social engineering trickx - owasp doha 2015

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Social Engineering Trickx Michael Hendrickx Doha, Qatar. 23 Nov 2015

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Page 1: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Social Engineering Trickx

Michael HendrickxDoha, Qatar. 23 Nov 2015

Page 2: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

$ whoami• Michael Hendrickx– Security Analyst in HelpAG– Working in infosec for past decade– [email protected]– Belgian

Page 3: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Social Engineering• You have a firewall, good for you.– Let’s target the users, not systems

• Human beings are helpful by nature• Defined as:

“Any act that influences a person to take an action that may or may not be in their best interest”

Find people Find Info Get access

Page 4: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Finding people• 2 Ways of finding people:– Phishing (casting a net)• Quantity over quality• Very noisy

– Spear phishing (targeted)• Quality over quantity• Takes more time, more effort

Page 5: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Finding people: phishing• People haven’t changed much

Page 6: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Finding people: phishing• People haven’t changed much

Page 7: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Finding people: phishing• People haven’t changed much

Page 8: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Finding people: phishing• People haven’t changed much

Page 9: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Finding people: phishing• People haven’t changed much

Page 10: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Finding people: phishing• People haven’t changed much

Page 11: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Finding people: phishing• People haven’t changed much

Recent “Rombertik” malware:- State of the art malware (evil though) - 97% of code never called - sandbox confusion - browser snooping - MBR destruction upon debug-detection- Lame Ineffective distribution

Page 12: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Finding people: phishing• Phishing not always best option– Very noisy – ISP / Hosting company may block you– Too many recipients• Somebody is bound to report it

Spear phishing is a better option

Page 13: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Finding people: spear phishing• Email from somebody

who “knows you”– You probably know them too

• Somebody who took time to research you

• Interested in you– Rather, what you know– Who you know– What you have access to.

Page 14: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Finding people• Target a domain, find its users:– Maltego, theHarvester, metasploit, recon-ng

Emails are probably: [email protected]

Page 15: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Finding people• Emails are [email protected]

Let’s look for more names:

[email protected][email protected][email protected][email protected][email protected][email protected]?…

https://ae.linkedin.com/in/nsolling

Page 16: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Finding people• Emails are [email protected]

Let’s look for more names:

[email protected][email protected][email protected][email protected][email protected][email protected]?…

Let’s dig just a bit further….

https://ae.linkedin.com/in/nsolling

Page 17: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Study the target: Nicolai Solling

Page 18: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Study the target: Nicolai Solling

We know Nicolai’s writing style

Page 19: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

More target studying• Examine digital footprint

Page 20: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

More target studying• Examine digital footprint

Nicolai’s Digital footprint:• Full name• Address• Interests:• Porsche 911• PADI Diver• Line6 Guitar pod• Merc GL550• Trivial Pursuit

Page 21: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

More target studying• Examine digital footprint

Nicolai’s Digital footprint:• Full name• Address• Porsche 911• PADI Diver• Line6 Guitar pod• Merc GL55• Trivial Pursuit

Page 22: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

So far, what do we know?• Nicolai’s contact details– Email address

• Who he knows / might know– His social network– School, hobby groups, …

• What he likes– His interests

• How he writes

Page 23: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

And what can we do?• Target Nicolai:– “Hi, we met at Porsche club, ManAge spa…”– “Your 2013 Mercedes GL550 service is due, …”

• Or, pretend to be Nicolai– Target his contacts / colleagues

([email protected])

– We know his writing style– Exploit their trust

Page 24: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

How can we do it?• Need to trick target to

“believe us”• Let technology help us• Abuse 33 year old protocol– Domain squatting– Fake email threads– Fake CC

Page 25: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Domain Squatting• Using “similar” domain for bad purposes– Homoglyphs, repetition, transposition…– Use DNSTwist

Original* helpag.com...Homoglyph heipag.comHomoglyph he1pag.comHomoglyph helpaq.com ...Transposition heplag.com...

Page 26: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Increase credibility• Make your email as legit as possible• Email footer?– Annoy somebody till they email you back

We got a

footer!

Page 27: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Fake Email Threads• SMTP just sends text

to a program. – “Email threads” have no

connection.– Unless we have the entire

thread, digitally signed, we can’t trust it at all

– Modern equivalent of saying:

“Can I go dad? Mom said I could go”

Page 28: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Fake CC• CC doesn’t really exist• It’s just a MIME

header

HELO blahMAIL FROM: [email protected] TO: [email protected]

From: Michael Hendrickx <[email protected]>Content-Type: text/plain;Subject: Very important emailCc: khaled hawasli <[email protected]>, [email protected]: [email protected]

Hey guys,

As per our conversation, please install the security update located at http://evil.com/patch.exe

Well, in fact, this is an email that Khaled and Obama will never get - but you can never find that out!

Thank you,Security Admin

This is for the SMTP server

This is for the email client

Page 29: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Fake CC• CC doesn’t really exist• It’s just a MIME

header

HELO blahMAIL FROM: [email protected] TO: [email protected]

From: Michael Hendrickx <[email protected]>Content-Type: text/plain;Subject: Very important emailCc: khaled hawasli <[email protected]>, [email protected]: [email protected]

Hey guys,

As per our conversation, please install the security update located at http://evil.com/patch.exe

Well, in fact, this is an email that Khaled and Obama will never get - but you can never find that out!

Thank you,Security Admin

This is for the SMTP server

This is for the email client

Page 30: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Fake CC• To, CC and BCC does

the same thing (SMTP wise)

• SMTP sends the message to every recipient

Page 31: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Putting it all together

Fake email thread

Fake CC

Domain spoofing

Same writing style

Page 32: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Get access• Invite user to visit URL– New intranet portal, survey, …– Capture domain credentials • Through basic auth popup

(many think it’s the proxy)• Through a webpage

– Make site seem as real as possible (logo, …)– Show the domain name filled in

Page 33: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Get access: phishing site

Page 34: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Or, deliver malware• Choose distribution method:– Exe, pif, cmd, scr: probably blocked– PDF, Office macro, .. : probably allowed

Page 35: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Lessons learned• Awareness is key• Minimize digital footprint– The more people know about

you, the more they can trick you.• Use digital signatures• Don’t trust anything sent to you.

Page 36: Social Engineering Trickx - Owasp Doha 2015

Questions?

Thank you!

@[email protected]