdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingrequirements
to
ndash establish technical provisions with respect to all (re)insurance obliga-
tionstowardspolicyholdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insurancecontracts
ndash investassetsheldtocovertechnicalprovisionsinthebestinterestsof
allpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccountanydisclosed
policyobjective)
ndash investonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoseriskstheundertakingcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash meet capital requirements set at a level equivalent to that under
SolvencyIIwhichensuresthatbeneficiariesandpolicyholdersare
adequatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsintheeventof
significantlosses
ndash maintainaminimumlevelofcapital(orsufferimmediatesupervisory
intervention)and
ndash meetcapitalrequirementsreferredtoabovewithownfundsof
sufficientqualitywhichareabletoabsorbsignificantlossesbothina
goingconcernandinacaseofwindingup(Article379(b))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsofthesolvencyregimeinthethirdcountrymust
berisk-basedtocapturequantifiableriskandanysignificantnon-quan-
tifiableriskmustbeaddressedthroughanothersupervisorymechanism
(Article 379(c))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tion by local supervisory authorities in the event that capital requirements
are not complied with (Article 379(d))
bull Thesolvencyregimeofthethirdcountrymustprovidethatallpersons
workingorwhohaveworkedforlocalsupervisoryauthoritiesandauditors
orexpertsactingonbehalfofthoseauthoritiesareboundbyobligations
ofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinformationreceivedfromall
supervisory authorities (Article 379(e))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article379(f))
mayer brown 15
bull Wherea(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptoris
beingcompulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnot
concernthirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakings
should be able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article
379(g))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesshouldonlyusethatinformation
inthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 379(h))
bull Arethesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrypermittedtoexchange
informationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthedischargeof
theirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreachesofcompanylaw
with other authorities bodies or persons where that authority body or
personissubjecttoanobligationofprofessionalsecrecyinthethirdcoun-
tryandissuchinformationonlydisclosedoncetheexpressagreementof
theoriginator(s)hasbeenobtainedandwhereappropriatesolelyforthe
purposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission(Article379(i))
Group supervision
(Article 260)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryhavethenecessarymeans
andresourcesrelevantexpertiseandthemandatetoeffectivelyprotect
policyholdersandbeneficiarieswhereverlocated(Article 380(a))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareempoweredbylawor
regulation to
ndash determinewhichundertakingsfallunderthescopeofsupervisionat
grouplevel
ndash supervise(re)insurerswhicharepartofagroup and
ndash imposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessary
(Article 380(b))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareabletoeffectively
assesstheriskprofileandsolvencyfinancialpositionof(re)insurers
whicharepartofagroupandthegrouprsquosbusinessstrategy(Article
380(c))
bull Supervisionatgrouplevelincludesallundertakingsoverwhichapartici-
patingundertakingexercisesdominantorsignificantinfluence(unless
notappropriateforgroupsupervisionobjectives)(Article 380(d))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustdulyconsiderthe
potentialimpactoftheirdecisionsonthestabilityoffinancialsystems
globally particularly during emergency situations (Article 380(e))
16 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmovementsin
financialmarketsoccur(Article 380(f))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectivesystemof
governanceatgrouplevelwhichprovidesforsoundandprudentbusiness
management and prescribes
ndash that there must be an adequate transparent organisational structure
withclearallocationandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementstoensurethatpersonswhoeffectivelyruntheundertak-
ingarefitandproper
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothwithinthegroupandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthorities and
ndash requirementsforensuringthattheoutsourcedfunctionsoractivities
areeffectivelysupervised(Article 380(g))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectiverisk
management system at group level comprising at least
ndash the strategies processes and internal reporting procedures necessary
toidentifymeasuremonitormanageandreportrisksonacontinu-
ousbasistowhichthegroupiscouldbeexposedand
ndash aneffectiveinternalcontrolsystem(Article 380(h))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
have sound reporting and accounting procedures to monitor and manage
intra-grouptransactionsandriskconcentrations(Article 380(i))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
establishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcomplianceinternal
auditandactuarialfunctions(Article 380(j))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthegroupto
ndash providethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswithanyinformation
thattheyneed
ndash reportsignificantriskconcentrationatthelevelofthegroupand
significantintra-grouptransactionsonatleastanannualbasisand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on the solvency and
financialconditionofthegroup(Article 380(k))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequirethatproposed
changestothebusinesspolicyormanagementofthegroup(orqualifying
holdings in the group) are consistent with the sound and prudent man-
agementofthegroup(Article 380(l))
mayer brown 17
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofthegroupshouldrelyonsound
economicprinciplesandassessmentofsolvencyshouldbebasedonan
economicvaluationofallassetsandliabilities(Article 380(m))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
holdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingarequirementfor
ndash technical provisions with respect to all obligations towards policy-
holdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insuranceundertakingsinthegroup
ndash assets held to cover technical provisions to be invested in the best
interestsofallpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccount
anydisclosedpolicyobjective)
ndash thegrouptoinvestonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoserisksitcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash the group to meet capital requirements at a level which ensures that in
theeventofsignificantlossespolicyholdersandbeneficiariesareade-
quatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsastheybecomedue
ndash (re)insuranceundertakingswhicharepartofthegrouptomaintaina
minimumlevelofcapitalnon-compliancewithwhichtriggers
immediatesupervisoryinterventionand
ndash groupcapitalrequirementstobemetwithownfundsthatareofa
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesinbothagoing
concernandacaseofwindingup(Article 380(n))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsoftheprudentialregimeofthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiablerisksandwhereasignificant
riskisnotquantifiablethatriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanother
supervisory mechanism (Article 380(o))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tionbythesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryintheeventthat
capital requirements are not complied with (Article 380(p))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryrestricttheuseofown-fund
itemsofarelated(re)insuranceundertakingwheretheitemscannoteffec-
tivelybemadeavailabletocoverthecapitalrequirementoftheparticipating
undertakingforwhichgroupsolvencyiscalculated(Article 380(q))
bull Thecalculationofgroupsolvencyinthethirdcountryrsquosprudentialregime
should produce a result that is at least equivalent to the result produced
byeitheroneoforacombinationofthecalculationmethodsinSolvency
II and the calculation method used should ensure that there is no double
useofownfundstomeetthegroupcapitalrequirementandthatthe
intra-groupcreationofcapitalthroughreciprocalfinancingiseliminated
(Article 380(r))
18 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatallpersons
whoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethird
countryaswellasauditorsandexpertsactingonbehalfoftheauthorities
areboundbyobligationsofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinforma-
tionreceivedfromallsupervisoryauthorities(Article 380(s))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 380(t))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatwhere
a(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingmaybe
divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 380(u))
bull Thethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswhichreceiveconfidential
informationfromothersupervisoryauthoritiesmustonlyusethat
informationinthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 380(v))
bull The third country supervisory authorities should be permitted to
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirsupervisoryfunctionsorthedetectionorinvestigation
ofbreachesofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersons
wherethatauthoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofes-
sionalsecrecyintherelevantthirdcountryprovidedthattheinformation
isonlydisclosedwiththeexpressagreementoftheoriginatorandonlyfor
thepurposesforwhichsuchauthoritywasgiven(Article 380(w))
19 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Annex 2
Potentially temporarily
provisionally equivalent area
Criteria to determine temporaryprovisional equivalence
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172(4))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities(particularly
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities)
Solvency assessment
(Article 227(5))
(a) The third country either already has an equivalent solvency regime in
place or one may be adopted or applied
(b)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(c)Thethirdcountryrsquoslawinprincipleallowscooperationandexchange
ofconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities
(d)Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(e)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider advising many of the worldrsquos largest companies including a significant portion of the Fortune 100 FTSE 100 DAX and Hang Seng Index companies and more than half of the worldrsquos largest banks Our legal services include banking and finance corporate and securities litigation and dispute resolution antitrust and competition US Supreme Court and appellate matters employment and benefits environmental financial services regulatory and enforcement government and global trade intellectual property real estate tax restructuring bankruptcy and insolvency and wealth management
Please visit wwwmayerbrowncom for comprehensive contact information for all Mayer Brown offices
This Mayer Brown publication provides information and comments on legal issues and developments of interest to our clients and friends The foregoing is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject matter covered and is not intended to provide legal advice Readers should seek legal advice before taking any action with respect to the matters discussed herein
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider comprising legal practices that are separate entities (the ldquoMayer Brown Practicesrdquo) The Mayer Brown Practices are Mayer Brown LLP and Mayer Brown Europe-Brussels LLP both limited liability partnerships established in Illinois USA Mayer Brown International LLP a limited liability partnership incorporated in England and Wales (authorized and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered in England and Wales number OC 303359) Mayer Brown a SELAS established in France Mayer Brown Mexico SC a sociedad civil formed under the laws of the State of Durango Mexico Mayer Brown JSM a Hong Kong partnership and its associated legal practices in Asia and Tauil amp Chequer Advogados a Brazilian law partnership with which Mayer Brown is associated Mayer Brown Consulting (Singapore) Pte Ltd and its subsidiary which are affiliated with Mayer Brown provide customs and trade advisory and consultancy services not legal services ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
copy 2015 The Mayer Brown Practices All rights reserved
0822fin
Group supervision
(Article 260(5))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasaprudentialregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting transparency and group
solvency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
other supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthoritiesinparticular
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandothersupervisory
authorities
![Page 15: Solvency II: Equivalence Decisions](https://reader030.vdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022012812/61c3bd04e721fa32777b3bfb/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
mayer brown 15
bull Wherea(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptoris
beingcompulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnot
concernthirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakings
should be able to be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article
379(g))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrywhichreceiveconfiden-
tialinformationfromotherauthoritiesshouldonlyusethatinformation
inthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 379(h))
bull Arethesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrypermittedtoexchange
informationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthedischargeof
theirfunctionsordetectionandinvestigationofbreachesofcompanylaw
with other authorities bodies or persons where that authority body or
personissubjecttoanobligationofprofessionalsecrecyinthethirdcoun-
tryandissuchinformationonlydisclosedoncetheexpressagreementof
theoriginator(s)hasbeenobtainedandwhereappropriatesolelyforthe
purposesforwhichtheoriginatorgaveitspermission(Article379(i))
Group supervision
(Article 260)
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryhavethenecessarymeans
andresourcesrelevantexpertiseandthemandatetoeffectivelyprotect
policyholdersandbeneficiarieswhereverlocated(Article 380(a))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareempoweredbylawor
regulation to
ndash determinewhichundertakingsfallunderthescopeofsupervisionat
grouplevel
ndash supervise(re)insurerswhicharepartofagroup and
ndash imposesanctionsortakeenforcementactionwherenecessary
(Article 380(b))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryareabletoeffectively
assesstheriskprofileandsolvencyfinancialpositionof(re)insurers
whicharepartofagroupandthegrouprsquosbusinessstrategy(Article
380(c))
bull Supervisionatgrouplevelincludesallundertakingsoverwhichapartici-
patingundertakingexercisesdominantorsignificantinfluence(unless
notappropriateforgroupsupervisionobjectives)(Article 380(d))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymustdulyconsiderthe
potentialimpactoftheirdecisionsonthestabilityoffinancialsystems
globally particularly during emergency situations (Article 380(e))
16 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmovementsin
financialmarketsoccur(Article 380(f))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectivesystemof
governanceatgrouplevelwhichprovidesforsoundandprudentbusiness
management and prescribes
ndash that there must be an adequate transparent organisational structure
withclearallocationandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementstoensurethatpersonswhoeffectivelyruntheundertak-
ingarefitandproper
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothwithinthegroupandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthorities and
ndash requirementsforensuringthattheoutsourcedfunctionsoractivities
areeffectivelysupervised(Article 380(g))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectiverisk
management system at group level comprising at least
ndash the strategies processes and internal reporting procedures necessary
toidentifymeasuremonitormanageandreportrisksonacontinu-
ousbasistowhichthegroupiscouldbeexposedand
ndash aneffectiveinternalcontrolsystem(Article 380(h))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
have sound reporting and accounting procedures to monitor and manage
intra-grouptransactionsandriskconcentrations(Article 380(i))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
establishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcomplianceinternal
auditandactuarialfunctions(Article 380(j))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthegroupto
ndash providethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswithanyinformation
thattheyneed
ndash reportsignificantriskconcentrationatthelevelofthegroupand
significantintra-grouptransactionsonatleastanannualbasisand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on the solvency and
financialconditionofthegroup(Article 380(k))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequirethatproposed
changestothebusinesspolicyormanagementofthegroup(orqualifying
holdings in the group) are consistent with the sound and prudent man-
agementofthegroup(Article 380(l))
mayer brown 17
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofthegroupshouldrelyonsound
economicprinciplesandassessmentofsolvencyshouldbebasedonan
economicvaluationofallassetsandliabilities(Article 380(m))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
holdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingarequirementfor
ndash technical provisions with respect to all obligations towards policy-
holdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insuranceundertakingsinthegroup
ndash assets held to cover technical provisions to be invested in the best
interestsofallpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccount
anydisclosedpolicyobjective)
ndash thegrouptoinvestonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoserisksitcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash the group to meet capital requirements at a level which ensures that in
theeventofsignificantlossespolicyholdersandbeneficiariesareade-
quatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsastheybecomedue
ndash (re)insuranceundertakingswhicharepartofthegrouptomaintaina
minimumlevelofcapitalnon-compliancewithwhichtriggers
immediatesupervisoryinterventionand
ndash groupcapitalrequirementstobemetwithownfundsthatareofa
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesinbothagoing
concernandacaseofwindingup(Article 380(n))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsoftheprudentialregimeofthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiablerisksandwhereasignificant
riskisnotquantifiablethatriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanother
supervisory mechanism (Article 380(o))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tionbythesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryintheeventthat
capital requirements are not complied with (Article 380(p))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryrestricttheuseofown-fund
itemsofarelated(re)insuranceundertakingwheretheitemscannoteffec-
tivelybemadeavailabletocoverthecapitalrequirementoftheparticipating
undertakingforwhichgroupsolvencyiscalculated(Article 380(q))
bull Thecalculationofgroupsolvencyinthethirdcountryrsquosprudentialregime
should produce a result that is at least equivalent to the result produced
byeitheroneoforacombinationofthecalculationmethodsinSolvency
II and the calculation method used should ensure that there is no double
useofownfundstomeetthegroupcapitalrequirementandthatthe
intra-groupcreationofcapitalthroughreciprocalfinancingiseliminated
(Article 380(r))
18 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatallpersons
whoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethird
countryaswellasauditorsandexpertsactingonbehalfoftheauthorities
areboundbyobligationsofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinforma-
tionreceivedfromallsupervisoryauthorities(Article 380(s))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 380(t))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatwhere
a(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingmaybe
divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 380(u))
bull Thethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswhichreceiveconfidential
informationfromothersupervisoryauthoritiesmustonlyusethat
informationinthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 380(v))
bull The third country supervisory authorities should be permitted to
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirsupervisoryfunctionsorthedetectionorinvestigation
ofbreachesofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersons
wherethatauthoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofes-
sionalsecrecyintherelevantthirdcountryprovidedthattheinformation
isonlydisclosedwiththeexpressagreementoftheoriginatorandonlyfor
thepurposesforwhichsuchauthoritywasgiven(Article 380(w))
19 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Annex 2
Potentially temporarily
provisionally equivalent area
Criteria to determine temporaryprovisional equivalence
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172(4))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities(particularly
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities)
Solvency assessment
(Article 227(5))
(a) The third country either already has an equivalent solvency regime in
place or one may be adopted or applied
(b)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(c)Thethirdcountryrsquoslawinprincipleallowscooperationandexchange
ofconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities
(d)Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(e)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider advising many of the worldrsquos largest companies including a significant portion of the Fortune 100 FTSE 100 DAX and Hang Seng Index companies and more than half of the worldrsquos largest banks Our legal services include banking and finance corporate and securities litigation and dispute resolution antitrust and competition US Supreme Court and appellate matters employment and benefits environmental financial services regulatory and enforcement government and global trade intellectual property real estate tax restructuring bankruptcy and insolvency and wealth management
Please visit wwwmayerbrowncom for comprehensive contact information for all Mayer Brown offices
This Mayer Brown publication provides information and comments on legal issues and developments of interest to our clients and friends The foregoing is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject matter covered and is not intended to provide legal advice Readers should seek legal advice before taking any action with respect to the matters discussed herein
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider comprising legal practices that are separate entities (the ldquoMayer Brown Practicesrdquo) The Mayer Brown Practices are Mayer Brown LLP and Mayer Brown Europe-Brussels LLP both limited liability partnerships established in Illinois USA Mayer Brown International LLP a limited liability partnership incorporated in England and Wales (authorized and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered in England and Wales number OC 303359) Mayer Brown a SELAS established in France Mayer Brown Mexico SC a sociedad civil formed under the laws of the State of Durango Mexico Mayer Brown JSM a Hong Kong partnership and its associated legal practices in Asia and Tauil amp Chequer Advogados a Brazilian law partnership with which Mayer Brown is associated Mayer Brown Consulting (Singapore) Pte Ltd and its subsidiary which are affiliated with Mayer Brown provide customs and trade advisory and consultancy services not legal services ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
copy 2015 The Mayer Brown Practices All rights reserved
0822fin
Group supervision
(Article 260(5))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasaprudentialregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting transparency and group
solvency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
other supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthoritiesinparticular
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandothersupervisory
authorities
![Page 16: Solvency II: Equivalence Decisions](https://reader030.vdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022012812/61c3bd04e721fa32777b3bfb/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
16 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountrymusttakeintoaccount
thepro-cyclicaleffectsoftheiractionswhereexceptionalmovementsin
financialmarketsoccur(Article 380(f))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectivesystemof
governanceatgrouplevelwhichprovidesforsoundandprudentbusiness
management and prescribes
ndash that there must be an adequate transparent organisational structure
withclearallocationandappropriatesegregationofresponsibilities
ndash requirementstoensurethatpersonswhoeffectivelyruntheundertak-
ingarefitandproper
ndash effectiveprocessestoensurethetimelytransmissionofinformation
bothwithinthegroupandtotherelevantsupervisoryauthorities and
ndash requirementsforensuringthattheoutsourcedfunctionsoractivities
areeffectivelysupervised(Article 380(g))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresaneffectiverisk
management system at group level comprising at least
ndash the strategies processes and internal reporting procedures necessary
toidentifymeasuremonitormanageandreportrisksonacontinu-
ousbasistowhichthegroupiscouldbeexposedand
ndash aneffectiveinternalcontrolsystem(Article 380(h))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
have sound reporting and accounting procedures to monitor and manage
intra-grouptransactionsandriskconcentrations(Article 380(i))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
establishandmaintaineffectiverisk-managementcomplianceinternal
auditandactuarialfunctions(Article 380(j))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryrequiresthegroupto
ndash providethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswithanyinformation
thattheyneed
ndash reportsignificantriskconcentrationatthelevelofthegroupand
significantintra-grouptransactionsonatleastanannualbasisand
ndash disclose publicly at least annually a report on the solvency and
financialconditionofthegroup(Article 380(k))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountrymustrequirethatproposed
changestothebusinesspolicyormanagementofthegroup(orqualifying
holdings in the group) are consistent with the sound and prudent man-
agementofthegroup(Article 380(l))
mayer brown 17
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofthegroupshouldrelyonsound
economicprinciplesandassessmentofsolvencyshouldbebasedonan
economicvaluationofallassetsandliabilities(Article 380(m))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
holdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingarequirementfor
ndash technical provisions with respect to all obligations towards policy-
holdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insuranceundertakingsinthegroup
ndash assets held to cover technical provisions to be invested in the best
interestsofallpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccount
anydisclosedpolicyobjective)
ndash thegrouptoinvestonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoserisksitcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash the group to meet capital requirements at a level which ensures that in
theeventofsignificantlossespolicyholdersandbeneficiariesareade-
quatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsastheybecomedue
ndash (re)insuranceundertakingswhicharepartofthegrouptomaintaina
minimumlevelofcapitalnon-compliancewithwhichtriggers
immediatesupervisoryinterventionand
ndash groupcapitalrequirementstobemetwithownfundsthatareofa
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesinbothagoing
concernandacaseofwindingup(Article 380(n))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsoftheprudentialregimeofthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiablerisksandwhereasignificant
riskisnotquantifiablethatriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanother
supervisory mechanism (Article 380(o))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tionbythesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryintheeventthat
capital requirements are not complied with (Article 380(p))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryrestricttheuseofown-fund
itemsofarelated(re)insuranceundertakingwheretheitemscannoteffec-
tivelybemadeavailabletocoverthecapitalrequirementoftheparticipating
undertakingforwhichgroupsolvencyiscalculated(Article 380(q))
bull Thecalculationofgroupsolvencyinthethirdcountryrsquosprudentialregime
should produce a result that is at least equivalent to the result produced
byeitheroneoforacombinationofthecalculationmethodsinSolvency
II and the calculation method used should ensure that there is no double
useofownfundstomeetthegroupcapitalrequirementandthatthe
intra-groupcreationofcapitalthroughreciprocalfinancingiseliminated
(Article 380(r))
18 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatallpersons
whoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethird
countryaswellasauditorsandexpertsactingonbehalfoftheauthorities
areboundbyobligationsofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinforma-
tionreceivedfromallsupervisoryauthorities(Article 380(s))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 380(t))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatwhere
a(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingmaybe
divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 380(u))
bull Thethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswhichreceiveconfidential
informationfromothersupervisoryauthoritiesmustonlyusethat
informationinthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 380(v))
bull The third country supervisory authorities should be permitted to
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirsupervisoryfunctionsorthedetectionorinvestigation
ofbreachesofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersons
wherethatauthoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofes-
sionalsecrecyintherelevantthirdcountryprovidedthattheinformation
isonlydisclosedwiththeexpressagreementoftheoriginatorandonlyfor
thepurposesforwhichsuchauthoritywasgiven(Article 380(w))
19 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Annex 2
Potentially temporarily
provisionally equivalent area
Criteria to determine temporaryprovisional equivalence
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172(4))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities(particularly
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities)
Solvency assessment
(Article 227(5))
(a) The third country either already has an equivalent solvency regime in
place or one may be adopted or applied
(b)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(c)Thethirdcountryrsquoslawinprincipleallowscooperationandexchange
ofconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities
(d)Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(e)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider advising many of the worldrsquos largest companies including a significant portion of the Fortune 100 FTSE 100 DAX and Hang Seng Index companies and more than half of the worldrsquos largest banks Our legal services include banking and finance corporate and securities litigation and dispute resolution antitrust and competition US Supreme Court and appellate matters employment and benefits environmental financial services regulatory and enforcement government and global trade intellectual property real estate tax restructuring bankruptcy and insolvency and wealth management
Please visit wwwmayerbrowncom for comprehensive contact information for all Mayer Brown offices
This Mayer Brown publication provides information and comments on legal issues and developments of interest to our clients and friends The foregoing is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject matter covered and is not intended to provide legal advice Readers should seek legal advice before taking any action with respect to the matters discussed herein
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider comprising legal practices that are separate entities (the ldquoMayer Brown Practicesrdquo) The Mayer Brown Practices are Mayer Brown LLP and Mayer Brown Europe-Brussels LLP both limited liability partnerships established in Illinois USA Mayer Brown International LLP a limited liability partnership incorporated in England and Wales (authorized and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered in England and Wales number OC 303359) Mayer Brown a SELAS established in France Mayer Brown Mexico SC a sociedad civil formed under the laws of the State of Durango Mexico Mayer Brown JSM a Hong Kong partnership and its associated legal practices in Asia and Tauil amp Chequer Advogados a Brazilian law partnership with which Mayer Brown is associated Mayer Brown Consulting (Singapore) Pte Ltd and its subsidiary which are affiliated with Mayer Brown provide customs and trade advisory and consultancy services not legal services ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
copy 2015 The Mayer Brown Practices All rights reserved
0822fin
Group supervision
(Article 260(5))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasaprudentialregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting transparency and group
solvency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
other supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthoritiesinparticular
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandothersupervisory
authorities
![Page 17: Solvency II: Equivalence Decisions](https://reader030.vdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022012812/61c3bd04e721fa32777b3bfb/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
mayer brown 17
bull Assessmentofthefinancialpositionofthegroupshouldrelyonsound
economicprinciplesandassessmentofsolvencyshouldbebasedonan
economicvaluationofallassetsandliabilities(Article 380(m))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldrequirethegroupto
holdadequatefinancialresourcesincludingarequirementfor
ndash technical provisions with respect to all obligations towards policy-
holdersandbeneficiariesof(re)insuranceundertakingsinthegroup
ndash assets held to cover technical provisions to be invested in the best
interestsofallpolicyholdersandbeneficiaries(takingintoaccount
anydisclosedpolicyobjective)
ndash thegrouptoinvestonlyinassetsandinstrumentswhoserisksitcan
properlyidentifymeasuremonitormanagecontrolandreport
ndash the group to meet capital requirements at a level which ensures that in
theeventofsignificantlossespolicyholdersandbeneficiariesareade-
quatelyprotectedandcontinuetoreceivepaymentsastheybecomedue
ndash (re)insuranceundertakingswhicharepartofthegrouptomaintaina
minimumlevelofcapitalnon-compliancewithwhichtriggers
immediatesupervisoryinterventionand
ndash groupcapitalrequirementstobemetwithownfundsthatareofa
sufficientqualitytobeabletoabsorbsignificantlossesinbothagoing
concernandacaseofwindingup(Article 380(n))
bull Thecapitalrequirementsoftheprudentialregimeofthethirdcountry
shouldberisk-basedtocapturequantifiablerisksandwhereasignificant
riskisnotquantifiablethatriskshouldbeaddressedthroughanother
supervisory mechanism (Article 380(o))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldensuretimelyinterven-
tionbythesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryintheeventthat
capital requirements are not complied with (Article 380(p))
bull Thesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethirdcountryrestricttheuseofown-fund
itemsofarelated(re)insuranceundertakingwheretheitemscannoteffec-
tivelybemadeavailabletocoverthecapitalrequirementoftheparticipating
undertakingforwhichgroupsolvencyiscalculated(Article 380(q))
bull Thecalculationofgroupsolvencyinthethirdcountryrsquosprudentialregime
should produce a result that is at least equivalent to the result produced
byeitheroneoforacombinationofthecalculationmethodsinSolvency
II and the calculation method used should ensure that there is no double
useofownfundstomeetthegroupcapitalrequirementandthatthe
intra-groupcreationofcapitalthroughreciprocalfinancingiseliminated
(Article 380(r))
18 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatallpersons
whoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethird
countryaswellasauditorsandexpertsactingonbehalfoftheauthorities
areboundbyobligationsofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinforma-
tionreceivedfromallsupervisoryauthorities(Article 380(s))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 380(t))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatwhere
a(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingmaybe
divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 380(u))
bull Thethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswhichreceiveconfidential
informationfromothersupervisoryauthoritiesmustonlyusethat
informationinthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 380(v))
bull The third country supervisory authorities should be permitted to
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirsupervisoryfunctionsorthedetectionorinvestigation
ofbreachesofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersons
wherethatauthoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofes-
sionalsecrecyintherelevantthirdcountryprovidedthattheinformation
isonlydisclosedwiththeexpressagreementoftheoriginatorandonlyfor
thepurposesforwhichsuchauthoritywasgiven(Article 380(w))
19 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Annex 2
Potentially temporarily
provisionally equivalent area
Criteria to determine temporaryprovisional equivalence
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172(4))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities(particularly
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities)
Solvency assessment
(Article 227(5))
(a) The third country either already has an equivalent solvency regime in
place or one may be adopted or applied
(b)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(c)Thethirdcountryrsquoslawinprincipleallowscooperationandexchange
ofconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities
(d)Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(e)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider advising many of the worldrsquos largest companies including a significant portion of the Fortune 100 FTSE 100 DAX and Hang Seng Index companies and more than half of the worldrsquos largest banks Our legal services include banking and finance corporate and securities litigation and dispute resolution antitrust and competition US Supreme Court and appellate matters employment and benefits environmental financial services regulatory and enforcement government and global trade intellectual property real estate tax restructuring bankruptcy and insolvency and wealth management
Please visit wwwmayerbrowncom for comprehensive contact information for all Mayer Brown offices
This Mayer Brown publication provides information and comments on legal issues and developments of interest to our clients and friends The foregoing is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject matter covered and is not intended to provide legal advice Readers should seek legal advice before taking any action with respect to the matters discussed herein
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider comprising legal practices that are separate entities (the ldquoMayer Brown Practicesrdquo) The Mayer Brown Practices are Mayer Brown LLP and Mayer Brown Europe-Brussels LLP both limited liability partnerships established in Illinois USA Mayer Brown International LLP a limited liability partnership incorporated in England and Wales (authorized and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered in England and Wales number OC 303359) Mayer Brown a SELAS established in France Mayer Brown Mexico SC a sociedad civil formed under the laws of the State of Durango Mexico Mayer Brown JSM a Hong Kong partnership and its associated legal practices in Asia and Tauil amp Chequer Advogados a Brazilian law partnership with which Mayer Brown is associated Mayer Brown Consulting (Singapore) Pte Ltd and its subsidiary which are affiliated with Mayer Brown provide customs and trade advisory and consultancy services not legal services ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
copy 2015 The Mayer Brown Practices All rights reserved
0822fin
Group supervision
(Article 260(5))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasaprudentialregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting transparency and group
solvency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
other supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthoritiesinparticular
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandothersupervisory
authorities
![Page 18: Solvency II: Equivalence Decisions](https://reader030.vdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022012812/61c3bd04e721fa32777b3bfb/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
18 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatallpersons
whoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisoryauthoritiesofthethird
countryaswellasauditorsandexpertsactingonbehalfoftheauthorities
areboundbyobligationsofprofessionalsecrecywhichextendtoinforma-
tionreceivedfromallsupervisoryauthorities(Article 380(s))
bull Withoutprejudicetocasescoveredbycriminallawconfidentialinforma-
tionreceivedbyallpersonwhoworkorhaveworkedforthesupervisory
authoritiesinthethirdcountrymustbekeptconfidentialfromallpersons
andauthoritiesexceptinasummaryoraggregateformwhichdoesnot
allowidentificationofindividualundertakings(Article 380(t))
bull Theprudentialregimeofthethirdcountryshouldprovidethatwhere
a(re)insuranceundertakinghasbeendeclaredbankruptorisbeing
compulsorilywoundupconfidentialinformationwhichdoesnotconcern
thirdpartiesinvolvedinattemptstorescuetheundertakingmaybe
divulged in civil or commercial proceedings (Article 380(u))
bull Thethirdcountrysupervisoryauthoritieswhichreceiveconfidential
informationfromothersupervisoryauthoritiesmustonlyusethat
informationinthecourseoftheirdutiesor
ndash tocheckconditionsattachedtothebusinessofreinsurancesystemsof
governanceandpublicdisclosureandsolvencyassessments
ndash toimposesanctions
ndash inadministrativeappealsagainstsupervisoryauthoritydecisionsor
ndash in court proceedings relating to the solvency regime in the third
country (Article 380(v))
bull The third country supervisory authorities should be permitted to
exchangeinformationreceivedfromsupervisoryauthoritiesinthe
dischargeoftheirsupervisoryfunctionsorthedetectionorinvestigation
ofbreachesofcompanylawwithotherauthoritiesbodiesorpersons
wherethatauthoritybodyorpersonissubjecttoanobligationofprofes-
sionalsecrecyintherelevantthirdcountryprovidedthattheinformation
isonlydisclosedwiththeexpressagreementoftheoriginatorandonlyfor
thepurposesforwhichsuchauthoritywasgiven(Article 380(w))
19 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Annex 2
Potentially temporarily
provisionally equivalent area
Criteria to determine temporaryprovisional equivalence
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172(4))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities(particularly
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities)
Solvency assessment
(Article 227(5))
(a) The third country either already has an equivalent solvency regime in
place or one may be adopted or applied
(b)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(c)Thethirdcountryrsquoslawinprincipleallowscooperationandexchange
ofconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities
(d)Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(e)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider advising many of the worldrsquos largest companies including a significant portion of the Fortune 100 FTSE 100 DAX and Hang Seng Index companies and more than half of the worldrsquos largest banks Our legal services include banking and finance corporate and securities litigation and dispute resolution antitrust and competition US Supreme Court and appellate matters employment and benefits environmental financial services regulatory and enforcement government and global trade intellectual property real estate tax restructuring bankruptcy and insolvency and wealth management
Please visit wwwmayerbrowncom for comprehensive contact information for all Mayer Brown offices
This Mayer Brown publication provides information and comments on legal issues and developments of interest to our clients and friends The foregoing is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject matter covered and is not intended to provide legal advice Readers should seek legal advice before taking any action with respect to the matters discussed herein
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider comprising legal practices that are separate entities (the ldquoMayer Brown Practicesrdquo) The Mayer Brown Practices are Mayer Brown LLP and Mayer Brown Europe-Brussels LLP both limited liability partnerships established in Illinois USA Mayer Brown International LLP a limited liability partnership incorporated in England and Wales (authorized and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered in England and Wales number OC 303359) Mayer Brown a SELAS established in France Mayer Brown Mexico SC a sociedad civil formed under the laws of the State of Durango Mexico Mayer Brown JSM a Hong Kong partnership and its associated legal practices in Asia and Tauil amp Chequer Advogados a Brazilian law partnership with which Mayer Brown is associated Mayer Brown Consulting (Singapore) Pte Ltd and its subsidiary which are affiliated with Mayer Brown provide customs and trade advisory and consultancy services not legal services ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
copy 2015 The Mayer Brown Practices All rights reserved
0822fin
Group supervision
(Article 260(5))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasaprudentialregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting transparency and group
solvency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
other supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthoritiesinparticular
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandothersupervisory
authorities
![Page 19: Solvency II: Equivalence Decisions](https://reader030.vdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022012812/61c3bd04e721fa32777b3bfb/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
19 Solvency II Equivalence Decisions
Annex 2
Potentially temporarily
provisionally equivalent area
Criteria to determine temporaryprovisional equivalence
Reinsurance supervision
(Article 172(4))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities(particularly
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities)
Solvency assessment
(Article 227(5))
(a) The third country either already has an equivalent solvency regime in
place or one may be adopted or applied
(b)Thethirdcountryhasasolvencyregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting and transparency
(c)Thethirdcountryrsquoslawinprincipleallowscooperationandexchange
ofconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAandsupervisory
authorities
(d)Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(e)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthorities
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider advising many of the worldrsquos largest companies including a significant portion of the Fortune 100 FTSE 100 DAX and Hang Seng Index companies and more than half of the worldrsquos largest banks Our legal services include banking and finance corporate and securities litigation and dispute resolution antitrust and competition US Supreme Court and appellate matters employment and benefits environmental financial services regulatory and enforcement government and global trade intellectual property real estate tax restructuring bankruptcy and insolvency and wealth management
Please visit wwwmayerbrowncom for comprehensive contact information for all Mayer Brown offices
This Mayer Brown publication provides information and comments on legal issues and developments of interest to our clients and friends The foregoing is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject matter covered and is not intended to provide legal advice Readers should seek legal advice before taking any action with respect to the matters discussed herein
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider comprising legal practices that are separate entities (the ldquoMayer Brown Practicesrdquo) The Mayer Brown Practices are Mayer Brown LLP and Mayer Brown Europe-Brussels LLP both limited liability partnerships established in Illinois USA Mayer Brown International LLP a limited liability partnership incorporated in England and Wales (authorized and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered in England and Wales number OC 303359) Mayer Brown a SELAS established in France Mayer Brown Mexico SC a sociedad civil formed under the laws of the State of Durango Mexico Mayer Brown JSM a Hong Kong partnership and its associated legal practices in Asia and Tauil amp Chequer Advogados a Brazilian law partnership with which Mayer Brown is associated Mayer Brown Consulting (Singapore) Pte Ltd and its subsidiary which are affiliated with Mayer Brown provide customs and trade advisory and consultancy services not legal services ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
copy 2015 The Mayer Brown Practices All rights reserved
0822fin
Group supervision
(Article 260(5))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasaprudentialregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting transparency and group
solvency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
other supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthoritiesinparticular
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandothersupervisory
authorities
![Page 20: Solvency II: Equivalence Decisions](https://reader030.vdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022012812/61c3bd04e721fa32777b3bfb/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider advising many of the worldrsquos largest companies including a significant portion of the Fortune 100 FTSE 100 DAX and Hang Seng Index companies and more than half of the worldrsquos largest banks Our legal services include banking and finance corporate and securities litigation and dispute resolution antitrust and competition US Supreme Court and appellate matters employment and benefits environmental financial services regulatory and enforcement government and global trade intellectual property real estate tax restructuring bankruptcy and insolvency and wealth management
Please visit wwwmayerbrowncom for comprehensive contact information for all Mayer Brown offices
This Mayer Brown publication provides information and comments on legal issues and developments of interest to our clients and friends The foregoing is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject matter covered and is not intended to provide legal advice Readers should seek legal advice before taking any action with respect to the matters discussed herein
Mayer Brown is a global legal services provider comprising legal practices that are separate entities (the ldquoMayer Brown Practicesrdquo) The Mayer Brown Practices are Mayer Brown LLP and Mayer Brown Europe-Brussels LLP both limited liability partnerships established in Illinois USA Mayer Brown International LLP a limited liability partnership incorporated in England and Wales (authorized and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered in England and Wales number OC 303359) Mayer Brown a SELAS established in France Mayer Brown Mexico SC a sociedad civil formed under the laws of the State of Durango Mexico Mayer Brown JSM a Hong Kong partnership and its associated legal practices in Asia and Tauil amp Chequer Advogados a Brazilian law partnership with which Mayer Brown is associated Mayer Brown Consulting (Singapore) Pte Ltd and its subsidiary which are affiliated with Mayer Brown provide customs and trade advisory and consultancy services not legal services ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
ldquoMayer Brownrdquo and the Mayer Brown logo are the trademarks of the Mayer Brown Practices in their respective jurisdictions
copy 2015 The Mayer Brown Practices All rights reserved
0822fin
Group supervision
(Article 260(5))
(a) The third country has committed to adopt and apply a solvency regime
thatiscapableofbeingassessedasfullyequivalentbeforetheendofthe
temporaryperiodofequivalenceends
(b)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedaworkprogrammetofulfil(a)
(c)Thethirdcountryhasallocatedsufficientresourcestofulfil(a)
(d)Thethirdcountryhasaprudentialregimethatisriskbasedand
establishes quantitative and qualitative solvency requirements and
requirements relating to supervisory reporting transparency and group
solvency
(e) The third country has entered into written arrangements to cooperate
andexchangeconfidentialsupervisoryinformationwithEIOPAand
other supervisory authorities
(f )Thethirdcountryhasanindependentsystemofsupervision
(g)Thethirdcountryhasestablishedobligationsofprofessionalsecrecyfor
allpersonsactingonbehalfofitssupervisoryauthoritiesinparticular
ontheexchangeofinformationwithEIOPAandothersupervisory
authorities