solar super storms

8/6/2019 Solar Super Storms

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7/28/2008

The Solar Superstorm (SS)Threat to Infrastructure



Kevin Briggs 7/2 8/2008 2

Purpose: summarize key findings from …

–

Workshop on the Societal and Economic Impacts of Severe Space Weather Events,sponsored by the National Academies, 22-23 May 2008 [Reference 1, denoted as R1]

–

Recent FEMA studies related to Solar Superstorms•

“An Assessment of the Threat Potential to the US Electric Power Grids from Extreme Space Weather

Storms –

Analysis of US Power System Impacts from Large Geomagnetic Storm Events”

by JohnKappenman and Peter Warner, Metatech Corporation, in support of a FEMA sponsored contract withCubic Applications, Inc., 1 Oct 2007 (Meta-R-295) [R2]

•

“The Threat of a 100-Year Geomagnetic Superstorm to the U.S. Power Infrastructure”

by Dr. WilliamRadasky, Ph.D., P.E. and Mr. John Kappenman, P.E., Metatech Corporation, in support of a FEMAsponsored contract with Cubic Applications, Inc., 20 January 2008 (Meta-R-280)

[R3]•

“Economic Analysis of a Major Geomagnetic Storm on the United States”

–

Briefing provided by CubicApplications, Inc., 8 February 2008 [R4]

–

NASA websites•

http://science.nasa.gov/headlines/y2008/06may_carringtonflare.htm

(acce ssed 6/5/2008)

[R5]•

http://helios.gsfc.nasa.gov/cme.html#cmenews

(acces sed 6/5/2008) [R6]•

http://www.nasa.gov/vision/universe/solarsystem/perfect_space_storm.html

(acces sed 6/5/08) [R7] –

Email from J. Kappenman to K. Briggs, 6/5/08, “Subject: Follow-up ”

[R8]

–

Historical news articles: www.solarstorms.org

[R9] –

“Solar Tsunamis”, briefin g by John Greenhill, Depar tment of Energy representativeto the National Communi cations System, 11/12/200 7

[R10]

–

“Bracing for a Solar SuperStorm”

by Sten F. Odenwald and James L. Green,Scientific American, August 2008 [R11]

–

NOAA websites•

http://www.swpc.noaa.gov/info/SolarEffects.html

(acces sed 7/22/2008)

[R12]•

http://www.swpc.noaa.gov/primer/primer.html

(and ot her primer pages –

accessed 7/22/2008)

[R13]• http://www.swpc.noaa.gov/NOAAscales/index.html#GeomagneticStorms (acces sed 7/22/2008) [R14]

http://www.swpc.noaa.gov/NOAAscales/index.html#GeomagneticStorms








http://www.solarstorms.org/





































Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008 3

Why should we be concerned?

•

Note : This briefing does not present a DHS or NCS position regarding Solar Superstorms. It does consolidate some subject matter expert

opinions from government and industry regarding this threat.•

Some reasons for concern (as explained later in the brief) : –

A Solar Superstorm (SS) could strike the United States (US) in the near future•

Last US SS occurred in 1972 … SSs historically occur about every 30 years over the US•

Our power infrastructure is far more vulnerable to SSs today than back in 1972

–

SSs could cause long term power outages (from weeks to years) –

A long term outage (LTO) over large regions would lead to severe

communicationsdisruptions that would hinder restoration efforts

–

LTOs could cover large portions of our country; LTOs could also occur in other nations

–

Without power/communications, all other infrastructures are disrupted/eventually fail –

A black start of large portions of the US power grids may be required –

Without communications for the operators and SCADA* nets, restarting grid regions maybe impossible; all infrastructures would need resilient communications to limit losses

–

Some of the necessary equipment required to fix the problem, such as large generator step-up (GSU) transformers, are in short supply, require a long time to install, and mayrequire years to be delivered from overseas

* SCADA = Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition




•

A Solar Superstorm (also called a Solar Tsunami) is “a huge destructive geomagnetic disturbancein the earth caused by a coronal mass ejection (CME)”

[R10, p. 12]•

“Solar flares and CMEs are currently the biggest "explosions" in our solar system, roughly

approaching the power in ONE BILLION hydrogen bombs! ”

[R6]•

“There are about 5,000 solar CMEs per year but only few hit the earth”

[R10, page 7]•

Solar Superstorms strike the earth about once every 11 years . They have an intensity of over 200on the “Ap”

storm intensity index. [R3, page 4 ] –

SSs often focus their energy on continental sized regions of the

earth [R10, page 4]

–

SSs are likely to occur over the USA about once every 30 years [R2, p. 3-13]•

“Fast CMEs occur more often near the peak of the 11-year solar cycle, and can trigger major disturbances in Earth's magnetosphere , known as space weather.”

[R6] –

Fastest CME plasma reached earth in 14.6 hours

[R1 (ww7.nationalacademies.org/ssb/spaceweather08_green.pdf)

]•

CMEs ≠

Solar Flares; “large non-recurrent geomagnetic storms are produced by coronal massejections (CMEs), not by solar flares.”

(http://lheawww.gsfc.nasa.gov/~reames/DARK7.HTML)•

“Geomagnetic storms are created when the Earth's magnetic field captures ionized particlescarried by the solar wind due to coronal mass ejections or coronal holes at the Sun. Although thereare different types of disturbances noted at the Earth surface, the disturbances can becharacterized as a very slowly varying magnetic field with rise times as fast as a few seconds, and

pulse widths of up to an hour.

The rate of change of the magnetic field is a major factor in creatingelectric fields in the Earth and thereby inducing quasi-dc current flow in the power transmission

network .” [R2, page 1-1]

What are Solar Superstorms?

Note: Red text highlights are not in the original texts quoted in this briefing




•

1859 “Carrington” Superstorm (a 5,000+ nanoTesla (nT)/min. level event [R2, p.3-13]

) –

“At 11:18 AM on …

September 1, 1859, 33-year-old Richard Carrington …

was capturing thelikeness of an enormous group of sunspots. Suddenly, before his eyes, two brilliant beads of blinding white light appeared over the sunspots, intensified rapidly, and became kidney-

shaped. …

Just before dawn the next day, skies all over planet Earth erupted in red, green,and purple auroras so brilliant that newspapers could be read as

easily as in daylight . Indeed,stunning auroras pulsated even at near tropical latitudes over Cuba, the Bahamas, Jamaica,El Salvador, and Hawaii.”

(http://science.nasa.gov/headlines/y2008/06may_carringtonflare.htm) –

“Within hours, telegraph wires in both the United States and Europe spontaneously shortedout, causing numerous fires , while the Northern Lights, solar-induced phenomena moreclosely associated with regions near Earth's North Pole, were documented as far south asRome, Havana and Hawaii, with similar effects at the South Pole.”

[R7] –

Unseen by Carrington, the largest “earth-directed”

CME in the past 500 years occurred

•

1921 “NY Railroad” Superstorm (a ~5,000 nT/min. level event [R2, p.3-13]

) –

“…

induced currents caused fires in telegraph equipment in Sweden ”

[R2, page 3-8] –

“At 7:04 AM on May 15, the entire signal and switching system of the New York CentralRailroad below 125th street was put out of operation, followed by a fire in the control tower at57th Street and Park Avenue . …

Telegraph Operator Hatch said that he was actually driven

away from his telegraph instrument by a flame that enveloped his

switchboard and ignited theentire building at a loss of $6,000.”

[R9, http://www.solarstorms.org/SS1921.html]

Historical “1 in 100 year +”Solar Superstorms over the USA


http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/solar-super-storms 6/27Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008 6

•

1940 “Easter Sunday” Solar Superstorm –

“On Easter Sunday calls to grandma by millions of people were halted

betw een 10:00AM and 4:00 PM

creating pand emonium at nearly all Western Union offices. [New YorkTimes, March 25, 1940, p. 1] . A telephone cable between Fargo North Dakota andWinnipeg was found with its wires fused together , presumably from the voltage surges.…

In Bangor Maine, lightning arresters were burned out

as well. The New York Timesnoted that United Press reported earth currents at 400 Volts in Boston, 450 inMilwaukee, and more than 750 Volts near St. Louis. All tolled, the Associated Press'sentire investment of

185,000 miles of leased wires were put out of service . Practically

every long-distance telegraph or telephone office in the country was doing repair work.... AT&T land lines had been badly disrupted by 600 volt surges on wires designed for 48 volts. In the Atlantic Cable between Scotland and Newfoundland, voltages up to2,600 volts were recorded during the storm .”

[R9]* –

“…

first reported power system problems ”

[R2, page 3-6]

•

1972 “Space Age” Solar Superstorm (~2,200 nT/min. level event [R2, p.3-13]

) –

“knocked out long-distance telephone communication

across Illinois

… event …

causedAT&T to redesign its power system for transatlantic cables .”

[http://science.nasa.gov/headlines/y2008/06may_carringtonflare.htm]

–

“At 22:30 UT AT&T reported a voltage surge of 60 volts on their coaxial telephone cable

between Chicago and Nebraska. Another 30 minute shutdown of phone service on Bell'scable link between Plano, Illinois and Cascade, Iowa was also attributed to the storm.* [R9, http://www.solarstorms.org/SRefStorms.html]

Other more recentSolar Superstorms over the USA

http://www.solarstorms.org/NewsPapers/1940a.pdf










1989 “Hydro Quebec” Solar Storm caused acollapse of Quebec’s grid within 92 seconds

This ~400 nT/minstorm causedQuebec’s grid togo down. Themost noteworthyevent (within theUS during this

storm) was thecomplete loss of alarge generator step-up (GSU)transformer connected to the500kV grid at theSalem Nuclear Power Plant.[R2, pages 2-1 2-

2, and 2-29]



Coronal Mass Ejections (CMEs)

Space PerspectivesBelow : A CME fromSOHO/LASCO of an April

7, 1997 halo event. A"halo" event is one wherethe CME is headed in thedirection of Earth. The darkdisk in the center is not theSun, but the occulting, or Sun-blocking, disk of theLASCO coronagraph [R6]

Above : Graphic of a CME interacting with the earth’s

magnetosphereCredit: www-istp.gsfc.nasa.gov/istp/outreach/images/Gusts/cme-earth.jpg



Coronal Mass Ejections and the Earth

Image from the Solar and Heliospheric

Observatory(SOHO) satellite shows an erupting coronal mass ejection,with an Earth inset at the approximate scale of the image.

R7 Credit: NASA



An aurora in Plymouth, OH.

Credit : Terry Lutzfrom www.nasa.gov/images/content/119657main_aurora_lg.jpg

(web page accessed in June 2008)

An aurora in AlaskaCredit: Jan Curtis of the Geophysical Institute at

the University of Alaska

from: www.nasa.gov/centers/goddard/news/topstory/2008/aurora_live.html

(web page accessed in June 2008)

Coronal Mass Ejections (CMEs)

As seen on the earth as auroras“Auroras are much more than just pretty lights in the sky. Underlying each display is apotent geomagnetic storm with possible side-effects ranging from satellite malfunctions inorbit to power outages on terra firma. Telecommunications, air traffic, power grids and GPS

systems are all vulnerable. In a society that relies increasingly on space technology,understanding these storms is vital.” –

Tony Phillips, NASA(from: www.nasa.gov/centers/goddard/news/topstory/2008/aurora_live.html

; access ed June 2008)

•••

http://www.nasa.gov/images/content/119657main_aurora_lg.jpg

http://www.nasa.gov/centers/goddard/news/topstory/2008/aurora_live.html







http://www.nasa.gov/images/content/119657main_aurora_lg.jpg



Systems that can be impacted bySolar Storms

Credit: NASA and Bell laboratories, Lucent Technologieswww-istp.gsfc.nasa.gov/istp/outreach/images/Gusts/effects.gif [June 2008]



Solar Storms have damaged critical infrastructures –

Satellites (upset and damage) [R1]

•

1994:

Anik E1 & E2 damaged (TV and data services lost to 1600 communities)•

1998: PanAmSat's Galaxy IV satellite (disrupted pager service across USA)•

2003: Extensive satellite upsets and damage due to a solar storm

–

Power grid (especially Extra High Voltage (EHV) transformers) (damage) [R1/2/9]•

1958 & 1972: Transformer failures at British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority

•

1989: Hydro Quebec power interrupted/damaged; Salem NJ nuclear plant transformers failed•

2003: 14 transformers damaged in South Africa [R1 and R2, page 3-25]

–

Long communications lines (disruption and damage) [R1/2/5/9]•

1859, 1882, 1909, 1921, 1926: Telegraph lines disrupted, operators shocked, fires started•

1940 and 1958: Landline and undersea lines disrupted and/or damaged

•

1972: US and Canada’s telephone system damaged/disrupted –

HF radio paths (disruption) [R1/9]•

1991 upset of HF radio support Gulf War

–

Global Positioning System (GPS) (disruption) [R1]

Examples of historical Solar Stormdamage to infrastructure

Damaged Salem NJ nuclear planttransformer


http://solarscience.msfc.nasa.gov/suntime/images/trans3.jpg



Potential impacts to satellites

•

“Experts who have studied the question say there is little to be done to protect satellitesfrom a Carrington-class flare. In fact, a recent paper estimates potential damage to the900-plus satellites currently in orbit could cost between $30 billion and $70 billion. Thebest solution, they say: have a pipeline of comsats ready for launch.”

-

Source: http://science.nasa.gov/headlines/y2008/06may_carringtonflare.htm

Source for table at right: [R1]

www7.nationalacademies.org/ssb/

spaceweather08_green.pdf





Solar Superstorms can occur at any time

SSs denoted by red peaks Sunspots shown in blue

SSs do not always followthe sunspot cycle

SSs are more frequent during peaks of sunspot cycle (2011/12 is Cycle 24 peak)

From R3,page 4.



Damaging Solar Superstorm Probabilities

•

One in 100 year storms (of ~4,800+ nT/min level over the USA)*: –

In the last 150 years, only the 1859 and 1921 SSs reached this level –

62 years between these storms … 87 years have passed since (1921 – 2008) –

Later slides show the potential impact on the E. Coast for a 4800 nT/min storm

•

One in 30 year storms (of ~2,400+ nT/min level over the USA)*: –

1972 (and perhaps in 1940 and 1958) solar storm(s) approached this level overthe USA (none have reached this level over the last 36 years in the USA)

–

1989 Hydro Quebec storm was at a lower level (max ~900 nT/min in N. America)

•

This storm caused transformer damage at one nuclear power plant site in NJ•

Caused complete collapse of Quebec’s power grid•

The US power grid is generally more vulnerable to these effects today –

Later slides show the potential impact on the W. Coast for a 2,400 nT/min storm

•

The next solar sunspot maximum will occur in 2011-2012 –

Likelihood of a Solar Superstorm increases during solar max periods

Bottom line: Some experts believe we are due for a damaging,possibly catastrophic storm. The next “high risk”

period is 2011-2012.

* From R2, page 3-13




CONUS High-Voltage Transmission Network

Today’s US power grid

is far more vulnerableto SSs than during thelast major storm in1972.

The higher the voltage,the higher the risk.From R2 (Metatech: Meta-R-295), p. 1-13

US has the world’s most extensive grid at345kV & above




Continental US High Voltage Transformers

From R2, page 1-13




Metatech SS Scenario Results (part 1)presented at National Academies Workshop, 23 May 08

Areas of probableimmediate powersystem collapse

Cascading effectscould potentiallycause outagesacross major

portions of the USpower grid andcould necessitatea Black Start of thegrid.




33%

24%

55%

34%

17%27%

18%19%

47%

9%

21%

35%

30%7%

7%

40%

1%

82%

97

%

11%

7%

37%

39%

8%

17%

23%

24%

38%

12%

75%

55%

72%

6%

15%

32

%

6%

26%

19%

36%

47%

30%

Metatech reported that approximately 365

large EHV transformers would be at-risk ofpermanent damage in this scenario [R1 and R8]

Percentage of at-risk transformer capacity in Mega Volt-Ampere (MVA) (for the 50° N scenario) for each State





•

“Present US Grid Operational Procedures are based largely on limitedexperience, generally do not reduce GIC* flows and are unlikely to beadequate for historically large disturbance events”

•

“Historically large storms have potential to create Power Grid Blackouts andTransformer Damage of unprecedented proportions, long term blackout,lengthy restoration times, and chronic shortages (multiple years) are possible”

•

“Economic and societal costs could be also of unprecedented levels; –

August 14, 2003 Northeast Blackout Cost Estimate -

$4 -

$10 Billion –

Hurricane Katrina Cost Estimate -

$150 -

$300 Billion –

Severe Geomagnetic Storm Scenario - ~$1 - $2 Trillion (in 1st Year)

•

“Depending on Damage, Full Recovery could take 4 –

10 Years ”

•

“Improved Situational Awareness for Power Grid Operators is needed and isreadily available, Emphasis on disturbance environments/GIC levels insteadof ambiguous K/G Indices ”

•

“Major Emphasis should be focused on Preventing Storm-RelatedCatastrophic Failure -

Remedial Design measures (transformer neutralresistors) are readily feasible and cost effective (~$100M) and have potentialto reduce GIC 60-70%.”


* GIC = Geomagnetically-Induced Current




FEMA Solar SuperstormScenario Background

For the analysis done for FEMA by Metatech, the eastern US is exposed to a 4800 nT/mindisturbance intensity, while west of the Mississippi, the disturbance intensity decreases to only 2400nT/min. This simulation was also performed for the two highest impact and likeliest latitudelocations, the 45 °

N and 50 °

N locations. Using the impact criteria described in Appendix 1 (fromreference R2) and using a 2-minute time window during the disturbance peak, the regions of expected power system collapse can be estimated.[Derived from “An Assessment of the Threat Potential to the US Electric Power Grids from Extreme Space Weather Storms –

Analysis of USPower System Impacts from Large Geomagnetic Storm Events”

by John Kappenman and Peter Warner, Metatech Corporation, in support of a FEMA sponsored contract with Cubic Applications, Inc., 1 Oct 2007 (Meta-R-295) [R2]]

Disturbance Centered at 45°

N Latitude Disturbance Centered at 50°

N Latitude




Areas of probableimmediate powersystem collapse

Cascading effectscould potentiallycause outagesacross majorportions of the US

power grid andcould necessitatea Black Start of thegrid.

From: “An Assessment of the Threat Potential to the US Electric Power Grids from Extreme Space Weather Storms –

Analysis of US Power System Impacts from Large Geomagnetic Storm Events” by John Kappenman and Peter Warner, Metatech Corporation,in support of a FEMA sponsored contract with Cubic Applications, Inc., 1 Oct 2007 (Meta-R-295) [R2]

FEMA Solar Superstorm Study ResultsGrid Transformer Damage (45°N scenario )




FEMA Solar Superstorm Study Resultsfor Grid Transformer Damage (50°N scenarios)

C A

N Y

T X

F L

P A

IL

O H

M I

N J

N C

G A

V A

M A

I N

MO

WI

T N

W A

M D

MN

L A

A L

K Y

AZ S C

C O

OK

O R

I A

MS

K S

AR

W VU T

NE

N M

M E

N V

N HI D

M T

SD

D E

ND

V T

W Y

US Grid Map with Effective GIC Over 90A4800nT Scenario Centered at 50N

C A

N Y

T X

F L

P A

IL

O H

M I

N J

N C

G A

V A

M A

I N

MO

WI

T N

W A

M D

MN

L A

A L

K Y

AZ S C

C O

OK

O R

I A

MS

K S

AR

W VU T

NE

N M

M E

N V

N HI D

M T

SD

D E

ND

V T

W Y

US Grid Map with Effective GIC Over 30A4800nT Scenario Centered at 50N

If transformers fail at GIC over 90A:~640 Transformers Damaged

If transformers fail at GIC over 30A:~1000 Transformers Damaged

At Present, 3+ Years Delivery Time for a Single Replacement Transformer in World MarketNo Domestic Manufacturing Facilities Exist in the USA for EHV Transformers

Even the Medium Damage Scenario May Take ~10 Years to Replace All Damaged Transformers

From: “Economic Analysis of a Major Geomagnetic Storm on the UnitedStates” – Briefing provided by Cubic Applications, Inc., 8 February 2008 [R4]




Some Blackstart Issues

•

“…

Nuclear would not be available for blackstart

and may not be able to be re-

established at all due to transformer loss. Large coal plants (the largestsource of electric energy in the US) would also be at-risk long term due to

transformer loss . Natural Gas fueled electric generation (also a significantshare of elec

gen

capacity) may not be able to operate at all due to concernsabout interdependencies and loss of gas supply either immediately or withinvery short time period following power grid collapse

(i.e. there is no ability todo gas storage at the generator unlike other plants, they run off of pipelinepressure which is constantly adjusted by pipeline companies through use of pressurization pump facilities, many of which can be dependent on electricgrid availability). Next major generation resources are hydro which isgenerally remote from all population areas and may not be accessible due toloss of EHV grid (due to multiple transformer failures).

This leaves somesmall pockets of distillate fueled generation in major metropolitan areas as last

resort, and fuel inventories for these plants according to DOE data is generallyless than 10 days and capacity is very small relative to normal energy demandanyway.”

(from R8: Quote of J. Kappenman’s 5 June 08 email to K. Briggs)



27

Summary of key findingsrelated to the Solar Superstorm threat

•

A Solar Superstorm

can seriously disrupt our power and communicationsinfrastructures (and as a result, all other key infrastructures) –

Significant portions of the USA (especially the East & West Coasts and Texas) are at risk

–

Cascading effects could cause blackouts over most of the USA•

We are heading into a solar max period (2011 –

2012) with increased risk –

However, we could be struck by a Solar Superstorm

at any time

•

Since communications are dependent on power and the power grids are

dependent on comms, we need to protect both to avoid long-term power outages•

Long-term outages (LTOs) are possible over large regions (perhaps for years)•

Resilient capabilities need to be in-place to enable blackstart(s)•

Additional mitigation efforts proposed include: –

Protect EHV transformers by installing large resistors on the transformer neutrals –

Develop resilient communications infrastructures that can operate through LTOs –

Improve our national capabilities to provide warnings to industry, etc. regarding SSs•

Ensure we have SS warning satellites and ground sensors to provide timely SS alerts•

Utilize near-real-time analysis capabilities to predict GIC levels and provide informed alerts• Develop a precise measure/index for SSs … the Kp index is viewed as inadequate• Stockpile large GSU transformers as well as other EHV transformers and critical parts

solar super storms

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