social neuroscience: insights from neuropsychology · 2015-09-13 · social neuroscience: insights...
TRANSCRIPT
Social Neuroscience: Insights fromneuropsychology
Dana SamsonUniversité catholique de Louvain
Theoryof Mind: Insights fromcognitiveneuropsychology
Dana SamsonUniversité catholique de Louvain
Two topics…
� Part 1: What can cognitive neuropsychologytell us about ToM?
� Part 2: Implicit and Explicit ToM?
Part 1: What can neuropsychology tell us?� Functional Necessity
� Is language necessary for ToM?� Are executive functions necessary for ToM?
� Neural Necessity� Which parts of the ToM brain network are
essential/necessary?
� Cognitive and Neural Architecture� What are the ToM building blocks?
Functional necessity
Functional Necessity
� Children usually pass FB tests from the ageof 4 (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), i.e. at a time when they acquire more sophisticated language and executive function abilities
� Non-humans do not pass FB tests (Call & Tomasello, 2008)
� Are language and executive function necessary for belief reasoning?
Necessaryfor what?
Necessaryfor what?
� (1) To deal with the incidental processingdemands?� Belief problems are complex, we need
language and executive function to processthe incidental task demands (understandingthe words describing the situation, remembering the events etc.)
� Not the most interesting relation…but needs to be taken into account to be ruled out as sole link..
Necessaryfor what?
� (2) To develop a ToM?(Scaffolding hypothesis)� LANGUAGE:
� verbal interactions
� could allow children to learn about mental states, for example via the description that parents give about their mental states (e.g., Sabbagh & Callanan, 1998)
� the mastering of complex grammar � could give them the means to discover the properties of
propositional mental states such as beliefs (e.g., de Villiers & Pyers, 2002)
Necessaryfor what?
� (2) To develop a ToM? (Scaffolding hypothesis)� EXECUTIVE FUNCTION:
� being able to disengage from salient information (i.e., inhibitory control), could help children
� understand that other people may have different mental states to theirs,
� that beliefs do not necessarily match the outside world (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001; Russell, 1996)
Necessaryfor what?
� (3) For reasoning per se?� LANGUAGE:
� the use of complex grammar could be necessary to represent beliefs (de Villiers, & Pyers, 2002)
Necessaryfor what?
� (3) For reasoning per se?� EXECUTIVE FUNCTION:
� working memory could be necessary to hold in mind multiple perspectives (Gordon & Olson, 1998)
� inhibitory control could be necessary for the mental flexibility needed when reasoning about other people’s mental states (Russell, 1996).
Necessaryfor what?
� Developmental studies have found correlations between language and/or executive function abilities, and performance on ToM tasks (Astington & Jenkins, 1999;Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002; de Villiers, & Pyers, 2002; Ruffman, Slade, Rowlandson, Rumsey, & Garnham, 2003; Sabbagh, Moses, &
Shiverick, 2006).
� BUT:� For scaffolding or reasoning per se?
� � need to investigate adults� Correlation and causality…
� � need for a more direct causal test
Causal test
� What happens if language or executive function is unavailable in an adult?� Temporary unavailability in healthy subjects:
dual task paradigm� More enduring unavailability in patients with
acquired brain damage: patients withlanguage or executive function deficits
Necessaryfor what?
� For reasoning per se?� LANGUAGE:
� the use of complex grammar could be necessary to represent beliefs (de Villiers, & Pyers, 2002)
The functional necessityof language
� Two published studies tested the necessity of language for ToM in healthy adults with the dual task paradigm (Newton & de Villiers, 2007; Forgeot
d’Arc & Ramus, 2011).
� Language shadowing task � no specific language ability was targeted
� Conflicting results
� What about patients with grammatical processing deficits?
� Hypothesis: grammar plays a fundamental role� Sally thinks that the marble is in the basket
�Embedded complement clauses (de Villiers & Pyers, 2002)
� He pushes the man that shouted at the woman� Embedded relative clauses, i.e. more general role of embedded grammatical structures (Smith, Apperly, & White, 2003)
� Evidence for a link comes mainly from developmental psychology
Languageand Belief reasoning
� Can agrammatic patients infer and represent beliefs?(preliminary indication: yes, Varley & Siegal, 2000;
Varley et al., 2001)
The functional necessityof language
PH (male, age=33, stroke)Left fronto-temporal lesions
Severe anomiaDeep dyslexia and deep dysgraphia
Relatively spared lexico-semantic processing
(Apperly et al., 2006)
Palpa test 55 – sentence/picture matching
Oral: 67% correct overall (50% correct on reversible sentences)
Written: 70% correct overall (55% correct on reversible sentences)
“The dog is followed by the man ”PH’s interpretation: “the dog is following the man”
� extracts meaning by following the order of the words rather than taking into account grammar
Grammatical processing
(Apperly et al., 2006)
New grammatical test specifically testing embedded relative clauses
The woman shook the man that drank the water
(+ control sentences)
Grammatical processing
The woman shook the man that drank the water.
(Apperly et al., 2006)
New grammatical test specifically testing embedded relative clauses
The woman shook the man that drank the water Embedded relative clause sentence
Grammatical processing
7/14
Nonverbal ToM tasks
(Apperly et al., 2006)
Video false belief task – indirect/low self salience
Video false belief task – direct/high self salience
2nd order nonverbal false belief task (woman 1 wrongly thinks that woman 2 wrongly thinks the object is in the left box)
12/12
11/12
12/12
(Apperly et al., 2006)
Verbal false belief inference task 10/12
Jeremy is eating out at a restaurant. Inside therestaurant, Jeremy hangs his coat on the standby the door, and leaves his bag underneath. Thewaitress shows Jeremy to his table and tells himabout today’s special dishes. When she comesback, the waitress notices Jeremy’s bag beneaththe coat stand by the door. She decides that it isunsafe for the bag to stay there, as it would beeasy for someone to steal. Leaving the coat onthe coat stand, she locks the bag in the storecupboard.Where does Jeremy think the bag is? On the chair or in the store cupboard?
Verbal ToM tasks
(Apperly et al., 2006)
Embedded complement clauses (no belief inference)
he thinks there is a red ball in the boxbut
really there is a yellow ball in the box
Verbal ToM tasks
(Apperly et al., 2006)
he thinks there is a red ball in the boxbut
really there is a yellow ball in the box
Verbal ToM tasks
3/12Embedded complement clauses (no belief inference)
Functional necessityof language
� Can agrammatic patients infer and represent beliefs?� YES!
� Grammar is not necessary to infer and reason about beliefs as such
� But grammar plays an important role to understand verbally presented contexts (input to belief reasoning )
Necessaryfor what?
� For reasoning per se?� EXECUTIVE FUNCTION:
Evidence frompatients
� Co-occurrence of deficits in many studies
� But not for all types of ToM tasks and not all type of EF tasks (e.g., Bibby, & McDonald, 2005; Channon & Crawford, 2000; Gregory et al,. 2002; Happé, Malhi, & Checkley, 2001; McDonald & Pearce, 1996; Rowe, Bullock, Polkey, & Morris, 2001; Shamay-tsoory, Tomer, Berger, & Aharon-peretz, 2003).
Evidence frompatients
� There have been also reports of dissociations, with impaired performance on ToM tasks without deficits on standard executive function tasks (e.g., Lough, Gregory, & Hodges, 2001; Lough & Hodges, 2002) or vice versa (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Bird, Castelli, Malik, Frith, & Husain, 2004).
Necessaryfor what?
� For reasoning per se?� EXECUTIVE FUNCTION:
� working memory could be necessary to hold in mind multiple perspectives (Gordon & Olson, 1998)
� inhibitory control could be necessary for resisting interference from one’s own perspective/knowledge of reality (Russell, 1996).
WorkingMemoryand ToM
� Dual task in healthy adults:� Concurrent working memory task has
detrimental effects on 2nd order more than 1st order false belief reasoning (McKinnon and Moscovitch, 2007).
� Brain damaged patients:� Performance on a working memory task
predicted performance on a 2nd order but not 1st order false belief task (Bibby and McDonald, 2005).
Inhibition and ToM
� Dual task in healthy adults and neuropsychological studies: � quite messy results….� no control for the critical “inhibitory” aspect of
ToM
Inhibition and ToM
SeriousAshamedAlarmed
Bewildred
Inhibition and ToM
Tony puts some Coke in the cabinet. Then he leaves the room. Maria comes along and moves the Coke from the cabinet into the refrigerator to chill. Later, Tony comes back in.
Where does Tony think the Coke is?
Necessaryfor what?
� For reasoning per se?� EXECUTIVE FUNCTION:
� working memory could be necessary to hold in mind multiple perspectives (Gordon & Olson, 1998)
� inhibitory control could be necessary for resisting interference from one’s own perspective/knowledge of reality (Russell, 1996).
� Need to show specific relation between inhibition and ToM tasks in which there is a need to inhibit one’s own perspective
High Self-perspective Inhibition demands
Self-perspective inhibition
High Self-perspective Inhibition demands
Low Self-perspective Inhibition demands
Self-perspective inhibition
WBA, male, age=61, strokePW, male, age=75, stroke
Cognitive control problem: perseveration of thoughts
Voxel-based morphometry analysisresults
WBA PW
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Num
ber c
orre
ct
Samson et al., 2005, Brain
High Self-perspective Inhibition demands
Low Self-perspective Inhibition demands
Self-perspective inhibition
Self-perspective inhibition
� Do all frontal patients with executive function(inhibition) deficits have difficulties inhibitingtheir own perspective?
� Do patients with a deficit in self-perspective inhibition have difficulties inhibiting any type of information?
WBA, male, age=61, strokePW, male, age=75, stroke
Cognitive control problem: perseveration of thoughts
GA, male, age=52, herpes encephalitisSP, male, age=53, herpes encephalitis
Cognitive control problem: distractibility
WBA & PW versus SP & GALesions common to WBA, PW, SP & GA
What colour would Simon want the next card to be?
Participant
Desirereasoningtask
Participant
Simon
?
What does Simon want the next card to be?� Not red, bue (disengagement from self-perspective)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
WBA PW GA SP
Num
ber c
orre
ct
Thoughtperseveration
(problems inhibitinginternal information)
Distractibility(problems inhibitingexternal information)
Houthuys et al., in prep
What colour would Simon want the next card to be? (win/approach)
Participant
Simon
?
Participant
Simon
?
What do you want the next card to be?� Not red, bue (disengagement from salient card)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
WBA PW GA SP
Num
ber c
orre
ct
Thoughtperseveration
(problems inhibitinginternal information)
Distractibility(problems inhibitingexternal information)
What colour would Simon want the next card to be? (win/approach)
What colour would You want the next card to be? (loose/avoidance)
Houthuys et al., in prep
Self-perspective inhibition
� Do all frontal patients with executive function(inhibition) deficits have difficulties inhibitingtheir own perspective?
� Do patients with a deficit in self-perspective inhibition have difficulties inhibiting any type of information?
� Self-perspective inhibition and inhibition of internally-generated information?
Functional necessity: conclusions (I)
� Enduring role of domain-general cognitive processes for ToM? � Working memory may be necessary to hold
multiple perspectives� Inhibition seems necessary to resist
interference from one’s own perspective BUT:� Grammar does not appear to be necessary to
hold in mind propositional mental states such as beliefs.
Functionnecessity: conclusions (II)
� Language or executive function or ToMshould not be considered as unitary functions�careful task analyses are necessary to identify what the demands of a given task are likely to be � need and scope for within-task manipulations
Neural Necessity
� Which parts of the classic ToM are essential?
Lateral view
TPJ
TP
Medial view
MPF
C
PCC
The medial prefrontal cortex
� Frontal variant of fronto-temporal dementia (fvFTD)
� Brain atrophy most marked in the medial prefrontal cortex (Williams, Nestor, & Hodges, 2005)
� Severe problems in social conduct
The medial prefrontal cortex
Gregory et al. (2002)
The medial prefrontal cortex
Gregory et al. (2002)
The medial prefrontal cortex
� Problem: lesions can often extend into the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex as well as the temporal cortex
� not straightforward to link the impairment solely to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
The medial prefrontal cortex
� 62 year old woman� Stroke� Dysexecutive syndrome
Bird et al., 2004
The medial prefrontal cortex
The medial prefrontal cortex
� No clear evidence that the region is necessary for ToM tasks
� What is then the role of the medial prefrontal cortex and why do we find it so often activated when healthy adults reason about mental states?
The medial prefrontal cortex
� Hypothesis 1:
� the medial prefrontal cortex could be activated because when adults are presented with ToM problems, these often also trigger reasoning about social characteristics of the protagonists other than their mental states such as their personality traits (e.g., Van Overwalle, 2009)
The medial prefrontal cortex
� Hypothesis 2:
� because participants not only infer the mental state but also think about the behavioural or emotional consequences of the protagonists’mental states (e.g., Aichhorn, Perner, Kronbichler, Staffen, & Ladurner, 2006)
� Hypothesis 3:
� Medial prefrontal cortex would be recruited when the situation is ambiguous (e.g. Jenkins & Mitchell, 2010)
� Independent evidence that patients with medial prefrontal cortex deficits have only problems when they have to deal with “ill-structured” situations (Burgess, Gilbert, & Dumontheil, 2007)
The medial prefrontal cortex
� Both the left and the right temporo-parietal junction have been associated with ToM (Saxe
& Powell, 2006). � RTPJ: more specific to beliefs
� LTPJ: also activated when adults reason about non-social representation of the world such as false signs (Aichhorn et al., 2009).
The temporo-parietal junction
� So far, no documented report of the effects of a lesion to the RTPJ on ToM performance.
� However, lesions to the LTPJ leads to an impaired performance on a false belief reasoning task (Samson, et al., 2004).
The temporo-parietal junction
The temporo-parietal junction
PF, female, age=55, stroke
DB, male, age=68, stroke
RH, male, age=70, stroke
Samson et al., 2004
The temporo-parietal junction
Where is the green object?
The temporo-parietal junction
Samson et al., 2004
The temporo-parietal junction
Where is the green object?
The temporo-parietal junction
Apperly et al., 2007
The temporo-parietal junction
� Thus, LTPJ is necessary for belief reasoning
� And for reasoning about other forms of representations
The temporal poles
� These brain regions are usually thought to be involved in semantic processing, particularly for integrating various sources of knowledge about objects or the world (Patterson, Nestor & Rogers, 2007).
� This had led to the hypothesis that the temporal poles would be involved in the retrieval of social conceptual knowledge (Frith & Frith, 2003; Ross & Olson, 2010).
The temporal poles
� Temporal variant of fronto-temporal dementia (tvFTD)� severe atrophy of the temporal poles� major changes in the patients’ social conduct � the amount of problems noticed by family and
friends in terms of perspective taking and empathic concern (as measured by the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), Davis, 1983) has been found to positively correlate with the amount of atrophy in the temporal poles (Rankin
et al., 2006).
The temporal poles(amygdala)
� Acquired damage to the amygdala which often occurs alongside damage to the temporal poles � Some authors found ToM impairments (Stone,
Baron-Cohen, Calder, Keane, & Young, 2003) while others found only a slight impairment especially for lesions acquired in childhood (Shaw et al., 2004).
The temporal poles(amygdala)
Stone et al., 2003
Faux Pas Reading the Mind in the eyes
Shaw et al., 2004
The temporal poles
CM, degenerative temporal pole atrophy, especially on the left (semantic dementia)60 years old manPicture Naming: 21/80, 26%, correct (mean controls: 74.2/80)
Michel et al., in prep
The temporal poles
Michel et al., in prep
CM, degenerative temporal pole atrophy, especially on the left side (semantic dementia)60 years old man
The temporal poles
Michel et al., in prep
Social semantics: synonym judgment tasks
Disdainful
Arrogant Indecent
Abondant
Diffuse Opulent
Personality traitsMental states Non-social
The temporal poles
Michel et al., in prep
Social semantics: synonym judgment tasks
Disdainful
Arrogant Indecent
Abondant
Diffuse Opulent
CM= 24/48 (50%) CM= 15/48 (31%)
Average performance of matched controls: >90%Below control performance, p<0.01
The temporal poles
Michel et al., in prep
Social semantics: discrimination of mental state expressions
Je suggère que l’objet est dans cette boîte
Je confirme que l’objet est dans cette boîte
The temporal poles
Michel et al., in prep
Social semantics: discrimination of mental state expressions
CM= 55/72 (76%)
Average performance of matched controls: >90%Below control performance, p<0.01
The temporal poles
Michel et al., in prep
Social semantics:
The patient is impaired compared to controlsBUTNo more so for mental than non-mental states
The temporal poles
Theory of Mind: Intention reasoning (Sarfati et al., 2003)
Michel et al., in prep
The temporal poles
Theory of Mind: Intention reasoning
Michel et al., in prep
02468
10121416182022242628
Intention items Control items
Num
ber
corr
ect
Within control rangep=0.18
The temporal poles
Theory of Mind: source of knowledge reasoning
Michel et al., in prep
stapler
post-it
We look for the stapler
Qui sait ?Who knows where it is?
02468
1012141618202224
2 modalities 4 modalities
Num
ber
corr
ect
The temporal poles
Theory of Mind: source of knowledge reasoning
Seeing vs. weighting
Michel et al., in prep
Seeing vs. touchingvs. smelling vs.
tasting
Controls 22-24/24
The temporal poles
Theory of Mind: Belief reasoning
Michel et al., in prep
High Self-perspective Inhibition demands
Low Self-perspective Inhibition demands
The temporal poles
Theory of Mind: Belief reasoning
Michel et al., in prep
Low Inhibition High Inhibition
0123456789
101112
Num
ber c
orrect
False Belief
Memory Control
Controls 11-12/12
The temporal poles
Theory of Mind:
The patient performs very close to or within normal rangefor intention reasoningfor source of knowledge inferencefor false belief reasoning
The temporal poles
� These findings suggest that the left TP � is not specifically dedicated to the storage of
social concepts � is not necessary for inferring mental states.
� Right TP?
The temporal poles
� No clear evidence for the necessity of the temporal poles for ToM
� Perhaps ToM problems tested are too simple, temporal poles may only be recruited when more complex social knowledge is recruited
Other areas?
� Posterior cingulate/precuneus� self-reflective thoughts (Johnson et al., 2002),
� autobiographical memory (Summerfield, Hassabis, & Maguire, 2009)
� egocentric spatial representations (Weniger, Ruhleder, Wolf, Lange, & Irle, 2009).
�However, there is so far no direct evidence that these areas are necessary to solve ToMproblems.
Neural necessity: conclusions
� Except for TPJ: results are mixed
� Current tasks may not be fine grainedenough to show subtle deficits
� Perhaps different parts within the network can compensate for one another
Cognitive and Neural Architecture
Cognitive and Neural Architecture
Emotion, desire, intention, belief
TEMPORARY AND CONSCIOUSREPRESENTATION OF SOMEONE’S
MENTAL STATE
Self-perspectiveinhibition
Role of the right lateral prefrontal cortex
WBA PW
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Num
ber c
orre
ct
Samson et al., 2005, Brain
High Self-perspective Inhibition demands
Low Self-perspective Inhibition demands
Self-perspective inhibition
Cognitive and Neural Architecture
Emotion, desire, intention, belief
TEMPORARY AND CONSCIOUSREPRESENTATION OF SOMEONE’S
MENTAL STATE
Self-perspectiveinhibition Social
knowledge andtheory of mind
LONG-TERMKNOWLEDGE
Top-down
Top-down
Role of the temporo-parietal junction?
Self-perspective inhibition demands do not predict errors in TPJ patients
PF DB RH
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Num
ber c
orre
ct
High Self-perspective Inhibition demands
Low Self-perspective Inhibition demands
WBA PW
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Num
ber c
orre
ct
Right frontal lesion patients Temporo-parietal lesion patients
TPJ patients do not necessarily makeegocentric errors
Right frontallesion patients
Temporo-parietallesion patients
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
WBA PF
Per
cent
age
Other errors
Egocentric errors
Distribution of errors
Samson et al., 2007
Monitoring the environment
Monitoring the environment
Cognitive and Neural Architecture
Emotion, desire, intention, belief
TEMPORARY AND CONSCIOUSREPRESENTATION OF SOMEONE’S
MENTAL STATE
Self-perspectiveinhibition Social
knowledge andtheory of mind
LONG-TERMKNOWLEDGE
Top-down
Top-down
Cognitive and Neural Architecture
Emotion, desire, intention, belief
TEMPORARY AND CONSCIOUSREPRESENTATION OF SOMEONE’S
MENTAL STATE
Self-perspectiveinhibition Social
knowledge andtheory of mind
LONG-TERMKNOWLEDGE
Top-down
Top-down
Two main conclusions
1. Distinction between theory of mind use and theory of mind knowledge� The patients reported here could solve theory
of mind tasks in some situations but not others� � their theory of mind knowledge seemed
intact� � their difficulties relate to the “use” of that
knowledge
� The question is more complex than “having” or “not having” a ToM
Two main conclusions
1. Distinction between theory of mind use and theory of mind knowledge
2. Distinct theory of mind use processes� Qualitative differences in deficits indicating
that the use of one’s ToM does not rely on a unitary process
� Self-perspective inhibition� Orientating attention to the relevant elements in
the environment� Detecting relevant cues� Inhibition of salient distractors in the
environment� Integration of various information/cues
Methodological implications
1. Need for new tasks, with within/between-task manipulations to isolate processing demands
Methodological implications
1. Need for new tasks, with within/between-task manipulations to isolate processing demands
2. Heterogeneity of deficits: caution about group averages
PF DB RH
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Num
ber c
orre
ct
WBA PW
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Num
ber c
orre
ct
High Inhibition
Low Inhibition
Methodological implications
1. Need for new tasks, with within/between-task manipulations to isolate processing demands
2. Heterogeneity of deficits: caution about group averages
Group
0
10
20
3040
50
6070
80
90100
Num
ber c
orre
ct
High Inhibition
Low Inhibition
Part 2: Implicit and Explicit ToM?
Current puzzle in the literature…
Is belief reasoningdifficult?
Is belief reasoningdifficult?
More than 30 years of research: Only from the age of 4, children pass false belief tasks
Is belief reasoningdifficult?
More than 30 years of research: from the age of 4, children pass false belief tasks
Recent findings:Infants are sensitive to another person’s false beliefFrom 24 months (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005)
From 7 months (Kovacs et al., 2010)
Is belief reasoningautomatic?
Main taskMain taskMain taskMain task: follow where the object is
Secondary taskSecondary taskSecondary taskSecondary task: respond yes/no to the question:BELIEF QUESTION : She thinks it is in the left/right boxREALITY QUESTION: It is true that it is in the left/right box
Two experimental conditionsTwo experimental conditionsTwo experimental conditionsTwo experimental conditions:(1) No explicit instruction to track beliefs(2) Explicit instructions to track beliefs
Question
Apperly et al.,2006
Is belief reasoningautomatic?
Is belief reasoningautomatic?
Apperly et al.,2006
Is belief reasoningautomatic?
Kovacs et al.,2010
Question
Is belief reasoningautomatic?
Low level processes?
Consistent perspectives
Self sees 1Other sees 1
Self sees 2Other sees 1
How many discs does the other see?
Inconsistent perspectives
Samson et al.,2010
Self sees 3Other sees 3
Self sees 3Other sees 1
How many discs do you see?
Samson et al., 2010
Consistent perspectives Inconsistent perspectives
+
HE
2
Samson et al.,2010
+
YOU
2
Samson et al.,2010
Egocentric biases
Consistent Perspectives
Inconsistantes Perspectives
Samson et al.,2010
Altercentric biases
Consistent Perspectives
Inconsistent Perspectives
Samson et al.,2010
Altercentric biases
Consistent Perspectives
Inconsistent Perspectives
Samson et al.,2010
� We can’t prevent ourselves from computingwhat the other person sees even when it has detrimental effects on our performance
� In some conditions, we are quicker at judgingthe other person’s perspective than our ownperspective
Altercentric biases
+
YOU
2
Bip Bip
�
1x
Bip
�
2x
Secondary task
Qureshi et al., 2010
Dual task paradigm
VOLET 1: processus de bas niveau
Prise de perspective visuelle
Qureshi et al., 2010
VOLET 1: processus de bas niveau
Prise de perspective visuelle
Qureshi et al., 2010
� We can’t prevent ourselves from computingwhat the other person sees even when it has detrimental effects on our performance
� In some conditions, we are quicker at judgingthe other person’s perspective than our ownperspective
� We compute what other people seeeffortlessly
Altercentric biases
Top-down
Top-downBottom-up
Samson, 2009
Desire representation
Belief representation
Self/Otherdistinction
TEMPORARYREPRESENTATION
Social knowledge andtheory of mind
LONG-TERMKNOWLEDGE
Top-down
Motor state
Emotional state
Visual experience
Bottom-up
Top-down
Bottom-up
Bottom-up
Top-downBottom-up
Desire representation
Belief representation
Self/Otherdistinction
TEMPORARYREPRESENTATION
Social knowledge andtheory of mind
LONG-TERMKNOWLEDGE
Samson, 2009
Thanks to…
� All the patients� Collaborateurs
� Ian Apperly (University of Birmingham)� Glyn Humphreys (University of Oxford)
� Past lab members� Sarah Houthuys� Adam Qureshi � Sarah Boldey Scott � Eleanor Limback� Sanni Quadflieg
� Funding bodies� MRC, Lerhulme Trust, Stroke Association, FNRS, FSR
www.springlab.org
� Current lab members� Henryk Bukowski� François Maurage� Gaëlle Meert� Caroline Michel � Richard Ramsey� Andrew Surtess