social media impacts on social & political goods · 2 policy brief no. 22 toda peace...

PolicyBriefNo.20 APLN/CNND 1

SocialMediaImpactsonSocial&PoliticalGoods:APeacebuildingPerspective

LisaSchirchTheTodaPeaceInstituteandtheAllianceforPeacebuildingarehostingaseriesofpolicybriefsdiscussingsocialmediaimpactsonsocialandpoliticalgoods.Overthenextseveralmonths,topexpertsandthoughtleaderswillprovideinsightintosocialmedia’sthreatsandopportunities.Thisfirstbriefingprovidesaconceptualsummary,andasetofpolicyrecommendationstoaddressthesignificantthreatstosocialandpoliticalgoods.TheFullReportprovidesamorein-depthliteraturereviewandexplanationofkeythemes.

Socialmediaisbothanassetandathreattosocialandpoliticalgoods.Thisfirstinaseriesofpolicybriefsonsocialmediaaimstobuildthecapacityofcivilsocietytoun-derstandtheeconomicandpsychologicalappealofsocialmedia,identifytherangeofopportunitiesandchallengesrelatedtosocialmedia,andpromotediscussiononpo-tentialsolutionstothesechallenges.Currently,fewincivilsocietyorgovernmentun-derstandhowsocialmediaworks.Technologyexpertsandinvestor-orientedsocialmediaplatformscannotaddresstheopportunitiesandchallengesbroughtbysocialmediacapabilities.Together,government,corporations,andcivilsociety,needtofindwaystorespondtothegrowingcrisisofsocialmediaethicsandimpacts.

• Allformsofmediaholdthepotentialforbothsolvingandamplifyingso-

cialandpoliticalproblems.Mediais,asitsLatinrootsuggests,“inthemid-dle”;itisachannelforcommunicationbetweenpeople.

• Socialmediavastlyincreasestheamountofinformationandcommunica-tionavailabletopeople.Socialmediaisa“supply-sideshocktotheamountoffreedomintheworld.”(Shirky2008)Socialmediahasbeenamassivetechno-logicalexperimentbothforandagainstdemocracy.

PolicyBrief#22

October2018

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ABSTRACT

PolicyBriefNo.22 TodaPeaceInstitute/AllianceforPeacebuilding2

• Socialmediaprofitmotives.Socialmediacorporationsharvestdataonuserstocreatepsychometricprofilesthatarethensoldtoadvertiserswithinterestsinpersuadingandmanipulatingthepublictowardspecificgoals.Socialmediacorporationsaredrivenbyprofit;theyselltheattentionofuserstoadvertisers.

• BrainhackingforAddiction.Socialmediacompaniescompeteforuser’sat-

tention.Theyhaveaprofitmotivetokeeppeopleusingandsharinginfor-mationonsocialmediaplatforms.Theydesigntheseplatformstofostergreateruse,whatsomerefertoas"brainhacking."

• MonetizingandGrabbingAttention.Inthe“attentioneconomy,”socialmediaplatformsattempttoharnessandmonetizeourattentionbytechcreatingpsy-chologicallyaddictiveprogramsthat“hijack”attention.Whenusersshareinfor-mation,they“harvest”thesepsychologicalprofilesthrougharangeofinfor-mation-gatheringsurveillance.Theythentheysellthispersonalinformationtocorporationsandpoliticalactorswithinterestsinpersuadingandmanipulatingthepublictowardspecificgoals.

• HateSpreadsFasterthanTruthorLove.Socialmediaplatformsalgorithmsprioritizepoststhatcontainstrongemotions,spreadingthemtoothers.Re-searchbytheWallStreetJournaldiscoveredthatYouTube’salgorithmsmoreoftenrecommended“conspiracytheories,partisanviewpointsandmisleadingvideos”overmorereputablebut“boring”videosrepresentingfact-basedre-porting.(Nicas2018)

• AffirmationAddiction.Humanscraveattentionandconnection.Socialmediaoffersinstantgratificationforsocialaffirmation.MRIbrainscansillustratethatfeedbackviasocialmediaactivatesthe“rewardcenter”ofthebraininawaysimilartoaddictivedrugs.(Wolpert2016)

• EmotionalReactions,notDeliberation.Socialmedia’s“racetothebrainstem”

makescomplexthinkingmoredifficult.Democraticdeliberation,criticalthinkingtodeterminefactfromfiction,andcreativeproblem-solvingtakesplaceinthefrontalcortex,behindtheforehead.Thefrontalcortexisessentialtobuildingso-ciety,analyzingpublicproblems,andcreatingsolutionsandinnovationstoim-provesocialandpoliticalgoods.Inthemidstofconflictandtrauma,moreprimi-tiveandemotion-basedneurologicalsystemstendtotakeover.Ironically,themorechaosandconflictthatthereisinsociety,thelessablehumansaretore-spondwiththepartoftheirbrainthatmightenablethemtoreducechaosandviolence.

SummaryofSocialMediaOpportunitiesStartinginthelate1990s,manypeoplebelievedsocialmediacouldimprovesocialandpoliticalgoodsbyconnectingandempoweringpeopleandimprovingaccesstoinfor-mation.Today,nearlyhalfofthepeopleontheplanetusesocialmediatoexchangeideas,photos,andvideos.Statesandcivilsocietyorganizationsareusingsocialmediafora

LisaSchirch SocialMediaImpactsonSocial&PoliticalGoods 3

widerangeofcontributionstosocialandpoliticalgoods,includingthefollowing,de-scribedinmoredepthintheFullReport.

SummaryofSocialMediaChallengesBetween2016-2018,descriptionsofsocialmediadramaticallyshiftedtowarditemizingitsfaults:fakenews,addiction,interferenceindemocraticelectionsanddeliberation,grouppolarization,andpromotionofviolentconflict.Researchersandjournalistsiden-tifyawiderangeofsocialmediaharmstosocialandpoliticalgoods,describedinmoredepthintheFullReport.Underminespersonalwell-beingthroughchronicdistraction,hijackingattentionforcorporateprofit,whichfostersaddictiveconsumptionandtechno-stressSpreadsmisinformationanddisinformationUnderminesaccurateinformationbydecreasingthenumberofnewspapersandthejournalistsasadvertisersmovetosocialmediaCreates information filter bubbles and echo chambers via social media algo-rithmsthat filter informationenabling forumsfor tribalismwheresmallgroupsofpeople,includingthosewithanti-socialnorms,connectwithoutpublicscrutinyFuelssocialpolarizationandnationalismwithingroupsProvidesnewplatforms forhate speech and incivility,where people can posttheiranti-social,hatefulmessageaimedatinterruptingcivildiscourseDistractspeople’sattentionawayfromcriticalissuesbyfloodingwithpersonalin-terestorpositivestoriesSpreadsdeceptivepropaganda,“influencecampaigns”andpsychologicaloper-ationsthat“destabilize”publictrustinpublicinstitutionsSwayselectionswithadsaimedattargetingandrepressingvotersEmpowers states tomonitor andharass journalistsandpro-democracymove-mentsToleratesgenderedonlineharassmentofwomenAllowsadsthatexcludespecificgroups,suchasminorities,peopleofcolor,Jews,women,andpeopleover50TreatssmallcountriesassocialmedialaboratoriesAllowsrecruitingandorganizingforviolentextremistgroupsEnablesgroupstofomentviolenceandmobilizegenocide

Buildempathy,toleranceandcompassionforothersandcombatsocialisolationDesign“civictech”toaddresssocialproblemsExpanddemocraticgovernanceandimprovethestate-societyrelationshipEnablesocialmovementstocoordinateandcommunicatewithothersaroundtheworldSupportcrisisresponse,humanitarianassistanceanddevelopmentPreventandconfronthatespeechandthreatsofviolenceEnhancepublicsupportforpolicynegotiation,diplomacy,andpeaceprocessesUsenewsocialmarketingmethodsofcrowdsourcingideas,fundraising,broaden-ingsupport,engagingthepublicandevaluatingtheimpactofnonprofitgroups


PolicyRecommendations

Howdowemaximizethepossibilityforsocialmediatoempowerustoimprovesocialandpoliticalgoods,andminimizetheworst impactsofsocialmedia?Recommendationstoenablesocialmediatocontributetosocialandpoliticalgoodsincludethefollowing:

A. Inspire“HumaneDesign”TristanHarrisandthestaffattheCenterforHumaneTechnology,basedinSanFrancisco,wanttomoveawayfromtechnologythatextractsattentionanderodessociety,towardstechnologythat“protectsourmindsandreplenishessociety.”Asformerinsidersinthesocialmediaindustry,theyassertthefollowing:

Technology that tears apart our commonreality and truth, constantlyshredsourattention,orcausesustofeelisolatedmakesitimpossibletosolvetheworld’sotherpressingproblemslikeclimatechange,poverty,andpolarization.Noonewantstechnologylikethat.Whichmeanswe’reallactuallyonthesameteam:TeamHumanity,torealigntechnologywithhumanity’sbestinterests.(CenterforHumaneTechnology2018)

TheCenterforHumaneTechnologyisencouraginga“designrenaissance”thatempha-sizes “non-extraction-based design decisions and business models” that might em-powerpeopletomanagetheirattentiontowardactivitiesthatbenefitthesocialgood,bothpersonalandcollective.Unlikesocialmediaplatformsthathaveaprofitmotivetokeepusersontheplatformlonger,companieslikeMicrosoft,Apple,andSamsungthatmake the devices that run socialmedia coulddesign safeguards for human securitysincetheirprofitmodeldoesnotdependuponuserssharinginformationonline.Thesecorporationscandesigntheirproductstoprotectourmindsandsociety,toenhancefo-cusratherthandistraction.(CenterforHumaneTechnology2018)

B. Designan“ArchitectureofSerendipity”Afunctionaldemocracyrequiresencounteringexperiences,facts,opinions,informationandideasdifferentfromourown,andthenfindingcommongroundandbuildingem-pathyandunderstandingbasedonsharedexperiences,facts,andbeliefs.Currentsocialmediaplatforms reduceuser’s exposure to ideasorexperiences that challenge theirpointofview.Socialmediaplatformscoulddesignunplannedserendipitousencounters.This“architectureofserendipity”wouldreplacethecurrentalgorithmsthatfosterechochambersandlike-mindedgroupsrecognizingthatsuchserendipitousencountersim-provebothsocialandpoliticalgoods.(Sunstein2017)

C. DesignPlatformsthatFacilitateEmpathy,DialogueandDeliberationSocialmedia’scontributiontopolarizationandviolencerequiresanewgenerationofconflicttransformationexpertswhospecializeinsocialmediastrategiesfordialogueanddeliberation.Itrequirestechcompaniestoconsultwithexpertswhospecializeinfacilitation,dialogueandsocialcohesion.Peopleinthefieldsofpeacebuildingandcon-flict transformation, including socialmovement activists, facilitators,mediators, and


peacebuilders,includingthesponsorsofthisreport,havespecialtrainingandpracticalexperienceindesigningintergroupprocessestoaddressconflict,orchestratingcomplexpeaceprocesses,andcommunityorganizing.Conflicttransformationanalysisandskillscouldhelptoreformsocialmediaplatformssothattheybuildempathyandenabledia-logueanddeliberation,socialcohesion,andcross-cuttingrelationshipsonsocialmedia.

D. Conduct“DoNoHarm”andConflictSensitivityAssessments

Socialmediaplatformsareresponsibleforunintentionalharmsthatoccurasaresultofthedesignandalgorithmsonitsproducts.Otherorganizationsthatcreateunintendedharms,includingthefieldsofmedicine,humanitarianassistance,andpeacebuilding,aswellas themilitary, investsignificantresources inassessmentandplanningtoavoidunintendedconsequences.Conflictsensitivityistheuseofassessmenttoolstoanalyzethelocalcontext(suchasthecountryinwhichasocialmediaplatformoperates)toan-ticipatewaystheplatformmaybeabusedorcontributetosocialdivisionsorviolencewithinthatcontext.Socialmediacompaniescanuseconflictassessmenttools toad-vancetheircapacityforconflictsensitivityanddesigntheirservicestominimizeharmwithknowledgeofthelocalcontext.(Schirch2014)Thereareconflicttransformationandpeacebuildingorganizationsoperating innearlyeverycountry in theworldthatcouldworkwithsocialmediaorganizationstocarryoutsuchassessments.

E. CoordinateSupportforFactCheckingandHateMonitoring

Whendoesfact-checkinghappen?Whodoesit?Howdotheydoit?Thetruthneedsstaff.Facebookalreadyhasnearly20,000contractorsattemptingtoreviewandrespondtocomplaintsofhatespeechandfakenews.Butoftenthesecontractorssitintinyofficesinothercountriesandonlyhave3-5secondstodecidewhetherapostorcommentstaysorisdeleted.(Chen2014)Factcheckingisacollectiveeffort,requiringcoordinationofdiverseactors,including:

• Socialmediacompanystaff,• Userswhoflagfalse,hatefulorviolentcontent,and• Organizationsdevotedtomediaaccuracyandtruth.

F. CoordinateaCampaignforSocialMediaLiteracy

Peopledonotwanttobe“dataproducingfarmanimals,domesticatedanddependent”uponsocialmediaforourunhealthyaddiction.(Vaidhyanathan2018,203)Thepublicneedstounderstandhowsocialmedia is impactingtheirpersonal livesandbroadersociety.Providingsocialmedialiteracyforbillionsofpeopleisdaunting.Governments,socialmediaplatforms,corporations,schoolsanduniversities,andcivilsocietyorgani-zationsallneedtoparticipate.Thecontentofsocialmedialiteracyshouldincludethefollowing:

• basictrainingonprivacysettingstohelpusersbeawareandcontroltheirinfor-mation;

• strategiesforself-control,sosocialmediauserssetlimitsontheirownusage;• accountabilitycoaching,sousersunderstandthe impactof incivilityandhate

speech;and• trainingtorecognizethetricksofpersuasionandpropaganda.

Propagandadoesnotworkwhenpeoplerecognizethesignsofpropaganda.Yetevenexpertsfinditchallengingtodeterminethedifferencebetweenrealandfakeaccounts


onFacebook.(CollinsandFrenkel2018)Researchers foundthatsimplyencouragingpeopletoquestionwhetheranewsstoryistrueorfalsemakesthemlesslikelytoshareanewsstorythattheysuspectmightbefakeinthefuture.(PennycookandRand2018)Oneoptionistodesignasocialmediaalerttoletusersknowthattheyareexperiencinganarrowvieworunsubstantiatedinformation.(Bail2018)

G. AdvocateforGovernmentRegulationAswithany industry, consumerscanpressgovernments forconsumerprotectionssothatsocialmediacorporationsareheldaccountableforpublicharms.TheEuropeanUn-ionactivelyregulatessocialmediacorporationsrecognizingthevasteffectstheyhaveonsocialandpoliticalgoods.InAugust2018,USSenatorMarkWarnerreleasedawhitepaperentitled“PotentialPolicyProposalsforSocialMediaandTechnologyFirms”withamenuofregulationandpolicyoptionsincludingidentifyingfalseinformation,offeringgovernmentsupportformedialiteracy,andprotectinginformation.Thewhitepaperstates,“Thesizeandreachofthese[socialmedia]platformsdemandthatweensureproperoversight,transparencyandeffectivemanagementoftechnologiesthatinlargemeasureundergirdoursociallives,oureconomy,andourpolitics.”(Warner2018)

Therearearangeofproposalsandexamples,including

• Treatingsocialmediacompaniesas“informationfiduciaries”andassuchneedregulationtoprotectandcareforthepublic’saccesstoaccurateinformation.(Balkin2016)

• Developing"publicinterestcurators"with"civic-purposealgorithms"includ-ingtheintegrity,reputation,location,andinclusionofthoseproducingthedata.(Kelly2016)

• Designingsocialmediaplatformssothatthesourcesofpoliticalinformationpostedonsocialmediaaretransparentandaccountableforitsaccuracy.(CenterforHumaneTechnology2018)

• Regulatingsocialmediatoensuretherearegreaterprivacycontrols,suchastheEuropeanUnion’sGeneralDataProtectionRegulation("GDPR")

• Requiringsocialmediaplatformstotakethelegalresponsibilityforremovingextremistcontent.inEurope,forexample,socialmediaplatformsmustremoveterroristcontentwithinonehourofitsposting.(CounterExtremismProject2018)


SocialMediaImpactsonSocial&PoliticalGoods:APeacebuildingPerspective

LisaSchirchTheTodaPeaceInstituteandtheAllianceforPeacebuildingarehostingaseriesofpolicybriefsdiscussingsocialmediaimpactsonsocialandpoliticalgoods.Overthenextseveralmonths,topexpertsandthoughtleaderswillprovideinsightintosocialmedia’sthreatsandpossibilities.TheExecutiveSummaryprovidesaconceptualoverviewandasetofpol-icyrecommendationstoaddresssocialmediathreats tosocialandpoliticalgoods.TheFullReportprovidesamore in-depth literature reviewandexplanationof key themes.Ideally,theExecutiveSummaryandtheFullReportarereadtogether,asthepolicyrec-ommendationsarefoundintheExecutiveSummary.

AnIntroductiontoMediaEffectsonSocialandPoliticalGoods

1. Allformsofmediaholdthepotentialforboththreateningandsecuringsocialandpoliticalgoods.Mediais,asitsLatinrootsuggests,“inthemiddle”;itisachannelforcommunicationbetweenpeopletoeitherachieve–ordestroy–socialandpoliticalgoods.

2. Thefantasyoffixingsocialproblemswithtechnologyhasalonghistory.InHereComesEverybody,ClayShirkyobserves,“Forahundredyearsafteritstarted,theprintingpressbrokemorethingsthanitfixed,plungingEuropeintoaperiodofintellectualandpoliticalchaosthatendedinthe1600s.(Shirky,HereComesEverybody:ThePowerofOrganizingwithoutOrganizations2008,73)Socialmediaisatool,andaswithmosttools,itcanbeusedforbothgoodandevil.IntheirbookonLiberationTechnology:SocialMediaandtheStruggleforDemoc-racy,DiamondandPlattnerdescribetheinternetas“a“cyberstew”;awidelydivergentmixofactorsandmotives,where“liberationandcontrol,transpar-encyanddeception,cooperationandpredation,toleranceandextremismallviewithoneanother”bothto“boostdemocracy”and“enablerepression.”(Shirky,HereComesEverybody:ThePowerofOrganizingwithoutOrganizations2008,xiii)

3. Socialmediaisdistinctfromothermediainatleastsixwaysknownasthe6Vs:volume,variety,velocity,value,veracity,andvariability.Socialmediasig-nificantlyincreasestheabilityfordiversepeopleandgroupstocommunicate,share,cooperate,andtakecollectiveactionwithouttheguidanceofinstitutions

FULL REPORT

Social goods refer to ac-tions, resources, or any-thingthatbenefitssocialre-lationships such as educa-tion, clean water,healthcare, safety, empa-thy, understanding, and asenseofcommunity.Politicalgoodsrefertotheinstitutions,ruleoflaw,anddecision-making processesthatprotect and createso-cialgoods.


ororganizations(volumeandvariety).Socialmediaenablesamuchfasterspreadofinformation,images,andvideos(velocity).Butthequalityandtypesoftheinformationarehighlyuncertain(value,veracity,andvariability).

4. Socialmediaisa“supply-sideshocktotheamountoffreedomintheworld.”(Shirky,HereComesEverybody:ThePowerofOrganizingwithoutOrganizations2008)Socialmediahasbeenamassivetechnologicalexperimentfordemocracy.Butmerelygivingpeopleaccesstomodesofcommunicationandformsofinformationdoesnotstrengthendemocracy.

5. Theriseofsocialmediacorrelateswithsignificantthreatstosocialand

politicalgoods.Socialpolarization,nationalism,andthreatstomulticulturalvaluesareincreasing.Democraticfreedomsaredecliningaroundtheworld.(FreedomHouse2018)Authoritarianleadersandsomeofthosewhoelectthemareunderminingsocialandpoliticalgoodsinthefollowingways:

• Attackingdemocraticnormsandinstitutions• Underminingbeliefinscience,facts,andnewsmedia• Repressingthehumanrightsofethnicandreligiousminorities• Corruptinggovernmentstoadvancetheirownselfishfinancialinterests

HowSocialMediaWorks

Socialmediaisabroadterm,includingcommunicationsystemssuchasemails,texts,andblogsaswellassocialmediaplatformssuchasFacebook,Twitter,andGoogleplat-forms,includingYouTube.Mostofsocialmedia’sproblemsrelatetoplatformsgearedtowardprofit.

6. TheGoalsofSocialMediaPlatforms.Leadersofsocialmediacorporations

oftenseemgenuineintheirdesiretocontributetosocialandpoliticalgoods.• Untilrecently,Google’smottowas“don’tbeevil.”TodayGoogle’smission

isto“toorganizetheworld’sinformationandmakeituniversallyacces-sibleanduseful.”

• Twitter’smissionis“istogiveeveryonethepowertocreateandshareideasandinformationinstantlywithoutbarriers.”Twitter’swebsitestates,“Webelieveinfreeexpressionandthinkeveryvoicehasthepowertoimpacttheworld.”Andthecompany’spage“TwitterforGood”outlinesitscivicengagementeffortstosupportsocialgoods.

• Facebook’smissionis“togivepeoplethepowertobuildcommunityandbringtheworldclosertogether.”Facebook’sSocialGoodForumrollsoutnewaspectsofitsplatformtoaidavarietyofsocialgoods,includingcri-sisresponse,health,charitablegiving,andmentoring.AndFacebookhasobserverstatusintheGlobalNetworkInitiativeaimedatprotectinghu-manrightsandcorporateresponsibilityinthetechindustry.

7. SocialMediaPlatformsareProfitableCorporations.Socialmediacorpora-

tionsaregearedtowardshareholderprofit.Facebook’sprofitsjumpedfrom$26billionin2016to$40billionin2017.(Statista2018)Whileprofitisnot


necessarilyincompatiblewithcontributingtosocialandpoliticalgoods,thereareinherenttensions.

8. AdvertisementsonSocialMedia.Likenewspapers,TV,andothermedia,so-cialmediaplatformslikeTwitter,Google’sYouTube,andFacebookoperatebasedonads.Sixmillionadvertisersplaceadsonsocialmediaplatforms.TheseadsgenerateprofitandpayforthethousandsofstaffrunningcorporationslikeFacebook.(Crawford2018)

9. AttentionforSale.Whatisbeingsoldbysocialmediacorporationsistheat-tentionofsocialmediausers.Inexchangeforusingsocialmediaplatforms,us-ersagreetohavetheirinformationsharedwithadvertisers,includingcorpora-tionswhowanttosellproducts,andthosewithspecificsocialandpoliticalgoalsthatwanttosellideas.

10. HarvestingPersonalDataandPsychometricProfiling.Socialmediaplat-

forms“harvest”personalinformationbycollectingdataonwhatuserspost,wheretheyare,whotheyknow,andhowtheymightbeinfluenced.Psychomet-ricprofilingprovidesadvertisersandpoliticalstrategistswithinformationbasedonusers’onlineactivity,interests,gender,sexualpreference,geograph-icallocation,religion,andanyotherinformationgleanedfromoursocialmediapostssothatadvertiserscantailortheiradstothese“customaudiences.”(TacticalTech2018)

11. AdvertisersPreferPlacingAdsonSocialMedia.Forafractionofthecostofplacinganadvertisementontelevision,newspapersormagazines,advertisersusingsocialmediaplatformscantargetspecificadstospecificgroupsofpeo-ple.Facebookcallsthisits“CustomAudiences”program.Googleplacesadver-tisementsbasedonuser’ssearches.Google’ssearchenginesandalgorithmsprioritizeandsortlinkstopagesontheinternetthatarerelevantaccordingtoaviewer’sgeographiclocation,language,traffic,andotherfactors.

12. CultivatingAddictiveHabitstoCollectMoreData.SocialmediaplatformslikeGoogleandFacebookcollectinformationonbillionsofpeople,morethanathirdofthehumanrace.Themoretimepeoplespendontheseplatforms,themoredatathesecorporationscancollect.Moredataallowsthecorporationstosellmoreads,inturngenerategreatershareholderprofits.Someresearchersarguethattheprofitmodelofsocialmediaplatformsrelieson“hijackingatten-tion”awayfromotheractivities.“Facebookattractsus,hooksus,encouragesustodeclareouraffiliations,dividesus,andtrackseverysingleinteractionalongtheway.”(Vaidhyanathan2018,51)Inresponsetothiscritiqueof“addictionbydesign,”afewsocialmediacorporationsbeganintroducingnewsettingsandoptionsforuserstomonitortheirusageinAugust2018.(Hern2018)

13. PublicLoyaltyandProfit.Publicloyaltyisimportanttosocialmediaplat-

forms’businessmodel.TarletonGillespiedescribesthechallengethatsocialmediacompaniesfaceintheirtornloyaltiesto“customer-users”andprofit-driveninvestorsinhisbookCustodiansoftheInternet:Platforms,Content


Moderation,andtheHiddenDecisionsthatShapeSocialMedia.(Gillespie2018)Thepublic’sloyaltytoasocialmediaplatformrequirestrustthatuserswillnotunintentionallyencounterpornography,hate,orviolencewhilescrollingthroughtheirnewsfeed.Negativestoriesaboutsocialmedia’sroleinunder-miningelectionsandfosteringextremismfrom2016tothepresentalsoim-pactspublicloyalty.Forexample,Facebooklost$118billionofstockvalueinJuly2018followingnewsstoriesofthecompany’santi-socialroles.(Solon2018)

14. GovernmentSurveillance.Intellingthestoryofhowsocialmediaworks,somepointtothehistoryofthedevelopmentoftheinternetandtheworldwideweb.WalterIsaacsondetailsthe“creativecollaboration”betweenthemil-itary,academicinstitutions,industries,andagroupofprogressiveandlibertar-ianfreethinkersinhisbook,TheInnovators.(Isaacson2014)TheU.S.militaryhelpedtocreatetheinternettoenablecommunicationsintheeventofawide-spreadattackordisaster.Someassertthemilitaryalsohadaninterestinde-signingacommunicationplatformthatwouldenableintelligencecollectiononpopulationssothatitcouldidentifythreats.Someresearchersnotethat"Nomatterwhatweusethenetworkfortoday—dating,directions,encryptedchat,email,orjustreadingthenews—italwayshadadual-usenaturerootedinin-telligencegatheringandwar”.(Levine2018)

Todayitisnosecretthatgovernment’sspyontheircitizensthroughsocialme-diaplatforms.Thenumberof requestsbygovernments toFacebook foruserdataissteadilyincreasingasstateslearnaboutFacebook’spsychometricprofil-ing data. Facebook’s April 2018 Transparency Report reports that over 100countriesmadeover80,000informationrequeststoFacebookbetweenJanuary2013andApril2018.(Facebook.2018)Today,millionsofpeopleuploadphotostosocialmediaeveryday.Thesephotos,pairedwithfacialrecognitiontechnologies,createintelligencedataforspyagen-ciestrackingpeople.Forstatesfocusedonhumansecurityandcombattingcrime,suchsurveillancemightimprovepublicsafety.Butforgovernmentsfocusedonconcentratingwealthandpower,suchsurveillanceunderminesdemocracy.

NeuroscienceandtheAppealofSocialMedia

Neuroscienceisaninterdisciplinarystudyofthebrainandnervoussystem.Research-ersuseneurosciencetounderstandhowhumansfeel,think,andbehave.Neuroscienceisessentialtoappreciatingthepsychologicalappealofsocialmedia.

15. SocialMediaNoise.Socialmediavastlyincreasestheamountofinformationavailabletopeople.Gettingattentionisdifficultgiventhisoverwhelminginfor-mation“noise.”Techno-sociologistZeynepTufekciobserves,“Inthe21stcen-turyitistheflowofattention,notinformation(whichwealreadyhavetoomuchof),thatmatters.”(Tufekci2018)


16. ThePsychologyofGrabbingAttention.Attentionisafinitecommodity;eachpersonhasalimitedspanofattention.Dozensofbooksbymarketingexpertsandpsychologistsdescribehowto“breakthroughthenoise”and“grab”thepublic’sattentionbyusingcompellingpersonalstoriesandmetaphorsto“frame”anissue.Socialmediaplatformsattempttoharnessandmonetizeourattention.Inthemostskepticalanalysisofthe“attentioneconomy,”techcompa-niescreatepsychologicallyaddictiveprogramsthat“hijack”attention;they“harvest”psychologicalprofilesthrougharangeofinformation-gatheringsur-veillance;andthentheysellthisinformationtocorporationsandpoliticalac-torswithinterestsinpersuadingandmanipulatingthepublictowardspecificgoals.(Vaidhyanathan2018)

17. TheNeuroscienceofPersuasionandStrategicCommunication:thefieldofstrategiccommunicationstudieshowtoinfluencepeoplebyunderstandingtheirneeds,interests,andperspectives.StanfordUniversity’sPersuasiveTech-nologyLabteachesbusinessandtechleadershowtocaptureandkeepaudienceattentionbydesigningsocialmediaplatformsandapplications,orproductsandmessages,with“stickiness”thatcreatesbehavioralchanges.Oneofthekeyele-mentsoftheirresearchishowtoremoveobstaclesthatmakepeoplelesslikelytospendtheirtimeandmoneyonsocialmedia.Thephotos,images,colors,andfeedbacktoolsto“like”andcommentonsocialmediaaredesignedtokeeppeo-pleontheseplatformslongerandtoreturnregularly.(Alter2017)(SalkeverandWadhwa2018)

18. Fear,Anxiety,andthe“RacetotheBrainstem."TechethicistTristanHarrisdescribestechcompanies'competitionforourattentionas"brainhacking"anda"racetothebottomofthebrainstem."(Harris2016)Theoldestpartofthebrainisthereptilianbrainstem.Itcontrolsautomaticfight-or-flightreactionsthatrespondtofear,anxiety,orthreats.Newspapereditorsoftenquip,“Ifitbleeds,itleads”toindicatethatemotionalcontentonthefrontpage,whetherevokingfear,disgust,anger,orjoy,sellswell.Emotionsarecontagious.Simi-larly,socialmediapoststhatinvokeintenseemotionslikefearandangergetmore“views”fromotherpeople.Emotionalpostsseemtostimulatebiochemi-calresponsesthatmakepeopleanxiousandmorelikelytosharethesepostswithothers.(DiResta2016)Socialmediaplatformsalgorithmsprioritizepoststhatcontainstrongemo-tions,spreadingthemtoothers.ResearchbytheWallStreetJournaldiscoveredthatYouTube’salgorithmsmoreoftenrecommended“conspiracytheories,par-tisanviewpointsandmisleadingvideos”overmorereputablebut“boring”vid-eosrepresentingfact-basedreporting.(Nicas2018)

19. AffirmationAddiction.Humanscraveattentionandconnection.Socialmediaoffersinstantgratificationforsocialaffirmation.Thelimbicsystem,orrewardsystem,controlsemotionalresponsesandpositiveornegativerewards.Thispartofthebrainrespondstosocialmedia’sofferofsocialaffirmationthrough“likes”andcomparisontoothers.Theseolderbrainstructuresbecomead-dictedtotheimagesandfeelingsinvokedbysocialmediafeeds.MRIbrain


scansillustratethatfeedbackviasocialmediaactivatesthe“rewardcenter”ofthebraininawaysimilartoaddictivedrugs.(Wolpert2016)PsychologistLarryRosendescribes:

Thetypicalpersoncheckstheirphoneevery15minutesorlessandhalfofthetimetheychecktheirphonethereisnoalert,nonotification.It’scomingfrominsidetheirheadtellingthem,“Gee,Ihaven’tcheckinFacebookinawhile….Iwonderifsomebodycommentedonmy…post."Thatthengeneratescortisol[inthebrain],and itstarts tomakeyouanxious.Andeventually,yourgoal is to get rid of that anxiety, so you check in. (AndersonCooper2017)

ThecoloredthumbsuponFacebookoffersusersahitofdopaminewhensome-oneontheirFriendListhitsakey.Dopamine,apleasurablebrainchemical, isinfamousforitsroleincreatingasenseofpleasureforpeoplewithself-destruc-tiveaddictionstofood,sex,anddrugs.Byofferingaffirmationthrough"Likes,"socialmediaplatformsarecreatingwhatmanyresearcherscall“affirmationad-dicts.” This may be particularly harmful for young people, especially youngwomen,whomresearchersdocumenthavelowerlevelsofself-confidenceafterinteractingonsocialmedia.(TeenSafe2016)Socialmediagivesustheabilitytopubliclyperformaffiliationsandprojectiden-titywhileinvitingaffirmationandconfirmationofrelationships.InhisbookAnti-SocialMedia, SivaVaidhyanathandescribes the sadisticoriginof socialmediaplatformslikeFacebookorInstagraminanonlinegamecalled“HotorNot.com,”inwhichpeoplejudgedandofferedtheirfacestobejudgedbyothers,signalingtheintensehumandesireforsocialfeedback.(Vaidhyanathan2018,39-50)

20. EmotionalReactions,notDeliberation.Socialmedia’s“racetothebrainstem”makescomplexthinkingmoredifficult.Democraticdeliberation,criticalthinkingtodeterminefactfromfiction,andcreativeproblem-solvingtakesplaceinthefrontalcortex,behindtheforehead.Thefrontalcortexisessentialtobuildingso-ciety,analyzingpublicproblems,andcreatingsolutionsandinnovationstoim-provesocialandpoliticalgoods.Inthemidstofconflictandtrauma,moreprimi-tiveandemotion-basedneurologicalsystemstendtotakeover.Ironically,themorechaosandconflictthatthereisinsociety,thelessablehumansaretore-spondwiththepartoftheirbrainthatmightenablethemtoreducechaosandviolence.(AllianceforPeacebuilding2016)

OpportunitiesforSocialandPoliticalGoods

Thedawnofsocialmediacamewithatechno-optimistnarrativethatnewtechnologiescouldhelpindividualsandinstitutionsdevotedtosocialandpoliticalgoods.

21. ConnectingwithOtherstoBuildEmpathy,Tolerance,andCompassion.So-cialmediaofferspeoplemoreopportunitiestovoicetheirexperiences,ideas,andpoliticalpreferences.Peoplecanconnectwitheachother,combattingsocial


isolationandbringingtheworldclosertogether.Attheindividuallevel,socialmediaallowspeopletosharetheirthoughtsandexperiences.Thiscanenablepeopletounderstand,feelempathyandcompassionforothers.Socialmediaalsosavestimeandenergybyreducingtheneedfortravelthroughincreasingtheabilitytoemailorvideoconference.

22. DesigningCivicTechnology.“CivicTech”isanumbrellatermthatdescribestheuseoftechnologyforvarioussocialgoods,includingimprovinggovernanceandcoordinatingcommunityaction.CivicTech“hackathons”arehappeningallovertheplanettosolvesocialproblems.InCivicTechintheGlobalSouth:As-sessingTechnologyforthePublicGood,authorsdocumentavarietyoftechsolu-tionstosocialchallenges,suchasBrazil’suseofonlinevotingonparticipatorybudgeting,(PeixotoandSifry2017)InSeattle,Washington,forexample,avari-etyofindependentgroupsgatherstaffattechnologyfirmswithcommunityleadersconcernedaboutthesocialgoodtothinkabouthowtousetechnologyincludingsocialmediatosolvesocialchallengesbothlocallyandglobally.(SeattleTech4Good2018)

23. ExpandingDemocraticGovernance.Communityleaders,governments,andinternationalorganizationsliketheWorldBankusesocialmediatoimprovethestate-societyrelationship.Socialmediaallowsgovernmentstoheardirectlyfromcitizenstoidentifyconcerns,brainstormsolutions,andshareinformationrelatedtopublicissues.Socialmediaplatformsalsocreateopportunitiesforcitizenstoholdgovernmentstoaccount,aspolicymakersrespondtoconstitu-ent"noise"orpressure.Withoutsocialmedia,electedofficialsinsomecoun-triesencounterfarmore"noise"fromcorporationswithlobbyistspressingandrewardingofficialswhorespondtocorporateinterests,oftenattheexpenseofpublicinterests.

24. EnablingSocialMovements:Priortosocialmedia,theexpenseofphonecalls

andtransportationmadeitdifficultforcivilsocietygroupsaroundtheworldtocollaborate.Socialmediaoffersvirtuallyfreemethodsforcivilsocietytocoor-dinateglobalprotestsagainstwarandsexualabuse,andglobalactionstostemclimatechangeandcoordinatewitheachothertoadvancesocialandpoliticalgoods.Socialmediaalsoletscitizenreportersdocumentabusesofpower,evenwhenmainstreamnewssourcesignoreorcoveruptheseabuses.Socialmediaenablesactiviststoamplifyinformationaimedatempoweringpeopletotakecollectiveaction.

Between2010and2012,civilsocietyactivistsinTunisia,EgyptandelsewherecreditedsocialmediaplatformslikeTwitterandFacebookforenablingcivilso-cietytoorganizethemselvesinsocialmovementsandtakemassactiontoholdthoseinpowertoaccount.Whileon-the-groundactivistshadworkedforyearstobuildsocialmovementsintheso-called“ArabSpring”,socialmediaboostedtheseactivistsbycreatingwidepublicawarenessofprotests.Socialmediaalsogavepeopleawaytocommunicatequickly.Socialmediahelpedpeopleover-comeisolationbroughtaboutby“pluralisticignorance”—thelackof


understandingthatotherpeoplesharethesamegrievances,hopes,orideas.(Tufekci2018)

A2018PewResearchstudyonsocialmediaandsocialactivismfoundabundantexamples.Thehashtag#BlackLivesMatterhasappearednearly30milliontimesonTwittertohelpmarkandsortconversationsonrace,violenceandpolicing.InthefirsttwomonthsafterwomenonTwitteraskedeachothertopost#MeTooto report on sexual harassment and abuse, nearly 2million people used thehashtag.ThePewreportfindsthattwo-thirdsofAmericansbelievethatsocialmediaplaysavitalroleincitizenengagementanddrawingattentiontoissuesthatpoliticalleadersneedtoaddress.(Pew2018)Yetthereportalsofindsthatamajoritybelievethatonlineactivismresultsin“slacktivism,”inwhichlessmotivatedpeoplewhomightnotjoinaprotestinthestreet could send an email to their political leader or share a Facebook postaboutanissuefromtheirhome.Researchersfindthatthislow-costandlow-riskactivismmayactuallyweaken the typeof in-personsocialmovementactivitynecessarytofurthersocialgoods.(SchumannandKlein2015)Somenotethatworking-class groups have less access toonline socialmovements. (Schradie2018)

25. SupportingCrisisResponses,HumanitarianAssistanceandDevelopment.Socialmediatechnologyhasanessentialroleinprovidinganearlywarningandrespondingtohumanrightsemergenciesandhumanitariancrisesduetonatu-raldisastersandviolentconflict.TheUnitedNationsandNGOsarescalingupsocialmediatechnologiestohelppeoplesoundthealarmaboutanimpendingcrisis,andthentocoordinateandrespondtocriseswithtwo-waycommunica-tiontechnologies.Forexample,theInternationalNetworkofCrisisMappingworksattheintersectionofhumanitariancrises,newtechnology,crowd-sourc-ing,andcrisismappers.

26. PreventingViolenceandHateSpeech.Socialmediaplatformscanspreadin-formationabouthumanrightsanddignitytopreventandconfronthatespeechandthreatsofviolence.Kenyanscreatedthe“Ushahidi”socialmediatechnol-ogytocoordinateeffortstopreventelectionviolence,documentvotingirregu-larities,andcounterhatespeech.(Ushahidi2017)Ushahidialsofunctionsasacoordinationsystemforhumanitarianresponse.

27. EnhancingNegotiation,Diplomacy,andPeaceProcesses.Manypeacepro-cessesdesignedtoendarmedconflictendinfailure,primarilybecauseoflackofpublicsupport.Socialmediaoffersnewwaystocommunicateaboutthetradeoffsandoptionsdiscussedbyhigh-leveldiplomats.ResearchersfoundthatsocialmediawasanimportantmethodofcommunicationabouttheCo-lombianreferendumonthepeaceprocess,hypothesizingthatsocialmediacouldhavehelpedtoengagethepubliconvariousoptionsforendingthearmedconflictinColombiaandbuildingpublicsupportforthepeaceplan.(Nigam,etal.2017)


28. MarketingforSocialGood.Beforesocialmedia,onlywealthygroupscouldaf-fordtoputtogetheranadcampaignthatrequiredbuyingnewspaper,radio,orTVslots.Now,eventhesmallestnonprofitorganizationscanhaveaFacebookpage,aTwitteraccount,andablogwithoutspendingmuchmoney.MinoritygroupsandsmallNGOscanamplifytheirvoiceevenwhenprofessionalnewsorganizationsignorethem.Socialmediacreatesvastnewpossibilitiesforhowgroupsgoaboutworkingforthesocialgood,includingnewsocialmarketingmethodsofcrowdsourcingideas,fundraising,broadeningsupport,engagingthepublicandevaluatingtheimpactoftheirwork.(KanterandFine2010)(AakerandSmith2010)(MathosandNorman2012)

ChallengesandThreatstoSocialandPoliticalGoods

Alertsaboutsocialmedia’spotentialdangersbeganyearsago.Butthese“techno-pessi-mist”concernsareescalating.Dozensofnewbooksandresearcharticlesdocumentawiderangeofsocialmedia-relatedchallengestosocialandpoliticalgoods.29. UnderminingWellbeing.Socialmediaunderminespersonalwell-beinginat

leastthreeways.First,socialmediaexposespeopletomoney-makingscams,computerviruses,weapons-makinginstructions,recruitmentfromviolentex-tremistgroups,hatespeech,fakenews,andunwantedsexualcontent.Second,socialmediaisprimarilyaspacedevotedtoincreasingthesaleofconsumergoods.Corporationsaimtohijackattentionforcorporateprofitthroughcon-stantexposuretoconsumergoodswhichcanfosteraddictiveconsumption.Third,thisfloodingofinformation,bothpositiveandnegative,addsto“techno-stress”andfosterschronicdistraction,takingpeople’sattentionawayfromlife-givingrelationshipsandactivities.

30. SpreadingMisinformationandDisinformation.Misinformationisthespreadofinformationthatisunintentionallyinaccurate.Peoplesharemisinformationonsocialmediawhentheyincorrectlythinkitistrue.Disinformationistheintentionalspreadoffalseinformationor“fakenews.”Peoplesharedisinformationwhentheyhavetaintedsocialandpoliticalmotives.CarolineJack’sLexiconofLiesidentifiesanarrayofterminologyrele-vantto“problematicinformation.”(Jack2017)Socialmedia’sroleinspreadinginaccurateinformationisuniqueintermsofthescaleandscope.Inhisbook#Republic,CassSunsteindescribeshowsocialmediadisseminatesinaccurateinformationandemotions,particularlyfearandanger,through“cybercascades”thatspreadlikewildfirethroughsocialmediaplatforms.(Sunstein2017,98)

InApril2018,agroupofMITresearchersreleasedareport,basedonadatasetoffalse"rumorcascades"onTwitterfrom2006to2017.Researchersfoundthat

falsenewsreachedmorepeoplethanthetruth; thetop1%offalsenewscascadesdiffusedtobetween1000and100,000peo-ple,whereasthetruthrarelydiffusedtomorethan1000people.


Falsehoodalsodiffusedfasterthanthetruth.Thedegreeofnov-eltyandtheemotionalreactionsofrecipientsmayberesponsi-bleforthedifferencesobserved.(Vosoughi,RoyandAral2018)

Thedesignofsocialmediaplatformscontributestothisproblem.

• Fakenewsstoriesofteninvokefearoranger,resultingingreateratten-tionandsharing.Socialmediaalgorithmsthenhighlighttheseposts,fur-therpromotingmisinformationanddisinformation.

• Peoplewhousesocialmediaprimarilyforentertainmentmayencounterfakenewsinvoluntarily.Iftheydonotseekoutothersources,thisfakenewsmaybetheironlyencounterwithnews-relatedinformation.

• Socialmediaplatformsdonotdistinguishthesourceofinformationthroughuniquefonts,colors,orframesthatcouldalertuserstocrediblenewssources.Facebook’sNewsFeedpostsalllookthesame,regardlessofthecontent,thusmixingourpolitical,personalandcommercialactivi-ties.(Vaidhyanathan2018)

• Anyonecancreateanaccount,ormultipleaccounts,onasocialmediaplatformtoenabletheanonymoussharingofdisinformation.Inthefirstquarterof2018,Facebookreportedthatitdisabled583millionfakeac-counts.(Facebook.2018)

• OnsomesocialmediaplatformslikeWhatsApp,aninstantmessagingappownedbyFacebookwithoverabillionusersaroundtheworld,peo-plecanpostafakenewsstoryandcirculateitwithinagroupwithoutanypublicexposure.Thismeansthattherestofthepublicmayneverknowthatafakenewsstoryhasspread.This,inturn,makesitmoredif-ficultforfact-checkersorprofessionalnewsmediatocounterthefalseinformation.

Socialmediacompaniesoftensaythattheylackthecapacitytoreliablycheckforconspiracies, lies, and fake users. Facedwith criticisms that they censor toomanypostsononehandandallowtoomuchhatefulandviolentcontentontheother,socialmediacompaniesarestrugglingtocomeupwithcommunityguide-linesandprocessesforremovingmisinformationanddisinformation.WhatsAppassertsthatitcannotmonitormessagingonthisapp,althoughsomeassertthatitcouldremovesuchcontentifitwantedto.(GuptaandTaneja2018)

31. UnderminingAccurateInformation.Socialmediaunderminesauthenticnewsinavarietyofways.Inareportonthe“PlatformPress:HowSiliconValleyReengineeredJournalism,”theTaylorOwenandEmilyBellnote,“Journalismwithhighcivicvalue—journalismthatinvestigatespowerorreachesunder-servedandlocalcommunities—isdiscriminatedagainstbyasystemthatfa-vorsscaleandshareability.”(OwenandBell2017)Socialmediaplatformsthatcollatenewsstoriesdrawpeopleawayfromthenewssourceswherethesto-riesfirstappeared.Consequently,theaudienceisreadingtheadsplacedonso-cialmedia,nottheadsplacedinnewspapers.Thischangehashadadramaticeffectonthefinancialviabilityofprofessionaljournalistsandnewsproducerswhoaredoingtheactualworkofreporting.


Whileprofessionalnewsserviceshaveoversightandpublicaccountability,so-cialmediaproducersoffakenewsarefarlesslikelytobeheldtoaccount.Theincreaseinsocialmediaasasourceofnewsandinformationcorrelateswithadeclineinprofessionaljournalism,andit's"generalinterest"intermediarieswhohelptoprovidecommon,accurateinformationandexperiencesthatena-bleinformeddeliberation.(Sunstein2017)

Socialmedia promised thedemocratization of information, but some counterthatithasresultedinsteadintheweaponizationofinformation.Manycommen-tatorsbelievesocialmediaisenabling“informationpollution”makingitmoredifficult forsociety tohavea conversationbasedon sharedunderstandingofwhatisorisnottrue.

32. Creating“InformationFilterBubbles”and“EchoChambers.”Humancogni-tionalreadyhasabiastowardconfirmingwhatwealreadythinkandoverlook-inginformationthatdisprovesorcomplicatesourunderstandingoftheworld.Peopleendorseinformationonsocialmediabysharingitwiththeirfriends.Misinformationanddisinformationpassedonthroughfriendsaremorelikelytobereadandviewedascredible.Peoplewanttoreinforcetheirownviews.

EliParisercalledthese“filterbubbles”anticipatingyearsbeforemostthatpeo-plereceiving informationthroughsocialmedia filtersmayviewotherpeople,withdifferentsourcesof information,withsuspicionanddislike. Informationbubbles are a result of both self-selection and algorithms that ensure peoplewith similar experiences and opinions see the same types of information.(Pariser2011)Peopleinaninformationbubblemayexperienceatypeof“echochamber”wheremostoftheirsocialcontactspostinformationthatissimilartowhattheybelieve.Thisenvironmentcancreateanillusionthat"everyonebe-lievesasIdo"orthatapersonisvalidatedintheirbeliefsbecausetheyperceivethattheyarea"majority"eveniftheirechochamberisrelativelysmall,andmostofthepopulationbelievesdifferently.

Socialmediaenables “enclavedeliberation”or caucusgroupsbetween like-mindedpeople.These internalnegotiationscould, insomecircumstances, im-provehowgroups relateexternally.Butmisperceptions sharedby agroupofpeoplearemorelikelytopersist,eveninthefaceofinformationthatcounterstheperception.Individualsaremorelikelytochangetheirmindwhentheyarenotpartofa“groupthink”thatreinforceeachother’smisperceptions.Discussionamong like-minded people can contribute to people becoming overconfidentthattheirviewsareright,andothersarewrong.

33. WorseningPolarization.Thedesignofsocialmediaplatformsinherently

drivespolarizationandunderminesdemocraticdeliberationanddialogue.So-cialmediaplatformsusealgorithmstolinkpeoplewithsimilarinterests.Socialmediaoffersan“architectureofparticipationandcontrol”wherepeoplepartic-ipateinchoosingwhattheywanttoseeandhearfromothersontheplatform.


Theplatformsownalgorithmsoperatetomaximizehomophily.Hashtagshelppeoplefindconversationsorotherpeopleorgroups.(Sunstein2017)Echochamberscanbreedpolarization,hate,contemptforothers,andviolentex-tremism,asetofbeliefsthatjustifyviolencetowardotherstosupportideologicalgoals. Self-insulation decreases understanding of different points of view, orcommon values and experiences. (Sunstein 2017, 57) People tend to choosefriendsandgroupsthatsharetheirinterestsandopinions.Socialmediahelpspeople to create self-assembled “tribal” groupswith similar interests. This isknownas“homophily”,orthehumandesiretoconnectandbondwithpeoplewhoaresimilartoourselves.

People organize on-line toovercome real-lifehurdles, including social disap-provalfortheirgroup.On-linegroupsgrowinstrengthaslike-mindedpeoplecooperatetoovercomeexternalthreats.Tufekcidescribesthisas“ashiftfromapublic,collectivepoliticstoamoreprivate,scatteredone,withpoliticalactorscollectingmoreandmorepersonaldatatofigureouthowtopushjusttherightbuttons,personbypersonandoutofsight.”(Tufekci2018)

34. ExpandingHateSpeechandIncivility.Thereareseveralhypothesesrelatedtowhetherpeopleexpresslessrespectandmorehatredforotherson-linethaninperson.Peoplemaysimplyencounteragreatervarietyofpoliticalopinionson-linethantheydoinperson,andsoitmaybedifficulttocompareon-lineandin-personcommunicationstyles.Somesocialmediaplatformsallowanony-mousposts,orpostswithapseudonym.Thisoptionmightmakeitlesssociallycostlytoexpresshateandanger,andtheremaybefewermechanismsofac-countabilityandlessimpactonthereputationofthosewhodopostsuchmes-sages.(Trump,etal.2018)

35. Using“StrategicDistraction.”Inadditiontofloodingpeoplewithinaccurateinformation,socialmediaplatformsalsoareachannelforinformationaimedatdistraction.XuanchuanisaChinesewordtodescribethegovernment’sattempttodistractthepubliconsocialmediaawayfromcontroversialstoriesbyflood-ingitwithpositive,personal-intereststories.Chinaiswellknownforitsmediacensorship,anditscontributiontofakenewsinChinaandothercountries.Butthisnewtechniqueofstrategicdistractionisasignificantnewtactic.Bysomeestimates,theChinesegovernmentemploys2millionpeopletomakeup448millionpostsaimedat“strategicdistraction”eachyear.Thesearecalled“50cent”postsbecausethepeopleinChina’s“keyboardarmy”arereportedlypaidhalfadollarforeachpost.(King,PanandRoberts2017)AldousHuxley’sBraveNewWorlddescribedanagewhengovernmentscontrolthepublicnotthroughforce,butbecauseindividualsinsocietyaredrugged,emotionallydetached,overstimulatedbyfluffentertainment,anddistractedwithemptypleasures.Formanyobservers,socialmediaanditsdistractingfluffstoriesarethedrugenablingauthoritarianism.(Sampson2017)


36. ConductingInfluenceCampaignsandPsychologicalOperations.Stateshavelongusedpropagandaintheirdeliberateattemptstomanipulatethepub-lictowardadesiredpoliticalgoal.TheRussiantermdezinformatsiyareferstotheattemptto“destabilize”publictrustinthemediaandotherpublicinstitu-tionswiththegoaloffosteringapprovalforauthoritarianleadership.(Jack2017)Forexample,theUSmilitaryusesPsychologicalOperations(PSYOPS)orMilitaryInformationSupportOperations(MISO)to“createemotions,attitudes,understanding,beliefs,andbehaviorfavorabletotheachievementofUnitedStatespoliticalandmilitaryobjectives.”TheUSgoalisto“wintheheartsandminds”oflocalpopulationsinthewaronterror.Socialmediacreatesvastpos-sibilitiesfornon-stategroupswithoutthefinancialresourcesoftheUSmilitary,likewhitenationalistsandISIS,towagelarge-scalepsychologicaloperationsthatunderminesocialandpoliticalgoods.SwayingElectionsandSuppressingVoters.Politicalactorsusesocialmediatoinfluenceelectionsinavarietyofways.Politicalactorswhodonothaveexplicithelporcoachingstafffromthecorporationitselfalsousesocialmediaplatformstoswayvoting.Inthe2016USPresidentialelection,RussiacreatedfakeFace-bookaccounts(knownas“bots”)thatposteddivisiveandfakenewsstorieswiththeintenttoswayvoterstowardcandidateTrumpandawayfromcandidateClin-ton.InJuly2018,Facebookrevealedthatithaduncoveredanalarmingrateofattempts to interfere in the November 2018midterm elections. (Fandos andRoose2018)RussiaalsousedsocialmediatoswaytheUKBrexitvote,aswellasinvotinginEuropeanandothercountries.Somesocialmediacompanies,suchasFacebook,providestaffassistantstoanypoliticalcampaignthatbuysads.Facebookstaffhaveprovidedadvicetoau-thoritarianleadersinthePhilippines,India,Russia,andelsewherewhouseFa-cebooktothreatenjournalists,spreaddisinformationaboutminorities,andun-derminesocialandpoliticalgoods.(Etter,SilverandFrier2017)ButFacebookassertsthattheyhave“agnostic”politicalvalues.Facebookofferedstaffassis-tanceto“embed”withboththeTrumpandClintoncampaignsduringthe2016USelections.ClintondeclinedtheofferofaFacebookstaffsupport,whileTrump’scampaignreliedheavilyonthedailyadviceandguidanceFacebookstaffgavetotheircampaign.Inadditiontospreadingmasspropagandaanddisinformation,politicalactorsalso use micro-targeted ads to suppress or influence specific users. (Tenove2017)TheTrumpcampaignalsoranthreetypesofmicro-targetedadsonFace-book to suppress votes for Clinton. Ads targeted Bernie Sanders supporters,youngwomen,andAfricanAmericansinkeyswingstateswiththegoalofintro-ducingdoubtandconvincingevenasmallminorityofthemnottovoteforClin-ton.(Beckett2017)TheBerlin-basedthinktankTacticalTechreportsonthepsychologicalbasisofdevelopingpsychometricprofilingviasocialmediaplatforms,andhowpoliticalstrategistsusesuchprofilingtoswayelections.(Bashyakarla2018)(Hankey2018)TheCambridgeAnalyticacorporationobtainedpsychometric


informationon50millionFacebookusersbeforethe2016USelection.JustasISISusessocialmediawiththeintentofrecruitingnewmembers,sodopoliti-calcandidates,includingthosewiththeintentofunderminingdemocracy."Per-suadingsomebodytovoteinacertainwayisreallyverysimilartopersuadinga14-to25-year-oldboyinIndonesiatonotjoinAlQaeda."(Bashyakarla2018)Politicalactorsprojectmasspropagandaandmicro-targetedpropagandaaimedatspecificpsychologicalprofilestoswayelections.

37. HarassingandThreateningJournalists,Minorities,andGovernmentCrit-ics.Governmentsusesocialmediatoharassandrepressjournalists.FilipinoPresidentDuterte’sauthoritarianapproachtogoverningincludestheuseof“patriotictrolling”by“trollarmies”offakeaccountsthatharassjournalistsandcriticsoftheregime.(Etter,SilverandFrier2017)InIndia,PrimeMinisterModi’strollarmiesthreatenpoliticalopponentsandjournalistscritiquinganti-Muslimpolicies.RussiaandChinacensorandremovepostsaimedatmobilizingsocialmovementsorexpressinggrievancesagainstthegovernment.Instagram(ownedbyFacebook)agreedtoaRussiangovernmentrequesttoblockthewebsiteofoppositionleaderandanti-corruptionactivistAlexeiNavalny.(Troianovski2018)Socialmediaplatformsdonotpublishtherulesforwhatcontenttheydeemin-appropriateandwhattheywillremove.Minoritygroupsassertthatthereappeartobedifferentstandardsinuseforminoritygroups.Forexample,FacebookdidnotremoveaFacebookpostfromaLouisianaCongressionalRepresentativewhocalledforidentifyingandkillingall"radicalized"MuslimsintheUS,butremovedaFacebookpostanddisabledtheaccountofanAfricanAmericanactivistwhoposted a comment noting that all white people are racist. (Angwin andGrassegger2017)

38. ToleratingGenderedOnlineHarassment.Femalejournalistsandbloggersfaceanalarmingamountofonlineabuseonallsocialmediaplatforms,includ-ingthreatsofmurder,rape,andviolentattacksviaemailandcommentsec-tions.(Mijatovic2016)AmnestyInternationalfoundthat1in5womenhasex-periencedonlineabuseandthreats,andthatmanyreportstress,anxiety,orpanicattacksasaresultofharmfulonlineexperiences.In2017,thehashtag,#WomenBoycottTwitteraimedtoexposehowTwitterfailedtoapplyitscom-munitystandardsandremovecontentincludingthreatsofrapeanddeathtowomenusingTwitter.(AmnestyInternational2017)

TheSriLankanCenterforPolicyAlternativesfoundintheirresearchthatFace-bookpagesincludeacultureofmisogynyandimpunityenjoyedbytheoften-anonymousperpetratorsofonlineviolence.Thisincludedfrequentincidentsofsexualharassment,non-consensualdisseminationofintimateimagesandotherformsoftechnology-relatedviolenceagainstwomenandgirlsthatevenwhenreportedtoFacebook,arenotremoved.(CenterforPolicyAlternatives2018)TheUniversityofMarylandfoundthatthosewithfemaleusernamesinonlinechatroomsexperienced threats25 timesmoreoften than thosewithmaleor


ambiguoususernames.(DepartmentofMechanicalEngineering2006)ThePewResearchCenterfoundthatwhilemenmoreoftenreportedlesssevereformsofharassment such as online name-calling and embarrassment, women overallweremoreconcernedaboutonlineabuse,andyoungwomenreportedmorese-vereforms,includingphysicalthreats,postingofphotoshoppedpictures,sexualharassment,andstalking.(Dugan2017)

39. AllowingTargetedAdsthatIntentionallyExcludeSpecificGroups.Until2017,whitesupremacistgroupscouldsellNazimerchandiseorinvitepeopletoawhitesupremacyrallyusingFacebook’sCustomAudienceswhilemakingsurethatJewswouldnotseetheadvertisement.(Angwin,VarnerandTobin2017)Itremainedpossiblein2018foradvertiserstointentionallyexcludespecificgroups,suchasethnicorracialminorities,orpeopleover50,intheiradvertise-mentsforhousingorjobsonFacebook,despiterepeatedpromisesandseverallawsuitspressingthecompanytofixthisproblem.(Tobin2018)Facebookpromisedtoensurethatadvertiserscouldnotdiscriminateagainstlegallypro-tectedminoritiesintheUSimmediatelyandstatedthatthispromisewouldeventuallybeextendedtoothercountries.(Perez2018)

40. TreatingSmallCountriesasSocialMediaLaboratories.Facebook's"FreeBasics"programprovidesFacebookaccessfreeofchargetothosewhocannotaffordtobuyinternetservice.ButFreeBasicsoffersadiffer-entversionofFacebookthanavailableintheUS.InCambodia,Bolivia,SriLanka,andothercountries,theFacebookNewsFeedonFreeBasicsexcludesstoriesfromreputablenewssourceswhileallowingandamplifyingfakenewsstoriesthatpeoplesharewitheachother.Thisgivesthepublicopenaccesstodisinformationbutrestrictedaccesstoaccuratenewssources.(Frenkel,CaseyandMozur2018)InarelatedFacebookexperimentinresponsetopublicconcernaboutfakenewsonitsplatform,FacebookredesigneditssitebysplittingitsNewsFeeds.Onetaballowednotes from friendsand families.A separate tab allowednewsstoriesfromprofessionalnewsgroups.Thechangegreatlyreducedexposuretoprofes-sionalnews.ASlovenianjournalistwroteaboutthisFacebookexperiment,“Bypickingsmallcountrieswithshakydemocraticinstitutionstobeexperimentalsubjects,itisshowingacynicallackofconcernforhowitsdecisionsaffectthemostvulnerable.(Dojcinovic2017)Facebookdecidedtoendtheexperimentaf-ternegativepublicfeedback.(Ingram2018)

41. RecruitingandOrganizingforViolentExtremistGroups.Beforesocialme-dia,aterrorgrouplikeISIShadlittleopportunitytocommunicateorrecruitmembersoutsideoftheirowncommunity.ISISinvestsheavilyinrecruitingnewmembersandsupportersonsocialmedia.Onaverage,everydayISISusessocialmediatosharethreevideos,fifteenphotographicreports,90,andbe-tween46,000and70,000pro-ISIStwitterposts.(Radsch2016,5)Whitesu-premacistsintheUS,Germanyandothercountriesalsorelyheavilyonsocialmediatorecruitandorganize.Germanwhitenationalistgroupscoordinateflashmobattacksonimmigrantsviapostsonsocialmedia.(Bennhold2018)


ExtremistgroupsusewellknownsocialmediasiteslikeFacebookandTwitter,buttheyalsouselesswell-knownsitesthatallowanonymity,likeReddit,YouTube,4chan,and8chan.

Socialmediaprogramsmayprofit fromhigh traffic to controversialposts. InApril2018,FacebooktestifiedtotheUSCongressthatitwasremovingextremistcontent.ButinJuly2018,theCounterExtremismProjectfoundthatFacebookwasnot takingdownmaterialdenying theHolocaustorpromoting terrorismandviolenceagainstwomen.Analystsnotedthatextremistcontentissometimesremoved but that profit-generating extremist content is often left in place.(CounterExtremismProject2018)

42. CallingforandDirectingViolence.InIndia,arumoraboutchildkidnappersspreadonWhatsAppledtomobviolencekillingatleast29people.Whenthegovernmenthiredsomeonetocountertherumorstostopthekilling,thecrowdslynchedhimtoo.(Vij2018)InMyanmar,pro-government,anti-MuslimFacebookaccountscalledforethniccleansingoftheMuslim-minorityRohingyapopulation,includingboycottsofMuslim-ownedbusinesses,abanoninterfaithmarriages,andlimitsonrightsofMuslims.DespitereportstoFacebookcom-plainingofthesepostsandaskingfortheirremovalbeforetheexplosionofvio-lenceagainsttheRohingya,Facebookinitiallydidlittletostemthetideofhate.(McKirdy2018)

SocialMedia:SocialandPoliticalGoodsvsEvilsDante'sInfernodefinesevilaspride,envy,anger,laziness,greed,over-consumption,andlust.Theseevilsunderminesocialandpoliticalgoods.Dante'slistofevilsreadslikealitanyofproblemsexacerbatedbysocialmedia.Peopleusesocialmediaplatformstoboosttheirego(pride),comparethemselvestoothers(envy),expressoutrage(anger),procrastinateworkorrealrelationships(laziness),bebombardedwithadvertisements(greedandoverconsumption),andsharepornography(lust.)(Vaidhyanathan2018)Whilesocialmediaholdsthepotentialtosupportandexpandsocialandpoliticalgoods,italsohasthepotentialtohijackdemocracy,polarizesociety,andconcentratewealthandaccesstopoweramonganelitegroupattheexpenseofothers.ThePolicyRecommendationsfoundintheExecutiveSummaryforthisreportlayoutanagendaforcivilsociety,government,andbusinesstoworktogethertoaddressthesechal-lenges.

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TheAuthor

LisaSchirch,PhDisNorthAmericanResearchDirectorfortheTodaPeaceInstituteandSeniorPolicyAdvisorwiththeAllianceforPeacebuilding.Schirchistheeditorof“TheEcologyofViolentExtremism”(2018)co-authorof“SynergizingNonviolentActionandPeacebuilding”withUSInstituteofPeace(2018).In2015,Schirchfinisheda3yearpro-jectcoordinatingaglobalnetworktowriteaHandbookonHumanSecurity:ACivil-Mil-itary-PoliceCurriculumandsetof40peacebuildingcasestudiesonLocalOwnershipinSecurity. Schirchworkswith a global network of civil society, government, andU.N.partnersdevotedtoexpandingsocialandpoliticalgoods.TodaPeaceInstitute

TheTodaPeaceInstituteisanindependent,nonpartisaninstitutecommittedtoad-vancingamore just andpeacefulworldthroughpolicy-orientedpeace researchandpractice. The Toda Peace Institute commissions evidence-based research, convenesmulti-trackandmulti-disciplinaryproblem-solvingworkshopsandseminars,andpro-motesdialogueacrossethnic,cultural,religiousandpoliticaldivides.Itcatalyzesprac-tical,policy-orientedconversationsbetweentheoreticalexperts,practitioners,policy-makersandcivilsocietyleadersinordertodiscerninnovativeandcreativesolutionstothe major problems confronting the world in the twenty-first century (seewww.toda.org formore information).TheTodaPeaceInstituteprovidedfunding forthispolicybriefseriesandworksincollaborationwiththeAllianceforPeacebuilding.ContactUsSamonElevenBldg.5thFloor3-1Samon-cho,Shinjuku-ku,Tokyo160-0017,JapanWebAddress:www.toda.orgEmail:[email protected]

TheAllianceforPeacebuilding(AfP)isamembershipnetworkofover100organiza-tions.Ourmembers include someof theworld’s largestdevelopmentorganizations,mostinnovativeacademic institutions,andthemostpowerfulpeacebuildinggroups.Webringtogethercoalitionsinkeyareasofstrategyandpolicytoelevatetheentirepeacebuildingfield,tacklingissuestoolargeforanyoneorganizationtoaddressalone.

ContactUsWebAddress:https://allianceforpeacebuilding.orgEmail:[email protected]

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