Sociotechnology

Secrecy in science: a dilemma revisited

While Government experts agree on the need for free scientific expression, some deliberate on related issues

Four U . S . Government leaders who have distin­guished themselves in matters of science and technol­ogy responded to Spectrum's call for analytical com­ments on the question of secrecy in science. Their comments complement Spectrum's report on. science, secrecy, and the law (Nov. 1973, pp. 65-70) in which both Just ice Department and opposing views were presented. Despite the fact that all were asked to de­liberate on the same topic—freedom of information and its impact on the scientific community—their re­sponses are as varied as the personal styles of the in­dividuals themselves .

Nevertheless , all regard the free flow of information as essential to free government. What emerges from these critical analyses is an unresolved assemblage of problems concerning such areas as personal and pro­prietary information, data management , and comput­er privacy. Moreover, Senator Moss and Representa­tive Teague both elected to emphas ize the role of the proliferation of information (Moss to the near exclusion of the major issue—secrecy); an indication, perhaps, of both the complexity and subtlety of our subject matter.

Cause and cure Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) gives unusual

insight into the causes of excessive secrecy over the past quarter century. Emphasiz ing the traditional American fundamental of free expression. Sen. Gold-water sees this inordinate secrecy as a temporary ex­ception to the norm that resulted from the unfortu­nate Cold War after World War II—to wit, "a neces­sary evi l ." In reviewing a t tempts at removing these abuses, the Senator cites two major landmarks—the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Act of 1958 and the Freedom of Information Act of 1966. His positive conclusions reveal a strong belief that unwarranted secrecy will ult imately succumb to the combined efforts of the three branches of Govern­ment.

The information explosion As Chairman of the Senate Aeronautical and Space

Sciences Committee, Senator Frank E . Moss ( D -Utah) is acutely aware of the importance of dealing with the accelerating explosion of scientific informa­tion that has occurred in recent years. In the succinct description he provided Spectrum of the need for vastly improved information management to obtain

Marce Eleccion Staff Writer

optimal results, Sen. Moss chal lenges IEEE members to provide solutions to this serious problem.

Senator Moss's counterpart in the House, Repre­sentat ive Olin E . Teague (D-Tex . )—Chairman of the House's Science and Astronautics Committee—is equally aware of the futility of past approaches at managing the logistics of the information explosion. Bel ieving that the situation is indeed manageable, Rep. Teague foregoes the usual plat i tudes; instead, he issues a clear call to Spectrum readers for more re­search toward this goal.

A scientist's view T h e seventh Director of the Nat ional Bureau of

Standards, Richard W. Roberts c a m e to the Bureau in February 1973 directly from General Electric's Re­search and Development Center in Schenectady, N.Y. , where he had spent nearly a decade and a half advancing research in m a n - m a d e diamonds, machine tools for space-age metals and alloys, new composite materials, solid-waste recycling, high-power magnet­ics, and coal gasification. Such experience has kept him in good stead when dealing with highly technical issues directly affecting the sc ient is t and engineer.

In his s tatement to Spectrum^ Dr. Roberts reviews the constraints to public disseminat ion of scientific information administered by the Freedom of Informa­tion Act, both explicitly and implicit ly . In the pro­cess, he candidly reveals a personal sensitivity against premature disclosure of undigested investigative data that can only be appreciated by a fellow scientist . T h a t the Act does not deal expl ic i t ly with this prob­l e m complicates an already difficult situation.

Computer privacy N B S Director Roberts is also concerned about a

facet of today's secrecy that is quickly becoming a cause celebre for many people—the privacy of data banks containing personal records of literally mill ions of persons. Recognizing that the computer has only exacerbated an existing problem, Dr. Roberts sees the solution to this d i lemma as a special responsibility of N B S .

T h a t this problem is indeed urgent can be seen in President Nixon's call for a review of the privacy quest ion in his recent State of t h e Union address. In this 22 000-word message, Mr. Nixon stated that "one of the rights we cherish most in America is the right of privacy. With the advance of technology, that right has been increasingly threatened."

Mr. Nixon added: "One part of the current problem is that as technology has increased the ability of gov-

56 I E E E s p e c t r u m A P R I L 1974

e m i n e n t and private organizations to gather and dis­seminate information about individuals, the safe­guards needed to protect the privacy of individuals a n d communicat ions have not kept p a c e / ' The Presi­dent s u m m e d up by promising to look into the con­flicts that "arise and the balances that must be struck between legit imate needs for information and the right of privacy."

Action is coming! After his State of the Union message, Pres. Nixon on

February 23 announced the formation of a top priority c o m m i t t e e to investigate the growing problem of pri­

vacy invasion. Headed by Vice President Gerald R. Ford, the commit tee was directed to prod into every possible source of such invasion, including the Federal Government . What the President wanted was a series of direct, enforceable measures that would become effective immediate ly , asking for a plan within four months. S u c h action is intended to include regulations, executive act ion, legislation, and voluntary restraints.

The "dehumaniz ing effects" of computerized inva­sions of t h e public privacy have already been stressed in a Uni ted Nat ions study issued earlier this year, call­ing such intrusions a violation of the fundamental human right to personal privacy.

Freedom and secrecy Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona) Committee on Aeronautical and

Space Sciences

W i t h the end of World War Π, the peoples of the Western democracies hoped for a return to the free a n d easy days of the prewar period. Instead, a new era of tension occurred symbolized by the phrase "Cold War."

Where a global freedom had been expected and proclaimed, nearly half of the world was living under tyranny. Where a free exchange of ideas had been the proclaimed new order, secrecy and hostility became pervasive.

A s a result, the democracies were forced to create a s y s t e m for maintaining the peace which was antithet­ical to the concept of pure freedom: secret laborato-

Goldwater: The forces of freedom and secrecy resemble Siamese twins who hate

each other, but who are forced to live together or not at all.

ries, security clearances, secret military installations, a n d secret budgets .

Despi te the proclamation of some revisionist histo­rians, it was not a sys tem we wanted. Overwhelming ev idence suggests it was forced upon us.

A t the same t ime that the system of self-survival, w i t h its necessary corollary secrecy, was being creat­ed, there were parallel efforts to preserve traditional American freedom, albeit in somewhat restricted form. At t imes , the forces of freedom and secrecy re­s e m b l e d S iamese twins who hate each other, but who are forced t o l ive together or not at all.

Secrecy—the exception, not the norm I bel ieve we often overlook an important aspect of

t h e secrecy vs. freedom-of-information debate: when secrecy has been established or invoked in contempo­rary America, it has been recognized as a departure from the normal. Stated another way, those advocat­ing a need for secrecy, recognizing that secrecy is ab­horred in a democracy, have had to establish an ex­ceptional justification.

It is in t h a t light that I suggest we must view the secrecy apparatus engendered by the Cold War. It is a large apparatus with over two million Americans, roughly half civil ian and half military, currently hold­ing security clearances. At best, it is a necessary evil .

There h a v e been numerous abuses within the sys­tem. They involve overclassification, refusal t o re­move classification when all need has expired, and lowly a t t empts to conceal mistakes through the clas­sification process. These excesses are brought about by mismanagement , venality, and bureaucratic tor­por. Inevitably, science has been a casuality of sys tem abuse.

Every Administrat ion since the end of World War II has a t t empted to remove abuses. S u c h devices as periodic review of classified documents, automat ic re­classification of documents , and the redefinition of the levels of classification have been used. None have been successful because the less enviable side of human nature seems to get in the way.

Those who argue that Cold War politics have creat­ed a web of secrecy stifling inquiry must contend with some notable exceptions. I shall deal with two, the 1966 Freedom of Information Act, and the Nat ional Aeronautics and Space Administration Act of 1958.

Congress to the rescue A much-mal igned Congress has not been oblivious

to the secrecy-in-Government issue. On June 20, 1966, the U.S . H o u s e of Representatives amended the Ad­ministrative Procedure Act of June 11, 1946, which had justif iably come under attack as a bureaucratic refuge for secrecy. Involved here was an a t tempt t o establish t h e rights of all citizens to have access t o in­formation possessed by the Government. It became known as t h e Freedom of Information Act, with a purpose (as one Congressman said at that t ime) t o re­move "every barrier to information about . . . an un­derstanding of . . . government activities consistent with our security . . . . "

I don't c l a i m that the Freedom of Information Act has been as successful as its sponsors intended. In­deed, Government bureaucrats have been artful in devising new ways to prevent the disclosure of infor-

S e c r e c y i n sc ience : a d i l e m m a rev i s i t ed 57