sociocognitive study

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SOCIOCOGNITIVE STUDY

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Cognition in the Context of Culture

Vladislav Lektorsky, D.Sc. (Philos.)

In literature on the theory of culture, knowledge and culture are sometimes opposed toeach other. The reasons given being roughly an follows: knowledge is an object existing

outside consciousness. The objective truth, the acquisition of which is the goal of

cognitive activity, represents a situation which exists regardless of man. Culture,

however, expresses, according to the adherents of this view, a system of values

orientating man within the world and characterises human possibilities and attainments,

so that man is not only the subject of culture but also a direct object of the

culture-creating activity.

Although this course of reasoning may appear convincing, it in actually based on a false

premise: the opposition of cognitive reflection of objective reality and human creative

activity oriented towards certain value systems. In fact, cognition as the highest form ofthe reflection of reality is mediated by historically evolving socio-cultural activity,

underlying which is objective practice. This proposition, which is fundamental to the

Marxist analysis of cognition, entails the need to study the cognitive role of man-made

material objectifications of culture, beginning with labour implements and the methods

and techniques of activity embodied in them, and ending with systems of everyday and

specialised languages, scientific apparatus, etc. Cognition in general, and scientific

cognition in particular, must be regarded as a culture-forming and culture-creating

activity, while "orientation towards truth", as impossible and inconceivable outside

culture (this orientation does not exist where reflection of external reality is pre-human,

that is, pre-cognitive).

Therefore, the development of scientific knowledge, for instance, not only characterises

the level at which the human mind in grasping the external world and mastering it, but

also, and to no lesser degree, the level of the development of culture. The physical

conceptions of Aristotle, Newton and Einstein are not just differing conceptions of the

structure of nature. Each of them assumes varying cultural contexts necessarily including

not only the image of nature but also the image of man.

A modern philosophical analysis of cognitive activity claiming to be an allround

interpretation of the results of the specialised sciences concerned with knowledge is

impossible without a study of culture-imposed and historically variable ideals and normsof cognition, without a study of a wide range of problems related to the socio-cultural

determination of scientific knowledge. Such specific procedures in the assimilation of

cultural objects as conception' and 'interpretation', which at one time appeared to have no

direct relation to the analysis of the mechanisms of the development of science, have now

proved to be of significance for the study of the interrelations between "scientific pictures

of the world", global theories, styles of thinking, etc., succeeding each other in the

development of science.

Epistemology, which endeavours to present knowledge as an integral phenomenon in all

the diversity of its types and kinds, and at the same time to present it in its unity,

historical development and continuity, must inevitably study it in a broad cultural context.


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The above does not, however, exhaust the links between epistemology and the problems

of culture. The point is that epistemology itself, the formulation of its problems and the

methods of their solution, is included in a definite cultural context. Let us consider this in

greater detail.

* * *

The historical development of epistemology has been accompanied by an increase in the

complexity and concreteness of its problems and by the identification of its links not only

with everyday knowledge but also with systems of specialised knowledge as represented

by science. Questions directly concerned with an analysis of the logical structure of

scientific theories and with working out a methodology of scientific research figure

prominently in modern studies in epistemology.

The specialisation and differentiation of studies in epistemology may hinder the

realisation of the following extremely important circumstance. Epistemology, as long as it

remainsphilosophicalresearch (rather than a "technical" study of the logical structures ofeveryday language or the language of science), is necessarily included in the integral

system of philosophical knowledge and thus exists and develops in a definite cultural

context. It is precisely in this context that the profound worldview significance of studies

in this area can be appreciated.

The fact that epistemology is part of the cultural context is manifested in two ways. First,

however invariant the basic problems of epistemology may be (the problem of truth and

error, reliable and probabilistic knowledge, possibilities of cognition, etc.), the modes of

formulating and ways of analysing it have a concrete historical character, bearing the

imprint of a definite socio-cultural system. Second, epistemology itself, as an inalienable

part of philosophy, performs a definite culture-creating function. Let us illustrate these

two aspects.

Ancient philosophy shows clearly the links between epistemological constructions and

general cultural attitudes.

In the ancient theory of knowledge, problems of distinguishing between truth and opinion

was directly connected with the relation between being and non-being. This was an

expression of the specifically "ontological" and cosmological orientation of ancient

culture as a whole. In their discourse on knowledge, all thinkers of the ancient world

assumed that knowledge cannot be other than of a piece with that of which it isknowledge. This assumption was accepted as something quite natural and was even left

undiscussed, for the main interest of the discussion lay in elucidating the process by

which the object is transposed into the state of being knowledge. Specifically, the

assertion of the unity of knowledge and its object was combined in ancient philosophy

with a lack of understanding of the subject's activity in obtaining knowledge and an

inability to see the need for the subject's creative activity as a means of a genuine

reconstruction of the object. From the standpoint of ancient philosophy, the genuine

object can only be "given" to the knowing person; anything that is a product of his

creativity, of his subjective cognitive activity, is merely opinion that is not true and does

not accord with reality. This epistemological thesis expresses the specific orientation of

ancient culture at "incorporating" man in cosmic order.


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In post-mediaeval European philosophy, developing within the framework of a different

type of culture and at the same time connected with the emergent natural science which

also largely determined the specificity of a new cultural system, problems of

epistemology occupied a focal position, being the basis for constructing philosophical

systems (and at times coinciding with a system). Special importance was attached to

establishing that absolutely reliable knowledge which could serve as the starting point andat the same time as the ultimate foundation for the rest of the body of knowledge,

permitting an evaluation of this knowledge in terms of the degree of truth contained in it.

A characteristic feature of epistemology at that time was the discussion of the problem of

the connection between the subject and the material substance, between "I" and the

external world, which followed from the sharp opposition of the subjective and the

objective world. This opposition itself, most distinctly formulated precisely in

epistemology, had at the same time deep roots in the specificity of the emergent bourgeois

culture, in particular in the characteristic opposition of man and nature: the latter was

viewed as an object of technical transformation and utilisation.

Attempts were made to sublate the confrontation of subject and object in classicalGerman philosophy, which expressed a new cultural orientation. In developing Kant's

idea of the subject as self-activity, Hegel interpreted the latter as the subject's

self-development. Hence the Hegelian thesis of the unity of subject and object, of the

coincidence of epistemology and ontology. It is important to note that Hegel clearly

understood the determining role of socially-created culture for the formation of individual

consciousness, and the fact that the individual implementing an act of cognition derives

from the social subject. The social spirit, Hegel believed, was the individual's substance,

his "inorganic nature", which each individual faced as the externally given forms of

culture.

Marxist-Leninist epistemology, which emerged within the framework of a philosophy

expressing the worldview of a new social revolutionary force, the working class, and

provided with an adequate socio-cultural basis under socialism, proceeds from the view of

knowledge as that included in the historical development of socio-practical activity and

formulates all other epistemological problems in the light of this fundamental concept.

The dialectico-materialist conception of the cognitive relationship does more than provide

answers to the questions, in which non-Marxist epistemology has become entangled, does

more than offer a scientific explanation for the real facts of cognition which bourgeois

philosophers have come across but which they find it impossible to explain. The

Marxist-Leninist conception of knowledge opens up fundamentally new horizons in

epistemological studies, setting before epistemology tasks and problems which areimpossible in the theory of knowledge traditionally accepted by non-Marxist philosophy

(e.g., the problem of the unity of reflective, objective-practical, and communicative

activity, connections between various types of objective-practical and cognitive activity,

the socio-cultural conditioning of cognition, the dialectico-materialist conception of truth

as a process, etc.).

The incorporation of epistemological problems into a cultural context, and changes in the

modes of formulation and methods of study of epistemological problems in connection

with historical changes in the cultural field, do not mean that these problems are thereby

relativised. "Orientation towards truth" remains invariant for philosophy and culture an a

whole. The cultural-historical conditionality of epistemological problems does notexclude a genuine development of the latter, the accumulation of certain facts and


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solutions, the extension of the range of these problems and, finally, the possibility of the

emergence of a theory of knowledge which can be justifiably viewed as scientific.

* * *

The formulation of epistemological problems expresses not only the specificity of adefinite historical system of culture. Epistemology itself is also a most important mode of

cultural creativity, and in this capacity it is determined by the specificity of a given stage

in the development of culture and also expresses the historical continuity of development

as a whole.

It is by epistemological means that one or other piece of knowledge is substantiated as

genuine and, consequently, a certain type of reality corresponding to that knowledge is

singled out as true. This function of epistemology has a reverse side as well: it overthrows

that which does not accord with true knowledge, presenting it as an illusion, an

appearance, a delusive form, etc. All of this obviously has great world-view significance

and, moreover, leads to important practical consequences. Inasmuch as true and untrueknowledge, genuine and illusory reality are differently evaluated, practical behaviour will

also be guided, in one way or another, by the first part of the oppositions, while that

which is interpreted as illusory, will be disregarded or evaluated negatively.

When science emerges as an independent subsystem of culture, the epistemological

substantiation of knowledge becomes much more complicated. It is now a question not

only of substantiating a more or less unified system of knowledge, but also of bringing

into agreement two such different (and with time, increasingly divergent) systems as

everyday and scientific knowledge. Inasmuch an science continually changes and

develops, philosophy must undertake, first the epistemological analysis of science. and

second, the tank of bringing science within the system of culture as a whole, including

such components as non-specialised pre-scientific knowledge, art, morality, etc.

Substantiation of knowledge in general and of scientific knowledge in particular, thus

plays an important culture-creating role. And this reveals a number of important features

of epistemology. In epistemology, the attempt to describe that which is genuine, true

knowledge, is inseparably connected with the implicit or explicitprescription of a certain

ideal of cognitive activity.

The formulation of an epistemological conception is always an attempt to change rather

than simply describe the existing practice of cognition, an attempt to reject certainaccepted canons of cognitive activity as leading cognition away from the attainment of its

goals and at the same time an attempt to net up new standards for this activity. The

overall image of cognition and science created by epistemology is itself included in the

actual course of cognition and in some respects restructures it. Therefore, any influential

epistemological conceptions are not only re-interpretations of the existing cognitive

practice but also a critique of some aspects of this practice in the light of some ideal of

knowledge and science.

The above does not mean that all epistemological systems (and there have been a great

many of them in the history of philosophy) could affect the actual process of cognition.

Nor should it be thought, that in all cases where such an impact did occur it wanbeneficial. The history of philosophical and scientific thought has known instances when


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an epistemological conception set the reference points for the production of special

scientific theories of a certain type and at the name time formulated an entirely erroneous

conception of the nature of cognition, knowledge, and science as a whole, which resulted

in insoluble conflicts in constructing a general epistemological conception, and at the

same time essentially limited the possibilities of science itself. Not every image of science

as specified by epistemology is acceptable to science itself.

Epistemological reflection can restructure its object, the system of scientific knowledge,

only to the extent to which this restructuring serves to reveal conceptual structures which

express more precisely the real objective processes reproduced in scientific theory and at

the same time correspond to the objective norms of the development of knowledge itself.

Where this condition is not satisfied, the reflection proves to be false. In this case, the

image of knowledge reconstructed in epistemology by reflection and the real knowledge

itself may to some extent or other disagree. History provides numerous examples of this

sort.

For instance, Francis Bacon's epistemological empiricism played a very progressive roleat the time of the emergence of experimental science. However, even then it did not

accord with the actual practice of natural science, and later it became a manifest obstacle

in the way of its development. There are also well-known fundamental defects in

Descartes' epistemological conception. However, one cannot ignore the fact that the

Cartesian theory of knowledge underpinned his metaphysics, and the latter was the

nucleus of a research programme in physics and psychology. Cartesian physics obtained

certain historically important results. Considerable factual materials were accumulated in

the framework of empirical psychology that proceeded from the Cartesian conception of

consciousness. At the same time that psychology had outlived its usefulness by the

beginning of the 20th century.

The epistemology of Immanuel Kant did not merely formulate the general strategy for the

research in a number of theoretical disciplines (e.g., Kantian epistemology entails the

impossibility of rationalist ontology, the special status of psychology as a science that

cannot be mathematised, the need in biology to complement causal explanations with

teleological ones, etc.).

The Kantian conception (along with Edmund Husserl's phenomenology) was used by L.

Brauer and L. Heyting in constructing an intuitionist programme for the substantiation of

mathematics. A number of important results were obtained within the framework of

mathematical intuitionism, although on the whole this trend failed to solve the task it setfor itself. It is well known, however, that Kant's apriorist interpretation of the main

principles of classical science came into sharp conflict with the development of

knowledge.

Epistemological conceptions can also affect the development of science in other ways. An

epistemological system may be completely inadequate as a reflection of scientific

knowledge, presenting science as a whole in a false light and being patently untenable on

the general philosophical plane. Yet at the same time such a system may be used for the

production of certain local concrete scientific theories which retain certain value even

after their philosophical interpretation has been rejected. This is possible because some

aspects of the cognitive process are usually grasped even in false epistemologicalstructures. However, the special scientific theories produced in such cases have, as a rule,


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only very narrow significance. At the same time the main paths of development of

scientific knowledge are obstructed by false epistemological conceptions, so that the

development of theoretical thought in the given area of knowledge follows the wrong

direction. Such was the case of the epistemology of operationalism and the physical

theories formulated on the basis of operationalist conceptions.

A fruitful epistemology, on the other hand, can have a crucial impact on the development

of science. This idea is borne out by the history of Marxist epistemology and its relations

with the natural and social sciences. Marx's Capital, which contains a scientific theory of

political economy, was written an the basis of the conscious application of

dialectico-materialist epistemology and methodology of science.

Proceeding from a scientific conception of the nature of theoretical thought and

Consciously employing the philosophically substantiated method of ascending from the

abstract to the concrete, Marx constructed a scientific economic theory. He gave a

detailed formulation of the methodological problems arising in the course of theoretical

research, providing consistent solutions for them on the basis of general epistemologicalprinciples. Mar did not criticise bourgeois political economy by merely juxtaposing the

content of his scientific theory with erroneous interpretations of the same subject-matter:

he also always criticised fundamentally erroneous methodological approaches. As Marx

showed, the main defect of bourgeois political economy, which predetermined its

fundamentally unscientific character, and which is directly linked with its social function,

is the false conception its representatives had of the nature of the object cognised and of

the methods of scientific knowledge. Therefore a change in methodological,

epistemological orientation is a necessary condition of creating a scientific political

economy.

Epistemology thus functions as a powerful culture-creating factor, being included in the

formation and development of scientific theories, directly affecting the construction of a

scientific picture of the world and style of thinking, and offering a philosophical

interpretation of scientific results.

SOURCE: Lektorsky, Vladislav. Cognition in the Context of Culture, in: Civilisation,

Science, Philosophy: Theme of the 17th World Congress of Philosophy (Montreal, August

1983) (Moscow: "Social Sciences Today" Editorial Board, USSR Academy of Sciences,

1983), pp. 117-126. (Problems of the Contemporary World; no. 111)


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