social cognitive psychology - link.springer.com978-1-4615-5843-9/1.pdf · barone, david f. social...
TRANSCRIPT
SOCIAL COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
HISTORY AND CURRENT DOMAINS
SOCIAL COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
HISTORY AND CURRENT DOMAINS
THE PLENUM SERIES IN SOCIAL/CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY Series Editor: C. R. Snyder
University of Kansas Lawrence, Kansas
Current Volumes in the Series:
AGGRESSION Biological, Developmental, and Social Perspectives
Edited by Seymour Feshbach and Jolanta Zagrodzka
COERCION AND AGGRESSIVE COMMUNITY TREATMENT A New Frontier in Mental Health Law
Edited by Deborah L. Dennis and John Monahan
EFFICACY, AGENCY, AND SELF-ESTEEM Edited by Michael H. Kernis
HUMAN LEARNED HELPLESSNESS A Coping Perspective
Mario Mikulincer
PATHOLOGICAL SELF-CRITICISM Assessment and Treatment
Raymond M. Bergner
PROCRASTINATION AND TASK AVOIDANCE Theory, Research, and Treatment
Joseph R. Ferrari, Judith L. Johnson, and William G. McCown
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VANDALISM Arnold P. Goldstein
SELF-EFFICACY, ADAPTATION, AND ADJUSTMENT Theory, Research, and Application
Edited by James E. Maddux
SOCIAL COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY History and Current Domains
David F. Barone, James E. Maddux, and C. R. Snyder
A Continuation Order Plan is available for this series. A continuation order will bring delivery of each new volume immediately upon publication. Volumes are billed only upon actual shipment. For further information please contact the publisher.
THE PLENUM SERIES IN SOCIAL/CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY Series Editor: C. R. Snyder
University of Kansas Lawrence, Kansas
Current Volumes in the Series:
AGGRESSION Biological, Developmental, and Social Perspectives
Edited by Seymour Feshbach and Jolanta Zagrodzka
COERCION AND AGGRESSIVE COMMUNITY TREATMENT A New Frontier in Mental Health Law
Edited by Deborah L. Dennis and John Monahan
EFFICACY, AGENCY, AND SELF-ESTEEM Edited by Michael H. Kernis
HUMAN LEARNED HELPLESSNESS A Coping Perspective
Mario Mikulincer
PATHOLOGICAL SELF-CRITICISM Assessment and Treatment
Raymond M. Bergner
PROCRASTINATION AND TASK AVOIDANCE Theory, Research, and Treatment
Joseph R. Ferrari, Judith L. Johnson, and William G. McCown
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VANDALISM Arnold P. Goldstein
SELF-EFFICACY, ADAPTATION, AND ADJUSTMENT Theory, Research, and Application
Edited by James E. Maddux
SOCIAL COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY History and Current Domains
David F. Barone, James E. Maddux, and C. R. Snyder
A Continuation Order Plan is available for this series. A continuation order will bring delivery of each new volume immediately upon publication. Volumes are billed only upon actual shipment. For further information please contact the publisher.
SOCIAL COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
HISTORY AND CURRENT DOMAINS
DAVID F. BARONE Nova Southeastern University
Fort Lauderdale, Florida
JAMES E. MADDUX George Mason University
Fairfax, Virginia
AND
C. R. SNYDER University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas
SPRINGER SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, LLC
Library of Congress Cataloglng-In-Publlcatlon Data
Barone, David F. Social cognitive psychology : history and current domains / David
F. Barone, James E. Maddux, and C.R. Snyder. p. cn. -- (The Plenum series in social/clinical psychologyl
Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-306-45475-2 ISBN 978-1-4615-5843-9 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-4615-5843-9 1. Cognitive psychology. 2. Social psychology. I. Maddux, James
E. II. Snyder, C. R. III. Title. IV. Ser ies. BF201.B35 1997 302--dc21 97-1614
CIP
Quotations from the following copyrighted works are included in this book:
Bartlett, F. C. Remembering. ©1932, 1935 byCambridge University Press. Published with permission of Cambridge University Press.
Bruner, J. Acts of Meaning. ©1990 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press.
Bruner J. Actual Mind, Possible Worlds. ©1986 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press.
Dennett, D. C. Brainstorms. ©1978 by Branford Books. Published with permission of MITPress.
Dewey, J. The Early/Middle/Later Works of Tohn Dewey, J. A. Boydston (Ed.). ©1972-1986 by The Board of Trustees, Southern lllinois University. Published by permission of the publisher, Southem lllinois University Press.
James, W. Principles of Psychology. ©1983 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press.
Mead, G. H. Mind, Self, and Society. C. W. Morris (Ed.). ©1934 by The University of Chicago. Renewal ©1962 by Charles W. Morris. Published with permission of The University of Chicago Press.
ISBN 978-0-306-45475-2
© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media New York Originally published by Plenum Press, New York in 1997
http://www.plenum.com
AH rights reserved
1098 76 5 4 3 2 1
No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming,
recording, or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher
To My Family Deborah, Justine, Tim, and Jon
For granting me a partial sabbatical to write this book
-DFB
To My Family Deborah, Justine, Tim, and Jon
For granting me a partial sabbatical to write this book
-DFB
PREFACE
A pragmatic social cognitive psychology covers a lot of territory, mostly in personality and social psychology but also in clinical, counseling, and school psychologies. It spans a topic construed as an experimental study of mechanisms by its natural science wing and as a study of cultural interactions by its social science wing. To learn about it, one should visit laboratories, field study settings, and clinics, and one should read widely. If one adds the fourth dimension, time, one should visit the archives too. To survey such a diverse field, it is common to offer an edited book with a resulting loss in integration.
This book is coauthored by a social personality psychologist with historical interests (DFB: Parts I, II, and IV) in collaboration with two social clinical psychologists (CRS and JEM: Parts III and V). We frequently cross-reference between chapters to aid integration without duplication. To achieve the kind of diversity our subject matter represents, we build each chapter anew to reflect the emphasis of its content area. Some chapters are more historical, some more theoretical, some more empirical, and some more applied. All the chapters reflect the following positions.
We interpret psychology as an ongoing process of inquiry by theorists, researchers, and practitioners. Like all human enterprises, it includes centrist establishmentarians and fringe dissenters, some of whom market their weak ideas effectively and others of whom market their ingenious ideas poorly, some of whom do splashy studies and others of whom do quiet, transforming programs of research. We present psychology in terms of these social processes rather than as a set of objective, finished facts. This is particularly important in a field still defining its subject matter and beset by fashionable topics that come and go every few years. In this interpretation, it is essential to understand historical development and context.
We select and comment on topics that we judge to be important. We do not pretend to an objective, impersonal, comprehensive exposition of an agreed-upon body of established fact. There is consensus on most of our selections, which are drawn from the major publication outlets in the field and have been authored by respected, award-winning psychologists. However, there is disagreement on their interpretation. We present the important texts in the field-theories, sample studies, and lines of research-in some detail and provide commentary consistent with our thematic development. We like to let authors speak for themselves, especially historical figures whose formulations cannot be adequately appreciated when translated into contemporary terms. We provide the necessary background to make them comprehensible and then provide a sample of quotes of enduring value.
Philosophy of science is important to us. Logical empiricism has been taught explicitly or implicitly to generations of psychologists. It is preeminent no longer, having been successfully challenged by alternative positions, as discussed in Chapter l. We shall focus on the oldest of these positions, pragmatism, on which there is an emerging consensus in social cognitive psychology. This is not surprising, because the orginators of pragmatic philosophy were the first to formulate a social cognitive position linked to practice. Pragmatism, practice,
VII
PREFACE
A pragmatic social cognitive psychology covers a lot of territory, mostly in personality and social psychology but also in clinical, counseling, and school psychologies. It spans a topic construed as an experimental study of mechanisms by its natural science wing and as a study of cultural interactions by its social science wing. To learn about it, one should visit laboratories, field study settings, and clinics, and one should read widely. If one adds the fourth dimension, time, one should visit the archives too. To survey such a diverse field, it is common to offer an edited book with a resulting loss in integration.
This book is coauthored by a social personality psychologist with historical interests (DFB: Parts I, II, and IV) in collaboration with two social clinical psychologists (CRS and JEM: Parts III and V). We frequently cross-reference between chapters to aid integration without duplication. To achieve the kind of diversity our subject matter represents, we build each chapter anew to reflect the emphasis of its content area. Some chapters are more historical, some more theoretical, some more empirical, and some more applied. All the chapters reflect the following positions.
We interpret psychology as an ongoing process of inquiry by theorists, researchers, and practitioners. Like all human enterprises, it includes centrist establishmentarians and fringe dissenters, some of whom market their weak ideas effectively and others of whom market their ingenious ideas poorly, some of whom do splashy studies and others of whom do quiet, transforming programs of research. We present psychology in terms of these social processes rather than as a set of objective, finished facts. This is particularly important in a field still defining its subject matter and beset by fashionable topics that come and go every few years. In this interpretation, it is essential to understand historical development and context.
We select and comment on topics that we judge to be important. We do not pretend to an objective, impersonal, comprehensive exposition of an agreed-upon body of established fact. There is consensus on most of our selections, which are drawn from the major publication outlets in the field and have been authored by respected, award-winning psychologists. However, there is disagreement on their interpretation. We present the important texts in the field-theories, sample studies, and lines of research-in some detail and provide commentary consistent with our thematic development. We like to let authors speak for themselves, especially historical figures whose formulations cannot be adequately appreciated when translated into contemporary terms. We provide the necessary background to make them comprehensible and then provide a sample of quotes of enduring value.
Philosophy of science is important to us. Logical empiricism has been taught explicitly or implicitly to generations of psychologists. It is preeminent no longer, having been successfully challenged by alternative positions, as discussed in Chapter l. We shall focus on the oldest of these positions, pragmatism, on which there is an emerging consensus in social cognitive psychology. This is not surprising, because the orginators of pragmatic philosophy were the first to formulate a social cognitive position linked to practice. Pragmatism, practice,
VII
Vlll PREFACE
and practitioner originate in Greek and Latin words denoting proficiency acquired through action in contrast to a preoccupation with thought alone. We cover a number of issues in the philosphy of science of enduring relevance to social cognitive psychology: science and practice, laboratory and real life, mechanism and intentionality, nature and culture, the individual and the social environment, and cognition and behavior.
We try to find a middle way between uncritical positivism and relativistic postmodernism. Our subject matter is as much what psychologists have thought and done as what their subjects have thought and done. While we accord special status to scientific method, it remains a matter of contention what good science is in our young field. Thus, we focus not only on the empirical but also on the historical (psychology as intellectual history), the hermeneutic (interpretation of texts), and the epistemological (assumptions about knowing). Our social cognitive psychology is pragmatic, contextual, and interactional.
We favor a style that is scholarly yet flexible and personable. This is not an introductorylevel book; it is a text for the advanced serious student of psychology. Its chapters are not bitesized, meant to go down easily in a single sitting; rather, they need to be mulled over and revisited to yield their intellectual nourishment. This book does not just give the facts and nothing but the facts. Rather than the conclusion of a line of research, it presents the series of studies, and not just their conclusions, but their methods and results. Consistent with a pragmatic view of knowledge, we believe that it is critical to know the context conditioning knowledge rather than to present it as abstract truth. Like many of our colleagues in recent years, we are more colloquial than in traditional professional writing. We the authors and you the readers are not outside observers of this story; as psychologists, we identify with the theorists and researchers, and as human beings we identify with the objects of study. We use the first-person plural in these contexts. We rely on our reader's skill at discourse comprehension to disambiguate which participants are included.
Weare telling the story of the construction of a kind of psychology. We want the readers, like its characters, to experience the confusion of opposing formulations, the tension of clashing lines of research, the suspense of not knowing where important findings are leading, and the exhilaration of understanding achieved. Thus, our style is more narrative than in the typical text. However, when our complex, nonfiction story does not succeed in holding a reader's interest, we ask for his or her effort at understanding to keep us connected. To comprehend rather than memorize a text requires the reader to make inferences actively (Kintsch, 1994). Our style is supported by current theories that we think in two ways: paradigmatic and narrative (Bruner, 1986; Zukier, 1986). We want to activate rigorous analysis and to arouse the imagination. Our careful exposition of theory and research is combined with pithy conclusions that are extrapolations about human nature. Heartfelt knowledge promotes spreading activation and rich associations; remembering an interesting story line and conclusion provides a starting point for reconstructing additional detail and qualification.
We expect this book to be read by graduate students, capable advanced undergraduate students, and professionals in psychology. We hope it will be read by those in other disciplines; we agree with Jerome Bruner (1990) that psychology needs to be more concerned about participating in the larger intellectual discussion. We treat social cognitive psychology not as an exclusive club but as a nexus in the scholarly community. We draw freely on work in the social sciences, humanities, and natural sciences. However, our focal audience is psychologists, and we use our longtime teaching exerience to build on their implicit knowledge and
Vlll PREFACE
and practitioner originate in Greek and Latin words denoting proficiency acquired through action in contrast to a preoccupation with thought alone. We cover a number of issues in the philosphy of science of enduring relevance to social cognitive psychology: science and practice, laboratory and real life, mechanism and intentionality, nature and culture, the individual and the social environment, and cognition and behavior.
We try to find a middle way between uncritical positivism and relativistic postmodernism. Our subject matter is as much what psychologists have thought and done as what their subjects have thought and done. While we accord special status to scientific method, it remains a matter of contention what good science is in our young field. Thus, we focus not only on the empirical but also on the historical (psychology as intellectual history), the hermeneutic (interpretation of texts), and the epistemological (assumptions about knowing). Our social cognitive psychology is pragmatic, contextual, and interactional.
We favor a style that is scholarly yet flexible and personable. This is not an introductorylevel book; it is a text for the advanced serious student of psychology. Its chapters are not bitesized, meant to go down easily in a single sitting; rather, they need to be mulled over and revisited to yield their intellectual nourishment. This book does not just give the facts and nothing but the facts. Rather than the conclusion of a line of research, it presents the series of studies, and not just their conclusions, but their methods and results. Consistent with a pragmatic view of knowledge, we believe that it is critical to know the context conditioning knowledge rather than to present it as abstract truth. Like many of our colleagues in recent years, we are more colloquial than in traditional professional writing. We the authors and you the readers are not outside observers of this story; as psychologists, we identify with the theorists and researchers, and as human beings we identify with the objects of study. We use the first-person plural in these contexts. We rely on our reader's skill at discourse comprehension to disambiguate which participants are included.
Weare telling the story of the construction of a kind of psychology. We want the readers, like its characters, to experience the confusion of opposing formulations, the tension of clashing lines of research, the suspense of not knowing where important findings are leading, and the exhilaration of understanding achieved. Thus, our style is more narrative than in the typical text. However, when our complex, nonfiction story does not succeed in holding a reader's interest, we ask for his or her effort at understanding to keep us connected. To comprehend rather than memorize a text requires the reader to make inferences actively (Kintsch, 1994). Our style is supported by current theories that we think in two ways: paradigmatic and narrative (Bruner, 1986; Zukier, 1986). We want to activate rigorous analysis and to arouse the imagination. Our careful exposition of theory and research is combined with pithy conclusions that are extrapolations about human nature. Heartfelt knowledge promotes spreading activation and rich associations; remembering an interesting story line and conclusion provides a starting point for reconstructing additional detail and qualification.
We expect this book to be read by graduate students, capable advanced undergraduate students, and professionals in psychology. We hope it will be read by those in other disciplines; we agree with Jerome Bruner (1990) that psychology needs to be more concerned about participating in the larger intellectual discussion. We treat social cognitive psychology not as an exclusive club but as a nexus in the scholarly community. We draw freely on work in the social sciences, humanities, and natural sciences. However, our focal audience is psychologists, and we use our longtime teaching exerience to build on their implicit knowledge and
PREFACE IX
formal education. We try to elaborate what we know is discrepant for them and thus likely to be missed. Other readers may find us at times belaboring the obvious and glossing the obscure. The current book would be an appropriate text in courses in social and personality psychology (with special appeal to students in applied and professional training programs) or in courses on social clinical or social counseling psychology. As knowing and study aids, we have provided a comphrehensive summary and a glossary of the most important terms at the end of each chapter.
We want to acknowledge the input of our students. They heard our lectures and read our drafts. Their feedback has influenced our selection of material and our style of presentation. In particular, graduate students in Nova Southeastern University's School of Psychology taking Social Cognitive Bases of Behavior during 1995 and 1996 read the entire manuscript then available and provided feedback. Thanks to their efforts, this book is more readable than it might have been.
Our colleagues who have read parts of our manuscript have also provided helpful feedback. These include C. Daniel Batson, Roy Baumeister, Rue Cromwell, Scott Fehr, John Lewis, Jack Martin, Mark Middlebrooks, Melissa Pigott, Annette Stanton, Julie Verette, and Beatrice A. Wright. We benefited from their suggestions, but we bear full responsibility for the final text.
DFB, JEM, and CRS acknowledge Nova Southeastern University, George Mason University, and the University of Kansas, respectively, for granting sabbaticals to facilitate the writing of this book. DFB acknowledges the efforts of Nova Southeastern's Einstein Library. The historical research included in this book would not be possible at a 30-year-old university without able library support. DFB also acknowledges Jon Barone for his contribution of the figures in Parts I and II; Michael Di Gregorio, Daphine Franklin, and his other student assistants for their library work and manuscript preparation; and Claire Komar for her most competent and friendly assistance in every aspect of his office work.
Finally, we want to acknowledge Eliot Werner, our congenial editor at Plenum Press, for believing in this project and providing us with the support to go forward with it, and Michele Fetterolf, our supervising editor, for shepherding an improved manuscript to publication.
PREFACE IX
formal education. We try to elaborate what we know is discrepant for them and thus likely to be missed. Other readers may find us at times belaboring the obvious and glossing the obscure. The current book would be an appropriate text in courses in social and personality psychology (with special appeal to students in applied and professional training programs) or in courses on social clinical or social counseling psychology. As knowing and study aids, we have provided a comphrehensive summary and a glossary of the most important terms at the end of each chapter.
We want to acknowledge the input of our students. They heard our lectures and read our drafts. Their feedback has influenced our selection of material and our style of presentation. In particular, graduate students in Nova Southeastern University's School of Psychology taking Social Cognitive Bases of Behavior during 1995 and 1996 read the entire manuscript then available and provided feedback. Thanks to their efforts, this book is more readable than it might have been.
Our colleagues who have read parts of our manuscript have also provided helpful feedback. These include C. Daniel Batson, Roy Baumeister, Rue Cromwell, Scott Fehr, John Lewis, Jack Martin, Mark Middlebrooks, Melissa Pigott, Annette Stanton, Julie Verette, and Beatrice A. Wright. We benefited from their suggestions, but we bear full responsibility for the final text.
DFB, JEM, and CRS acknowledge Nova Southeastern University, George Mason University, and the University of Kansas, respectively, for granting sabbaticals to facilitate the writing of this book. DFB acknowledges the efforts of Nova Southeastern's Einstein Library. The historical research included in this book would not be possible at a 30-year-old university without able library support. DFB also acknowledges Jon Barone for his contribution of the figures in Parts I and II; Michael Di Gregorio, Daphine Franklin, and his other student assistants for their library work and manuscript preparation; and Claire Komar for her most competent and friendly assistance in every aspect of his office work.
Finally, we want to acknowledge Eliot Werner, our congenial editor at Plenum Press, for believing in this project and providing us with the support to go forward with it, and Michele Fetterolf, our supervising editor, for shepherding an improved manuscript to publication.
CONTENTS
Part I. Historical Foundations
Chapter 1
The Conception of a Pragmatic Social Cognitive Psychology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Linking Science to Practice ....................................... . . . . 3 Early Social Cognitive Psychology: Dewey, Baldwin, and Mead. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 New Traditions Emerge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Chapter 2
The Social Gestalt and Social Learning Traditions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Extending Perceptual Gestalt Psychology to Social Living . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Learning: From Animal Lab to Home and Clinic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Chapter 3
The Constructivist Tradition 59
Kelly's Personal Constructs ........................................... 60 Constructing Symbolic Versions of Reality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Constructing Lives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Chapter 4
The Information-Processing Tradition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Artificial and Pragmatic Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 The Intelligent Interlocutor's Tool Kit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 Reflexivity, Metacognition, and Bounded Self-Understanding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Xl
CONTENTS
Part I. Historical Foundations
Chapter 1
The Conception of a Pragmatic Social Cognitive Psychology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Linking Science to Practice ....................................... . . . . 3 Early Social Cognitive Psychology: Dewey, Baldwin, and Mead. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 New Traditions Emerge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Chapter 2
The Social Gestalt and Social Learning Traditions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Extending Perceptual Gestalt Psychology to Social Living . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Learning: From Animal Lab to Home and Clinic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Chapter 3
The Constructivist Tradition 59
Kelly's Personal Constructs ........................................... 60 Constructing Symbolic Versions of Reality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Constructing Lives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Chapter 4
The Information-Processing Tradition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Artificial and Pragmatic Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 The Intelligent Interlocutor's Tool Kit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 Reflexivity, Metacognition, and Bounded Self-Understanding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Xl
XII CONTENTS
Part II. Knowing Others
Chapter 5
Evolving Models of the Social Knower. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
The Naive Scientist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 The Cognitive Miser. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 The Motivated Tactician ............................................. 139
Chapter 6
Multiple Knowing Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
Automatic and Controlled Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 Adding Noncognitive to Cognitive Knowing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Chapter 7
Stereotyping and Prejudice. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Applying the New Model ............................................ 189 Automatic Caricatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 Overcoming Stereotypes: Toward Individual Portraits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
Part III. Self Processes
Chapter 8
Negotiating Realities to Know Oneself. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Self Theory as an Inherently Social Transaction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217 The Good-and-in-Control Prototype . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 The Negative Self Theory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 The Interaction of Self Theory and Self-Knowledge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242 "Knowing" Oneself as a Social Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
Chapter 9
Goals in Personality, Emotion, and Subjective Well-Being. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
Goals and Self-Regulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 Types of Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
XII CONTENTS
Part II. Knowing Others
Chapter 5
Evolving Models of the Social Knower. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
The Naive Scientist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 The Cognitive Miser. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 The Motivated Tactician ............................................. 139
Chapter 6
Multiple Knowing Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
Automatic and Controlled Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 Adding Noncognitive to Cognitive Knowing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Chapter 7
Stereotyping and Prejudice. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Applying the New Model ............................................ 189 Automatic Caricatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 Overcoming Stereotypes: Toward Individual Portraits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
Part III. Self Processes
Chapter 8
Negotiating Realities to Know Oneself. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Self Theory as an Inherently Social Transaction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217 The Good-and-in-Control Prototype . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 The Negative Self Theory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 The Interaction of Self Theory and Self-Knowledge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242 "Knowing" Oneself as a Social Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
Chapter 9
Goals in Personality, Emotion, and Subjective Well-Being. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
Goals and Self-Regulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 Types of Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
CONTENTS XlIl
Goals as Cognitive Motivators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252 Goals and Personality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258 Goals and Emotion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 Goals and Subjective Well-Being. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
Chapter 10
Self-Regulation: The Pursuit of Goals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
Components of Self-Regulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278 Control Theory: The Mechanistic Side of Human Self-Regulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . 279 Goal Theory and Self-Efficacy Theory: The Human Side of Self-Regulation. . . . . . 288 New Developments in Self-Regulation .................................. 296
Part IV. Interpersonal Processes
Chapter 11
Communication-Based Social judgments and Relationship-Based Self Schemas. . . . . . . . . . . . 307
Communication and Conversations ..................................... 308 Working Models of Self with Others. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
Chapter 12
Close Relationships 339
Psychology's Long Courtship with Love. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339 Relational Constructs and Methodologies ........................ . . . . . . . . 341 Relationship-Forming Processes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345 Romantic Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349 Relationship-Maintaining Processes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355 Becoming Relational Experts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365
Part V. The Clinical Context
Chapter 13
Social Clinical Psychology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
A History of Social Clinical Psychology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374 Social Clinical Psychology Today. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382
CONTENTS XlIl
Goals as Cognitive Motivators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252 Goals and Personality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258 Goals and Emotion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 Goals and Subjective Well-Being. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
Chapter 10
Self-Regulation: The Pursuit of Goals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
Components of Self-Regulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278 Control Theory: The Mechanistic Side of Human Self-Regulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . 279 Goal Theory and Self-Efficacy Theory: The Human Side of Self-Regulation. . . . . . 288 New Developments in Self-Regulation .................................. 296
Part IV. Interpersonal Processes
Chapter 11
Communication-Based Social judgments and Relationship-Based Self Schemas. . . . . . . . . . . . 307
Communication and Conversations ..................................... 308 Working Models of Self with Others. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
Chapter 12
Close Relationships 339
Psychology's Long Courtship with Love. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339 Relational Constructs and Methodologies ........................ . . . . . . . . 341 Relationship-Forming Processes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345 Romantic Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349 Relationship-Maintaining Processes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355 Becoming Relational Experts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365
Part V. The Clinical Context
Chapter 13
Social Clinical Psychology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
A History of Social Clinical Psychology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374 Social Clinical Psychology Today. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382
XIV CONTENTS
Chapter 14
The Social Cognitive Construction of Difference and Disorder. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
Clinical Myths and Sequelae. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399 Defining Normality and Abnormality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 401 Categorical Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 408 Errors and Biases in Clinical Judgment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 491
XIV CONTENTS
Chapter 14
The Social Cognitive Construction of Difference and Disorder. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
Clinical Myths and Sequelae. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399 Defining Normality and Abnormality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 401 Categorical Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 408 Errors and Biases in Clinical Judgment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 491