Socio-Environmental Socio-Environmental Impacts of Large Impacts of Large

Projects in Drainage Projects in Drainage SectorSector

Naseer MemonNaseer Memon

Irrigation in SindhIrrigation in Sindh Cultivable command area (CCA) is about Cultivable command area (CCA) is about 12.8 million acres. 12.8 million acres. More than 95% of the irrigation is from More than 95% of the irrigation is from canal water.canal water.The irrigation system comprises ofThe irrigation system comprises of

3 Barrages3 Barrages 14 canals14 canals 1,462 branch canals/distributaries/minors1,462 branch canals/distributaries/minors More than 40,000 water coursesMore than 40,000 water courses

Water Logging And SalinityWater Logging And SalinitySindh has serious problems of water logging and Sindh has serious problems of water logging and salinity due to salinity due to

flat topographyflat topography inadequate salt exit inadequate salt exit traditional watering of crops traditional watering of crops late implementation of drainage programmelate implementation of drainage programme

In 1999, the waterlogged area was 5.434 million In 1999, the waterlogged area was 5.434 million acres out of the total CCA of 12.815 million acres in acres out of the total CCA of 12.815 million acres in Sindh. Sindh.

Left Bank Outfall Drain (LBOD)Left Bank Outfall Drain (LBOD) The LBOD project commenced in 1984The LBOD project commenced in 1984 The Stage-1 of LBOD project was aimed The Stage-1 of LBOD project was aimed to benefit 0.35 million Culturable Command to benefit 0.35 million Culturable Command AreaArea in Nawabshah, Sanghar and in Nawabshah, Sanghar and Mirpurkhas (Mirpurkhas (mapmap). ). Project started with initial estimate of 8.5 Project started with initial estimate of 8.5 billion rupees which ended up with over 31 billion rupees which ended up with over 31 billion rupees.billion rupees. IDA and ADB were the major donors of IDA and ADB were the major donors of the project. the project.

Project Finances (Dec 1997)Project Finances (Dec 1997)

Donor AgencyDonor Agency Amount (m. US$)Amount (m. US$)The World BankThe World Bank 140.1140.1

ADBADB 169.4169.4

OPECOPEC 8.88.8

CIDACIDA 11.911.9

ODA/DFIDODA/DFID 32.632.6

SDCSDC 1010

Islamic Development BankIslamic Development Bank 8.78.7

Saudi Fund for Devel.Saudi Fund for Devel. 43.143.1

M&E Trust FundM&E Trust Fund 4.64.6

BorrowerBorrower 414.9414.9

TotalTotal 844.1 844.1 (963 in 2002)(963 in 2002)

Salient Features of ProjectSalient Features of Project

Area served Area served

(3 districts)(3 districts)

1.27 million acres 1.27 million acres (0.35 CCA)(0.35 CCA)

Surface DrainsSurface Drains 1,623 kms1,623 kms

Standard Tube wellsStandard Tube wells 1,667 No1,667 No

Scavenger Tube wellsScavenger Tube wells 357 No357 No

Transmission linesTransmission lines 4,133 kms4,133 kms

Spinal DrainSpinal Drain 285 kms285 kms

Tidal LinkTidal Link 42 kms42 kms

Left Bank Outfall Drain (LBOD)Left Bank Outfall Drain (LBOD) District of Badin was used as conduit for District of Badin was used as conduit for the Spinal Drain of the project for ultimate the Spinal Drain of the project for ultimate disposal to the Arabian Sea through a 42 disposal to the Arabian Sea through a 42 kms long Tidal Link Canal. kms long Tidal Link Canal. The major challenge for the project The major challenge for the project designers was to provide safe disposal of designers was to provide safe disposal of effluent to sea. effluent to sea. Outfall was designed and executed Outfall was designed and executed without proper consultation with without proper consultation with stakeholders and their concerns were also stakeholders and their concerns were also not considerednot considered

Outfall Options Outfall Options

Shakoor Lake

Outfall OptionsOutfall Options Most viable option of Shakoor lake was rejected Most viable option of Shakoor lake was rejected due to political pretextdue to political pretext it was decided to transport the effluent to sea it was decided to transport the effluent to sea through a natural lake complex of very high through a natural lake complex of very high ecological significance. ecological significance. Two of the four lakes Nureri and Jubbo were Two of the four lakes Nureri and Jubbo were recognized as Ramsar sites.recognized as Ramsar sites. The lake eco-system, also supported livelihood The lake eco-system, also supported livelihood for about 15,000 fishermen from about 40 villagesfor about 15,000 fishermen from about 40 villages An embankment with a 4.5 ft high and 1800 ft An embankment with a 4.5 ft high and 1800 ft wide Cholri weir was provided to maintain water wide Cholri weir was provided to maintain water level in lakeslevel in lakes

The Disaster The Disaster Cholri Weir collapsed during the night of 24th Cholri Weir collapsed during the night of 24th June 1998June 1998 Authorities made cosmetic efforts to repair the Authorities made cosmetic efforts to repair the weir but within 4 months the breach became 450 weir but within 4 months the breach became 450 ft wide from southern side and authorities ft wide from southern side and authorities capitulated. capitulated. It unleashed an unprecedented environmental It unleashed an unprecedented environmental havoc on fragile lake system converting them in havoc on fragile lake system converting them in saline sink.saline sink. At one stage salinity of Pateji dhand was At one stage salinity of Pateji dhand was measured as horribly high at 68,000 ppm measured as horribly high at 68,000 ppm previously measured at 15,000 ppm.previously measured at 15,000 ppm.

The Disaster The Disaster A disastrous cyclone lashed the area on 21 May A disastrous cyclone lashed the area on 21 May 1999. 1999. It caused 54 breaches in the embankment of the It caused 54 breaches in the embankment of the tidal link rendering it completely irreparable.tidal link rendering it completely irreparable. The breached structure unleashed an The breached structure unleashed an unprecedented disaster on nearby settlements of unprecedented disaster on nearby settlements of fishermen communities and according to official fishermen communities and according to official figures about 75 people died in Badeenfigures about 75 people died in Badeen Tidal Link became dead and sea water found a Tidal Link became dead and sea water found a regular inlet to lake systemregular inlet to lake system Local drains started backflow destroying land Local drains started backflow destroying land and aquifer in Badeenand aquifer in Badeen

Causes of Failure Causes of Failure In 1983 when project was at preparation stage In 1983 when project was at preparation stage soil samples analyzed along the Tidal link show soil samples analyzed along the Tidal link show stiff cohesive clay with 85% silt content. stiff cohesive clay with 85% silt content. At design stage soil testing carried out by At design stage soil testing carried out by Foundation Engineering Ltd. depict the soil with Foundation Engineering Ltd. depict the soil with much smaller silt and clay, frictionless cohesive much smaller silt and clay, frictionless cohesive soil. soil. In spite of knowing that the soil in the channel In spite of knowing that the soil in the channel bed is not sufficiently cohesive, no protection was bed is not sufficiently cohesive, no protection was provided at the bed of Cholri Weir, which was provided at the bed of Cholri Weir, which was exposed to active erosion during tidal fluctuation. exposed to active erosion during tidal fluctuation.

Causes of Failure Causes of Failure Outfall system was designed without proper Outfall system was designed without proper consultation with stakeholders specially local consultation with stakeholders specially local communities and fishermen communities and fishermen Tidal Link was constructed against wind Tidal Link was constructed against wind direction which reinforced wave impactdirection which reinforced wave impact Proper environmental and socio-economic Proper environmental and socio-economic studies were not conducted studies were not conducted An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for LBOD was carried out in 1989, which was not very LBOD was carried out in 1989, which was not very comprehensive, limited only to biological aspects comprehensive, limited only to biological aspects ignoring socio-economic and cultural aspects. ignoring socio-economic and cultural aspects.

The Inspection PanelThe Inspection Panel A group of affectees and an NGO Action Aid A group of affectees and an NGO Action Aid Pakistan approached World Bank’s Inspection Pakistan approached World Bank’s Inspection Panel on 10th September 2004.Panel on 10th September 2004.

After investigating the issue, the Panel submitted After investigating the issue, the Panel submitted its report on 6its report on 6thth July 2006 July 2006

The WB responded in Nov 2006 and chalked out The WB responded in Nov 2006 and chalked out a Plan of Actiona Plan of Action

The Inspection Panel Findings The Inspection Panel Findings Serious flaws were detected at key stages of the Serious flaws were detected at key stages of the project i.e. planning, designing, execution, project i.e. planning, designing, execution, supervision and monitoring.supervision and monitoring. The decision of the Bank to categorize the The decision of the Bank to categorize the Project as “Category B,” rather than “Category A Project as “Category B,” rather than “Category A was not appropriate.was not appropriate. Project documents did not assess how the Project documents did not assess how the Project might affect wetlands or identify required Project might affect wetlands or identify required mitigation measures at the critical stage of Project mitigation measures at the critical stage of Project design and appraisal. design and appraisal. The Bank did not comply with policy provisions The Bank did not comply with policy provisions on consultation and participation of affectees on consultation and participation of affectees

The Inspection Panel Findings The Inspection Panel Findings The selected alignment for the Tidal Link was The selected alignment for the Tidal Link was politically attractive, however technically and politically attractive, however technically and environmentally risky environmentally risky There were no provisions for an emergency There were no provisions for an emergency closure of the Tidal Link. No facilities were in place closure of the Tidal Link. No facilities were in place to warn the population and mitigate flood impact. to warn the population and mitigate flood impact. There were no fail-safe provisions in the design There were no fail-safe provisions in the design As a result of shortcomings in the Environmental As a result of shortcomings in the Environmental Assessment, decision making on environmentally-Assessment, decision making on environmentally-crucial elements under the Project became less crucial elements under the Project became less systematic, less informed and more ad hoc. systematic, less informed and more ad hoc.

Future Outlook Future Outlook The Bank has developed an Action Plan in The Bank has developed an Action Plan in response to the Inspection Plan. No stakeholder response to the Inspection Plan. No stakeholder consultation was carried out while developing this consultation was carried out while developing this action plan.action plan.

The Bank wants to compensate affectees through The Bank wants to compensate affectees through two project i.e. Coastal Area Development Program two project i.e. Coastal Area Development Program (CADP) and Water Sector Improvement Project (CADP) and Water Sector Improvement Project (WISP).(WISP).

Both CADP and WSIP are financed under Both CADP and WSIP are financed under loans of World Bank respectively of US$ 90 loans of World Bank respectively of US$ 90 million and US$ 140 million. Hence it is not million and US$ 140 million. Hence it is not compensation but an additional loancompensation but an additional loan

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