Solis vs. CA Petitioner GregorioSolis was found guiltyofmalversationofpublic funds The judgment was penned and signed on 19 June 1954 by the Honorable Jose N. Leuterio, then Judge-at-Large assigned to Camarines Sur. On 20 June 1954,Republic Act No. 1186, which abolished all existing positionsofJudges-at-Large, took effect without Executive approval. On 21 June 1954, the defendants appeared before thecourt; this time, thecourtwas presided over by Honorable Perfecto R. Palacio, judgeofanother salaofthecourt. Judge Palacio promulgated the judgmentofJudge Leuterio, against the objections ofherein petitioner. PetitionerSolisappealed the judgment to theCourtofAppealsxxx he raised in issue and attacked the validityofthe promulgationofthe judgmentofthe lowercourt, for having been made by another judge after the incumbencyofthe judge who rendered it had ceased. The Solicitor-General's brief, in theCourtofAppeals, agreed that the promulgation was illegal and void. Upon the facts heretofore stated, the judgmentoftrial judge Jose N. Leuterio was promulgated (on 21 June 1954) one (1) day after his position as Judge-at-Large was abolished (on 20 June 1954) byRepublic Act 1185. The judgment is, therefore, void, for it is now firmly established in our jurisprudence that a decision is void if promulgated after the judge who rendered it had permanently ceased to be a judgeofthecourtwhere he sat in judgment. Thus, a judgment is a nullity if it had been promulgated after the judge had actually vacated the office and accepted another office;3or when the termofofficeofthe judge has ended;4or when he has left the Bench;5or after the judge had vacated his post in viewofthe abolitionofhis position as Judge-at-Large underRepublic Act 1186;6or after the cessation or terminationofhis incumbency as such judge. Section 6ofRule 116ofthe old RulesofCourt, allowing the dispensing with the presenceofthe judge in the readingofa sentence, applies only to the physical absenceofthe judge, being construed to mean that the decisionofthe judge may be promulgated even without his presence, as long as he is still a judgeofthatcourt.HELD: The main ground upon which theCourtofAppealsheld the contested judgmentoftheCourtofFirst Instance to be valid is that "since the approvalofRepublic Act 1186, effective 20 June 1954, was not yet publicly or generally known on 21 June 1954, Judge Leuterio should be considered as a judgede factoofsaidcourtand the promulgationofhis appealed decision on said date is valid and legally effective."10This is a misapplicationofthe doctrine laid down in the very case cited by theCourtofAppeals. In Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez,supra, a judgede factowas defined as one who has the reputationofbeing the officer he assumes to be and yet is not a good officer in pointoflaw because there exists some defect in his appointment or his right to exercise judicial functions at the particular time (37 Phil. on page 192); but it is "essential to the validityofthe actsofade factojudge, that he isactually actingunder some colorofright" (case cit. on page 190). In the present case, Judge Leuterio did not actually act or perform or exercise the dutiesofjudge when his decision was promulgated, as he had ceased to be one, and the decision was promulgated under another presiding judge. The other cases cited by theCourtofAppeals(Regalav. JudgeoftheCourtofFirst InstanceofBataan, 77 Phil. 684; U.S.v. Abalos, 1 Phil. 78) were similarly misapplied, as said decisions refer to theactsofade factojudge, not to a case where he didnot act. FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decisionofthe respondentCourtofAppealsand the decisionoftheCourtofFirst InstanceofCamarines Sur are hereby voided and set aside. The recordsofthe criminal cases as hereby ordered returned to theCourtofFirst InstanceofCamarines Sur, for new adjudication by the judge presiding therein, in accordance with the evidence already introduced, and for further proceeding conformable to law. No costs.|||(Solis v. CA, G.R. Nos. L-29777-83, March 26, 1971)

REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; JUDGMENT RENDERED WITHOUT JURISDICTION, A NULLITY. The judgmentoftrial judge Jose N. Leuterio was promulgated (on 21 June 1954) one (1) day after position as Judge-at-Large was abolished (on June 1954) byRepublic Act 1186. The judgment, is therefore, void, for it is now firmly established in our jurisprudence that a decision is promulgated after the judge who rendered it had permanently ceased to be a judgeofthe courtwhere he sat in judgment. Thus, a judgment is a nullity if it had been promulgated after the judge had actually vacated the office and accepted another office; or when the termofofficeofthe judge had ended; or when he has left the Bench; or after the judge had vacated his post in viewofthe abolitionofhis position as Judge-at-Large underRepublic Act 1186; or after Section 6ofRule 116ofthe old RulesofCourt, allowing the dispensing with the presence, asofthe Judge in the readingofa sentence, applies only to the physical absenceofthe judge, being construed to mean that the decisionofthe judge may be promulgated even without his presence, as long as he is still a judgeofthatcourt. A sentence has been set aside where the judge who presided in theCourtofFirst InstanceofNueva Ecija had been extended an ad interim appointment to theCourtofFirst InstanceofManila, to which position he qualified the judgment was filed with the ClerkofCourtofthe formercourt. Nullity likewise attached to a dismissal order when the temporary assignmentofthe judge that rendered it had been terminated before the order was issued, because a new judge for the samecourtqualified. JUDGE DE FACTO DEFINED; CASE AT BAR. In Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, (37 Phil. 186) a judge de facto was defined as one who has the reputationofbeing the officer he assumes to be and yet is not a good officer in pointoflaw because there exists some defect in his appointment or his right to exercise judicial functions at the particular time (37 Phil. on page 192); but it is "essential to the validityofthe actsofa de facto judge, that he is actually acting under some colorofright" (case cit. on page 190). In the present case, Judge Leuterio did not actually act or perform or exercise the dutiesofjudge when his decision was promulgated, as he had ceased to be one, and the decision was promulgated under another presiding judge. The other cases cited by theCourtofAppeals(Regalav. JudgeoftheCourtofFirst InstanceofBataan, 77 Phil. 684; U.S.v. Abalos, 1 Phil. 73) were similarly misapplied, as said decisions refer to the actsofa de facto judge, not to a case where he did not act.

x--------xpineda vs ClaudioPineda vs Claudio1.PUBLIC OFFICERS; SECURITY OF TENURE; CIVIL SERVICE CAREER OFFICIALS AFFORDED THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FROM REMOVAL FROM OFFICE. This Court, by a long, unbroken, unquestioned course of impressive adjudication has correctly buttressed the constitutional protection afforded the civil service career officials from the many and diverse ways by which removal, in fact could result, though ostensibly based on nonobjectionable grounds, contrary to the security of tenure safeguarded by the fundamental law.2.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; AUTONOMY OF. The norm applicable to a department head should equally be considered fitting when the power to appoint is given to the city mayor of a chartered city. Only thus may local autonomy be further bolstered and fortified. The judicial interpretation adopted by us is thus in conformity with the limitation on the powers of the President, where local government is concerned, to that of general supervision as distinguished from the control he may exercise over all the executive departments, bureaus or offices of the national government.FACTS: Upon the death of Col. Mariano Tumaliuan, the position of chief of police of Pasay City became vacant. To fill the vacancy,Mayor Claudioappointed the respondent Francisco Villa, a state prosecutor in the Department of Justice, But the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service Abelardo Subido held the appointment in abeyance until other persons who, in Subido's opinion, had preferential right to appointment have been considered. One of these persons isPinedawho, as deputy chief of police, "is a person next in rank entitled to promotional preference for the position of Chief of Police . . . before others may be considered (for) transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, or certification." Answering the memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, Subido contended xxx what is important is that the filling of positions in the police service including that of Chief of Police in accordance with the procedure outlined in paragraph 3 of Sec. 23 ofRepublic Act 2260in relation to Sec. 4 of the Decentralization Act (Rep. Act 5185) would strengthen the police service.Vice versa,leaving the matter of promotion solely to the discretion of the Mayor without regard to the order of priorities contained in the Civil Service Law, would result in its demoralization." RespondentsClaudioand Villa point out, on the other hand, that Subido should be held in estoppel on the basis of his approval of the very appointment ofPinedaas deputy chief of police of Pasay City, where no list of those with "preferential rights" and no inquiry as to the mayor's reasons for not appointing the police officer next-in-rank in the Pasay City police department was made; and that advising the mayor that "the filling of the vacancy for Deputy Chief of Police is governed by Section 4,R.A. 5185," Subido merely issued a certification, containing the names of "five ranking qualified and eligible persons" includingPineda, and evidently did not consider as applicable the provisions on preferences of Section 23 of the Civil Service Act nor the ruling inMillaresv. Subido1now invoked by him.

The petitioner states the issues as follows:"(1)Is it mandatory and ministerial upon the Mayor of Pasay City to promote to the vacant position of Chief of Police, a competitive position, petitionerPineda, the incumbent Deputy Chief of Police, who is the competent and qualified next-in-rank employee with the appropriate civil service eligibility?"(2)Is respondent Mayor's appointment of respondent Villa to the said classified position of Chief of Police null and void, considering that he is an outsider, he is not the next-in-rank employee and he has not passed the Civil Service examination for Chief of Police?"HELD Resolving the issue squarely presented, we hold that it is neither mandatory nor ministerial for the mayor of Pasay City to promote to the vacant position of chief of police the incumbent deputy chief of policePineda, and that the appointment to said position of the respondent Villa, who has been certified as qualified and eligible, although an "outsider" and not the next-in-rank employee,is valid,in the same manner that the appointment ofPineda, although an "outsider" and not the next-in-rank, to the position of deputy chief of police was valid. The Civil Service Act does not peremptorily require the mayor to promote the officer next in rank. Section 23 thereof does not require that vacanciesmustbe filled by promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment or certification,in that order.That would be to construe the provision not merely as a legislative prescription of qualifications but as a legislative appointment, repugnant to the Constitution. What it does purport to say is that as far as practicable the person next in rank should be promoted, otherwise the vacancy may be filled by transfer, reinstatement, reemployment or certification, as the appointing power sees fit, provided the appointee is certified to be qualified and eligiblewhich is the basic requirement of the Civil Service Act, as well as of the Police Act and the Decentralization Law. To construe Section 23 the way the petitioner urges it should be, would be to unduly interfere with the power and prerogatives of the local executive as reinforced by the Decentralization Act at the same time that it would frustrate the policy of the Police Act "to achieve and attain a higher degree of efficiency in the organization, administration, and operation of local police agencies"2and that of the Civil Service Act "to attract the best qualified to enter the service." Here, the question is squarely presented,4and we now rule that the principle of seniority and the next-in-rank rule embodied in Section 23, with its corollary requirement to set forth the "special reason or reasons" in case the officer next in rank is not appointed to the vacant position, applies only to cases of promotion. Hence, where the appointing power chooses to fill the vacancy not by promotion but by transfer, reinstatement, reemployment or certification (not necessarily in that order, as we have already said) he is under no duty whatsoever to explain his action, for the law does not so require him. The reason for this distinction is simple. When a person who is a junior jumps over his senior, the ranking is disturbed and the person next in rank is actually bypassed, and so it is reasonable to require the appointing power to give his "special reason or reasons" for preferring his appointee to the officer next-in-rank. But where the vacancy is filled not by promotion but by transfer, the person next-in-rank is not really bypassed, because the person appointed is one who holds a position of equivalent rank as the vacant position. To the appointee, the new position is hardly a higher one. As this Court correctly observed inMillares,in distinguishing promotion from transfer, "whereas the first denotes a scalar ascent of a senior officer or employee to another position,highereither in rank or salary, the second refers to a lateral movement from one position to another of equivalent rank level or salary."5 This is not to say that seniority and rank are of no consequence. The Civil Service Act does direct, as we construe it, that as far as practicable the next in rank should be among the first considered for the vacancy, if qualified and eligible, and requires that when the vacancy is filledby promotion,the appointing authoritymustgive the "special reason or reasons" for bypassing the next-in-rank. But such official cannot claim any preferential right to appointment to the vacancy over others equally certified to be qualified and eligible for appointment by transfer, reinstatement or reemployment, or by appropriate certification, just as those applying for transfer cannot claim preference over those seeking reinstatement, etc., nor subject the appointing authority's reasons for his choice to final review and decision by the Civil Service Commissioner. To so hold as the petitioner and the respondent Commissioner contend, would be to invalidly substitute the judgment of the Commissioner of Civil Service for that of the appointing authority, in whom the prerogative of free choice resides. More, in the present case, Subido's action of questioning respondentClaudio's sincerity in not appointing petitioner to the vacant position of chief of police when he had appointed him(Pineda)as deputy chief of police just a few months before, projects the pitfalls of such a theory which would in some cases permit unauthorized interference by the Commissioner of Civil Service with the appointing authority's free exercise of his Judgment and prerogative of free choice. We, therefore, hold that in the event of there occurring a vacancy, the officer next in rank must, as far as practicable and as the appointing authority sees fit in his best judgment and estimation, be promoted, otherwise the vacancy may be filled either by transfer, reinstatement, reemployment or certificationnot necessary in that orderand that it is only in cases of promotion, where an employee other than the ranking one is appointed, is the appointing power under duty to give "special reason or reasons" for his action to the Civil Service Commissioner, as provided in Section 23, third paragraph, of the Civil Service Act. As there is no question that the respondent Villa has been certified to be qualified and eligible, it is well within the ambit of the power of the respondentClaudioto appoint him chief of police of Pasay City. Consequently, the respondentClaudioowes the petitioner no duty to extend to him a promotional appointment, the performance of which may be compelled by mandamus.ACCORDINGLY, the petition for mandamus is denied, without pronouncement as to costs.x----------------x